The Lincoln Institute has supported the authors’ work on property taxation in South Africa for several years, and in February 2002 the Institute published Property Taxes in South Africa: Challenges in the Post-Apartheid Era. Edited by Bell and Bowman, the book presents major portions of their own work, together with chapters by several of their colleagues in the U.S. and in South Africa. This article provides an overview of seminars on property tax issues conducted by Bell and Bowman in South Africa in March 2002.
The end of apartheid in South Africa nearly a decade ago presented new opportunities and challenges to every aspect of national life, including fiscal issues. The government faced the task of extending the property tax to previously untaxed areas and adapting it to provide services through a set of radically restructured local governments. The final reorganization of local government took effect in December 2000, and the new governments now must develop comprehensive property tax (rates) policies.
Several key pieces of apartheid-era legislation had established the spatial basis for racial separation:
These policies greatly complicated efforts to amalgamate former white and black local authorities (WLAs and BLAs), with important implications for property taxation. Specifically, for local governments, the legacy of apartheid includes:
Post-Apartheid Local Government Structure
The dismantling of apartheid began in the mid-1980s and was essentially complete by the early 1990s. At the end of 1993, the Local Government Transition Act (LGTA) was signed by then-President de Klerk and, symbolically, by Nelson Mandela, leader of the African National Congress (ANC). The LGTA provided for short-, medium- and long-term transformation of local governments to create nonracial self-government. It created two-tier local governments in metropolitan areas, with powers and responsibilities shared between a geographically larger unit and two or more smaller units within the same area. The Municipal Structures Act of 1998, providing for single-tier metropolitan government, was implemented after the local elections of December 2000 as part of a general and final redemarcation of local governments that reduced the number of authorities from approximately 845 to less than 300.
Amalgamation of municipalities brought new areas into the property tax base, including former BLAs, bantustans and their associated rural R293 towns, but the residents of these newly incorporated areas had never before paid property taxes. Thus, it was necessary to develop the information and administrative infrastructure needed to value properties, determine tax liabilities, distribute tax bills to those responsible, and collect the taxes due, all in an equitable manner. Moreover, the new tax system had to overcome the psychology of payment boycotts, sometimes characterized as a “culture of nonpayment,” an important resistance technique used against the apartheid government.
Combining formerly taxed areas with different valuation rates or systems into a single municipality produces inconsistencies within the property tax roll of the amalgamated area, multiplying inequities among property owners with different effective tax rates. Both those new to the tax and those who historically have paid property taxes often question whether their tax shares are equitable and how the resulting revenue is being spent. In some instances, tax boycotts have occurred in former WLAs.
National Property Tax Policy
Although property taxation remains a local tax in South Africa, the 1996 Constitution authorizes central government regulation of property taxation. A national Property Rates Bill, scheduled for adoption in 2002, will replace current provincial property tax laws. Each locality now must adopt an explicit and comprehensive property rates policy.
Our seminars took place in this context of national legislation, municipal consolidation and municipal property rates policies. We collaborated with local institutions of higher education: Port Elizabeth Technikon in Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and the University of North West in Mafikeng Local Municipality. Seminar participants included current and former elected city councilors, newly enfranchised and long-time non-elected officials, and students and faculty of the educational institutions.
Nelson Mandela Municipality is one of South Africa’s six metropolitan municipal governments, the only local government within its geographic area. Its population and business center is the former city of Port Elizabeth. Principal property tax concerns raised at the seminar included: (1) unifying the tax rolls of the various jurisdictions making up the metropolitan area, since their valuation dates range over a number of years; (2) bringing former black local authority (BLA) areas into the property tax base; (3) deciding on the appropriate way to deal with rural (agricultural) land, previously not taxed but now part of the municipal area; and (4) accomplishing these things in a manner that is sensitive to the special circumstances of those with very low incomes.
Mafikeng, the capital of the North West Province, lies within the Mmbatho District Municipality in the former Bophuthatswana homeland near the Botswana border. Some property tax concerns raised at the Mafikeng seminar were the same as in Nelson Mandela Municipality. In addition, Mafikeng is wrestling with incorporating tribal (traditional authority) areas and the black urban agglomerations (R293 towns) of the former bantustan. Tribal areas present two special problems: property ownership is communal, not private; and the traditional authority structure remains in place, even though these areas now are included within municipal borders, creating a dual authority structure that further complicates amalgamation.
Key Property Taxation Themes
Policy Framework
New national legislation requires each local government to produce a property rates policy to address such issues as whether to include all real properties in the tax base; whether to apply uniform or differential rates to the many categories of property included in the tax base; and what form of property relief should be given, and to whom. If the property tax is to be a viable local revenue source, local rates policies must be guided by the following principles:
These fundamental characteristics of a property tax system provide a framework for restructuring property taxes in South Africa, with tradeoffs made through an open and transparent political process at the local level.
Monitoring
The property tax base is fair market value. Because most properties do not sell in a market transaction each year, however, estimating market value is the task of trained assessment professionals. Differences in location, depreciation and other characteristics make valuation partly an art, not strictly a scientific or technical endeavor. Uniformity relative to market value may not always result, even though it is required and the assessors follow the procedures intended to achieve that result. Thus, a system for monitoring valuation outcomes is needed, which may include three dimensions of assessment quality:
Formal assessment/sales ratio studies have not been done in South Africa, but we calculated simple ratios for several cities. The results in Table 1 indicate that assessment uniformity generally needs to be improved, since coefficients of dispersion across the case study cities are typically high and the price-related differentials are generally substantially above one.
Targeting Tax Relief
Although property taxation is a tax on value, it is paid out of current income, and thus may place an unacceptable burden on property owners with low incomes. Property tax relief is any reduction in tax liability. Indirect relief results from changes that take pressure off the property tax: reduced expenditures or increased revenue from alternative sources. Alternatively, direct relief comes from a change in the calculation of property tax liability.
Direct relief was the focus of our studies and the seminar discussions. In South Africa direct residential property tax relief typically is a uniform percentage credit, termed a rebate, which generally is 20 percent or 25 percent of gross property tax liability. The rebate approach has two limitations. First, most of the tax relief goes to those with the most expensive properties. Second, low-income property owners are still required to pay most of their property tax liability, which still could be burdensome relative to income.
While an income-based circuit breaker is our preferred approach for targeting tax relief to those in need, it would be extremely difficult to administer in South Africa because income information is not readily available, in part because of the extensive informal economy. An alternative way to target property tax relief to those most in need is to exempt a fixed amount of the base from taxation.
Table 2 illustrates the effects of moving from a 25 percent rebate to a R20,000 exemption (US$1,740). Under the partial exemption alternative, the lowest valued properties, including those hardest to value at this time, are removed from paying taxes, and net taxes are reduced on all properties up to about R100,000 (US$8,700). The aggregate cost of property tax relief under this approach is substantially reduced because each property receives the same exemption. Durban and Johannesburg now are experimenting with the partial exemption approach to property tax relief.
Dealing with Previously Untaxed Areas
As a result of the local government restructuring in December 2000, South Africa now has local governments throughout country. Three types of areas previously outside the property tax now are to be brought into the tax: former BLAs and R293 townships, agricultural areas and tribal areas. In the former BLAs and R293 townships property is being transferred to private ownership and these areas must be surveyed by the national Surveyor General to establish individual property boundaries and identifications necessary to administer the property tax. Different localities are at different stages in this process.
Property taxes were levied on rural agricultural lands in the past, but these lands have not been in the property tax base since the late 1980s. Bringing them into the tax base now poses two problems. The first is developing the property record information necessary for tax administration. The second is the question of how taxes on such properties should relate to taxes levied in the urban portions of a municipality, as farmers often provide themselves and their workers with services typically associated with local government. One possibility is use-value assessment of agricultural land, an approach endorsed by a national commission that reviewed the taxation of rural lands. Alternatively, differential rates for different categories of property are allowed under current provincial property tax laws and the draft national Property Rates Bill. If there is to be differentiation in effective tax rates, imposing a lower rate on market value assessments provides greater transparency and understanding of the tax and should be part of the local government rates policy.
Bringing tribal areas into the tax base presents another set of issues. First, given communal land tenure systems existing in these traditional authority areas, how does one establish ownership, a necessary condition for the application of property tax based on the principle of private property? Second, because there is no land market per se, how are estimates of market value to be made? Finally, given the two competing governance structures that now exist in tribal areas, how does one make the payment of a property tax acceptable to residents who did not previously pay the tax? These issues are clearly the most intractable ones that must be addressed in the newest round of local government reform in South Africa.
Conclusion
The property tax has been an important part of local finance in South Africa for centuries and is likely to play an increasingly important role in the future, as newly amalgamated local governments wrestle with addressing the legacies of apartheid and the requirements of new national property tax legislation. There is no single right answer to many of the perplexing questions surrounding the design and implementation of a local property tax, but it will continue to evolve to meet changing circumstances and needs.
Michael E. Bell is president of MEB Associates, Inc., in McHenry, Maryland. John H. Bowman is professor of economics at Virginia Commonwealth University in Richmond.
References
Bell, Michael E. and John H. Bowman. 2002. Property Taxes in South Africa: Challenges in the Post-Apartheid Era. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
On July 18, 1997, the Congress of the Republic of Colombia passed an innovative new Law of Land Development with ambitious goals for permitting municipalities to recover socially created land values, known in Spanish as plusvalía. Specifically, Law 388 declares that the public has a right “to participate” in increases in land values created when land use regulations increase the potential for development. Three categories of public actions are covered:
(1) changing a designation of rural land (in which development is extremely limited) into land for urban or suburban development;
(2) modification of zoning or other land use regulations;
(3) modification of regulations that permit greater building density.
Briefly stated, the legislation provides that the square-meter value of the land shall be determined before any public action and then after the action. Any municipality, at the initiative of its mayor, may demand that it “participate” by being able to recapture 30 to 50 percent (as it chooses) of the increase in value. The value is determined by multiplying the two square-meter values by the area of the parcel concerned and subtracting the pre-action value from the post-action value. A maximum of 50 percent was established to ensure that developers would still be financially motivated.
With this legislation, Colombia has enacted into national policy the basic premise of Henry George’s writings: that the public has a moral right to recover socially created values, as manifested in this case by increases in land values released by the three categories of public decisions mentioned above. With the possible exception of Taiwan, few if any other countries have attempted to so directly incorporate Georgian principles into actual legislation at the national level.
Implementation Procedures
The current legislation is only the first step. Under Colombian practice, acts of Congress set general policies, but implementation depends on follow-up at the national executive level and at the municipal level. To make the critical before and after square meter evaluations as objective as possible, an independent organization known as the Agustín Codazzi Geographical Institute will carry out assessments according to guidelines established in the law for each of the three categories.
Fees (called participaciones in the law) must be paid when a landowner applies for permission to subdivide or to construct on the property, when the use of the property is changed, when the property is transferred, or when development rights (representing rights for additional construction) are acquired. These fees are to be recorded in the registry of titles to assure compliance, and land cannot be transferred in the registry until the fees are paid in one of various forms:
(1) by paying cash;
(2) by transferring to a public body a portion of the property that is of equivalent value;
(3) by exchanging urban land of equivalent value at other locations;
(4) by making the public body a partner in the execution of the project with an interest of equivalent value;
(5) by providing needed infrastructure or open space of equivalent value; or
(6) by giving back a portion of the development rights created by the public action that is equivalent in value.
It may be anticipated that most developers will prefer to partner with municipalities instead of paying cash. Indeed, the legislation provides an incentive to use method (6) since it carries a 10 percent discount on the fees, or methods (2) or (4), which have a 5 percent discount.
Municipalities must earmark the revenues produced from participation in socially created land values for specific purposes:
Potential Implications of the Law
This legislation touches on many land policy issues that have long been of concern to the Lincoln Institute. Martim Smolka, director of the Institute’s Latin America and Caribbean Program, and other Institute associates are holding seminars and training programs to share experiences in working out implementation procedures, possibly assist in pilot projects, and carefully monitor the Colombian experiment as it unfolds.
One such program was a three-day workshop cosponsored in March with the National University of Colombia and the Advanced School of Public Administration in Bogotá. The workshop consisted of both formal and informal commentaries from a broad range of interested parties from Colombia and other countries. Since Colombia has obviously taken a bold step and there are few precedents for guidance, the appropriate officials must be innovative as they proceed toward actual implementation. The workshop identified a number of potential issues that will have to be faced as further steps are taken.
Constitutional Issues: The new law is squarely based on Article 82 of the Colombian Constitution of 1991, itself a remarkably innovative document on many aspects of urban land reform. Article 82, in simplified terms, states that when public actions increase the development potential of land, the public has a right to participate in the increased value (plusvalía) produced by such actions, so that the costs of urban development will be defrayed and distributed equitably.
The legal/constitutional debate is twofold: 1) Can the municipalities act on the sole basis of the law, or should they wait until the national government issues “regulations” and remain subject to these regulations? and 2) Should the law be limited to establishing the common, general principles, since the 1991 Constitution attributes the responsibility of land taxation exclusively to municipalities?
Practical Effects of Municipal Discretion: The workshop also pointed out that the voluntary nature of the law may have negative and possibly unintended consequences. Since it is the mayor of each municipality who initiates the imposition of the “participation,” he or she may well come under considerable pressure, financial or otherwise. In rapidly developing areas, a 30 to 50 percent share of increasing property values might be a very large sum. One speaker, for example, asserted that in Cali 60 percent of the increases in land values caused by planning decisions would be equal to the entire municipal budget. On the other hand, the law may facilitate mutually useful negotiations and partnerships between municipalities and developers that do not occur now.
Maintaining a Political Constituency: The political environment that made this bold legislation possible included scandalous cases of overnight fortunes being made from a zoning change in Bogotá and a decision to expand the urban perimeter in Cali. In the latter case, land prices were said to have multiplied by more than one thousand times!
Beyond initial implementation there is the long-range question of maintaining a political constituency for the effective implementation of such a law in the face of powerful and well-financed resistance by landowners and developers. On the other hand, the ability of any national government to have passed such a law in the first place is an achievement of exceptional interest to those concerned about “value recapture” as an essential element in urban land policy.
Maintaining Objectivity in Assessments: In spite of very specific procedures in the law designed to make it as objective and transparent as possible, it will not be easy for the Codazzi Institute to make the required before and after assessments accurately under the time constraints defined in the statute. Moreover, the various transfer alternatives to cash payment of the fees, which are sure to be popular, are dependent on a local determination as to what constitutes “equivalent value.” A number of speakers pointed out that this process might be an invitation to corruption.
Technical Issues: Speakers also pointed out a number of technical assessment problems with the guidelines as set forth in the law. For example, if restrictive zoning causes one owner to lose value, which in turn increases value for an adjoining owner, what provision can be made for compensating the former while recovering the increased value from the latter? Moreover, since the market anticipates public action, will the “before” assessment already reflect increased values arising from the probability of the action? Or, if land use or building regulations increase values of low-income, small property owners, they may not have the cash to pay for development fees, nor would the other forms of payment be feasible at a very small scale. Forced sales or displacement of the poor could result. These matters raise the policy calculation: Is it better to stride ahead and work things out over time or attempt legislative correction of technical problems before proceeding further?
Economic Effects: Although legally described as public participation in the increased values that public actions have created, the legislation may also be seen as a form of capital gains tax. How often will it be used? Will implementation tend to push down the price of the land affected, or will changes in value be passed on to the ultimate consumer? If it is the latter, the law could have a negative effect on affordable housing. For this reason Article 83(4) exempts land to be used for “housing of social interest,” as defined by the national government. Will this become a loophole for widespread evasion? There is little international experience to answer such questions.
Master Planning: Law 388 of 1997 also requires all municipalities to prepare master plans (Planes de Ordenamiento) and contains fairly detailed descriptions of them in Articles 9 through 35. Obviously, planning alters expectations of owners, and therefore of land values. The administrative and economic interaction of the city’s planning process and its recapture of increased land values will surely be a complex one.
Conflicts in Objectives: As is often the case with fiscal tools, the new changes seek several objectives that are not always compatible: financing better urban development; reducing land speculation; introducing increased equity and progessivity into taxation; and closing some of the favorite avenues for corruption of municipal officials.
Learning from Innovation
In spite of these concerns, Colombia continues its tradition as one of the world’s most innovative nations in urban land planning, law and finance. Bogota was the first major city in the world to create a special zoning district that recognized the realities of low-income housing practices. Stimulated by the ideas and influence of the late Lachlin Currie, an economic advisor to the national government for some 30 years, the city used special assessment districts (contribuciones de valorización) to carry out a major physical transformation during the 1960s. Colombia’s laws on territorial development of 1989 and 1991, to which this 1997 law is a modification and supplement, are among the most comprehensive approaches to land planning since the British Town and Country Planning Act of 1947. Furthermore, the Colombian constitution is virtually alone in specifically mentioning the moral claim of the public to increases in land values caused by public action.
As might be expected, some of these innovations eventually fell short of initial expectations. Indeed, some participants at the workshop argued that the energies going into the recovery of plusvalía might be more usefully spent on increasing the efficiency of conventional property taxes. On the other hand, the new law is addressing and resolving some problems of earlier legislation and policies, and the country is learning from its experience. The conclusion of the workshop participants was that the process has been worthwhile, and that the new law must be understood and evaluated in its relationship to previously established instruments of value capture and fiscal policy in general.
William A. Doebele is professor of urban planning and design, emeritus, at Harvard University Graduate School of Design and a faculty associate of the Lincoln Institute. This article was prepared with important contributions by Martim Smolka, senior fellow for Latin America Programs, Fernando Rojas, visiting fellow of the Institute, and Fernanda Furtado, faculty and research associate of the Institute.
See also Fernando Rojas and Martim Smolka, “New Colombian Law Implements Value Capture,” Land Lines, March 1998.
The collapse of communism in the early 1990s launched an era of political and economic reforms in Russia and throughout the former Soviet Union that introduced democracy and the free market economy to countries that previously had no experience with either of these concepts. In Russia privatization of land was one of the first items on the reform agenda, and by the end of 1992 the Russian Parliament had adopted the federal law On the Payment for Land. This law set normative land values differentiated by regions to be used for taxation, as well as a basis for land rent and purchase. At the time the country had no land market, so this was considered a very progressive measure. Lands that were previously held in public ownership were rapidly distributed to individuals, and by 1998 some 129 million hectares of land were privately held by some 43 million landowners. Introduction of private ownership rights in land also meant the introduction of the land tax, since owners or users of land plots became eligible to pay for their real property assets.
Economic reforms in Russia were accompanied by inflation that ran thousands of percent annually. To maintain revenue yields, local and regional authorities adjusted normative land values accordingly. As land market activity started to develop in the mid-1990s, some of these authorities used market price information to make land value adjustments. As a result land taxes became absolutely inconsistent with the economic situation, and tax amounts were not comparable for similar properties located in different jurisdictions.
By the late 1990s the land tax system had developed faults that required tax reform on a nationwide scale. The basic outline of the tax reform included the following features:
Reform of the land tax is seen as part of a wider property tax reform. The current property tax system in Russia includes a number of taxes: individual property tax; enterprise property tax; land tax; and real property tax. While the first three are operational, the fourth tax has been tested as an experiment since 1997 in two cities, Novgorod Veliky and Tver (Malme and Youngman 2001, Chapter 6). It is expected that when Russia is in a position to introduce the real property tax nationally, the first three taxes will be canceled.
In 1999 the Land Cadastre Service of Russia, a land administration authority of the federal government, was delegated the responsibility to develop mass valuation methods and to implement the country’s first mass valuation of all land. The government chose mass valuation, identifying the sales comparison, income and cost approaches as the basic valuation models that needed to be developed. Land is valued at its site value as if it were vacant.
Implementation of a mass valuation system has been constrained by the lack of reliable land market data, however. The housing market is the only developed market in Russia that can be characterized by a large number of sales transactions. These transactions are spread unevenly throughout the country, with large cities characterized by many transactions and high prices for apartments, whereas small towns and settlements have few examples of real estate sales. The national land market recorded some 5.5 million transactions annually, with only about 6 percent of them being actual buying and selling transactions. Official data from land registration authorities could not be used as a data source because transacting parties often conceal the true market price to avoid paying transfer taxes.
This lack of reliable market data has forced the developers of mass valuation models to identify other factors that may influence the land market. The model developed for valuation of urban land included some 90 layers of information that were geo-referenced to digital land cadastre maps of cities and towns. Apart from available market information, these data layers included features of physical infrastructure such as transport, public utilities, schools, stores and other structures. Environmental factors also are taken into consideration.
Mass valuation methods in Russia have identified 14 types of urban land use that can be assigned to each cadastral block. Thus, the model can set the tax base according to the current or highest and best land use. The actual tax base established for each land plot is calculated as the price of a square meter of land in a cadastral block multiplied by the area of the plot.
It took one year of development and model testing and two years of further work to complete the cadastral valuation of urban land throughout Russia. Actual valuation results suggest that the model works accurately with lands occupied by the housing sector. The correlation between actual market data and mass valuation results is between 0.6 and 0.7 on a scale of 0 to 1.0, with greater accuracy in areas where the land market is better developed.
Cadastral valuation of agricultural land is based on the income approach, since availability of agricultural land market information is extremely limited. Legislation allowing the sale of agricultural land became effective in early 2002. The data used to value agricultural land included information on soils and actual farm production figures over the last 30 years. Mass valuation of forested lands was also based on the income approach. Russian land law also identifies a special group of industrial lands located outside the city limits that includes industrial sites, roads, railroads, and energy and transport facilities. These lands proved to be a difficult subject for mass valuation because there are so many unique types of structures and objects on them; individual valuation is often applied to them instead.
Over the past four years, some 95 percent of Russia’s territory has been valued using mass valuation methodology. The Federal Land Cadastre Service continues to refine and improve its methods in preparation for the enactment of relevant legislation authorizing the introduction of a new value-based land tax. During this period, the Cadastre Service organized a Workshop on Mass Valuation Systems of Land (Real Estate) for Taxation Purposes, in Moscow in 2002, under the auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. It also assembled a delegation for the Lincoln Institute’s course Introducing a Market Value-Based Mass Appraisal System for Taxation of Real Property, in Vilnius in 2003 (see related article).
Alexey L. Overchuk is deputy chief of the Federal Land Cadastre Service of Russia and deputy chairman of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Working Party for Land Administration.
Reference
Malme, Jane H. and Joan M. Youngman. 2001. The Development of Property Taxation in Economies in Transition: Case Studies from Central and Eastern Europe. Washington, DC: The World Bank. Available at http://www1.worldbank.org/wbiep/decentralization/library9/malme_propertytax.pdf
Housing is an important component of both a household’s net worth and aggregate national wealth or stock of residential capital. Aggregate residential wealth is the sum of the values of all housing units. In Brazil, residential structures represent about one-third of total net fixed capital, so their value is important for economic and social policy. This analysis asks: What variables determine the stock values of residential property? How do location and neighborhood conditions affect these values? What is the aggregate residential wealth in the Rio de Janeiro Metropolitan Region (Metro Rio)? What is its distribution among household income and housing value groups? In other words, what generates residential wealth? How much residential wealth is there? Who holds it? Where is it located? (Vetter, Beltrão, and Massena 2013.)
Methodology for Estimating Residential Wealth
To address these questions, we first calibrated a hedonic residential rent model with sample microdata from the 2010 population census conducted by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE). The units of analysis are households living in private, permanent housing units in urban areas of Metro Rio. The total number of households in 2010 was 3.9 million, and our sample is 223,534 (5.7 percent). We used the 41,396 renters in the sample to calibrate our model and then estimated the rents for homeowners and the landlords of rent-free units. Finally, we transformed the actual and imputed rents into housing values by dividing them by the monthly discount rate of 0.75 percent (9.38 percent annual rate), as is standard practice for Brazilian residential wealth studies (Cruz and Morais 2000, Reiff and Barbosa 2005, and Tafner and Carvalho 2007).
The underlying assumption in these studies is that the hedonic prices of the characteristics in the model and the discount rate are similar for rental and nonrental units. These are strong but necessary assumptions for the application of the methodology with the existing census microdata. The sum of estimated housing values is our measure of residential wealth. The objective is to estimate the aggregate value of all housing units and their average values.
In calculating average housing prices for these groups, we do not control for housing size or other characteristics, as would be done for hedonic housing price indices. Using census microdata, we can also estimate the residential wealth by household income as well as for smaller spatial units within municipalities, such as neighborhoods or districts. Even though the sample of rental units is relatively large, sample size drops rapidly as rents and household incomes rise, and the variances are particularly high for the open group at the top end of the distribution. Because we do not have data on the value of mortgages, our measure is of gross rather than net residential wealth.
Using rents from the census or a household survey compares favorably with other commonly used methods for estimating residential wealth for the Brazilian national accounts and related studies (Garner 2004), such as asking homeowners to estimate the selling price or monthly rent of their homes, using the asking prices for home sales, or using the prices registered when recording the sale. Whereas renters know their monthly rent payment, the informants may have little understanding of current trends in housing prices, and the original asking price is often higher than the final sale price. In Rio de Janeiro, the municipal government uses its own estimates of the sale prices based on asking prices, rather than the value registered in calculating the real estate transfer tax, because buyers and sellers often register lower prices.
In our hedonic residential rent model, the dependent variable is a vector of residential rents, and the independent variables are matrices of the structural characteristics of the housing unit, access to employment, and neighborhood characteristics, including indicators of access to urban infrastructure and services. The variables used are for the household per se and also for the census area in which it is located. Figure 1 shows Metro Rio’s 336 census areas and the larger municipal boundaries grouped into six subregions based on indicators analyzed in this and previous studies (Lago 2010).
The indicator for access to employment measures the average commute time to work for residents in each of the census areas. Figure 2 (p. 16) shows that the average commute time increases with distance from the center, but not by as much as one might expect—partly due to increased traffic congestion in all areas and to the fact that Metro Rio is polycentric with many subordinate centers.
The indicators of the quality of neighborhood infrastructure and services include the household`s access to the public sewer and water systems, garbage collection, and block conditions (e.g., street paving and drainage). As these indicators are highly intercorrelated, the component scores from a principal components analysis serve as the independent variables in the hedonic model. Component 1 explains 46.6 percent of the variance and shows high positive loadings on adequate block conditions and infrastructure, and high negative loadings on inadequate block conditions (e.g., garbage in the street and open sewers), indicating which areas have a higher level of attractiveness or desirability (figure 3). Although the lowest scores are clearly concentrated in the outlying areas, the patterns of attractiveness vary considerably. As with commute times, the distribution pattern of the attractiveness scores reveals the complexity of Metro Rio’s spatial structure.
Our hedonic model explains 73 percent of the variance of residential rent. The key independent variables are statistically significant; neighborhood quality and access to employment explain nearly two-thirds of the variance, while the structural characteristics of the housing explain only about one-third of the variance. In other words, the bulk of housing value is the capitalized value of access to employment and to neighborhood infrastructure and services, all of which are determined in large part by public expenditures. Figure 4 (p. 18) shows the distribution of average estimated housing values for census areas in US$ determined by our methodology. (The average exchange rate for 2010 is US$1=R$1.76.) These values tend to be highest in areas affording relatively low commute times and good access to urban infrastructure and services.
Distribution of Residential Wealth
How much residential wealth is the property of homeowners versus the landlords of rental properties and rent-free units used by employers, family members, or others? Our estimate of Metro Rio’s aggregate residential wealth of both occupied and unoccupied units in 2010 is US$155.1 billion (94.2 percent of Metro Rio’s 2010 GDP of US$164.4 billion) and US$140.2 billion for occupied units only (84.2 percent of Metro Rio’s GDP). Among total occupied units, 74.8 percent of this residential wealth (about US$105 billion) belongs to owner-occupied units, and the rest belongs to landlords of rented and rent-free units. In the case of lower-income households, the landlords could be another lower-income family.
Table 1 shows that the percent of homeowners is quite similar for all household income groups. For example, homeowners occupy nearly three-quarters of the households in the lowest household income group (with fewer than two minimum salaries or an average annual income of only US$4,407). A key reason for these high homeownership levels is that those living in favelas, squatter settlements, or other types of informal housing can declare themselves homeowners, even if they do not legally own the land on which their home is located. The 2010 Census showed more than 520,000 households (more than 15 percent of the total private permanent urban households) living in these types of settlements in Metro Rio. Land ownership in these settlements is a complex legal question on which even lawyers may not agree, since the chances of removal (at least removal without compensation) are quite low, and those living on land without a legal title may be eligible for squatter’s rights after five years under Brazilian law.
Although 25.3 percent of total households earned less than two minimum salaries (US$ 6,960 per year), the homeowners in this group held only 15.3 percent of the aggregate residential wealth of all homeowners. By contrast, only 15.6 percent of households earned 10 or more minimum salaries (US$34,800 per year), but homeowners in this income group held 34.5 percent of the aggregate residential wealth. Nonetheless, lower income households have more residential wealth than one might expect, in part because they are often homeowners in informal settlements.
Figure 5 (p. 19) shows the Lorenz Curve for the distribution of aggregate residential wealth of homeowners by housing value groups. This distribution is quite unequal, because the nearly 23.7 percent who are not homeowners have no such wealth (as shown where the Lorenz curve runs along the bottom of the axis) and because those living in higher-priced housing have greater residential wealth.
Distribution of Residential Wealth by Subregions
The bulk of aggregate residential wealth is held by those living in the suburbs and periphery around Metro Rio, although the average value of their housing units is lower. Table 2 shows that those subregions (4 and 6) together represent 79 percent of Metro Rio’s total households (3.1 million) and 58.1 percent of aggregate residential wealth (US$80.9 billion). Subregion 2 (the older, higher-income neighborhoods along the bay and coast) holds only 6.3 percent of Metro Rio’s households (about 242,000) and 19.0 percent of its residential wealth.
The percentage of renters is highest in the large squatter settlements (subregion 5), at 28.6 percent, with an additional 2.7 percent of rent-free units. Homeownership rates are highest (80.4 percent) in the periphery (subregion 6), where many owners live on land for which they do not have full legal title, though these areas generally are not squatter settlements as defined by IBGE.
Spatial Distribution of Household Income
One result of the interplay of market forces that shape residential rent and housing prices is that the distribution of aggregate household income tends to mirror the distribution of aggregate residential wealth. In other words, there is a relatively high residential segregation by income groups, with lower-income families concentrated in the large squatter settlements and in the suburbs and periphery (subregions 4, 5, and 6). High spatial concentration of higher-income households generates higher aggregate income and demand in areas that support higher-level services—in turn making these areas more attractive to higher-income homebuyers and renters. Figure 6 (p. 20) shows that the average annual household incomes for the census areas in 2010 reflect to a large extent the distribution of average housing values (figure 4), commute times (figure 2), and neighborhood attractiveness (figure 3).
In 2010, the high-income Barra da Tijuca area (subregion 3) held only 2.1 percent of total households in Metro Rio but 8.1 percent of aggregate household income and 7.6 percent of aggregate residential wealth. By comparison, the four large squatter settlements of subregion 5 held 2.5 percent of total households but only 1.0 percent of aggregate household income and 1.4 percent of residential wealth. Nonetheless, the aggregate residential value in these four squatter settlements was nearly US$2 billion, and the average housing value was almost US$21,000. These results show a relatively high spatial concentration of both aggregate household income and residential wealth that is tempered slightly by the home-ownership rate in squatter settlements.
Implications for Methodology and Policy Decisions
The methodology used in this analysis provides interesting insights into the macroeconomic and social importance of residential wealth; the variables that generate it; its distribution among household tenure, income, and housing value groups; and its allocation among subregions ranging from high-income neighborhoods to squatter settlements. The strong assumptions required in using the methodology must be taken into account when interpreting the results. Data from property registries or other sources with more detailed information on unit size could eventually be used to complement this methodology.
Government services, investments, and regulatory actions can result in benefits (e.g., access to employment, urban services, and amenities) and costs (e.g., taxes, fees, and negative environmental impacts) that are capitalized into the value of housing in the affected neighborhoods. For homeowners, positive net benefits from government actions increase their residential wealth, because they are capitalized in the value of their housing. However, for renters and new homebuyers, these same government actions can cause rents and housing prices to rise along with the net benefits. Some households, especially the lower-income renters and homebuyers, may have to leave the benefited area, and other potential new owners may be unable to locate in the area. Thus, housing tenure is important in determining whether or not a household receives the net benefits of government investments and regulatory actions.
Capitalization of the net benefits of government actions would clearly be an issue for the more than 30 percent of households in the four large squatter settlements that are not homeowners, as well as for those entering the housing market. Although there are no reliable data on housing turnover, we know that the total number of urban households in Metro Rio increased more than 20 percent, by almost 657,000, between 2000 and 2010. This increment was 14 percent higher than the total number of households in the Municipality of Curitiba (the state capital of Paraná) in 2010 and well over twice the number in Washington, D.C. All these new households, plus all the renters (about one-fifth of total households) and homeowners wishing to move, would be subject to increased rents and housing prices generated by the net benefits of government actions.
These results demonstrate a need for policies to ensure that rising rents and housing prices do not exclude some households from areas where public services and infrastructure are being improved. For example, financial assistance for home purchases could be part of the improvement program. One way of financing the needed lower-income housing and investment programs would be to capture part of the value being generated by infrastructure investments from higher-income households. Capturing part of the value generated by urban investments could help finance additional housing subsidies for lower-income families, as well as added investment, thereby providing a kind of investment multiplier.
About the Authors
David M. Vetter (Ph.D. University of California) has worked for more than four decades on urban finance and economics issues in Latin America for Brazilian entities, at the World Bank and Dexia Credit Local, and also as a consultant.
Kaizô I. Beltrão (Ph.D. Princeton University) was the dean and a senior researcher at the National Statistics School (an entity of IBGE) and is now a full professor and senior researcher at the Fundação Getúlio Vargas.
Rosa M. R. Massena (Doctorate, Université de Bordeaux) was a senior researcher at the IBGE for 23 years and since then has worked as a consultant on social indicators programs for Habitat, the World Bank, UNDP, and other entities.
Resources
Cruz, Bruno. O. and Maria P. Morais. 2000. Demand for Housing and Urban Services in Brazil: A Hedonic Approach. Paper presented at the European Network for Housing Research Conference, Gavle, Sweden (June).
Garner, Thesia I. 2004. Incorporating the Value of Owner-Occupied Housing in Poverty Measurement. Prepared for the Workshop on Experimental Poverty Measures, Committee on National Statistics. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies.
Lago, Luciana C. 2010. Olhares Sobre a Metrópole do Rio de Janeiro: Economia, Sociedade e Território. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Observatório das Metrópoles, FASE, IPPUR/UFRJ.
Reiff, Luis. O. and Ana L. Barbosa. 2005. Housing Stock in Brazil: Estimation Based on a Hedonic Price Model. Paper No. 21. Basel, Switzerland: Bank for International Settlements.
Tafner, Paulo and Marcia Carvalho. 2007. Evolução da Distribuição Familiar da Riqueza Imobiliária no Brasil: 1995–2004. Revista de Economia 33(2) (Julho-Dezembro): 7–40.
Vetter, David M., Kaizô I. Beltrão, and Rosa R. Massena. 2013. The Determinants of Residential Wealth and Its Distribution in Space and Among Household Income Groups in the Rio de Janeiro Metropolitan Region: A Hedonic Analysis of the 2010 Census Data. Working Paper. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
It is with great sadness that we announce that Arlo Woolery passed away on February 28, 2002, at his home in Sun City West, Arizona.
Arlo brought zest, courtesy and unfailing curiosity to all of his endeavors over 82 years. Even before graduation from Luther College in Decorah, Iowa, in 1943, he turned his gift for public speaking to early success as a radio broadcaster. He provided play-by-play radio descriptions of baseball games, complete with sound effects for hits and cheering crowds, guided only by wire service score reports. Later he held several executive positions in radio and television, dealing both with broadcasting, equipment manufacturing and the first development of cable television networks.
He became an expert on public utility regulation and valuation, earning the Certified Assessment Evaluator (CAE) designation from the International Association of Assessing Officers and serving as chairman of its education committee. He was an expert witness in numerous utility valuation cases and taught in the annual Wichita State University program on railroad and utility valuation for many years. The Supreme Court of Utah reflected the respect with which he was regarded when it described him as a “well-educated, long experienced and highly qualified appraiser.” From 1967 to 1976 he served as director of the Property Tax Program for the state of Arizona, dealing with issues of valuation and tax administration and taking the lead in the development of computer-assisted mass appraisal.
Arlo was the first executive director of the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, from 1974 to 1986, and upon retirement was named the Archibald M. Woodruff Fellow. He led the Institute’s move to Cambridge and its establishment as a center for education on land use and land-related tax issues. He organized and participated in numerous international symposiums on property taxation, land policy and computer-assisted valuation. He assisted in the development of the International Center for Land Policy Studies and Training (formerly the Land Reform Training Institute) in Taiwan and served on its Board of Directors from 1975 to 2000. He also wrote and edited many books, including The Art of Valuation (1978); Introduction to Computer Assisted Valuation (1985); Property Tax Principles and Practice (1989); and Valuation of Railroad and Utility Property (1992).
“Arlo’s legacy to the Lincoln Institute is its solid academic underpinnings,” notes Kathryn J. Lincoln, Chairman of the Board. “Even after his official retirement, Arlo remained involved with the Lincoln Foundation, and his continuing leadership and teaching at the International Center for Land Policy Studies and Training were instrumental in the development of that Lincoln program. We shall miss his wisdom and guidance.”
The interactions between land and property markets and the broader economy of cities and nations are central to the Lincoln Institute’s concerns. Two key objectives of our work in this area are (1) to raise awareness about the stakes of good land policy for creating well-functioning land and property markets and for improving the performance of financial markets, labor markets, the fiscal affairs of local and national governments, and ultimately the economic health of both cities and countries; and (2) to indicate the need for high quality data and an appropriate analytical framework to aid in understanding the importance of good land policy, monitoring the effects of land policies throughout the economy and facilitating policy reforms. In November 1997, the Lincoln Institute held a conference on the theme of “Land Prices, Information Systems, and the Market for Land Information” to explore these issues.
Land Values and Land Policy
How important are the stakes of good land policy? Hee-Nam Jung of the Korean Research Institute for Human Settlements reported on the importance of land markets in the economies of five countries (see Table 1). The value of land in mature economies such as Canada, France and the United States ranged from about one-third to three-quarters of GNP during the mid-1980s, and represented from 8 to 21 percent of estimated national wealth. In the more rapidly growing economies of Japan and Korea, land values were from three to six times as high as GNP in the 1980s, and represented half or more of estimated national wealth. In the mature economies these figures illustrate the importance of land as a source of wealth, but in rapidly growing economies land has an even more significant role in determining economic welfare and a host of incentives for the performance of the economy.
In Japan, for example, booming land and property values during the 1980s served as collateral to fund credit expansion throughout the economy and, indeed, throughout the world. Land prices in Japan’s six largest cities increased dramatically from 1980 to 1991, at a compound rate of about 12 percent annually (see Figure 1). By 1990, the estimated price of land being developed for residential purposes in Tokyo was estimated to be about $3,000 per square meter, compared to figures of roughly $110 in Toronto and Paris and $70 in Washington, D.C.
Between 1991 and 1996, however, Japanese land prices fell by nearly half, taking down the Japanese economy and a host of financial institutions in its wake. The cumulative losses of the Japanese banking system associated with the collapse of the property market and associated businesses are estimated around $1 trillion, making the U.S. Savings and Loan “crisis” seem comparatively insignificant. Analysis of Japanese land policy suggests some of the causes of the boom and bust cycle in land prices: policies that have severely restricted conversion of agricultural land to urban uses; an especially complex land development system that requires exceptionally long times for approvals; and a fiscal system that places little emphasis on the taxation of land and property values.
Land prices in Korea also rose at a tremendous rate during the 1980s-over 16 percent annually from 1981 to 1991. Remarkably, in most years nominal capital gains on Korean land were greater than Korea’s GNP. Jung explained that these gains had profound implications for the distribution of wealth and income in Korea, and for economic incentives. Not surprisingly, the recent collapse of Korean property markets has had tidal effects throughout the economy. As in the case of Japan, the Korean land policy framework has been seen as highly questionable. Government intervention in land and property markets over the years has been responsible for severely distorted markets that represent a major structural imbalance in the Korean economy.
Using Land Market Data for Policy Analysis
Other speakers at the conference presented information on the importance of land market performance for a variety of stakeholders throughout the economy: consumers and taxpayers; land developers and builders of residential and non-residential properties; banks and financial institutions; and both local and central governments. In the case of Cracow, Poland, Alain Bertaud from the World Bank indicated that policies embodied in master plans and zoning regulations were highly inconsistent with the nominal objectives of the regulations, and would lead to inefficient and costly spatial patterns within the city. His paper illustrated the value of having good data on land prices, regulations and the spatial distribution of the population in order to evaluate the effects of policies involving land use, infrastructure and property taxation.
Paul Cheshire from Oberlin College and Stephen Sheppard from the London School of Economics illustrated how data on land and housing prices, land and housing characteristics, and regulations can be used to evaluate the effects of government policies such as the preservation of urban open space. Jean-Paul Blandinieres of the French Ministry of Equipment, Transportation and Housing discussed an ambitious program of the French government to establish “Urban Observatories” to collect and analyze information on land and property markets and the effects of government policies.
Data Collection on Land and Property Markets
Recognition of the costs of land policy failures or, conversely, of the benefits associated with implementing good policies, has given rise to a number of systematic efforts to collect and analyze high quality data on land and property markets within various institutional settings. Pablo Trivelli discussed land and property information systems in Latin America that serve the needs of public and private stakeholders. Perhaps the most impressive of these is an effort in Brazil called EMBRAESP, which monitors key indicators of urban property market performance along with urban legislation, land regulations and major public works projects that might have an impact on the behavior of property markets. Data and analyses from EMBRAESP are of interest to many institutions throughout Brazil. The distribution of the information is self-sustaining through contracts with major newspaper chains, sales of periodic bulletins, disks containing standard data, and special reports responding to individual demands. Much of this information can also be accessed through the Internet.
Another major data collection and analysis effort was reported by David Dowall from the University of California-Berkeley. He developed the “Land Market Assessment,” a tool for analysis of land and housing markets that has been applied in over 30 developing countries and transitional economies. At comparatively modest cost, data are collected through aerial photos and satellite images, surveys of land brokers, and secondary sources on population, infrastructure and regulatory frameworks. Dowall’s analysis of the experience with these assessments documents a number of generic policy findings, especially concerning the costs of inappropriate land policies. His work also suggests that even more cost-effective versions of the tool can be developed that will illustrate the workings of land markets and beneficial policy reforms.
Romeo Sherko, David Stanfield and Malcolm Childress from the Land Tenure Center at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, addressed the issue of designing a strategy for the creation and dissemination of land information in transitional economies, where information has historically been tightly held, thus frustrating both the evolution of property markets and opportunities for policy analysis. Their conclusions regarding the role of the public and private sectors, the scope of data collection, and pricing and dissemination strategies help to explain why land market information is often not provided or is poorly provided by either the government or the private sector. On the other hand, their analysis suggests that the benefits of good land market information are considerable. Some of these benefits were illustrated by David Dale-Johnson from the University of Southern California and Jan Brzeski from Jagellonian University, Cracow, who discussed efforts to document rapidly evolving market prices of property in Cracow and to inform property tax reform efforts.
Samu Kurri, Seppo Laakso, and Heikki Loikkanen of the Finnish Government Institute of Economic Research discussed the land price information system in Finland, suggesting that it is only now beginning to catch up with the needs of many different potential users of the data. These users include those concerned with implementation of a new property tax and macro-economic and financial sector policymakers concerned with the interaction of the Finnish property market and national economic performance. Karl (Chip) Case of Wellesley College presented findings from a preliminary analysis of 100 years of land prices in Boston, which was designed, among other things, to highlight some of the methodological difficulties of measuring land prices in a way that facilitates policy analysis and reform.
Stephen K. Mayo is a senior fellow of the Lincoln Institute.
Land value is determined primarily by external factors, mainly changes that occur in the neighborhood or other parts of the city rather than by direct actions of the landowner. This observation is especially valid for small lots whose form or type of occupancy do not generate sufficiently strong externalities to increase their own value retroactively; that is, a small lot generally does not have a significant impact on those very external factors that could affect its own value. However, large urban projects (grandes proyectos urbanos or GPUs) do influence those factors, and also the value of the land that supports them. Herein lies the essence the Lincoln Institute’s interest in such projects.
We propose two perspectives for analyzing GPUs that complement and contrast with others that formerly predominated in this debate. First, these projects can be a stimulating force for immediate urban change that is capable of affecting land values, and therefore land use, for large areas if not an entire city region. This view is focused more on urban design or urbanism and stresses the study of the physical, esthetic and symbolic dimensions of large urban projects. A second approach, covering the field of regulation, attempts to understand the land value appreciation generated by the implementation and operation of these projects as a potential means for self-support and economic feasibility. It analyzes the role of GPUs in providing a new function for certain areas of the city. Both perspectives require a more holistic understanding that includes the diversity and levels of complexity of the projects, their relation to the city plan, the type of regulatory framework they require, the role of the public and private sectors in managing and financing them, land taxation and fiscal policies, and other factors.
These large projects are not new to Latin America. In the early twentieth century, many cities were impacted by programs that used public-private management arrangements, including outside players (national and international) and complex financial structures. Some projects had the potential to trigger urban processes capable of transforming their surroundings or even the city as a whole, as well as accentuating the preexisting socio-spatial polarization. Often the projects were layered over existing regulations, contributing to questions about the urban planning strategies in force at the time. Large urban developers and utility companies (English, Canadian, French and others) coordinated the provision of services with complex real estate development operations in almost all the major cities of Latin America.
Today large projects attempt to intervene in especially sensitive places to reorient urban processes and create new urban identities on a symbolic level. They also aim to create new economic areas (sometimes territorial enclaves) able to foster an environment protected from urban poverty and violence, and more favorable to domestic or international private investment. When describing the motives that justify these programs, the rhetoric focuses on their instrumental role in strategic planning, their alleged contribution to urban productivity, and their effectiveness in boosting their intercity competitive position.
In a context marked by transformations due to globalization, economic reforms, deregulation and the introduction of a new focus on urban management, it is not surprising that these programs have been the subject of much controversy. Their scale and complexity often spur new social movements; redefine economic opportunities; put into question urban development regulatory frameworks and land use rules; strain local finances; and expand political arenas, thus altering the roles of urban stakeholders. An additional complication is the long time frame for executing large urban projects, which usually exceeds the terms of municipal governments and the limits of their territorial authority. This reality presents additional management challenges and formidable dilemmas within the public and academic debate.
The Lincoln Institute’s contribution to this debate is to underscore the land component in the structure of these large projects, specifically the processes associated with urban land management and the mechanisms for land value capture or the mobilization of land value increments for the benefit of the community. This article is part of a broader, ongoing effort to systematize recent Latin American experience with GPUs and to discuss the relevant aspects.
A Wide Range of Projects
As in other parts of the world, large urban projects in Latin America comprise a wide range of activities: restoration of historic downtown areas (Old Havana or Lima); renovation of neglected downtown areas (São Paulo or Montevideo); redevelopment of ports and waterfronts (Puerto Madero in Buenos Aires or Ribera Norte in Concepción, Chile); reuse of old airports or industrial zones (the Tamanduatehy artery in Santo Andre, Brazil, or the Cerrillos airport in Santiago, Chile); expansion zones (Santa Fé, Mexico, or the former Panama Canal zone); residential or neighborhood improvement projects (Nuevo Usme in Bogotá or Favela Bairro in Rio de Janeiro); and so on.
Land management is a key component in all of these projects, and it presents diverse sets of conditions (Lungo 2004; forthcoming). One common trait is that the projects are managed by a government authority as part of a city project or plan, even though they enjoy private participation in several respects. Thus exclusively private programs, such as shopping centers and gated communities, are a different category of development project not included in this discussion.
Scale and Complexity
The minimum threshold of scale, in terms of surface area or amount of financial investment, for a project to meet the GPU criteria depends on the size of the city, its economy, social structure and other factors, all of which help define the complexity of the project. In Latin America projects often combine large scale and a complex set of players associated with key roles in land policy and management, including various levels of government (national, provincial and municipal), private entities and community leaders from the affected area. Even relatively small upgrading projects are often formidably complex with regard to the land readjustment component.
There is obviously a huge difference between a project proposed by one or a few owners over a large area (such as ParLatino, an abandoned industrial site in São Paulo) and a project involving the cooperation of many owners of small areas. The latter requires a complex series of actions capable of generating synergies or sufficient external economies to make each action economically viable. Most projects fall between the two extremes. They often involve the prior acquisition of rights over smaller parcels by a few agents in order to centralize control over the type and management of the development.
The key to analysis and design of GPUs in Latin America lies in the ability of the institutional organization in charge of project management to incorporate and coordinate scale and complexity appropriately. Governmental corporations have been created in some cases, but they operate autonomously (as in Puerto Madero) or as special public agencies attached to the central or municipal governments (as in the housing program being developed in the city of Rosario, Argentina, or the Nuevo Usme program in Bogotá). The case of the failed project to build the new Mexico City airport demonstrates the negative consequences of not correctly defining this fundamental aspect of GPUs.
Relationship of GPUs to the City Plan
What is the point of developing GPUs when the city has no comprehensive urban development plan or socially shared vision? It is possible to find situations where execution of GPUs may stimulate, enhance or strengthen the city plan, but in practice many such projects are established without any plan. One of the main criticisms aimed at GPUs is that they become instruments for excluding citizen participation in decision making about individual elements of what is expected or supposed to be part of an integrated urban project, as is normally provided for in a city’s master plan or land use plan.
This is an interesting debate within the framework of urban policies in Latin America, since urban planning itself has been criticized as being elitist and exclusionary. Some authors have concluded that urban planning has been one if not the main cause of the excesses of social segregation typical of cities in the region. In this context the recent popularity of GPUs can be seen as a reaction of the elite to redemocratization and participatory urban planning. Others may view GPUs as an advanced (and perverse) form of traditional urban planning; a yielding to the failures or ineffectiveness of urban planning; or even a lesser evil because at least they ensure that something is done in some part of the city.
There are many challenges for GPUs regarding their relationship to a city plan. They can help build a city plan where none exists, alter traditional plans, or do what we might call “navigating through the urban fog” if the former paths are not viable. In any case, land management proves to be a critical factor, both for the plan and for the projects, because it refers to the fundamental role of the regulatory framework covering urban land use and expansion.
Regulatory Framework
The preferred regulatory solution would be a two-part intervention: on one hand, maintaining general regulations for the whole city but changing the conventional criteria to be more flexible in absorbing the constant change taking place in urban environments; and on the other, allowing specific regulations for certain projects but avoiding regulatory frameworks that may contradict the stated goals of the city plan. Urban Operations, a specific and ingenious instrument devised under the Brazilian urban development legislation (Statute of the City Act of 2001), has been used widely to accommodate these dual needs. The city of São Paulo alone has 16 such operations in effect. Another version of this instrument is the so-called “partial planning” provision to readjust large tracts of land, which is included in Colombia’s equally innovative Law 388 of 1997.
Again in practice we see that exceptions are often granted in an apparently arbitrary manner, and regulatory restrictions are frequently ignored. The point is that neither type of regulation is submitted to any assessment of its socioeconomic and environmental value, thus losing a significant portion of its justification. Given the financial and fiscal fragility of cities in Latin America, what prevails is an extremely low capacity for public discussion of the requests made by the proponents of GPUs. The absence of institutional mechanisms that would make these negotiations transparent makes them more venal, insofar as they expose the capacity to discuss other, less prosaic legal challenges.
Public or Private Management and Financing
What is the desirable combination of public and private management of these projects? To guarantee that public management of a large urban project fulfills its function, land use must be monitored and regulated, although the degree to which the control should be exercised, and on which specific components of land ownership rights, is unresolved. Ambiguity in the courts and the uncertainties associated with the development of GPUs often result in public frustration over unanticipated outcomes favoring private interests. The proper balance between effective ex ante (GPU formulation, negotiation and design) and ex post (GPU implementation, management, operation and impacts) controls over land uses and rights is at the heart of the problem. Typically in the Latin American experience with GPUs there is a huge gap between original promises and actual outcomes.
In recent years the management of GPUs has been confused with the utility and feasibility of public-private partnerships, such as those set up in many countries to carry out specific projects or programs. Some stakeholders even propose the possibility of privatizing urban development management in general. If the private sector has complete control over the land, however, GPUs are severely limited in their ability to contribute to socially sustainable urban development, despite the fact that in many cases the projects contribute significant taxes to the city (Polese and Stren 2000).
The preferred public management system should call on the greatest social participation possible and include the private sector in the financing and implementation of these projects. The large urban programs that seem to contribute the most to the development of a city are those based on public management of the land.
Land Value Appreciation
There is consensus around the fact that GPUs generate an appreciation in land value. Differences emerge when we try to assess the real amount of this appreciation, if it is to be redistributed and, if so, how it should be shared and whom it should benefit, both in social and territorial terms. Again we have the public-private conundrum, wherein this redistribution formula often leads to the appropriation of public resources by the private sector.
The appreciation of land value as a resource that can be mobilized for self-financing the GPU or transferred to other areas of the city could be a way to measure whether or not public management of these projects is a success. However, we rarely have an acceptable estimate of this land value increment. Even in the Puerto Madero project in Buenos Aires, which is considered to be a success, to date there is no evaluation of the land value increment associated with either the properties within the project itself or those in neighboring areas. As a result, the discussion of possible redistribution has not gone beyond a few educated guesses.
GPUs conceived as instruments for achieving certain strategic urban goals are generally registered as successes when they are executed according to plan. The question regarding to what extent these goals were actually reached is not fully answered, and it is often conveniently forgotten. The hypothesis that best seems to fit Latin American experiences with GPUs is that the apparent lack of interest in goals has little to do with any technical inability to make the source of the increased value transparent. Rather, this inattention comes from the need to hide the role of public management in facilitating the private sector’s capture of the land value increment in general, if not its capture of public resources used to develop the construction project itself.
We are not feigning ignorance of or trying to minimize the difficulties in advancing knowledge about how land value appreciation is formed and in measuring its size and circulation. Indeed, there are many technical obstacles to overcome when faced with complicated land rights, the vicissitudes or permanent flaws in cadastres and property registers, and the lack of an historical series of geo-referenced real estate values. Even the smallest plan must distinguish between the appreciation generated by the project itself and that generated by urban externalities that almost always exist despite the scale of the project, the different sources and rates of appreciation, and so forth. Some encouraging work has been done on measuring and evaluating the land value increment associated with development, but technical obstacles seem to be less relevant than the lack of political interest in knowing how these projects are being managed.
When land value increments are created, they are usually distributed in the immediate project area or nearby. This principle is based on the need to finance a specific project within the area, to offset certain negative impacts, or to implement actions such as relocating precarious housing sited on the land or its surroundings that may detract from the image of the new project. Given the socioeconomic conditions found in the typical Latin American city, it is not hard to see that the preferred use of the captured value is to earmark it for projects of a social nature in other parts of the city, such as housing complexes. In fact a significant part of the generated land value increment results exactly from the removal of negative externalities produced by the presence of low-income families in the area. Needless to say, this strategy raises conflicting opinions.
There is certainly a need to devise better legislation and instruments to overcome the trade-off between socially mobilized land value increment and gentrification through displacement. Despite the lack of hard empirical studies, there are reasons to believe that a broader understanding of the impacts of these projects will show that some of the compensatory intracity transfers may actually prove to be counterproductive. For example, the resulting higher land price differences and social residential segregation may involve higher social costs that will need to be addressed by additional public resources in the future (Smolka and Furtado 2001).
Positive and Negative Impacts
On the other hand, the negative impacts caused by GPUs often obscure the varied positive impacts. The challenge is how to reduce the negative impacts produced by this type of urban intervention. It soon becomes clear, whether directly or indirectly, that the role of land management is critical to understanding the effects of large interventions in urban development, planning, regulation, socio-spatial segregation, and the urban environment and culture. Scale and complexity have a role as well, depending on the type of impact. For example, scale is more relevant to environmental and urban development impacts, while complexity is more critical in terms of social impact and urban policy.
As already mentioned, the gentrification that these projects generally produce encourages the displacement of the existing, usually poor, inhabitants from the new project area. However, gentrification is a complex phenomenon that requires further analysis of its own negative aspects, as well as how it could help to raise living standards. It could be more useful to move on from simple mitigation of unwanted negative impacts to better management of the processes that create these risks.
Any GPU can have positive or negative effects, depending on the way urban development is managed, the role of the public sector, and the existing level of citizen participation. We have emphasized that one of the central issues is management of the land and of the land value increment associated with these projects. Large urban projects can not be analyzed in isolation from the entire development of the city. Likewise, the land component must be evaluated with respect to the combination of scale and complexity that is appropriate for each project.
Mario Lungo is a professor and researcher at the Central American University (UCA José Simeón Cañas) in San Salvador, El Salvador. He formerly served as executive director of the Office of Planning for the Metropolitan Area of San Salvador.
Martim O. Smolka is senior fellow of the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, cochairman of the Department of International Studies and director of the Program on Latin America and the Caribbean.
References
Lungo, Mario, ed. 2004. Grandes proyectos urbanos (Large urban projects). San Salvador: Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas.
Lungo, Mario (forthcoming). Grandes proyectos urbanos. Una revisión de casos latinoamericanos (Large urban projects: A review of Latin American cases). San Salvador: Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas.
Smolka, Martim and Fernanda Furtado. 2001. Recuperación de plusvalías en América Latina (Value capture in Latin America). Santiago, Chile: EURE Libros.
Polese, Mario and Richard Stren. 2000. The social sustainability of cities. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Sonia Rabello de Castro has a Ph.D. in law and is a professor of administrative law and urban law at the University of the State of Rio de Janeiro (UERJ). She was elected in 2008 as a member of the Municipal Legislative Council of the City of Rio de Janeiro, representing the Green Party. She is also a member of the Ethics and Mores Parliamentary Committee and represents the Legislative Municipal Council at the Environmental Municipal Council.
From 1992 to 1996 she was attorney general for the Municipality of Rio de Janeiro, where she collaborated in the development of several far-reaching urban projects, including the Favela-Bairro program. She has also worked as director of legal services for a number of public entities and has published numerous articles on urban development, housing, governance, public administration, and preservation of the cultural patrimony. Her book on Preservation of the Brazilian Cultural Patrimony (Preservação do Patrimônio Cultural Brasileiro) is considered a basic reference for administrative and juridical decisions on this topic.
Land Lines: How did you become associated with the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy?
Sonia Rabello: I met Martim Smolka, the director of the Program on Latin America and the Caribbean, in the late 1990s, when I was researching how the traditional concept of property rights based upon civil law could be transformed in the context of urban law. The development of new urban laws could lead to conceptual changes in the way the right to property was originally understood, given the need to adapt the concept to meet the social and economic requirements of urban development. At that time, Brazil had not yet approved the federal urban development law known as the City Statute (Estatuto da Cidade), although the Brazilian Federal Constitution of 1988 had introduced the principle of urban development as a social function subject to public policy.
As a visiting fellow at Lincoln House in 2000 I became convinced of the need to create a new, more modern concept of property rights that would reflect the current urban reality in Latin America and allow for the use of the city by all citizens, whether they are property owners or not.
Land Lines: Can you explain this property rights concept further?
Sonia Rabello: It is the need to distinguish the right to own land from the right to build on that land. The Civil Code in Latin American countries follows the French model, which defines real estate property rights as having three components guaranteed to the owner: the right to use the property; the right to receive income accruing from the property; and the right to dispose of the property. Only the owner can exercise these rights. The right to build is not in itself an inherent component of this property right, but a condition for the owner to use the property, without which the utility of the property would be voided—and in this case the very meaning of the property right would be lost.
For the owner to exercise her ownership right to use the property, the public authority, through established urban planning regulations, must allocate a minimum building coefficient to that land. The building coefficient refers to the amount of development allowed on a parcel, also known as floor-area-ratio (FAR). The allocation of an equitable and free minimum building coefficient applied to all properties uniformly has a double function. First, it guarantees to all owners and possessors an economic use of their property. Second, it precludes the occurrence of unjust differences in the allocation of building coefficients among owners.
Land Lines: Why is this concept important for Latin America?
Sonia Rabello: All Latin American countries, including Brazil, have been addressing urban regulation and land policy at the national level, especially since the economic stabilization and redemocratization during the 1990s, when the need to consider the so-called accumulated social debt became a prominent issue. At the time, Latin American cities were experiencing acute problems due to the lack of basic infrastructure services such as sewer systems, public spaces, transportation, and access to affordable housing, as well as the challenge of creating a more equitable distribution of costs and benefits in the urbanization process.
Land Lines: How relevant is Brazil’s City Statute in this process?
Sonia Rabello: The City Statute, which was approved in 2001, confirms the distinction between the right to own land and the right to build, a distinction that had been discussed and implemented since the 1970s in São Paulo and other Brazilian cities. The expression “right to build” as used in the Brazilian Civil Code had led many landowners to assume that their right to own land also included the right to build on the land, in keeping with urban legislation and norms.
How much and what can be built is reflected in the price of land. That is, parcels with a higher building coefficient than others, or parcels where commercial use is permitted as well as residential use, sell at prices that incorporate the benefits freely given to landowners by the public authorities. When this happens, landowners appropriate as their private good the building rights provided by urban law, even though they had not invested in the infrastructure or services needed to support the land development. As a result, the costs of urbanization fall entirely on the public authority while private citizens profit, contradicting the general legal principle barring enrichment without just cause.
Land Lines: What does the principle of “enrichment without just cause” mean?
Sonia Rabello: This general principle of law, accepted in most Latin American countries, deems unacceptable an increase in private wealth that does not result from the person’s own labor or investment—that is, a legitimate cause pertaining to the person who benefits financially. In Brazil this principle is explicit in the legislation, specifically in the Civil Code, and is applicable to the entire juridical system.
Land Lines: How does the City Statute provide for the separation of the right to own land from the right to build?
Sonia Rabello: This concept was introduced through the instrument known as “charge for awarded building rights” (outorga onerosa do direito de construir) in Art. 28: “The master plan may delineate areas where the building right can be exercised above the basic coefficient adopted, given a counterpart payment by the beneficiary.” It is important to emphasize that the City Statute is a federal law that addresses the content of real estate property rights and has the same hierarchical standing as the Civil Code. Thus, if the law states that the public authority shall charge for a given right, then that right does not belong to the person to whom it is given.
Land Lines: In what way does the “charge for awarded building rights” help to preclude enrichment without just cause?
Sonia Rabello: The charge extracts the corresponding value of such rights from the land price. In other words, without that charge, the land price would include the value of the building rights freely granted to the landowner by the urban planning legislation. Without the charge, when the landowner sold the land he would be paid according to its market value, which includes the maximum use permitted on that land.
Land Lines: However, if I buy land expecting to build at a given floor-area-ratio that exceeds the basic coefficient and the public authority charges for these awarded building rights, wouldn’t that imply paying twice for the land?
Sonia Rabello: No, as long as the system of acquiring building rights from the public authority is well-established. Under the new law, building rights above the minimum coefficient belong to the city as a whole and must be purchased separately from the public authority. As a result, when paying the landowner, the buyer discounts from the land price the value of the additional awarded building rights.
Land Lines: In what other ways is this charge implemented to benefit society?
Sonia Rabello: In addition to addressing unjust enrichment, the principle concerns the legitimacy of recovering the added land value generated by public sector interventions in the urbanization process, and to prevent the added value accruing to the landowner. This principle is also reflected in the compensation paid for urban land expropriation. When not recovered by the public authority, the value of the additional building rights becomes an integral part of the market price. If the public authority expropriates that land, the landowner will receive compensation equivalent to the market price, which includes the land value plus the value of the building coefficient granted by the public authority free of charge.
Land Lines: Since the property tax is imposed on real estate property, wouldn’t this charge constitute double-taxing?
Sonia Rabello: To understand why this is not the case we need to look at the important distinction between the Colombian and Brazilian legislation. The Colombian law classifies the value capture charge as a tax, but in Brazil it is defined as an instrument for the public authority to recover a good that belongs to society. That is, the nature of the charge is a responsibility relative to the costs of urbanization. A decision by the Brazilian Supreme Court (RE509422 STFSC of 2008) resolved this issue by ruling that the charge for awarded building rights is not a tax but a payment for which the landowner is responsible.
I think this juridical opinion is coherent given that a tax corresponds to a contribution to the public treasury from one’s private assets, but, as noted, awarded building rights are not privately owned but are a public good that belongs to the city as a whole. To classify the value capture charge as a tax suggests a juridical inconsistency, since taxation is a form of assessing private wealth to finance public goods and services. This is not the case in Brazil, since the charge is levied on an essentially public asset.
Land Lines: Does the judiciary in Latin America accept and implement these concepts?
Sonia Rabello: Not uniformly or consistently. These juridical concepts fundamentally change the traditional understanding of property rights. Because of that, the principles upon which they are based and the logic behind them must be disseminated and assimilated more broadly. This is a judicial evolution that has to happen in order to reduce the exacerbated social exclusion that characterized Latin American cities.
Land Lines: How has the Lincoln Institute’s Program on Latin America and the Caribbean contributed to this new vision of land policy in the region?
Sonia Rabello: The Institute has been a very important influence in clarifying land policy issues among public officials and politicians in Latin America, especially through its training programs in which participants can be exposed to such principles, concepts and ideas, exchange experiences, and build a new land policy culture. The Institute has developed a critical mass of people committed to improving the quality of land policies and promoting new strategies to finance urban development. Understanding that individual property rights can coexist with social rights to the city has been a critical factor driving the evolution of urban thinking in the region.
Mark Skidmore es profesor de Economía en la Universidad Estatal de Michigan, donde también es titular de la cátedra Morris en Finanzas y Políticas del gobierno estatal y municipal; también colabora en el Departamento de Agricultura, Economía de Alimentos y Recursos y en el Departamento de Economía. Recibió su título en Economía por la Universidad de Washington en 1987, y un doctorado en Economía por la Universidad de Colorado en 1994. Se desempeña como coeditor del Journal of Urban Affairs.
Las investigaciones del profesor Skidmore se han centrado en la economía pública y la economía urbana y regional. Sus intereses de investigación actuales son los siguientes: política tributaria del gobierno estatal y municipal, relaciones intergubernamentales, relación entre las decisiones al nivel del sector público y la actividad económica, y la economía de las catástrofes naturales. Sus trabajos han recibido el financiamiento del Programa Fulbright, el Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, la National Science Foundation, el Urban Institute y USAID.
Los artículos del profesor Skidmore han aparecido en revistas profesionales tales como Economic Inquiry, Economics Letters, Journal of Urban Economics, Kyklos, Land Economics, National Tax Journal, Public Choice, Regional Science and Urban Economics y Southern Economic Journal. Asimismo, sus investigaciones han sido objeto de citas en medios noticiosos importantes, tales como la BBC, China Post, The Economist, Europe Intelligence Wire, Forbes, International Herald Tribune, Los Angeles Business Journal, MSNBC, Newsweek, The New Yorker, The New York Times y PBS News Hour.
Land Lines: Durante este año, usted se desempeña como investigador visitante en el Instituto Lincoln. ¿Sobre qué temas está trabajando?
Mark Skidmore: Hace aproximadamente dos años, junto con mi colega Gary Sands recibimos una invitación del concejal Kenneth Cockrel de la ciudad de Detroit para evaluar el deteriorado entorno del impuesto sobre la propiedad en dicha ciudad. El concejal Cockrel se preguntaba qué ganaría Detroit si se volcara a un impuesto basado en el suelo. Nos dieron acceso a información detallada sobre más de 400.000 parcelas inmobiliarias dentro de la ciudad a fin de llevar a cabo una evaluación. En este sentido, estamos agradecidos al Instituto por el apoyo que nos brindó para realizar dicho proyecto. En nuestro informe identificamos una importante erosión de la base del impuesto sobre la propiedad y analizamos distintas opciones con el fin de expandir dicha base imponible, tal como cambiar el enfoque hacia un impuesto basado en el suelo. Nuestra evaluación mostró que un impuesto basado en el suelo serviría para ampliar la base imponible, aunque también generaría cambios significativos en las cargas fiscales de los propietarios de inmuebles residenciales, comerciales e industriales.
En el año 2013, los problemas fiscales de Detroit llegaron a un punto crítico cuando el gobernador Rick Snyder designó a un gerente financiero de emergencia, quien, a su vez, inició el proceso de declaración de quiebra. El 3 de diciembre de 2013, el juez Rhodes emitió un fallo en el que establecía que la ciudad de Detroit era elegible para recibir la protección ante quiebras establecida en el capítulo 9. A pesar del colapso casi completo del mercado inmobiliario dentro de la ciudad durante la Gran Recesión, el impuesto sobre la propiedad continúa siendo una importante fuente de ingresos y, según cómo se lo administre, puede ayudar u obstaculizar la recuperación económica y fiscal. Durante el año en curso, mi idea es utilizar los datos a nivel de parcelas para analizar algunos problemas importantes, tales como la evasión impositiva, la sobrevaluación de propiedad, el valor de terrenos vacantes y las políticas relacionadas con la transferencia de títulos de propiedad del sector privado al sector público debido a las ejecuciones fiscales y la posterior transferencia de los mismos nuevamente al sector privado.
Land Lines: ¿Cuáles son algunos de los factores subyacentes tras de los problemas actuales que enfrenta Detroit?
Mark Skidmore: Cerca del 48 por ciento de los propietarios de inmuebles en Detroit son evasores fiscales, lo que refleja la erosión del contrato social entre los ciudadanos y la ciudad. Esta tasa de evasión fiscal tan alta es el resultado de una confluencia de factores. En primer lugar, la ciudad no ha logrado hacer cumplir las obligaciones tributarias, particularmente en lo relacionado con las propiedades de bajo valor. En segundo lugar, muchos ciudadanos perciben que el impuesto es injusto debido a la sobrevaluación de sus propiedades. Finalmente, la experiencia indicaría que los ciudadanos no pagan sus impuestos porque las autoridades municipales no les brindan los servicios públicos básicos, tales como la iluminación de calles, el barrido de nieve y la seguridad pública.
Una de las causas principales de la alta tasa de evasión de impuestos es la sobrevaluación de las propiedades para fines fiscales. La crisis inmobiliaria fue particularmente grave para Detroit. En 2010, el precio de venta promedio de una parcela residencial con una estructura era de menos de US$10.000; no obstante, el valor tasado promedio de dicha propiedad para fines fiscales era de US$54.000. Según las pautas del estado, la relación entre el valor tasado y el precio de venta debería ser aproximadamente de 1:1. En septiembre de 2013, los funcionarios municipales anunciaron que, en el plazo de los 3 a 5 años siguientes, todas las propiedades de la ciudad se someterían a una revaluación.
En segundo lugar, Detroit ha tenido la costumbre de demoler estructuras deterioradas sujetas a ejecución fiscal. En consecuencia, es una de las pocas grandes ciudades de los Estados Unidos que presenta una gran cantidad de ventas de terrenos vacantes. Por lo general, resulta difícil establecer el valor de los terrenos vacantes en áreas altamente urbanizadas, aunque resulta esencial determinar valuaciones exactas si se desea imponer un tributo al suelo o un impuesto de dos niveles sobre el suelo y sobre las estructuras. La gran cantidad de operaciones de venta de terrenos vacantes en Detroit brinda una oportunidad para estimar el valor del suelo. Curiosamente, en 2010, el valor promedio de una parcela sin mejoras según los datos de venta era de US$34.000, es decir, un valor mucho mayor que el precio promedio de parcelas residenciales con estructuras, el cual, según se mencionó anteriormente, era inferior a los US$10.000.
En la actualidad, el gobierno municipal posee y administra más del 25 por ciento de la superficie del suelo de la ciudad, y la titularidad de propiedades por parte del gobierno continúa creciendo debido a que las ejecuciones fiscales han superado en rapidez a la transferencia de parcelas públicas a manos privadas. Algunas de las cuestiones que me encuentro investigando son las siguientes: ¿Cuáles son las políticas apropiadas que deben tomarse en una sociedad orientada al mercado con el fin de administrar las operaciones inmobiliarias urbanas de bajo valor? ¿Por qué es tan alta la tasa de evasión fiscal, y qué puede hacerse para mejorar el cumplimiento de las obligaciones fiscales en cuanto al impuesto sobre la propiedad en el contexto de un mercado inmobiliario urbano al borde del colapso? ¿Qué rol desempeña la percepción de valuaciones “injustas” por parte de los contribuyentes en la evasión fiscal?
Land Lines: ¿Cuál sería el pronóstico a largo plazo para Detroit?
Mark Skidmore: La problemática fiscal de la ciudad es un síntoma de problemas subyacentes más profundos. Ya sea que consideremos el redesarrollo de un área urbana en franco deterioro o la reconstrucción posterior a una catástrofe natural de grandes proporciones, los elementos más importantes en cualquier recuperación son el capital humano y los atributos sociales y culturales. Si aceptamos la premisa de que estos elementos son los factores esenciales de cualquier redesarrollo, y si dichos elementos escasean, la prioridad principal será entonces considerar la adopción de políticas y medidas que faciliten su desarrollo. En el año 2011, la tasa de graduación de la escuela secundaria en Detroit fue del 62 por ciento. El porcentaje de hogares conformados por sólo uno de los padres fue del 62 por ciento. Según algunas mediciones, la tasa de alfabetización funcional entre los adultos es de solamente el 53 por ciento. Resulta difícil construir una economía urbana dinámica y sólida sobre un fundamento tan débil.
Queda claro entonces que los encargados de elaborar políticas deben tratar los problemas fiscales inmediatos, pero el pronóstico a largo plazo para Detroit dependerá de las medidas que se tomen para mejorar la base económica subyacente, es decir, el capital humano y social. Si no se abordan estos profundos desafíos, Detroit continuará tambaleándose. No existe una solución rápida. Para que Detroit tenga una oportunidad de prosperar nuevamente, Michigan deberá comprometerse a largo plazo a mejorar dichas condiciones de fondo.
Land Lines: ¿Puede considerarse a Detroit como un indicador para otras ciudades de los EE.UU.?
Mark Skidmore: Sí y no. Otros gobiernos municipales también enfrentan problemas fiscales significativos, como Chicago, Jacksonville, Los Angeles, Oakland y Providence, por nombrar sólo algunos. Uno de los principales problemas es el de los planes de aportaciones para el futuro pago de jubilaciones sin suficientes fondos. Aun así, muchas de estas ciudades tienen una probabilidad razonable de resurgir y, posiblemente, prosperar en un futuro no muy lejano, debido a que las agudas crisis que están atravesando son un resultado de la recesión y no necesariamente de problemas fiscales crónicos. No obstante, las ciudades que presentan problemas crónicos debido a déficits importantes en su capital social y humano podrán considerar a Detroit como un indicador de su propio futuro. Espero que los encargados de elaborar las políticas estatales y municipales en todo el país puedan aprender de la experiencia de Detroit y comenzar así a realizar las inversiones a largo plazo que sean necesarias en su activo más importante -las personas y, en particular, los niños- a fin de evitar los problemas económicos y fiscales crónicos que se han observado en Detroit.
Land Lines: ¿De qué manera el proyecto de Detroit encaja en sus tareas de investigación en general?
Mark Skidmore: Una gran parte de mi investigación tiene que ver con las relaciones entre la toma de decisiones en el ámbito público y la actividad económica. Con el correr de los años he analizado cuestiones como la efectividad de las finanzas basadas en el aumento de los impuestos, las implicaciones que conlleva imponer tarifas de impacto a fin de solventar los costos de infraestructura asociados con el desarrollo, y los efectos que los impuestos sobre la propiedad, las reducciones impositivas y otros subsidios tienen sobre el desarrollo. También he estudiado otras cuestiones relacionadas con las finanzas públicas, como las loterías estatales, los impuestos a las ventas y los impuestos a las ganancias. En particular, me interesan las relaciones espaciales, dinámicas y competitivas entre jurisdicciones tributarias adyacentes y superpuestas.
Land Lines: Una gran parte de su investigación gira en torno a las políticas y finanzas gubernamentales en los Estados Unidos. ¿Qué otros trabajos ha realizado usted a nivel internacional?
Mark Skidmore: En los últimos años, recibí, junto con mis colegas de la Universidad Estatal de Michigan (MSU), una subvención financiada por la Agencia Estadounidense para el Desarrollo Internacional (USAID) en Mali. Mi tarea ha sido analizar de qué manera el sistema de gobierno recientemente descentralizado de Mali puede utilizarse en forma más efectiva en los ámbitos de seguridad de los alimentos y gestión del uso del suelo. El cambio climático afecta a Mali en formas muy tangibles: debido a que el suelo en el norte se ha vuelto más árido, se ha observado una migración significativa hacia el sur, que posee un mejor acceso al agua. Esta migración ha dado como resultado una violencia cada vez mayor debido a que los derechos de posesión y propiedad del suelo son ineficaces. Ahora que se ha reestablecido el gobierno democrático, estamos trabajando nuevamente junto con nuestros socios de Mali a fin de desarrollar sistemas que involucren a las autoridades municipales para gestionar la seguridad de los alimentos, el acceso al suelo, los derechos de propiedad y los conflictos relacionados con el suelo. Curiosamente, el problema relativo a qué hacer con todos los terrenos de propiedad pública en Detroit ha dado forma a nuestro trabajo en Mali y viceversa.
Por otro lado, actualmente también estoy investigando sobre la economía de las catástrofes naturales. En uno de mis artículos publicados recientemente (cuya autoría comparto con Hideki Toya), se utilizaron miles de catástrofes ocurridas en todo el mundo para demostrar que los países con sistemas gubernamentales más descentralizados sufren una cantidad significativamente menor de muertes por dichas catástrofes. Según nuestra investigación, existen pruebas de que los gobiernos descentralizados brindan servicios esenciales de manera más efectiva que los sistemas más centralizados.
Un tercer proyecto recientemente concluido demuestra que, en diferentes países, la confianza de la sociedad tiende a aumentar en los años posteriores a las catástrofes climáticas. La relación que observamos es sólida, por lo que podemos sugerir la hipótesis de que dichas catástrofes requieren y brindan oportunidades para que las personas trabajen salvando las barreras de las clases sociales a fin de superar sus desafíos, lo que genera confianza y capital social. Aunque las catástrofes naturales pueden tener un terrible impacto humano y económico, un posible efecto beneficioso derivado de la exposición a una catástrofe de grandes magnitudes podría ser una sociedad mucho más unida.
Land Lines: ¿De qué manera su investigación refleja los intereses y valores del Instituto Lincoln?
Mark Skidmore: El Instituto Lincoln es reconocido en todo el mundo como una organización líder en temas del uso, regulación y tributación del suelo (impuestos sobre la propiedad, reducción de impuestos, políticas de desarrollo económico y sistemas fiscales descentralizados), temas todos que son el centro de mi investigación. A lo largo de los años, el Instituto Lincoln ha apoyado mi trabajo relacionado con las finanzas basadas en el aumento de los impuestos en Wisconsin, el estrés fiscal del gobierno municipal de Michigan y mi actual investigación sobre el entorno del impuesto sobre la propiedad en Detroit. El sistema estadounidense de un gobierno nacional y varios gobiernos subnacionales en gran medida autónomos brinda un campo fértil a los investigadores que desean estudiar y aprender qué “experimentos en política” obtienen mejores o peores resultados. De verdad me encanta este trabajo y estoy agradecido por tener al Instituto como socio en mis investigaciones.