Topic: Imposto à Propriedade Imobiliária

Assessment Reform in Indiana

One Step Forward, Two Steps Back
Frank Kelly and Jeff Wuensch, Novembro 1, 2000

The property tax in Indiana has long generated considerable public policy debate, centering on the methods prescribed by the state to determine property values. Most states use some form of market value as the assessment standard, but Indiana relies on “true tax value.” Indiana law defines this as “the value determined under the rules of the State Board of Tax Commissioners,” and it declares that “true tax value does not mean fair market value.”

A landmark decision by the state Supreme Court in December 1998 ignited new debate over Indiana’s property tax system. The Court ruled that the tables used in the 1995 assessment manual lacked “meaningful reference to property wealth,” did not contain “objectively verifiable data,” and violated the state constitution. Although the legal opinion contained language suggesting approval of the use of market-derived data, the Court fell short of mandating a system based strictly on market value.

Almost two years have passed since this ruling, but minimal progress has been made in implementing a more equitable and uniform assessment system. Policy makers have focused almost exclusively on the projected tax shifts, especially those to homeowners, under market-derived valuation methods, and have all but ignored the underlying inequities that plague Indiana’s assessment system.

This article reviews the essential features of Indiana’s property tax and assessment systems, describes recent reform efforts, and identifies critical reform issues, apart from the tax shifts, that need to be addressed.

Property Tax and Assessment Systems

Property Tax Revenues. In 1999, the property tax raised more than $4.6 billion, nearly all of it generated locally and used for local services, especially K-12 public education. The property tax is the largest revenue source in Indiana, generating more revenue in 1999 than federal funds ($3.8 billion), individual income taxes ($3.7 billion), and sales and use taxes ($3.4 billion). Together, these four revenue sources account for nearly 80 percent of total state and local revenue (see Figure 1).

Nearly 65 percent of the total property tax levy in 1999 was paid by the business community, including commercial, industrial, utility, and agricultural property (see Figure 2). Personal property accounts for about one-half of the total business property tax burden. Although Indiana’s constitution prohibits unequal property taxation, this relatively high business share demonstrates a de facto classification system that allocates a majority of the property tax burden to non-voting entities.

Local Administration. The primary assessing jurisdiction in Indiana is the township. Each of the state’s 1,008 townships elects either a full- or part-time assessor, depending on population; nearly 85 percent of these assessors are part-time. County assessors are elected in each of the state’s 92 counties. As a general rule, the county assessor has a greater role when townships have more part-time assessors, because the county assessor reviews both personal property and real estate assessments.

State Administration. The State Board of Tax Commissioners (Tax Board), the first property tax commission of its kind in the nation, is primarily responsible for promulgating assessment rules and regulations for both real and personal property. Additionally, the Tax Board hears property tax appeals, approves local government budgets, provides assessor training, and maintains a comprehensive local government database.

Assessment Standards. Real and personal property are assessed at one-third of true tax value (TTV). The TTV of improved real property is based on a cost approach, but neither the replacement costs nor the depreciation schedules are market derived. In fact, when compared to the market, Indiana’s TTVs vary widely, not only between property classes (i.e., residential, business, utility and agricultural) but within classes as well.

The TTV of personal property is based on original acquisition cost, but, like the TTV of real property, relies on depreciation schedules that bear little relationship to the market. Most business assets receive accelerated depreciation of 40 to 60 percent in the first few years. However, older assets are subject to a relatively high residual value of 30 percent of original cost. Business inventory also is based on its original cost and is subject to the same floor, but it receives a 35 percent assessment deduction.

Indiana law provides that the TTV of land is to be based on market value, but recent studies have found that land assessments are significantly less than market value. Residential land values are roughly 40 percent of market value. The TTV of farmland is based on a use value of $495 per acre, adjusted for soil productivity, resulting in an assessment that is also well below market value.

Assessment Cycle. Indiana employs two different assessment cycles. Personal property is self-assessed annually, while real property reassessment is both infrequent and irregular. The last general reassessment of real property took effect in March 1995. The previous reassessment occurred in 1989, and reassessments generally took effect every ten years before then. The next general reassessment of real property has been delayed from March 1999 until at least March 2002.

Assessment Reform

Major state reform efforts, whether in welfare programs, school funding or tax policy, tend be driven by either fiscal distress or judicial mandates, but the political process dictates the speed of reform. This same pattern holds true for tax reform to achieve a more equitable and uniform assessment system in Indiana, as policy makers have been slow to respond to judicial mandates.

Judicial Efforts. The Indiana Supreme Court’s 1998 decision in State Board of Tax Commissioners v. Town of St. John is widely considered to be the most significant judicial decision on taxation in the state’s history. The Supreme Court affirmed the state Tax Court’s decision that the 1995 real property assessment manual violated the state constitution’s requirement that the Indiana General Assembly provide for “. . . a uniform and equal rate of property assessment and taxation.”

The Supreme Court found these mandates of uniformity and equality were not met because the manual’s cost schedules were arbitrary, did not reflect actual construction costs, and were not based on “objectively verifiable” data. Unlike the Tax Court, however, the Supreme Court did not mandate a strict market value system. Rather, it ruled that any departures from market value must result in assessments that are “substantially uniform and equal based on property wealth.”

Because executive and legislative policy makers have been slow to respond to this mandate, the Tax Court has become increasingly assertive in the pursuit of an equitable assessment system. Recently, the Tax Court established certain dates for both the adoption (June 2001) and implementation (March 2002) of constitutional assessment regulations, required the Tax Board to submit monthly progress reports, and announced that an independent reassessment commissioner would be appointed if the Tax Board’s efforts were “deficient in any meaningful way.”

Executive Efforts. To carry out its duty to ensure uniformity and equality of property assessment and taxation, the Indiana General Assembly has delegated the development and oversight of the state’s assessment system to the State Tax Board, an executive agency under the governor. This agency has the unenviable task of creating a new assessment system that will likely cause considerable shifts in tax burdens. Delays have further politicized this process, and assessment reform and tax burden shifts have become the focus of the November 2000 general election.

The Tax Board has taken steps to comply with the Supreme Court decision. The Board’s 1999 proposed real property assessment manual incorporated market-derived cost tables for all property classes. Residential depreciation schedules also were based on the market, and the base value of agricultural land was increased from $495 to $1,050 an acre.

Unfortunately, other actions by the Tax Board and the inaction of the executive branch may have offset these improvements. For example, the proposed manual provided a residential assessment reduction, or shelter allowance. The Tax Board argued that basic shelter is not property wealth, since other assets cannot substitute for shelter. A shelter allowance was calculated for each county, ranging in value between $16,000 and $22,686, to be deducted from residential property assessments. This unique valuation method would reduce the predicted residential tax shift from 33 to 7 percent and could be considered a form of classification. Viewing this shift as unacceptable, the governor did not approve the 1999 proposed real estate manual, illustrating the highly politicized nature of assessment reform.

Legislative Efforts. Anticipating a major court decision, the 1997 Indiana General Assembly enacted legislation that many considered the first step toward significant assessment reform. It increased assessor training requirements, improved the local and state appeals process, and required the state to establish level of assessment and uniformity standards and to conduct equalization studies. Again, these improvements may have been offset by other legislative initiatives. The 1997 legislation allows township assessors to establish land values, an authority that previously rested with county land commissions. Current data indicates that these township land values are far from market values, and it is unlikely that the large number of part-time township assessors can establish more accurate land values in the future.

The recently enacted equalization legislation is also problematic. Most states equalize assessments in the first year that reassessment takes effect, to provide immediate mitigation for unequal assessment. Current Indiana law delays equalization for at least two years following the effective date of reassessment.

Conclusion

It comes as no surprise that projected property tax shifts have become the focal point of both assessment reform efforts and the 2000 general election. The highly politicized debate over “acceptable” tax burden shifts has distracted policy makers from addressing reform of assessment regulations. While market-derived assessment manuals represent a significant step, this alone will not result in a more uniform and equitable assessment system. Policy makers must also consider the following issues:

1. Taxpayer equity cannot be measured by interclass tax shifts at the county level alone. Assessment reform will produce dramatic intraclass and intracounty tax shifts, but these shifts have been discussed only as they relate to residential property. Yet, current data indicates that equally significant shifts will occur within other property classes, especially business property.

2. The current administrative structure of the state’s assessment system may not be compatible with an equitable and uniform assessment system. Restructuring the Tax Board could help insulate it from the political consequences of its oversight function. At the local level, policy makers should consider streamlining the roles of local assessors and identifying alternative assessment jurisdiction models based on population, parcel counts, and/or assessed value.

3. Adoption and enforcement of strict equalization standards may be the most significant step in the reform process.

4. The Indiana assessment community should take further steps to increase the level of assessor training and expand assessor qualification requirements. Policy makers also should consider appointment of local assessors by the county executive.

5. Indiana land assessments have been and continue to be well below market value. This underlying problem must be rectified through assessor training, more diligent state oversight, and implementation of the equalization process.

These issues must be addressed in order to remedy the inequities currently plaguing Indiana’s property tax and assessment systems.

____________

Frank Kelly and Jeff Wuensch are cofounders of the Nexus Group, an Indiana-based research firm specializing in property taxation. Kelly is also assistant professor of economics at Butler University and Indiana University; he previously served as the senior tax analyst for the Indiana State Tax Board. Wuensch previously worked as director of tax review at the Indiana State Tax Board and at the Indiana Fiscal Policy Institute. Kelly, Wuensch and Thomas Hamilton, assistant professor of real estate in the Department of Finance at the University of St. Thomas in St. Paul, Minnesota, are joint recipients of a David C. Lincoln Fellowship in Land Value Taxation from the Lincoln Institute. This article is based on their study of Indiana’s property tax system as part of their Fellowship project.

Total state and local revenue: Table/Chart 1 Sources are the Indiana State Tax Board and Indiana State Budget Agency Who pays the property tax: Table/Chart 2 Source is the Indiana State Tax Board.

South Africa

Land Policy and Taxation in Transition
Joan Youngman, Novembro 1, 1997

The shift to a multi-racial government in South Africa is as pronounced and dramatic a transition as that of the new independent states of Central and Eastern Europe. In the past five years, South Africa has adopted a new constitution, elected a new government, redrawn state and municipal boundaries, and undertaken basic reform of its legal and political system. Land policy is central to this transformation, for “since the 1913 Natives Land Act, rights to own, rent or even share-crop land in South Africa depended upon a person’s race classification.” (1) Among the major land-related issues currently under scrutiny are property tax reform, restitution of land rights, and improvements in tenure security and access to landholding.

Land and Property Taxation

South African real property taxes take a number of forms, including “site rating,” a tax on unimproved value alone; “flat rating” on land and structures uniformly; and “composite ratings,” which tax land and improvements at different rates. Multiplicity and change are the norm, as Cape Town has recently decided to adopt site rating, Durban is considering replacement of its composite rating system with site rating, and Pretoria has introduced a temporary tax on improvements to supplement its site rating system.

The property tax in South Africa is not at present applied to rural land, although its potential extension to non-urban areas is the subject of intense debate. It is in the cities, however, that the struggle to transform the country will succeed or fail. In 1995, the urban sector accounted for about 65 percent of South Africa’s population and more than 80 percent of its GDP. Property taxes are an important source of revenue for cities to meet the cost of providing services within their newly redrawn boundaries.

These new boundaries are another index of the pace and variety of change in South Africa. Efforts to consolidate wealthy residential and commercial areas with impoverished townships and settlements have taken different forms in different regions. The central business districts of Johannesburg and Durban have been divided among several taxing jurisdictions that extend beyond their city limits. By contrast, the most of Cape Town’s business and residential regions were combined this summer with a set of neighboring townships in a new administrative region. It consists of 19 former administrations consolidated into 7, involving a transfer of more than 10,000 municipal staff and many assets. These measures have extremely important political and fiscal implications, bringing together as they do residential areas with living standards equal to or even surpassing European norms and settlements without electricity, paved roads or running water.

From a land policy perspective, perhaps the most dramatic legacy of past racial policies is the imbalance between white and non-white landownership. Under apartheid, 87 percent of the country’s land was reserved for white residents, who in 1995 constituted only 13 percent of South Africa’s population. Under these circumstances, property taxation takes on special importance as a potential means for expanding access to the land market. Roy Bahl and Johannes Linn have written:

[A]n equity argument may be at the heart of the matter: urban land prices are frequently so high that low-income groups cannot afford to purchase land…. To the extent that the revenue from property taxes is capitalized into lower current land values (since the tax reduces the expected future private yield on the land), it partially expropriates landownership rights from the present owner and also constitutes a loan to future owners, who can now acquire the land at a lower price but will have to pay property taxes in the future. If low-income groups cannot buy land because they lack liquidity and access to capital markets, property taxation may be one of the policy instruments to improve their access to landownership. (2)

Tax Collections and Tax Revolts

The government faces the challenge of reversing a “culture of nonpayment” for municipal services among township residents. During the apartheid era, the African National Congress (ANC) encouraged its supporters to refuse payment of water and utility charges as a means of contesting the legitimacy of the state-sponsored black local authorities. The resulting arrears were a major financial burden on all levels of government. Now the ANC seeks to promote voluntary payment for these same services, and as well as payment of real property taxes by those who now are able to hold title to their property.

Ironically, one tax protest that received wide publicity took the form of a property tax revolt in one of the nation’s wealthiest white residential areas, the Sandton suburb of Johannesburg. When property tax rates doubled and tripled there in 1996, many local property owners withheld payment in protest. This situation illustrates one of the most paradoxical aspects of the fiscal challenge to the new South Africa: the need to redress the enormous imbalance in resources across racial groups while commanding support from white citizens who feel over-taxed.

On the one hand, the disparities in needs and resources are overwhelming. Households falling below the official poverty level include only 0.7 percent of the white population, but 65 percent of the black population. At the same time, many white taxpayers feel overburdened by taxes-income tax rates, for example, can reach 45 percent on earnings over $22,000-and resentful of nonpayment by some township residents. In Alexandra, a black township inside Sandton, last year’s tax collection rate was only 3 percent. Any effort to meet the pressing fiscal needs of the new South Africa must take into account the vastly different perceptions of contribution and entitlement across its diverse population.

Perspectives on Future Directions

In July, a conference at the University of South Africa in Pretoria brought together governmental officials, policy analysts, academics and international experts to consider local government design and fiscal capacity. Brief overviews of two of the more than 30 presentations at that conference give a sense of the range of issues debated there, from concrete points of physical engineering to theoretical questions of intergovernmental fiscal relations.

At the most basic level, the definition of revenue needs depends on a prior decision as to the scope of local services to which all citizens are entitled. Given that large township areas have grown up without standard infrastructure, what goals should the government set for provision of water, electricity and roads?

Peter Vaz of the official Financial and Fiscal Commission outlined an approach to the monumental task of estimating the cost of providing the minimum services that each citizen can expect. The South African constitution enumerates 27 guaranteed rights, including the right to equality, to human dignity, to life, to freedom of expression, to a healthy environment, to housing, to health care services, to sufficient food, water and social security, to education, to information. The Commission is considering attempts to identify three levels of services-basic, intermediate and full provision. It is also looking at the cost of extending six services to urban and rural areas: water, sewerage, solid waste, roads, stormwater, electricity. For example, the basic level of water provision might be a communal standpipe, the intermediate level a yard tap, and full provision a house connection. The capital cost of each service package then provides a first estimate of the revenue necessary to meet the guarantees relevant to local government activities.

The broadest fiscal questions concern the allocation of taxes and functions among levels of governments. Rudolph Penner of the Barents Group stated that his general support for decentralization in transition economies was tempered in the case of South Africa. The model of voters as consumers choosing a set of local services in exchange for payment of local taxes is not necessarily applicable or desirable in this context. The strong ideological background to politics in South Africa means that voters are not primarily making a local electoral choice on the basis of economic policy. Moreover, the history of apartheid makes self-selected homogeneous groupings unacceptable if they lead to segregation by income class or race. Penner concluded that fiscal decentralization in South Africa must be of a more restrained variety than might be appropriate elsewhere.

These considerations serve only to highlight the sweeping reconsideration of all public institutions and their mandates that has accompanied the initiation of a new era in South African history. Improvements in land policy and taxation may play a significant role in assisting this immense task of national self-transformation.

Joan Youngman is a senior fellow of the Lincoln Institute, where she directs the Program on the Taxation of Land and Buildings. She and Martim Smolka, senior fellow for Latin America Programs, served on the faculty of the July conference at the University of South Africa.

Notes:

1. South African Department of Land Affairs, Our Land: Green Paper on South African Land Policy (1996), p. 9.

2. Roy W. Bahl and Johannes F. Linn, Urban Public Finance in Developing Countries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 168.

What are the names of South Africa’s official languages?

A recent newspaper trivia puzzle gives a startling perspective on the enormity of the political, legal and cultural changes experienced by South Africa since 1993, and the difficulty foreign observers face in grasping the scope of these transformations.

The original answer to the question about official languages was given as English and Afrikaans. One week later, a correction noted that South Africa’s major tribal languages should also be included. So the full answer lists ten official languages:

English

Afrikaans

Ndebele

Northern Sotho (Sepedi)

Southern Sotho (Sesotho)

Swati

Tsonga

Tswana (Setswana)

Venda, Xhosa

Zulu

Stabilizing Property Taxes in Volatile Real Estate Markets

Joan Youngman and Jane Malme, Julho 1, 2005

Property taxes based on market value have many features that recommend them as a source of local government revenue. They promote visibility and accountability in public spending by providing property owners with a means of evaluating the costs and benefits of local government services. They can provide stable, independent local revenue that is not at the mercy of state budget surpluses or deficits. They are now considered to be proportional or even mildly progressive, in contrast to earlier economic views that presumed the tax to be regressive.

Against these strengths, the greatest challenge to a value-based property tax is political: taxpayers’ strong and completely understandable resistance to sharp increases in tax payments that reflect rising markets but not necessarily rising incomes with which to pay the tax increases. The best known and most dramatic response to this situation was rejection of the value-based tax system in California in 1978. When voters approved Proposition 13, they changed the tax base to the value of the property at the time of purchase or construction, with a maximum 2 percent annual inflation adjustment. For property held by the same owner since 1978, the inflation adjustment is applied to its value on the 1975–1976 tax roll.

This change has greatly altered California’s fiscal landscape. It has restricted the role of local governments, centralized service provision and decision making, and redistributed the tax burden from long-time residents to new property owners. Local governments now have an incentive to seek sales tax revenue by encouraging large retail establishments, such as auto malls, in what has been termed the “fiscalization of land use.” Can the property tax achieve greater stability and predictability without such drastic social and governmental costs? Table 1 illustrates the wide range of residential property tax levies in large metropolitan areas, a factor that presents additional challenges to formulating uniform policies or practical recommendations.

A Lincoln Institute seminar in April 2005 brought together public finance and assessment officials, policy analysts and scholars to consider alternate approaches to the recurrent problems that volatile real estate markets pose for value-based property taxes.

Problems Related to Market-Value Assessment

Discussion began with the incontrovertible observation, “Taxpayers do not like unpredictability.” In theory, reductions in tax rates could balance increases in property prices to maintain stability in actual tax payments under market-value assessments. This approach faces two obstacles. The first and most straightforward is governmental reluctance to reduce tax rates and forego increased revenues when rising values provide a cover for greater tax collection. The second is nonuniform price appreciation in different locations and for different types of property. When one segment of the tax base experiences a disproportionate value change, a corresponding change in the tax rate applied to the entire property class will not maintain level tax collections. California faced both difficulties in the years preceding adoption of Proposition 13. There, rapid residential appreciation was not matched by the lagging commercial sector, and a $7.1 billion state surplus fueled taxpayer cynicism as to the actual need for increased government revenues.

While rapid market shifts are the most challenging source of unpredictable tax changes, taxpayer “shocks” can also be caused simply by long delays in reassessment. Maintaining outdated values on the tax rolls achieves short-term predictability in tax bills, but at the expense of uniformity, accuracy and even legality. Long-postponed reassessments have been followed by tax revolts in many jurisdictions, both in this country and overseas.

Options for Addressing Value Shifts

Seminar participants reviewed the benefits and drawbacks of various measures to address these problems.

Circuit breakers, as their name implies, attempt to reduce a property tax “overload” by providing a refund or credit for taxes that exceed a set percentage of the property owner’s income. When funded by the state and administered as part of the state tax system, they have the dual benefit of protecting local revenue and targeting aid to the most needy taxpayers. At the same time, they require state funding and administration, and taxpayers must file tax returns to order to obtain these benefits. Like all programs that require income information, they sometimes encounter taxpayer resistance and consequent underutilization.

Homestead exemptions, available in most states, reduce assessments on the taxpayer’s primary residence. These exemptions are often granted without regard to taxpayer income, and so are not targeted to the most needy. In predominantly residential communities, this results in a significant loss of municipal revenues unless the tax rate is increased or the tax burden is shifted to other taxpayers. Like all preferential programs for homeowners, these exemptions fail to benefit renters, who bear a portion of the property tax burden and generally are less affluent than homeowners.

Tax deferral measures, often available to low-income elderly homeowners, permit unpaid taxes to accumulate as a lien against the property, to be paid after the residence changes hands. However, the desire to retain property clear of encumbrances has traditionally led homeowners to avoid making use of this option.

“Truth in taxation” legislation requires local governments to take various measures, such as publishing voter information and requesting ballot approval, to treat increases in tax collections in the same manner whether they are the result of growth in the tax base or increases in the tax rate. These enactments seek to counter the temptation to allow rates to remain constant while market values rise, thus increasing taxes and spending without budgetary accountability.

Limitations on annual total property tax collection increases, such as Proposition 2½ in Massachusetts, restrict overall levy growth but do not address unpredictable tax bill changes for specific taxpayers. For example, after several decades of tax stability, Boston taxpayers are now facing assessment shifts that reflect a downturn in the commercial property market with simultaneous explosive growth in certain residential values.

Limitations on annual tax increases for individual properties have enormous political appeal, but face three hazards. First, there is often pressure to make the phase-in period as long as possible, or even longer than possible. Montana provided for an extended 50-year phase-in of new assessments. Second, initial success at limiting increases to a certain percentage may lead to efforts to reduce that limit again. Oklahoma instituted a 5 percent limit and now faces pressure to reduce it to 3 percent. Finally, the “catch-up” of tax assessments when values stabilize or even drop elicits opposition of its own as taxpayers face increasing assessments while property values are flat or falling.

Assessment “freezes” take limitations on increases to their ultimate conclusion, prohibiting any increases despite changes in market values. They often are restricted to specific groups of taxpayers, such as elderly homeowners. Proposition 13 is a type of assessment freeze for all property, with only a 2 percent annual inflation adjustment in the tax base. These measures are in many respects equivalent to the long delays in reassessments that lead to nonuniformity and resistance to new valuations. After values are frozen taxpayers may seek to transfer that value to other family members, as they do in California, or to new residences, as in Texas.

Possible New Approaches

Seminar participants discussed methods for utilizing these and other measures to address the problems of unpredictability while minimizing the problems of inequitable distribution of the tax burden and maintenance of collections. A major distinction was drawn between approaches that moderate tax bill shifts but maintain a market-value base and those that alter assessments themselves. Altering assessments by limiting increases in value can result in situations where owners of similar properties pay very different tax bills. Furthermore, over time properties with average or lesser value appreciation can experience an increasingly greater share of taxes compared with properties that have had larger market increases. As a result wealthier taxpayers are more likely than those of moderate or low incomes to benefit from assessment limits.

To maintain a market-value tax base, with its benefits of uniformity, understandability and administrative efficiency, participants offered suggestions to stabilize rapid increases in tax payments due to significant shifts in the assessment base.

  • Eliminating stringent income limitations on eligibility for senior citizen deferral programs, expanding eligibility for circuit breakers and tax deferral, and including such measures in state rather than local tax relief programs would allow more taxpayers to participate. A state could establish a property tax deferral fund to reimburse local jurisdictions for delayed collections.
  • Classification and taxation of property according to use is a common means of taxing commercial and industrial properties at a higher rate than residential properties. Changing the class rates to accommodate a shift in the value base can be an appropriate short-term remedy, but may have harmful economic consequences in the long term. In Massachusetts the permitted shift of the share of the total tax levy from residential to commercial property in a municipality is subject to statutory limits. The recent combined acceleration of residential values and downturn of commercial values would have resulted in a substantial shift of taxes to homeowners in the City of Boston and a few other urban centers. Thus the legislature permitted a temporary increase of the share to be borne by the commercial class, at local option, but required a return to an even more limited class share difference within a five-year period.
  • Alternative methods of tax collection, such as credit card, direct debit or more frequent payment schedules, may offer greater financial convenience than the more common annual and semiannual billings.
  • Shorter periods between revaluations avoid the “sticker shock” that accompanies dramatic shifts and increases in value when reassessment occurs infrequently. Annual reassessments using computer-assisted mass appraisals offer greater stability and uniformity. Tax bills that reflect current values, rather than fractional assessments or outdated figures, are easier for taxpayers to understand.

Even significant increases in assessed value, if relatively uniform across the jurisdiction, do not result in increased taxes for most property owners if the municipal budget requires no additional property tax revenues and the tax rate is reduced proportionately. Better information about the relationship between assessed value and the tax rate will make it less likely that taxpayers will place the blame for their higher taxes on the assessors and their assessments. They may consider instead the adequacy of funding sources available to local governments, the effect of exemptions that reduce the property tax base, and unfunded mandates that require additional local expenditures.

The property tax, as the most important source of autonomous local revenue, often bears the brunt of criticism for the social, economic and fiscal pressures on local communities. Among these pressures are increased costs of new educational, environmental and security requirements, reductions in state and federal assistance, changing demographics and economic conditions, and increasing numbers of exemptions. Attention to these issues can clarify the debate over the role and burden of property taxes and the effectiveness of various tax relief measures.

Improving Educational Resources

There is an urgent need to provide government officials, lawmakers and the public with better information on property tax policy choices. Tax revolts and anti-tax initiatives make compelling news stories, but they should be balanced by concise and accessible information that sheds light on the problem and its solution. There is also a need for periodic research on such topics as:

  • The effects over time of assessment and tax limits on the distribution of the property tax burden and on revenue growth, and the full costs to residents of additional fees and charges imposed to offset decreases in local property tax revenues.
  • The effectiveness of property tax relief measures, and the distribution of their benefits across taxpayer classes.
  • “Tax expenditure” studies to quantify the cost of exemptions, and exploration of the use of payments in lieu of taxes (PILOTS) for tax-exempt nonprofit property owners to pay for municipal services received.
  • Assessment quality studies to evaluate both individual assessment equity and the distribution of the tax burden.

The Institute will be collaborating with the seminar participants and others in continuing these discussions and will undertake further research and the preparation of publications on these property tax issues in the coming year.

Joan Youngman is senior fellow at the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, where she chairs the Department of Valuation and Taxation. Her writings include Legal Issues in Property Valuation and Taxation (1994), and two books co-edited with Jane Malme, An International Survey of Taxes on Land and Buildings (1994) and The Development of Property Taxation in Economies in Transition (2001). She is a contributing author on the property taxation chapter of Jerome R. Hellerstein and Walter Hellerstein’s State and Local Taxation (7th ed. 2001), and writes on property taxation for State Tax Notes.

Jane Malme, fellow of the Lincoln Institute, is an attorney, author and consultant on property tax policy, law and administration in the U.S. and internationally. She directed the Massachusetts Department of Revenue’s Bureau of Local Assessment as it implemented major property tax reforms from 1978 to 1990.

The Lincoln Institute seminar on Property Taxes and Market Values—Responding to Post-Proposition 13 Challenges in April 2005 included participants from many states, including California, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York and Oklahoma. The discussion leader was Alan Dornfest, property tax policy supervisor in the Idaho State Tax Commission.

The Institute will continue this discussion at the International Association of Assessing Officers (IAAO) Annual Conference in Anchorage, Alaska, in September. Jane Malme will moderate a policy seminar on Property Tax Viability in Volatile Markets with speakers Alan Dornfest; Mark Haveman, director of development for the Minnesota Taxpayers Association and project director for its Center for Public Finance Research; and Andrew Reschovsky, professor of public affairs at the University of Wisconsin’s LaFollette School of Public Affairs.

Faculty Profile

Andrew Reschovsky
Julho 1, 2008

Faculty Profile of Andrew Reschovsky

Faculty Profile

Weidong Qu
Abril 1, 2011

Weidong Qu is a research fellow at the Peking University–Lincoln Institute Center for Urban Development and Land Policy in Beijing, and an associate professor in the Department of Land and Real Estate Management at Renmin University of China. Dr. Qu’s research interests include real estate appraisal, land and cadastral management, fuzzy cluster analysis, GIS programming and analysis for real estate valuation, and real estate investment analysis and finance.

Since 2003, he has focused much of his research on property tax reform in China. Dr. Qu has authored five academic books and published over twenty papers for both international and domestic Chinese journals and conferences. He earned his Ph.D. in real estate appraisal at the Geodetic Institute of the University of Hannover, Germany, in 2000.

Dr. Qu also serves as director of the China Association of Real Estate Academicians and executive secretary general of the Global Chinese Real Estate Congress. He is also conducting research in Munich on real estate mortgage valuation and risk analysis as a Humboldtianer fellow of Germany’s Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, and taking part in a research project on property tax reform in Germany.

Land Lines: How did you become associated with the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy?

Weidong Qu: After returning to China in 2002 following my studies Germany, I took part in a training seminar on urbanization and smart growth that was cohosted by the Lincoln Institute and Renmin University. Then, in December 2003, I was invited by officials in the City of Shenzhen to participate in an international symposium on property taxation organized by China’s State Administration of Taxation and the Lincoln Institute. At a later conference on property taxation in Beijing in 2007, I met Joyce Yanyun Man, the director of the Institute’s China Program and the Peking University–Lincoln Institute Center for Urban Development and Land Policy, and she invited me to join the Center’s research group to lead the property tax team.

Land Lines: Why is research on property taxation in China so important?

Weidong Qu: China’s real estate market has developed rapidly over the past 30 years as economic reforms have been introduced. At the same time, real estate–related taxes remain relatively complicated, with a lack of distinction between taxes and fees, and widespread use of administrative fees in place of taxes that may not otherwise have been approved by central regulatory authorities. The steady increase in the use of taxes and fees has begun to influence development costs in the residential housing sector, with the combined charges estimated to account for 40 percent of total costs for new housing stock. This situation is a growing source of criticism from both property developers and residents, who see this increase in charges as one of the factors pushing China’s urban housing prices ever higher.

Another tax-related issue confronting the sustainable growth of China’s real estate sector is the preference for levying taxes and fees on the developer rather than the ultimate owner. To date, China has not established a property tax system, and taxes and fees levied on property owners remain comparatively low, which has contributed to overinvestment and speculation in the property market.

In addition, due to China’s centralized tax system and the lack of a stable local revenue source such as a property tax, local governments have become heavily dependent on revenues from land transfer fees to fund public expenditures and infrastructure investments. According to China’s Ministry of Land and Resources, during the 11th Five-year Plan (2006–2010), more than 33 million mu (more than 200 million acres) of land was transferred by local governments for development, generating revenues of 7 trillion renminbi (approximately US$1.1 trillion). This land-based approach to public finance undermines economic stability and puts pressure on land prices, with the potential to contribute to a real estate bubble.

Land Lines: What challenges differentiate property tax issues in China from the experience in the United States, Europe, or other developed economies?

Weidong Qu: Property tax levies in developed countries are generally based on an assessed value, and most jurisdictions utilize computer-assisted mass appraisal (CAMA) systems to administer their property taxes. At this time, however, none of the taxes or fees levied on China’s real estate sector are based on an assessed value and, consequently, there is a critical shortage of experienced assessors and officials. Most current assessors focus primarily on individual properties, and they lack experience with mass appraisal techniques.

Administering a modern property tax also requires an integrated geographic and property database. My research indicates that more than 90 percent of China’s cities do not yet have such a property database, and many local governments cannot document the number of parcels within their jurisdictions, or even the ownership of each parcel.

Land Lines:How does property taxation in China relate to the country’s rapid urban development and growth?

Weidong Qu: According to a projection from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, China’s rate of urbanization will be 52.28 percent in 2015, 57.67 percent in 2020, and 67.81 percent in 2030, after which the rate is expected to stabilize. This trend will produce a rapid increase in the urban population and the need for significant expansion of basic infrastructure, such as schools and hospitals, as well as more residential housing. Supplying land for this new infrastructure will be an ongoing challenge and will eventually render China’s current land-based public financing approach unsustainable.

Land Lines: How do you approach property taxation in China through your own research?

Weidong Qu: The first official mention of property tax reform came in a report from the third plenary session of the 16th Central Committee of the Chinese Community Party in 2003. That report directed the government to “reform city and village construction taxes and fees, and levy a property tax on fixed assets when the conditions are ready, including the concomitant cancelation of overlapping taxes.” This statement was one of the major impetuses for the Lincoln Institute to become involved with property tax research in China and to collaborate with the State Administration of Taxation in Shenzhen, as well as the beginning of my own work in the area.

With the central government’s support, policy makers selected six Chinese cities to serve as initial property tax reform pilot cities for internal sample valuations and research. The study was later expanded to ten cities, including Beijing. These pilots have built upon China’s ongoing stamp tax reform, which refers to a value-based tax paid during the sale of a property and has been invaluable in pushing jurisdictions to formulate their own assessment standards. According to the Ministry of Finance, China will transition to an assessed-value standard for the stamp tax by 2012, which will require each jurisdiction to develop its own computer-assisted mass appraisal system.

In my opinion, four key issues merit research attention. First, it is important to define what we mean in China by a property tax, because considerable disagreement exists among policy makers and scholars about what such a tax should include. Second, property databases remain incomplete or inaccurate, so it is vital to conduct a national-scale survey of housing stock and ownership. Without this data, government agencies are unable to assess property values for all parcels within their jurisdictions or ensure that property tax bills are mailed to the correct property owner.

Third, further research into mass appraisal theories and techniques is still needed. Although China’s tax officials have made progress in their knowledge of the basic principles of mass appraisal, they generally lack specialized real estate training, and their limited understanding threatens to lead to ill-informed policy making. Fourth, before any progress can be made, it is necessary to overcome opposition from China’s political and economic elites, who often own multiple properties and have emerged as one of the biggest obstacles to property tax reforms. Given the uncertainty as to the final direction of property tax reform in China, these interest groups have seen delaying the imposition of a property tax as their best strategy.

Land Lines: What challenges has the PKU-Lincoln Center’s property tax demonstration project sought to address?

Weidong Qu: Since property tax reform in China was first mentioned in 2003, the Lincoln Institute has contributed to this important issue by hosting training seminars and international conferences on property tax assessment and theory, along with lessons from other international experiences. The property tax demonstration project represents the logical next step in the Institute’s work, with a goal of identifying and addressing the practical challenges of such reform. Many of these challenges, such as the importance of cross-ministerial information sharing and CAMA valuation codes, are not the high-profile issues focused on by officials, but they are equally important in ensuring the success of any property tax reform.

Specifically, the demonstration project has focused on 18 properties on Financial Street in western Beijing, the location of the People’s Bank of China and the headquarters of a number of other major domestic and international financial companies. We chose Financial Street because it is one of the most developed districts in Beijing; however, even in such a modern area it took us several months to collect all of the geographic, property, and tenant information needed. This underscores the importance of constructing standards for data gathering and information sharing among government agencies.

Land Lines: What are the biggest remaining obstacles to implementing an effective residential or commercial property tax in China?

Weidong Qu: Assessing a property tax on residential housing stock and on commercial real estate are two separate issues in China. As mentioned, many factors hinder the implementation of a property tax on residential housing stock, including the opposition of powerful interest groups and the current lack of reliable property transaction and ownership data. As in most countries, citizens’ historic opposition to paying taxes on owner-occupied property is also a challenge.

In terms of a property tax on commercial real estate, the current consensus is to leave the existing tax burden unchanged by eliminating the present land use fee and the rental-income and original-value-based real estate taxes levied on commercial property and then establishing a single assessed-value property tax. This approach should not generate the same opposition as that seen against a residential property tax.

In my view, there are two key challenges remaining. The first is to revise China’s existing laws related to taxes on property and then to draft new legislation. The second challenge is the current variety of commercial real estate and the lack of consensus on what valuation method should be used for each type. The demonstration project conducted by the PKU-Lincoln Center in 2009 focused exclusively on top-grade commercial real estate, such as office space, hotels, and apartments. There remains a need for further research on the best valuation methods for property such as gas stations, hospitals, shopping centers, and informal shops in China.

¿Podrá un cinturón verde reducir los eriales de Detroit?

Mark Skidmore, Outubro 1, 2014

Es difícil figurarse la manera en que la pérdida constante de población ha devastado a Detroit. Entre 1900 y 1950, cuando el crecimiento de la manufactura automotriz en los EE.UU. la convirtió en uno de los principales centros industriales y culturales del país, la población de Detroit saltó de 300.000 a 1,85 millones de habitantes. A partir de 1950, sin embargo, comenzó a disminuir. Y este descenso ha continuado hasta la actualidad, desplomándose a sólo 700.000 habitantes en 2010, una tasa de reducción casi tan rápida como lo había sido el aumento en la primera mitad del siglo XX.

A pesar del esfuerzo de Detroit durante varias décadas para mantenerse al ritmo de la pérdida de población eliminando el inventario de viviendas ruinosas, aproximadamente un cuarto de sus 380.000 parcelas se encuentra hoy abandonado y administrado por la ciudad u otros entes públicos. Hasta julio de 2014 se han demolido 114.000 propiedades, y 80.000 más se consideran arruinadas (Austen 2014). Si bien es cierto que el centro se está recuperando y los suburbios siguen mostrando vitalidad, un visitante desprevenido quedará anonadado por la “incomprensible desintegración del paisaje edificado” en amplias zonas de la ciudad (Austen 2014).

Este artículo, el primero de una serie de dos, considera las causas fiscales y repercusiones del superávit de viviendas y terrenos baldíos en Detroit, desde la extensión y ubicación de las casas y lotes abandonados en la ciudad hasta la espiral descendente de los precios de las viviendas, que ha provocado una sobrevaluación de las propiedades, mora en el pago del impuesto sobre la propiedad y ejecuciones tributarias; la adquisición pública de dichas propiedades; el patrón de valores del suelo a lo largo de la ciudad; y, finalmente, algunas maneras potenciales de reconciliar la cantidad de habitantes que quedan con la cantidad de propiedades vacantes y administradas públicamente. Estas medidas van desde revitalizar vecindarios densamente poblados a establecer un cinturón verde y adquirir parcelas vacantes para uso público, como parques, bosques, zonas de amortiguamiento industrial, lagunas de retención y otros espacios abiertos (Austen 2014).

Factores de la caída

Las causas de la decadencia de Detroit son múltiples y quizás demasiado conocidas. La infraestructura de transporte subsidiada por el gobierno federal, como por ejemplo el sistema de autovías interestatales, facilitó la rápida suburbanización, promovida además por códigos de desarrollo inmobiliario permisivos. La tensión racial, las fuerzas económicas globales y la corrupción desgastaron lo que quedaba de la ciudad propiamente dicha. En las primeras etapas del deterioro, los residentes de mayores ingresos, la mayoría de los cuales era de origen caucásico, se mudó a los suburbios en busca de una mejor calidad de vida, como se muestra en la tabla 1. Para 1990, la población afroamericana también había alcanzado su pico, y comenzó a disminuir en la primera década del siglo XXI. A comienzos de 1960, la manufactura de automóviles de Michigan inició su largo y vertiginoso declive, que afectó de forma desproporcionada a Detroit y Flint. La pérdida de puestos de empleo bien remunerados para la clase media dañó aún más la base demográfica y económica urbana, ya que dichas familias fueron a buscar oportunidades de empleo en otro lado. Las crecientes tasas de crimen y la erosión constante de los servicios públicos provocaron otra ola de deserciones.

La tabla 1 ilustra esta decadencia de las condiciones demográficas y económicas de la ciudad entre 1950 y 2010. Para el 2012, según fuentes gubernamentales, la mediana de ingresos de las unidades familiares era de solamente US$25.000, menos de la mitad de la mediana nacional de ingresos. Los índices de pobreza y desempleo eran 38 y 27,5 por ciento, respectivamente. La tasa de participación laboral era del 54 por ciento (comparado con el 63 por ciento en todo el país) y por cada 6,35 trabajadores empleados había una persona que recibía beneficios de discapacidad del Seguro Social (comparado con 1 de cada 12 en todo el país). Más del 34 por ciento de la población de la ciudad recibía cupones de alimentos, y el 81 por ciento de los niños de las Escuelas Públicas de Detroit eran elegibles para el Programa de Almuerzo Gratis o a Precio Reducido. Las fuentes de ingreso comenzaron a depender cada vez más de aportes externos, incluyendo los no residentes, como se explica en el recuadro 1. En 2013, cuando la ciudad finalmente sucumbió al peso de los problemas fiscales acumulados y se declaró en quiebra, sus deudas y obligaciones sin fondos ascendían a US$18.000 millones, o sea US$68.000 por unidad familiar, lo cual es aproximadamente 2,7 veces la mediana de ingresos de las unidades familiares (Turbeville 2013).

El fracaso del mercado de la vivienda

El descomunal excedente de oferta de viviendas que se acumuló a lo largo de las décadas como consecuencia de la demanda selectiva en Detroit corroyó el valor de la propiedad. La crisis inmobiliaria de 2007–2008 asestó el golpe final, lo que dio como resultado la desintegración casi completa del mercado de la vivienda de Detroit. En 2010, el precio promedio de una propiedad residencial, que en 2006 era US$57.000, se había desplomado a alrededor de US$7.000 (Hodge et al. 2014a). El excedente actual de suelo y vivienda de Detroit podría inhibir una recuperación de los precios inmobiliarios en los próximos años, incluso si la población se estabilizara.

Mora en el impuesto sobre la propiedad, abandono y adquisición pública de propiedades

Los funcionarios de la administración tributaria no han recalibrado el valor de tasación de las propiedades para que este refleje la caída del precios de las viviendas. Esto ha traído como consecuen-cia una sobrevaluación de hasta el 80 por ciento (Hodge et al. 2014a), contribuyendo a una falta de voluntad generalizada para pagar los impuestos, según Alm et al. (2014). Su investigación también muestra que hubo otros factores que agravaron, como las altas tasas tributarias estipuladas por ley, y la limitación de servicios como la seguridad pública.

En el medio de esta crisis inmobiliaria, la tasa de mora en el pago del impuesto sobre la propiedad llegó a un nivel alarmante del 50 por ciento (Alm et al. 2014). La figura 2 (pág. 15) muestra las tasas de mora por vecindario de la ciudad en 2010. La recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad depende de la capacidad de una jurisdicción para imponer sanciones por falta de pago, como señala Langsdorf (1973). Cuando los valores inmobiliarios colapsan, las autoridades tributarias no tienen un mecanismo de cumplimiento práctico; el ahorro de los propietarios por no pagar el impuesto sobre la propiedad es mayor que el valor de la casa que poseen y que perderían en caso de ejecución tributaria. Más aún, lo recaudado por la venta de propiedades ejecutadas de bajo valor es insuficiente para cubrir la deuda tributaria morosa y el costo para el gobierno de iniciar las actuaciones de ejecución tributaria.

La falta de pago generalizada del impuesto sobre la propiedad y el abandono subsiguiente de las viviendas ha traído como consecuencia la adquisición pública de miles de propiedades en todo Detroit. El quince por ciento de las parcelas de esta ciudad de 360 km2 está ahora vacante, y cerca del 25 por ciento de la superficie del suelo de Detroit no es actualmente tributable al ser propiedad o estar administrada por la ciudad o algún otro ente público (Sands y Skidmore 2014), como se ilustra en la figura 3.

La espiral descendente de ejecuciones tributarias

En la actualidad, la cantidad de propiedades que pasan a manos públicas por ejecuciones tributarias es mucho mayor que la cantidad de propiedades públicas adquiridas de vuelta por contribuyentes privados.

En Michigan, los impuestos sobre la propiedad morosos están sujetos a una tasa administrativa del 4 por ciento y un interés mensual del 1 por ciento sobre el monto adeudado, a una tasa de interés no compuesta y a partir del primer mes de falta de pago. Después de un año de mora, la ciudad transfiere la propiedad al gobierno del condado y el dueño es sujeto a un cargo de interés mensual adicional del 0,5 por ciento. Durante este período de dos años, los dueños pueden recuperar sus propiedades pagando todos los impuestos y cargos vencidos.

Si el impuesto sobre la propiedad queda sin pagar por más de dos años, el tesorero del condado de Wayne inicia las actuaciones de ejecución tributaria. Después de una audiencia para demostrar causa justificada en la corte de apelaciones, el tesorero del condado vende las parcelas ejecutadas en subasta pública. El monto inicial de la subasta es el del equivalente a los impuestos sobre la propiedad adeudados más intereses y penalizaciones, y lo recaudado se distribuye en forma proporcional entre las jurisdicciones tributarias. Si la propiedad no se vende en la primera subasta, el condado reduce el monto de subasta mínimo a US$500 y organiza una segunda subasta. Este procedimiento ha causado más evasión tributaria, ya que algunos propietarios prefieren ignorar sus facturas de impuestos a la espera de volver a comprar su parcela por US$500 en la segunda subasta.

Las propiedades que no se venden en ninguna de las subastas se pueden transferir a un organismo público (municipal o estatal) o a un banco de suelo estatal o local, o se puede retener para una subasta subsiguiente. Los registros del condado indican que el 80 por ciento de las parcelas vendidas a compradores privados en subasta en los últimos dos años están nuevamente en mora tributaria (MacDonald 2013). Dado que la tasa de mora tributaria es del 67 por ciento para propietarios que no residen en su vivienda (Alm et al. 2014), da la impresión de que una cantidad significativa de los compradores en subasta son propietarios absentistas que pretenden reducir sus gastos operativos y aumentar sus ingresos netos de alquiler dejando de pagar sus impuestos sobre la propiedad.

En las parcelas de bajo valor, los impuestos sobre la propiedad son, en la práctica, optativos. Para reducir la cartera de lotes con mora tributaria (MacDonald 2013), el condado no ejecuta la hipoteca de propietarios que deben menos de US$1.600 en impuestos y multas acumuladas, con lo cual estas deudas se convierten en optativas.

La recaudación prevista por la venta de parcelas de bajo valor es insuficiente para cubrir los gastos legales de una ejecución por falta de pago de impuestos y saldos tributarios impagados. El resultado final es una creciente tasa de mora e inventario de propiedades indeseadas que terminan en manos públicas, donde no generan ningún ingreso para la ciudad.

Y de aquí, ¿adónde vamos?

Se espera otra ola de ejecuciones tributarias a fines de 2014 y comienzos de 2015. ¿Qué se puede hacer para estabilizar la situación?

Cómo poner freno a la mora en el impuesto sobre la propiedad

Como se mencionó previamente, la mora se reducirá cuando los contribuyentes perciban que reciben un valor proporcional a su dinero. Así, si se mejoran los servicios prestados con la recaudación de impuestos como la seguridad pública, la evasión y el pago atrasado de impuestos se reducirá (Alm et al. 2014). Bajo el liderazgo del alcalde recientemente electo, Mike Duggan, el gobierno de la ciudad está adoptando medidas para mejorar el suministro de servicios públicos básicos y ordenar su panorama fiscal. Por ejemplo, en la actualidad sólo 35.000 de las 88.000 luces de la ciudad funcionan, así que Duggan piensa instalar cada mes 2.400 luces que alumbren (Austen 2014). También aumentó la cantidad de autobuses operativos de 143 a 190 y mejoró los servicios de remoción de nieve durante el pasado invierno, que fue particularmente riguroso.

Una reducción de las tasas de impuestos también reduciría modestamente la tasa de mora (Alm et al. 2014). Las tasas tributarias de Detroit, que son aproximadamente el doble del promedio de la región, son de 67 y 85 milésimas por dólar de valuación para propiedades que son un bien de familia y que no lo son, respectivamente. Este valor es el máximo admitido por el estado. Si bien es cierto que una reducción mejoraría la competitividad de la ciudad con relación a otras comunidades de la región, en la actualidad no se está considerando una reducción en la tasa del impuesto sobre la propiedad.

La alineación de la valuación con las condiciones del mercado actual también reduciría la mora. El Alcalde Duggan recientemente prometió reducir las valuaciones en un 5 al 20 por ciento en toda la ciudad, para reconciliarlas con las pautas estatales. No obstante, las reducciones prometidas por Duggan son sólo una pequeña fracción del recorte del 80 por ciento necesario para alinear las valuaciones con el valor del mercado, según Hodge et al. (2014a).

Retirar suelo del mercado

En la ausencia de una demanda sólida de suelo, la cual no parece probable en un futuro cercano, el excedente se tiene que retirar del mercado por un período de tiempo con objeto de que el valor inmobiliario mejore de manera general en toda la ciudad. Dado que los entes públicos poseen ahora tantas propiedades, son las autoridades gubernamentales las que tienen el poder para retirarlas del mercado de forma creíble. Sin este tipo de medidas políticas, la posibilidad de que estas parcelas se transfieran rápidamente al sector privado afectará la recuperación de los precios.

En la actualidad, hay muchos entes públicos que poseen suelos. Las autoridades de la ciudad de Detroit, el condado de Wayne y el gobierno estatal están colaborando para consolidar estas parcelas bajo un solo ente que pueda administrarlas de manera más efectiva. Detroit Future City (2010) detalla esta propiedad fragmentada de suelos públicos:

Los suelos públicos en Detroit están en manos de muchas agencias distintas de la ciudad, el condado y el estado, como también de muchas entidades autónomas o cuasi autónomas como las Escuelas Públicas de Detroit, la Comisión de Vivienda de Detroit y la Corporación de Crecimiento Económico de Detroit. Hay pocas ciudades que tengan un inventario de propiedades tan fragmentado de suelo público. No hay coherencia de políticas, procedimientos o misiones entre estos entes, y muchos de ellos están maniatados por requisitos legales burocráticos y procedimientos complejos. El Departamento de Planificación y Desarrollo controla la mayor cantidad de propiedades; sin embargo, su capacidad para darles un destino estratégico está restringida por obstáculos de procedimiento, como la necesidad de obtener aprobación del Concejo Municipal para cualquier transacción, no importa cuán pequeña o insignificante sea desde la perspectiva de la ciudad.

Aunque este proceso de consolidación es necesario, no es suficiente. Hacen falta recursos financieros para eliminar el deterioro urbano e implementar planes de uso del suelo. Los dirigentes municipales se centran principalmente en estrategias para devolver estas parcelas a manos privadas. Si pudieran estimular un mayor interés en las propiedades de Detroit, esta estrategia podría ser viable.

Hay, efectivamente, oportunidades emergentes para estimular la propiedad privada en el distrito comercial central (central business district, o CBD). Daniel Gilbert, fundador de Quicken Loans, ha mudado su sede al centro de Detroit y ha invertido US$1.300 millones en bienes inmuebles (Forbes 2014). Y la renovación del área del centro ha generado un aumento considerable de los precios de alquiler (Christie 2014).

Los valores del suelo en el CBD son muy altos, como se muestra en la figura 4 por las parcelas negras, que representan los valores del suelo más alto del mapa. Sin embargo, el gradiente de valores del suelo en Detroit es muy pronunciado. Si bien varias zonas dentro del anillo que rodea el CBD han retenido algo de valor, el precio del suelo cae rápidamente a medida que aumenta la distancia al CBD, aun cuando vuelven a subir al acercarse a de los límites de la ciudad, probablemente debido a las comodidades disponibles en los suburbios cercanos, como centros comerciales.

Dada la débil demanda fuera del CBD, podría ser más efectivo determinar qué propiedades públicas deberían volver a manos de contribuyentes privados, qué propiedades deberían retirarse del mercado durante una década o dos, con la opción de volver a introducirlas al mercado en caso de que las condiciones cambien, y qué propiedades deberían retirarse del mercado de manera permanente.

El plan de ordenamiento de 2012, delineado por Detroit Future City, propone la reasignación de suelo para parques, bosques, amortiguadores industriales, vías verdes, lagunas de retención, jardines comunitarios y hasta campamentos (Austen 2014). La implementación plena de esta propuesta ambiciosa requiere recursos financieros importantes. Pero consideremos la manera en que las autoridades estatales y federales intervinieron en el último episodio importante de ejecución tributaria masiva. Durante la Gran Depresión, muchos dueños de residencias familiares en suelos agrícolas marginales de Michigan, Minnesota y Wisconsin ya no pudieron pagar sus impuestos sobre la propiedad, lo que causó una ola masiva de mora tributaria, ejecuciones hipotecarias, abandonos y en última instancia confiscaciones. En esos estados, los gobiernos del condado frecuentemente pasaron a poseer miles de hectáreas, gran parte de las cuales fueron vendidas a los gobiernos estatales y federal. Los seis bosques nacionales de Minnesota, Wis-consin y Michigan, así como numerosos bosques estatales de la región, tuvieron su origen en el abandono masivo de suelo durante la Gran Depresión, cuando las autoridades estatales y federales fueron uniendo en mosaico un conjunto de suelos adyacentes adquiridos a los condados, ansiosos de vender las propiedades que habían decomisado por falta de pago.

En la actualidad, las autoridades del estado y el gobierno federal no se inclinan por un rescate financiero de Detroit. Pero la historia sugiere que los gobiernos federal y estatal podrían ayudar a Detroit a recuperar su viabilidad fiscal adquiriendo grupos de parcelas no deseadas, realizando pagos en lugar de impuestos (como es habitual para otros suelos públicos) y usando después el suelo para beneficio del público en general. Los usos potenciales se describen en el plan de ordenamiento mencionado anteriormente, y se exploran en el segundo artículo de esta serie. Una alianza del gobierno federal con el gobierno estatal y los gobiernos locales para hacerse cargo de estas propiedades podría ayudar a estabilizar el mercado del suelo y crear una fuente de ingresos para la ciudad y demás jurisdicciones fiscales pertinentes (incluyendo el gobierno estatal mismo, a través del impuesto de educación del estado). La recuperación del valor de la propiedad en combinación con la reinversión en el centro de la ciudad, el mantenimiento de los esfuerzos para mejorar el paquete de servicios brindados con la recaudación tributaria de Detroit y la eliminación del deterioro urbano, y una inversión a largo plazo en el capital humano y social de Detroit son elementos esenciales para una recuperación sostenible de la ciudad.

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Recuadro 1: Los no residentes como fuente de ingresos

Las fuentes de ingresos de Detroit dependen cada vez más de aportes externos, como por ejemplo de los no residentes, ya que su población y su base económica se han reducido. Este cambio se produjo en parte porque con el tiempo las legislaturas estatales de Michigan permitieron que la ciudad de Detroit usara estrategias de exportación de impuestos para afianzar su situación tributaria debilitada y lidiar con los cambios estructurales masivos de la economía regional. Aunque hubo períodos en que parecía que Detroit estaba por recuperarse, varias fuerzas impidieron la “velocidad de escape”.

Hoy en día, la ciudad de Detroit depende del impuesto sobre los ingresos, el impuesto sobre la propiedad, el impuesto sobre las apuestas en casinos, la coparticipación en los ingresos estatales, un impuesto de uso sobre las utilidades, subvenciones federales, y varios aranceles y licencias para financiar sus servicios públicos. De estos, el impuesto sobre las apuestas en casinos y el impuesto municipal sobre los ingresos se adoptaron para reforzar los debilitados ingresos provenientes de fuentes más tradicionales.

El impuesto sobre las apuestas en casinos, basado en las facturas de las ganancias de los apostadores, ha adquirido particular importancia para la ciudad de Detroit en la última década, como se muestra en la figura 2, que resume las tendencias de las fuentes principales de ingresos de la ciudad entre 1960 y 2012. La legislatura estatal autorizó la actividad de apuestas en casinos y el impuesto sobre las apuestas en Detroit en 1996 para ayudar a superar sus problemas fiscales. La construcción del casino se completó en 2001. Los US$180 millones en ingresos anuales adicionales ayudaron a reducir la presión financiera mientras otras fuentes, como el impuesto sobre los ingresos y la coparticipación de ingresos estatales, se iban reduciendo. Hasta el 85 por ciento de los apostadores de los tres casinos principales de Detroit no son residentes, según informes recientes y entrevistas con expertos de las apuestas (Miklojcik 2014).

Desde 1963, el impuesto municipal sobre los ingresos ha representado la fuente de ingresos más importante y, durante varios años, la de mayor crecimiento. En el momento de su adopción, la mayor parte del impuesto sobre los ingresos era abonada por los residentes de la ciudad. Sin embargo, a medida que la población se ha ido reduciendo, el impuesto sobre los ingresos de los no residentes que trabajan en la ciudad ha cobrado una participación cada vez mayor en la base gravable tributaria, compuesta de sueldos y salarios ganados por empleo dentro de la ciudad. La tasa tributaria es del 2,4 por ciento para los residentes de la ciudad, y del 1,2 por ciento para los no residentes. Aunque las corporaciones y sociedades también pagan un impuesto sobre los ingresos, es una porción muy pequeña de los ingresos totales recaudados. Según Scorsone y Skidmore (2014), aproximadamente la mitad de la recaudación del impuesto municipal sobre los ingresos en Detroit está pagada por no residentes.

La coparticipación de los ingresos estatales sigue desempeñando un papel clave en las finanzas de Detroit, a pesar de que la pérdida de población también ha reducido esta fuente de ingresos. En Michigan, el gobierno estatal recauda un impuesto estatal sobre las ventas y después comparte una porción de lo recaudado con los gobiernos municipales. Los ingresos del impuesto sobre las ventas se asignan a los gobiernos locales de acuerdo a disposiciones constitucionales y legislación estatal. La porción constitucional de la coparticipación de los ingresos depende del porcentaje de la población total del estado de cada jurisdicción. Dada la disminución del número de residentes en Detroit, esta porción de la coparticipación estatal ha venido disminuyendo a lo largo de varias décadas. La ciudad experimentó un crecimiento significativo de los fondos de coparticipación de ingresos en las décadas de 1970 y 1980 debido a aumentos en la coparticipación de los ingresos estipulados por las leyes estatales, que se distribuyen de acuerdo a fórmulas que los legisladores han ido ajustando en décadas recientes. Pero los nuevos cambios en las leyes estatales, en combinación con el estancamiento del impuesto sobre las ventas, ha provocado una reducción del crecimiento y en última instancia una caída en los ingresos de coparticipación de todas las ciudades del estado en la década de 1990. Durante la década de 2000, Michigan experimentó una recesión y esta caída continuó en la mayoría de las jurisdicciones locales, incluyendo Detroit.

Algunos han señalado que las reducciones en la coparticipación de ingresos fue una de las causas principales de los problemas financieros de la ciudad de Detroit y uno de los catalizadores fundamentales de su quiebra. No obstante, estas reducciones afectaron a todas las ciudades que recibieron fondos de coparticipación en Michigan. Si bien la reducción de los ingresos de coparticipación probablemente aceleró la declaración de quiebra de Detroit, no fue la causa principal. Más aún, es importante recalcar que la coparticipación de ingresos estatales de Detroit representa una transferencia neta positiva de fondos del resto del estado a la ciudad. Según el censo económico de 2007, las ventas al por menor en la Ciudad de Detroit fueron de US$3.200 millones, o sea alrededor del 2,9 por ciento de los ingresos totales del estado de Michigan, de US$109.000 millones. En 2012, los ingresos totales por coparticipación en todas las municipalidades de Michigan fueron aproximadamente US$1.000 millones, y la parte que le tocó a Detroit fue de US$172 millones, es decir el 17,2 por ciento. Dado que Detroit representa sólo el 3 por ciento de las ventas minoristas totales de Michigan, se puede concluir que la mayor parte de los ingresos de coparticipación estatal que ingresaron en Detroit se originó en transacciones producidas fuera de la ciudad.

En 2014, la ciudad de Detroit contaba con aproximadamente US$1.000 millones en su Fondo General, un monto considerablemente menor que en 2002, cuando los ingresos llegaron a un pico de US$1.400 millones. Esta caída de ingresos del 30 por ciento a lo largo del tiempo, sin un recorte proporcional en los gastos, condujo a la crisis fiscal de Detroit y su declaración de quiebra en 2013. Para el año 2012, Detroit había tomado en préstamo más de US$1.000 millones para tratar de evitar la mora y una crisis de liquidez (Departamento del Tesoro de Michigan, 2013).

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Sobre el autor

Mark Skidmore es profesor de Economía en la Universidad Estatal de Michigan, donde ocupa la Cátedra Morris en Finanzas y Política Gubernamental Estatal y Local, con nombramientos conjuntos del Departamento de Economía Agrícola, de Alimentos y Recursos y del Departamento de Economía.

Referencias

Alm, J., T. Hodge, G. Sands, and M. Skidmore. 2014. “Detroit Property Tax Delinquency—Social Contract in Crisis.” Documento de trabajo. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Austen, B. 2014. “The Post-Apocalyptic Detroit.” New York Times, 13 de julio. http://nyti.ms/1mFu3Jn

Center for Educational Performance and Information. Accedido en julio de 2014 en www.michigan.gov/cepi/0,4546,7-113-21423_30451—,00.html

City of Detroit. 2013. Comprehensive Annual Financial Report. www.detroitmi.gov/Portals/0/docs/finance/CAFR/Final%202012%20Detroit%20Financial%20Statements.pdf

Christie, Les. 2014. “I’ve Been Priced Out of Downtown Detroit.” CNN Money, 27 de mayo. http://money.cnn.com/2014/05/27/real_estate/downtown-detroit/index.html

Detroit Future City. 2010. Detroit Future City Strategic Framework Book. http://detroitfuturecity.com/framework

Forbes. 2014. “World’s Billionaires.” www.forbes.com/profile/daniel-gilbert

Hodge, T., D. McMillen, G. Sands, y M. Skidmore. 2014a. “Tax Base Erosion and Inequity from Michigan’s Assessment Growth Limit: The Case of Detroit.” Documento de trabajo. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Hodge, T., G. Sands, and M. Skidmore. 2014b. “The Land Value Gradient in a (Nearly) Collapsed Urban Real Estate Market.” Documento de trabajo. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Landsdorf, K. 1973. “Urban Decay, Property Tax Delinquency: A Solution in St. Louis.” The Urban Lawyer 5: 729–748.

MacDonald, C. 2013. “Half of Detroit Property Owners Don’t Pay Taxes.” The Detroit News, 12 de febrero.

Michigan Department of Treasury. 2013. Supplemental Documentation of the Detroit Financial Review Team. www.michigan.gov/documents/treasury/Review_Team_Report_Supplemental_2–19-13_411866_7.pdf

Michigan Department of Treasury. 2010. Real Property Tax Forfeiture and Foreclosure. www.michigan.gov/taxes/0,4676,7-238-43535_55601—,00.html

Miklojcik, J. 2014. President of Michigan Consultants. Información compartida en entrevista personal con Eric Scorsone.

National Public Radio. 2014. “Chinese Investors Aren’t Snatching up Detroit Property Yet.” www.npr.org/2014/03/04/285711091/chinese-investors-arent-snatching-up-detroit-property-yet

Sands, G. y M. Skidmore. 2014. “Making Ends Meet: Options for Property Tax Reform in Detroit.” Journal of Urban Affairs 36(4) Octubre.

Scorsone, E. y M. Skidmore. 2014. “Blamed for Incompetence and Lack of Foresight and Left to Die.” Response to William Tabb’s “If Detroit Is Dead Some Things Need to Be Said at the Funeral.” Por publicarse en Journal of Urban Affairs.

Turbeville, W. 2013. “The Detroit Bankruptcy.” Demos, 20 de noviembre. www.demos.org/publication/detroit-bankruptcy

Local Government and Property Tax Reform in South Africa

Riël C.D. Franzsen, Maio 1, 2000

Since first holding democratic elections at the national and provincial levels in 1994, South Africa has undertaken far-reaching constitutional changes. Arguably, the most fundamental transformation is taking place at the local government level, where the divisions created by apartheid were most severe. These changes were set in motion by the Local Government Transition Act of 1993, and during 1994-1995 the formerly racially segregated urban local authorities were amalgamated into a variety of non-racial transitional councils:

  • in metropolitan areas, transitional metropolitan councils (TMCs) with constituent transitional metropolitan local councils (TMLCs);
  • in secondary cities and towns, transitional local councils (TLCs); and
  • in rural areas where no primary municipalities existed in the past, transitional representative councils (TRepCs) or transitional rural councils (TRCs).

In non-metropolitan areas, the former regional services councils were transformed into district councils, thereby retaining a secondary tier of local government in rural areas.

In March 1998 the national government published the White Paper on Local Government, which set out its vision for the future of local government. The White Paper resulted in passage of the Local Government Demarcation Act and the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act. Under the Demarcation Act, the Municipal Demarcation Board was established to assign new boundaries for the different categories of municipal governments throughout the country. The present 843 transitional municipalities are to be severely reorganized after the local elections in November 2000 into 284 newly demarcated municipalities (see Table 1).

Within the six metropolitan areas to be established, single-tier metropolitan municipalities will replace the TMCs and TMLCs. In the non-metropolitan areas 47 district municipalities will replace the present 42 district councils. Each district municipality will consist of two or more (primary-tier) local municipalities to replace the present local and rural councils. A typical future local municipality will consist of a number of neighboring towns and their rural hinterland. In sparsely populated rural areas where the establishment of a local municipality is not viable (designated as district management areas), a district municipality will be the only form of local government.

Municipal Finance Reform

The structural reforms at the local government level also require reform of municipal finances. The government is currently preparing two important pieces of legislation in this regard, the Local Government: Property Rates Bill (dealing exclusively with property taxation) and the Municipal Finance Management Bill.

Section 229 of South Africa’s Constitution guarantees “rates on property” (i.e., the property tax) as an autonomous source of revenue for municipalities. It states that the “power of a municipality to impose rates on property…may be regulated by national legislation.” National framework legislation regarding the property tax is indeed needed for the following reasons:

  • Property tax is currently levied in terms of four outdated provincial ordinances retained from the apartheid era (e.g., it is not presently possible to utilize computer-assisted mass appraisal (CAMA) because physical inspections of each rateable property is legally required).
  • Property tax is presently levied only by urban municipalities.
  • The future amalgamation of urban and rural councils (i.e., the structural changes to date and still to be effected) necessitates change.
  • The amalgamation of racially segregated urban municipalities has resulted in a number of constitutional challenges.
  • It is the most important own-tax instrument at the local government level, accounting for 19 percent of total local government operating income (Budget Review 2000).

Therefore, the Local Government: Property Rates Bill, currently in its 10th draft, is to be welcomed, at least in principle. It has not yet been published for public comment and may be further amended. However, when this bill is eventually passed into law, it will regulate the levying, assessing and collection of property taxes by municipalities.

Policy Issues in the Property Rates Bill

Diversity of Tax Bases

Urban municipalities generally have a choice between three tax bases, which are spread remarkably evenly throughout the country:

  • Site rating (rating land values only) is prevalent in at least three of South Africa’s nine provinces (Gauteng, Northern Province and Mpumalanga);
  • Flat rating (rating improved capital values) is dominant in the Western Cape; and
  • Composite rating (rating land values and the value of improvements, but at different tax rates) is most commonly used in KwaZulu-Natal.

Earlier drafts of the Property Rates Bill retained this diversity as well as local choice. However, clause 5(1) of the 10th draft of the bill now states that a rate levied on property “must be…an amount in the Rand (South Africa’s currency) determined by the municipality on the improved value of the property.” Although it seems that government has opted for a single tax base (i.e., improved capital value), the bill goes on to provide that a rate levied on the “improved value of property may be composed of separate amounts on the site value of the property and the value of the improvements.” By implication, therefore, composite rating and site rating have been retained (if the amount in the Rand on improvements is set at zero).

Extension of the Tax Base and Possible Exclusions

In principle a municipality may tax “all property in its municipal area,” including areas where the property tax has not been levied before, such as agricultural and tribal land. However, the bill also allows a municipality to exclude a category or categories of property from rating. These excluded properties need not be reflected in the valuation roll.

McCluskey and Franzsen (2000) suggest several reasons why municipalities should include all properties in the valuation roll, and then allow specific exemptions rather than exclusions from the taxing process. First, it can be difficult to justify and defend exclusions constitutionally; second, it is politically easier to phase out an exemption than to introduce a tax on formerly excluded properties; and third, if properties are not valued and thus not reflected in the valuation roll, the extent of the tax base relinquished through exclusions is not known.

“Public infrastructure” is to be excluded from the tax base. This will have significant implications, particularly for municipalities with large tracts of land owned by public utility companies, and may need to be reconsidered in light of privatization. International practice suggests that public utilities should be rated at least on their operational land.

Differentiation and Phasing-in of Rates

Current legislation only provides for rate uniformity throughout a municipal area. However, municipalities sometimes achieve effective differentiation by granting arbitrary rebates to certain properties on the basis of zoning. For example, all improved residential properties in the Pretoria TMLC are presently granted a 35 percent rebate.

The bill provides that different rates may be levied for different categories of property according to use, status or location-a critical point in light of the extension of municipal boundaries into rural areas. For example, it would be possible for a future local municipality (comprising various small towns, commercial farmland and tribal land) to have the following different property categories (and therefore different tax rates):

  • residential properties in a formal township in town A (consisting of generally low-value properties);
  • residential properties in a formal township in town B (consisting of generally high-value properties);
  • residential properties in an informal (squatter) settlement;
  • commercial properties;
  • industrial properties;
  • commercial farmland;
  • tribal land.

However, a municipality will have to justify its differential rate schedule in an annually revised rates policy document presented to all taxpayers. Although municipalities may be permitted to treat ratepayers differently, they must justify this action. The bill also allows for the phasing-in of rates over a three-year period with respect to property not subject to property taxation before 1 July 1999 (e.g., tribal land). In certain instances the period may be extended for a further three years.

Tax Rates

The bill (clause 5(2)) states that municipalities may set their own tax rates. However, the Minister for Local Government, in concurrence with the Minister of Finance, may set a limit or rate cap on the amount. Apart from reducing municipalities’ fiscal autonomy, rate caps set nationally may not reflect differences in taxing capacity that exist between municipalities (see Table 2).

An alternative, and more practical, “capping” measure that has been inserted in the 10th draft (clause 5(3)(a)(ii)) is to limit the annual tax rate increases, not unlike one part of Proposition 13 in California.

Extension of Property Tax to Tribal Land

Extending property taxation to tribal land is an area of major political concern and is fraught with practical problems. “Ownership” of tribal land is not uniform, and some tribal authorities are not prepared to accept any form of local government within their area of jurisdiction, let alone any form of taxation of “their” land. Identifying the taxpayer may be problematic. Furthermore, formal ownership of tribal land seldom reflects the complex system of tenure rights of the individuals entitled to the use of that land. Even if it were possible to identify a taxpayer and establish an assessed value for (tribal) “property,” the abject poverty and inability of residents in many tribal areas to pay any tax will have to be considered. In fact, few tribal areas presently receive municipal services that could justify the introduction of a property tax.

Rates Policy

Clause 13 of the bill requires municipalities to adopt a rates policy and then levy rates accordingly. This is a welcome change. The rates policy, which is to be reviewed annually, must explain and justify the provision of exemptions, rebates, reductions and relief for the poor. This policy should significantly enhance the transparency, efficiency and accountability of municipal councils, and perhaps encourage compliance.

Valuation Quality Control

Another welcome aspect in the bill concerns monitoring valuation quality for equity and consistency across the country. However, the bill (clause 64) confers this responsibility on the Minister responsible for local government. McCluskey and Franzsen (2000) suggest that an independent and professional valuation agency, preferably at the national level, should be established for this highly technical task. Such agencies exist in Australia, New Zealand and Canada. In South Africa, this type of agency should perform the following primary tasks:

  • provide technical advice to government on valuation issues and the regulation of the valuation services sector;
  • set minimum quality standards and specifications necessary to meet government outcomes;
  • monitor and audit the valuations submitted by valuation providers (e.g., municipal valuers) against certain minimum standards; and
  • certify to municipalities (and through them to ratepayers) that the resulting valuations meet the minimum standards for a fair and consistent property tax system.

The monitoring service could well be expanded to provide valuation advice, expertise and data to municipalities. Such an agency could also undertake valuations of property for other taxes levied at the national level, such as estate and gift taxes.

Conclusion

The Local Government: Property Rates Bill should provide a solid framework for property taxation as South Africa begins to implement its new local government structure. If municipalities adhere to the principles articulated in the bill, a more uniform, equitable and efficient property tax system will play an even more important role in the future.

Riël C.D. Franzsen is professor in the Department of Mercantile Law at the University of South Africa in Pretoria, South Africa. His research on property tax reform in South Africa has been supported in part by the Lincoln Institute.

References

Budget Review 2000: Chapter 7. South Africa Department of Finance. http://www.finance.gov.za/b/budget_00/default.htm

Franzsen, R.C.D. 1999. Property taxation in South Africa. In W.J. McCluskey (ed.) Property Tax: An International Comparative Review. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 337-357.

Local Government: Property Rates Bill. 2000. 10th draft. South Africa Department of Provincial and Local Government.

McCluskey, W.J., and R.C.D. Franzsen. 2000. Some policy issues regarding the Local Government: Property Rates Bill. SA Mercantile Law Journal 12: 209-223.