Topic: Planejamento Urbano e Regional

Faculty Profile

Diego Alfonso Erba
Janeiro 1, 2006

Diego Alfonso Erba is a visiting fellow at the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, on leave from his position as professor in the Graduate Program of Geology at Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos–UNISINOS, Brazil. He received undergraduate training as a land survey engineer from Universidad Nacional de Rosario, Argentina, and later earned two master of science degrees and taught in several universities in Brazil. His early professional experience was in regularization of informal settlements in Santa Fé, Argentina, and he headed the GIS department for an agricultural cooperative in southern Brazil. He also earned a doctorate in Surveying Sciences from Universidad Nacional de Catamarca, Argentina, and did postdoctoral research in GIS for Water Bodies at the Natural Resource Center of Shiga University, Otsu, Japan; and in GIS for Urban Applications at Clark Labs-IDRISI of Clark University, Worcester, Massachusetts.

Land Lines: What is a territorial cadastre?

Diego Erba: The institution of a territorial cadastre does not exist in the United States, at least not in the same way as in many countries around the world. Although the term “cadastre” has more than one meaning, in general there is consensus that it comes from the Greek catastichon, which can be translated as “a list of parcels for taxation.”

This kind of list exists in the U.S., but the profile of the institutions that manage the data are different from those in Latin America and in many European and African countries, where the territorial cadastre encompasses economic, geometrical, and legal data on land parcels and data on the owners or occupants. The institutions that manage this data, also often named territorial cadastres, are closely connected with the Registry of Deeds or Register of Land Titles because their data complements each other and guarantees land property rights. These longstanding connections reflect the cadastral heritage of Roman and Napoleonic legal systems.

LL: Why do urban public administrators need to know about territorial cadastres?

DE: The cadastre and the register should be connected for legal reasons, if not for practical reasons, and there are many models of how cadastres could or should relate to public institutions. Unfortunately, the norm is still an isolated or nonintegrated cadastre, which dramatically reduces its potential usefulness as a tool for urban planning and land policy.

For example, irregular settlements (slums) are generally developed on public or environmentally protected areas, or even on private parcels, and are neither taxed nor registered in territorial cadastre databases. These areas are represented in cadastral cartography as “blank polygons” as if nothing happened inside them. The paradox is that data and cartography about irregular settlements normally exist, but that information is often in institutions that are not related to the cadastre and consequently are not registered.

There is a growing perception of the cadastre’s importance as a multipurpose information system serving not only the legal and financial sectors of cities, but also all of the institutions that make up the “urban reality,” including public services agencies, utilities, and even certain private providers of urban services. The move to this new concept and improved urban information systems has not been easy or without resistance in developing countries, however.

LL: Why is a multipurpose cadastre so difficult to establish and use?

DE: The implementation of a multipurpose cadastre typically requires administrations to allow for more horizontal exchanges of information. It also frequently requires changes in the legal framework and the establishment of more fluid relationships between the public and private agents to share standardized data and ensure continuous investments to keep the databases and cartography up-to-date.

This sounds like a simple process, but in practice it is not easy because many administrators still consider that “the data is mine,” and they are not ready to collaborate. At the same time, some overly zealous administrators convinced of the potential value of a multipurpose cadastre may skip stages and jump from a traditional cadastre to a multipurpose model without due attention to effectively implementing the exchanges of information.

Even when operated privately, territorial cadastres are treated as a public service, which means they depend on public funding and political decisions for approval to update the land valuation system or the cartography. At the same time, this kind of public service is not visible and therefore is not as interesting for the politicians who wish to demonstrate their accomplishments through more tangible projects such as a new bridge or school.

The updating of cadastral data impacts land value and consequently the amount of property taxes, which is not popular with voters. Nevertheless, new government administrators who seek to improve their jurisdiction’s fiscal status may decide to update the cadastre in an attempt to increase property taxation revenues. This has a strong political impact at the beginning of the official’s term, but the data on property value may not be touched for years afterwards and will grow more and more inaccurate compared to the actual market value. In many Latin American jurisdictions legislation imposes the obligation of cadastral updates on a regular basis, although compliance is inconsistent.

Another frequent mistake is to consider that the solution is to implement a modern geographic information system (GIS) to manage the cadastral data. In the ideal situation we would like to see integrated systems that use coordinated and standardized databases, but some municipalities are ill-equipped, and those that do have sufficient infrastructure do not have enough well-prepared employees to accomplish the tasks. The notion that “one size fits all” is not really applicable to a region in which there are such significant differences among jurisdictions. I like to say that the problem with cadastral institutions is not hardware or software but “people-ware.” Even when financial resources exist, the lack of trained professionals and technicians is a significant obstacle.

LL: In this context, is it possible to consider a multipurpose cadastre for Latin America?

DE: It is possible, but the concept is still new and frequently is not well understood. There are many good cadastres in Latin America, as in some Colombian and Brazilian municipalities and in some Mexican and Argentinean states. In some jurisdictions the fusion of the territorial cadastres with public institutions and geotechnological systems generates cadastral institutes that are better structured in terms of budget and technical staff and consequently are better able to identify illegal settlements and monitor the increment of land value using modern tools.

However, from my viewpoint the region still does not have a full-fledged operational multipurpose cadastre. A common assumption is that implementing a multipurpose cadastre requires adding social and environmental data to the existing alphanumeric databases available in the traditional territorial cadastres, which consider economic, geometric, and legal aspects of the parcel, and then connecting all that data with a parcel map in GIS. While this is very important it is not essential, because the implementation is not a technological problem as much as a philosophical one. Most municipal administrations do not think about putting institutions that traditionally manage different social (education and health), environmental, and territorial (cadastre) databases under the same roof.

LL: How is your work with the Lincoln Institute helping to broaden awareness about territorial cadastres?

DE: I have been working with the Program on Latin America and the Caribbean since 2002 to explore the relationships among multipurpose cadastres and the program’s four topical areas: large urban projects; land valuation and taxation; informal settlements and upgrading programs; and value capture. It is always a challenge to tailor the curriculum for educational programs, but we believe strongly that it is important to facilitate the widespread sharing of knowledge in each country and to prepare public officials and practitioners with different levels of expertise. The participants, including cadastre administrators, urban planners, lawyers, and real estate developers, gain a common language and vision of the urban cadastral applications, and they can start a process to improve the system in their own countries.

Our pedagogical strategy for this year involves the dissemination of knowledge through a combination of distance education and traditional classroom courses at different levels. We plan to develop training seminars followed by a tailored distance education course in those countries that demonstrate the conditions necessary to implement this new vision of the multipurpose cadastre. Finally, we will organize a regional classroom course for the best distance education students in three neighboring countries.

This plan contrasts with many training programs offered by other international institutions, which contemplate concepts and the use of tools that may not be applicable in countries with different legal frameworks and technological levels. We will begin this cycle with seminars in Chile and Peru, working with the Chilean Association of Municipalities and the Institute of Regional Economy and Local Government in Arequipa, Peru. These and other partners in Latin America have committed to disseminate and increase local capacity on these issues.

Another component of our strategy is the dissemination of resource materials. We will be publishing two books later in 2006 about the concepts and implementation of cadastres that can be applied in most countries. One book describes in detail the cadastral system in each Latin American country, and the other conceptualizes the juridical, economical, geometrical, environmental, and social aspects of the multipurpose cadastre, highlighting the relationship between the territorial cadastre and the four topical areas of the Institute’s Latin America Program.

In 2005 we made a DVD, which is currently available in Spanish and Portuguese. It includes a documentary film about multipurpose cadastres and some taped segments from classes and discussions on the relationships between the multipurpose cadastre and complex urban issues.

LL: What is the long-term goal of the multipurpose cadastre?

DE: The problems that have been raised here should not discourage urban administrators from reorganizing their cadastres and their legal land policy frameworks in their cities and countries. On the contrary, they should try to change the reality by developing new laws that shows the spirit of an updated land policy. Data on Latin American cities exist, but they are fragmented and not standardized.

The best way to build a multipurpose cadastre is to integrate all the public and private institutions that are working at the parcel level and to develop a unique identifier to define standards for the alphanumeric and cartographic databases. It is a very simple and clear concept, but its implementation is not. To reach that objective it is necessary for administrators, practitioners, and citizens to understand the cadastre’s potential for improving land management practices and the quality of life in urban areas. Many times simple solutions can help to solve complex problems such as those presented by cadastral systems.

Faculty Profile

Fernanda Furtado
Janeiro 1, 2008

Faculty Profile of Fernanda Furtado

Perfil Docente

Eduardo Reese
Janeiro 1, 2010

Eduardo Reese, arquitecto que se especializa en planeamiento urbano y regional, es el subadministrador del Instituto de la Vivienda de la Provincia de Buenos Aires, Argentina. En cargos profesionales anteriores, fue asesor técnico para los planes maestros de más de 20 ciudades en argentina; Secretario de Políticas Socioeconómicas del Ministerio de Desarrollo Humano y Laboral de la Provincia de Buenos Aires; asesor al Consejo de Planeamiento Urbano de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires; y Secretario de Planeamiento en la ciudad de Avellaneda.

Reese es docente en el Instituto del Conurbano de la Universidad Nacional del General Sarmiento en Buenos Aires. Actualmente es profesor de gestión urbana en el programa de grado en urbanismo en dicha universidad. También enseña desarrollo urbano en programas de maestría de la Faculta de Arquitectura, Urbanismo y Diseño de la Universidad de La Plata, así como en universidades de Mar del Plata y Córdoba. Además, dirige el plan maestro de la cuenca Matanza-Riachuelo en Buenos Aires.

Land Lines: ¿Cómo se involucró usted en el Programa para América Latina del Instituto Lincoln?

Eduardo Reese: Mi relación con el Programa se remonta a 1997, cuando estábamos elaborando el plan de la ciudad de Córdoba, que incluyó la formulación de diferentes proyectos urbanos de gran escala. En ese momento el Instituto colaboró activamente para ampliar el debate de los impactos de estos proyectos sobre el mercado de suelo y, consecuentemente, en la configuración de la ciudad. Posteriormente, me fui integrando en diversas actividades del Instituto, y hace cuatro años asumí la coordinación de los cursos anuales de Gestión del Suelo en Grandes Proyectos Urbanos, a partir del fallecimiento de Mario Lungo, quien había dirigido ese programa desde su inicio.

En el 2004, el Programa y el Instituto del Conurbano de la Universidad Nacional de General Sarmiento, realizamos en conjunto el curso Mercados de Suelo: Teoría e instrumentos para la gestión de políticas, el cual fue la primera actividad del Programa para América Latina y el Caribe que implicó un programa de formación de siete meses para 50 alumnos argentinos. Esa experiencia educativa ayudó a formar una masa crítica de técnicos y profesionales con una visión innovadora y diferente respecto de la gestión de las políticas de suelo. El impacto de ese curso se ha reflejado en decisiones de políticas urbanas en diferentes municipalidades (tales como San Fernando y Morón en el Gran Buenos Aires); en la constitución en Argentina del Movimiento de Reforma Urbana en 2005; y en cambios académicos en el mismo Instituto del Conurbano.

Land Lines: ¿Qué rol puede jugar un proyecto urbano en la calidad de vida de una ciudad en el contexto latinoamericano?

Eduardo Reese: Las grandes operaciones o proyectos urbanísticos sobre sectores definidos de la ciudad (tanto en áreas centrales como en las periferias) han sido grandes protagonistas del urbanismo contemporáneo en el último cuarto de siglo. En América Latina se cuenta hoy con un amplio muestreo de experiencias y proyectos, aunque todavía se requiere una reflexión teórica más rigurosa. Algunos ejemplos importantes son los proyectos del Portal del Bicentenario en Santiago de Chile; los proyectos urbanos integrales en Medellín, Colombia; las operaciones urbanas en diferentes ciudades de Brasil; y el proyecto de reestructuración en el sector Oeste de San Fernando, Argentina.

Sin embargo, es importante aclarar que las grandes operaciones urbanísticas son un instrumento de intervención en la ciudad que ya tienen muchos años no sólo en los países centrales, sino también en nuestras sociedades. En Buenos Aires, por ejemplo, la apertura de la Avenida de Mayo y de las diagonales, proyectada hacia 1880 y llevada a cabo en las décadas siguientes, implicó importantes impactos, tanto en lo físico-espacial como en lo social, económico y, fundamentalmente, en el campo simbólico. Este enfoque de múltiples impactos permite, sin duda, asimilar la operación de Avenida de Mayo a un gran proyecto urbano contemporáneo, pero también generó un gran debate sobre quién debía financiar la operación y quién se apropiaría de las rentas de suelo generadas. En última instancia, la Corte Suprema falló que la municipalidad no podía financiar las obras con la plusvalía generada, porque las rentas eran enteramente de los terratenientes. Durante muchos años, este caso fue un precedente en relación a la intervención estatal en el proceso de valorización de suelo generado por un gran proyecto público.

Land Lines: Usted tiene una mirada muy crítica del reconocido proyecto de regeneración urbana Puerto Madero, en Buenos Aires. ¿Qué haría de manera diferente en otras grandes áreas de redesarrollo?

Eduardo Reese: Puerto Madero es un caso emblemático de proyectos urbanos que promueven un modelo de planeamiento urbano segregado y que hoy en día se “exporta” a otras ciudades y países como instrumento básico para poder “competir” por las inversiones internacionales. En este proyecto el Estado adoptó una posición de sumisión frente al mercado y permitió la construcción de un barrio exclusivo para sectores de altísimos ingresos. Es un ejemplo notorio de una política pública diseñada explícitamente para privilegiar a los sectores más ricos sin recuperación de las enormes valorizaciones del suelo que fueron producto de esta misma política pública.

Más aún, a fin de garantizar a los inversionistas la sobrevalorización de las propiedades que compraron, el emprendimiento tiene una serie de características que la “recortan” (física y socialmente) del resto de la ciudad, creando con ello rentas aún mayores debido a la segregación. Puerto Madero no tiene un muro explícito, como los condominios cerrados, pero tiene múltiples acciones y mensajes implícitos, explícitos y simbólicos que señalan claramente que ese lugar está fuera del alcance para la mayoría de la sociedad:

  • Es el único barrio administrado por una Corporación Estatal que, además, hace 19 años paga sueldos de funcionarios y gerentes para construir y mantener unos pocos metros cuadrados de parque accesibles únicamente a aquel barrio adinerado.
  • El proyecto creó una escenografía urbana diseñada y de cuidadosos detalles estéticos que contrasta fuertemente con la pobreza brutal del espacio público en el resto de la ciudad. Los parques e infraestructura son construidos sobre suelo ya privatizado para garantizar las inversiones, pese a utilizar fondos públicos, que benefician únicamente a los propietarios de élites de las torres de vivienda y oficinas que los rodean.
  • El sistema se apoya en un sofisticado sistema de cámaras y de seguridad que definen y controlan el acceso a una zona sobreprotegida.
  • Todos estos mecanismos están al servicio de garantizar la sobrevalorización de las propiedades como un seguro de que allí solo podrá comprar y habitar la clase social más alta.

En definitiva, Puerto Madero es la clara demostración de urbanismo y política pública de distribución regresiva: un “ghetto” libre de problemas para ricos.

Land Lines: En la medida en que las municipalidades compiten por inversiones externas, ¿es posible reconciliar esto con objetivos alternativos tales como prioridades ambientales y sociales?

Eduardo Reese: El problema de nuestras ciudades no es la falta de planeamiento, sino el actual orden excluyente de las políticas y del urbanismo. No puede haber una ley para la ciudad formal y un conjunto de excepciones para el resto. Es necesario crear un nuevo orden urbanístico y jurídico en América Latina respecto al derecho a la ciudad, la distribución equitativa de los beneficios de la urbanización, y la función social de la tenencia de suelo.

Land Lines: ¿De qué manera la municipalidad de San Fernando, en el Área Metropolitana de Buenos Aires, ofrece una alternativa a este enfoque?

Eduardo Reese: San Fernando es un municipio ubicado en la zona norte del Gran Buenos Aires, a 30 km de la ciudad de Buenos Aires, con una superficie continental de 23 km² y una población de 156.000 habitantes. Tiene un frente litoral al Río Luján de 5 km de extensión sobre su desembocadura en el Río de la Plata donde se concentra una gran cantidad de actividades productivas vinculadas con la náutica. Este sector del municipio tiene una ubicación privilegiada, con altos valores inmobiliarios y está dotado de la totalidad de los servicios urbanos.

El plan urbano y el modelo de gestión del suelo se comenzaron a elaborar en el 2003 a través de un convenio entre el municipio y el Instituto del Conurbano de la Universidad Nacional de General Sarmiento. En el año 2005, un seminario de capacitación del Instituto Lincoln ayudó a ampliar las ideas tradicionales sobre manejo de suelo que abundaban en los grupos profesionales locales y llevó a una serie de decisiones importantes:

  • generar recursos sustentables para reorientar el desarrollo urbano;
  • recuperar la cultura de financiamiento de obras públicas con una contribución por mejoras
  • recuperar suelo para vivienda social, infraestructura urbana y redes viales
  • fortalecer las administraciones urbanas y municipales como actores innovadores en la implementación de políticas públicas; y
  • limitar la sobrevaluación del suelo al intervenir en el mercado a través de mecanismos tales como nueva legislación de planeamiento urbano, instrumentos para recuperar la valorización, y una importante oferta de suelo para los sectores de bajos ingresos.

La política urbana en San Fernando se enfocó en una serie de estrategias de acción que incluyeron (1) asegurar el acceso a nuevos espacios públicos sobre el río para fines recreativos, deportivos y comerciales, especialmente para ser aprovechados por los sectores pobres; y (2) la regularización comprehensiva del sector oeste de la municipalidad, donde se concentra los mayores niveles de pobreza.

Para implementar estas estrategias, fue necesario aumentar los recursos fiscales para inversión pública de dos maneras: a través de la apropiación de la rentabilidad del uso del suelo o tierra municipal sobre el río a través de la creación del consorcio Parque Náutico de San Fernando, S.A. (PNSFSA); y con la participación de la municipalidad en la plusvalía a partir de una reforma tributaria municipal. (PNSFSA es una empresa creada por la municipalidad de San Fernando para administrar las tierras del dominio municipal en la costa ribereña del sector este de la ciudad, conocida como Marina Park).

La experiencia de San Fernando se basa en un conjunto de herramientas de gestión orientadas a la redistribución de rentas urbanas para construir una ciudad más equitativa. El suelo se considera como un activo clave dentro de una estrategia más amplia de desarrollo local y, por lo tanto, la gestión depende de una combinación de instrumentos de planeamiento, administrativos, económicos, fiscales y legales orientados a fortalecer el papel del sector público. El eje central de las políticas es la búsqueda de equidad en la distribución de los costos y beneficios de la urbanización, dentro del contexto desafiante de la creciente presión sobre el suelo en toda el área metropolitana de Buenos Aires.

Land Lines: ¿Qué cambios habría que realizar en el sistema educativo para la capacitación de los planificadores urbanos?

Eduardo Reese: Primero, es necesario incorporar una mayor comprensión del funcionamiento de los mercados de suelo en el contexto actual de las ciudades de los países en desarrollo. Segundo, hace falta un análisis más crítico de los instrumentos teóricos, metodológicos y técnicos para llevar a cabo el diagnóstico e intervención en asuntos de suelo urbano. El curso sobre mercados de suelo de 2004 que mencioné antes buscó desarrollar este tipo de materiales para permitir que los estudiantes cubrieran las diferentes escalas y dimensiones del problema.

Land Lines: ¿Qué tensiones existen entre intereses públicos y privados en el planeamiento urbano?

Eduardo Reese: Esta es una pregunta crucial porque toda la historia de la gestión territorial en nuestras ciudades ha tenido un hilo conductor: el derecho de la propiedad privada del suelo juntamente con la estructura de la propiedad han entrado siempre en conflicto con la actividad urbanística que es una responsabilidad pública. En ese sentido siempre habrá una tensión entre intereses públicos y privados en la construcción de la ciudad.

A mi juicio, los proyectos urbanos en América Latina tienen la responsabilidad de contribuir a la creación de nuevos espacios de uso y goce público, a la inclusión social, a la generación de empleo, a la equidad en el acceso a los servicios para todos, a la sostenibilidad ambiental y a la redistribución de las rentas urbanas generadas por el proyecto. Los cuatro casos mencionados antes de Chile, Colombia, Brasil y Argentina muestran que estos beneficios son posibles en muchos países.

Sin embargo, y lamentablemente, en una gran cantidad de casos en América Latina los proyectos urbanos se han justificado como necesarios para atraer inversiones y/o consumidores y asegurar o reforzar las ventajas competitivas dinámicas de la ciudad. Estos insospechados objetivos positivos a veces se usan como un mecanismo para legitimizar intervenciones que profundizan la segregación socioespacial de las ciudades. Estos efectos adversos del mercado no son fatales para las ciudades, sino que son el resultado de elecciones políticas perversas.

Una nueva mirada a la recuperación de plusvalías en América Latina

Martim O. Smolka, Julho 1, 2012

Muchos países de América Latina han aprobado legislaciones para respaldar políticas de recuperación de plusvalías como medio de recuperar parte o todo el aumento en el valor del suelo privado debido a regulaciones o inversiones públicas. Hasta ahora, sin embargo, sólo algunas jurisdicciones en ciertos países han aplicado esta herramienta financiera potencialmente poderosa de forma sistemática y exitosa.

En 2011 y 2012 el Lincoln Institute of Land Policy realizó encuestas a autoridades públicas y académicos de la región para averiguar por qué no se ha utilizado la recuperación de plusvalías con más frecuencia. El cuestionario de 2012 fue diseñado para recabar las opiniones de los encuestados sobre la perspectiva de diseñar, institucionalizar e implementar dos instrumentos emblemáticos de la recuperación de plusvalías: las contribuciones de valorización y la venta de derechos de edificabilidad (outorga onerosa en portugués).

Las contribuciones de valorización (conocidas como “special assessments” en los Estados Unidos) son cargas impuestas a los dueños de propiedades seleccionadas para subvencionar el costo de una mejora o servicio público del que se benefician explícitamente (Borrero 2011; Borrero et al. 2011). Con la venta de derechos de edificabilidad, sin embargo, el gobierno impone cargos por la concesión de derechos especiales por él garantizados, como, por ejemplo, permitir un factor de edificabilidad más alto, un cambio de zonificación (por ejemplo, de residencial a comercial) o la conversión de suelo de uso rural a uso urbano (Sandroni 2011).

Los resultados de ambas encuestas ponen en duda gran parte de la “sabiduría convencional” sobre el uso de las políticas de recuperación de plusvalías en América Latina. En particular, los encuestados con experiencia real en el uso de estas herramientas consideran que las dificultades legales y técnicas presentan un obstáculo para su implementación menor que la incomprensión de las autoridades públicas con poder de decisión acerca de su rédito potencial. Más aún, la recuperación de plusvalías es considerada fundamentalmente como una herramienta para promover equidad en las ciudades, más que como una manera de mejorar la autonomía fiscal municipal.

Distribución de la encuesta

La primera encuesta, llevada a cabo en el segundo trimestre de 2011, fue distribuida electrónicamente a 436 funcionarios públicos y académicos que habían participado en uno o más cursos o talleres ofrecidos por el Instituto Lincoln sobre temas de recuperación de plusvalías. Un segundo cuestionario, con una serie de preguntas distintas, fue enviado por correo electrónico en febrero de 2012 a 14.355 personas afiliadas al Programa para América Latina y el Caribe del Instituto. Las personas que respondieron a estas encuestas (134 y 1.066, respectivamente) incluyeron a funcionarios de gobierno de todos los niveles, urbanistas, académicos, investigadores independientes y consultores, y miembros de organizaciones no gubernamentales (ONG).

Analizadas por país, las respuestas a las opciones individuales de muchas de las preguntas fueron menos de diez. Por esta razón, y para simplificar la presentación, este análisis combina las respuestas de países con características sociopolíticas similares en el área de recuperación de plusvalías en tres grupos:

1. B olivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay y Venezuela. Estos cinco países cuentan con alguna legislación nacional sobre recuperación de plusvalías y son gobernados en la actualidad por gobiernos que favorecen las políticas de recuperación de plusvalías. Uruguay en 2008 (Ley No. 18.308 del 18 de junio de 2008) y Ecuador en 2010 (con su nuevo código nacional, COOT AD) aprobaron legislación nacional para ampliar el alcance de las prerrogativas gubernamentales sobre la plusvalía del suelo.

2. Argentina, Chile, México y Perú. Estos países maduros y de rápido crecimiento todavía están teniendo problemas para introducir legislación nacional más explícita sobre la recuperación de plusvalías, además de imponer contribuciones de valorización.

3. América Central y la República Dominicana. Los países de esta región comprenden un solo grupo porque son relativamente pequeños y tienen regímenes liberales de desarrollo urbano.

Brasil y Colombia se presentan por separado porque abarcan un porcentaje significativo de los encuestados y tienen la mayor cantidad de experiencia con las herramientas de recuperación de plusvalías. La cantidad de encuestados en general es proporcional al tamaño de la población del grupo de países, salvo Brasil y Colombia, que representan un porcentaje desproporcionadamente alto de encuestados (tabla 1).

El carácter pragmático de la recuperación de plusvalías

Aun cuando sólo unos pocos países estipulan explícitamente la recuperación de plusvalías en su legislación, la encuesta más concisa de 2011 reveló información detallada sobre las jurisdicciones que habían recuperado algo de la plusvalía resultante de los cambios en el uso del suelo. De los 13 países cubiertos por esa encuesta, los encuestados citaron 22 casos de recuperación de plusvalías en 30 jurisdicciones de 8 países. En general, estos casos involucraron cierto tipo de exacción para beneficio de la comunidad, logrado por medio de una negociación directa entre los emprendedores inmobiliarios y las autoridades públicas.

En promedio, sin embargo, la plusvalía recuperada ascendió a menos de un tercio del incremento estimado en el valor del suelo. La probabilidad de que la contribución exceda un tercio de la plusvalía total fue mayor cuando la contribución fue realizada en efectivo en vez de en especie. Estos casos se produjeron en países sin legislación explícita sobre la venta de derechos de edificabilidad, como Bolivia, Costa Rica y Perú, ilustrando la política pragmática de recuperación de plusvalías de las autoridades a cargo de la gestión del suelo urbano.

En general, los encuestados se consideran familiarizados con el tema, y los resultados de la encuesta de 2012 refuerzan el argumento de que el conocimiento de los instrumentos de recuperación de plusvalías no se limita a los países que han institucionalizado su práctica. Relativamente pocos encuestados declararon no estar familiarizados con los instrumentos de recuperación de plusvalías, si bien la cantidad real de funcionarios puede ser mayor, dado el sesgo a la autoselección de los encuestados (tabla 2). El porcentaje de encuestados que no están familiarizados con los instrumentos de recuperación de plusvalías en Brasil y Colombia es alrededor de la mitad del porcentaje de encuestados en la misma situación de otros países.

El desafío de la implementación

Uno de los argumentos más frecuentes que se dan sobre la dificultad de aplicar políticas de recuperación de plusvalías en América Latina es la complejidad técnica de su implementación y, en particular, el problema de cómo valorar la plusvalía de la tierra resultante de las intervenciones públicas. Para investigar la importancia de este tema, la encuesta de 2012 preguntó a los encuestados si consideraban que un margen de error del 30 por ciento en la valuación era aceptable para justificar la aplicación de la recuperación de plusvalías. La gran mayoría de los encuestados (89 por ciento) respondió que se deberían aplicar las políticas de recuperación de plusvalías fuera cual fuese el margen de error. Sólo el 11 por ciento argumentó lo contrario.

La razón principal que se citó para apoyar la recuperación de plusvalías fue nuevamente pragmática, pues se producen márgenes de error similares en otros contextos como, por ejemplo, a la hora de valuar la propiedad con fines de tributación (36,9 por ciento). La segunda respuesta, con un porcentaje cercano (31,8 por ciento) fue “la necesidad de establecer el fundamento”. El hecho de que los instrumentos de recuperación de plusvalías se contemplen en la legislación ocupó el tercer lugar (21,4 por ciento). Como era de esperar, los encuestados de Brasil y Colombia respondieron que la razón legal por imponer la recuperación de plusvalías era la más importante (27 por ciento y 31,6 por ciento, respectivamente), frente a los encuestados de otros países (15,2 por ciento en promedio).

Es de hacer notar que el 41,8 por ciento de los encuestados de Argentina, Chile, México y Perú, países que todavía están luchando por promulgar una legislación nacional sobre la recuperación de plusvalías, clasificaron la “necesidad de establecer el fundamento” más alto que otros encuestados. En contraste, los encuestados de Colombia clasificaron esta respuesta en tercer lugar. Las razones dadas por los encuestados de otros grupos de países no son significativamente distintas al promedio de la muestra (31,8 por ciento). Del 11 por ciento de los encuestados que se opusieron a las políticas de recuperación de plusvalías, los argumentos legales y de legitimidad fueron más importantes que los pragmáticos (ilegitimidad de la política o costos administrativos y judiciales).

Lo conocido frente a lo desconocido

En toda América Latina hay leyes que respaldan las contribuciones de valorización, y los gobiernos locales frecuentemente cuentan con esta fuente de ingresos en sus presupuestos. No obstante, estos ingresos son generalmente modestos y rara vez sobrepasan el 1 por ciento de los ingresos locales en la mayoría de los lugares, salvo en Colombia y, en menor medida, en ciertas ciudades con experiencia en el uso de este instrumento, como Cuenca, Ecuador y San Pedro Sula, Honduras, y en algunas jurisdicciones del estado de Paraná. En contraste, la venta de derechos de edificabilidad, todavía se está estableciendo como herramienta de recuperación de plusvalías y sólo está legislada en unos pocos países.

También se pidió a los encuestados que expresaran su preferencia entre las contribuciones de valorización (la herramienta familiar de recuperación de plusvalía que no tiene buen rendimiento) y la venta de derechos de edificabilidad (el nuevo instrumento con mayor potencial de generar ingresos). En todos los países, los resultados muestran un mayor respaldo a las contribuciones de valorización: 59 por ciento frente al 41 por ciento.

Incluso entre los encuestados de Brasil, único país en que la venta de derechos de edificabilidad fue significativamente mayor al promedio (48,9 por ciento), las contribuciones de valorización siguen siendo la herramienta preferida de recuperación de plusvalías (51,1 por ciento). Esto es llamativo, dado el éxito de São Paulo en la generación de ingresos considerables por la venta de derechos de edificabilidad. Por ejemplo, la subasta de abril de 2012 de Certificados de Potencial Adicional de Construcción (CEPAC) en São Paulo agregó US$420 millones a las arcas públicas, además de los 2.500 millones de dólares de las subastas anteriores (Bolsa de Valores de São Paulo 2012).

Los resultados de la encuesta sugieren que la mayoría de los encuestados no son conscientes de la diferencia en el potencial de ingresos entre estas dos herramientas de recuperación de plusvalías. De hecho, sólo el 10 por ciento de los encuestados citó el potencial de ingresos municipales como razón principal para preferir una opción sobre la otra. Los partidarios de la recuperación de plusvalías otorgan mayor prioridad a promover la equidad que a generar ingresos, otro resultado sorprendente, dado el potencial de la recuperación de plusvalías para fortalecer la autonomía municipal.

Cuando se preguntó cómo caracterizarían los argumentos a favor de la recuperación de plusvalías, los encuestados de 2011 podían elegir entre 50 términos relacionados con los atributos de la política de suelo. Los ocho términos que recibieron mayor cantidad de respuestas (el 49,7 por ciento del total) estaban relacionados con temas de equidad, tales como cargos y beneficios, redistribución, función social de la propiedad, lucha contra la especulación, equidad y justicia social. La única excepción fue un término financiero, que ocupó el cuarto lugar.

En contraste, términos como autonomía fiscal, armonía fiscal, descentralización, impuesto, autosuficiencia, financiamiento y recursos adicionales recibieron sólo el 18,7 por ciento de los votos, mientras que términos relacionados con el funcionamiento de los mercados urbanos, como eficiencia y disciplina del mercado, recibieron sólo el 11 por ciento. Los argumentos contra la recuperación de plusvalías se asociaron con términos como impuesto, carga fiscal, derechos adquiridos y doble tributación, y también con abuso, violación de derechos e ilegitimidad.

Los encuestados de ambas encuestas citaron la legitimidad ética y sociopolítica como razón principal para preferir una herramienta de recuperación de plusvalías a otra. En efecto, el 59 por ciento de los encuestados que prefieren las contribuciones de valorización sobre la venta de derechos de edificabilidad mencionaron la legitimidad ética y sociopolítica como la razón más importante. El 41 por ciento de los encuestados que prefieren la venta de derechos de edificabilidad dio las mismas razones para su preferencia. Al mismo tiempo, el 24,4 por ciento de los encuestados que prefieren los derechos de edificabilidad consideraron que la segunda razón más importante era la capacidad para generar ingresos, pero sólo el 17,6 por ciento de los encuestados que prefieren las contribuciones de valorización compartieron la misma opinión.

En definitiva, esto sugiere que las autoridades en América Latina normalmente toleran bien una distancia amplia entre el principio de equidad-legitimidad y la generación de ingresos, basándose en la percepción de que las contribuciones de valorización son más fáciles de imponer desde el punto de vista técnico. Desde otra perspectiva, parecen preferir el camino más rápido de la superioridad moral que el que conduce a mayores ingresos locales.

La importancia de la experiencia

Después de la legitimidad ética y sociopolítica, la siguiente razón más importante para preferir un instrumento de recuperación de plusvalías en particular varía según al nivel de experiencia del encuestado. Una confirmación sólida de la importancia de la experiencia de implementación proviene de los países que han aplicado las herramientas: los colombianos prefieren las contribuciones de valorización, pero los brasileños, la venta de derechos de edificabilidad.

Colombia posee gran cantidad de experiencia en las contribuciones de valorización, lo cual explica por qué el 16 por ciento de los encuestados de dicho país citan la facilidad técnica de la implementación como razón para elegir esta herramienta. En comparación, sólo el 7,9 por ciento de los encuestados de otros países menciona esa razón. Por su parte, el 12,6 por ciento de los encuestados de Brasil prefiere la venta de derechos de edificabilidad debido a la facilidad de implementación, en comparación con sólo el 5 por ciento de los encuestados de otros países. Estos resultados ponen de manifiesto hasta qué punto la experiencia influye en las opiniones sobre las restricciones técnicas de las herramientas de recuperación de plusvalías.

Obstáculos a la implementación

Los encuestados de 2012 atribuyen la renuencia de las autoridades públicas a aplicar políticas de recuperación de plusvalías fundamentalmente a la falta de información (23,2 por ciento) y al riesgo político (22,5 por ciento). Otras explicaciones son la complicidad con los intereses relacionados con los propietarios (18,4 por ciento) y las dificultades técnicas de implementación (15,4 por ciento). Muy pocos consideran que la falta de legislación sea un factor importante para que no se usen instrumentos de recuperación de plusvalías (1,5 por ciento), y los motivos ideológicos (3,2 por ciento) y los costos administrativos (3,8 por ciento) están muy poco por encima de los anteriores.

Las razones pragmáticas son importantes sólo para los encuestados de países que no tienen una experiencia significativa con estas herramientas. Mientras que el 13 por ciento de los encuestados de Brasil y Colombia citan las dificultades de implementación técnica como obstáculo principal, el 31 por ciento de los encuestados de otros países citan la misma razón en promedio. Esto refuerza la conclusión de que la experiencia en herramientas de recuperación de plusvalías es un factor importante. Los brasileños explican por qué no se usan los instrumentos de recuperación de plusvalías en términos de intereses del suelo y riesgos políticos, que suman en conjunto un 59 por ciento de las respuestas. Entre los colombianos, el 26 por ciento no ve ninguna razón para no usar los instrumentos de recuperación de plusvalías. Esta es una proporción mucho más alta que las respuestas de otros países (7,2 por ciento en promedio), lo que indica que en Colombia existe una percepción de que las herramientas están recibiendo la atención que se merecen.

Identificación de las partes interesadas clave

La encuesta de 2012 pidió a los encuestados que seleccionaran qué actores involucrados en el debate deberían recibir atención prioritaria para superar la resistencia a las políticas de recuperación de plusvalías. A la cabeza de la lista están los directivos de las áreas ejecutivas de gobierno, como alcaldes y directores, seguido de los miembros de las legislaturas, incluyendo miembros del congreso y los diputados municipales (tabla 3). Los urbanistas — quienes frecuentemente se encuentran a la vanguardia de las operaciones políticas — ocuparon el tercer lugar.

Sorprendentemente, sólo el 6,2 por ciento de los encuestados citaron a los miembros del ámbito judicial (jueces, abogados y fiscales), aun cuando sean los tribunales los que frecuentemente bloquean las iniciativas de recuperación de plusvalías. Los encuestados de Brasil fueron los únicos en asignar una importancia mayor a los miembros del ámbito judicial. En consonancia con los avances institucionales que sus países han realizado en el campo de recuperación de plusvalías, tanto los encuestados de Brasil como los de Colombia dieron menor prioridad a los legisladores (20,7 por ciento) que los encuestados de otros países (32,3 por ciento en promedio).

Los encuestados de todos los grupos profesionales clasificaron en último lugar a los académicos y periodistas. En consecuencia, la estrategia de capacitar a los capacitadores parecería ser contraproducente, en la medida en que no se considera a los académicos como actores importantes para reducir la resistencia a las políticas de recuperación de plusvalías. Este resultado respalda el enfoque del programa del Instituto Lincoln sobre la construcción de capacidad entre las autoridades públicas directamente involucradas en el debate político o la implementación de herramientas, en vez de construir capacidad en las escuelas de graduados. La baja prioridad dada a los periodistas como destinatarios de capacitación es desconcertante, pero puede ser un reflejo de que el debate sobre la recuperación de plusvalías sigue estando confinado fundamentalmente a las entidades públicas y los círculos académicos. De todas maneras, una mayor participación de los medios podría tener una influencia positiva en la ampliación del debate.

Otro resultado interesante de la encuesta es que las respuestas de los diversos grupos son relativamente homogéneas. La profesión, filiación institucional, lugar de empleo, nivel de educación e incluso el tamaño de la ciudad del encuestado suponen poca diferencia. En efecto, sólo la distinción entre encuestados de países con y sin experiencia significativa en la recuperación de plusvalías parece ser importante.

Conclusiones

Los resultados de la encuesta apuntan a una comprensión relativamente homogénea del estado del debate y la implementación de recuperación de plusvalías en América Latina. Sin embargo, el pronóstico para implementar políticas exitosas de recuperación de plusvalías en la región, es menos claro. La retórica de justicia social parece prevalecer incluso entre sus partidarios “informados”. Además, las autoridades que se encuentran en puestos ejecutivos y con capacidad de decisión parecen estar mal informados o carecen de voluntad política. Más aún; como demuestran las experiencias de Brasil y Colombia, el proceso de institucionalización de políticas de recuperación de plusvalías supone un proceso de ensayo y error que tarda tiempo en tener éxito.

Se pueden extraer tres lecciones del trabajo efectuado por el Instituto Lincoln sobre la recuperación de plusvalías en América Latina. Primero, los incrementos en el valor del suelo se pueden recuperar más exitosamente de los actores específicos que reciben el mayor beneficio de una intervención del sector público que de la comunidad en general (la condición de ganancias para ambos) Segundo, las herramientas de recuperación de plusvalías tienen una mayor probabilidad de éxito cuando se conciben para resolver un problema local reconocido que cuando tratan de emular unas supuestas buenas prácticas.

Tercero, es esencial reforzar la legitimidad de las políticas de recuperación de plusvalías. Esto se puede conseguir dando publicidad de proyectos exitosos, sobre todo en países en que las iniciativas de recuperación de plusvalías todavía son aisladas y esporádicas. Es importante trasladar el debate sobre la recuperación de plusvalías de la retórica ideológica y bien intencionada a un contexto más técnico y práctico, fundamentado en la comprobación de que es posible implementarlo y, más importante aún, en que se ha implementado ya de forma efectiva en muchos casos.

Sobre el autor

Martim O. Smolka es senior fellow y director del Programa de América Latina y el Caribe del Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. Ha estado investigando políticas y experiencias de recuperación de plusvalías durante muchos años.

Referencias

Borrero Ochoa, Oscar. 2011. Betterment levy in Colombia: Relevance, procedures, and social acceptability. Land Lines 23(2): 14-19.

Borrero Ochoa, Oscar, Esperanza Durán, Jorge Hernández, and Magda Montaña. 2011. Evaluating the practice of betterment levies in Colombia: The experience of Bogotá and Manizales. Working Paper. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Sandroni, Paulo Henrique. 2011. Recent experience with land value capture in São Paulo, Brazil. Land Lines 23(3): 14-19.

São Paulo Stock Exchange. 2012. http://www.bmfbovespa.com.br/pt-br/mercados/download/Agua-Suplemento-27012012.pdf

The Road to Recovery

Governing Post-Disaster Reconstruction
Laurie A. Johnson and Robert B. Olshansky, Julho 1, 2013

Imagine for a moment that you are a political leader—a prime minister, president, or governor—and you awake to the news that natural disaster has struck. Citizens died, buildings collapsed, infrastructure is hobbled, and local leaders desperately need additional resources and support.

You respond immediately, sending personnel and equipment to the disaster zone and pledging additional assistance to local leaders. Your country, like many around the world, has institutionalized a scalable, tiered response system with regional, state, and national levels of government engaging as disaster-related demands exceed local capacities to respond. Yet within days, even hours—before all the casualties are treated and citizens are accounted for, and before the streets have been cleared of rubble and basic services have been restored—other leaders and the media are demanding answers to questions you haven’t had time to consider: How much money will be pledged to the rebuilding? What standards will guide it? Will all landowners be permitted to rebuild? Who will lead the process? Is a new institution or governance structure needed to cut through bureaucratic red tape and expedite the rebuilding?

This article summarizes ongoing research into the roles of various government levels in successful disaster recovery and rebuilding (table 1). It represents the synthesis of two decades of recovery research and planning practice following some of the largest disasters of our time in the United States, Japan, China, Taiwan, Indonesia, India, New Zealand, Australia, Chile, and elsewhere. Its purpose is to find common lessons in these disparate environments and help facilitate recovery for communities struck by disasters yet to come.

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Table 1: Recovery Management Experiences Around the World

Australia

Victoria Bushfire Recovery and Reconstruction Authority

  • Formed after February 2009 bushfires; disbanded in June 2011 and transferred operations to government departments, local councils, and nonprofit groups.
  • State-level department formed through a national-state agreement.
  • Had broad authority and responsibility for leading and coordinating recovery and reconstruction including state- and community-level planning and actual rebuilding.

Queensland Reconstruction Authority

  • Established in February 2011 following 2010–2011 flooding in Queensland; still exists.
  • State-level statutory authority established by the state parliament.
  • Has broad authorities to decide recovery priorities, work closely with communities, collect information about property and infrastructure, share data with all government levels, coordinate and distribute financial assistance, realize the board’s strategic priorities, and facilitate flood mitigation.

Chile

Ministry of Housing and Urban Development (MINVU- Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo)

  • Formed after Chile’s 2010 earthquake and tsunami.
  • Main national agency in charge of reconstruction and development of national reconstruction plan.
  • Interministerial Committee established by Chile’s president; includes representatives of MINVU and all other national ministries involved in recovery and reconstruction; coordinates national budget and finance, integrates the work of ministries involved in reconstruction, and coordinates and monitors the implementation of complex projects over time.

China

General Headquarters for Earthquake Relief

  • Formed following the 2008 Wenchuan Earthquake.
  • Established within China’s State Council (Chinese cabinet), with the premier as nominal director.

India

Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority (GSDMA)

  • Formed after 2001 earthquake; still exists.
  • Formed administratively as state implementing agency; subsequently formalized through legislation in 2003.
  • Cabinet-level agency with chief minister as chair.
  • Has broad powers to manage public recovery funds (provided by government of India, Gujarat, and international donors), set policy, issue recovery guidelines, and to plan, coordinate, and monitor recovery.

Abhiyan

  • Established after 2001 Gujarat earthquake; still exists.
  • A network of 30 NGOs facilitates among NGOs, communities, and government.
  • Formally endorsed and supported by government.

Project Management Unit

  • Created after 1993 earthquake in Maharashtra state.
  • Implemented policies of a cabinet-level recovery policy subcommittee.
  • Focused on implementing community reconstruction projects, with authority to supervise other state agencies and hire consultants.

Indonesia

Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency—BRR

  • Formed after 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, with a 4-year life.
  • Operated under the authority of the president.
  • Had considerable latitude to coordinate, monitor, and implement recovery; took over housing reconstruction when other agencies failed to deliver.
  • Built capacity of Aceh government following 30 years of armed conflict.

Coordination Team for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction—TTN

  • Established by presidential decree after 2006 earthquake in provinces of Yogyakarta and Central Java.
  • Coordination team of national and provincial representatives.
  • Improved coordination and communication between central and local governments.

Japan

National Reconstruction Agency

  • Formed after the March 11, 2011 earthquake and tsunami; still exists.
  • National agency directly responsible to prime minister.
  • Sets guidelines for local planning, approves local recovery plans, and coordinates work of national ministries as they implement reconstruction.

New Zealand

Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority

  • Formed following 2011 earthquake in Christchurch; expires April 2016.
  • National agency reporting to special cabinet-level minister appointed for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery.
  • Broad authority to lead recovery policy and planning and to manage critical recovery and rebuilding functions for national and local governments.

Taiwan

921 Post-Earthquake Recovery Commission

  • Formed after 1999 earthquake in central Taiwan.
  • Temporary national organization formalized by presidential decree; dissolved in 2006.
  • Central government agency led by three ministers of state; included representatives from various national departments.
  • Responsible for all post-earthquake recovery activities.

Morakot Post-Disaster Reconstruction Council

  • Formed after 2009 typhoon in southern Taiwan.
  • Central government agency modeled after the 9-21 Post-Earthquake Recovery Commission.
  • Responsible for all relief activities and reconstruction.

United States

Lower Manhattan Development Corporation

  • Formed after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks; still in operation.
  • Joint state-city corporation governed by 16-member board of directors (half appointed by New York governor and half by New York City mayor).
  • Lead planning agency for reconstruction of Lower Manhattan; responsible for distribution of federal rebuilding funds.

Louisiana Recovery Authority

  • Formed after 2005 Hurricane Katrina; expanded focus following 2005 Hurricane Rita; disbanded in 2010.
  • State agency set planning policy for recovery, made recovery policy recommendations to the governor and state legislature, and provided oversight of state agency recovery activities.

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Recovery Management Around the World

Governments tasked with post-disaster reconstruction face an extraordinary set of management challenges. The first is the compression of activities in time, focused in space, as cities built over the course of decades if not centuries are destroyed or damaged suddenly and must be rebuilt in a fraction of the time it took to construct them. From this tension develops a second challenge: a keen tension between speed and deliberation, as the various recovery actors in stricken communities move with urgency while aiming to make thoughtful and deliberate decisions, to ensure optimal long-term recovery. From both these phenomena a third challenge arises: the need for immediate access to a deep wealth of money and information—the two currencies of the post-disaster recovery environment.

To meet these demands, governments in every country after every large disaster create new relief agencies or significantly rearrange existing organizations. The most common reason for these post-disaster governance transformations is lack of capacity. Governments still need to attend to their normal daily affairs while they coordinate the reconstruction or reinvention of impacted communities, so they appoint an entity that can focus daily attention on rebuilding while coordinating the recovery-related activities of multiple government agencies. Commonly designed to serve a variety of purposes and governmental settings, these recovery agencies provide a range of substantive functions as they rebuild infrastructure, housing, and economic activity. They differ depending on the type and scale of coordination they provide; the scope of their authority, especially regarding the flow of money and information; and the level of government they serve—at either the national, state, or intergovernmental level.

National governments handle very large disasters at the top political tier, mobilizing financial resources from national reserves or international aid and providing capacity support to lower levels of government in the disaster-stricken locality. When large disasters transcend state or provincial boundaries, national governments also assume active roles in developing recovery policies, and they create recovery organizations to assist them. Examples include Japan’s National Reconstruction Agency, established after the 2011 earthquake and tsunami; New Zealand’s Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority, created after the 2010 and 2011 earthquake sequence in Christchurch; and China’s General Headquarters for Earthquake Relief following the 2008 disaster in Wenchuan. Each of these international bodies hewed to the national administrative leadership, derived authority from the top rung of government, and articulated policies approved by the reigning administration.

Similarly, state-level recovery agencies are usually created in direct response to disasters that affect a region or other subnational jurisdiction. The authorities and legalities of these entities are more limited by their authorizing body’s secondary, subnational position in government. Examples include the Gujarat State’s Disaster Management Authority (GSDMA), created after the 2001 earthquake in western India; Louisiana’s Recovery Authority, founded after Hurricane Katrina in 2005; Victoria State’s Bushfire Reconstruction and Recovery Authority (VBRRA), established after the 2009 Australian bushfires; and Queensland State’s Reconstruction Authority, founded after the summer 2010–2011 floods in Australia.

A third class of organizations are designed to operate between levels of government, such as the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation, created as a state and city partnership for recovery planning and funding following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in New York City. Another example, the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (BRR) created in Aceh, Indonesia, following the 2004 tsunami, consisted of three independent agencies whose membership came from a wide range of local and national stakeholders. Likewise, the Indonesian government’s Coordination Team for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (TTN), following the 2006 earthquake in Yogyakarta and Central Java, was designed to provide a bridge between national agencies and local agencies, and it also monitored and investigated local implementation issues.

In some cases, governments choose to modify or adapt existing institutions and procedures to help manage recovery. For example, Chile established a national interministerial task force after the 2010 earthquake and tsunami, but the existing Ministry of Housing and Urban Development took on expanded roles and responsibilities and managed the national planning and implementation efforts.

The Mastery of Money, Information, Collaboration, and Time

Considering these factors, common to all post-disaster recovery settings, our research demonstrates that the key to governing large-scale crises effectively is the mastery of money, information, collaboration, and time. For this article, we offer here some best practice examples and lessons learned from our various country-organization studies.

1. Managing Money: Sourcing and distributing recovery funding efficiently, effectively, and equitably.

When large amounts of public funds are involved in a disaster cleanup, the true power over the recovery resides with the level of government that controls the flow of money and how it is acquired, allocated, disbursed, and audited. Sometimes, the recovery organization assumes all or some of these powers, and sometimes all funding authority continues to reside where it did before the disaster, in the same legislative and administrative branches. Important functions in the post-disaster environment include setting policies and priorities for allocating large sums of recovery funding and establishing accounting systems that allow for timely disbursal of critical financing while also providing transparency and minimizing corruption.

Some organizations, such as India’s state-level GSDMA, are established specifically to collect all the recovery funds in one place and then allocate and disburse them. Some, such as one of the three legs of Indonesia’s intergovernmental BRR, are created to independently audit and monitor the expenditures of recovery implementation organizations. In contrast, the state-level Louisiana Recovery Authority recommended funding priorities to the state and provided oversight as needed, but it had no direct control over recovery funds. Japan’s National Reconstruction Agency received national funding and allocates that money to the relevant national ministries and local governments.

2. Increasing Information Flows: Effectively gathering, integrating, and disseminating information to enhance decision making and actions by all recovery actors.

A critical demand is to accelerate and broaden the flows of information among recovery actors about the dynamics of reconstruction actions and emergent opportunities. This challenge includes the planning and public engagement processes that provide information to citizens and institutions involved in the recovery, facilitate communication and innovations among recovery actors, and convey citizen concerns to government agencies and NGOs in a timely manner. It also includes providing information between both governmental and nongovernmental organizations and establishing forums to facilitate coordination.

In Victoria, Australia, after the 2009 bushfires, national and state leaders worked with affected communities to form more than 30 local recovery committees, which were then charged with developing a community recovery plan that identified local priorities and projects. These committees were used by state and national governments as focal points for local funding distribution and by local communities to raise additional funds and establish local policy guidance for rebuilding. In Yogyakarta, Java, after the 2006 earthquake, TTN kept a variety of local and national agencies mutually informed of each other’s activities—which, in turn, helped to provide early alerts to officials regarding potential problems.

A critical function appropriately provided by a government-supported agency is the acquisition, synthesis, and distribution of basic information on damage, reconstruction activities, population, social and economic issues, and various recovery indicators. Such agencies issue regular progress reports and monitor recovery indicators, as both Japan’s National Reconstruction Agency and New Zealand’s Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority have done, using a variety of communication mechanisms, including website postings, press releases, newsletters, and forums. Frequent information from credible sources can help to ensure that all actors understand the current recovery environment, and it can also help reduce the spread of rumors and misinformation.

3. Supporting Collaboration: Building sustainable capacity and capability for long-term recovery through genuine collaboration and coordination, both horizontally among local groups and vertically among different levels of government.

Vertically organized, hierarchical agencies—with clear organizational charts and streamlined channels of communication—are usually not well suited to manage disaster recovery, because the lack of “connecting flow” across vertical hierarchies limits collaboration as well as the flow of new and updated information among organizations. U.S. national agencies involved in recovery, for example, are more adept at administering individual programs than they are at solving complex problems that cut across governmental institutional boundaries.

By contrast, horizontally organized agencies can promote interagency coordination and information sharing, allowing individual groups to adapt to new contexts and information while remaining responsible to their parent organization. If multiple states or local jurisdictions are involved, cooperation among multiple jurisdictions is essential. Technical assistance and capacity building for the key recovery actors is also important for building local capabilities to sustain long-term recovery.

After Hurricane Katrina in 2005, Governor Kathleen Blanco appointed the members of the Louisiana Recovery Authority, so it was technically an extension of the state-level administration. But the legislature eventually formalized it. As an intentionally bipartisan body, it operated independently as it interacted with both U.S. national officials and local governments, made policy recommendations, and provided oversight of state agency recovery activities. Even though its power was limited to making policy recommendations, it was able to exert considerable influence at multiple levels in a very politically contentious atmosphere. It also collaborated with U.S. national agencies to set standards for long-term community recovery planning and helped match technical assistance and provide other planning resources at regional, local, and neighborhood scales.

Because they carried the authority of state leaders, India’s GSMDA and Queensland Australia’s reconstruction authority were able to successfully coordinate the activities of other state agencies. Similarly, Chile’s MINVU and Taiwan’s national recovery agencies have had the centralized authority to coordinate activities of other national agencies. Abhiyan, an NGO officially endorsed by the Gujarat government in India but without any defined governmental authority, also played a crucial role in coordinating the work of hundreds of NGOs and in establishing a network of local subcenters to provide information and technical support.

The hierarchical recovery process after the 2008 Wenchuan Earthquake in China succeeded in quickly reconstructing buildings, but it left little room for local innovation, as it lacked genuine local capacity building and involvement in decision making. Because local conditions were not always considered, economic recovery appears to be uneven.

Likewise, in many tsunami-affected communities in the Tohoku region of Japan, recovery has stalled because the hierarchical system established under the national government and the National Recovery Agency leaves insufficient room for local innovation. Furthermore, within the complex and powerful Japanese ministry system, the National Reconstruction Agency lacks power to compel actions by other ministries.

Increasingly, research shows that if residents are partners in reconstruction planning, they are tolerant of delays, and they are more satisfied with the results. Still, even the best examples of decentralized processes involve an agency at the top establishing the framework and rules. This trend strongly suggests that governments should resist the urge to manage the details of reconstruction and act less as managers and more as coordinators and facilitators of the process.

4. Balancing Time Constraints: Effectively meeting the immediate and pressing local needs of recovery while also successfully capitalizing on opportunities for longterm betterment.

Governments face a balancing act as they confront the tensions between speed and deliberation, and between restoration and betterment. The most fundamental way to address these challenges is to increase information flows, as described above. But recovery agencies have found several other specific ways to attain both speed and improvement.

To hasten reconstruction, there are often opportunities to streamline normal bureaucratic processes of decision making, especially regarding construction permits, without compromising quality. Because such processes often involve multiple agencies, a recovery agency can be helpful to the extent that it can facilitate or compel line agencies to cooperate more effectively.

New Zealand’s parliament conferred upon the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority and its minister a wide range of unilateral powers that would enable the timely and coordinated recovery of greater Christchurch. Parliament continued the emergency authorities granted under previous legislation and extended the expiration date of those authorities where appropriate; permitted the minister to acquire land compulsorily; and allowed the suspension of any part or all of the national land use, local government, and transport management, plans or policies developed under various acts. It directed CERA to prepare a draft recovery strategy within nine months of its authorization. Similarly, it issued the Christchurch city council a nine-month deadline to draft a recovery plan for the city’s damaged central business district.

Most recovery agencies include disaster risk reduction in their reconstruction policies. A common recovery slogan is “build back better.” The slogan of the Louisiana Recovery Authority was “Safer, Stronger, Smarter.” The easiest form of post-disaster betterment is to adopt disaster-resistant building standards. The incorporation of new structural standards need not slow down the rebuilding process, but land use improvements such as relocating neighborhoods or entire communities can require considerable time for planning and land acquisition. These projects involve difficult tradeoffs between speed, design quality, and public involvement. New Zealand is undertaking a major buyout of neighborhoods that sustained heavy damage in the 2010–2011 earthquakes and remain vulnerable to damage from future tremors. Japan is encouraging relocation of coastal communities from tsunami hazard areas, and some of these will likely take up to ten years to complete.

One way to manage these goals simultaneously is to support participatory planning processes to create long-term betterment while also trying to meet immediate needs. In many cases, professional planners worked with neighborhoods—in Japan, Chile, New Orleans, and Bhuj, India, for example—but each project also involved difficult compromises in order to meet time constraints. Victoria and Queensland’s creation of local recovery planning committees, however, are great examples of state and national support systems that helped build local capacity to carry forward the rebuilding processes over time.

Next Steps in our Research

Governments know that their task is to manage information and money flows among many actors in a compressed time. Up to this point, we have identified many examples of how to accomplish this. But, even better, we would like to be able to create menus of organizational and process choices, based on combinations of disaster magnitude and scope and economic, political, environmental, and governmental contexts.

We also have several remaining questions: Why do many of the same institutional problems continue to appear from one disaster to the next, and is there a way to avoid repeating some of them? What are the effective outcomes—negative and positive—of these institutional arrangements that may inform future leaders facing similar reconstruction challenges? What specific kinds of technical assistance and capacity building should international donors and national governments focus on providing for local governmental and non-governmental organizations, so they can do their jobs better during the recovery process? In large-scale disasters, how do the tiered goals of a recovery (i.e. rebuilding households, neighborhoods, cities, regions, nations) relate to each other, in terms of consistency, efficiency, and effectiveness? And what happens when these disaster-related organizations cease to exist? Is the local capacity and capability in place for long-term community sustainability? By studying varied national and organizational experiences, we can better understand how the time compression phenomenon of post-disaster recovery affects other theoretical constructs guiding public policy and city management; planning, land development and growth management; and fiscal and capital management.

About the Authors

Co-authors of Clear As Mud: Planning for the Rebuilding of New Orleans (2010, APA Planners Press), Laurie A. Johnson and Robert B. Olshansky are currently collaborating on a Lincoln Institute book and policy focus report on governing post-disaster recovery. For the past two decades, they have been researching and practicing post-disaster recovery planning following urban disasters around the world. Johnson is an urban planner based in San Francisco and specializing in disaster recovery and catastrophe risk management. Olshansky is professor of urban and regional planning at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Contact: laurie@lauriejohnsonconsulting.com or robo@illinois.edu

References

Alesch, Daniel J., Lucy A. Arendt, and James N. Holly. 2009. Managing for Long-term Community Recovery in the Aftermath of Disaster. Fairfax, VA: Public Entity Risk Institute.

Chandrasekhar, Divya and Robert B. Olshansky. 2007. Managing Development After Catastrophic Disaster: A Study of Organizations That Coordinated Post-Disaster Recovery in Aceh and Louisiana. Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

Olshansky, Robert B., Lewis D. Hopkins, and Laurie A. Johnson. 2012. Disaster and recovery: Processes compressed in time. Natural Hazards Reviews. 13(3):173–178.

Olshansky, Robert B., Laurie A. Johnson, and Kenneth C. Topping. 2006. Rebuilding communities following disaster: Lessons from Kobe and Los Angeles. Built Environment. 32(4): 354–374.

Smith, G., and Dennis Wenger. 2007. Sustainable disaster recovery: Operationalizing an existing agenda. In Handbook of disaster research (Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research). ed. Havidan Rodriguez, 234–257. New York, NY: Springer.

Message from the President

Institutions that Protect the Common Interest
George W. McCarthy, Fevereiro 1, 2015

Human development is often characterized as a war between the contradictory goals of individuation and conformity. We struggle to distinguish ourselves from the herd, but we panic at the prospect of social isolation. Our social sciences, especially economics, are similarly conflicted. The cult of the individual is a dominant social meme, and this dominance is exacerbated by the rise of economic fundamentalism—the unquestioning faith in unregulated markets and the concomitant distrust of government and social systems. Starting with Adam Smith’s invisible hand, scores of economists built careers devising theories based on methodological individualism, the idea that “social phenomena must be explained by showing how they result from individual actions, which in turn must be explained through reference to the intentional states that motivate the individual actors,” according to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. These theorists uniformly praised unfettered individuals and markets as the best way to achieve the joint goals of prosperity and fairness and promoted (or prevented) public policies buttressed by this view.

At the same time, other mainstream economists have warned about the “isolation paradox,” a category of scenarios in which individuals, acting in relative isolation and guided only by their short-term self-interest, generate long-term results that are destructive to all. Examples include the Malthusian nightmares of famine and pestilence curbing population growth, the prisoner’s dilemma, or the tragedy of the commons, which was described in a 1968 essay by Garrett Hardin. Hardin warned about the hazards of population growth through a parable about unmanaged use of common grazing land. The inevitable over-use of the land by individual herders maximizing their flocks would destroy the land and make it unsuitable for everyone. The solution, according to Hardin and others, is some form of enclosure of the commons, through privatization or public ownership that can establish coercive mechanisms to ensure that individuals behave in ways that protect the common interest.

Luckily, most humans do not subscribe to economic theory and instead develop their own ways to reconcile these contradictions between individuation and conformity. And public intellectuals such as Elinor Ostrom, the 2009 Economics Nobel laureate (and the only woman so honored), have advanced our knowledge about the ways we mediate these two very human tendencies. We do it through institutions—groups of humans voluntarily organizing themselves to harness the benefits of individual effort while avoiding the pitfalls of isolated individuals run amok. According to Ostrom and others, various institutional arrangements—formal organizations, rules of engagement, public policies, to name a few—organically emerge to prevent unfortunate events like the tragedy of the commons. In this issue of Land Lines, we feature stories about a number of such institutional arrangements that have emerged to protect us from ourselves or to manifest mutual benefits. In our interview with Summer Waters of the Sonoran Institute (p. 30), we learn about efforts to promote the economy and protect the ecology of the Colorado River watershed and reintroduce the flow of fresh water to the river’s delta.

We’ve only begun to study systems that organically emerge to manage commons, but we know even less about how we create commons. This might be a result of our tendency to treat commons like manna—conveyed from heaven, not created by humans. However, as reported by Tony Hiss (p. 24), thousands of people have come together voluntarily to create a new commons—millions of acres of land conserved to protect vast ecosystems, to save habitat for endangered species, to provide green space for densely packed urban dwellers, and to realize a variety of other long-term goals. From the point of view of orthodox economists, it’s a world gone crazy. Not only are formerly isolated individuals acting in ways that prevent the tragedy of the commons, they are taking action to create new ones.

Ironically, the story of America’s first public park, Boston Common, is often used as a cautionary tale to illustrate the tragedy of the commons. Truth be told, it is one of the first examples of individuals self-organizing and subordinating their short-term interests to create a shared resource for the long term. Boston Common was created in 1634 when members of the Massachusetts Bay Colony voted to tax themselves to purchase and protect the parcel of land to train troops and graze cattle. These citizens understood that, with some 2,500 people joining the colony annually, it would not be long before all habitable land was developed and all urban open space would disappear, according to Jim Levitt in his forthcoming book, Palladium of the People.

Public education is another man-made commons, as are most public goods. We organize and tax ourselves to support the provision of this critically important institution. And over time, we need to revise the way we manage and maintain it, like any commons. In this issue, Daphne Kenyon and Andy Reschovsky offer a window into the analyses of the challenges cities face in financing their schools—and some ideas about how we can address these problems (p. 34). We also explore how universities and hospitals can work with their neighborhoods and cities to pursue mutually beneficial collaborative goals, in the feature on anchor strategies from Beth Dever, et al. (p. 4).

For some economists, creation of new commons is a theoretical impossibility. In his first book, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Mancur Olson hypothesized that people will endure the complications of acting together only if there is a sufficient private incentive; and large groups will not pursue collective action unless motivated by significant personal gain (economic, social, etc.). Theory and practice clearly have collided, and the impact is and will continue to be profound. As Hiss notes, in his essay on large landscape conservation, “The first thing that grows is not necessarily the size of the property to be protected, but the possibility for actions, some large, some small, that will make a lasting difference for the future of the biosphere and its inhabitants, including humanity.”

It doesn’t stop there. In the United States, a bastion of the free market, some 65 million citizens belong to common interest communities, such as condominiums and homeowners’ associations, as reported by Gerry Korngold (p. 14). A quarter of the nation voluntarily has limited its own autonomy to protect and preserve common interests. As noted by Korngold, this wouldn’t have surprised de Tocqueville, who described the U. S. as “a nation of joiners.” In Democracy in America, in 1831, he wrote, “I have often admired the extreme skill with which the inhabitants of the United States succeed in proposing a common object to the exertions of a great many men, and in getting them voluntarily to pursue it.” Perhaps it is time to organize a cult of collective action to celebrate the incredible things we are able to do when we work together. We might find that the policies, practices, organizations, and institutions that we create to mediate our internal war between individuation and conformity have contributed more to human advancement than the individual achievements we more often celebrate.

Charting Progress

PolicyMap Democratizes Data Analysis
By Alex Ulam, Outubro 1, 2015

Housing costs are spiraling upward in many areas throughout the United States, cutting down on the ability of Americans to save and leading to the gentrification of formerly affordable neighborhoods. However, as with many public policy challenges, it is not always immediately apparent where problems are the most acute. This became clear to Helen Campbell, an analyst in Los Angeles’s Housing + Community Investment Department, late on a Friday afternoon in July. An information request from the mayor’s office led her to discover that a large part of the San Fernando Valley in L.A. was home to the nation’s highest rental cost burden, which the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) defines as a situation where families are paying more than 30 percent of their income on renting a home.

Los Angeles officials knew they had areas where home owners and renters were struggling to pay for housing, says Campbell, but they had no idea how severe the situation was or even where it was most pronounced. The mayor’s office needed authoritative data on this troubling trend for a lobbying effort to preserve the HOME Investment Partnerships Program (HOME), the largest federal block grant program for affordable housing. Currently, in Washington, DC, lawmakers are considering a Senate bill that would eviscerate the program.

If Campbell had used conventional geographic information software (GIS), it would have taken her an inordinate amount of time to analyze the city’s housing cost burden. But she was able to access the necessary information quickly by typing several simple queries into PolicyMap—a unique web-based software program that is changing the way that planning data is gathered and displayed. “If we didn’t have PolicyMap, we simply would have said no to the request,” Campbell says, “It would have taken too many hours to do the work.”

When Campbell ran her PolicyMap search, she discovered that the 29th Congressional District, part of which is situated within the city of Los Angeles, was, out of all of the 435 congressional districts in the country, number one in terms of rental cost burden and number three in terms of home owner cost burden. Those rankings for the 29th Congressional District, which includes a large part of the San Fernando Valley, translate into 62.9 percent of renters and slightly more than 50 percent of home owners there suffering from a housing cost burden. “We thought that South L.A. or Northeast L.A. would have higher rent burdens, but you have Valley as being the higher rent burden,” Campbell says.

Public Data for All

Since its launch in 2007, PolicyMap has grown into the largest geographic database on the web, and become the go-to public information resource for financial institutions, universities, nonprofits, and close to 2,500 government agencies. The online tool currently has more than 37,000 indicators, on categories ranging from crime to grocery store access, making the world of public data significantly easier to parse. Last year, the site had 434,000 unique visitors. Most of the data housed on PolicyMap is free, but proprietary data is available from various providers through paid subscriptions. Overall, PolicyMap’s easy-to-use mapping tools have helped democratize data analysis by making the process relatively affordable for nonprofits and local governments, which usually don’t have the resources to hire teams of GIS specialists. The site can help anyone in the public policy world avoid getting stuck on the wrong side of the widening digital divide.

One of the website’s most notable attributes is its capacity to simultaneously display various types of indicators, such as Superfund Sites, neighborhood income levels, or developments built with low-income housing tax credits. That capacity can facilitate contemporary planning initiatives, like the Obama administration’s Promise Zone or Choice Neighborhood programs, which require interagency collaboration and emphasize coordination of various types of investments in underserved areas.

PolicyMap also allows users to chart the effectiveness of particular programs over a period of time, helping them reap rewards or cut their losses down the road. Although government money is primarily doled out through formulas, there has been a marked increase in competitive grant programs that require progress reports and data that details evidence of needs. When it comes to competitive grants, according to Lincoln Institute President and CEO George W. McCarthy, “cities that have better data, and put together more polished proposals, are obviously going to have an advantage over those that don’t.”

The Starting Point

PolicyMap is the brainchild of The Reinvestment Fund (TRF), a Philadelphia-based Community Development Financial Institution (CDFI), which has $839 million in capital under management, and which invests in low-wealth people and neighborhoods. The organization finances a wide array of community building blocks, such as affordable housing developments, daycare centers, and grocery stores. PolicyMap was born out of TRF’s need to track how these community programs were working on the ground.

In the early 2000s, TRF began exploring ways to map and understand the impact of its own investments. “We were looking at where we were making investments over time,” says PolicyMap President Maggie McCullough, who was then a researcher with TRF’s Policy Department. “We also wanted to know what kind of impact we were making—how we had changed the markets in which we were working.”

In 2005, the state of Pennsylvania hired TRF to collect and map a vast amount of data on housing prices, foreclosures, and incomes. The project’s goal was to enable officials to think more strategically about how state money was being spent on housing throughout the state. But even with a contract worth almost $200,000, there were limitations to what TRF could do. The data and maps were trapped in a fixed format on a disk. “After we handed the disk over,” McCullough says, “I remember thinking that it was going to be like a paper report that sat on a shelf and was never going to get updated.”

That epiphany inspired McCullough and others at TRF to brainstorm on how to build a dynamic web-based mapping platform—one that would allow datasets to be refreshed and enable users to upload their own databases. In developing PolicyMap, McCullough was able to draw on her background as one of the pioneers in designing web portals for public information. In the 1990s, she was part of the team that built the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) initial web presence. “My experience [at] HUD made me realize that if people [other than] researchers needed or wanted to understand data, we had to make it easier to understand,” says McCullough. “We had to give data indicators common names and simple descriptions, just like we had to give HUD programs common names.”

McCullough wanted PolicyMap to serve the entire country, unlike other data initiatives that focused on local geographies. Upon PolicyMap’s launch in 2007, “there really wasn’t any online GIS,” McCullough explains. “You could get driving directions and find a local restaurant with Google Maps, but a lot of that GIS software was locked on desktops. We wanted to create something that the public could access simply, over the web.”

The first dataset that TRF loaded onto PolicyMap in 2007 was comprised of reports from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), the government’s most important data source for spotting predatory and discriminatory lending. At the time, the housing bubble was bursting, and officials from government and law enforcement were scrambling to get a grip on the burgeoning crisis; the HMDA data was one of the first places where they would look for information. But HMDA data wasn’t arranged in GIS user-friendly format, making certain types of searches extremely difficult. For example, if a researcher with a background in GIS wanted to zero in on a section of Detroit where she suspected there might have been a flood of high-cost loans, there was no online tool available to extract the HMDA data for that particular area.

PolicyMap’s initial success making data publicly available helped attract prominent paying customers—including the Federal Reserve Board in Washington, DC, which was in charge of collecting the HMDA data at the time. In addition to loading all of the HMDA data for mapping purposes and making it available to the general public, McCullough’s team custom-built a reporting tool within PolicyMap for the Fed that enabled its staffers to pull out HMDA data for any locale they wanted to study. Says McCullough, “We had made it easier for [The Fed] to access its own data.”

Leveling the Playing Field

Big lenders and real estate investors typically have in their toolkits subscriptions that can cost in the six figures for access to services that provide proprietary information such as property evaluation reports and in-depth market research. But many community-based organizations and local governments can’t afford to buy such licensed data. And even if they could afford expensive subscriptions, many community organizations and local governments lack the staffers or GIS capabilities to use it on interactive maps.

Take NeighborWorks, a national network of 240 community-based organizations that doesn’t have a GIS specialist on staff. Harry Segal, a performance and planning specialist at NeighborWorks America, says that PolicyMap has changed the equation for his network by giving them access to data and mapping tools that they couldn’t otherwise afford. “Any developer, public or private, trying to move into a new neighborhood has to court the powers that be and demonstrate an understanding of local market conditions,” Segal says. “It’s much more difficult for nonprofit organizations to compile this sort of data.” Without PolicyMap, he says, “the juice almost isn’t worth the squeeze.”

NeighborWorks’ PolicyMap subscription, which costs $5,000 per year, provides access to this kind of proprietary data and allows the organization’s members to query different sections of a map for information on a variety of indicators such as the average income of residents within a certain neighborhood and the level of high-cost mortgages that have been made there. This ability to look at different geographic scales empowers local community groups that are trying to access funding or call attention to predatory lending in their neighborhoods. “We have a couple of organizations in upstate New York. If you are looking at statistics on that region, they are going to be heavily skewed by New York City,” Segal says. “But with PolicyMap, we can pull up data by census tract or block group.”

Some city agencies also lack the capability to design or maintain the types of databases that they can now get through a PolicyMap subscription. “I am the only person here who has GIS capabilities,” says Sara Eaves, a planning and policy analyst for the San Antonio Housing Authority. She adds that PolicyMap allows many people in her office to perform tasks that would otherwise require specialized training. Through their PolicyMap subscription, the San Antonio Housing Authority also makes data publicly available about schools, residential vacancy rates, neighborhood income levels, and other information that a city resident might want to consider when deciding where to buy a house or rent an apartment. “We could maintain similar databases in-house, but we don’t have the resources. PolicyMap has allowed us to put interactive maps on our website, which is making the information available not just internally, but to the general public as well.”

Streamlining the Process for Cities and Community Groups

Many policy analysts use both full-blown GIS software, such as Esri, and the simplified GIS tools available on PolicyMap. Campbell from the Los Angeles Department of Housing + Community Development says that Esri offers the ability to do forecasts and run certain types of complex analyses that are not possible with PolicyMap. But she notes that PolicyMap saves her time and makes it easier to explain her research to laypeople. “I like PolicyMap because it is just based on facts and it is irrefutable,” she says, whereas Esri contains predictions about the future. “Sometimes, when you hand someone a community analysis report with Esri data, it may be too much information for them to digest. There will be 2005, 2010, and 2015 information. But for the 2020 information, there is a formula for how they created that forecast, which we may not need, and which may be wrong.”

PolicyMap is also flexible enough to respond to users’ changing needs. As data requirements have become larger and more complex, long-time PolicyMap customers have requested new tools to help improve efficiency. For instance, Melissa Long, the deputy director of Philadelphia’s Office of Housing and Community Development, had been using PolicyMap to display aggregated and cleaned-up census data. But several years ago, she realized that her agency needed more comprehensive analytic tools in order to apply for the increasing number of grants that are being awarded on a competitive basis.

“We needed a lot of neighborhood demographic information, and we needed to know what types of city programs were being deployed,” Long says, noting that having city data available on PolicyMap has improved the coordination among different city agencies and better positioned the city to apply for competitive grants.

Long says the tools that PolicyMap has developed for Philadelphia will enable the city to monitor its progress while implementing a Choice Neighborhoods Implementation Grant, which supports locally driven strategies to address struggling neighborhoods with distressed public or HUD-assisted housing. “The grant covers a five-year period. If we look and see that our neighborhood stabilization proposal is not working,” she says, “then we can make midterm grant corrections.”

Being able to map different types of data simultaneously also lets researchers chart the co-benefits from a particular investment. For example, two different programs in Philadelphia involve cleaning up and greening vacant lots. PolicyMap lets users see the lots rehabilitated by both programs simultaneously, and study whether they have improved the quality of life in surrounding neighborhoods. Philadelphia’s contract with PolicyMap has made it possible to overlay data from multiple studies—such as one from University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School that showed how real estate values rose 17 percent on average around the cleaned-up lots, and another that showed how gun crime dropped significantly in the areas around them. A third co-benefit is the several hundred summer jobs that are tied to keeping the rehabilitated lots in good shape. “You cannot just look at housing alone,” Long says. One has to consider “all the other things going on in a neighborhood.”

One of PolicyMap’s most popular analytic tools is the Market Value Analysis (MVA), which TRF developed for Philadelphia and has replicated in about 18 other cities. MVAs evaluate the strength of different areas of a city by looking at color-coded sections of a map that denote assigned values, which range from “Distressed” to “Regional Choice,” which is the highest rating. The rankings are established using a technique called Cluster Analysis, which evaluates census blocks based on groups of indicators, such as home sale activity, vacancy rates, and foreclosures. When you click on any section of the map, a table pops up to reveal the data that was used to determine the ranking for that specific area. The Regional Choice Neighborhoods, McCullough says, are generally defined by strong sales values, low vacancy rates, and a mixture of home owners and renters.

Those MVAs provide government agencies and nonprofits the information they need to address an area’s specific problems, says the Lincoln Institute’s McCarthy. “You want to get the best bang for your buck from public money,” he says. “In the really terrible neighborhoods, that might mean investing in large-scale demolition to accelerate the reuse of properties. In a transitional neighborhood, you might want to acquire abandoned homes and fix them up.”

The Road Ahead

The PolicyMap team often releases new indices and new tools right on the heels of court decisions and agency rulings This past July, for instance, McCullough and her team released the Racially and Ethnically Concentrated Areas of Poverty (RCAP/ECAP) index, which is used to identify U.S. Census tracts that have both a high proportion of nonwhite individuals and people living below the poverty line. McCullough says that her team anticipated the Supreme Court’s ruling in June on “disparate impacts” in housing practices and, several months earlier, had started developing the index to help individuals and organizations understand the issues related to the court’s decision. “The timing was great,” she says. “When [the Supreme Court decision] happened, we were ready to go.”

PolicyMap is still missing major data sets that McCullough would like to upload, to help researchers get a better picture on critical issues facing the country. For example, McCullough says that she has long wanted to incorporate national foreclosure data as part of PolicyMap’s efforts to track factors influencing home sale prices, but it’s difficult to find comprehensive and authoritative foreclosure data sets. Plus, it’s still prohibitively expensive to purchase licenses for the foreclosure data from private vendors. PolicyMap clients have also expressed interest in accessing credit scores—some of the most difficult data to obtain. “We couldn’t even get permission from the credit-score agencies to license the data,” McCullough says. “And if we were going to get it from them, it would be aggregated at a high geography, [like] at a statewide level.”

Meanwhile, PolicyMap will get one of its biggest-ever data resources this coming October, with the first segment of a project tentatively titled “State of the Nation’s Land,” subsidized by the Lincoln Institute. “State of the Nation’s Land” will include a collection of 18 huge databases from 150 different government agencies, covering criteria such as heavily polluted sites, public investments in land, flood zones, and zoning information.

The Lincoln Institute project is intended to help government agencies do their jobs better and provide average citizens with tools they can use to hold their elected officials more accountable. It should also shed more light on some our country’s most vexing problems, like the persistence of poverty in certain areas or reverse redlining, when minority consumers are targeted for loans on unfavorable terms. Ultimately, however—as with the discovery that the San Fernando Valley is in fact the most unaffordable place to live in the country relative to local residents’ income—we cannot even anticipate some of the most interesting facts and trends that will be unearthed in the future, as more researchers get savvy about navigating PolicyMap.

“Every time I get into PolicyMap, I start looking at new things,” says McCarthy. “There is a whole process of discovery that I go through, and it’s very illuminating.”

Alex Ulam is a journalist who focuses on architecture, landscape architecture, urban planning issues, and housing.

Land Reform and Property Markets in Russia

Leonid Limonov, Abril 1, 2002

St. Petersburg was the host city for an international conference on “Land Reform and the Emerging Property Market in Russia,” organized by the Leontief Centre for Social and Economic Research and the Lincoln Institute in May 2001. Experts from government agencies, commercial entities and academic institutions in Russia, the U.S. and Europe convened to assess the progress of Russian land reforms and discuss future implementation. The conference focused on two key points: the principal obstacles to be targeted by various land reform actions and the triggers that are needed to set a series of decisive steps in motion.

From an academic and historical perspective, the unfolding story of Russian land privatization is intellectually engaging and, from a practical point of view, the process and its implications have far-reaching implications for the Russian people. The Lincoln Institute’s interest in convening the conference and its continuing involvement in Russia allow us to learn from local experts, to share Institute experience and perspectives from other countries, and to provide support for ongoing land reform efforts. The conference revealed the need for professional training for Russians working in the emerging land market, and the Lincoln Institute and the Leontief Centre are developing curriculum and training courses to be offered in St. Petersburg later this year. For example, many private business owners now find themselves in the new role of property manager, and sometimes their land and buildings are a more valuable asset to the enterprise than the business itself. However, they lack knowledge and experience regarding property rights, leases, appraisal, zoning, regulation, planning and a range of other topics.

In the post-Soviet period, privatization of the real estate sector in Russia has been most advanced in its urban centers, and St. Petersburg was one of the first cities to start selling land plots occupied by either privatized (i.e., former state) or new businesses. Yet even there, by 2000 only about 5 percent of urban land had been privatized. The main problems with regard to the land market in Russia arise from the lack of clear definitions provided by Russian law; the failure of the law to develop fundamental provisions contained in the Russian Constitution regarding private ownership of land; and the consequent lack of firm guarantees for private property and inadequate protections through the courts. A brief history of land policies in Russia will help to provide a context for the current situation.

Land in Russian History

Land has been a central social and economic force throughout Russian history, although Russia has never had private ownership of land for any length of time or in any full sense of the term. Until the beginning of the twentieth century, state property was the predominant form of property ownership. Moreover, a considerable part of that property, including land, was unregistered and unconnected to the broader economy. It was only in 1906 that the Stolypin reforms began destroying the obshchina (the existing feudal-like peasant communities) as the main structure upon which allotment-based land use depended, while extending private land ownership through land tenure regulations, a peasants’ land bank and a resettlement policy. In this pre-Soviet period, Russia’s towns and cities experienced a growing market in urban land plots that were already built upon or earmarked for further development.

Following the revolutions of 1917, private ownership of land was abolished, civil transactions involving land were forbidden, and land was transferred to the use of all who worked on it. A 1918 decree abolished private ownership of real estate in cities and towns, and the process of nationalizing land was completed with the adoption of the Land Code of the Russian Socialist Federation of Soviet Republics in 1922. During the New Economic Policy (NEP) of the 1920s, land could be leased for periods of not more than six years (although subletting was not allowed) and tenants involved in working the land could use additional hired labor. However, by 1929 large-scale collectivization was under way, resulting in the creation of so-called cooperative-collective property. Leasing of land was abolished, and hiring labor on small peasant holdings was forbidden. Under socialism land was neither sold nor bought, and all land transactions were prosecutable under the law.

The situation today is reminiscent of that at the end of the nineteenth century, prior to the Stolypin reforms, when land law consisted of piecemeal legislation applying to ownership of different types of land. Private ownership of land was introduced in 1990 by the Constitution of the Russian Socialist Federation of Soviet Republics, beginning a gradual liquidation of the state monopoly on land ownership. The 1990 laws “Regarding Peasant Smallholdings” and “Regarding Land Reform” permitted citizens to hold in private ownership plots of land for use as smallholdings for horticultural purposes, the construction of houses and other personal uses. The terminology of these laws included “the right of use of land,” “life-long possession with the right to pass on as an inheritance,” “rent” and “property.” This wide variety of bases for property rights necessitated subsequent amendments of existing legislation, a development that was also stimulated by the collapse of the USSR.

Over the past decade, land relations continued to evolve. In December 1991 the president of the Russian Federation issued a decree and the Duma passed a resolution that allowed for the privatization of land in a two-step process. First the decree granted collective ownership of land and other assets to collective and soviet farms. Subsequently, shares of farms could be owned by the individuals who worked on them. Only at the end of 2001 was the right to own land, which is inseparable from the right to buy and sell land, ratified in Russia, and this right applied only to urban lands. However, the prohibition on the sale of agricultural land has no absolute force; laws introduced since 1991 permit the sale of land that is to be used as a private subsidiary smallholding for construction of a one-family residential building, or by members of stock-rearing and garage cooperatives.

According to a former minister for agriculture, there is a flourishing black market in land, which denies the general public access to information on the market values of land and negatively affects economic development. The absence of shared information on land market values means the absence of an objective criteria against which to measure land use efficiency. The extensive black market in leasing also deprives governmental budgets of property tax income since real estate cannot be properly taxed without accurate information on levels of ground rent. Under the current Civil Code of the Russian Federation (RF), land plots are considered to be objects of real estate and rights to these plots are categorized as property rights. The land privatization process was initiated in 1997 but then stalled because the RF government overruled buyout prices established by local administrations that were perceived as too low. The RF government indexed prices at a rate higher than locally established lease rates, thus undermining the transition to a private market in real estate. At the same time, under certain conditions (such as stable lease rates or minimal investment conditions), long-term leasing may turn out to be an acceptable substitute for title ownership. On the issue of real estate registration, the existing Russian system does not protect bona fide purchasers, nor does it provide adequate reimbursement when a purchaser’s title is contested. Furthermore, purchasers are normally unable to get a comprehensive review to determine whether their title is clear in the first place.

Obstacles to Land Reform

While the evolution of a private market in land is encumbered by history and politics, the participants at the St. Petersburg conference were interested in changes and adjustments in practice that land professionals might make to facilitate the transition. Zoning and surveying, as well as investment decisions, are among the areas where changes in practice might be made at the level of local government to address some of the following obstacles to land reform.

Slow implementation of legal zoning

Legal zoning, though mandatory according to the RF Urban Planning Code, is being introduced slowly in Russian cities. Some speakers attributed this situation to reluctant municipalities that cling to the “operative space” currently under their direct control, for fear of losing that land. Others maintained that key municipal officials have a number of more specific concerns: (1) their professional image and the stability of their administration depend on the actions they take to attract investment; (2) the arrival of new investors automatically expands the amount of “operative space;” and (3) the realization that even a perfect system of urban planning regulations will leave out a sufficient number of special cases that will have to be considered separately. Further, municipal officers are citizens, too, and they sincerely wish to raise more funds for their cities’ renovations. The problem is that their attention is too often distracted by more immediate economic and political challenges. Nevertheless, an increasing number of Russian cities are introducing legal zoning regulation systems, including Novgorod Veliky, Ufa, Kazan, Irkutsk, Khabarovsk, Tver, Chelyabinsk and Nizhni Novgorod. St. Petersburg’s recent practice of issuing “by-plot urban planning regulations” raised questions about whether or not they conform to the RF Urban Planning Code, which defines urban planning regulations as a set of requirements and restrictions applicable to zones, not to individual units or parcels. The practice of issuing plot-specific regulations was found dramatically inefficient for a number of reasons. First, it precludes making investment decisions from a representative sample of properties, since each property in the city is subject to different regulations. Second, it is more labor intensive than applying regulations to an entire zone. Finally, it is laden with higher developer risks, thus impairing the city’s overall investment profile. Participants from other cities noted that these delays in introducing zonal urban planning regulations evidently clashes with St. Petersburg’s image as the frontrunner of Russia’s reforms in legal and institutional real estate market development.

Inferior surveying

Many land-related problems in Russian cities stem from inferior surveying. Some plots are limited by the uncertainty of the parcel and/or building boundaries, and others suffer from poor siting. That is, many properties that are new to the market have no direct access to transport, communications, storm water collection systems, or other infrastructure networks. The result is a host of deficient properties that in turn inhibit the development of adjacent properties, and can bring down the value of an entire urban area. The conference discussions emphasized the importance (or even inevitability) of conducting an extensive urban land survey, which could provide more certainty to both investors and developers, reduce the time needed to prepare investment proposals, and help to expand property ownership.

Confusion over privatization of apartments

Most urban residents have not taken advantage of the recent privatization of apartments. Not only did this initiative fail to produce a new class of motivated and effective property owners capable of acting as responsible customers for housing maintenance agencies, but it created baffling new legal challenges as well. No one in St. Petersburg, where the privatization of apartments is most advanced, understands who (and on what legal basis) should be in charge of issuing permits to reconstruct general-purpose premises or reassign residential apartments for nonresidential use. As a result, apartment owners can exercise only a limited set of property rights, which in turn hampers the extension of the private real estate market. The conference participants discussed to what extent a law requiring apartment owners to purchase condominiums could help address the situation. Moreover, given an environment where apartment owners have limited experience with such ownership arrangements, discussion centered around whether economic stimulation or economic sanctions would be most successful in dealing with those who fail to meet their ownership obligations.

Investment in infrastructure

The complicated issues of engineering and infrastructure support for construction and renovation projects are evident in St. Petersburg. When determining title payments, the city takes into account the developer’s contributions to urban infrastructure development and actively mediates between the developer and the resource supplier. Provision of full, authentic and timely information is the principal factor behind the attractiveness of real estate investments, since this information allows for the quick and safe selection of investment opportunities. St. Petersburg has made progress in this direction, but its database will remain inadequate until the city fully adopts urban planning regulations (i.e., legal zoning), formulates clear heritage protection standards for its many historic properties, undertakes an overall land survey, allocates areas for municipal developments, and maps at least the contours of infrastructure networks.

Intergovernmental taxation systems

A reform of intergovernmental budget relations is necessary to improve the current taxation system. Most cities receive budget support from their oblasts (similar to U.S. states). Thus, they are not interested in reporting increased property tax revenues, because those revenues would then be subject to redistribution to the oblast. For example, to simplify its taxation system and stimulate investment in real estate, the city of Novgorod Veliky replaced its two-part land and property tax with a single real estate tax. For legal persons, as opposed to business establishments, the tax is charged on full title owners only. Despite a certain dip in the tax proceeds from the unified tax (compared to revenues from the former two taxes), the city’s overall tax revenues increased because of a higher profit-tax yield due to enhanced business activities.

Lessons from Russia and around the World

The RF government’s meetings and decisions on the notorious electric supply failures in the Far East and floods in Yakutia during the late spring of 2001 show that, unfortunately, only large-scale catastrophic events seem to be able to galvanize public administrators to change their old ways. One would like to believe that less destructive developments could stimulate action as well. For example, it would be worthwhile comparing investment activities in different Russian cities to see if such activity varies with the development levels of their local regulatory bases, the amount and types of information provided to developers, and the time required to develop project applications and the time it takes for local government bureaucrats to make project decisions. The case of recent German urban planning history is instructive to the situation in Russia. Beginning in 1990, the German system lost some of its characteristically strict reliance on municipal plans and initiatives for development and moved toward more reliance on private-sector initiatives. Now it is more common for private developers, rather than municipalities, to prepare detailed zoning plans, and then to purchase and develop the site. However, a direct borrowing of this German method is not recommended for Russian cities, since any system must take into account specific local challenges and cultural traditions. American participants had a similar view on the risks of borrowing planning methods from other countries. Although the general guidelines and principles may seem to be similar across countries or jurisdictions, local regulations, procedures and techniques can vary significantly due to different historical precedents and the specificity of current challenges. Some principles to consider include the following:

  • balancing of municipal and private interests;
  • minimization of risks by preliminary establishment of all major planning and regulatory requirements;
  • transparency and public discussion of planning and development decisions by the municipality;
  • accessibility and reliability of information;
  • minimization of costs involved with engineering services due to the monopoly that municipalities often hold on the provision of these services; and
  • creation of a mechanism for appealing administrative decisions.

This opinion was supported by Russian speakers who referred to urban planning regulations in Russia before 1917 or to the current situation that compels cities to illegally hide their revenue growth and thus evidently hamper economic development. In closing, H. James Brown, president of the Lincoln Institute, reminded the participants that it is important to build mutually acceptable decisions rather than to continue disputes and quests for the ultimate (and not always absolute) truth. He called on those present to listen to their opponents’ arguments in order to arrive at fruitful agreements, not to waste time and effort on trying to prove one’s own case.

Leonid Limonov is the research director of the Leontief Centre for Social and Economic Research in St. Petersburg.

References

Limonov, Leonid E., Nina Y. Oding and Tatyana V. Vlasova. 2000. Land Market Development in St. Petersburg: Conditions and Peculiarities. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy Working Paper. Malme, Jane H., and Joan M. Youngman. 2001. The Development of Property Taxation in Economies in Transition: Case Studies from Central and Eastern Europe. Washington, DC: World Bank Institute.

Italy in Transition

New Approaches to Planning
Francesca Leder, Março 1, 2000

The urban landscape typical of many small and medium-sized Italian cities is filled with historical richness but also with more recent incoherent and contradictory development patterns. As a result, planners are actively adopting new ideas and theories about urban planning and are studying policies and practices about open space from colleagues in other countries.

The concept of quality of life is a common theme in European planning programs seeking to improve the image and functionality of neighborhoods. This idea normally represents a complex set of values to describe socio-economic conditions, but it can also be a useful instrument to set policies, implement strategies, improve landscapes and preserve open spaces. As the quality of life in many Italian cities has improved over the past ten years, attention to the needs of urban settlements has shifted from the central historical districts to the peripheries. Smaller suburban and rural communities now are demanding better living conditions and enhanced local identity through broad-based citizen participation in urban planning and design projects.

England, France and the United States, in particular, provide inspiration to Italian planners and public officials concerned about how to better integrate urban planning and the natural landscape. The loss of what had been an important cultural tradition in Italy has resulted in a more simplified and standardized urban architectural language and a lack of consideration for open space as either a valuable natural resource or an opportunity for economic and cultural growth.

The European Union (EU) is also influencing important reforms in many aspects of governance and public administration. For example, Italy’s regions, which have long been the dominant level of local government, are managing their territories with more sophisticated planning techniques based on the principles of sustainable development. At the same time, recently passed national fiscal and land taxation reforms are helping the municipalities create new resources and policies for housing rehabilitation and for public services and infrastructure, such as schools, parks and sports facilities. For example, the Regional Government of Tuscany, through its 1995 Urban Planning and Development Act, has begun a number of institutional and administrative changes, including new planning tools and public grants that have encouraged urban regeneration projects and private-public partnerships to support their costs.

The Center for Urban Research (CRU) of the Department of Architecture at the University of Ferrara has been involved in many projects promoted by both the regional and the national governments. Most address both training programs for public officials and private professionals and initiatives to disseminate “best practices” in urban planning and land use. In the last few years, the Center has consulted with many municipalities, including Ferrara in the Emilia-Romagna region and Massa Marittima in Tuscany. While recognizing the different histories and needs of these two cities, the Center is helping their municipal authorities find new opportunities for economic and social development and for enhancing their quality of life.

Ferrara

Located between Venice and Bologna in the Po Valley close to the river delta, Ferrara currently has about 120,000 inhabitants. The city’s main development can be dated to the medieval period, but important transformations were introduced during the Renaissance by the Duke d’Este. Ferrara’s distinctive network of streets, squares, gardens and buildings owe their design to the Duke, who in 1492 implemented the so-called “Addizione Erculea,” which can be considered the first modern urban plan in Europe.

The basic traits of the urban fabric have not changed much since then. The historical center, enclosed inside a system of walls, is still well preserved, and bicycles and pedestrians still outnumber cars. During the winter the fog often softens the buildings, giving the city a magical appearance, and the pace of life slows down as in ancient times. Ferrara also has strong traditions with agriculture and water, including the Po River, the delta and lagoons along the coast, and the extensive network of drainage and irrigation canals.

The city’s beauty and sense of magic have influenced artists since the Renaissance, and Ferrara is home to one of the oldest and finest Italian universities, which is small but exerts an influential role in city life. At present, most jobs in the district are connected with government functions, education, research and design, medical services, agriculture-related industries and tourism. Ferrara’s relative isolation with respect to the Italian “grand tour” has enabled the city to develop balanced cultural tourism policies over the years.

The Barco, a public park designed for the Duke d’Este as a private hunting area, offers the city an interesting opportunity to link urban planning and open space development. This semi-rural landscape is enclosed by the town walls, the Po River and a large industrial petrol-chemical factory. Supported by a special regional grant for urban rehabilitation, CRU is beginning research and planning for this project, which will also involve private sector contributions to help realize this recreational and open space resource for the city.

Another important local government goal is to use the urban environment and surrounding landscape as elements to improve economic growth. The project involves extending the traditional idea of cultural tourism beyond the historic city to include a network of small rural communities. Visitors to Ferrara and the Po River Delta Park will thus have the opportunity to discover ancient villas, marvelous natural landscapes and archeological settlements, as well as inns, restaurants and other amenities throughout the region. At the same time, young people who do not want traditional jobs in farming and fishing will be able to find different employment opportunities and more reasons to stay in their towns. To accomplish this goal, the project is using a variety of planning strategies, including some EU measures that support economic regeneration through training courses and start-up enterprises.

Foreseeable constraints on the success of this project may come from some local residents who consider agriculture their only possible economic resource, a mentality strongly rooted in history. From the Renaissance until World War Two, people from other, poorer regions of Italy were brought to the Po valley to transform the wetlands into agricultural fields. Many of the original workers have become owners of small and mid-sized farms, and they fear the loss of their rights and traditions, even though the farm produce is of poor quality and it is very expensive to maintain flood controls over the fields. Winning the trust of both urban and rural residents is a challenge that will require collaboration to increase the quality of life of residents throughout the region.

Massa Marittima

Massa Marittima is a small city in Tuscany with a population of about 10,000, sixty percent of whom live in small outlying towns. It also is the capital of the Colline Metallifere (Metal Hills) district, where for almost four thousand years silver, copper, and iron mines have operated continuously. Mining started in the Bronze Age and continued throughout the Etruscan, Roman, and medieval eras, through the Siena domination and the Medici and Lorraine eras, until the present generation of large industrial corporations. Populonia, one of the most important Etruscan industrial centers, is twenty miles from Massa Marittima, and archeological remains are found near the steel center of Piombino.

The free commune of Massa Marittima passed the oldest known mining laws in the Western world at the beginning of the fourteenth century. The natural environment surrounding the city still bears the signs of this economic history. There are large forests, which once produced timber for the mines and fuel for the furnaces, and the countryside is only partially cultivated. A less attractive sign of this heritage are the highly polluting mine waste sites.

Massa Marittima experienced a severe economic and identity crisis when the last operating mine closed ten years ago. The local community was forced to make two major decisions. First, it had to change from being a specialized economy based on difficult but secure jobs and dependence on the mining company, along with a very protective welfare system, to becoming a diversified, dynamic and flexible economy where individual enterprise is central. Second, the residents had to accept tourism as the new main source of employment to take advantage of the most important local resources: the region’s cultural heritage and its natural environment.

As in the case of Ferrara, the relative isolation and the late emergence of a tourism-based economy helped Massa Marittima work out more balanced strategies and policies for its future. In this case the opportunity was offered by the national ministries of Heritage and Environmental Policies to develop a national park for the Colline Metallifere district. The Massa Marittima city government asked the CRU to research this program using national and EU plans and grants. The core concept is an open-air museum of local history, which could help preserve the natural environment and also create new jobs for the young people, who have few employment alternatives.

One of the most important tasks in managing the new national park is to create a regional network of economic activities, facilities and public services related to both cultural tourism and the concept of environmentally sustainable development, based on EU economic measures. By sharing these resources, the towns can reduce local competition and maximize the benefits to all residents. The core of the CRU’s proposal is to create new opportunities for cooperation among different levels of public administration and public-private partnerships to promote and finance projects of public interest, such as infrastructure, sports facilities, urban and rural parks, and other resources. A final decision on a national grant to fund the Massa Marittima project is expected in March from the Ministry of Public Works.

These two case studies represent the kinds of complex planning problems that are on the agendas of many local governments throughout Italy. Learning from the best practices and examples of other countries is one of the methods that Italian planners and researchers are using to implement innovative approaches to planning the future of Italy’s historic landscape.

____________ Francesca Leder is professor of urban theories in the Department of Architecture at the University of Ferrara. She was a visiting fellow of the Lincoln Institute during the fall of 1999 to study American planning practices regarding urban parks and open space.

La recuperación de plusvalías ‘socialmente creadas’ en Colombia

William A. Doebele, Julho 1, 1998

Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 4 del libro Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.

El 18 de julio de 1997 el Congreso de la República de Colombia aprobó una innovadora Ley de Desarrollo Territorial con objetivos ambiciosos que permiten que los municipios y distritos recuperen el valor de la tierra creado socialmente, es decir, las plusvalías. Específicamente, la Ley 388 establece que los ciudadanos tienen derecho a “participar” en el aumento del valor de la tierra cuando el marco legal que regula su uso aumenta el potencial de desarrollo. Se distinguen tres categorías de acción urbanística:

  1. cambio en la clasificación, de tierra rural (en la que el desarrollo está sumamente limitado) a tierra para expansión urbana o suburbana;
  2. modificación de la zonificación u otras regulaciones del uso de la tierra;
  3. modificación de las regulaciones que permiten un mayor aprovechamiento de la tierra.

Para expresarlo de forma breve, la legislación estipula que el precio del metro cuadrado de tierra se calculará antes y después de cualquier acción urbanística. Cualquier municipio, por iniciativa del alcalde, podrá exigir su “participación” y así podrá recuperar entre el 30 y el 50 por ciento (según lo decida el mismo municipio) de la plusvalía generada. El precio se determina multiplicando los dos precios en metros cuadrados por el área de cada predio individual en cuestión y restando el precio antes de la acción urbanística del nuevo precio de referencia. Se fijó una tasa máxima del 50 por ciento para garantizar que siguiera habiendo motivación financiera para los promotores inmobiliarios.

Con esta legislación, Colombia ha dado fuerza de ley nacional a la premisa fundamental de los postulados de Henry George, quien sostenía que los ciudadanos tienen el derecho moral de recuperar el valor creado socialmente, como se evidencia en este caso con el aumento del precio de la tierra generado por las tres categorías de acción urbanística mencionadas anteriormente. Tal vez con la única excepción de Taiwán, pocos países, por no decir ningún otro, han intentado incorporar de manera tan directa los principios de George en una ley verdadera de carácter nacional.

Procedimientos para la aplicación

La legislación actual es apenas el primer paso. Según las prácticas colombianas, el Congreso actúa para trazar las políticas generales, pero su aplicación depende del seguimiento que se haga en el nivel ejecutivo nacional y en el nivel municipal. Para hacer el peritazgo crítico por metro cuadrado anterior y posterior a la acción urbanística con la mayor objetividad posible, una entidad independiente llamada Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi llevará a cabo los avalúos de acuerdo a las directrices establecidas en la ley para cada una de las tres categorías.

Las tasas (denominadas participaciones en la ley) deben pagarse cuando el propietario solicita una licencia de urbanización o construcción, cuando cambia el uso del inmueble, cuando hay transferencia del dominio sobre el inmueble o cuando se adquieren títulos valores (representativos de los derechos adicionales de desarrollo y construcción). Estas tasas deben quedar asentadas en el registro de escrituras de propiedades para garantizar el cumplimiento del pago, y el dominio del inmueble no podrá ser transferido en dicho registro hasta que se paguen las tasas mediante alguna de estas modalidades de pago:

  1. en dinero efectivo;
  2. por transferencia a una entidad pública de una porción del predio con valor equivalente al monto de la participación;
  3. por canje de predios de valor equivalente localizados en otras zonas urbanas;
  4. haciendo socia a una entidad pública en la ejecución del proyecto con un interés social equivalente a la participación;
  5. mediante la ejecución de obras de infraestructura o áreas de recreación de valor equivalente; o
  6. mediante la cesión de una parte, de valor equivalente, de los derechos de desarrollo derivados de la acción urbanística.

Es de esperar que la mayoría de los promotores privados preferirá asociarse con los municipios en lugar de pagar dinero efectivo. De hecho, la legislación prevé a manera de incentivo un descuento del 10 por ciento sobre el monto de la participación al utilizar la modalidad (6) y un descuento del 5 por ciento al utilizar las modalidades (2) y (4).

Los municipios y distritos deben destinar los recursos provenientes de las participaciones en las plusvalías para fines específicos:

  • compra de predios o inmuebles para viviendas de “interés social”;
  • obras de infraestructura en las áreas donde el desarrollo sea inadecuado;
  • ampliación de la red de espacio público urbano;
  • financiamiento del sistema de transporte masivo;
  • ejecución de macroproyectos urbanos o programas de renovación urbana;
  • pago de los costos de expropiación de inmuebles para programas de renovación urbana; o
  • fomento de la conservación del patrimonio histórico.

Posibles repercusiones de la ley

Esta legislación aborda muchos aspectos de las políticas de la tierra que por mucho tiempo han sido de interés para el Instituto Lincoln. Martim Smolka, director del Programa para América Latina y el Caribe del Instituto y otras instituciones asociadas realizan seminarios y programas de capacitación con el propósito de compartir las experiencias adquiridas durante los procedimientos de implementación, posiblemente brindar asistencia en los proyectos piloto y seguir la evolución del experimento colombiano.

Uno de estos programas fue un taller de tres días impartido en marzo y copatrocinado por la Universidad Nacional de Colombia y la Escuela Superior de Administración Pública de Bogotá. El taller comprendía las observaciones formales e informales de un amplio espectro de partes interesadas en el tema, tanto de Colombia como de otros países. Puesto que es obvio que Colombia ha dado un paso atrevido y existen pocos precedentes que sirvan de orientación, los funcionarios públicos responsables de la implementación deben actuar de manera innovadora. En el taller se identificaba un número de posibles complicaciones que pueden presentarse a medida que avanza la implementación.

Aspectos constitucionales: La nueva ley se fundamenta inequívocamente en el artículo 82 de la Constitución de Colombia de 1991, que en sí mismo es un documento sumamente novedoso en muchos aspectos de la reforma de políticas de tierra urbanas. Para expresarlo de forma sencilla, el artículo 82 establece que cuando las acciones urbanísticas aumentan el potencial de desarrollo de la tierra, los ciudadanos tienen el derecho de participar en la plusvalía generada por tales acciones, de manera que se sufrague y distribuya equitativamente el costo del desarrollo urbano.

El debate legal y constitucional tiene dos facetas: 1) ¿Pueden los municipios actuar con base únicamente en la ley o deben esperar hasta que el gobierno nacional decrete “regulaciones” para luego ceñirse a ellas por completo? y 2) ¿debe la ley limitarse a establecer los principios generales comunes, dado que la Constitución de 1991 confiere la responsabilidad de los impuestos territoriales exclusivamente a los municipios?

Efectos prácticos de la sindéresis municipal: En el taller también se señaló que la naturaleza voluntaria de la ley puede tener consecuencias negativas y posiblemente imprevistas. Puesto que es el alcalde de cada municipio quien da inicio a la tasación de la “participación”, puede verse sometido a una presión considerable, tanto financiera como de otra índole. En áreas de rápido desarrollo, una tasa entre el 30 y el 50 por ciento del incremento en el valor de la propiedad puede ser una suma altísima. Un vocero, por ejemplo, aseguró que en Cali el 60 por ciento de las plusvalías generadas por las decisiones de planificación equivalían al monto total del presupuesto municipal. Por otra parte, la ley puede facilitar negociaciones y asociaciones de beneficio mutuo entre los municipios y los promotores inmobiliarios, las cuales no ocurren en este momento.

Cuidado del electorado: El ambiente político que produjo esta valiente legislación abarcaba casos escandalosos de fortunas repentinas que surgieron a raíz del cambio de zonificación en Bogotá y de la decisión de extender el perímetro urbano de Cali. En este último caso, se dijo que el precio de la tierra llegó a multiplicarse, ¡más de mil veces!

Además de la implementación inicial, se plantea la cuestión sempiterna de mantener un electorado que permita la efectiva implementación de dicha ley de cara a la resistencia poderosa y bien financiada que oponen los terratenientes y promotores inmobiliarios privados. Por otra parte, la habilidad de cualquier gobierno nacional que haya aprobado una ley de este tipo es de por sí un logro que despierta interés especial en aquellos que consideran la “recuperación de plusvalías” como un elemento esencial de la política de desarrollo urbano.

Objetividad de los avalúos: A pesar de los procedimientos tan específicos estipulados en la ley con la finalidad de lograr la mayor objetividad y transparencia posibles, no será fácil para el Instituto Codazzi cumplir a cabalidad con el avalúo previo y posterior a la acción urbanística dadas las limitaciones de tiempo que establece la ley. Más aún, las distintas alternativas de transferencia para el pago de las tasas con dinero efectivo, que seguramente gozarán de mayor popularidad, dependen de la apreciación local que se haga de lo que se considera “valor equivalente”. Varios oradores señalaron que este proceso podría ser una invitación a la corrupción.

Aspectos técnicos: Los oradores también hicieron mención a un número de problemas de avalúo técnico con las directrices establecidas en la ley. Por ejemplo, si la zonificación restrictiva hace que un propietario pierda valor de su propiedad, y esto a su vez aumenta el valor de un propietario adyacente, ¿qué disposición puede estipularse para proteger al primer propietario sin dejar de recuperar la plusvalía del segundo? Es más, puesto que el mercado anticipa la acción urbanística, ¿se reflejará ya en el avalúo “previo” el aumento de valor que provoca la probabilidad de la acción? O, si las regulaciones del uso de la tierra o de la construcción aumentan el valor de los propietarios de bajos ingresos con predios o inmuebles pequeños, es posible que éstos no cuenten con el dinero efectivo necesario para pagar las tasas por desarrollo, y a pequeña escala tampoco serían viables las otras modalidades de pago. Esto podría traer como resultado ventas forzadas o el desplazamiento de los habitantes pobres. Estos asuntos plantean un reto para la viabilidad de la política: ¿Es mejor seguir adelante y resolver las dificultades a medida que se presenten o intentar una modificación legislativa de los problemas técnicos antes de proseguir?

Efectos económicos: Aunque legalmente se describe como participación pública en el aumento del valor que generan las acciones urbanísticas, la legislación también puede ser considerada como una forma de impuesto a las ganancias de capital. ¿Con qué frecuencia se aplicará? ¿La implementación tenderá a bajar los precios de las tierras afectadas o será el consumidor final el que absorba los cambios en el valor? Si ocurre esto último, la ley podría tener un efecto negativo sobre las viviendas de precio asequible. Por esta razón el artículo 83 (4) exonera del cobro de la participación a los inmuebles destinados a “viviendas de interés social”, según la definición que de esto hace el gobierno nacional. ¿Se convertirá esto en una ruta de escape para la evasión masiva? Existe poca experiencia internacional para responder estas interrogantes.

Planes de ordenamiento territorial: La Ley 388 de 1997 también estipula que todos los municipios y distritos deben elaborar planes de ordenamiento y proporciona descripciones bastante detalladas de dichos planes en los artículos 9 al 35. Sin duda la planificación altera las expectativas de los propietarios y, por ende, el valor de los inmuebles. La interacción administrativa y económica del proceso de planificación de la ciudad y la recuperación de las plusvalías seguramente será un asunto complejo.

Conflictos en los objetivos: Como suele suceder con los instrumentos fiscales, los nuevos cambios buscan alcanzar varios objetivos que no siempre son compatibles: financiar un mejor desarrollo urbano, reducir la especulación inmobiliaria, darle mayor equidad y carácter progresivo a la tributación y cerrar algunas de las vías predilectas para la corrupción de los funcionarios municipales.

Aprendizaje mediante la innovación

Pese a estas inquietudes, Colombia continúa la tradición de ser una de las naciones más innovadoras del mundo en el campo de la planificación de desarrollo urbano, legislación y finanzas. Bogotá fue la primera ciudad importante del mundo en crear un distrito de zonificación especial que reconocía las realidades de las prácticas de vivienda para sectores de ingresos menores. Con el estímulo producido por las ideas y la influencia del fallecido Lachlin Currie, asesor económico del gobierno nacional durante aproximadamente 30 años, la ciudad utilizó distritos de avalúo especial (llamados contribuciones de valoración) para llevar a cabo una transformación física de envergadura en los años 1960. Las leyes colombianas sobre el desarrollo territorial de 1989 y 1991, modificadas y ampliadas por esta ley de 1997, se encuentran entre los enfoques más integrales de la planificación urbana desde la ley británica para el control del desarrollo urbano promulgada en 1947 (British Town and Country Planning Act of 1947). Asimismo, la constitución colombiana prácticamente es única en mencionar el derecho moral que tienen los ciudadanos a las plusvalías generadas por las acciones urbanísticas.

Como cabría esperarse, algunas de estas innovaciones a la larga no llenarán las expectativas iniciales. De hecho, algunos participantes del taller sostenían que los esfuerzos invertidos en la recuperación de la plusvalía podrían ser de mayor utilidad en el mejoramiento de la eficacia de los impuestos a la propiedad convencionales. Por otra parte, la nueva ley está abordando y resolviendo algunos problemas causados por legislaciones y políticas anteriores, y el país está aprendiendo de esta experiencia. La conclusión de los participantes en el taller fue que el proceso bien ha valido la pena y que la nueva ley debe entenderse y evaluarse comparándola con otros instrumentos para la recuperación de plusvalías establecidos anteriormente y la política fiscal en general.

William A. Doebele es profesor emérito de planificación urbana y diseño en la Escuela de Postrado en Diseño de la Universidad de Harvard y miembro asociado del cuerpo docente del Instituto Lincoln. La preparación de este artículo contó con las valiosas colaboraciones de Martim Smolka, miembro superior de los programas para América Latina, Fernando Rojas, docente invitado del Instituto, y Fernanda Furtado, asociada del cuerpo docente y de investigación del Instituto.