Over the past five years, the Lincoln Institute has supported the study of value capture policies and instruments in many Latin American countries. Notwithstanding the diversity of approaches and the variety of specific cases, we have identified seven substantive lessons that can help to clarify some of the confusion and misunderstandings associated with the implementation of value capture principles. Each lesson summarized below presents one or two examples drawn from the book, Recuperación de Plusvalías en América Latina: Alternativas para el Desarrollo Urbano.
Value capture refers to the process by which all or a portion of increments in land value attributed to “community efforts” rather than landowner actions are recovered by the public sector. These “unearned increments” may be captured indirectly through their conversion into public revenues as taxes, fees, exactions or other fiscal means, or directly through on-site improvements to benefit the community at large.
1. Value capture is not a new concept in Latin America. The Latin American experience with value capture has long-standing historical precedents. Public debates on the use of value capture and related instruments have been held since the beginning of the twentieth century in several countries. In the 1920s, the debate was triggered by concrete events, such as the problem of paving streets in São Paulo, Brazil, and the lack of external financing for needed public works in Colombia. In other cases, political and ideological factors have motivated national discussions. Representatives of the Partido Radical in Chile made several attempts to introduce the idea, and in the 1930s President Aguirre Cerda proposed legislation to create a national tax on plusvalías (land value increments) based on the ideas of Henry George.
2. However, its application in the urban policy agenda is still limited. Despite many reports of relevant experiences that integrate the principles of value capture, the issue is not well represented or even sufficiently acknowledged within the sphere of urban policy. In some instances, promising value capture initiatives have gained prominence in their own times, only to be forgotten later. An important example is the well-known Lander Report from Venezuela, which proposed in the 1960s that land and its increments in value should be the main source of financing for urban development projects. That report formed the basis for recommendations on urban development finance included in the proceedings of Habitat I (1976).
In other cases, interesting opportunities to use value capture as a tool for urban policy are being lost or ignored. Currently some Latin American countries are not taking advantage of potential unearned land value increments generated by major inner-city revitalization projects. While there is general acceptance of the notion of capturing increases in land values, in reality little of that increased value derived from public action has actually been recovered and redistributed.
3. Legislation often exists but is not implemented. As in many other countries in the region, the variety of value capture instruments available in Mexico, ranging from the contribución por mejoras (a special assessment or betterment levy aimed at recovering the costs of public works) to taxes on plusvalías, illustrates the discrepancy between what is legally possible and what is actually implemented. Contrary to what is often alleged, the general problem is not that the planners or local officials lack legal or practical access to these instruments but that the following conditions tend to prevail.
4. Resistance is more ideological than logical. Even when value capture legislation and instruments are understood (or in some cases because they are understood), they may not be implemented fully due to the proverbial “lack of political will.” This resistance may take the form of misleading interpretations, stereotyped rationalizations and even pure ideological “preaching.”
It is not hard to find public justification that the application of such instruments is neither timely nor appropriate, especially if the justification is based on misleading interpretations. Some such arguments are that impositions on land values are inflationary and disruptive of well-functioning markets, or that they incur unacceptable taxation of the same base twice. Such misconceptions seem to lie behind the reluctance of the Ministry of Housing and Urbanism of Chile to promote the review and resubmission to the Congress of some value capture provisions in the country’s new legal framework on urbanism.
Objections based on stereotyped rationalizations may use the following arguments:
Contradicting these arguments, however, are the development of successful participatory improvement programs in poor areas of many cities (for instance in Chile, Brazil and Peru). These programs have been technically and economically efficient and usually have strong support from the low-income population affected.
Finally, some objections are of a purely ideological nature. The resistance to the implementation of participación en plusvalías in Colombia, for example, is based on the allegation that this device, although recognized as technically well-formulated, represents one more unwanted public “interference” on urban real estate business, such as a higher fiscal burden, limitations on property rights or more regulation (Barco de Botero and Smolka 2000). This position has been replaced recently by a broad consensus among politicians, business leaders and the general public that acceptance of this instrument is a better option than the imposition of additional property taxes.
5. Value capture is gradually becoming more popular. In spite of the obstacles and political resistance, recent Latin American experience with value capture shows a growing interest in the subject and in the conditions that would justify its utilization. Value capture is attracting the attention of municipal planners throughout the region, and it is beginning to be perceived as an important urban policy initiative. This growing popularity is related to several factors occurring in the region.
First, greater administrative and fiscal decentralization requires more autonomy in redefining and obtaining alternative sources of public funds to finance the urbanization process. The need for more local resources has been reinforced by the social demands and political pressures associated with current redemocratization processes and growing levels of popular participation. Formation of extra-budget funds to finance special social programs is linked to almost all new value capture initiatives and has been one of the most attractive reasons for implementing those policies.
Second, the redefinition of the functions of the state (including privatization), together with the decline of comprehensive planning, have set the stage for the development of more flexible public interventions and direct negotiations in land use regulation and public-private partnerships. The release of public areas to the private land market, as well as better coordination between real estate and public sector interests to promote new areas in the cities, are also significant. It is worth noting that even in Cuba one finds a vigorous program through which the Office of the Historian in Havana, operating as a kind of property holding company, refinances its state-owned operations with land value increments resulting from urban renovation projects in the form of rents charged to private development “partners” (Nuñez, Brown and Smolka 2000).
Other favorable factors include the conditions imposed by the agendas of the multilateral agencies, which clearly promote the universalization of user charges and the recovery of the costs of public investments. The growing popularity of new value capture instruments can also be attributed to some frustration with the poor results obtained from the application of taxes and other traditional charges related to urban land in past decades, in terms of both revenues and urban policy objectives.
6. Pragmatism overrides ethical or theoretical justifications. A corollary to the preceding point is that the growing popularity of value capture seems to be inspired more by eminently pragmatic reasons than by ethical criteria, notions of equality, or theoretical and political justifications. Some reforms may even have been introduced without full political awareness of the process, or of its theoretical importance, as previously illustrated in the Mexicali case. The historical evidence shows that most value capture initiatives have responded above all to the need to face fiscal crises and other local problems in the financing of urban development. This is the case even in Argentina, where the need for revenues prevailed over established principles opposed to new taxes when a temporary five-percent increase in the property tax was used as one of the initiatives to finance investments in the new Buenos Aires subway system.
Nevertheless, one should not assume from the above examples that accumulation of experience is not important for the refinement of instruments and the evolution of value capture policies. A case in point is the Colombian experience with the contribución de valorización since the 1920s and the many attempts to overcome some of its limitations, especially in the past 40 years. The recently enacted participación en plusvalías is a more technically developed and politically acceptable version of an instrument targeted to capture the sometimes huge land value increments associated with administrative decisions concerning zoning, density levels and other urbanistic norms and regulations.
7. Value capture is not necessarily progressive or redistributive. It must be noted that the reference to plusvalías is in no way a monopoly of the political left. Both Argentina’s and Chile’s recent experiences show clearly the disposition toward the subject in neo-liberal contexts. In addition, the operacões interligadas (linkage operations) developed in São Paulo, and effectively applied by administrations of opposing political and ideological tendencies, put forward a convincing argument about the impossibility of labeling these instruments in advance.
Progressive local governments, on the other hand, are sometimes reluctant to apply these instruments, and may even reject the notion altogether, for three reasons. First, they may believe that such contributions would be simply a mechanism to impose additional fiscal charges with no redistributive impact whatsoever. Second, even when the resulting revenues are earmarked for the low-income population, they may be insufficient to reduce the absolute differences between rich and poor in the access to the serviced land (Furtado 2000). And third is the intergenerational argument that such charges are being imposed on newer, generally poor, residents who need services, whereas earlier generations were not charged for infrastructure services or amenities.
Thus, the progressive nature of such policies is not resolved by “taxing” land value increments or by focusing on high-income taxpayers. The “Robin Hood” image of such policies fades once it becomes clear that the part of the value actually captured in this way tends to be only a fraction, and often a small one, of what the owner actually receives in benefits. This point seems to have been well understood by many lower-income populations, like those in Lima where a successful program featuring some 30 projects used the contribución de mejoras to finance public works in the early 1990s.
This example and other strong evidence support the need to revisit the conventional wisdom regarding the tension between the principles of benefit and capacity of payment. In practice, the strategy of attracting some public intervention to one’s neighborhood (even if it means paying for its costs) is more advantageous than the alternative of being neglected. This point should, nevertheless, be taken with caution, in light of certain experiences where the contribución de mejoras has been applied in low-income areas with purposes other than benefiting the occupants-for example, to justify the eviction or force the departure of those who cannot pay for the improvements (Everett 1999).
Final Considerations
In spite of the difficulties in interpretation and resistance to implementation outlined above, value capture policies are undeniably arousing new interest and growing acceptance. Efforts to utilize value capture have grown in both number and creativity, and its virtues beyond being an alternative source of public financing are becoming better understood. Public administrations are realizing the “market value” of their prerogative to control land use rights, as well as to define the location and timing of public works. They also see that the transparent negotiation of land use and density ratios reduces the margin of transactions that used to be carried out “under the table.” As the link between public intervention and land value increment is becoming more visible, attitudes are changing to be more conducive to building a fiscal culture that will strengthen property taxes and local revenues in general.
However, there is still much to be done in two spheres: researching the complex nature of value capture policies and promoting greater understanding among public officials with regard to how it can be used to benefit their communities. More knowledge is required on certain Latin American idiosyncrasies, such as when significant land value increments are generated under alternative land tenure regimes that are outside the protection of the state, and in cases where the land represents an important mechanism of capitalization for the poor.
Beyond the traditional, structural constraints of patrimonialism, corruption, hidden interests, ideological insensitivity and the like, a considerable part of the “unexplained variance” in different experiences with value capture in Latin America can be attributed to lack of information. Toward that end of improving understanding of the principles and implementation of value capture, there remain many opportunities to document and analyze current experiences with alternative land valuation and taxation instruments.
Martim Smolka is a senior fellow and the director of the Lincoln Institute’s Latin American Program, and Fernanda Furtado is a fellow of the Institute and a professor in the Postgraduate Program in Urbanism at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro.
References
Barco de Botero, Carolina, and Martim Smolka. 2000.Challenges in Implementing Colombia’s Participación en Plusvalías. Land Lines 12 (March):4-7.
Everett, Margaret. 1999. Human Rights and Evictions of the Urban Poor in Colombia. Land Lines 11 (November):6-8.
Furtado, Fernanda. 2000. Rethinking Value Capture Policies for Latin America. Land Lines 12 (May):8-10.
Nuñez, Ricardo, H. James Brown, and Martim Smolka. 2000. Using Land Value to Promote Development in Cuba. Land Lines 12 (March):1-4.
Perlo Cohen, Manuel. 1999. Mexicali: A Success Story of Property Tax Reform. Land Lines 11 (September):6-7.
SHARE
For more than a century, California’s Great Central Valley has been recognized as one of the world’s foremost agricultural regions. A giant basin 450 miles long and averaging 50 miles wide, the Valley encompasses some 19,000 square miles. With only one-half of one percent of the nation’s farmland, the Valley accounts for 8 percent of the nation’s farm output-including 15 percent of America’s vegetable production and 38 percent of fruit production.
Today, large parts of the Valley are making a transition to an urban economy. Led by such emerging metropolitan areas as Sacramento, Fresno and Bakersfield, the Central Valley already has more than 5 million residents. State demographers predict growth to reach almost 9 million people by 2020 and more than 11 million by 2040.
Given this scale of urban growth, what are the key issues facing the Valley? With the assistance of the Lincoln Institute, the Great Valley Center-a non-governmental organization supporting the economic, social and environmental well-being of California’s Central Valley-has undertaken an effort to try to frame this basic question. Which issues are purely local, and which ones require a more regional approach? What are the constraints the Valley faces in the decades ahead? And, finally, what are the choices? How might the Valley approach the question of accommodating urban growth while still retaining an agricultural base, a vibrant economy, a good quality of life and an enhanced natural environment?
Perhaps the biggest question is simply whether the Central Valley can accommodate such a vast quantity of urban growth and still maintain its distinctive identity. For decades, the Valley’s regional environment consisted mostly of three elements intertwined on the landscape-vestiges of nature, a panoply of crops and compact agricultural towns. The development of agriculture created a rural landscape, but one in which nature was often sacrificed for agricultural production. A distinctive urban form evolved that was far different from the rest of California. The Valley’s older towns, often sited on railroad lines, are typically compact but not dense, with wide, shady streets stretching out along the flat expanse from an old commercial downtown.
Regional and Sub-Regional Growth Dynamics
In determining urban development options for the Central Valley, it is important to understand the context of growth dynamics that affect the entire region as well as important sub-regions. Although the geographical size of the Central Valley is very large-far larger than many states, for example-in many ways it should be viewed as one region with a common set of characteristics and problems. These include:
Air quality: The Central Valley consists of one air basin, and so pollutants emitted in one part of the Valley can have an impact hundreds of miles away.
Water supply and distribution: Although many parts of the Central Valley depend heavily on groundwater, almost every community in the region is at least partly dependent on one water source: The drainage that flows into the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers and then through the Sacramento Delta. This water source is also used in many different ways by both state and federal water projects. Transportation links: The Central Valley is connected internally and to other regions by a series of transportation links. Most obvious are the major freeway corridors, including Highway 99, Interstate 5, and Interstate 80, along with rail lines, which generally follow the Highway 99 corridor.
Land supply and cost: In virtually all parts of the Central Valley, land is cheaper and in more abundant supply than it is in coastal areas. This is one of the main reasons why population growth has shifted from the coast to the Central Valley.
At the same time, the Valley can be viewed as a group of five sub-regions, each with its own growth dynamic. These include:
North Valley: Seven counties in the northern portion of the Sacramento Valley remain rural and experience relatively little urban growth pressure compared to the rest of the Valley.
Sacramento Metro: Six counties around Sacramento have the highest rates of educational attainment and the highest wage scales anywhere in the Valley, largely because of the state capital, the University of California at Davis, and proximity to the Bay Area. This has become a popular location for high-tech employers.
Stockton-Modesto-Merced: Traditionally a major ranching and agricultural area, these centrally located counties are now experiencing tremendous urban growth pressure because of Bay Area commuting, though they are not adding jobs as rapidly as Sacramento Metro.
Greater Fresno: Four counties near Fresno remain the agricultural heartland of the Central Valley. Though population growth rates are high due to immigration and high birth rates, especially in the metropolitan Fresno area, the economy is only beginning to diversify and remains heavily focused on agriculture and related industries. As with other parts of the Valley, much of Greater Fresno’s population growth has come from immigration and high birth rates.
Bakersfield-Kern County: Somewhat separate geographically from the rest of the San Joaquin Valley, this area remains a center of both agriculture and extractive industries, especially oil. This region is experiencing rapid population growth and is the only part of the Valley that appears to be directly influenced by spillover growth from Greater Los Angeles.
Underlying Issues
With so much urban growth on the horizon, the Central Valley’s twenty-first-century landscape will be shaped by the interplay among several different issues:
Agriculture: Agriculture is likely to consume less land and less water in the future than it has used in the past, but it is still likely to be the sector that most determines the Valley’s urban growth patterns. The critical issues are: What kind of agricultural base will the Valley have in the next century, and how much land and water will that agricultural base require? Recent trends have moved the Valley toward ever-higher-value crops, and competition with foreign markets is expected to be fierce.
Socioeconomic issues: The Valley has traditionally lagged behind the rest of California in social and economic indicators. Unemployment and teenage pregnancy are high, while household income and educational attainment is low. Like the rest of California, the Valley is rapidly evolving a unique mix of racial diversity. Although the Valley will soon get a boost from the creation of a new University of California campus in Merced County, the region’s overall economic competitiveness may not be able to match its urban population growth.
Natural resources: In the rush to create one of the world’s great agricultural regions, the Central Valley’s leaders often overlooked the wonderland of natural resources that lay at their feet. For example, the Valley’s vast system of wetlands, once one of the largest and most important in the world, has almost completely disappeared, much to the detriment of the migratory bird population. In the future, there will be increasing pressure to restore and enhance these natural resources even as the Valley continues to urbanize. The entire San Francisco Bay-Sacramento Delta ecosystem has emerged as the focal point of a massive state and federal effort to improve water quality and restore biodiversity.
Infrastructure and infrastructure financing: When California’s coastal metropolitan areas were created, mostly in the postwar era,- the state and federal governments contributed greatly to their success by picking up the tab for most of the infrastructure they required. In the last two decades, however, all this has changed. In the Central Valley, the urban infrastructure is underdeveloped, and the financial ability of developers and new homebuyers to bear the full cost of community infrastructure is questionable.
Governmental structure and regional/sub-regional cooperation: In the Valley as elsewhere, a wide range of local, regional, state and federal agencies make decisions that create the emerging landscape. But there is little history of cooperation among these agencies, and especially among local governments. If all these entities can work together well, they can effectively increase the region’s “capacity” to create an urban environment that works for its users while protecting agricultural land, natural resources and other non-urban values. But if these entities do not establish a pattern of working together, the result could be a haphazard pattern of urban growth that does not serve any goal well.
Possible Strategies
Given these background conditions, the Central Valley could adopt any one of a number of strategies for shaping urban growth, or different parts of the Valley could “mix and match” from a variety of possibilities, which include the following:
Concentrate urban growth in existing urban centers. The Central Valley’s urban centers are well established and well served by existing infrastructure. They contain most of the current job centers and community support services and amenities required for urban or suburban living. This strategy would concentrate urban growth in and near these centers through a combination of infill development and compact growth in new areas.
Adopt a “metroplex” strategy. This strategy would recognize that population growth in the Valley will be concentrated in a few large metropolitan areas. Urban growth needs, including urban centers, bedroom communities, parks and greenbelts, should be dealt with at the metropolitan level in a small number of distinct “urban metropolitan regions.”
Create a “string of pearls” along Highway 99. For most of this century, Highway 99 has been the Central Valley’s “main drag.” Virtually all of the Valley’s older urban centers are located along this corridor. One possible strategy would be to concentrate future urban development up and down Highway 99, creating a string of urban and suburban pearls. In point of fact, the string of pearls is already emerging in some places. New development districts are being created along the corridor to the north and south of existing cities and towns because of access to this major transportation artery.
Encourage the creation of new towns in the foothills on the west side of the Valley. The so-called “Foothill Strategy” has been discussed for several years in some parts of the Valley. Foothill new towns would place commuters closer to Bay Area jobs and protect prime farmland on the Valley floor. However, water and infrastructure finance issues make this strategy very difficult to achieve.
Permit the emergence of an urban ladder. A final possibility is to permit the development of what might be called an urban ladder: a network of urban and suburban areas that run up and down the Valley along Highway 99 and Interstate 5, and then run across the Valley on a series of east-west rungs along smaller roads that connect the two freeway corridors. In many ways, the urban ladder is the most likely possibility, simply because it connects existing cities and towns with probable new areas for urban growth by using the available transportation corridors. At the same time, however, it holds the potential to create more “suburban sprawl” than any other option.
Many of these options are already emerging as an actual urban pattern in certain parts of the Valley, and it is unlikely that there is a “one-size fits all” answer for the entire Valley. But, unless the civic leaders of the Valley confront the issue of urban growth head-on, it is likely that the Valley will adopt the sprawling and inefficient land use patterns that characterize Los Angeles and California’s other coastal metropolitan areas.
There is still time to shape a different outcome in the Valley, if civic leaders work together in a conscious attempt to design a set of workable urban development patterns that will operate efficiently and effectively for urban dwellers, for employers, for agriculturalists, and for the natural environment.
William Fulton is editor of California Planning and Development Report, contributing editor of Planning magazine, and correspondent for Governing magazine. For more information about the Great Valley Center, see www.greatvalley.org.
SHARE
Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 2 del libro Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.
Académicos y profesionales involucrados en la regularización de asentamientos en sectores de bajos ingresos en Latinoamérica compartieron sus experiencias en un foro patrocinado por el Instituto Lincoln en marzo de 1998. La ciudad de Medellín, Colombia y su oficina de regularización, PRIMED (Programa Integrado para el Mejoramiento de Barrios Deficientes en Medellín) sirvieron de anfitriones. Entre los participantes se incluyeron representantes de PRIMED, empleados oficiales de la ciudad de Medellín y observadores de instituciones multilaterales, tales como el Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID), el Banco Mundial, USAID y la Fundación GTZ de Alemania.
Doce ponencias principales informaron sobre los casos de estudio más significativos de ocho países: Brasil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, México, Perú y Venezuela. El foro resultó ser una reunión excepcional cuyas conclusiones, resumidas más adelante, probablemente tendrán importantes repercusiones en las políticas de Latinoamérica.
Perspectivas Comparativas de Regularización
Diversos puntos de vista sobre regularización aparecen ilustrados por los trabajos de cada país. Los dos enfoques principales son la regularización jurídica (por ejemplo: procedimientos de legalización de títulos de la tierra a fin de convertir la propiedad “de hecho” en propiedad jurídica, en Perú, Ecuador y México) y la regularización física (urbanización), incluyendo la expansión de servicios de infraestructura en asentamientos irregulares (Colombia, Venezuela, Brasil y otros países). Un tercer enfoque, en el cual se ha hecho énfasis sólo recientemente, establece como prioridad la integración social y cívica de los asentamientos de población de bajos ingresos dentro de la estructura urbana a través de una serie de medidas.
Aunque en la mayor parte de los países se presentan elementos de estos tres tipos de regularización, generalmente cada país se orienta más en una dirección que en otra. En México, los tres enfoques se utilizan simultáneamente. En la mayoría de los otros países, el énfasis depende de la fuerza relativa de los actores, las organizaciones y las políticas por una parte, y de la forma en que el problema de regularización es concebido (“construido”) por las autoridades federales y locales, por otra.
La Regularización Jurídica: Programas de Adjudicación de Títulos de Propiedad
La regularización de títulos de propiedad se ha convertido en práctica similarmente aceptada por gobiernos, agencias internacionales y organizaciones no gubernamentales. De hecho, la pregunta “¿por qué regularizar?” que se planteó al comienzo del foro pareció tomar a todos de sorpresa. Sin embargo, esta pregunta nos dirige al fondo de la cuestión sobre quienes definen los problemas relacionados con la tenencia de la tierra y quiénes establecen las políticas a favor de su regularización. La mayoría de los programas de títulos examinados en los casos de estudio resultaron largos y costosos; además, una vez puestos en práctica, sirvieron de poco para afectar significativamente el nivel de seguridad o para suministrar servicios en forma sistemática a los asentamientos.
Figura 1
Argumentos Comunes a Favor de la Regularización de la Tierra
En lo que concierne a los sectores pobres de la población, sin embargo, varios de los argumentos a favor de la regularización aparentan ser falsos. Los hogares establecidos generalmente tienen seguridad de hecho y pocas veces consideran la necesidad de un título legal completo como una prioridad, sino más bien como una necesidad asociada con el sistema de valores de la clase media. Es más, una vez que los asentamientos están bien establecidos, las mejoras y la consolidación de la vivienda ocurren en una proporción estrechamente asociada con la disponibilidad de recursos, no con la seguridad del título de propiedad. En relación con la introducción de servicios, la mayoría de los proveedores siguen sus propias reglas internas para definir el tiempo y los procedimientos; pocas veces el título legal es un criterio importante.
Por lo demás, a las familias de bajos ingresos no les gusta endeudarse y no les resulta fácil el incorporarse a los sistemas formales de crédito, aun cuando las organizaciones no gubernamentales y los gobiernos tienden a inclinarse hacia la asistencia por medio de microcréditos. En suma, da la impresión de que cuando los grupos de bajos ingresos desean la regularización de la propiedad es porque el Estado quiere que lo deseen y, consecuentemente, contribuye a construir la demanda correspondiente.
Se podría concebir la regularización de la propiedad como un fin en sí misma tanto como un medio hacia un fin. La regularización como “fin” aparece claramente ilustrada en el caso de Lima, donde el acceso a la tierra y a los programas de adjudicación de títulos de propiedad sustituyen a una política sistemática de vivienda. El ciclo más reciente de adjudicación de títulos (desde 1996) incluye también la retitularización de terrenos anteriormente regularizados, como un campo de patrocinio político destinado a beneficiar al gobierno central a cuentas de los líderes políticos ciudadanos. Una situación similar prevalecía en México con las agencias de regularización múltiplex creadas durante los años ’70. En ambos países la dedicación a la regularización de la tenencia de la tierra aparece claramente señalada por programas activos, que generalmente procesan un alto número de títulos cada año a bajo costo.
En otras partes, la regularización puede ser también un “fin”, pero de importancia secundaria. En Colombia, Brasil, El Salvador y Ecuador, por ejemplo, la adjudicación de títulos constituye solamente una pequeña parte del conjunto de la regularización física. Aún así, la ausencia de propiedad legal y la necesidad de regularización pueden ser utilizadas hacia buenos fines políticos al regular el suministro y el orden de la provisión de infraestructura.
La regularización de títulos como medio hacia un fin se encuentra ampliamente fomentada por las agencias internacionales como parte del Nuevo Programa de Gerencia Urbana del Banco Mundial. México constituye un buen ejemplo del proceso, en donde la adjudicación de títulos de propiedad de la tierra es un requisito previo para la gestión de la tierra urbana, la planificación y la administración pública. La regularización incorpora a la población dentro del sistema del registro de tierras, la base de recaudación de impuestos, los controles de planificación, los permisos de construcción, las tasas de consumo, y la recuperación del costo de servicios e infraestructura. La regularización se convierte en un medio para el sustento y manejo urbanos; esta, más que ninguna otra razón, explica su amplia adopción y aceptación actual.
Un factor notable en varios de los casos estudiados fue la aparente renuencia a regularizar tierras privadas a no ser que la iniciativa tuviera el apoyo del dueño original. Como resultado, los asentamientos con mayores posibilidades de ser regularizados son aquéllos ubicados en tierras públicas o tierras cuya propiedad nunca ha sido cuestionada. Con la excepción de México, los gobiernos se han mostrado renuentes a expropiar tierras con fines de interés social. Varios países tienen un sistema de derechos de ocupación de la tierra que permiten la transferencia de la propiedad después de un cierto número de años de uso comprobado y apropiado. En Brasil, este sistema de usucapión ha sido ampliado recientemente a fin de permitir la transferencia de títulos de terrenos urbanos de propiedad privada menores de 250 m2 que hayan sido ocupados continuamente durante cinco años.
Factores de los programas de regularización jurídica:
La Regularización Física: Urbanización y Provisión de Infraestructura
El segundo campo principal de regularización registrado en muchos de los casos de estudio del foro estuvo enfocado en el proceso de regularización física de distintas formas de asentamientos irregulares. En Medellín, por ejemplo, se estima que aproximadamente el 12% de la población total vive en barrios de crecimiento rápido construidos frecuentemente sobre laderas empinadas, igual que en barrios similares en las laderas de Río o Caracas. Existen indudables problemas y peligros en estas áreas; sin embargo, la mayoría de los participantes en el foro que visitaron los asentamientos de PRIMED se mostraron más entusiasmados por su nivel y grado de consolidación que los propios oficiales locales. (La discusión no se extendió a las intervenciones y mejoras en alojamientos pobres del centro de la ciudad: conventillos, vecindades, cortiVos).
Es imposible describir adecuadamente todos los programas innovadores presentados en el foro, pero uno de los casos de mayor éxito es el programa Favela/Bairro, del municipio de Río de Janeiro. Este proyecto se basó en la estrecha colaboración con los residentes locales para abrir las calles de sus favelas al acceso vehicular y la instalación de servicios. No obstante, es importante reconocer que el éxito del proyecto ha tenido costos considerables: el gasto total entre 1994 y 1997 fue de 300 millones de dólares, suministrados en gran parte por el BID. Esto plantea serias interrogantes acerca de la capacidad de réplica de este tipo de programas.
Factores de los programas de regularización física:
La Regularización como Medio de Integración Social
Durante las deliberaciones del foro se hizo aparente que un objetivo cada vez más explícito de la regularización es el de alcanzar la integración social a través de la incorporación de la población de bajos ingresos a la mayoría social y a la estructura urbana. Esto se manifiesta con mayor frecuencia en referencia al “rescate” de la población de bajos ingresos y de otros grupos marginales y su incorporación a la ciudadanía urbana. Este ha sido uno de los objetivos primordiales del programa favela/bairro en Brasil, el cual, al menos en parte, estuvo orientado a romper los círculos de delincuentes juveniles y tráfico de drogas, y a rescatar a la población local de su influencia.
Un problema potencial de este enfoque reside en que los conceptos de “buen ciudadano” y “mayoría social” son construcciones sociales que frecuentemente están cargadas de valores y que pueden derivarse a partir de una cierta clase social o un grupo dominante del poder. La regularización con motivos de alcanzar la integración dentro de un amplio marco de oportunidades sociales tales como la educación pública y los servicios de salud es una cosa; la regularización a fin de lograr la convergencia social y la conformidad es otra. Sin embargo, la investigación y la literatura sobre este campo continúan siendo incipientes, y la noción completa de ciudadanía con sus correspondientes derechos y responsabilidades forma parte de una agenda todavía poco considerada.
Conclusión
Este foro internacional hizo énfasis en la necesidad de estar conscientes de las distintas razones subyacentes a la regularización física y jurídica en cada país, y de tomar en cuenta que estas razones se encuentran estrechamente relacionadas con los procesos políticos y de planificación. Para que la regularización funcione bien, debe haber un compromiso político genuino tal que todos los departamentos y oficiales que intervengan lo hagan con la mayor integración, cooperación y autorización. También se necesita pensar creativamente sobre sistemas alternativos, sistemas “paralelos” de propiedad, y sobre oportunidades para la real participación del público en la toma de decisiones en todas las etapas del proceso de regularización.
El compromiso y el sustento financieros también son temas importantes. A menos que la regularización vaya acompañada por la recuperación del costo a largo y mediano plazo a través de impuestos, tasas al usuario y avalúos diferidos, los programas continuarán dependiendo mayormente del financiamiento externo y de subsidios, lo cual limita severamente la extensión y la escala de su aplicación.
La interesante última sesión del foro permitió a los participantes reflexionar sobre las futuras direcciones de investigación y análisis de políticas de regularización del mercado de la tierra. Cinco áreas importantes emergieron de esta discusión. Primero, se reconoció la necesidad de identificar a los diversos actores y grupos de intereses involucrados en la promoción del desarrollo de tierras irregulares o ilegales, para empezar, y de hacer explícitas las diferencias entre invasiones de tierras, subdivisiones de propietarios, subdivisiones de empresas y otras acciones semejantes. Se planteó que la irregularidad es generada por varios actores y grupos de intereses con fines de lucro, y no únicamente el resultado de un proceso disfuncional de urbanización.
Segundo, se discutió la necesidad de alejarse del pensamiento dualista y romper con la definición del concepto del mercado de la tierra en términos de la ciudad formal e informal, la ciudad paralela, o los barrios normales y deficientes, todos los cuales implican que los sectores pobres se encuentran atrapados en un mercado separado. En realidad, hay un mercado único de la tierra que está segmentado, no separado, a lo largo de una continuidad en términos de acceso y capacidad de adquisición.
Tercero, se necesita afrontar el problema de la capacidad de réplica financiera de experiencias exitosas y las formas posibles de obtener financiamiento a través de subsidios internos, plusvalías, tasas de valorización, gastos de impuestos, tasas progresivas de consumo, y otros mecanismos. Cuarto, necesitamos hacernos menos los ciegos ante las diferencias de género. Es importante que pensemos con más imaginación al definir las prioridades de regularización para cada género, y que exploremos esquemas innovadores de programas de títulos que respondan a la necesidad de satisfacer los derechos específicos a la vivienda y al domicilio de la mujer.
Finalmente, necesitamos ser mucho más precisos en nuestra terminología y, más importante aún, reconocer que hay una “construcción social” imbuida en el lenguaje. Los términos adoptados por cada sociedad revelan la forma en que esa sociedad ve y diagnostica la vivienda y los problemas sociales relacionados con ella. La terminología puede conducir a soluciones políticas punitivas o condescendientes, e incluso “criminalizar” a sectores locales de la población. Gran parte de las diferencias y variaciones entre los distintos casos de estudio se derivan de la forma en que cada sociedad construye su percepción del problema de la vivienda y la manera en que esta visión es transmitida a la gente: a través de la terminología, a través de las leyes, los procedimientos y las políticas, y a través de la organización administrativa y burocrática del Estado mismo.
Peter M. Ward es profesor de sociología y asuntos públicos de la Universidad de Texas en Austin, y miembro asociado de la facultad del Instituto Lincoln. Entre sus numerosos libros se incluye una “Metodología para el análisis del mercado de la tierra y la vivienda”, editada conjuntamente con Gareth Jones y publicada por el Instituto Lincoln en 1994.
SHARE
Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 1 del libro Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.
En abril se reunió en Chile un grupo de expertos, funcionarios y asesores fiscales latinoamericanos que se encargan de monitorear los sistemas de información de los mercados urbanos y publican informes estadísticos sobre el comportamiento del mercado. La reunión, que tuvo la finalidad de facilitar el intercambio de experiencias y explorar planes de cooperación futura, contó con la asistencia de representantes de Ciudad de México; San Salvador, El Salvador; São Paulo y Porto Alegre, Brasil; Montevideo, Uruguay; Santiago, Chile; Quito, Ecuador; y Bogotá, Colombia, como también especialistas del Banco Mundial, el Banco Interamericano del Desarrollo y el Programa de Desarrollo de las Naciones Unidas (UNDP).
La mayoría de las iniciativas surgieron de empresas pequeñas con el objetivo original de obtener información para fines de evaluación de proyectos, requisitos de investigación o análisis de mercados; subsiguientemente se ampliaron a sistemas de gran escala para monitorear diferentes tipos de mercados y regiones geográficas.
Los mercados más frecuentemente estudiados son inmuebles residenciales, industriales y comerciales recién construidos, siendo las variables básicas consideradas, el precio, la ubicación y el tipo de producto. En casos específicos se emplean otras variables para obtener información más precisa sobre cada transacción o cada producto que se envía al mercado. En todos los casos se obtienen los datos estadísticos a partir del mercado formal, aun cuando un estimado de Bogotá indica que dicho mercado representa apenas un tercio de todas las transacciones.
Las más importantes fuentes de datos del mercado son periódicos, revistas o publicaciones especializadas, aunque también se consiguen informaciones útiles a través de permisos de construcción o visitas a obras. En San Salvador, la fuente principal son los datos bancarios sobre préstamos hipotecarios para la adquisición de bienes inmuebles.
El área geográfica y el período de computación de las estadísticas varía según el caso; no obstante, todos los sistemas se enfrentan al mismo problema, que es la pérdida de validez estadística al reducirse el tamaño de la unidad de análisis o al acortarse el período. Por otra parte, ampliar el área geográfica significa perder la homogeneidad de barrios bien definidos, y ampliar el marco temporal limita el ajuste fino del estudio.
Las estadísticas generales y las tendencias del mercado aparecen en periódicos y publicaciones especializadas, mientras que boletines periódicos e informes publican estadísticas más detalladas. Los listados de obras nuevas constituyen un mecanismo abierto y útil para corregir la información, dado que cuando un caso no aparece en una lista, el abastecedor es el primero en hacerlo público.
Por los momentos, sólo Brasil y México están gestionando sus sistemas de información con fines de lucro. En otros países, la venta de los datos del mercado apenas cubre los gastos de gestión, pero la diseminación de los datos facilita a consultores profesionales utilizarlos en actividades lucrativas. De tal manera, esta información asiste al sector privado porque aumenta la transparencia de los mercados y ayuda a los empresarios a evaluar proyectos urbanos y definir las tendencias geográficas y económicas. Para el sector público, los datos del mercado facilitan la tasación pública de inmuebles y las actividades de planificación.
Todavía quedan muchos problemas por resolver para poder mejorar la cobertura de las transacciones del mercado urbano, la calidad de la información, el análisis de los datos, y el debate que pueda originar esta información sobre las políticas del suelo urbano. Desde el punto de vista académico, el reto es mejorar el entendimiento del fenómeno observado, mientras que desde la perspectiva profesional, es utilizar la información disponible para mejorar el análisis de los proyectos y ajustar los planos de tasación, a fin de establecer registros más exactos y así optimizar el sistema del impuesto a la propiedad.
Dado que muchas ciudades latinoamericanas carecen de sistemas de monitoreo del mercado urbano, los participantes de este proyecto en curso deben abocarse a encontrar maneras de compartir sus experiencias para aumentar la eficiencia de las operaciones mercantiles y la planificación urbana de la región.
Sobre el autor
Pablo Trivelli es coordinador regional del Programa de Gestión Urbana, Programa de Desarrollo de las Naciones Unidas, Santiago, Chile. El seminario fue patrocinado junto con el Instituto Lincoln con el proyecto GTZ-MINVU, el Instituto de Estudio Urbanos de la Universidad Católica de Chile y el Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo de Chile.
SHARE
Global investment, sophisticated communications, and widespread corporate and personal mobility are transforming city regions around the world. Those who focus on urban issues have been arguing for many years that we are seeing the emergence of a new kind of human settlement, with its own distinct social and economic structures and associated physical forms.
The Lincoln Institute’s 1995 Cambridge Conference in September focused on these global forces. The consortium was organized by three research investigators—David Barkin, Gary Hack and Roger Simmonds—to study 12 city regions spread across Europe, Asia and the Americas. While each city offers unique characteristics and exceptions to certain patterns, they all meet the following measurable criteria:
12 Case Study Cities
Using the 12 sites as case studies, the researchers outlined several levels of investigation to assemble a picture of what global city regions look like and why. First, they examined the effects of the global political economy on the growth and development of cities over time. For example, how have the loss of traditional agricultural or industrial economies and the introduction of new players with investment capital changed the ways cities work? How have cities attempted to position themselves in relation to these powerful external forces?
Another research goal was to understand the relationships between changing urban form and regional infrastructure investments, such as transportation systems and new technology centers. How have populations dispersed around new transportation networks and economic centers? How can regional planning efforts influence changes in spatial form and impacts on the environment?
Third, the researchers explored changes in the quality of urban life resulting from the dynamics of globalization. What social and economic problems do urban residents face today? How are their local and national governments attempting to manage these problems?
Prior to the conference, research teams in each of the city regions gathered data to chart the growth and movement of their populations, infrastructure changes, and economic and industrial development over the last three decades. To make the data comparable across national boundaries, they mapped the physical evolution of the 12 city regions in 1960, 1970, 1980 and 1990, and then linked these maps to changes in key economic and social indicators over the same period. Each team also prepared a report on what special issues its government is facing, and how policymakers are attempting to shape the region’s changing spatial form.
A Portrait of Global City Regions
The 12 city regions represented at the conference illustrate substantial variation, but also many common patterns of growth and change. They range in size from about 2 million in Lyon to more than 32 million in Tokyo, the world’s largest city and also one of the wealthiest.
In all of these cities, the predominant pattern of physical growth has been sprawling out from the historic center and adjacent inner ring of development into increasingly distant open space and agricultural land. This dispersal involves both residential and commercial development, though sometimes in different directions. It has been facilitated by sharp increases in the availability and use of automobiles throughout the world. The most dramatic example is Taipei, where the number of autos increased from about 11,000 in 1960 to over 1 million in 1990; the number of persons per auto decreased from 127 to 5 over that period. Ankara and Santiago, at 13 people per auto in 1990, have been the least affected by auto-mania to date.
Even as most cities are spreading out, some inner cores have become more densely populated as wealthier residents and service sector employment have migrated into newly thriving downtowns. Monumental stadiums, convention centers, luxury hotels and residential condominiums have helped to promote tourism and an active cultural life in these central cores. The flip side, however, is increased decay outside the center, as large numbers of poor people are dispersed into areas where public services are often lacking.
The disadvantaged inner cities and wealthy, low-density suburbs of the United States are notable exceptions to this pattern. Cities such as Bangkok and Taipei demonstrate more neighborhood integration of rich and poor than others, but the predominant pattern still shows segmented pockets of wealth and poverty becoming more clearly defined over time.
In the new era of globalization, ironically, patterns of residence are becoming less important than patterns of interaction, as people who participate in the global economy communicate more often with their peers in other cities or countries, electronically or in person, than with people living next door.
Changing demographic patterns have generally slowed urban growth rates to around 3 percent compared to 6 to 8 percent in the 1960s. Most cities have seen decreases in both birth rates and migration from rural areas within the country or immediate region. But political upheavals and changing employment opportunities are also triggering new waves of transnational migration. Many of these newer immigrants settle in their own sections of the city, apart from the indigenous low-income sector, and present a different set of social and economic problems for national and local governments. In San Diego, for example, immigrants from Mexico and Central America contribute to both population growth and increased segmentation within the region. Sao Paulo, on the other hand, has experienced net outmigration as Brazilian policies and programs now encourage decentralization to new communities throughout that vast country.
The composition of economic sectors is quite consistent across countries according to the 1990 data. It generally shows less than 5 percent of the workforce employed in agriculture and resource extraction, 20 to 30 percent in manufacturing and 65 to 75 percent in the service sector. Some interesting exceptions in employment trends are Jakarta, with an agriculture sector rate of almost 16 percent in 1990, and San Diego, with a current service sector share of 83 percent. Bangkok and Taipei show the largest decreases in agriculture, from around 20 percent in 1960 to less than 2 percent in 1990, and both cities remain relatively high in manufacturing in 1990 at 32 and 36 percent respectively.
Income distribution also shows similar patterns across regions, with the bottom 20 percent of the population generally receiving only 5 to 7 percent of total earned income while the top 20 percent of the population earned 40 to 50 percent of income. Santiago, Sao Paulo and Jakarta show the greatest concentrations of wealth at the upper levels, while Tokyo and Taipei, closely followed by Randstad and Madrid, have the least inequality across income levels. San Diego, while relatively high in per capita income, has a mid-range income distribution of 44 percent at the upper end but shows only 4 percent of income earned by the poorest 20 percent of its population.
Contradictions in the Changing Global Economy
Discussion at the conference revealed several new realities about the world in which we live. Perhaps the most important is the difficulty that local and national authorities face in designing effective policies for social and political action to modify the powerful economic forces that are shaping new productive structures in their regions.
A recurrent theme in the regional analyses was the contradiction between highly centralized private investment and sweeping changes resulting from the insertion of the city region into the international economy. In most regions, “elite corridors” of globalization contrast sharply with the disadvantaged “residual city.” These wealthy enclaves accommodate the investments of transnational corporations producing for world markets and are near the residential and shopping areas of those who participate in this economy. In these financial and commercial centers, burgeoning bureaucracies of skilled professionals manage global production and marketing to assure attractive returns to international investors, often ignoring crises in the local economy.
While overall population growth has declined, remunerative employment opportunities have also ceased to grow. Every one of the city regions reported an accelerated shift of its labor force toward poorly paid, part-time jobs in the service sector, with a concomitant imbalance of economic opportunities that condemns a growing proportion of the people to poverty.
This menace is accompanied by shifts in the agricultural sector. Substantial numbers of small-scale rural producers are unable to compete in international markets with large-scale farmers elsewhere who have access to capital for the latest technologies to increase their output. The inexorable process of global expansion is also driving small and medium-scale manufacturing plants from the marketplace.
Most participants at the conference accepted and heartily embraced the new dynamic of globalization. Their governments are working actively to reposition their regions to attract foreign enterprises and real estate developers that promise modernization. They hope to convert their cities into beacons, leading their nations in the worldwide process of integration. Most see their primary task as clearing away the web of regulatory and other obstacles of previous eras, facilitating private initiative by offering (sometimes for free) the land and infrastructure required for new installations.
Many of the cities are targeting their infrastructure investment strategies specifically to expand the service economy. Bangkok, Taipei and Tokyo are working hard to become financial centers for Asia, betting on the demise of Hong Kong as a key competitor. Bangkok in particular is investing in substantial transportation and communications networks and in the education of its labor force to keep pace. In Europe, Madrid is using its role as the world’s center of Spanish culture to enhance its communications services; Randstad is promoting its airport support facilities; and Lyon is becoming an innovative center for emerging technological industries.
Impacts on Regional Development
The case studies and discussions at the conference also identified numerous problems emerging from this enthusiasm for globalization. The complex and disturbing phenomenon of urban sprawl is becoming universal as increased automobile use distributes populations to satellite employment centers and generally reduces the density of regional cities. Two interesting exceptions are Tokyo, whose extensive mass transit system helps to keep economic activity centralized, and Taipei, where mountainous geography constrains outward development. In Randstad, on the other hand, development is rapidly filling in lowland gaps between formerly freestanding settlements, even though the overall growth rate has been quite slow.
Some of this decentralization has been promoted by government efforts to deal with high land prices, traffic congestion or environmental protection. New towns or “science cities” are being built on the outskirts of Santiago, Lyon, Randstad, Taipei, Tokyo and Jakarta, and in Bangkok intensive infrastructure development is creating a new port miles from the city center. In Sao Paulo, strict regulations to protect watershed areas are pushing new development to distant sites.
Generally infrastructure follows development rather than truly shaping it. Private investors are able to respond more quickly to planned growth intentions within their regions than are the public agencies responsible for implementing major infrastructure projects. Thus, private development puts pressure on the public sector to provide services to areas that are already undergoing urbanization. This process has serious implications for long-term regional planning if it continues to be development driven with government playing catch-up.
Another theme that emerged during the conference was an increased consciousness about environmental problems. The accumulation of wealth and the accompanying increase in consumption in most city regions, is creating intense pressures on the environment. With regional integration proceeding apace and deregulation of the economy the order of the day, transnational corporations have great freedom to operate as they wish in the international economy. The participants repeatedly raised the difficulties of confronting these challenges constructively in each of their city regions. Yet, concern for the environment was also seen as the primary motivating factor for undertaking strategic regional planning.
Quality of Life Issues
Globalization offers the promise of greater prosperity. Most cities represented at the conference reported a relative increase in several quality-of-life averages between 1960 and 1990: per capita income, life expectancy and education level. These rising incomes, combined with technological advances that enhance productivity and the wider dissemination of information about goods available in world markets, have allowed city dwellers everywhere to make new choices about their consumer needs. However, powerful global models of organization and production are also imposing new, homogenized consumption patterns that threaten to stifle the extraordinary variety of lifestyles that characterizes most urban regions.
Increased physical mobility, largely achieved through the private ownership of automobiles, has provided many people with more choices about where to live, shop and work. At the same time, commuting times average 45 minutes, ranging from less than 30 minutes in San Diego to more than one and a half hours in Bangkok.
Conference participants agreed that this increased mobility had undermined a previous sense of community, as individuals begin to identify with increasingly dispersed urban places or develop identities that are not based on place at all. The “McDonald’s-ization” of world culture, including music, clothing and architecture, as well as food, was noted by almost every city representative. As markets for consumer goods become global, individuals in many city regions are also beginning to rely on those markets to deliver what were once semipublic services, such as education and recreation.
Changes in the economic function of major cities from manufacturing and shipping to finance and tourism have also caused important losses. Many historic city centers have been commodified for cultural tourism. Buildings or streets originally constructed as factories or warehouses now house retail shops or museums. The original factory workers or longshoremen, who often lived near their jobs, have given way to visitors who travel by car or plane from outside the city or even from other countries to admire buildings that have been restored in form but completely transformed in function. New high-rise office buildings, convention centers, stadiums and luxury hotels are often imposed on the urban landscape, generally with little regard for their spatial and social context.
By some measures of material circumstance the globalization process is encouraging, especially when considering the contributions of medical science and certain basic aspects of education and sanitation that can be made available with relatively inexpensive public investments. The reality, however, is that living standards and employment opportunities are deteriorating for growing segments of the population throughout the world.
Most new urban workers enjoy less security, if also more freedom, than their parents may have experienced as subsistence farmers or plantation laborers. Global information technologies and financial techniques now allow firms to seek out the world’s lowest-cost sites and labor, if necessary shifting jobs from one country to another in a matter of weeks.
The same new information media and transportation options that enable consumers to choose from a wider array of goods, or workers to choose from a wider array of jobs, also let criminals choose from a wider array of potential targets. Some conference participants argued that the perceived decrease in physical security was more apparent than real, especially in the U.S. But the perception itself is clearly driving a worldwide demand for gated or secure housing.
The positive and negative effects of globalization on the quality of life are two sides of the same coin, rather than tradeoffs. The same information technologies and market organization that spread new consumer goods around the world within weeks also transmit new “bads,” such as AIDS. The same automobiles that provide increased access to recreational opportunities in the countryside for city dwellers also produce sprawling cities that parcel out that countryside into private yards rather than scenic vistas of farmland or forest.
Given these contradictions, we must search for alternative models of production and consumption—models that permit people to strengthen their communities and protect their environments, that offer the possibility of creating productive employment for the whole population, and that place limits on the accelerated process of polarization.
The Role of Governance
To what extent are voters in global city regions asking their local, metropolitan or national governments to find ways of eliminating the negative effects of globalization? Conference participants in San Diego, Ankara and Tokyo, for example, reported that local elections are now fought over who benefits from globalization. Those voters who identify more with the global than the local economy demand that governments make high-technology infrastructure investments, build convention centers or stadiums, and promote higher education to attract future jobs.
In contrast, most lower-skilled workers see globalization as more of a threat than an opportunity, and are more concerned with investing limited local resources in such public services as schools and neighborhood clinics. Yet governments that avoid unpopular political decisions by focusing on local services may only be postponing the inevitable impact of globalization, including its potentially long-term beneficial effects.
In the end, the capacity of governments at any level to manage global forces may be limited, however. There is an inherent mismatch between the global economy and government, not only in the spatial sense of local or fragmented governments struggling to master regional or global economic forces, but in the contrasting operating modes of markets and governments.
Globalization has made increasingly problematic the definition of both “the region” that should be planned and “the community” that should participate in those plans. Local governments and even most national governments are losing their capacity to shield local businesses from global competition. In almost every city region represented at the conference, specialized interest groups and nongovernmental organizations have multiplied, while all-purpose governments have begun to fragment and decentralize. Political devolution is most advanced in the United States, but has begun to take hold elsewhere as well.
The tendency of governments of global city regions is to dispense with elaborate spatial planning techniques and instead adjust to what one conference planner called these fundamentally “new rules of property and politics.” But this leaves many contradictions: between the opportunities of the elites and the poor; between the advocates of greater local autonomy and those committed to emerging regional patterns of interdependence; and between policies favoring growth as opposed to redistribution of resources. Without an effective system of governance, all of these dichotomies have the potential for escalating conflict.
SHARE
Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 4 del libro Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.
Entre 1970 y 1989 se sometieron 17 proyectos de reforma urbana progresista al Congreso de Colombia, pero ninguno fue aprobado debido a la oposición del partido conservador apoyado por el influyente sector privado (formado, entre otros, por la industria de la construcción y promotores inmobiliarios). En 1989, luego de tres años de debates parlamentarios, se aprobó la Ley 9a de reforma urbana a pesar de la oposición de FEDELONJAS, entidad representante de los grupos de urbanización y bienes raíces. Tras la aprobación de la ley, FEDELONJAS presentó una demanda ante la Corte Constitucional por la pérdida de derechos de los propietarios de tierras que no se habían desarrollado durante el periodo definido por el plan maestro (Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial o POT). La corte ratificó la Ley 9a, y el sector de bienes raíces se dedicó a protestar a lo largo y ancho del país por lo que consideraba una expropiación injusta sin compensación. La ley fue tildada de “comunista” y peligrosa para el capital privado vinculado a la construcción y bienes raíces.
A principio de la década de 1990, la ciudad de Cali, con 2 millones y medio de habitantes y un gran déficit habitacional, aplicó la Ley 9a, con su amenaza de apropiación de propiedad, a un gran área de la ciudad cuyas tierras eran propiedad de un pequeño número de terratenientes. En anticipación de los hechos, urbanizadores y constructores de Cali sugirieron que estos propietarios se asociaran para desarrollar una gran cantidad de viviendas de interés social en sus propiedades.
Como resultado de esta experiencia positiva, la Cámara Nacional de la Construcción (CAMACOL, sindicato nacional de la industria de la construcción, incluidos urbanizadores, constructores y promotores de proyectos urbanos) brindó su apoyo a estos procesos de urbanización en otras ciudades, especialmente Bogotá y Medellín. Todo esto preparó el camino de manera tal que en 1997 el sector inmobiliario privado aceptó una modificación mejorada de la Ley 9a a la que se le dio el nombre de Ley 388. Este apoyo ha revolucionado la gestión del suelo urbano en Colombia. La nueva ley concede a las municipalidades la autoridad de gestionar el suelo urbano, promueve el plan maestro (POT), permite la recuperación de plusvalías urbanas y genera instrumentos de reglamentación del uso del suelo.
Para el año 2000, las discusiones ya no se centraban en demandas ni litigios sino más bien en las ventajas de obtener tierra para el desarrollo de proyectos a precios más bajos. Los sectores colombianos de construcción y bienes raíces han entrado al siglo XXI con una actitud proactiva hacia la recuperación pública de los incrementos del valor de la tierra (plusvalías) y otros instrumentos de gestión del suelo urbano. Ahora se entiende que esta legislación facilita tierra para desarrollo, genera arreglos para compartir tierras en grandes proyectos y estimula la producción de viviendas de interés social. Se han moderado los precios del suelo urbano y se ha vuelto más eficaz el uso del capital financiero para la construcción de viviendas en ciudades colombianas. Si bien es cierto que la oposición no ha desaparecido del todo, especialmente en las ciudades de tamaño mediano, también es cierto que ya no tiene la fuerza que tuvo en las décadas de 1970 y 1980.
Esta transformación en la actitud del sector inmobiliario privado ha orientado sus intereses a otros asuntos de índole social y colectiva. Está claro que la tierra es de su propietario, pero también que el derecho a desarrollarla pertenece al público y que puede concederse mediante instrumentos como la participación en plusvalías, la transferencia de derechos de desarrollo o la venta de derechos de construcción. Hoy por hoy las ganancias generadas por el desarrollo del suelo urbano están mejor distribuidas entre tres figuras: el inversionista, el terrateniente y la municipalidad.
Sobre el autor
Oscar Borrero Ochoa, economista y asesor urbanístico privado en Bogotá, fue presidente de FEDELONJAS desde 1981 hasta 1990.
SHARE
Gregory K. Ingram, Director-General, Operations Evaluation at the World Bank Group in Washington, DC, has been appointed by the Lincoln Institute Board of Directors to succeed Jim Brown as president and chief executive officer, effective June 1, 2005.
“I am very excited about joining the Lincoln Institute at an important time in its history. I am impressed by its traditional focus on land and tax policy and its strong programs in the valuation and taxation, planning and development, and international studies departments,” Ingram said. “This opportunity to lead the Institute allows me to draw upon my own interests and expertise in both the substantive areas of urban land markets, infrastructure and property taxation, and the management areas of program evaluation, policy development and research administration.”
Since joining the World Bank in 1977, Ingram has held positions in research, urban development, infrastructure, evaluation, and management, including an early urban research project in Bogotá, Colombia, and more recent research in China. He currently is responsible for evaluating operations, policies and programs at the Bank, the International Development Association, the International Finance Corporation and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency.
Ingram also has served on committees of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences and was formerly associated with the National Bureau of Economic Research. During the 1970s he was a graduate student and faculty member in the Department of Economics at Harvard University, where he taught courses in urban economics, transportation economics and microeconomic simulation models. His involvement with the Lincoln Institute also spans several decades, including participation in the Institute’s World Congress on Land Policy and its Taxation Resources and Economic Development (TRED) conferences.
He has conducted research in the areas of housing and land markets, urban economics, transportation, evaluation, and economic development. Among his many publications are World Development Report 1994: Infrastructure for Development and Evaluation and Development: The Partnership DimensionUrban Studies and Journal of Urban EconomicsEssays in Transportation Economics and Policy and Personal Cars and China.
Ingram holds a Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard University, a B.A. and M.A. in Philosophy, Politics and Economics from Oxford University, and a B.S. in Civil Engineering from Swarthmore College. He and his wife Lee, an educational psychologist, have three adult children. “We look forward to returning to Cambridge and renewing our involvement with the lively academic community there,” Ingram noted.
Kathryn Lincoln, chairman of the Lincoln Institute Board stated, “Greg brings the perfect blend of academic rigor and public policy experience to Lincoln as its next president. His evaluation work at the World Bank will be especially valuable as we continue to develop our own monitoring methods for both program and process. Personally, I look forward to working with him and to this new era for the Institute.”
SHARE
A well-functioning property tax system could offer many benefits to the nations of sub-Saharan Africa. At a time of decentralization, when local governments are being asked to assume new responsibilities for services and infrastructure in such countries as Sierra Leone, South Africa, and Uganda, a dependable and locally administered source of revenue would greatly benefit local democracy and economic development. It could improve the standard of living in local communities on a continent still grappling with abject poverty and poor governance.
SHARE
For many years, researchers have puzzled over the causes and consequences of voter-approved tax and expenditure limits (TELs), a fiscal rule that weakens the ability of elected officials to raise revenues or make expenditures.
SHARE
Cities are both contributors to and victims of global climate change. Delta cities, in particular, have long been recognized as being extremely vulnerable because they are located where the stresses on natural systems coincide with intense human activity.
A number of climate change impacts may affect delta cities, including rising sea levels, infrastructure damage from extreme weather events, the public health implications of higher average temperatures, altered energy consumption patterns, stress on water resources, impacts on tourism and cultural heritage, decreased urban biodiversity, and ancillary effects on air pollution (IPCC 2007). Climate change also may affect physical assets used for economic production and services, as well as the costs of raw materials and inputs, which in turn will affect competitiveness, economic performance, and employment patterns.
China’s remarkable economic growth since the beginning of the country’s reform period in 1978 has concentrated a large share of population and wealth along the coast, especially in three megacity regions: Pearl River Delta, Yangtze River Delta, and Capital Region. While the potential implications of climate change pose a challenge for coastal communities around the world, this geographic concentration of population and economic activity seems disproportionate in China.
Among China’s coastal and delta regions, the Pearl River Delta (PRD) in Guangdong province is an important economic center that includes the cities of Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and seven prefecture-level municipalities. Together with Hong Kong and Macao, the greater PRD area is one of the key megacity regions in the world, but its geography makes it highly vulnerable to sea level rise. Unprecedented economic and urban development, along with the major changes in land use and land cover accompanying that development over the past three decades, has released large emissions of CO2, leading to higher temperatures and more intensive and extreme weather events (Tracy, Trumbull, and Loh 2006). Given the importance of this region to both China and the broader global economy, we take a closer look at the PRD’s contribution to and risks from climate change.
Industrialization and Urbanization
With the establishment of the Shenzhen and Zhuhai Special Economic Zone in 1980, the PRD was among the earliest regions in China to begin to liberalize its economy. Its institutional advantages, combined with its proximity to Hong Kong and Macao, made the PRD the fastest growing region in the world during the past three decades. From 1979 to 2008, the PRD’s GDP grew at 15.6 percent annually in constant prices, outpacing both the national rate of 9.77 percent and the provincial rate of 13.8 percent.
As a result, the delta’s contribution to the share of GDP in China soared from 2.8 percent in 1979 to 9.5 percent in 2008. In terms of total fixed investment, foreign direct investment, exports, and energy consumption, the PRD was one of the most important and dynamic economic regions in China during this period (figure 1).
This rapid development resulted from the dual process of industrialization and urbanization. The region’s secondary and tertiary industries have grown rapidly as primary industry has gradually decreased in relative economic importance, with its contribution to GDP declining from 26.9 percent in 1979 to 2.4 percent in 2008, while the tertiary service sector grew from 27.9 percent to 47.3 percent.
Over the same time, the population increased from 17.97 to 47.71 million residents, reaching an urbanization rate of 82.2 percent in 2008. In terms of land use, areas designated for manufacturing, residential, and commercial uses grew by 8.47 percent annually, increasing from 1,068.7 square kilometers (k2) in 1979 to 4,617.16 k2 in 2008 (figure 2).
Climate Changes
Given these dramatic land use changes and the region’s increased emissions of greenhouse gases, it is not surprising that the PRD has experienced noticeable regional climate changes. The Guangdong Meteorological Administration (2007) reported that the average temperature increase in Guangdong province over the past five decades has been 0.21 °C every 10 years, which is similar to the rate of warming seen nationally in China. Guangdong’s coastal region, especially the highly urbanized PRD, witnessed even greater temperature increases, averaging 0.3 °C every 10 years. The cities of Shenzhen, Dongguan, Zhongshan, and Foshan warmed more than 0.4 °C every 10 years.
After compiling data from 21 meteorological stations in the PRD region, we calculated the average annual and seasonal temperatures during the 1971–2008 period and compared them with the annual temperatures in Guangdong. Our research showed the PRD has experienced significant warming and has been hotter than the entire Guangdong province during the observed period. Since the 1970s, the PRD has seen its average temperature rise by approximately 1.19 °C to 22.89 °C in the most recent decade, with annual average temperatures remaining above the region’s 30-year average temperature of 22.1 °C since 1994 (figure 3).
The winter and autumn seasons saw the most considerable temperature increases, with averages of 24.1 °C in the autumn and 15.2 °C in the winter between 1994 and 2007. These temperatures are significantly higher than their respective 40-year averages of 23.5 °C and 14.6 °C. While not as significant, average spring and summer temperatures in the PRD during the 1997–2007 period were also greater than their 40-year average temperatures of 22 °C and 28.2 °C. This regional warming phenomenon is also seen to a lesser degree in Guangzhou, a populous and characteristic metropolis in the PRD, where average temperatures have risen like those in the greater delta region.
As the PRD’s climate has warmed more quickly than that in the rest of the province, the rapid industrialization and urbanization has generated enormous energy demand from manufacturing industries, transportation, and residential consumers, resulting in greater emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases that are contributing to global climate change. The increased concentration of greenhouse gases, both regionally and globally, represents a large latent source of future warming and additional changes.
Impacts of Climate Change
Given its coastal geography and population density, Guangdong is among the most vulnerable of China’s coastal provinces to the sort of meteorological disasters that are expected to increase with global warming. In 2008, Guangdong experienced direct economic losses of 15.43 billion yuan and 73 deaths, accounting for 75 percent and 48 percent of national totals, respectively, as well as the loss of 602 kilometers (km) of land to coastal erosion (table 1). With sea levels in the province having risen by 75 millimeters (mm) during the 1975–1993 period, the China Meteorological Administration’s (2009b) prediction that sea levels will rise a further 78–150 mm between 2008 and 2038 represents a serious threat to coastal infrastructure and communities in the PRD.
Guangdong has long been impacted by marine hazards such as rainstorms, cyclones, and storm surges that have killed hundreds of people, caused serious damage to housing and transportation infrastructure, and impacted farming in the province. In the 1950s, the annual average farming area affected by marine hazards was about 200,000 hectares (ha), which grew to 440,000 ha in the 1960s and 500,000 ha in the 1970s, before jumping to 1,411,000 ha in the 1990s.
In addition to more frequent extreme storm events, instances of drought also have been increasing in the PRD. In the 1950s, the average farming area affected by droughts in Guangdong was 104,000 ha, which grew steadily to reach 201,500 ha in the 1980s, 282,500 ha in the 1990s, and 426,400 ha in the 2000s. Given the expected increases in the frequency of extreme weather events, as well as rising temperatures and sea levels, agricultural and mariculture activities in the PRD will be increasingly vulnerable to future climate change.
Cities in the PRD are particularly susceptible to natural disasters and climate change as they concentrate infrastructure, nonagricultural activities, and population, severely impacting economic activities and daily life. Rainstorms and typhoons occur frequently in the region and typically entail serious damage and huge economic losses. During the 2000–2007 period, for instance, rainstorms and typhoons in Shenzhen caused cumulative direct economic losses of 525 and 277 million yuan respectively, accounting for approximately for 63 and 33 percent of total direct economic losses associated with all meteorological hazards in the city (figure 4).
Meteorological hazards also lead to disruptive impacts on facilities, infrastructure, and transportation. Rainstorms and typhoons impose challenges on urban sewage systems and flood control facilities, while prolonged periods of high or low temperatures exert pressure on urban power supply infrastructure.
In May 2009, Shenzhen experienced an unprecedented rainstorm, with some parts of the city receiving daily precipitation in excess of 208 mm. The storm flooded 40 areas of the city and left 11 areas under at least one meter of water. Two years before, in April 2007, rainstorms flooded the Qinghuhe River in Shenzhen, damaging embankments and toppling power lines. On the other end of the spectrum, in July 2004 Guangzhou suffered a prolonged heat wave that created tremendous demand for electricity. Usage eventually peaked at 8.45 million kilowatts and forced many enterprises to stop production to help conserve power.
Transportation is the lifeline of urban activity and economic production. As two of China’s major population and economic centers, Shenzhen and Guangzhou are particularly important national transportation hubs, and any disruptions from extreme weather events such as rainstorms, typhoons, and flooding have far-reaching effects across the country.
When tropical storm Fengshen landed in Shenzhen on June 24, 2008, the city’s Yantian seaport was forced to close and hundreds of vessels were stuck in port, resulting in huge economic losses. During 2008, four tropical storms and one rainstorm resulted in the cancellation of 249 flights and the delay of 386 other flights at the Shenzhen International Airport, stranding more than 20,000 passengers. In 2009, three major weather events caused the cancellation of 176 flights and the delay of 326 flights, while 4,151 ships were forced to take shelter in Yantian port. As Chinese travelers become more affluent and air travel grows more rapidly, the vulnerability of these cities to disruption by severe weather events is set to increase.
Disruptive Effects of Sea Level Rise
The China Meteorological Administration (2009b) has identified the PRD as one of the country’s areas most at risk from rising sea levels due to its low mean sea level. Previous studies concur that sea levels in the PRD are rising and will continue to do so in the foreseeable future. Figure 5 illustrates the changes in sea level recorded at three tidal gauges (Hong Kong, Zha Po, and Shan Tou) during the 1958–2001 period. Hong Kong recorded a sea level rise of 0.24 centimeters per year (cm/year) during the period, while Zha Po and Shan Tou saw sea levels rise by 0.21cm/year and 0.13cm/year, respectively. Tidal records from six different gauges in the Pearl River estuary show that sea levels have risen at an accelerating rate over the last 40 years.
With the melting of glaciers globally due to climate change, these recent rises in sea level are expected to continue and potentially even accelerate. Li and Zeng (1998) offered three forecasts for sea level rise in the PRD, with 100 cm (high), 65 cm (middle), and 35 cm (low) forecasts by 2100. These predictions have been echoed by similar projections from the Chinese Academy of Sciences (1994), which indicate that sea levels in the PRD would rise by 40 to 60 cm by 2050.
The physical geography and urban development of the delta render it extremely vulnerable to the effects of sea level rise, and many lowland areas are likely to be inundated (Yang 1996). According to calculations by China’s National Marine Data and Information Service, a sea level rise of 30 cm could inundate an area of 1,154 k2 of coast and islands at high tide, with Guangzhou, Doumen County, and Foshan at particular risk (Guangdong Meteorological Administration 2007).
Coastal and river flooding in the PRD is influenced by several factors: rainfall, high tides, high winds, and typhoons and storm surges. The combination of weather and tidal factors that causes water levels to rise by upwards of three meters during tidal cycles is already well known in parts of the Pearl River Estuary (Tracy, Trumbull, and Loh 2006). According to Huang, Zong, and Zhang (2004), the current maximum tidal range increases as one travels up the estuary, from a low of 2.34 meters near Hong Kong to 3.31 meters at Zhewan, before reaching 3.35 meters at Nansha.
Rising sea levels would magnify the effect of storm surges, which already can be dramatic when weather and tidal factors coincide. Analyzing records from 54 tidal gauges across the PRD, Huang, Zong, and Zhang (2004) created predictions for water level rises in different parts of the delta under a number of different flood scenarios. According to the lowest freshwater discharge scenario (2000 m2/s), their simulations show that a 30 cm sea level rise will affect the northwest part of the region most severely and the majority of the area significantly. These researchers also simulated the impacts of a 30 cm sea level rise on the distribution of flood damage based on four freshwater discharge scenarios, showing that as floods increase in severity the size of the areas affected also increases.
Summary and Discussion
Delta cities enjoy locational advantages that make them attractive to both residents and businesses, and thereby lead many delta regions to develop into vital economic cores in many countries. Delta cities, however, are particularly vulnerable to meteorological hazards and are more at risk than inland cities to the existing and anticipated effects of climate change. The Pearl River Delta has witnessed substantial increases in both sea levels and temperatures, greater variation in rainfall, more frequent extreme weather events, and increasing losses from marine hazards.
More frequent meteorological hazards such as flooding from tropical storms and rainfalls have indeed caused disruptive impacts in the PRD: disrupting agricultural and mariculture production, damaging coastal defenses and embankments, destroying houses and facilities, shutting down transportation, and causing the loss of life. Sea level rise resulting from global warming represents a further threat and challenge in many parts of the region. The cumulative impact of these interrelated weather and climate phenomena have increased the costs of development in the PRD substantially. Fortunately, provincial and municipal governments have realized the importance of climate mitigation and adaptation, and are looking to the experiences of other delta cities around the world for valuable lessons about how best to strengthen urban sustainability and resiliency.
References
China Meteorological Administration. 2009a. China marine hazards report 2008. Beijing.
———. 2009b. China sea level report 2008. Beijing.
Chinese Academy of Sciences. 1994. The impact of sea level rise on economic development of the Pearl River Delta. In The impacts of sea level rise on China’s delta regions. Beijing: Science Press.
Du, Yao-dong, Li-li Song, Hui-qing Mao, Hai-yan Tang, and An-gao Xu. 2004. Climate warming in Guangdong province and its influences on agriculture and counter measures. Journal of Tropical Meteorology 10(2): 150–159.
Guangdong Meteorological Administration. 2007. Assessment report on climate change in Guangdong. www.gdemo.gov.cn
He, Canfei, Lei Yang, and Guicai Li. 2010. Urban development and climate change in the Pearl River Delta. Working Paper. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
Huang, Z., Y. Zong, and W. Zhang. 2004. Coastal inundation due to sea level rise in the Pearl River Delta, China. Natural Hazards 33: 247–264.
IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). 2007. Climate change 2007: Impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Li, P., and Z. Zeng. 1998. On the climatic and environmental changes in the Pearl River Delta during the last 500 years. Quaternary Sciences 1: 65–70.
Tracy, A., K. Trumbull, and C. Loh. 2006. The impacts of climate change in Hong Kong and the Pearl River Delta. Hong Kong: Civic Exchange.
Wu, Y. and Li, H. 2009. Meteorological disasters and hazard evaluations in Shenzhen since 2000. Guangdong Meteorology. 31(3): 43-45 (in Chinese).
Yang, H. 1996. Potential effects of sea-level rise in the Pearl River Delta area: Preliminary study results and a comprehensive adaptation strategy. In Adapting to climate change: An international perspective, J. N. Smith, et al., eds. New York: Springer-Verlag.
About the Authors
Canfei Heis professor in the College of Urban and Environmental Sciences, Peking University, and associate director of the Peking University–Lincoln Institute Center for Urban Development and Land Policy. He is also the associate director of the Economic Geography Specialty Group of the China Geographical Society. His research interests include multinational corporations, industrial location and spatial clustering of firms, and energy and the environment in China, and his publications appear in many international journals.
Lei Yang is a Ph.D. student in Shenzhen Graduate School of Peking University.
