In recent years, politicians, lobbyists and voters in the United States have often seemed polarized—or paralyzed—over where to draw the line between private and public rights in land. Common property, defined as group- or community-owned private property, straddles that line.

Most recognized common property is in natural resources, and most recognized commoners are rural people in developing countries. But the concept of commons might also apply to some aspects of urban land in the United States. At the least, common property theory may help U.S. policymakers understand more clearly what is at stake in debates about land rights.

At Voices from the Commons, the June 1996 conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property in Berkeley, California, the Lincoln Institute assembled a dozen researchers and practitioners from the U.S. to discuss these new forms of commons, some of which are described in this article:

• land trusts and limited-equity cooperatives
• incidental open spaces
• housing, including group homes, gated or common-interest developments and
• the use of urban public property by the homeless
• converted military bases

Property Rights and Land Use Strategies

Economist Daniel Bromley and legal scholar Carol Rose have proposed independent but roughly compatible schemes for classifying property regimes. Bromley focuses on the form of land rights, while Rose focuses on management strategies:

PROPERTY IN LAND

Bromley Rose

1. private property rights

2. state keep out

3. nonproperty do nothing

4. common property right way

Option 1 on each of these lists is classically private property. The owner’s rights are exclusive, and the owner decides what to do with the land. Option 2 is often associated with public land, in the sense that government owns it and decides what, if anything, can be done and who can do it on the land. Option 3 is the situation often lamented as “the tragedy of the commons,” in which the land is owned by no one, and everyone therefore has both access and incentives to abuse it. Despite the “tragedy of the commons” language, this option is better described as “open access,” “unowned” or “nonproperty.” Option 4 is most often associated with common property, defined as private property owned and managed in a specific “right” way by a group of people.

There is not a perfect correspondence between Rose’s strategies and Bromley’s categories. “Keep out” as a strategy may apply to either private or group-owned property as well as public lands–wherever the main strategy is to restrict access to a defined group, or to no one. The “right way” strategy may apply to “nonproperty” as well as commons–if anyone, and not just members of a specific group, can use the resource simply by following the prescribed rules of use.

Nevertheless, putting Bromley’s and Rose’s lists side-by-side suggests that the distinguishing feature of common property may be assigning land both to a specific group of people and to prescribed uses.

Most urban land in the United States is defined as either private or public property. Yet such land may be more like common property than is usually recognized. Zoning and environmental regulations, for example, do not allow private landowners to do anything and everything with “their” land. Instead, for example, the private owners of land next to a river may not be permitted to install underground oil storage tanks. Those aspects of land use that affect the community’s quality of life or shared environment are managed almost like common property.

What Makes a Successful Commons?

Elinor Ostrom has identified two prerequisites for successful common property regimes: the system must face significant environmental uncertainty, and there must be social stability in the group of owners/users. As Ostrom puts it, commoners must have “shared a past and expect to share a future.” They must be capable not just of “short-term maximization but long-term reflection about joint outcomes.”

Environmental instability gives commoners an incentive to share risks. Social stability allows or forces them to preserve resources for future generations. For example, in many Alpine villages, herds are private property but summer pastures are common property. To avoid overgrazing and free-riding, individual farmers cannot graze more sheep and goats on the summer pastures than they can feed privately over the winter. Access to the summer pastures helps to guarantee all families, whatever their private resources, a chance to earn a living.

Environmental instability and social stability are usually associated with rural places. Rural landowners face the random risks of droughts, floods and plagues, and are known–accurately or inaccurately–for their sense of community.

Do these requirements exist in the urban United States? Perhaps. Environmental instability is easy enough to find, if “environment” is defined as social and economic as well as physical. For many inner-city residents, depopulation, gentrification, or plant and base closings are just as random and devastating as floods or plagues. The social stability of these neighborhoods may be largely involuntary, created by economic and racial barriers to mobility. But some community activists also see human knowledge, social relationships and the land itself in such places as “social capital,” which can be mobilized for development through new forms of ownership.

Pros and Cons of Common Property

Most scholars who have written about common property have seen commoners as political and economic underdogs. A classic example is villagers defending their traditional forest grazing grounds against timber companies or government foresters who want to prohibit grazing to protect tree seedlings or prevent erosion. But commoners may also be prosperous or even highly privileged. For example, many private or gated “common interest” communities attempt to wall in high home values and wall out social and economic diversity.

Commoners are by definition conservative. To preserve their shared resources, they must exclude or expel anyone not willing to follow their land use rules. They must also keep the individuals who make the most productive or profitable use of the common property from taking their share of the proceeds and “cashing out” of the system. Although less comforting than the stereotype of downtrodden commoners who share and share alike, exclusionary commons may still be preferable to either privatization or state control.

But in practice, both these options may speed up resource exhaustion. Private owners may extract the maximum cash value from their land as quickly as possible, rather than preserve resources for their own or anyone else’s future use. “Keep out” signs may not keep local people from extracting resources unsustainably from government lands–in fact, hostility toward a distant government may encourage such behavior.

Economist William Fischel has applied this implicit comparison to U.S. local governments’ primary dependence on land-based (property) taxes. He sees all residents in a jurisdiction as commoners who share an interest in maximizing local land values. Fischel argues that California’s Proposition 13 was exactly the equivalent of turning a village commons into a national park. By restricting local property taxes and giving state government a stronger role in school funding, Proposition 13 transferred “ownership” of the schools from face-to-face communities to a distant government.

From the local taxpayers’ vantage point, this upward transfer of responsibility changed their schools from a local “commons,” with strong norms about the “right way” to finance and use education, into state property, which local residents almost saw as nonproperty. As a result, the quality of California schools was leveled across local jurisdictions, but it was leveled down rather than up. Education was exhausted rather than managed sustainably.

New Commons

A few experimental forms of land ownership and management in the U.S.–including land trusts, neighborhood-managed parks, community-supported agriculture and limited-equity housing cooperatives–explicitly avoid the extremes of private or public property. All these “new” forms of common property fit Carol Rose’s description of option 4: “right way.” All aim to foster or protect specific land uses or groups of users.

These experiments with property rights and responsibilities raise questions that few researchers, either on urban development or on common property, have yet addressed. When and how should local policymakers support experiments with “common property”? For example, should local and state officials help to remove regulatory barriers to group ownership of land, or support new criteria for mortgage financing of group-owned land?

There are also long-standing legal objections to “perpetuities”–trying to tie the hands of future owners about how to use their land. To avoid these objections, land trusts must sometimes seek special legal exemptions, or even change state property laws. The long-term costs and benefits of common property experiments, however, may depend less on the initial distribution of land rights than on shifting local politics and economic conditions. Finding answers to these questions will require close collaboration between researchers and practitioners.

Sidebars

Land Trusts and Limited-Equity Cooperatives

Much of land’s market value depends on whether it contains important natural resources, is located in a thriving community, or has access to services and infrastructure provided by government. The nineteenth-century American philosopher Henry George argued that all these values were created by something other than private action, and should therefore be captured for public use through taxation.

In recent years, land trusts and other groups have experimented with distributing the costs and benefits of land development in much the same way as proposed by Henry George, but through new forms of land ownership rather than taxation. Some of these experiments include limited-equity cooperatives and land trusts such as Boston’s Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative. The Dudley Street project has made the land in an inner-city redevelopment area the common property of a nonprofit group, while allowing private ownership of homes and other buildings.

Using similar arguments, groups such as the Connecticut-based Equity Trust have dedicated the “social increment” in property values–the increase in land prices as a neighborhood recovers from blight, or a small town grows–to social purposes. For example, the portion of a home’s sale price that is due to the increase in land values rather than housing construction costs is used to subsidize the purchase price for the next homeowner.

Incidental Open Spaces

Vacant lots, old cemeteries and partially buried urban streams raise a host of questions about managing urban landscapes as commons. Groups seeking to reclaim or use such incidental urban open spaces must often persuade private owners to let them use and help to maintain the land. Some geographers and planners have remapped cities’ neglected, and in practice often “unowned,” open spaces.

Groups such as the Waterways Restoration Institute in Berkeley, California, have built on this research to help low-income city residents uncover and restore forgotten streams and their banks, turning them from neighborhood eyesores into neighborhood treasures. The process increases residents’ appreciation of the interdependence between the city and nature, which they often think of as exclusively suburban or rural.

Housing

For the elderly, single-parent households and many low-income families, detached single-family housing is either inappropriate or priced beyond reach. Yet traditional land use regulations, grounded partly in concerns about property values, favor only single-family housing. Advocates of privatization, in the U.S. as well as in developing or transitioning economies, often argue for converting common property into private ownership to promote reinvestment or increase property values. Organizations serving the homeless, such as San Francisco’s HomeBase, are seeing this argument applied even to traditionally public spaces such as doorways, parks and bus benches. To discourage the homeless from occupying these spaces, some local businesses and neighbors support regulations that convert them into quasi-private property.

Yet in all these settings, some researchers and practitioners have also proposed to manage the housing stock as a whole as a form of common property, both to meet needs not met by single-family detached housing and to encourage neighborhood reinvestment. In the U.S., researchers such as Cornell’s Patricia Pollak have examined the sources of opposition to, and the consequences of, converting some single-family homes into group quarters, accessory apartments and elder cottages. Many home and business owners who oppose these land uses in interviews, expecting them to depress property values, are ironically unaware that their neighborhoods already contain some of this alternative housing.

Converted Military Bases

For each base closed, the federal government offers planning funds to a single organization. That organization must represent the entire local community affected by the base closing, from public to private interests and across local political jurisdictions. Researchers such as the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Bernard Frieden are now studying the way that communities around these bases, which often include very diverse interests, are being forced to create at least temporary “commons” structures to receive federal grants.

Few bases have been all the way through the conversion process yet, so it remains to be seen whether these temporary structures will be converted for permanent land ownership or management. In the Oakland-San Francisco area, however, the Earth Island Institute’s Carl Anthony and others on the East Bay Conversion and Reinvestment Commission consciously considered long-term group or community ownership of some base lands as a way to meet regional needs for housing, open space and jobs.

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Alice E. Ingerson, director of publications at the Lincoln Institute, earned her Ph.D. in cultural anthropology, for research on the politics of rural industrialization in Portugal. She moderated the session “Is There an Urban Commons in the U.S.?” at the 1996 Voices from the Commons conference in California.

References

Steve Barton and Carol Silverman, Common Interest Communities: Private Governments and the Public Interest (Berkeley, CA: Institute of Governmental Studies Press, 1994).

Daniel Bromley, Environment and Economy: Property Rights and Public Policy (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, Inc., 1991).

William A. Fischel, Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics, and Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).

Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

Carol M. Rose, “Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for Common Resources,” Duke Law Journal 1991, no. 1 (February 1991), pp. 1-38.

Lawrence Susskind is the Ford Professor of Urban and Environmental Planning at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and president of the Consensus Building Institute, in Cambridge, Massachusetts. He graduated from Columbia University and received his Masters of City Planning and his Ph.D. in Urban Planning from MIT. As current head of the Environmental Policy Group in MIT’s School of Architecture and Planning, he teaches courses on international environmental treaty negotiation, public sector dispute resolution and environmental planning. He also holds a joint appointment at Harvard University as visiting professor of Law and director of the Public Disputes Program at the interuniversity Program on Negotiation, which he helped to found. Susskind has published many books and reports and held many visiting appointments and guest lectureships. He is a faculty associate of the Lincoln Institute.

Land Lines: How did you become interested in land use mediation?

Lawrence Susskind: Land use planners are supposed to ensure that the public is involved in all growth management decisions. Yet, most efforts to ensure such public participation lead to protracted political battles. Within the planning profession it is not clear how competing conceptions of appropriate land uses ought to be reconciled. Since the early 1970s I have been trying to introduce the concept of mediation as well as other conflict management tools into the lexicon of professional planners. In my view, in the absence of consensus building strategies of some kind, most communities are doomed to use resources inefficiently, unfairly and unwisely. I got interested in land use mediation as a way of helping the planning profession do a better job.

LL: What types of land use disputes are most difficult to resolve?

LS: Land use disputes that revolve around values or identity are the most difficult to resolve. When values (as opposed to economic interests) are at stake, people often feel that their identity is threatened and in such situations they are rarely open to considering the views of others. For example, proposed changes in land use that would eliminate agriculture as a way of life are not likely to be accepted, even if financial compensation is offered to the landowners involved.

LL: When did you start collaborating with the Lincoln Institute?

LS: My ties to the Lincoln Institute go back a long time. When Arlo Woolery was executive director in the late 1970s, we worked together on a multiyear effort to analyze the impacts of the Property Tax Limitation Law (Proposition 2 1/2) in Massachusetts and on the state’s Growth Policy Development Act. Two decades later, in 1997, I began working with Rosalind Greenstein and later Armando Carbonell, co-chairs of the Institute’s Department of Planning and Development, on a series of research projects that evolved into the training programs on land use mediation that we (LILP and CBI) currently offer together.

LL: Explain a little more about CBI.

LS: The Consensus Building Institute is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1993 to provide consensus building services to clients involved in complex disputes. Building on the “mutual gains” approach to negotiation developed at the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School, CBI offers conflict management assistance, negotiation training, dispute system design services and evaluative research to public agencies, corporate clients and nongovernmental agencies on five continents.

Our staff now includes a dozen full-time professionals, mostly based in Cambridge, and a network of more than 30 experienced affiliates around the world. We have become known as expert public and environmental dispute mediators and have helped to resolve complex disputes related to the siting of controversial facilities, the setting of public health and safety standards, the formulation and implementation of development plans and projects, and conflicts among racial and ethnic groups.

LL: When did the joint Lincoln and CBI training programs begin?

LS: After several years of careful analysis of land use mediation efforts throughout the United States, CBI developed a curriculum with Lincoln Institute for public officials and planners, and that course has been offered since 1999 at a number of locations. During the first few years we offered only a basic course designed to familiarize participants with assisted negotiation as a method to resolve land use disputes, and then we expanded our offerings to include more detailed skill building for experienced mediators and practitioners. Today we offer a full range of courses at multiple locations around the country.

LL: Who are the primary participants in these introductory and advanced courses?

LS: We are trying to reach three different audiences. First, we have identified and invited local elected and appointed officials who preside over land development disputes and administer land use regulatory systems at the local, regional and state levels. They need to know that there are techniques they can use to help resolve land use disputes before they escalate.

Second, we are trying to attract real estate developers and their attorneys so they know how to participate effectively in dispute resolution efforts when they are offered or suggested by public officials. Third, we have a special interest in attracting professionals of all kinds who want to learn how to be better facilitators, particularly of multiparty land use dialogues that involve complex technical dilemmas.

LL: What are the key goals and lessons of these programs?

LS: The introductory course offers a quick overview of the reasons that land use disputes seem to escalate so quickly and often end up in court. We then introduce the basic principles and tools of dispute resolution and show how they can head off such escalation. They are presented in a very interactive way using gaming and simulations. Participants are given a number of hands-on opportunities to apply what they are learning in hypothetical situations and to bring their own cases before the group. We spend some time talking about techniques for overcoming resistance to the use of mediation and other consensus building strategies.

The advanced course is aimed at experienced mediators or planners and lawyers who think they might want to become mediators. It assumes that the participants have mastered the material presented in the introductory course and moves to a set of dilemmas at the next level, including methods of handling science-intensive disputes through the use of joint fact finding. We also review key theoretical debates, such as managing unequal power relationships in a mediation context.

LL: How do you incorporate both theory and practice into the curriculum?

LS: We expect many of the participants to bring their own stories about land use disputes in which they have been intimately involved. We model in real time how the theory we are teaching can be applied in their cases. We also try to ground all of our theoretical presentations in detailed case accounts of actual practice. Finally, as mentioned above, we use role playing simulations. Students can’t just sit back and take notes. They have to wrestle with the application of the ideas we are presenting.

LL: What other projects have you undertaken with the Institute?

LS: About a year ago, in May 2004, I joined Institute President Jim Brown at a Lincoln-sponsored seminar in Cuba on the problems of restoring and redeveloping Havana Harbor. Energy production and inadequate attention to pollution control have spoiled one of the most beautiful harbors in this hemisphere. Some of the many different committees and groups concerned with economic development, environmental cleanup, restoration of the harbor ecology, historic preservation of Old Havana, and enhanced tourism are seeking advice on strategies for balancing these (sometimes) competing objectives.

CBI is beginning to develop a new joint course with the Lincoln Institute and some of its partners involved in local economic development efforts around the country. We believe conflict resolution tools and negotiation skills can be of great use in neighborhood development disputes, not just growth management conflicts in the suburbs. With Roz Greenstein CBI is creating a new set of training programs for community-based organizations that we plan to offer for the first time next summer.

Another new initiative is a collaborative Web site that highlights recent research by the Lincoln Institute and CBI, as well as timely news articles, background material on consensus building, and links to related programs and publications. One section of the site will provide an interactive platform that will permit hundreds of alumni of our joint courses to remain in touch with each other and share their mediation experiences. This “virtual learning community” will be a valuable resource for public- and private-sector stakeholders involved in land use disputes (even if they haven’t taken the course).

LL: What is the outlook for future joint programs?

LS: I believe our ongoing CBI–Lincoln Institute partnership holds incredible promise. We have conducted an Institute-sponsored study on the use of consensus building to resolve land reform disputes in Latin America and hope to expand on that work, as well as to address land issues facing China and the newly independent states of Eastern Europe. The Institute is already involved in research and training programs in these regions, and land use disputes are at the core of many of the challenges facing national and local policy makers.

The Lincoln Institute is an ideal partner for CBI. We both care about applied research, theory building and sharing new knowledge through educational programs of all kinds. We both measure our success in terms of real improvements on the ground, and we share interests in both domestic and international arenas.

A large share of national energy consumption takes place in cities—in the United States about three-quarters of energy use is in or related to urban areas. Accordingly, cities offer significant opportunities for energy savings from increased efficiency, but important issues remain: Will market forces produce efficiency gains when appropriate, or will market failures such as imperfect information, unavailable financing, or misunderstood risks impede market solutions? How much do people value energy savings, and how sensitive are they to changes in energy prices? The Lincoln Institute hosted a conference on energy efficiency and cities in October 2012 to address these and related issues, and a few highlights follow.

Valuing Energy Efficiency

Consumers should be willing to pay more for built space that uses less energy. Evidence indicates that users of commercial space value energy efficiency and are willing to pay more for it, and many studies indicate that LEED-certified office and commercial space sells or rents at a premium over traditional space. There is much less evidence of such preferences for residences, in part because it is difficult for most homebuyers to determine the energy efficiency of a dwelling, especially a new one with no operating record.

Some residential developments are now being classified using procedures similar to LEED certification or to the Energy Star ratings such as those used for major appliances. Dwellings in California that have the highest energy efficiency ratings sell at a premium of about 9 percent above units with average energy efficiency. Similar price premiums have been observed in the Netherlands for houses certified at the highest efficiency level using a European certification procedure. Some of these premiums may reflect the improved comfort levels that these buildings provide in addition to energy savings. It also seems likely that the energy efficiency premium observed in California is up to three times greater than the incremental cost of the higher efficiency of these dwellings.

Determining Cost

The cost of integrating energy efficiency into new buildings is less than the cost of improving the efficiency of older buildings. A home built since 2000 uses about 25 percent less energy per square foot than one built in the 1960s or earlier. The technical potential for improved energy efficiency in older homes seems evident, but homeowners face two challenges: to determine which improvements have the highest payoff per dollar spent, and to obtain a contractor and financing for the work.

While many diagnostic tools are available to assess existing dwellings, their accuracy varies widely and depends critically on detailed inputs about both the dwelling’s attributes and the household’s living style. Obtaining a contractor and financing can involve high transaction costs for households in effort, time, and money. Many utility companies are offering both technical and financial support for energy retrofitting, but progress has been slow.

Changing Energy Consumption

It may be easier to change residential living styles than to retrofit old buildings, and many utilities are experimenting with schemes to modify household behavior. The most common program involves “nudging” households toward more efficient habits by providing periodic home energy reports that compare their recent energy use with that of their neighbors. Analysis indicates that these reports have both a short-term impact on household energy consumption and a longer-term cumulative impact that continues after the reports end. The energy savings from these programs are small, ranging from a half to one kilowatt hour per day for a household, but the program’s low cost makes the results as cost-effective as many other policies.

Recognizing John Quigley

This conference was designed with John Quigley, economics professor at the University of California at Berkeley, who passed away before the conference took place. In addition to the original papers on energy and cities, papers on urban economics were presented by some of his former students, colleagues, and coauthors. All of the papers will be submitted for a forthcoming special edition of Regional Science and Urban Economics, which will recognize his contributions over a long and distinguished career.

El desarrollo humano se ilustra, por lo general, como una guerra entre los objetivos contradictorios de la individualidad y la adecuación. Hacemos todo lo posible por distinguirnos del rebaño, pero nos aterramos ante la perspectiva del aislamiento social. Nuestras ciencias sociales, en especial la economía, presentan conflictos similares. El culto al individuo es un ícono social dominante, y esta dominancia se ve exacerbada por el auge del fundamentalismo económico: la fe incuestionable en los mercados no regulados y la desconfianza concomitante hacia el gobierno y los sistemas sociales. Tomando como punto de partida el concepto de “la mano invisible” de Adam Smith, muchos economistas construyeron sus carreras en la concepción de teorías cuyo fundamento era el individualismo metodológico, la idea de que “los fenómenos sociales deben explicarse como resultado de las acciones individuales, que, a su vez, deben explicarse en referencia a los estados intencionales que motivan a los actores individuales”, según lo expresa la Enciclopedia de Filosofía de Stanford. Estos teóricos preconizaban, de forma unánime, que el hecho de tener individuos y mercados sin restricciones era la mejor manera de lograr los objetivos compartidos de prosperidad y justicia, a la vez que promovían (o evitaban) las políticas públicas respaldadas por este punto de vista.

Simultáneamente, otros economistas de la corriente prevaleciente han advertido de la “paradoja del aislamiento”, una categoría de casos en los que los individuos, actuando en un relativo aislamiento y guiados únicamente por sus propios intereses a corto plazo, generan resultados que, a largo plazo, son destructivos para todos. Algunos ejemplos de esta teoría incluyen las pesadillas del maltusianismo sobre hambre y pestes que detienen el crecimiento de la población, el dilema del prisionero o la tragedia de los comunes (descrita por Garrett Hardin en su ensayo de 1968). Hardin advirtió de los peligros del crecimiento de la población utilizando una parábola sobre la explotación no administrada de tierras de pastoreo de uso común. La inevitable utilización desmedida de las tierras de pastoreo por parte de cada uno de los pastores que desean aumentar su ganado destruiría las tierras, convirtiéndolas en terrenos inútiles para todos. Según Hardin y otros pensadores, la solución radica en alguna forma de acotamiento de las tierras comunes, ya sea mediante la privatización o la propiedad pública, con el fin de establecer mecanismos de coerción que garantice que los individuos se comporten de tal manera que protejan el interés común.

Afortunadamente, la mayoría de los seres humanos no está de acuerdo con la teoría económica y, en lugar de ello, desarrollan sus propias maneras de conciliar estas contradicciones entre la individualidad y la adecuación. Ciertos intelectuales conocidos a nivel público, como Elinor Ostrom, la ganadora del Premio Nobel de Economía en 2009 (y la única mujer que obtuvo este galardón), han ampliado nuestros conocimientos respecto a las formas en que intentamos mediar entre estas dos tendencias tan humanas. Lo hacemos a través de las instituciones, descritas como grupos de seres humanos que se organizan voluntariamente para aprovechar los beneficios del esfuerzo individual, a la vez que evitan los inconvenientes provocados por individuos aislados que actúan sin control. Según Ostrom y otros pensadores, los diferentes tipos de acuerdos institucionales (organizaciones formales, normas de trabajo, políticas públicas, para nombrar sólo algunos) surgen orgánicamente para evitar que se produzcan situaciones indeseadas, tales como la tragedia de los comunes. En este número de Land Lines, presentamos las historias de algunas de estas decisiones institucionales que se tomaron para protegernos de nosotros mismos o crear beneficios mutuos. En nuestra entrevista a Summer Waters, del Sonoran Institute (pág. 34), aprendemos acerca de los esfuerzos realizados para promover la economía y proteger la ecología en la cuenca hidrográfica del río Colorado y para reintroducir el flujo de agua dulce en el delta del río.

Recién hemos comenzado a estudiar los sistemas que surgen orgánicamente para administrar los recursos comunes, pero aún sabemos mucho menos sobre la manera de crear dichos recursos. Y esto puede deberse a nuestra tendencia a tratar los recursos comunes como si fueran maná, es decir, como si vinieran del cielo, y no creados por la mano humana. No obstante, según informa Tony Hiss (pág. 26), miles de personas se han unido voluntariamente para crear nuevos recursos comunes: cientos de miles de hectáreas de tierra conservadas para proteger grandes ecosistemas, salvar el hábitat de especies en peligro de extinción, brindar espacios verdes a los habitantes de zonas urbanas muy densas y alcanzar muchos otros objetivos a largo plazo. Desde el punto de vista de los economistas ortodoxos, el mundo se ha vuelto loco. No sólo los individuos que antes actuaban aisladamente ahora lo hacen con el fin de evitar la tragedia de los comunes sino que también están tomando medidas para crear nuevos recursos comunes.

La educación pública es otro de los recursos comunes creados por el hombre, como lo son la mayoría de los bienes públicos. Nos organizamos y autoimponemos tributos para sustentar esta institución de capital importancia y, con el tiempo, debemos revisar las formas como la administramos y mantenemos, al igual que con cualquier otro recurso común. En este número de Land Lines, Daphne Kenyon y Andy Reschovsky ofrecen una mirada a los diferentes tipos de análisis de los desafíos que enfrentan las ciudades para financiar sus escuelas, así como también algunas ideas para abordar dichos problemas (pág. 39). Además, en el artículo sobre las estrategias de las instituciones “ancla” de Beth Dever y otros (pág. 4) también examinamos de qué manera las universidades y los hospitales pueden trabajar junto con los barrios y ciudades a fin de lograr objetivos de colaboración que los beneficie mutuamente.

Para algunos economistas, la creación de nuevos recursos comunes resulta una imposibilidad teórica. En su primer libro, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (La lógica de la acción colectiva: Los bienes públicos y la teoría de grupos), Mancur Olson propuso la hipótesis de que las personas soportarán las complicaciones derivadas de actuar conjuntamente sólo si existe un incentivo privado suficiente; además, ningún gran grupo de personas llevará a cabo medidas colectivas a menos que se vea motivado por una ganancia personal significativa (ya sea económica, social o de otro tipo). Evidentemente, se ha producido una colisión entre la teoría y la práctica, y el impacto de la misma es muy profundo y lo seguirá siendo. Tal como señala Hiss en su ensayo sobre conservación de grandes paisajes: “Lo primero que crece no es, necesariamente, el tamaño de la propiedad a proteger, sino la posibilidad de tomar medidas, algunas grandes y otras pequeñas, para marcar una diferencia perdurable en el futuro de la biósfera y sus habitantes, entre ellos la humanidad”.

Sin embargo, esto no termina aquí. En los Estados Unidos, bastión del mercado libre, unos 65 millones de ciudadanos pertenecen a comunidades con un interés común, tales como condominios y comunidades de propietarios, según señala Gerry Korngold (pág. 16). Un 25 por ciento de la nación ha limitado voluntariamente su propia autonomía con el fin de proteger y preservar los intereses comunes. Tal como subraya Korngold, este hecho no hubiera sorprendido a Alexis de Tocqueville, quien describió a los Estados Unidos como “una nación de personas que se agrupan”. En su obra Democracy in America (La democracia en América), de 1831, Tocqueville escribió: “Muchas veces he admirado la gran habilidad con la que los habitantes de los Estados Unidos logran proponerse un objetivo común al esfuerzo de muchos hombres y, como resultado, hacer que dichos hombres se alisten voluntariamente a su concreción”. Tal vez sea el momento de organizar un culto a la acción colectiva para celebrar las cosas increíbles que podemos hacer cuando trabajamos juntos. Es posible que descubramos que las políticas, prácticas, organizaciones e instituciones que creamos con el fin de mediar en nuestra guerra interna entre la individualidad y la adecuación han contribuido más al avance de la humanidad que los logros individuales que solemos celebrar.

Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 2 del libro Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.

En países subdesarrollados, la mayoría de los programas y propuestas de gestión urbana han requerido adoptar un criterio de orientación social a los derechos de propiedad, lo que garantiza una intervención estatal de amplio alcance sobre el control del uso y desarrollo del suelo. Ése es el caso particular de los programas de regularización del suelo.

Sin embargo, la adopción generalizada de políticas de liberalización y esquemas de privatización ha promovido una interpretación individualista y tradicional de los derechos de propiedad, que dificulta los intentos progresivos de disciplinar el uso y el desarrollo de la propiedad urbana.

Se trata de una paradoja aparente que revela la brecha entre una definición más progresiva de los derechos de propiedad y la tendencia actual en pro de la privatización. ¿Son estas tendencias mutuamente exclusivas, o pueden conciliarse hasta cierto punto?

Estas preguntas fueron el tema central de dos talleres de trabajo que tuvieron lugar en Johannesburgo (República Sudafricana) a finales de julio, dirigidos a legisladores, gestores urbanos y académicos. El Sexto Taller de Trabajo de “Legislación y Espacio Urbano” fue patrocinado conjuntamente por el Grupo Internacional de Investigación sobre Legislación y Espacio Urbano (IRGLUS) y el Centro de Estudios Jurídicos Aplicados (CALS) de la Universidad de Witwatersrand. El Instituto Lincoln contribuyó a la realización de este taller y también patrocinó un seminario sobre seguridad de tenencia del suelo en la República Sudafricana, los países subsaharianos, Brasil y la India.

Marco de trabajo conceptual para la legislación y el espacio urbano

IRGLUS, un grupo de trabajo del Comité de Investigación en Sociología Jurídica de la Asociación Sociológica Internacional (ISA), se propone organizar debates sobre la dimensión jurídica del proceso de urbanización, con la idea de promover ese diálogo tan necesario entre los estudios jurídicos y los estudios ambientales urbanos. La mayoría de los estudios urbanos han reducido el aspecto legal —incluidas las estipulaciones jurídicas, las decisiones judiciales y la cultura jurídica en general— a su dimensión instrumental: una corriente rechaza la ley como si fuera nada más que un simple instrumento político de discriminación social y exclusión política, mientras que otra la da por hecho, como si se tratara de un simple instrumento técnico que puede brindar soluciones fáciles e inmediatas a los crecientes problemas urbanos y ambientales.

Para expertos y profesionales urbanos, no están claras las razones de las crecientes prácticas ilegales identificadas en zonas urbanas, particularmente las que se refieren al uso y desarrollo del suelo. Según los datos existentes, si se toman en cuenta los patrones de acceso al suelo y de construcción, pareciera que entre el 40 y el 70 por ciento de la población de las principales ciudades de los países subdesarrollados está, de uno u otro modo, al margen de la ley, y ese número no está limitado a la población de bajos recursos.

Muy pocos estudios se han preguntado el porqué de este fenómeno de ilegalidad urbana, por qué importa y qué puede hacerse. Los observadores, en general, no han podido visualizar la aparente división que hay entre las llamadas ciudades “legales” e “ilegales” como una intrincada red de relaciones muy cercanas y al mismo tiempo contradictorias entre las reglas oficiales y las no oficiales, y entre los mercados formales e informales de los suelos urbanos.

En la mayoría de los países subdesarrollados, la inexistencia de una política habitacional eficaz, en combinación con fuerzas comerciales descontroladas, despoja de soluciones habitacionales adecuadas a la vasta mayoría de la población urbana. Lejos de ser un fenómeno restringido a los pobres urbanos, la ilegalidad urbana necesita atención urgente, dadas sus graves consecuencias sociales, políticas, económicas y ambientales para la sociedad y la estructura urbana como un todo.

Sin embargo, si bien la ilegalidad urbana es un reflejo de la poderosa combinación de los mercados del suelo y los sistemas políticos, también es resultado del sistema jurídico elitista y de exclusión que impera en los países subdesarrollados. La combinación de instrumentos jurídicos que no reflejan las realidades sociales que afectan el acceso a la vivienda y al suelo urbano, junto con la falta de leyes adecuadas, ha tenido un efecto sumamente nocivo y agravante, si no determinante, del proceso de segregación socioespacial.

Definiciones de los derechos de propiedad

Uno de los mayores problemas de la gestión urbana es la falta de soporte del sistema jurídico vigente para las políticas ambientales urbanas. Ciertamente existen provisiones retóricas, pero las provisiones básicas del sistema —especialmente las de naturaleza constitucional— no ofrecen apoyo jurídico alguno a dichas políticas. En este contexto, el punto central de atención es el de los derechos de propiedad, específicamente de inmuebles urbanos. En muchos países, las políticas urbanas con sesgo progresivo y social que amplían la acción estatal suelen estar reñidas con la definición constitucional de los derechos de propiedad.

En varias ponencias del taller del trabajo de IRGLUS/CALS se habló de cómo el abordaje tradicional a los derechos de propiedad individuales, imperante en muchos países subdesarrollados y típico del liberalismo clásico, ha favorecido intercambios económicos que han menoscabado la función social de la propiedad. Muchos intentos importantes para promover el uso y control del suelo, incluso la protección jurídica del ambiente y la herencia histórico-cultural, se han visto mermados por acciones que reducen fuertemente la intervención estatal en el dominio de los derechos de propiedad individuales. En repetidas ocasiones, los intentos para promover la regularización del suelo han enfrentado la oposición de terratenientes y tribunales conservadores, incluso en situaciones en que la ocupación del suelo ya había estado consolidada durante largo tiempo.

Mientras que la retención excesiva y especulativa del suelo urbano privado ha contado con un beneplácito tácito, la tan esperada ejecución de una política habitacional social eficaz ha sido más difícil debido a la necesidad de indemnizar a los propietarios de tierras vacantes a los precios del mercado. En muchos países, el sistema de derechos de propiedad individuales heredado de la época de la colonia no suele considerar los valores habituales tradicionales en la definición de los derechos de propiedad. Dado que dichos países han fallado considerablemente en reformar los cimientos del liberalismo jurídico-político, la discusión del llamado neoliberalismo no tiene sentido en este contexto.

Los participantes del taller de trabajo hicieron énfasis especial en las condiciones jurídico-políticas para que se reconozca la seguridad de la tenencia. Se hizo notar que agentes tan diversos como movimientos sociales, organizaciones no gubernamentales y de finanzas internacionales han planteado cada vez más argumentos diferentes, si bien complementarios, de tipo humanitario, ético, sociopolítico y, más recientemente, económico para justificar la necesidad de adoptar políticas públicas en esta materia. También es necesario adoptar argumentos jurídicos, entre ellos las viejas provisiones de la ley internacional y los principios fundamentales del estado de derecho referente a los derechos de vivienda y los derechos humanos, de forma de abrir paso a una nueva interpretación de los derechos de propiedad que tenga sesgo social y ambiental.

Gran parte de la discusión se centró en determinar si la seguridad de tenencia puede sólo y/o necesariamente alcanzarse al reconocer los derechos de propiedad individuales. En este sentido, el análisis de varios casos sugirió que la mera atribución de los derechos de propiedad no lleva por sí sola a la meta principal de la mayoría de los programas de regularización, o sea, a la completa integración de las zonas y comunidades ilegales al marco más amplio de la sociedad y estructura urbana. El consenso general fue que debe considerarse una amplia gama de opciones jurídico-políticas, desde la transferencia de propiedades individuales a algunas formas de tenencia absoluta y/o control de alquileres, hasta formas novedosas (aún sin explorar) de propiedad colectiva u ocupación con varios grados de control estatal.

Se argumentó que el reconocimiento de los derechos de tenencia del suelo urbano debe ocurrir dentro de un marco más amplio, integrado y multi-sectoral de planificación de la ciudad y del uso del suelo, y no como una política aislada, a fin de evitar distorsiones en el mercado del suelo que conduzcan al desalojo de los ocupantes tradicionales. Ejemplos de casos de estudios en Brasil, la India y la República Sudafricana han demostrado que, sea cual sea la solución adoptada en un caso particular, sólo funcionará bien si es resultado de un proceso de decisión democrático y transparente que incorpore eficazmente a las comunidades afectadas.

Por encima de todo, se aceptó que es necesario promover la redefinición de los derechos de propiedad, y de allí, el reconocimiento de la seguridad de tenencia, dentro de un contexto más amplio que concilie la reforma urbana con la reforma legislativa. La reforma legislativa es función directa de las autoridades urbanas. Requiere nuevas estrategias de gestión urbana basadas en nuevas relaciones entre el Estado (especialmente a nivel municipal) y la sociedad; relaciones intergubernamentales renovadas; y la adopción de nuevas formas de sociedad entre los sectores público y privado dentro de un marco de trabajo jurídico-político claramente definido.

La reforma legislativa requiere renovar el proceso general de toma de decisiones a fin de combinar mecanismos tradicionales de democracia representativa y nuevas formas de participación directa. En los últimos años, muchas municipalidades de varios países han introducido nuevos mecanismos que fomentan la participación de la población urbana en varias etapas de los procesos de decisión que afectan la gestión urbana. A nivel ejecutivo se observan ejemplos tales como la creación de comités, comisiones, etc., mientras que a nivel legislativo figuran los referendos populares, el reconocimiento de iniciativas individuales y/o colectivas en los procesos de legislación, como también la formulación de enmiendas populares a proyectos de ley. Una de las experiencias más interesantes y promisorias ha sido el “presupuesto participativo” adoptado en varias ciudades brasileñas, que permite la participación de organizaciones comunitarias en la elaboración de los presupuestos municipales.

Para finalizar, no podemos seguir haciendo caso omiso a la necesidad de promover reformas jurídicas y revisiones judiciales globales, especialmente aquéllas que incentiven el reconocimiento de derechos colectivos, amplíen el acceso colectivo a los tribunales y garanticen el cumplimiento de la ley. Países como la India y Brasil ya han incorporado una cierta noción de los derechos colectivos en sus sistemas jurídicos, habilitando la defensa judicial de los llamados “intereses difusos” en materias ambientales y urbanas por ciudadanos y organizaciones no gubernamentales.

En otras palabras, la reforma urbana y el reconocimiento de la seguridad de la tenencia no son cosas que van a conseguirse solamente a través de la ley, sino también a través de un proceso político que apoye el tan aclamado “derecho a la ciudad” como noción política y jurídica. Una función muy importante de este proceso deben ejercerla agentes diversos como abogados, jueces y fiscales del gobierno. No obstante, para poder garantizar la promulgación de leyes con sesgo social, y más importante, su cumplimiento, es imperativa la acción colectiva de organizaciones no gubernamentales, movimientos sociales, organizaciones nacionales e internacionales, y ciudadanos que formen o no parte del entramado estatal.

Si es cierto que vivimos en tiempos democráticos, la época de los derechos tiene también que ser la del cumplimiento de los derechos, especialmente de los derechos colectivos. Sólo a través de procesos participativos podrá la ley convertirse en un escenario político importante para promover la integración espacial, la justicia social y el desarrollo sostenible.

Sobre el autor

Edésio Fernandes es abogado y fellow de investigación del Institute of Commonwealth Studies de la Universidad de Londres. Es coordinador de IRGLUS (Grupo Internacional de Investigación sobre Legislación y Espacio Urbano), y coeditor (junto con Ann Varley) de Illegal Cities: Law and Urban Change in Developing Countries (Zed Books, Londres y Nueva York, 1998).

Water companies and the communities they serve have been grappling for years with complex issues of water treatment and provision, watershed management, public finance and control over regional land use decisionmaking. The federal Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974 prompted water providers across America to face a dilemma: “to filter or not to filter.” Some states or regions require filtration to ensure water quality, but elsewhere communities explore alternative strategies to both protect natural filtration processes in their watersheds and avoid the enormous costs of installing water treatment plants.

The hard-fought conversion of the New Haven Water Company from a private, investor-owned company to a public regional water authority provides an informative case study of a partnership strategy. In the process of hammering out agreements on difficult land use and tax issues, the city and surrounding suburbs succeeded in breaking down conventional barriers and recognized that regional solutions can meet shared needs for a safe water supply, open space protection, recreation and fiscal responsibility.

The drama unfolded in 1974, when the Water Company attempted to sell over 60 percent of its 26,000 acres of land in 17 metropolitan area towns to generate capital for filtration plant construction. The announcement of this massive land sale created vehement opposition throughout the state. Residents of the affected towns viewed the largely undeveloped land as an integral part of their community character. They feared losing control of the land as well as environmental damage and increased costs associated with potential new development.

Several New Haven area legislators recognized the critical link between the city and its watershed communities. They introduced legislation imposing a moratorium on the land sale and proposing public ownership of the water works. New Haven Mayor Frank Logue countered with an announcement that the city planned to buy the water company under a purchase option in a 1902 contract. The suburban towns responded by promoting regional ownership as the only viable alternative to city control.

After a lengthy feasibility study, and despite a gubernatorial veto, legislation enabling the creation of the South Central Connecticut Regional Water Authority (RWA) was enacted in 1977. In addition, separate legislation classified all utility-owned watershed land and severely restricted its sale. The sale restrictions combined with standards for source protection, provisions for public recreation and consideration of the financial impact on ratepayers, also diminished the land’s market value, thereby limiting the Water Company’s ability to use the land as a source of capital.

Regionalization of the Water Company also required a regional approach to taxation. This was the most difficult obstacle to overcome in passing the RWA enabling legislation. With New Haven Water Company’s projected capital investments in excess of $100 million, the region’s towns had looked ahead to vastly increased tax revenues from the private utility. However, New Haven, with the majority of consumers, was more concerned with keeping water rates low.

The conflict between city and suburbs was resolved through the principle that the regionalization of the water utility would cause no erosion of the tax base. Under the agreement, each town would receive payments in lieu of taxes (PILOTs) on all property acquired by the RWA, equivalent to the taxes that would be paid by a private owner. However, while these payments would rise and fall with future assessments, the RWA would not be required to make such tax-substitution payments for any new capital improvements.

Lessons of Regional Resource Sharing

In addition to forcing a reconsideration of the balance between suburban tax bases and urban water rates, New Haven’s Regional Water Authority has broadened its own mission. While protecting the water supply is the primary focus of all RWA land use policies, the authority also manages recreational use of the land to meet the needs of both inner city and suburban residents.

The early success of the conservation and recreational use plans depended on public participation in formulating the RWA Land Use Plan. Many types of active recreation would have been unsuitable for water supply land, but it was determined that hiking and fishing, the two most popular activities, could be conducted without threatening water quality.

The RWA’s active program for policing the watersheds was reinforced by establishing a center to educate future consumers on water supply protection. Located at the base of the dam at Lake Whitney, the Whitney Water Center annually teaches thousands of children the basics of drinking water science. It emphasizes the interdependence of source protection and safe drinking water.

Primary among the lessons to be learned from the New Haven Water Company’s ill-advised land sale proposal is that the value of a water supply watershed as a natural and human resource is far greater than its value as a market commodity. Management of the watershed’s natural resource potential must extend beyond the collection and distribution of water to include the needs of the people who live within the watershed. At the same time, limiting watershed land activities to low-risk uses minimizes the water treatment costs that are still necessary for safe drinking water.

Regional cooperation need not begin and end with water. Developing economic and ecological partnerships between cities and their suburbs for tax-sharing, recreation, and education recognizes that the economic and ecological concerns of all residents in a metropolitan region are interdependent. Successfully bucking the trend toward privatization, the RWA demonstrates that regional resource sharing is the most viable way of meeting the needs of New Haven and its suburbs.

Watershed Protection vs. Filtration in Other Regions

The public acquisition of the New Haven Water Company in the 1970s provided a preview of 1990s approaches to managing water resources. Today, water supply management is increasingly becoming watershed management, with plans reflecting the broader ecological functions of watersheds and the importance of partnerships with local residents. Conflict resolution has become an essential skill for today’s watershed managers.

Watershed land acquisition continues to be a key filtration avoidance strategy in many areas. New York City has the nation’s largest unfiltered water supply, and some experts have called on the city to develop programs to filter its drinking water. However, New York Governor George E. Pataki has taken the position he would “do whatever it takes to avoid filtration,” from working with farmers and businesses on mutually beneficial voluntary programs to buying up to 80,000 acres from willing sellers to protect the water supply.

New Jersey Governor Christine Todd Whitman has committed to a “hands across the border” $10 million contribution toward purchasing the New York portion of the two-state metropolitan watershed in Sterling Forest, which is threatened with commercial recreational and housing development. The nonprofit Trust for Public Land and the Open Space Institute are negotiating the purchase on behalf of both states, and recent congressional action has guaranteed funding for the project.

In central Massachusetts, the Metropolitan District Commission’s Quabbin Reservoir has met the Safe Drinking Water Act’s criteria as an unfiltered water supply source for the Boston area, but the MDC’s Wachusett Reservoir has not. A recently approved $399 million state open space bond includes funds for land acquisition in the Wachusett watershed.

Acknowledging the essential function that undeveloped land serves in preventing contaminants from reaching water supplies is long overdue. But is watershed source protection alone a viable alternative to filtration?

In North Carolina, where all surface water supplies are already filtered, state legislation requires local water authorities to develop watershed land use plans that must be approved by the state. Although such legislation can reduce the health risks of watershed development and the cost of water treatment, it cannot prevent future development.

Our conclusion is that the combination of watershed protection and filtration is a proven, cost effective approach to ensure safe drinking water while also building partnerships to implement regional land use policies.

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Dorothy S. McCluskey was a Connecticut State Representative from 1975 to 1982 and chaired the Environment Subcommittee on the Sale of Water Company Land. She subsequently served as director of government relations for The Nature Conservancy Connecticut Chapter. Claire C. Bennitt, secretary-treasurer of the Regional Water Authority since 1977, was a resident of North Branford when the threatened land sale galvanized the New Haven region. She worked with Rep. McCluskey as her administrative assistant in the state legislature. They have written Who Wants to Buy a Water Company: From Private to Public Control in New Haven, to be published in early 1997 by Rutledge Books, Inc., of Bethel, Connecticut.

In recent decades conservation easements—promises to restrict land development—have become enormously popular, but now they are in trouble. News reports have created concern that some easements are little more than tax avoidance schemes with no public benefit. In response, the IRS has stepped up audits, and some members of Congress want to curtail deductions for easements, or even eliminate them altogether.

Neither approach is desirable. Tax laws governing easements are so vague that the IRS seldom prevails against abusive appraisals. The meat-axe approach, meanwhile, would eliminate many beneficial easements yet fail to address serious, long-term problems. Fortunately, there are better answers. A set of simple reforms would ensure public accountability in easement creation, appraisal, and enforcement.

Few anticipated today’s problems when Congress enacted tax benefits for easements in 1980. Then conservation easements were relatively rare. But today there are more than 1,500 local and regional land trusts holding almost 18,000 easements—double the number of five years ago—covering over five million acres. And that doesn’t count thousands of easements held by federal, state, and local governments and by national organizations such as The Nature Conservancy and the American Farmland Trust. The public investment in direct expenditures and in tax deductions is difficult to estimate, but clearly substantial.

Despite this, most states have no standards governing the content of conservation easements. Nobody even knows where all the easements are, let alone their price in lost tax revenue and enforcement costs. Virtually no state ensures that land trusts have the capacity to manage the easements they hold. Few land trusts have the funds to enforce or defend just one easement in court, and challenges are certain to mount as land passes to new owners, economic incentives to develop property grow, and land subject to easements is subdivided.

Almost no states have measures to protect the public interest when land trusts—many created in the last two decades—dissolve, as some inevitably will, or when landowners attempt to terminate or amend existing easements. A recent survey by the Land Trust Alliance, a voluntary standard-setting organization, found that an overwhelming majority of land trust representatives fear that the easements they hold may not withstand the test of time.

The remedy must begin with transparency. Every state should have a comprehensive public registry of easements, and opportunity for public comment on how proposed easements fit overall developmental policies and priorities. Individual appraisals should be public and subject to closer scrutiny. It also would help to standardize easement terms. Their great variability complicates efforts to value them and to determine whether they merit their public subsidy. States should spell out procedures enforcing easements when land trusts fail, and for ensuring a public voice when landowners or easement holders seek to terminate or amend easements. That’s only fair. Conservation easements are financed with public money to achieve a public interest in the long-term preservation of open space. Failure to protect this defeats the very purpose of using public resources to create them in the first place.

These changes may not be politically popular. Some will object to increasing the role of government, and others will protest that transparency may discourage landowners from donating easements. Fortunately, these fears already have been put to an empirical test. Massachusetts has led the nation with a system of mandatory public review and approval of conservation easements at both the state and local levels for nearly four decades. Far from stifling the easement movement, government supervision has strengthened it. In fact, the Bay State has more conservation easements than almost any other state. With easements under close scrutiny in the media and losing support in Congress, this approach offers a model for reform.

For more background and analysis on this topic, see the recently published Lincoln Institute report, Reinventing Conservation Easements: A Critical Examination and Ideas for Reform>/I>, by Jeff Pidot, http://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/pub-detail.asp?id=1051.

Despite the challenges of overhauling existing policies and implementing a bold agenda for infrastructure investment, the decisive election of a new President on a platform of change presents a real opportunity and sense of momentum for action in Washington.