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Inclusionary Housing: Creating and Maintaining Equitable Communities
By Rick Jacobus
From Seattle to San Francisco to Chicago to Portland, Maine, debates are raging over inclusionary housing—the requirement that developers reserve a percentage of new residential development as affordable. Some say the policy discourages development—or, in an argument that could reach the Supreme Court, that it threatens property rights. Meanwhile, New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio faces dual criticisms that his inclusionary housing proposal goes too far, or not far enough.
This new report by Rick Jacobus, Inclusionary Housing: Creating and Maintaining Equitable Communities, separates myth from fact, charting a path forward for policy makers and showing how inclusionary housing can be used effectively to reduce economic segregation.
“In hot-market cities, skyrocketing housing prices push middle-class and low-income residents far away from well-paying jobs, reliable transportation, good schools, and safe neighborhoods,” says Lincoln Institute President and CEO George W. McCarthy. “Inclusionary housing alone will not solve our housing crisis, but it is one of the few bulwarks we have against the effects of gentrification—and only if we preserve the units that we work so hard to create.”
Through a review of the literature and case studies, author Rick Jacobus of Street Level Urban Impact Advisors offers solutions for overcoming the major political, technical, legal, and practical barriers to successful inclusionary housing programs.
“More than 500 communities have used inclusionary housing policies to help maintain the vibrancy and diversity of neighborhoods in transition, and we’ve learned much along the way,” Jacobus says. “Research shows that if programs are thoughtfully designed and implemented, they can be a valuable tool at a time when affordable housing is desperately needed.”
In particular, the report addresses the concern that inclusionary housing can impede new construction by making development less profitable. According to the report, many cities have avoided such impacts by allowing flexibility in how developers comply and offering incentives, such as the ability to build at greater densities.
Other key findings and recommendations in the report include:
The Lincoln Institute has for many years developed strategies to support permanently affordable housing, including the establishment of community land trusts and other shared-equity arrangements. The effort is in recognition of the ongoing housing affordability crisis in many cities. Stratospheric rents and home prices in hot real estate markets are displacing longtime residents and changing the character of cities and neighborhoods.
To order, visit http://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/3583_Inclusionary-Housing.
Rick Jacobus, a national expert in inclusionary housing and affordable home ownership, is the principal of Street Level Urban Impact Advisors (StreetLevelAdvisors.com). He was the founder of Cornerstone Partnership, and he currently serves as a strategic advisor to Cornerstone.
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The largest of the post-World War II suburbs were the size of cities, with populations between 50,000 and 80,000, but they looked like overgrown subdivisions. In Levittown, Lakewood and Park Forest, model houses on curving streets held families similar in age, race and income whose suburban lifestyles were reflected in the nationally popular television sitcoms of the 1950s. The planning of these suburbs was often presented in the popular press as hasty, driven by the need to house war heroes returned from the Battle of the Bulge or Bataan; any problems could be excused by the rush. But, haste was not the case. Political lobbying during the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s shaped postwar housing and urban design. The postwar suburbs were constructed at great speed, but that is a different part of their story.
Postwar suburbs represented the deliberate intervention of the federal government into the financing of single-family housing across the nation. For the first time, the federal government provided massive aid directed to developers (whose loans were insured by the Federal Housing Administration, FHA) and white male homeowners (who could get Veterans’ Administration guarantees for mortgages at four percent, with little or nothing down, and then deduct their mortgage interest payments from their taxable income for 30 years). The federal government came to this policy after fierce debates involving architects, planners, politicians, and business and real estate interests.
Herbert Hoover, as secretary of commerce (1921-1928) and then as president (1929-1933), drew the federal government toward housing policy to promote home building as a business strategy for economic recovery from the Depression. Working closely with the National Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB), Hoover’s Commerce Department had established a Division of Building and Housing in 1921, and went on to establish and support Better Homes in America, Inc. By 1930, this coalition had over 7,000 local chapters composed of bankers, real estate brokers, builders, and manufacturers who lobbied for government support for private development of small homes to boost consumption.
In 1931, Hoover ran a National Conference on Homebuilding and Home Ownership that explored federal investment, discussing not only financing and construction of houses, but also building codes, zoning codes, subdivision layout, and the location of industry and commerce. President Franklin D. Roosevelt followed Hoover and launched numerous New Deal programs in planning and housing. The National Housing Act created the FHA in 1934; the Resettlement Administration, created by Executive Order in 1935, sponsored the Greenbelt Towns; the U.S. Housing Act (Wagner Act) created the U.S. Housing Authority to sponsor public housing in 1937. Which of these programs would be the most influential?
The RPAA and the Labor Housing Conference
Housing activists such as Catherine Bauer and Edith Elmer Wood were members of the Regional Planning Association of America (RPAA), along with planners Lewis Mumford, Clarence Stein, and Benton MacKaye. They advocated federal support for public housing through the Wagner Act. Bauer, an architectural critic and author of Modern Housing, was also executive secretary of the Labor Housing Conference, which campaigned for the design of multi-family housing with child care centers and recreational amenities. Projects such as the Hosiery Workers Housing in Philadelphia and the Harlem River Houses for African Americans in New York, designed by teams of noted architects in the 1930s, demonstrated the excellence possible for multi-family urban projects. Nevertheless, conservative Republicans refused to vote for the Wagner Act in 1935 and 1936, passing it in 1937 with severe cost restrictions, means testing for tenants, and slum clearance provisions to protect private landlords. These provisions meant that design would be minimal and residents would be poor. The Labor Housing Conference members bemoaned the final result as the “Anti-Housing Act.”
The Realtors’ Washington Committee
Many of NAREB’s members, large-scale land subdividers of the 1920s, were originally real estate brokerage firms, not homebuilders. (They left the home building to small contractors or mail order house companies.) By the 1930s, many of these subdividers realized they could enhance profits by erecting houses on some of their lots to enhance the image of community and stability they were selling. They renamed themselves “community builders.” Herbert U. Nelson, NAREB’s chief lobbyist, became executive director of the Realtors’ Washington Committee, which lobbied hard for the FHA, so that federal sources of capital and guarantees of mortgages would provide a safety net for the subdividers’ building operations. Both the Urban Land Institute (ULI) and the National Association of Home Builders (NAHB) formed in the early 1940s as spin-offs from NAREB.
Beginning in 1934, the FHA insured bank loans to developers so they could purchase land, subdivide it, and construct houses on it with very little of their own capital involved. These loans of 80 or 90 percent of project cost eliminated risk and were made long before the developers had buyers. In return, the developers had to agree to submit site plans and housing plans for review by the FHA, which issued booklets offering conservative advice about architecture and site design. Meant to correct the worst abuses of corrupt builders, these manuals on small houses and on “planning profitable neighborhoods” rejected regional styles, scorned modern architecture and, according to architect Keller Easterling, instituted mediocre “subdivision products.” Kenneth Jackson has documented that the FHA’s concern for resale value also led it to refuse loans for racially mixed neighborhoods. Only all-white subdivisions, enforced by deed restrictions, would qualify.
The Realtors’ Washington Committee supported the FHA. It also lobbied against federal government funding for any other approaches to housing, including complete towns planned by the Resettlement Administration, wartime housing for workers constructed by the government that might provide competition for private efforts, and public housing in the cities. Allied with NAREB were the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the U.S. League of Savings and Loans, the National Retail Lumber Dealers Association, and others.
Housing Hearings of 1947-1948
After the war ended, demand for housing was intense. People were doubled up with relatives, friends and strangers. Veterans lived in converted chicken coops and camped out in cars. The need for shelter was only expected to grow as waves of demobilized veterans, wartime savings at the ready, married and formed new households.
Although they were deeply disappointed by some aspects of the 1937 housing legislation, Catherine Bauer and other advocates of multi-family housing in urban residential neighborhoods did not retreat. They campaigned for expanded public housing through better legislation in the form of the bipartisan Taft Ellender Wagner housing bill first introduced in 1945 and supported by such groups as the AFL, the CIO and the Conference of Mayors.
These advocates found themselves in a shouting match with NAREB lobbyists who were busy discrediting public construction of shelter as “un-American” and promoting government subsidies for private housing development. Historians Rosalyn Baxandall and Elizabeth Ewen, in their book Picture Windows, document the hearings on housing dominated by Senator Joseph McCarthy in 1947 and 1948. McCarthy hassled proponents of public housing and planned towns. Attacking one federally funded multi-family project for veterans, he claimed the government had paid for “a breeding ground for communists.” NAREB’s Herbert U. Nelson also believed public housing was communistic, whereas public support for private businesses was fine. He argued that “public credit can properly be used to help sustain home ownership and private enterprise,” and he railed against the women housing activists trying to promote affordable housing for workers. McCarthy’s committee also attacked building workers in the AFL’s traditional craft unions as incompetents who produced “slack” work and would impede the postwar housing process.
McCarthy found in developer William Levitt an ally who testified that only federal aid to large private builders, coupled with abolition of zoning codes, building codes and union restrictions, could solve the postwar housing shortage. Levitt and Sons, of Long Island, became the nation’s largest home building firm by 1952, creating its first postwar suburb of over 70,000 inexpensive houses on small lots. Levitt followed FHA restrictions on race, refusing to sell to African Americans, so Levittown became the largest all-white community in the nation. There was never an overall town plan for Levittown, which spanned two existing Long Island towns, Hempstead and Oyster Bay, in Nassau County. Levitt and Sons provided no sewers, relying instead on individual septic tanks, and built residential streets that failed to connect with county and state highways. The project was all about selling houses, not about the basics of sheltering tens of thousands of people according to professional standards of housing or urban design.
By October 1952, Fortune magazine gushed over “The Most House for the Money” and praised “Levitt’s Progress,” publishing his complaints about government interference through too-strict FHA and VA inspections and standards. With a straight face, and despite receiving hundreds of millions of dollars of FHA financing, Levitt said, “Utopia in this business would be to get rid of the government, except in its proper function of an insurance agency.”
Meanwhile, Catherine Bauer and her allies faced the same kind of opposition they had confronted on the earlier housing bill. The 1949 Housing Act did not meet their expectations, and its provisions for demolition began the neighborhood destruction pattern that would later become “urban renewal.” With each succeeding year, fewer units of new public housing construction were authorized.
The Two-Tier Legacy
In Modern Housing in America, historian Gail Radford defines the 1930s and 1940s as the time when Americans developed a “two-tier” policy to subsidize housing. Cramped multi-family housing for the poor would be constructed by public authorities, while more generous single-family housing for white, male-headed families would be constructed by private developers with government support. This policy disadvantaged women and people of color, as well as the elderly and people of low incomes. It also had profound implications for urban design. Inadequate financial resources hampered multi-family housing complexes, while material resources were wasted in single-family housing production without proper urban planning. Worst of all, federal policy mystified many working-class and middle-class Americans, who saw minimal visible subsidies helping the poor but never understood that their own housing was being subsidized in a far more generous way through income-tax deductions that grew with the size of their mortgages.
Despite the greater scope for urban public amenities suggested by New Deal legislation enabling federal involvement in town building and public housing, it was the FHA’s mortgage insurance for private subdivisions that proved to have the greatest long-term effect on American urbanization patterns. As real estate historian Marc A. Weiss has stated: “This new federal agency, run to a large extent both by and for bankers, builders, and brokers, exercised great political power in pressuring local planners and government officials to conform to its requirements.” Between 1934 and 1940, Weiss concludes that “FHA had fully established the land planning and development process and pattern that a decade later captured media attention as ‘postwar suburbanization.'” Barry Checkoway notes that accounts of subdivisions “exploding” often attributed their growth to consumer choice, but in fact consumers had little choice. The well-designed urban multi-family projects Bauer and others had envisioned were not available as alternatives to the large subdivisions of inexpensive houses constructed by the big builders who now controlled the housing market.
The distrust and anger generated by the two-tier housing solution endure today. Public policy has separated affluent and poor, white and black, male-headed households and female-headed households, young families and the elderly. Advocates of affordable housing and urban amenities often see white suburbs and their residents as the enemy, while many affluent white suburban homeowners and successful builders don’t want to deal with city problems. The two-tier solution also dampened idealism in the planning and design professions. Architects lost the chance to build large amounts of affordable multi-family housing with sophisticated designs. Regional planners lost the chance to direct the location and site design of massive postwar construction. Sixty years later, metropolitan regions are still shaped by the outcome of these old debates.
Dolores Hayden is professor of architecture, urbanism and American studies at Yale University. With support from the Lincoln Institute, she is working on a new history of American suburbia, Model Houses for the Millions: Making the American Suburban Landscape, 1820-2000.
Her new working paper, Model Houses for the Millions: Making the American Suburban Landscape, 1820-2000, is currently available from the Lincoln Institute.
References
Catherine Bauer. 1934. Modern Housing. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
Rosalyn Baxandall and Elizabeth Ewen. 2000. Picture Windows: How the Suburbs Happened. New York, NY: Basic Books.
Barry Checkoway. 1986. “Large Builders, Federal Housing Programs, and Postwar Suburbanization,” in Rachel G. Bratt, Chester Hartman, and Ann Meyerson, Critical Perspectives on Housing. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. 119-138.
Keller Easterling. 1999. Organization Space. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Dolores Hayden. 1984. Redesigning the American Dream: The Future of Housing, Work, and Family Life. New York, NY: W.W. Norton.
Kenneth T. Jackson. 1985. Crabgrass Frontier. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Gail Radford. 1996. Modern Housing in America: Policy Struggles in the New Deal Era. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Marc A. Weiss. 1987. The Rise of the Community Builders: The American Real Estate Industry and Urban Land Use Planning. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
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The excessively high price of serviced land in Latin America is one of several explanations for the extent and persistence of informal land markets. Contrary to popular beliefs, informality is expensive and therefore is not the best or even an advantageous alternative to combating poverty, but it is usually the only one available to the urban poor. A more consistent policy to reduce informality, and in so doing reduce poverty, should be at least neutral or contribute to reducing high land prices.
Poverty Alone Cannot Explain Informality
Although the map of illegality corresponds to a great degree with that of poverty, the extent and persistence of informality cannot be explained by poverty alone. Not all occupants of informal settlements are poor, as many empirical studies in Latin America have proved in recent years. The rate of new irregular land occupations is much higher than the rate of increase in the number of new poor families. In Brazil, for example, the total number of favela residents has increased at five times the rate of poor residents, and a similar trend is seen in most large Latin American cities.
This spectacular growth in informal settlements has occurred through expansion on the peripheries and densification in “consolidated” irregular urban areas, even though the birth rate and the number of rural-to-urban migrants have declined substantially and the percentage of poor citizens has remained relatively stable. Other explanations for this growth in informality include the lack of sufficient social housing programs, inadequate public investment in urban infrastructure for public amenities and services (such as drainage and sewage systems) and, last but not least, the reality that informal arrangements are profitable for those who promote them.
The High Cost of Serviced Land
Conventional economics argues that free market prices reflect the level at which a buyer’s ability and willingness to pay matches a supplier’s ability and willingness to sell, but in practice no assurance is given with respect to meeting social needs. That is, the market for serviced land may be functioning well, even though many families (even non-poor ones) are unable to access such land, and some existing urbanized lands are being kept vacant intentionally.
On the peripheries of many Latin American cities, the price of a square metre (m2) of serviced land made available by private agents can vary between US$32 and US$172. These figures are close in absolute terms to those found in cities in the developed world, where the per capita income is typically 7 to 10 times higher than in Latin America. Even a family above the poverty line saving up to 20 percent of its monthly wages (US$200) would need 12 to 15 years to save enough to acquire an urbanized plot of 150 m2. These indicators suggest that the difficulty of gaining access to serviced land may be one of the factors that actually contribute to poverty.
The price of serviced land, like prices in other markets, is determined by supply and demand. The supply of land depends on the amount that is newly serviced (produced) per year, the amount that is retained from the market, and the intensity of the use of the existing serviced land. The demand depends on the annual rate of formation of new households, adjusted by their income and/or purchasing power, their preferences and the prices of other items in their budgets. It is difficult to provide a full discussion of all factors affecting the behavior of land prices (see Smolka 2002), but it suffices to mention certain determinants that are emblematic to understanding some apparent idiosyncrasies of the functioning of urban land markets in Latin America.
On the supply side, property taxes, a major potential source of revenue to finance the production of serviced land, are ridiculously low. Typically property taxes represent less that 0.5 percent of GDP, compared to 3 to 4 percent in the U.S. and Canada. Overall there is a sense that Latin America underspends on infrastructure and services compared to its per capita GDP. The substantive observed land value increments resulting from investments in urban infrastructure and services are basically neglected as a revenue source to finance such investments, due to weak sanctions on capturing land value increments or simply holding improved land from the market (Smolka and Furtado 2001).
In addition, the disposition of considerable amounts of land is controlled by agents that do not follow strict economic rules (e.g., some public agencies, the Army, the Church or even state-owned enterprises like the railroads for whom some statutory restrictions preclude the disposition of land according to the market’s highest and best use criteria). Furthermore, the limited amount of available land that is fully serviced is often subject to overtly elitist urbanistic norms and regulations (zoning) designed to “protect” those serviced neighborhoods by making it difficult for low-income families to comply.
On the demand side, many families, even those with relatively high incomes, work in the informal sector and are excluded from the market because they lack the credentials required by financial agencies to apply for a loan. The need to self-finance housing production on a piecemeal basis through nontraditional funding sources extends the time between acquisition and occupation of land, thereby adding to both the cost of financing and the overall demand for land. Further, the legacy of high inflation, ill-developed or inaccessible capital markets, and limited participation in the social security system are responsible for nurturing a well-established culture and preference by lower-income sectors to use land as a reserve of value and as a popular means of capitalization, which also adds to the demand for land. In other words, holding undeveloped land and the culture of land speculation are not exclusive to high-income areas.
Prices for Informal Plots
Beyond these conventional arguments about supply and demand, one may also consider the dynamics or interdependency of formal and informal urban land markets as a factor contributing to high land prices. Specifically, the high prices for serviced land in the formal market seem to affect the relatively high prices of unserviced land in the informal market, and vice versa.
Land prices reveal the difference that the purchaser has to pay to avoid falling into a worse situation (that is, farther from work; fewer or worse services, lower environmental quality, and the like). Thus, if the “best” alternative is a plot in an unserviced settlement, one would expect a premium on the existing serviced land, which would also reflect the value of the legal title that comes with serviced land. On the other hand, if the minimum price for serviced land (raw land plus the cost of urbanization) is still unaffordable, then whatever land one could have access to would represent an alternative. This alternative could range from outright squatter settlement, to invasion through the mediation of “pirate” operators or organized movements (both of which involve fees and other payments), to the more prevalent land market for irregular subdivision of large parcels into small plots with inadequate services.
The price of land in the informal market is, therefore, higher than the price of raw land but normally less than the sum of the raw land price plus the cost of providing services. At the same time, it tends to be lower (though not necessarily on a per square-metre basis) than the minimum price of fully serviced and commercialized land in the formal market. In effect the market values more “flexible” means to access land, such as plots smaller than the minimum lot size, or construction without building codes, or even the possibility of selling the roof of a house as buildable space.
Most low-income families do not choose an informal arrangement because it provides the best price option, but simply because it is often their only option. The “choice” of acquiring an informal plot is still expensive. Conservative estimates obtained from an informal survey of 10 large Latin American cities show the average price of land on a commercialized illegal plot was US$27 for one square metre (see Table 1).
Table 1: Prices and Profitability of Informal and Formal Land Markets (US$)
1- Rural land designated for urban use
Informal market: $4
Formal market: $4
2- Cost of urbanization
Informal market: minimal = $5
Formal market: full = $25
3- Final price in the market
Informal market: $27
Formal market: $70
4- Profit over advanced capital=(3-1-2)/(1+2)
Informal market: 200%
Formal market: 141%
The profit figure (4) explains at least in part the question (an apparent paradox): Why, in spite of a significant mark-up in the provision of urbanized land in the informal market, does one find so little interest in development from the private sector? As Table 1 indicates, the provision of informal land is more profitable than the provision of formally developed land. In fact, the figures for the formal market are largely underestimated since there are higher risks associated with financial, security and marketing costs, and other costs borne by the developer that are not incurred in informal developments. These data also help explain why formality begets informality and exposes the fact that the advantages of informal arrangements are not necessarily perceived by the low-income occupants, but by the subdivider or informal developer.
Unexpected Effects of Regularization
Let us turn now to the question of policy responses to this state of affairs. Given the apparent impossibility or impracticality of adopting any other policy, the prevailing notion has been that tolerating informal “solutions” to gain access to land and then regularizing the settlements after they are established is cheaper in the long run for public finances, and better for the low-income occupants (Lincoln Institute 2002).
The public finance argument claims that the existing arrangement is cheaper because it capitalizes on private (self-) investments in the consolidated settlements, thus relieving public agencies of social responsibility and expenditures otherwise associated with one’s full “right to the city.” This view is questionable on two accounts. First, the physical conditions and existing housing are often unacceptable as human shelter, in spite of the ingenuity and imagination of informal solutions under extremely unfavorable conditions. The poor standards of land use and density in these settlements are only tolerated because the damage has already been done. Second, with regard to infrastructure, some of the alternative technologies that look promising are ultimately shown to perform poorly and to require overly expensive maintenance.
The impacts on low-income occupants are also worse than expected. Not only are land prices much too high but there are additional costs: those without an official address (because they live in an irregular settlement) are often discriminated against when looking for a job or social services; rents as a percentage of property value are higher than the rates observed in the formal market; access to water from a truck or other temporary source is much more expensive than piped water; and the cost of insecurity is greater because of living in a more violent environment.
Regularization policies evaluated in a broader urban context may actually contribute to aggravating the problem it is supposed to remedy. That is, as a curative approach these policies may instead have perverse or counter-productive preventative effects, as noted below.
Price Signals
The expectation that an area of land will eventually be regularized allows the developer to raise the price. A purchaser often obtains a lot with written evidence that the developer does not yet have the services required by urban planning norms. At the same time the developer promises that as soon as enough lots are sold the services or infrastructure will be provided, even though such promises are often unfulfilled. At best, a relationship of complicity is established between buyer and seller. At worst, and this is quite common, the purchaser is tricked by the existence of services, such as pipes put into the ground, which the developer claims are part of the infrastructure network. Other problems in these arrangements that can harm poor residents are doubtful rights of tenure, payment terms that disguise the full amount of interest to be paid, and confusing or inaccurate details in the contract.
As in any other segment of the land market, the actual prices reflect, or absorb, expectations about the future use of the lot. The informal sector is no exception. The greater the expectation that the plot of land that is currently without services will get them eventually, either from the developer or, as is more likely, from the government through some regularization program, the higher the price at which the land is sold.
Regularization as an Attraction for More Irregularity
Research on the first arrival dates of inhabitants in informal settlements suggests that in many cases more people moved in just when some regularization program (such as the granting of titles or urbanization improvements) was announced or implemented (Menna Barreto 2000).
The idea that expectations about regularization have an effect on informality is also corroborated by the large number of invasions or occupations that take place either just before or just after electoral periods, when candidates promise new regularization programs. The victory of Miguel Arraes as governor of Pernambuco, Brazil, in 1986 led to 13 land invasions in just over a month (Rabaroux 1997, 124), and the Latin American historiography of the effects of the expectations created by populist promises is rich in other examples. Many of the existing settlements that need to be regularized today owe their origin to the irresponsible complacency of politicians turning a blind eye to the irregular occupation of public or unsuitable areas, or, which is worse, who ceded public land for electioneering purposes.
The Opportunity Costs of Regularization
Regularization programs, which are normally of a remedial or curative nature, have a high opportunity cost compared to the cost of providing urbanized land in a preventative manner. The rule of thumb cost per benefited family of a typical upgrading or regularization program has been in the range of $3,000 to $4,000. Taking the size of a plot to be around 50 m2 and adding 20 percent to account for streets and other public services, the cost works out to US$50 to US$70 per m2. This is considerably higher than the cost for servicing new land, which is less than US$25 per m2, and is similar to the price charged by private developers, even when allowing for a handsome profit margin. ECIA, a private developer operating west of Río de Janeiro, offered completely urbanized plots for US$70 to US$143 per m2 at 1999 prices (Oliveira 1999). The Municipal Secretariat of Urbanism in Río de Janeiro has a technical study, from 1997, which demonstrates that it is possible to commercialize urbanized plots for less than US$55 per m2. Along the same lines, Aristizabal and Gomez (2001) in Bogotá estimate that the cost of correction (“reparation”) of an irregular settlement is 2.7 times the cost of planned areas.
These figures suggest the limitations of preventative programs in favor of curative ones. It is also relevent that permission to develop a regular, formal subdivision may take from three to five years, whereas the decision to regularize an informal settlement often takes less than six months.
The “Day After” of Regularization
A well-executed regularization program (that is, one that effectively integrates the informal area with the urban fabric) would ideally result in the improved quality of life for all occupants and a stronger community. In particular, one would expect an appreciation of property values, causing some residential mobility as families with below-average incomes are forced to move. However, when the program is badly executed the area may be consolidated as a low-income irregular settlement.
The Favela-Bairro upgrading program in Rio de Janeiro is often used to exemplify the most comprehensive and successful experience of its kind. Abramo’s (2002) study of the impact of regularization programs found a relatively small increase in property values in the affected areas (28 percent). Applying this average figure to typical or modest houses with an ex-ante value estimated at US$12,000, the added value is about US$3,400, a number close to the average per-family cost of regularization programs. This result contrasts with the mark-up of more than 100 percent obtained in the process of servicing raw land through the market by private agents. This intriguing piece of information seems to show how little notice the “market” takes of the increased value of these regularized settlements. At the same time, full integration into the urban fabric turns out to be less frequent than had been expected. Many of the favelas that received important upgrading investments remain stigmatized as favelas even 15 years later.
Conclusions
Informality is expensive, and it exacerbates the conditions of living in poverty. The diagnoses of such agencies as the UNCHS (Habitat), World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank and others would seem to be correct in regarding upgrading programs as an essential ingredient of any policy to deal with urban poverty. However, because of the piecemeal and limited approach of such programs, there is no guarantee that the regularization of settlements alone will contribute to reducing urban poverty. In effect these programs not only reiterate and keep intact the land market “rules of the game” that contribute to informality, but they also generate some perverse effects. This situation poses both a dilemma and a challenge. The dilemma is that not regularizing simply is not a political option (nor is it a humanitarian option). The challenge is how to interrupt the vicious cycle of poverty and informality through interventions in the land market. The task ahead is formidable, but there are places in Latin America where local governments are beginning to set new ground rules.
Martim O. Smolka is senior fellow and director of the Program on Latin America and the Caribbean at the Lincoln Institute.
References
Abramo, Pedro. 2002. Funcionamento do mercado informal de terras nas favelas e mobilidade residencial dos pobres. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy Research Paper.
Aristizabal, Nora, and Andrés Ortíz Gomez. 2002. Are services more important than titles in Bogotá?” in Land, Rights and Innovation: Improving Tenure Security for the Urban Poor, Geoffrey Payne, ed. 100-113. London: Intermediate Technology Development Group Publishing.
Lincoln Institute. 2002. Access to Land by the Urban Poor: 2002 Annual Roundtable. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
Menna Barreto Silva, Helena. 2000. Programas de urbanização e desenvolvimento do mercado em favelas brasileiras. São Paulo: University of São Paulo: LAB-Hab.
Oliveira, Fabrício L. de. 1999. Valorização fundiária e custos de urbanização na XVII R.A. – Campo Grande: uma primeira aproximação com o caso do Rio de Janeiro. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy Research Paper.
Rabaroux, Patrice. 1997. La Regularizacion en Recife (Brasil). In El acceso de los pobres al suelo urbano. Antonio Azuela and François Tomas, eds. México: Centro de Estudios Mexicanos y Centroamericanos del Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales de la UNAM.
Smolka, Martim O. 2002. The High and Unaffordable Prices of Serviced Land. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy Research Paper.
Smolka, Martim O., and Fernanda Furtado, eds. 2001. Recuperación de plusvalías en América Latina: Alternativas para el desarrollo urbano. Santiago, Chile: EURELIBROS.
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Many historic centers in Latin America have been the focus of government and private initiatives seeking to rehabilitate the building stock and position the areas to serve the tourism industry. In most cases these efforts have led to the displacement of lowincome residents or of residential activities altogether, due to gentrification and commercialization of the district (Scarpaci 2005). More recently, the rehabilitation of these historic cores has been framed as part of broader debates and efforts that pursue the recovery of the city centers (historical or otherwise) because of their key role as collective symbols or spaces of social interaction, or because of their potential efficiency as dense, well-serviced urban districts (Pérez, Pujol, and Polèse 2003; Rojas 2004).
This article seeks to advance this discussion based on the experience in Panama City’s historic center, “Casco Antiguo.” It describes some recent, innovative policies that have explored the intersections of tourism, affordable housing, employment, and culture in a historical context, and draws some general insights and lessons.
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Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 7 del CD-ROM Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.
Un mecanismo creciente de producción de suelo y vivienda en los Estados Unidos lo constituyen las subdivisiones comunitarias automanejadas de bajos recursos, denominadas “colonias” en Texas. En un estudio reciente financiado por el Instituto Lincoln, el autor de este artículo analiza los aspectos disfuncionales de estos mercados de suelo, destacados por un alto índice de propietarios absentistas, discretos niveles de transacción y rotación de terrenos y propiedades, y una falta de valorización (incremento del valor) significativa conforme se lleva a cabo la construcción y el mejoramiento de los asentamientos.
Subdivisiones comunitarias
Las colonias son emplazamientos con infraestructuras inadecuadas (o simplemente inexistentes) que se identificaron inicialmente en los condados más pobres de Texas a lo largo de la frontera mexicana. Sus pobladores compran terrenos sobre los cuales colocan casas-remolque o las menos móviles “casas prefabricadas”. En algunos casos las familias mismas construyen sus casas, comenzando con chozas endebles o remolques de segunda mano que van arreglando con el paso del tiempo.
Ciertamente las colonias no son un fenómeno de escala menor. Según el Consejo de Desarrollo de Agua de Texas, hay aproximadamente 1500 de estos asentamientos poblados por unas 400 mil personas, principalmente en las regiones fronterizas de los Estados Unidos. Los datos del Consejo y los resultados de nuestro propio estudio demuestran que existen muchas subdivisiones similares en otras localidades texanas, por lo cual estos estimados de población probablemente aumenten conforme se vayan incorporando nuevos datos. Muchos condados de Texas y de otros estados están comenzando a reconocer los problemas de estas subdivisiones no incorporadas que ofrecen unas de las pocas opciones de acceso a vivienda a las familias de bajos recursos.
Por “bajos recursos” nos referimos a ingresos familiares anuales que oscilan entre $12 000 y $25 000, aunque en realidad muchas familias de las colonias perciben entradas muy inferiores (véase la tabla 1). Estas familias residen en áreas de mercados laborales pobres, bien sea en regiones que experimentan polarización salarial y laboral entre trabajadores, o bien donde hay un predominio de empleos mal remunerados del sector de servicios. En la mayoría de las ciudades, los costos de vivienda están fuera del alcance de los habitantes pobres, quienes entonces recurren al extremo inferior del mercado de alquiler, en apartamentos o en terrenos para remolques (trailer parks). Aun así, muchas de estas familias aspiran a ser propietarias de viviendas porque reconocen las ventajas de escapar del modo habitacional de alquiler, carente de equidad. Muchas de ellas prefieren optar por estas subdivisiones rurales con infraestructuras inadecuadas, donde al menos pueden ser dueñas de propiedades que pueden valorizarse a través de ayudas mutuas y esfuerzos propios.
No obstante, las colonias no son homogéneas, sino que presentan fuertes variaciones en cuanto a su tamaño, disposición, modo de desarrollo, mezclas de tipos de viviendas, dimensiones de las parcelas, ocupación del terreno y tasas de rotación residencial, niveles de servicio, composición étnica, niveles de ingresos, y niveles de pobreza relativa. En Texas no existen colonias típicas, sino más bien una variedad de ellas, con diferencias de condado a condado.
Estos asentamientos son similares a los emplazamientos irregulares de países menos desarrollados, y su existencia se explica por un raciocinio similar, o sea: una economía de salarios bajos, el aumento en la demanda de vivienda, la falta de sistemas estatales de abastecimiento de viviendas capaces de satisfacer la demanda, y un sector privado desinteresado o incapaz de producir soluciones habitacionales económicas. Al igual que sus equivalentes en México y América Latina, las colonias ofrecen terrenos económicos carentes de servicios en los márgenes de áreas urbanizadas, terrenos que son costeables y accesibles a los grupos de ingresos más bajos de la sociedad. La mayoría de sus habitantes tienen que desplazarse largas distancias para llegar a sus trabajos en ciudades adyacentes.
Si bien las colonias en Texas son raramente ilegales, muchos aspectos del proceso de desarrollo son informales o cuasi-formales, especialmente:
Hace justamente una década, Texas identificó la existencia y proliferación de estas subdivisiones tipo colonias, y a través de sesiones legislativas bienales se iniciaron un conjunto de acciones destinadas tanto a detener su crecimiento como a simular su modernización. A continuación se exponen algunos ejemplos de las acciones legislativas tomadas al respecto en la última década:
Una debilidad subyacente de todas estas iniciativas es su aplicación exclusiva a la región fronteriza, únicamente a condados especialmente designados que forman parte del Programa de Áreas Empobrecidas (EDAP, por su sigla en inglés). En otras partes, el crecimiento de las colonias continúa impertérrito.
Parcelas vacantes y propietarios absentistas
Un indicador principal de la disfunción en los mercados de suelo es la falta de ocupación y desarrollo de las parcelas después de su venta. Se ha demostrado que entre el 15 y el 80 por ciento de los terrenos de las colonias pueden estar vacantes. Incluso en los asentamientos más grandes (y a menudo dotados plenamente de servicios), entre una cuarta y una sexta parte de los terrenos está vacante y pertenece a propietarios absentistas. Más aún, la existencia de terrenos relativamente grandes de 500 a 2000 metros cuadrados (o más), aunada a las prohibiciones de subdivisión y compartimento de los mismos, llevan a muy bajas densidades de población, entre 25 y 30 personas por hectárea. Esta característica exacerba el costo unitario de la provisión de servicios, reduce la recuperación de los costos, y debilita la cohesión de la comunidad y la ayuda mutua. Nuestros cálculos indican que hay más de 26.000 parcelas vacantes en Texas, lo cual equivale a más de 2800 hectáreas de suelo residencial desocupado. Si estas parcelas estuvieran totalmente ocupadas, incluso a las bajas densidades de población que caracterizan a las colonias, se podría alojar a otras 100 000 personas sólo en los asentamientos ya existentes.
Por tanto, la pregunta obligatoria aquí es, ¿cuál es la razón de que tantas familias pobres no ocupen sus parcelas? En términos de pura lógica uno podría pensar que la falta de servicios desanima a los pobladores potenciales, y que un catalizador para la ocupación de los solares sería la provisión de los servicios públicos básicos. No obstante, es de destacar que muchas personas sí ocupan sus parcelas desde el principio. Si bien es posible preguntarles directamente sus motivos y la razón de sus decisiones, ciertamente es difícil hacer lo mismo con los numerosos propietarios absentistas con paradero desconocido. ¿Quiénes son estas personas? ¿dónde están? ¿qué quieren de sus tierras?
A pesar de los obstáculos metodológicos derivados de la ausencia de documentos claros que detallen registros de compraventa de propiedades y títulos de las parcelas, nosotros pudimos utilizar registros de impuestos y de tasación de propiedades para rastrear algunos de estos propietarios absentistas. Sin embargo, determinamos que entre el 8 y el 10 por ciento de estos registros aparecen con direcciones “equivocadas”, con la consiguiente probabilidad de que el verdadero número de propietarios absentistas con paradero desconocido sea dos veces mayor. Al haber abandonado el suelo que compraron, estas personas están en efecto impidiendo que sus propiedades participen en futuras transacciones del mercado de suelo.
Lugar de residencia actual de los propietarios absentistas Mediante los registros tributarios de unos 2713 propietarios absentistas de 16 asentamientos (en condados fronterizos y no fronterizos), nos fue posible averiguar el paradero actual de los mismos.
Alrededor de un 75 % de ellos vive en los alrededores, bien sea en la ciudad adyacente o bien a distancias no mayores de 30 km. El resto de los absentistas se divide equitativamente entre aquéllos que viven en otras regiones de Texas y los que viven fuera del estado. En el primer grupo, si bien se observó una amplia dispersión de domicilios a lo largo y ancho del estado, la mayoría vive en Houston (26 %), Dallas (15 %) y San Antonio (12 %) -las tres áreas metropolitanas principales de Texas. De los absentistas que viven fuera del estado, el 35 % vive en California, seguido por un 14 % en Nuevo México y finalmente un 12 % en la región de Chicago (Illinois e Indiana).
Características de los ocupantes y de los propietarios absentistas
Esta investigación reveló que los ocupantes de las colonias y los propietarios absentistas son poblaciones bastante diferentes (véase la tabla 1). Dos tercios de los residentes de las colonias, en comparación con la mitad de los propietarios absentistas, son nacidos en México. Los propietarios absentistas exhiben una mayor diversidad étnica, y a pesar de ser pobres, están en mejor situación que los habitantes de las colonias; en su mayoría, adquirieron sus parcelas con anterioridad, y por tal motivo pagaron menos en términos reales.
Las diferencias más significativas entre los grupos se evidencian en sus patrones habitacionales y en los motivos de sus compras. Las familias absentistas no están esperando mudarse a sus parcelas tan pronto las equipen con servicios públicos. La mayoría de ellas (81 %) son ya propietarias de viviendas y parecen estar muy cómodas en sus residencias actuales. Aún más, un 49 % de los absentistas indicaron no haber comprado los terrenos para ellos, sino más como inversión, seguridad, o como herencia futura para sus hijos. Menos del 25 % declaró que la falta de servicios fuera el problema. Más de la mitad expresó no tener intenciones de mudarse a las parcelas en el futuro. De aquellos que sí han pensado en ocuparlos, muy pocos planean hacerlo en los próximos 5 a 10 años. En nuestra opinión, muy pocos terminarán mudándose. Algunos incluso dijeron que venderían sus parcelas en cualquier momento si se les ofreciera un buen precio.
Durante las últimas dos décadas, el mercado del suelo para ambas poblaciones ha sido totalmente diferente al de otros mercados residenciales. En términos reales, el valor del suelo de las colonias ha permanecido estancado y la tasa de recuperación ha sido baja, especialmente cuando se la compara con otros sectores del mercado de suelo y vivienda. Tal realidad sugiere que los pobres realmente no se están beneficiando ni de su inversión inmobiliaria, ni tampoco -en el caso de los residentes- del valor añadido a sus propiedades por mejoras realizadas por ellos mismos. Aunque sigue habiendo un nivel discreto de ventas (mayor que el anticipado), los mercados de suelo de las colonias no están experimentando una valorización significativa.
Políticas de mejoramiento del mercado
Los terrenos vacantes son, al mismo tiempo, la causa y el efecto de este bajo rendimiento del mercado. Es importante destacar aquí la errónea interpretación que se le da a la filosofía “constrúyalo y ellos vendrán”. Si bien es cierto que las políticas de desarrollo de los servicios urbanos pueden ayudar a acelerar la ocupación de los terrenos y la densificación de las colonias, también es cierto que se requieren otras intervenciones para mejorar la eficiencia de los mercados de suelo en las colonias. Entre dichas intervenciones podría figurar una revisión de las leyes para aumentar la productividad urbana, p. ej., otorgar permisos para el uso no residencial del suelo (a fin de generar ingresos), o para subdivisiones y alquileres. En efecto, una de las razones detrás de la falta de valorización de la tierra es la restricción impuesta sobre usos aprobados. Otro limitante del desarrollo es la moratoria de 1995 impuesta sobre las ventas de parcelas. Si bien es cierto que la ley se infringe constantemente, este hecho desinfla los precios, distorsiona la rotación de los terrenos y alienta las ventas clandestinas. La prohibición de las subdivisiones de parcelas internas (especialmente las de parcelas grandes) inhibe los alquileres y el compartimento de costos entre parientes.
También se plantea la necesidad de sacar al mercado las tierras que pertenezcan a personas con paradero desconocido. Al respecto, se podría llevar a cabo un secuestro de las parcelas que tengan imposiciones morosas, especialmente si tal abordaje se combinara con la creación de una empresa de tenencia pública o de fideicomiso de tierras que se dedique posteriormente a promover el suministro y la redistribución de solares a través de mecanismos tales como la socialización y el reajuste de la tierra. Al menos en Texas, atacar el “problema” de los propietarios absentistas ofrece la posibilidad de soluciones y resultados positivos.
Al trabajar por entender y proporcionar nuestro análisis de las subdivisiones comunitarias de Texas y otros estados, podremos suministrar más información a los legisladores, y posiblemente promover políticas del suelo más adaptadas y apropiadas para atacar el problema. Así, quizás pueda haber un aumento significativo de oportunidades habitacionales para los grupos más pobres de la sociedad estadounidense.
Referencias
Peter M. Ward. 1999. Colonias and Public Policy in Texas and Mexico: Urbanization by Stealth. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
______. 2000. Residential Land Market Dynamics, Absentee Lot Owners and Densification Policies for Texas Colonias. Artículo del Instituto Lincoln. WP00PW1. 160 páginas.
Peter M. Ward tiene el cargo del C.B. Smith Sr. Centennial Chair in US-Mexico Relations en la Universidad de Texas-Austin, donde también es profesor en el Departmento de Sociología y en la Escuela de Asuntos Públicos Lyndon B. Johnson.
Call for Research and Conference Papers
The documented proliferation of colonias in Texas suggests that similar types of quasi-formal homestead subdivisions exist across much of the U.S. to provide access to home ownership for urban households earning less than $20,000 a year. While there are significant private transport costs associated with living in poorly serviced communities several miles beyond the urban fringe, families of all ethnicities are quick to recognize the advantages of self-managed home ownership on relatively large lots compared to renting a trailer or apartment.
To investigate this phenomenon further, the Lincoln Institute is inviting researchers interested in quasi-formal homesteading to form a network to facilitate the collection and sharing of data. In addition, the Institute is sponsoring a conference to be held in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in Fall 2001 to pursue these three goals:
1) to develop a comparative research agenda to analyze quasi-formal homestead subdivisions;
2) to develop methodologies and data gathering strategies about the development of these subdivisions and land market performance; and
3) to develop policy instruments and approaches suitable for application in the U.S. and to learn from best practices in other countries.
The target audience for the conference includes scholars and researchers, county officials or their equivalents, and legislators or their senior aides with an interest in land policy for self-help homesteading among the poor. The conference planners are seeking participants to prepare papers on the following issues:
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Government-owned property is exempt from local taxes almost everywhere in the United States, but this situation is based less on logic than on now-outdated historical considerations. Remarkably, there are no comprehensive estimates of the value of these exemptions. For comparison, the value of property tax exemptions for nonprofit institutions (excluding houses of worship) was about $900 billion in 1997, and charitable properties (including hospitals and universities) accounted for about $500 billion of this figure (Cordes, Gantz and Pollak 2002, 89). Even without comprehensive data, it is clear that the amount of government-owned land is vastly greater than nonprofit holdings. However, the exempt status of government land barely provokes complaint (except in the western states where federal landholdings are enormous) whereas exemptions for nonprofit organizations are frequently challenged.
Historical Background and Federalism Today
Government-owned property traditionally has been exempt from taxation in order to avoid an empty ritual whereby the sovereign taxed itself. The implicit assumption of a single sovereign was quite reasonable in Elizabethan England, where the property tax first took root, but not so in the U.S. today. The myriad school districts and special districts that now compete with counties and municipalities for property tax revenues were virtually nonexistent in the nineteenth century. Today there is no economic reason to exclude all government property from the tax base.
Exemptions for private, nonprofit entities grew out of the government exemption. In the seventeenth century, private parties did not always wait for the Crown to repair their bridges, causeways, seawalls or highways. They assumed this responsibility whenever self-interest required and the purse permitted. The capital-intensive nature of such activities that relieved government of a burden made a property tax exemption a logical tool for encouraging private initiative. Thus the first charitable exemptions were a type of quasi-government exemption, subsidizing private parties who discharged public responsibilities.
Charitable exemptions for the alleviation of poverty began as a separate category, because reducing poverty was not originally considered a government responsibility. The change in this attitude over time had the effect of diminishing the distinction between alleviating poverty and relieving government of a burden, but these remain two separate bases for the charitable exemption. Before the New Deal of the 1930s, U.S. counties had the primary governmental responsibility for poor relief, through maintaining almshouses and work farms. The principal public expenditure required for them was for land and construction, since the residents did the day-to-day work of running these facilities. In this situation, a property tax exemption made sense. If a charitable organization did not build such a facility, the responsibility would fall to county government and would be funded through property taxes. It was easy to see a clear and convincing connection between the alleviation of poverty, relief of a government burden and a property tax exemption.
Modern U.S. federalism has undermined these connections. There is no single sovereign now, but rather 87,000 units of government, including 19,000 municipalities, 16,600 townships and towns, 3,000 counties, 13,700 school districts and 34,700 special districts, which often overlap in complex ways. The property tax is virtually the sole source of internally generated revenues for school districts and special districts. A government exemption can be administered so that no unit of government need pay taxes to itself, while taxpayers outside the taxing jurisdiction who benefit from the property would pay the tax.
Valuation of unique government property and infrastructure is a problem, but it is not insurmountable. A new addition to generally accepted accounting principles requires local governments to carry on their balance sheets the depreciated value of their physical assets, including infrastructure, which can be a starting point for valuing such property. Already local government property is taxable in 11 states, provided it lies outside the owner’s boundary. For example, a reservoir owned by a water district can be taxed by the town or county where the reservoir is located, and the tax can be collected through increased water rates charged to the utility’s customers.
The strong consensus in favor of exempting government property is due to inertia, power and precaution. The federal government has vast landholdings, collects no property taxes, and therefore would oppose any tax on government property. Besides, the Constitution shields it. State governments also have extensive holdings and do not benefit from property taxes to any significant degree, so they too would oppose taxing government property. Local governments, special districts and school districts would be the net beneficiaries if government property were taxed, since their own property holdings are small in comparison to federal and state governments, yet the property tax provides almost 40 percent of their revenue (U.S. Census Bureau 1998).
Charitable Exemptions as Sovereign Exemptions
As long as government property is exempt, the case for charities is strengthened. Evelyn Brody (1998; 2002) argues that the states, by conferring benefits of sovereignty on nonprofit institutions, are acknowledging the underlying independent, self-governing nature of those institutions. “Tax exemption carries with it a sense of leaving the nonprofit sector inviolate, and the very concept of sovereignty embodies the independent power to govern” (Brody 1998, 588). Under federal tax law, neither charitable institutions nor local governments are taxed on net income, contributions or interest income from bonds, but both are taxed for payments made for services rendered. Considering charitable nonprofit institutions as quasi-sovereign allows us to make sense of “the rules in the tax scheme that operate to curtail rather than enhance the economic strength of the charitable sector. After all, rival sovereigns rarely feel comfortable letting the other grow too powerful” (Brody 1998, 586).
The U.S. Supreme Court, in Walz v Tax Commissioners, 397 U.S. 664 (1969), supports the position taken by Brody: “[Exemption] restricts the fiscal relationship between church and state, and tends to complement and reinforce the desired separation insulating each from the other (emphasis added).” Churches, and by extension other nonprofit institutions, are sovereigns in their own domain, which is circumscribed by a higher sovereign—state government.
Conversely, arguments used to attack certain charitable exemptions can also be applied to the governmental exemption. Critics of nonprofit tax exemption focus on large, property-rich and financially strong organizations, calling them commercial enterprises (Balk 1971; Hyman 1990; Gaul and Borowski 1993). This category includes colleges, universities, hospitals and nursing homes. No state prohibits charities from engaging in commercial activities, but 8 states out of 43 responding to the survey described below prohibit charities from earning a profit, even for institutional purposes. All states prohibit the charitable owner of exempt property from distributing profit to private parties. “It is a well-established principle of law that a charitable institution does not lose its charitable character and its consequent exemption from taxation merely because recipients of its benefits who are able to pay are required to do so, as long as funds derived in this manner are devoted to the charitable purposes of the institution” (American Jurisprudence 1944).
Commercial enterprises of local government are generally tax exempt, including air and marine ports, electric power generating facilities, water treatment and distribution plants, golf courses, package liquor stores and parking garages, to name a few. If commercial activity is to be the test for taxation, this should be applied evenhandedly and extend to government property as well.
A Survey of State Charitable Exemptions
Every state exempts charitable property, but the meaning of “charitable” varies quite a lot because its legal antecedents are traceable to the English Statute of Charitable Uses of 1601. Policy makers have shown considerable ingenuity in adapting an ancient law to modern needs, and ingenuity breeds variety. A Lincoln Institute-sponsored survey explored the laws in each of the 50 states to clarify the definition and application of “charitable” property tax exemptions.
As befitting a sovereign, private nonprofit institutions enjoy a constitutionally protected tax exemption in almost as many states as do local governments. The constitutions of 38 states make reference to exemption of local government or private institutions, or both. States have probably been reluctant to define charity statutorily because the judicial branch is the final arbiter of constitutional matters. Four states authorize legislatures to grant exemptions without giving specific direction; only 9 (including all 6 New England states) are silent. Specific exemptions are mandated in 27 states, and are discretionary in 16. Arizona, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina and Virginia are in both categories because they mandate some exemptions (usually governmental) but give their legislatures discretion with respect to other classes of institutional property.
Only 10 states have statutory definitions, and they show very little similarity (see Figure 1). Four of them define charity in terms of a public benefit, two in terms of relieving government of a burden, and one (Florida) could be placed in either category. Other individual states define charity in terms of relief of poverty or deriving income in the form of donations, or simply by listing exemption-eligible activities, with a slight overlap with relief of poverty. Five state definitions (Florida, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina and Pennsylvania) are extremely broad, which essentially punts the issue to the judicial branch.
The lack of a discernable pattern in judicial opinions arouses suspicion that courts must work backwards from a desired result to develop standards and tests. The situation today parallels the first half of the twentieth century, when bureaucrats and judges were gatekeepers to the nonprofit sector, approving or denying a petition for a nonprofit corporate charter, and they “used their control to promote the causes they believed in” (Silber 2001, 6). Awarding a nonprofit charter is now a ministerial act, but property tax exemption for charitable purposes remains subject to a variety of state laws with idiosyncratic judicial interpretations in every state. Confusion in the public debate over the charitable property tax exemption is the sure result. In devising tests, courts sometimes conflate public benefit with relief of poverty, and the result is unenforceable. Either one or the other must take precedence. Unless statutes are clear, courts are free to choose and to switch back and forth.
The case of hospitals is illustrative. Although one will find exempt hospitals in every state, the law is ambivalent. Hospitals have constitutional protection in only 3 states, while in 17 they are exempt only because the court regards them as “institutions of purely public charity.” The famous 1985 decisions in the supreme courts of Utah and Pennsylvania that undermined hospital tax exemption were health care cases. The courts concluded that the hospital (Utah) and the consortium of hospitals (Pennsylvania) were not in fact charities. Without putting too fine a point on it, the judicial remedies were based on the principle of relieving poverty.
Much angst and legal conflict could be averted if relief of poverty could be treated as separate and distinct from public benefit and relieving government of a burden, and fortunately it can be quantified. If a legislature wants a particular type of institution (e.g., hospitals) to relieve poverty, then the state should tax the hospitals, but award each property owner in the group a tax credit equal to the amount of service they give away up to their tax liability. This proposal raises the thorny question of how to measure the value of services priced below market, but the problems are surmountable (see Bowman [1999] for a method for hospital services). Solutions to these complexities are not likely to introduce the element of arbitrariness that pervades judicial decisions today.
H. Woods Bowman is associate professor in the Public Services Program at DePaul University in Chicago, Illinois. He was a visiting fellow at the Lincoln Institute in 2001 and he contributed to the Urban Institute book, Property Tax Exemption for Charities, edited by Evelyn Brody (2002).
References
American Jurisprudence. 1944. Taxation 51 § 602.
Balk, Alfred. 1971. The Free List: Property Without Taxes. New York: The Russell Sage Foundation.
Bowman, Woods. 1999. Buying charity care with property tax exemptions. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management vol. 18, no. 1 (winter): 120–125.
Brody, Evelyn. 1998. Of sovereignty and subsidy: Conceptualizing the charity tax exemption. Journal of Corporation Law vol. 23, no. 4 (summer): 585–629.
_____. 2002. Legal theories of tax exemption, quasi and real. In The Property Tax Exemption: Mapping the Battlefield, Evelyn Brody, ed., 145–172. Washington, DC: Urban Institute.
Cordes, Joseph J., Marie Gantz, and Thomas Pollak. 2002. What is the property-tax exemption worth? In The Property Tax Exemption: Mapping the Battlefield, Evelyn Brody, ed., 81–112. Washington, DC: Urban Institute.
Gaul, Gilbert and Neill A. Borowski. 1993. Free Ride: The Tax-Exempt Economy. Kansas City: Andrews McMeel.
Hyman, David A. 1990. The conundrum of charitability: Reassessing tax exemption for hospitals. American Journal of Law and Medicine vol. 6, no. 3: 327–380.
Silber, Norman I. 2001. A corporate form of freedom: The emergence of the nonprofit sector. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Department of Commerce. 1998. Statistical Abstract of the United States 1998, table 500 (reporting 1995 data).
Figure 1: Statutory Criteria for Charitable Organizations
Arizona requires “qualifying charitable organizations” to spend at least 50 percent of their budgets on services to state residents who receive “temporary assistance to needy families benefits or low income residents…and their households” [A.R.S. § 43-1088 G(2)].
In Florida, “Charitable purpose means a function or service which, if discontinued, could legally result in the allocation of public funds for the continuance of the function or service. It is not necessary that public funds [actually] be allocated, but only that such allocation is legal” [F.S. §196.012]. Houses of worship are exempt under a separate statute.
Hawaii defines charitable purposes as “community, character building, social service, or educational nature, including museums, libraries, art academies, and senior citizens housing facilities qualifying for a loan under the laws of the United States” [H.C.A. § 246-32(c)(2)].
In Montana charities must accomplish their activities “through absolute gratuity or grants” [M.C.A. § 15-6-201(2)(a)(i)].
In Nebraska charities must operate “exclusively for the purposes of the mental, social, or physical benefit of the public or an indefinite number of persons” [R.S.N.A. § 77-202(1)(d)].
A New Hampshire charity is one that performs “some service of public good or welfare advancing the spiritual, physical, intellectual, social or economic well-being of the general public or a substantial and indefinite segment of the general public that includes residents of the state of New Hampshire…” [R.A. § 72:23-1].
In North Carolina, “A charitable purpose is one that has humane and philanthropic objectives; it is an activity that benefits humanity or a significant rather than a limited segment of the community without the expectation of pecuniary profit or reward. The humane treatment of animals is also a charitable purpose” [N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-278.3(d)(2)].
Pennsylvania requires: (1) relief of poverty; (2) advancement and provision of education, including secondary education; (3) advancement of religion; (4) prevention of treatment of disease or injury, including mental retardation and mental disorders; (5) government or municipal purposes; or (6) accomplishment of a purpose that is recognized as important and beneficial to the public and that advances social, moral, or physical objectives” [10 Penn. Stats. § 372].
A South Dakota public charity “must receive a majority of its revenue from donations, public funds, membership fees, or program fees generated solely to cover operating expenses; it must lessen a government burden by providing its services to people who would otherwise use government services; it must offer its services to people regardless of their ability to pay for such services…” [S.D.C.L. § 10-4-9.1].
Texas defines charity by reference to the type of activity such an organization undertakes. T.T.C. § 11(d) lists 19 activities, including: (d)(1) “providing medical care without regard to the beneficiaries’ ability to pay…”
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Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 7 del CD-ROM Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.
Paulo Sandroni se graduó de economista en la Universidad de São Paulo en 1964 y fue profesor adjunto de economía en la Universidad Católica de São Paulo (PUC) hasta 1969, cuando dejó Brasil durante la dictadura militar. Enseñó en la Universidad de Chile en Santiago hasta 1973 y después en la Universidad de los Andes en Bogotá, Colombia, hasta 1979. Después de retornar a São Paulo, volvió a enseñar en la PUC hasta 2006 y también se incorporó a la Escuela de Administración de la Fundación Getulio Vargas (FGV).
En 1988, después de la victoria del Partido de los Trabajadores (PT) en Brasil, se incorporó al gobierno municipal de la alcaldesa Luiza Erundina en São Paulo, donde dirigió agencias dedicadas al desarrollo urbano y el transporte público. Durante un breve período, también fue viceministro de administración en el gobierno federal.
En 1994 dejó el área de gobierno municipal para continuar enseñando y realizando investigaciones sobre desarrollo urbano en ciudades de Brasil y otros países de América Latina, y publicando artículos y libros sobre economía, incluyendo un diccionario de economía que se considera como referencia primaria en Brasil. Inició su afiliación con el Instituto Lincoln en 1997. En la actualidad es consultor privado sobre temas de desarrollo urbano y transporte, y sigue enseñando en la Escuela de Administración de FGV y en programas patrocinados por el Instituto Lincoln.
Land Lines: ¿Cómo se interesó en temas de política urbana, vistos sus antecedentes en macroeconomía?
Paulo Sandroni: En 1988 −cuando era asistente de Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, ahora Presidente de Brasil y en ese entonces un candidato en las elecciones de 1989− ayudé a desarrollar programas para resolver los problemas macroeconómicos de Brasil. Después de la victoria de Luiza Erundina a la alcaldía de São Paulo en 1988, fui invitado a dirigir el programa de Operaciones Interligadas. Este programa consistía en negociar y formar sociedades entre los sectores público y privado para otorgar derechos adicionales de edificación, y usar la recaudación proveniente de la parte recuperada del incremento del valor del suelo (o plusvalía) para construir viviendas sociales para familias pobres.
También participé en el desarrollo de Operaciones Urbanas (OU), una forma de intervención para revitalizar grandes áreas de la ciudad, que también involucró la recuperación de plusvalías. Estaba fascinado por el desafío de formar parte de un grupo cuya misión era gobernar la ciudad más grande de Brasil con un proyecto de gran connotación social, y además continué asistiendo al Presidente Lula da Silva en temas macroeconómicos hasta 1998.
Land Lines: A su juicio, ¿por qué los proyectos de desarrollo urbano son un desafío tan grande?
Paulo Sandroni: La primera razón es que en los grandes proyectos que afectan los aspectos históricos, culturales, sociales y ambientales de la ciudad, la resolución de los problemas económicos y de financiamiento se debe considerar como parte del desafío, pero no son el objetivo principal. Por ejemplo, las OU que tratan de evitar el aburguesamiento y producir un entorno social más equilibrado pueden tener que usar tierras más valiosas para construir viviendas sociales. Estos proyectos requieren atención especial, porque la tierra no se puede vender usando el criterio típico de mayor y mejor uso. En Brasil hay una distinción importante entre los grandes proyectos urbanos (GPU) que pueden o no usar las herramientas de recuperación de plusvalías proporcionadas por las OU. Los GPU que están en condiciones de usar estas herramientas pueden redituar beneficios financieros y sociales, tanto para el sector público como el privado, con mayor facilidad.
Land Lines: ¿Puede describir el instrumento financiero detrás de esta política?
Paulo Sandroni: Desde 2004, los fondos para financiar las viviendas sociales y otras inversiones de infraestructura en las OU se han recaudado por medio de un nuevo instrumento ingenioso de recuperación de plusvalías llamado CEPAC (Certificado de Potencial Adicional de Construcción). Un CEPAC puede representar una cantidad determinada de metros cuadrados de derechos de construcción adicionales, dependiendo de dónde se formó la OU. Por ejemplo, en la OU de Faria Lima los CEPAC oscilaban de un mínimo de 0,8 a un máximo de 2,8 m2 y en la OU de Agua Espraiada, de 1,0 a 3,0 m2, porque los precios del suelo varían entre distintos lotes, incluso dentro de la misma OU.
La administración pública que crea y posee los derechos de desarrollo puede vendérselos a los emprendedores que quieran edificar con una densidad mayor que lo que estaba permitido previamente en esos lotes. Los CEPAC se venden en subasta a través de la bolsa, y si el interés de los emprendedores es alto, los precios pueden llegar a aumentar. No hace falta que el sector público valore la propiedad, porque el mercado se encarga de hacerlo. Los ingresos por la venta de CEPAC se depositan bajo una ley muy estricta en una cuenta separada utilizada para financiar proyectos de infraestructura y de viviendas sociales dentro de la OU, de manera que no aumenta la presión sobre el presupuesto de la ciudad.
Muchos observadores ven con recelo este instrumento porque temen que sea una forma de especulación del suelo en los mercados financieros. Creo que esto es un error, por dos razones. Primero, los especuladores agresivos en general invierten en bonos de alta liquidez que pueden aumentar de valor rápidamente en el corto plazo; los CEPAC no tienen ninguna de estas características. Segundo y más importante, el gobierno controla el mercado a esta altura del proceso. Si los precios aumentan debido a especulación, el sector público puede vender estos derechos a un precio más alto, incrementando sus ingresos proporcionalmente, o puede vender una cantidad más grande de acciones, causando un descenso del precio y neutralizando a los especuladores.
Land Lines: ¿Cómo han funcionado los CEPAC en la práctica?
Paulo Sandroni: Ambas OU que mencioné anteriormente han usado este instrumento para recaudar fondos de los emprendedores. A la fecha se ha vendido el 31 por ciento del inventario de metros cuadrados, o CEPAC, en el caso de Agua Espraiada y el 32 por ciento de Faria Lima. El caso de Agua Espraiada ilustra el proceso de licitación y la influencia de los especuladores. El gobierno de la ciudad realizó una subasta de 186.740 CEPAC en febrero de 2008, a un precio inicial de R$460 (equivalente a US$200). Un oferente trató de comprarlos todos, así que el precio subió a R$1,110 (US$480), un aumento increíble del 141 por ciento.
Meses más tarde, en octubre, otra subasta ofreció 650,000 CEPAC a un precio inicial de R$535 (US$230), pero se vendieron solamente 379.650, sin ningún aumento del precio. Entre diciembre de 2004 y febrero de 2009, la recaudación por venta de CEPAC en la OU de Faria Lima fue de R$567 millones (US$244 millones) y en la OU de Agua Espraiada fue de R$642 millones (US$276 millones). Si comparamos estos ingresos combinados de $520 millones de dólares en el curso de cuatro años con la recaudación total de impuestos sobre la propiedad en 2008, que fue de $1,25 mil millones de dólares, vemos que representa más del 40 por ciento, o alrededor del 10 por ciento anual.
Land Lines: ¿Cómo se pueden usar estos ejemplos para obtener respaldo a los medios alternativos de financiamiento del desarrollo urbano?
Paulo Sandroni: La forma clásica de financiar inversiones de capital en infraestructura es por medio de préstamos de largo plazo y transferencias de fondos federales; en general, el impuesto sobre la propiedad se usa para mantener la infraestructura y los servicios públicos. Pero en Brasil, los préstamos que pueden tomar las municipalidades y los estados están sujetos a límites estrictos. El hecho de que los ingresos por CEPAC no tengan este tipo de restricción presupuestaria agrega un valor financiero significativo a este instrumento.
Además, al igual que en los Estados Unidos y otros lados, aumentar impuestos es muy impopular. En las últimas cinco elecciones en São Paulo, por lo menos tres candidatos perdieron porque los votantes interpretaron que respaldaban un aumento de impuestos. Por lo tanto, para financiar grandes proyectos urbanos tenemos que evaluar cuánta plusvalía se va a crear, determinar cómo capturarlo y crear una situación que beneficie a todos. Los CEPAC ofrecen una alternativa viable.
Land Lines: ¿La mayoría de los proyectos de América Latina tienen tendencia al aburguesamiento? ¿Cómo se pueden hacer más socialmente aceptables?
Paulo Sandroni: En la medida que los GPU se concentren en las inversiones urbanas en infraestructura (construcción de caminos, puentes, centros comerciales, centros de negocios, etc.), el precio de la tierra probablemente aumentará en ciertas áreas afectadas, y ello contribuirá a la expulsión de familias pobres y hasta algunas de la clase media. De todas maneras, estos GPU son iniciativas del sector público, así que se pueden diseñar mecanismos para mitigar estas fuerzas de exclusión.
La legislación brasileña permite el establecimiento de ZEIS (Zonas Especiales de Interés Social) en áreas ocupadas por barrios marginales dentro del perímetro de los GPU. En estas áreas designadas, el emprendedor sólo puede construir nuevas viviendas para los pobres, aun cuando el precio de la tierra sea muy alto. Por supuesto, la oposición económica y social creada por este mecanismo es considerable entre los terratenientes y los emprendedores inmobiliarios, pero es defendida vigorosamente por las organizaciones y los residentes locales. São Paulo cuenta en la actualidad con ZEIS en cuatro GPU: Agua Branca, Faria Lima, Agua Espraiada y Rio Verde-Jacu. El ZEIS del barrio marginal Coliseu en Faria Lima, y el barrio marginal Jardim Edith en Agua Espraiada, son casos interesantes, porque están ubicados en las tierras más caras dentro de estos proyectos (ver Biderman, Sandroni y Smolka 2006).
Land Lines: ¿Cuáles son las desventajas de estas herramientas regulatorias (CEPAC, ZEIS, OU, etc.) que puedan haber dejado vacíos para el oportunismo de partes interesadas bien posicionadas?
Paulo Sandroni: Bueno, se puede encontrar corrupción y conductas antisociales en todos lados, y algunas condiciones pueden favorecerlas. Pero si uno sobrecarga el sistema con reglamentaciones y normas, se puede terminar bloqueando las iniciativas para superar estos problemas y se paraliza un proceso que puede beneficiar el interés público. Es más riesgoso, por supuesto, reducir las reglamentaciones y brindar más oportunidad para negociar, pero este riesgo se puede mitigar si se crean normas de negociación, con castigos muy severos por violarlas. Al mismo tiempo, hay ciertos asuntos que demandan una reglamentación muy precisa, como es el caso de los ZEIS, porque los grupos más pobres de la ciudad necesitan de la intervención del sector público.
Land Lines: ¿Se pueden replicar estos tipos de proyectos de São Paulo en otras ciudades de América Latina?
Paulo Sandroni: Tenemos que tener cuidado a la hora de transplantar o repetir experiencias que fueron exitosas en un país a otro. Antes de hacerlo, es importante conocer dos cosas: las condiciones imperantes en la ciudad cuando se crearon estas OU; y los tipos de problemas que los planificadores querían resolver con estos proyectos.
Por ejemplo, una condición importante en São Paulo es la separación de los derechos de edificación de los derechos de propiedad, lo cual abre un camino para cobrar por un cambio en la relación de superficie de edificación a superficie del lote. En grandes partes de la ciudad, la relación de superficie de edificación a superficie del lote, que está relacionada con las normas de zonificación, es muy baja en la actualidad, oscilando entre una y dos veces el área del lote. Cuando sea posible aumentar esta relación tres o cuatro veces sin ejercer una gran presión sobre la infraestructura, se impone un cargo sobre los dueños o emprendedores por los derechos adicionales a construir con mayor densidad.
En otras ciudades, donde la relación de superficie de edificación a superficie del lote ya sea alta, hay menos flexibilidad para cobrar por derechos de desarrollo adicionales, de manera que quizás haga falta crear otras políticas o herramientas. La lección principal es que las OU de São Paulo han demostrado que cobrarles a los propietarios o emprendedores por los derechos adicionales a edificar ha sido tanto razonable como equitativo. Ya no es social, política o aun económicamente admisible conceder estos derechos de desarrollo sin cargo.
Referencia
Biderman, Ciro, Paulo Sandroni, y Martim O. Smolka. 2006. Large-scale urban interventions: The case of Faria Lima in São Paulo (Intervenciones urbanas a gran escala: el caso de Faria Lima en São Paulo). Land Lines 18(2): 8–13.
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Low-income, self-managed homestead subdivisions, called colonias in Texas, are a rapidly expanding form of land and housing production in the United States. In a recently completed Lincoln Institute-supported study, I have analyzed the dysfunctional aspects of these land markets as measured by a high level of absentee lot ownership, modest lot and property transactions and turnover, and a lack of significant valorization (value increment) as settlements are built through and improved.
Homestead Subdivisions
Colonias, the Spanish word for neighborhoods, were first identified in the poorest Texas counties along the border with Mexico. They comprise unserviced or poorly serviced settlements in which homesteaders have bought a lot upon which they place either a trailer-type dwelling, or its up-market and less mobile or portable form, the “manufactured home.” In some cases, families build their homes through self-help efforts, beginning residence in a shack, camper or second-hand trailer and later consolidating the home over time.
Colonias are not a small-scale phenomenon. According to the Texas Water Development Board, there are approximately 1,500 such settlements housing around 400,000 people, mostly in the border region. The Board’s data and my own survey results show that many similar types of homestead subdivisions exist elsewhere in Texas, so these population estimates are likely to increase as we learn more. Indeed, counties throughout Texas, and in other states as well, are beginning to recognize the problems of unregulated substandard subdivisions that offer one of the few affordable homestead options for low-income households.
Low income here refers to households earning between $12,000 and $25,000 a year, although many colonia households actually earn much less (see Table 1). These households are in poor labor market areas: either regions experiencing wage and labor polarization among workers, or where low-paid service sector jobs predominate. Housing costs in most cities place home ownership beyond the reach of households that seek accommodation within the lower end of the rental housing market, in apartments or in trailer parks. Yet, many of these households aspire to homeownership, recognizing the advantages of moving out of rental housing where they have no equity. Many of them favor homesteading in poorly serviced rural subdivisions where they can own and valorize property through mutual aid and self-help efforts.
Colonias are not homogeneous, however. They vary markedly in size, layout, mode of development, mix of housing types, lot dimensions, lot occupancy and residential turnover rates, level of servicing, ethnic composition, income levels, and levels of relative poverty. In Texas, there is no typical colonia, but rather a range of types that vary among counties.
These settlements are akin to so-called irregular settlements in less developed countries, and they have a similar rationality to explain their existence: a low-wage economy, a rising demand for housing, a lack of state housing supply systems capable of meeting demand, and a private sector uninterested or unable to produce housing at levels that people can afford. Like their counterparts in Mexico and Latin America, colonias offer low-cost unserviced land on the fringes of urbanized areas that is affordable and accessible to very low-income groups. Most residents must commute substantial distances into the adjacent cities for work.
While colonias in Texas are rarely illegal, many aspects of the development process are informal or quasi-formal, most notably:
Just over a decade ago, Texas became aware of the existence and proliferation of colonia-type subdivisions, and in biennial legislative sessions began to take action to stop their growth on the one hand, and to simulate upgrading on the other. Following are some examples of legislative action over the past decade:
An underlying weakness in all these initiatives is that they apply only in the border region and in specially designated counties that form part of the state’s Economically Depressed Areas Program (EDAP). Elsewhere, the process continues essentially unabated.
Vacant Lots and Absentee Ownership
A major indicator of land market dysfunction is the failure to occupy and develop a lot after it has been sold. The data show that between 15 and 80 percent of colonia lots may be vacant. Even in the largest and now often fully serviced settlements, as many as one-quarter to one-sixth of lots are held vacant by absentee lot owners. Moreover, relatively large lot sizes of one-eighth to one-half acre or more, together with prohibitions on lot subdivision and sharing, create very low densities of 10 to 12 persons per acre. This exacerbates the unit cost of providing services, reduces cost recovery, and weakens community cohesion and mutual aid. Weestimate that there are over 26,000 vacant lots in Texas comprising more than 7,000 acres of unoccupied residential land. If these lots were fully populated, even at the prevailing low densities generally found in colonias, an additional 100,000 people could be housed in existing settlements alone.
A key question, then, is why so many low-income households do not occupy their lots? Conventional wisdom argues that the lack of services discourages potential residents, and that providing basic utilities would be a catalyst to lot occupancy. However, this argument begs the question why many people do occupy their lots from the outset. They can be asked about their motives and decision-making process, but it is more problematic to question absentee lot owners who are difficult to trace. Who are they? Where are they? What do they want from their land?
In spite of the methodological conundrum caused by the lack of a clear paper trail from property conveyance records and lot titles, we were able to develop a research strategy using property appraisal and tax records to track down some of these absentee lot owners. However, an estimated 8 to 10 percent of these records were discovered to be “bad” addresses, with the probability that the actual number of untraceable lot owners may be twice as high. Having walked away from the land they bought, these lot owners are in effect locking their property out of future land market transactions.
Current Place of Residence of Absentee Owners
By using tax record data for some 2,713 absentee lot owners across 16 survey settlements (in border and non-border counties), it was possible to identify the current location of absentee owners.
Around three-quarters live locally, i.e., in the adjacent city or within 20 miles. The rest are non-local, split equally between those living elsewhere in Texas and those living out-of-state. While there was a broad spread of addresses across the state, most absentee lot owners lived in Houston (26 percent), Dallas (15 percent) and San Antonio (12 percent)-the three principal metropolitan areas of Texas. California, with 35 percent of all out-of-state absentee addresses, was the most frequently identified state, followed by New Mexico (14 percent), and the Chicago region (Illinois and Indiana with 12 percent).
Characteristics of Occupants and Absentee Owners
This research reveals that colonia occupants and absentee lot owners are substantially different populations (see Table 1). Absentee owners are more likely to be Mexican-American, and are more ethnically diverse. While poor, they are considerably better off than colonia residents. Generally, the absentee owners purchased their lots earlier, and therefore paid less in real terms.
The most dramatic differences between the groups emerge in their residential search behavior and their motives for purchase. Absentee lot owner households are not waiting in the wings to move onto their lots once servicing has been provided. Quite the opposite: most of them (81 percent) are homeowners already and appear to be quite comfortable in their current residence. Moreover, some 49 percent indicated they bought their lot not for themselves but as an investment, as security, or as a future gift or inheritance for their children. Less than one quarter stated that the lack of existing services was an issue. More than half expressed no future intention to move onto the lot, and of those who do intend to move, very few plan to do so in the next 5 to 10 years. In reality I anticipate that few will ever move. Some even said they would sell at any time if the price was right.
Land market performance for both populations during the past two decades is unlike other residential land markets. Land value trends in colonias have remained “flat” in real terms, and the rate of return has been low, especially compared with other sectors of the land and housing market. This suggests that the poor are not benefiting significantly either from their land purchase investment or from their sweat equity (in the case of residents). Although a modest level of market sales continues to take place (more than was anticipated), colonia land markets are not being valorized significantly.
Policies for Fixing the Market
Vacant lots are both a cause and an effect of this poor market performance. It is important to note that the “build-it-and-they-will come” notion is badly misconstrued. Policies to develop urban services in order to catalyze lot occupancy and densification may be helpful, but other land market interventions are also required to make land markets in colonias operate more efficiently. These might include revising legislation to facilitate urban productivity, such as allowing for some nonresidential land use for income production, or for subdivision and rental. Indeed, one reason why land is not being valorized is the restriction placed upon approved land uses. The 1995 moratorium on lot sales also limits development. Although the law is widely breached, doing so deflates prices, distorts turnover and drives sales underground. The prohibition upon internal lot subdivision (especially of large lots) inhibits rent-seeking and cost-sharing among kin.
Another need is to free up the land-locked areas that belong to owners who can no longer be traced. Sequestration of lots for nonpayment of taxes could be one approach, especially if tied to the creation of a public holding company or land trust that would subsequently promote the supply and redistribution of lots through mechanisms such as land pooling and land readjustment. In Texas, at least, tackling the “problem” of large-scale absentee lot ownership would offer a number of positive outcomes and solutions.
Understanding and widening our analysis of homestead subdivisions in Texas and elsewhere offers the potential that policy makers will be better informed, and that we may begin to develop more sensitive and appropriate land policies to address the issue. In so doing, we may substantially increase the supply of homesteading opportunities to the most disadvantaged income groups in U.S. society.
References
Peter M. Ward. 1999. Colonias and Public Policy in Texas and Mexico: Urbanization by Stealth. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
______. 2000. Residential Land Market Dynamics, Absentee Lot Owners and Densification Policies for Texas Colonias. Lincoln Institute Working Paper. WP00PW1. 160 pages. $18.
Peter M. Ward holds the C.B. Smith Sr. Centennial Chair in US-Mexico Relations at the University of Texas-Austin, where he also is a professor in the Department of Sociology and at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs.
Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 4 del libro Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.
La recuperación de plusvalías es un concepto que tiene mayor aceptación día a día y cuyo propósito es recuperar, parcial o totalmente, para el beneficio público, los incrementos en el valor de bienes raíces provenientes de aquellas inversiones o acciones que emergen de la comunidad más que del sector privado. Sin embargo, sobre la base de la experiencia que tiene el Instituto Lincoln en el patrocinio de muchos programas educativos y de investigación relacionados con las políticas de recuperación de plusvalías en América Latina, está claro que el concepto también despierta bastante controversia.
Este artículo aborda algunos de los temas polémicos y constantes que han involucrado a los participantes en un continuo debate sobre la recuperación de plusvalías, que va desde las preocupaciones básicas, tales como la comprensión adecuada de los fundamentos legales para los derechos en bienes raíces, hasta las cuestiones políticas de mayor envergadura que surgen de nuevos o mayores gravámenes sobre los bienes raíces. Asimismo, hay aspectos técnicos involucrados, tales como la distinción entre los incrementos en el valor de los bienes raíces (o plusvalías) que se atribuyen a inversiones públicas específicas o la toma de decisiones a partir de fuentes o factores más generales que influyen en el mercado inmobiliario, así como los desafíos pragmáticos que surgen de la selección de los instrumentos adecuados para las circunstancias apropiadas en el momento justo.
Para comprender mejor el concepto de recuperación de plusvalías, no basta con recurrir solamente a los argumentos técnicos o a la opinión de especialistas o peritos. De igual manera, tampoco se puede desestimar la cuestión meramente con fundamentos políticos atribuyendo los obstáculos principales a la implementación de políticas sobre la recuperación de plusvalías a grupos de interés con una posición privilegiada. Más bien, una parte considerable de la “discrepancia inexplicable” en la aplicación de la recuperación de plusvalías parece deberse a falta de información o a un concepto erróneo por parte de los actores fundamentales del debate.
La Figura 1 resume 10 problemas contenciosos de la recuperación de plusvalías; los puntos 1, 2 y 3 se comentan brevemente a continuación.
Gravámenes Injustos para Personas de Escasos Recursos
Aunque en América Latina está disminuyendo el apoyo a los subsidios directos o subvenciones para personas de escasos recursos, muchos siguen sosteniendo que estas personas no deben pagar los servicios municipales, o deben ser exonerados del pago de impuestos y demás gravámenes sobre su propiedad, tal como lo estipulan varias políticas y leyes más progresistas sobre la recuperación de plusvalías.
Uno de los argumentos más comunes a favor de exceptuar a las personas de escasos recursos de dichos gravámenes genera un dilema entre generaciones: dado que los ciudadanos con mayor poder adquisitivo han disfrutado durante muchos años de los servicios municipales en forma gratuita, ¿por qué los menos privilegiados deben pagar ahora los servicios que necesitan y merecen? Otro argumento se centra en la idea de que la mayoría de los incrementos sobre bienes raíces en áreas humildes de hecho han sido generados por los mismos pobres, mediante la aportación de mano de obra propia o proyectos particulares para tener acceso a los servicios básicos en su área, y no mediante la intervención pública. Algunos reconocen que los programas de mejoramiento urbano simplemente conducen a los asentamientos humildes a la primera etapa del proceso de urbanización, lo cual constituye sólo un requisito mínimo indispensable para participar en los mercados inmobiliarios comunes. Otros creen que hasta un instrumento de recuperación de plusvalías socialmente neutral puede producir un resultado regresivo, lo que entonces perpetuaría la diferencia entre ricos y pobres en el contexto de acceso injusto a las instalaciones y servicios urbanos, como es el caso en la mayoría de las ciudades de América Latina (Furtado 2000).
En el otro extremo están aquellos que piensan que los pagos por recuperación de plusvalías forman parte de los reclamos que hace el sector de escasos recursos por una ciudadanía de pleno derecho, que incluya el derecho de exigirle al gobierno que le preste atención. Son muchos los ejemplos de sectores menos privilegiados que han estado verdaderamente dispuestos a pagar por los servicios recibidos (tales como sistemas de suministro de agua, alumbrado público y control de inundaciones), dado que el costo de no tener acceso a los mismos es mayor que el pago por tenerlos. Esto fue lo que ocurrió en Lima, Perú, a principios de los años noventa, en donde más de 30 comunidades humildes participaron en un programa de servicios públicos que incluía el pago del costo de los servicios suministrados.
Un argumento más teórico y tal vez menos intuitivo considera el efecto de capitalización de todo gravamen en los precios de los bienes raíces. Dicho efecto es la reducción (o incremento) del precio actual de los bienes raíces en el mercado debido a la suma capitalizada o descontada de los costos (o beneficios) que afecta las ganancias previstas que las propiedades podrían generar en el futuro. En la medida en que los gravámenes sobre la recuperación de plusvalías para áreas regularizadas o mejoradas (reclasificadas) se incluyan en las expectativas relacionadas con los futuros impuestos sobre tierras sin servicios compradas a parceladores ilegales o piratas, se tendería a capitalizar dichos gravámenes en el precio que los compradores estarían dispuestos a pagar o el que el parcelador pudo cobrar (Smolka 2003). Si bien los pobres al final terminarían pagando el mismo monto, el dinero sería destinado al tesoro público local en vez de al bolsillo del parcelador.
Incidentemente, una opinión muy común pero errónea sostiene que dichos gravámenes (recuperación de plusvalías o impuesto inmobiliario) son inflacionarios o incrementan el precio de los bienes raíces en el mercado. Si bien el efecto de capitalización es complicado, la mayoría de las personas podrán comprender el ejemplo en el que se comparan dos departamentos que, en otras circunstancias, serían idénticos: el que está ubicado en un edificio con gastos comunes más altos tendría un alquiler más bajo en el mercado que el departamento con gastos comunes más bajos. El mismo razonamiento puede aplicarse para explicar por qué no existe la doble tributación entre la recuperación de plusvalías y el impuesto inmobiliario. El incremento significativo sobre el valor de los bienes raíces que resulta de una intervención pública se acumula o se agrega al precio mínimo observado en el mercado actual, que ya es un neto del efecto capitalizado de todo beneficio o pago futuro previsto, incluido el impuesto inmobiliario.
Derechos Adquiridos Cuando Cambia el Uso del Inmueble
A pesar de que pocos argumentarían que las expectativas son un factor crucial en la determinación de los precios de los inmuebles, se considera ampliamente injusto si la compensación de precio se ubica por debajo de los precios del mercado actual. Esta idea está comenzando a cambiar, tal como se refleja en la legislación reciente. Por ejemplo, la Ley 338 de 1997 en Colombia permite la adquisición pública de bienes raíces a precios justos del mercado, pero sin incluir el incremento del valor del inmueble resultante de inversiones públicas previas o de cambios en los usos normativos de la tierra (ver el artículo de Maldonado y Smolka, página 15). El mismo principio se establece en el nuevo Estatuto Municipal de Brasil (Ley 10.257 de 2001) cuando la expropiación de la tierra se usa como sanción contra un propietario que no cumple con los usos sociales de la tierra. Muchos abogados están de acuerdo en que las expectativas no crean derechos; por lo tanto, las expectativas no materializadas no deberían ser compensadas. La preocupación social acerca de la adquisición pública de bienes raíces que llevó a la postergación del nuevo megaproyecto propuesto para el aeropuerto de la Ciudad de México ilustra vívidamente este problema.
Es difícil para el típico propietario, que en buena fe compró una parcela de tierra con la expectativa de usar su potencial de desarrollo, entender por qué no debería ser compensado por la pérdida de esa tierra al precio vigente del mercado o al menos al precio de adquisición, aunque los derechos de desarrollo no hayan sido ejercidos. Sin embargo, a menudo el resultado depende del grado en que la nueva política haya sido efectivamente implementada. En la práctica, los precios reflejan las expectativas relacionadas con el cumplimiento (usualmente insatisfactorio) de la legislación existente, incluidas las discrepancias legales o lagunas impositivas en el contexto normativo y fiscal correspondiente. Éste ha sido el caso en la mayoría de las decisiones de la corte referidas a la justa compensación en los procesos de adquisición pública de bienes raíces y en las demandas de los propietarios (o de promotores inmobiliarios) sobre quienes los administradores locales imponen gravámenes de plusvalía. Un argumento más pragmático es que los derechos pueden en efecto estar restringidos por una nueva legislación o normativa de zonificación, siempre y cuando esté acompañada por reglas de transición adecuadas para proteger los derechos de aquellos que tenían demandas legítimas previas. Otros defienden el proceso de transición como un paso indispensable para permitir que el mercado absorba gradualmente tales cambios.
Los economistas luchan para transmitir la importancia de las expectativas al determinar la estructura de los precios actuales observados de los bienes raíces. La manera en que el futuro afecta los precios actuales de los inmuebles es de hecho más difícil de expresar al público en general que la noción de que los precios actuales reflejan derechos, como se hacía en propiedades comparables en el pasado. En América Latina las expectativas asociadas con los usos de la tierra no siempre están relacionadas con los códigos de zonificación o edificación, sino más bien con la especulación inmobiliaria. Sería de interés señalar que mientras la especulación en América Latina está asociada con la retención a largo plazo de los bienes raíces, en América del Norte, en cambio, está más asociada con la rapidez en la compra y venta de las propiedades. El fenómeno de la retención del inmueble para su desarrollo futuro, con la consiguiente apropiación privada de la plusvalía en los valores de los bienes raíces, ha obstaculizado el planeamiento y el desarrollo urbano desde que las ciudades comenzaron a expandirse rápidamente hace varias décadas.
Compensación Asimétrica para las Minusvalías
El debate acerca de la recuperación de plusvalías (es decir, recuperar los incrementos en el valor de los bienes raíces, las ganancias o las plusvalías) hace surgir inevitablemente esta pregunta: ¿qué pasa con las minusvalías? La percepción corriente es que los gobiernos están más ansiosos por aprobar la legislación para recuperar las plusvalías que por brindar protección legal a los ciudadanos contra expropiaciones o compensaciones arbitrarias en los casos de pérdidas igualmente predecibles (minusvalías). El informe de América Latina ha demostrado, sin embargo, que el balance entre las plusvalías recuperadas y las minusvalías pagadas es claramente negativo. La suma pagada en compensación a los propietarios sobrepasa en mucho a las ganancias pequeñas y esporádicas que el sector público ha logrado recuperar de los beneficios directos que genera para las propiedades privadas.
Todos los alquileres, y precios de los bienes raíces en este sentido, no son en esencia más que plusvalías acumuladas, o incrementos en el valor de los bienes raíces, a lo largo del tiempo, lo que hace eco del argumento de Henry George para la confiscación total de los alquileres inmobiliarios. Así, las minusvalías alegadas son consideradas incidentales y sólo parte de un valor con respecto al cual los derechos individuales no son (o no deberían ser) absolutos. El debate acerca de esta asimetría con lleva directamente a la definición correcta de las minusvalías y a la manera en que son entendidas estas pérdidas, lo cual hace surgir la cuestión de los derechos de desarrollo. Mientras que algunos desean restringir la compensación por las mejoras en la tierra y en los inmuebles que el propietario podría perder, otros argumentan que los derechos de desarrollo son un atributo inherente e incuestionable de los bienes raíces.
En la práctica no es fácil justificar estos argumentos. Lo que puede ser válido para la totalidad no lo es necesariamente para cada parte, ya que los propietarios individuales consideran como una pérdida en el valor de los bienes raíces cuando, por ejemplo, una autopista amurallada pasa a través de su terreno o un viaducto bloquea la vista y produce ruido y contaminación. El ciudadano promedio no se convence fácilmente con los argumentos antedichos. El reclamo por un tratamiento equitativo y simétrico es social y culturalmente demasiado delicado como para ser ignorado.
La transferencia de los derechos de desarrollo (TDD) –un instrumento concebido originalmente para compensar las minusvalías provenientes de ordenanzas históricas, arquitectónicas, culturales y de protección del medio ambiente para las plusvalías de otro sector– ahora se ha ampliado para mitigar otros reclamos legítimos de compensación de minusvalías. Algunos argumentan que la compensación ordinaria para las minusvalías es una garantía, lo que hace así más fácil aceptar pagos por pérdidas. Según el principio de la equidad, las decisiones de planeamiento, incluidos los esquemas de zonificación, están reconocidas como potencialmente injustas con respecto a la distribución de los valores en los mercados inmobiliarios. Por más ingenioso que pueda parecer el instrumento de la TDD, no permite aclarar las cuestiones en juego. Por el contrario, acentúa el debate, pues reconoce el derecho de que las minusvalías sean compensadas a la vez que sanciona el derecho de los individuos a las plusvalías, por lo que replantea la cuestión de las apropiaciones privadas de los valores comunitarios.
Comentarios Finales
El complejo debate sobre las políticas e instrumentos de recuperación de plusvalías en América Latina indica que queda mucho por investigar y aprender. Si bien la cuestión no tiene necesariamente una única respuesta, los argumentos presentados aquí demuestran que una parte significativa de la resistencia a tales ideas puede ser atribuida a prejuicios y falta de información. A pesar de que las posiciones mantenidas por los diferentes grupos no son tan claras ni tan coherentes como sería de esperar, las percepciones y las actitudes sí cambian, como lo demuestra el artículo adjunto.
Martim O. Smolka es Senior Fellow y Director del Programa del Instituto Lincoln para América Latina y el Caribe. Fernanda Furtado es Fellow del Instituto y profesora del Departamento de Urbanismo de la Universidad Fluminense Federal en Niteroi, Brasil.
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