Over the last two decades, and especially in the last few years, land regularization and upgrading programs have been implemented in informal settlements by central, regional and local governments in several Latin American countries. Important lessons must be learned from this incipient practice of urban policy making, not only to contribute toward improving existing experiences, but also to guide those governments that are confronting the phenomenon for the first time, or more likely are confronting the need to design policies to deal with significant increases in informal urban development.
To address this need, the Lincoln Institute sponsored its third offering of the course Informal Markets and Land Regularization Programs in Urban Areas, in November 2003. It was held in Recife, Brazil because of the city’s historic tradition of urban policy making, including its regularization program (PREZEIS), which for the past 20 years has been a pioneering instrument, despite its many shortcomings. The course brought together about 35 people with varied academic backgrounds and institutional positions representing 10 Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.
The 13 intertwined lessons offered here draw on the papers presented in Recife and on experiences discussed in the two previous courses in 2001 and 2002, as well as ideas generated in the meeting of the Institute’s Latin American Network on Land Regularization in Brasília, Brazil, in July 2003. This brief, critical analysis of land regularization programs reflects contributions from many people, but the authors take full responsibility for any misrepresentations that a general synthesis like this one may produce (see Figure 1).
1. The Process of Favelización
The process of informal production of urban space is increasing at a significant pace in Latin America, despite the fact that, unlike Africa and Asia, the region has been solidly urbanized for many decades. Occupied areas are becoming denser, and new settlements are being formed daily. Increasingly, these occupations encroach on environmentally sensitive areas, near protected water reservoirs, on public land, and in other areas not suitable for human occupation or economically feasible in the formal land market. This process has created all sorts of harmful repercussions—socio-environmental, legal, economic, political and cultural—not only for the millions of residents living in informal settlements, but also for city governments and the entire urban population. Despite the many regularization and upgrading programs implemented in the last few decades, the development rate of new informal settlements has been twice and even three times that of urban population growth. Thus, increasing informality is not exclusively the result of demographic change or even the increase in urban poverty, which also has been growing but at a much lower rate.
2. The Vicious Cycle of Informality
Multiple factors are responsible for the establishment of informal settlements. Over and above demographics and macroeconomic factors affecting urban poverty (employment and income policies), local variables contribute to the “unexplained variance” of increasing informality. By acting or failing to act, local authorities have fomented the growth of the phenomenon through exclusionary land use regulation, favoring wealthy neighborhoods in the spatial allocation of public investments, outright complicity with the delinquent practices of land subdividers, and inadequate local fiscal policies.
The corollary of this tolerance of informality is of great importance for land pricing policy. The informal market values and benefits from greater regulatory freedom and from the social values associated with traditional networks among residents within the settlements. Both of these dynamics affect prices in the informal market, which are reaching absurd levels. For example, a 6-square-meter (60-square-foot) wooden shack on a mangrove swamp in Recife has been valued at US$1,300. Such extremes and variations in prices reflect the diversity of informal processes at work in the access to urban land and housing, both among different settlements and within each settlement. Attacking the factors responsible for the vicious cycle of price formation should be an indispensable ingredient of any policy seeking to mitigate the consequences of informality.
3. A World of Diversity
Far from being a homogeneous phenomenon, informality manifests itself in many forms, contexts and places. Enormous differences may be found within and between settlements in the same city, not to mention among cities within a country and among cities in different countries. Each informal area has good and bad neighborhoods; relatively high-valued and low-valued areas; an uneven distribution of whatever services are available; and properties with different types of tenure rights. The income levels of many families in informal areas also are variable and in some cases are well above those of families in formal areas who are typically expected to pay for certain publicly provided services and benefits.
In comparing the archipelago of informal settlements distributed within formal neighborhoods in Latin America, property price gradients have been found to be uncorrelated, revealing altogether different market forces. Although both formal and informal areas are subject to vigorous land markets, the intervening price determinants are of different orders of magnitude. As mentioned above, regulatory freedoms, as well as longstanding informal networks that support the exchange of intangible benefits, affect property values. These realities must be taken into account when designing regularization programs that can offer positive reform of traditional practices.
There is also a need to adjust the programs to the different conditions of newly occupied areas and long-established settlements in consolidated areas. A clearer chain of market transactions can be traced in the newer occupations, whereas there is usually no linear succession of transactions in older areas. Furthermore, established settlements reflect a complex overlay of informally defined rights and transactions, such as rooftops sold to a third party as buildable “land,” which in turn may give rise to an additional living space. It is by no means clear whether regularization programs should start with recent occupations, where the costs of upgrading are lower and degrees of freedom are greater, or with older, consolidated areas that present more pressing social consequences, but where some legal rights may already exist.
4. Tolerance of Informality
Despite all the negative implications, public authorities have tolerated informal urban development processes, whether because of neglect, political convenience, ambiguous actions or even direct promotion of informal occupations. There is, however, little understanding that such tolerance generates rights over time and little information about the extremely high costs, both absolute and relative, of what is involved in upgrading programs. At the same time, tolerance of informal occupations is accompanied by a growing acceptance by both public authorities and public opinion that consolidated settlements should be upgraded with services, equipment and infrastructure. A recent study conducted by Cities Alliance in Brazil shows that the decision to regularize an irregular settlement is often made more quickly than the decision to approve a new regular settlement (six months versus two or three years).
This official tolerance also applies to the acceptance of “second-class solutions” for “second-class citizens” and often results in the early deterioration of upgraded areas. The combination of poor-quality materials and low-cost, unconventional techniques used in upgraded areas, as well as greater pressure on the existing infrastructure because of increased densification, renders the infrastructure obsolete and incurs high maintenance costs. Moreover, upgraded areas usually are not properly integrated into the municipal fiscal system. Throughout the region, the fiscal irresponsibility of municipal administrators is aggravated further by their failure to take responsibility for the broader scope of territorial development, as well as for their negligence or at best paternalistic attitude toward these regularized settlements.
5. Expectations and Land Values
Regularization programs to date have addressed a very small percentage of existing informal settlements, and as a result the vast majority of people living informally have not benefited from any type of public intervention. Furthermore, many regularization programs have been formulated without a proper understanding of the causes of informality, and they often deliver counterproductive results that contribute to the process of increasing socio-spatial segregation.
The mere expectation of upgrading puts a premium value on the land designated for improvements, thus significantly impacting prices in the informal market. The higher the expectation that an area will be regularized in the future, the higher the premium on that land and the higher the market demand for lower-priced subdivisions elsewhere. This suggests two approaches to upgrading: comprehensive programs for everyone in a few places coordinated with policies to change future expectations about cost recovery schemes; or partial upgrading in all informal areas of the city so expectations about market activity will be more balanced and consistent. The importance of integrating upgraded areas into municipal fiscal systems is not yet properly understood.
6. Isolated and Fragmented Policies
Public intervention in informal settlements through regularization programs has been promoted in an isolated, sectoral way without the necessary integration between such programs and the wider context of urban land management policies that have a direct bearing on such settlements. These policies include construction of social housing; rehabilitation of dilapidated urban centers; occupation of vacant areas and buildings; broader spatial allocation of public investments in urban infrastructure and services; modernization of tax collections and cadastres; and public-private partnerships. Moreover, most regularization programs have been limited to residential areas and have rarely been extended to informal industrial and commercial businesses, vacant public buildings and land in central areas, or informal settlements in rural areas.
At all levels of government, regularization programs have been marked by structural fragmentation— within programs, between secretariats and ministries, and among national, state and local levels—and as a result existing resources are often misspent or fail to reach all intended beneficiaries. The programs also have suffered from a lack of administrative continuity due mostly to changes in local political contexts. Rather than supplementing other initiatives, regularization programs often absorb much of the (limited) financial capacity of local municipalities, causing other social housing programs to be sacrificed or neglected. This problem has its origins in both the broad credit lines opened by national and international multilateral agencies and the absence of a requirement that local administrations match the financial burden of the program with efforts to expand their own revenue sources. In general, credit lines for regularization programs have been established without careful consideration of the financial capabilities of municipalities.
7. Lack of Financial Resources
As if the above problems were not enough, regularization programs have not been supported by adequate financial resources. The budgetary provisions are not compatible with the proposed and sometimes ambitious objectives, and often there are no specific funds for the programs. Revenues resulting from urban planning operations (such as earmarking resources from the sale of building rights in formal and high-income areas) have not been properly used to support upgrading. Resources from international agencies have been poorly spent, especially because there has not been a rigorous evaluation of the programs, nor a firm demand that their targets or objectives are fully accomplished. In addition, there are no adequate micro-credit policies in place to support or encourage community organizations.
8. Dissociation Between Upgrading and Legalization
Although it could be argued that illegality is a consequence of the insufficient supply of serviced land at affordable prices, in the vast majority of regularization programs the greater emphasis on upgrading has been dissociated from housing improvement and socioeconomic programs aimed at integrating communities, as well as from specific policies to legalize areas and plots. The components of upgrading and legalization have been conceived as if they were separate processes, or, frequently, as if legalization were an automatic result of the upgrading process. Most upgrading programs seem to fall short of what is required for land occupations to be legalized in the first place. As a result, those few programs that have reached the legalization stage have had to invent legal-political solutions, which often do not reflect the urban conditions actually in force in the area.
Despite the publicity given to regularization programs, the number of titles that actually result in a document issued by the property registration office is disappointingly low. The complexities imposed by law and the resistance and conservative attitudes of notaries and registration offices have been identified as some of the most critical bottlenecks to overcome. It should be added that most families, once they receive a title recognizing their legitimate right to their property, simply do not bother to complete the registration process, often because they do not understand its legal overtones or because it is too expensive or cumbersome. This situation has led to an outcry for the simplification of titling and registration systems and an associated need to disempower the existing bureaucratic entities.
9.The Importance of Titling
Given these problems, few programs have reached the legalization stage, and even fewer have achieved the registration of legalized plots. Perhaps because of that failure, many analysts have come to believe that titles are not important, that the mere perception of security of tenure would suffice. Although it is true that such a perception is indeed the main factor that encourages people to start investing in their houses, titling is important for two reasons: the personal interests of the occupiers (security of tenure, protection against forced eviction, domestic conflicts, marital separation, inheritance, problems with neighbors, access to an address and to forms of credit); and the interest of the city as a whole, since legal titling can contribute to the stabilization of land markets and allow for more rational and better articulated forms of public intervention.
There is still great resistance to land titling programs, especially on the part of the judiciary and the general public. However, it is important to note that individual beneficiaries of titling programs often do not have a full understanding of the protections and limitations of their title—What is it good for? Why does one need to actually register the title? All this suggests that educational programs for both city officials and residents should accompany the introduction of any regularization programs.
In addition, there has been little reflection on the implications of the kinds of instruments used to legalize plots. The emphasis placed on individual freehold titles has ignored the need for collective legal solutions for collective social problems; whenever such legal instruments have been used, they have not been introduced in a way that renders the new legal order compatible with the existing urban order and with the legal implications of the instruments. Most existing legal options have not been fully explored and generally lack creativity. Moreover, a consistent effort has yet to be made to have the new legal instruments fully validated by credit agencies, and by society at large.
10. The Fallacy of Popular Participation
The political quality of regularization programs has varied enormously, but in general the processes of popular participation in formulating and implementing the programs have been of little significance. This situation has been further aggravated by the creation of artificial forms of participation as a result of demands from financing agencies. The designed mechanisms for popular participation are in general a sheer formality, if not a farce from the outset. Very few programs have assimilated solutions proposed by the affected community. The political-institutional and cultural framework within which most regularization programs have been formed, along with the constraints imposed by the way these programs are financed, virtually eliminates any room for a truly effective public role, since public participation normally implies major challenges to the status quo. Regularization programs are more often perceived as solutions from or for the establishment than as a response to the real needs of the majority of the low-income population.
11. Compatible Scale, Patterns and Rights
Perhaps the main problem with regularization programs is the difficulty in making the scale of the interventions compatible with the technical, urban and environmental patterns proposed for the settlements, as well as with the nature of the rights to be recognized for the occupiers. These factors of scale, patterns and rights have to be discussed together to guarantee the sustainability of the programs and their impact on reality.
12. The After-effects of Regularization Programs
After an area is upgraded or a settlement is legalized, the public authorities normally do not maintain their presence in the areas. They should perform many important functions, from monitoring and evaluating the maintenance of installed equipment (notably water and sewage systems) to creating new guidelines or rules governing new occupations. As a result of the absence of official oversight and intervention, many areas rapidly begin to deteriorate. Moreover, the legitimization provided by the regularization program may make neighboring (originally formal) areas more prone to being “contaminated” by new informal land use practices. In general, regularization programs have not led to the promised urban, social and cultural integration of upgraded areas, and the informal areas remain stigmatized as second-rate long after they have been upgraded. The idea that regularized areas are placed in a new, virtuous trajectory rarely survives beyond the original documents setting the justifications for the program.
13. Balancing Individual Freedoms and Public Functions
In spite of their concern with the need to guarantee that the beneficiaries of public intervention are indeed the occupiers of informal settlements, regularization programs have not met a proper balance between respect for individual rights and freedoms and the programs’ public functions (the recognition of the social right to housing and the need to set aside urban areas for that purpose). Frequently the adopted legal solutions embed restrictions intending to freeze the mobility process within the areas (affecting terms of sale, acquisition, rent and so forth), which only helps to generate more informality.
The strategy of focusing on an area or social group seems to ignore the very nature and origins of informality, which is in fact a Catch-22 situation. The lack of sufficient finances in most programs would, on one hand, suggest that beneficiaries should not be able to cash in their benefits and move on to a new informal occupation to be similarly regularized in the future. On the other hand, the cost of monitoring and controlling such practices may be too high, if not unfeasible. Restrictions on transactions would simply generate new kinds of informal arrangements.
Interestingly, very few regularization programs actually accommodate or adjust to the potential upward and downward mobility of the affected occupants. They are formulated with a static community in mind. Intra-urban mobility, particularly among informal settlements and between formal and informal areas, is not well understood and thus is largely ignored. A possible way out of this conundrum would be to establish a cost-recovery scheme or value capture mechanism at the very beginning of planning for a new regularization program.
Conclusion
Regularization programs are typically not formulated with well-defined goals and timetables, and the problem is made worse by the lack of suitable evaluation indicators. In short, the declared objectives of regularization programs in Latin America (promotion of security of tenure and socio-spatial integration) have not been translated into an adequate combination of a comprehensive diagnosis, effective instruments and a clear implementation strategy, not to mention deficiencies in management capacity. As a result, the Latin American experience with regularization so far can not be considered fully successful.
It may be said, however, that regularization programs have shown merit in raising public awareness about the legitimacy of claims for more effective and comprehensive responses to the needs of a significant and growing group of citizens now excluded from the formal socioeconomic system. These programs have enabled some of the urban poor to remain in central, serviced areas of Latin American cities and have improved the livelihood and conditions of those living in regularized settlements, notwithstanding this discussion of their shortcomings. Given the cruel dynamics of socio-spatial segregation in the region, this fact is in itself of great importance.
Edésio Fernandes is a part-time lecturer in the Development Planning Unit of University College London.
Martim O. Smolka is senior fellow and director of the Lincoln Institute’s Program on Latin America and the Caribbean.
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Calderon, Julio. 2002. The mystery of credit. April: 5–8.
Fernandes, Edésio. 2002. The influence of de Soto’s The Mystery of Capital. January: 5–8.
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Smolka, Martim O. 2003. Informality, urban poverty and land market prices. January: 4–7.
Smolka, Martim O., and Laura Mullahy. 2003. A decade of changes: A retrospective of the Latin America program. October: 8–12.
Figure 1:
Dos and Don’ts of Regularization Programs
Dos
Don’ts
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The property tax has been subject to much popular criticism and political pressure in recent decades. Several states have implemented, or are considering, a variety of caps and limits on property assessments, property tax rates, or total revenue raised from the property tax. Perhaps the best-known example is California’s Proposition 13, which ties property assessments to the purchase price of a dwelling (rather than its current market value) and limits the tax rate that can be levied on homes. It is worth taking another look at the property tax and considering its strengths and weaknesses as a source of funding for local government services.
How will local government finances be affected by the large and increasing burden to pay for previously obligated pension costs? How, in particular, will these pension legacy costs change residents’ perceptions of the local property tax and their willingness to pay? As a first step in a larger Lincoln Institute of Land Policy research agenda on these questions, we ask: What is known–and just as importantly, what is not known–about the magnitude of unfunded local government pension liabilities in the United States? (see Gordon, Rose, and Fischer 2012)
It is a first principle of public finance that current services should be paid with current revenues and that debt finance should be reserved for capital projects that provide services to future taxpayers. This principle is violated when pension liabilities associated with current labor services are not funded by current purchases of financial assets and instead have to be paid for by future taxpayers.
Alas, principles of prudence in public finance are not always observed, and local governments in the United States have accumulated substantial unfunded pension liabilities in recent years. This situation breaks an important link in the relationship between taxpayers and the services they receive–the rough correspondence between the overall value of public services and the resources taken from the private sector. There is considerable debate about the strength of this correspondence and how price-like the relationship is between value paid and value received for individual taxpayers, but there can be little question that using current revenues to pay for past services weakens the link.
Growing Public Awareness
State and local government employee pensions are in the headlines almost daily (box 1). Only a few years ago, they were the nearly exclusive province of a few elected officials, appointed boards, investment advisors, actuaries, and credit rating agencies. What changed? The most immediate answer is the Great Recession, which sapped not only state tax revenue but also the value of pension plan assets. In particular, state and local pension fund equity holdings lost nearly half of their value, dropping from a peak of $2.3 trillion in September 2007 to a low of $1.2 trillion in March 2009 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2012).
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Box 1: Where Are Local Pensions in Trouble?
To understand where local pensions were experiencing particular difficulties, Gordon, Rose, and Fischer (2012) used media monitoring software to conduct a search of all U.S. domestic news outlets for the first three months of 2012. To satisfy the query, articles had to include the word “pension” in conjunction with terms that identify local governments (e.g., municipality, city, or county) and descriptions of funding problems (e.g., liability, deficit, underfunded, cut, default, reform, or problem). The search yielded over 2,000 separate articles from places all over the country.
Their analysis suggests several types of places are experiencing pension troubles. One group consists of jurisdictions that have been losing people and jobs over time. A prominent example is Detroit, Michigan, which has twice as many retirees as active workers. Also in this category is Prichard, Alabama, which has lost more than 45 percent of its population since 1970 and by 2010 had fewer than 23,000 residents. It simply stopped sending pension checks to its former employees in September 2009 and declared bankruptcy one month later. For such communities, pension problems may also be a symptom of larger fiscal distress or political dysfunction.
Another group of jurisdictions rode the housing boom and bust. Examples include fast-growing California cities like Stockton, which just entered bankruptcy proceedings this year, the largest city ever to do so. More puzzling are relatively affluent places, such as New York’s Suffolk or Nassau Counties, which appear unable to make tough spending cuts or raise taxes because of political gridlock. Instead, many of these jurisdictions have turned to borrowing to meet their pension obligations.
Only two recent municipal bankruptcies (Vallejo, California, and Central Falls, Rhode Island) stemmed from public pensions and employee compensation pressures together with falling revenues. Other places such as Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, and Jefferson County, Alabama, are struggling with poor investment decisions. Also, major cities such as Atlanta, San Francisco, and New York have taken steps to limit pension growth, often with cooperation from local public employee unions. Central Falls managed to extract concessions from active police officers and fire fighters as well as current retirees, but even this was insufficient to stop the slide toward bankruptcy.
Although stock markets have largely recovered and state and local plan equity holdings have climbed back over $2 trillion, public pensions remain under scrutiny. Credit rating agencies increasingly are taking unfunded pension liabilities into account when developing their assessments of state and local government borrower risk. In addition, analysts are growing more vocal in their criticisms of methods commonly used to evaluate pension funding levels.
The federal government is also paying attention. Alarmed by the prospect of defaults, Congress held a series of hearings into state and local government finances in early 2011. More recently, the Republican staff of the Joint Economic Committee (JEC) has issued reports raising the specter of a Eurozone-like crisis due to unfunded state pension liabilities (JEC 2011; JEC 2012).
In light of these criticisms and concerns about growing pension costs, 43 states enacted significant reforms to their pension systems between 2009 and 2011 (Snell 2012). The most common changes were: increased employee contribution requirements (30 states); raised age and service for eligibility (32); adjusted formulas for calculating benefits (17); and reduced cost of living increases (21). In some states the changes applied to new employees only, but in others they affected active workers and current retirees. The latter actions have proven especially controversial, prompting lawsuits in Colorado, Minnesota, New Jersey, and South Dakota.
Most of the heightened attention to government employee pensions has concentrated on state government plans, while local public employee pensions remain relatively unexplored. Although local plans represent a modest share of total public pension membership (10 percent) and assets (18 percent), their failures could be devastating. Mobile residents and businesses could flee communities that levy higher taxes to rebuild pension assets rather than to provide basic services. A shrinking tax base would leave the fund even worse off and potentially less able to pay promised benefits. The result could be more cities like Prichard, Alabama.
Looking at State and Local Pension Plans Together
State and local pensions are an important part of the nation’s retirement system. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the total of $15.3 trillion in retirement assets at the end of 2011 by type of plan. State and local public employee retirement funds held a combined $2.8 trillion in assets, or almost one-fifth of the total.
Every state has at least one public employee pension plan and some have many. There are more than 220 state plans—some of which are state-administered plans that cover local government workers—and almost 3,200 local government plans (table 1). Together these plans cover 14.7 million current workers, 8.2 million current beneficiaries, and 4.8 million people eligible for future benefits but not yet receiving them.
State and local pensions are all the more important because 27.5 percent of government employees do not participate in Social Security (Nuschler, Shelton, and Topoleski 2011). These uncovered public employees are highly concentrated in a handful of states. Figure 2 ranks the 16 states with the highest concentrations of government workers not covered by Social Security. Almost all state and local government employees in Ohio and Massachusetts and more than half in Nevada, Louisiana, Colorado, California, and Texas are not covered.
Another key feature of state and local pensions is that they are mostly defined benefit (DB) plans. Benefits are calculated by a formula, typically something like:
(Average salary in final 3 years) x
(Years of service) x
(2% for each year of service) =
Benefits
Most state and local government pensions also include a cost of living adjustment. A minority of public sector workers are enrolled in defined contribution (DC) plans where a specified amount is put in a retirement fund for each year of work. Compared to DC plans, DB pensions protect employees from investment, inflation, and longevity risks. As of 2009, nearly 80 percent of state and local workers were enrolled in DB plans and just over 20 percent were in DC plans. Private sector workers had the opposite mix: 20 percent in DB plans and 80 percent in DC plans (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2011).
DB plans used to be more prevalent in the private sector but have been disappearing partly because the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) imposed minimum funding standards, required insurance contributions, and other administrative burdens on them.
The weaker funding and reporting requirements that apply to public pensions allow governments to shift labor costs into the future. This is an implicit form of borrowing that can evade balanced budget rules and avoid the voter approval usually required for issuing bonds.
Funding and Reporting Requirements for State and Local Pensions
For most of their history, state and local pensions were financed out of general revenues on a pay-as-you-go basis. The current practice of prefunding state and local pension plans began in the 1970s and 1980s. While public sector plans were not covered by ERISA, the act did mandate a report on their practices. The 1978 report found a “high degree of pension cost blindness . . . due to the lack of actuarial valuations, the use of unrealistic actuarial assumptions, and the general absence of actuarial standards” (Munnell et al. 2008, 2).
This wake-up call led to voluntary increases in funding levels by many plans and increased attention to actuarial and accounting standards. The Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB) was formed in 1984, issued its first rules for pension plans in 1986, and extensively revised its actuarial valuation standards in 1994. Compliance with these rules is voluntary, but is rewarded by credit rating agencies, auditors, and other data consumers. Unlike ERISA rules that require specific valuation methods for all private plans, GASB sets out criteria that allow some latitude as to which specific methods are used by public plans. As a consequence there are serious transparency and comparability concerns with the self-reported data on state and local pension plan liabilities.
Employer Contribution
The calculation of a plan’s Actuarial Accrued Liability (AAL) requires the following information: ages and salary histories of members; assumptions for salary growth, retirement ages, asset earnings, and inflation; longevity probability tables; and a discount rate to translate estimated future values into present values. Unfunded Actuarial Accrued Liability (UAA L) equals AAL minus plan assets.
The “Normal Cost” of a pension plan is the increase in AAL due to the current year of service by existing employees. ERISA requires that normal cost be covered by employee and employer contributions. GASB specifies an “Annual Required Contribution” (ARC) of normal cost plus a 30-year amortization of UAA L. The problem is that, contrary to its name, payment of ARC is not strictly required in most jurisdictions.
Choice of Discount Rate
The issue that has received the most recent attention is the choice of discount rate. Current GASB rules allow discounting future liabilities based on projected investment returns, which averaged 8 percent per year prior to the recession. But most economists and financial theorists would agree with Brown and Wilcox (2009, 538) that “the discount rate used to value future pension liabilities should reflect the riskiness of the liabilities,” not the assets. Constitutional and other legal guarantees make government pensions of low risk, while historical investment returns include a risk premium.
State and local governments cannot avoid longterm risks such as a protracted productivity slump or a decade-long down market. Therefore, the historical long-term rate of return on an equity-heavy portfolio–before risk adjustment–is too high a discount rate. Higher discount rates can make pensions appear better funded than they truly are. This reduces contribution requirements and imposes unwarranted obligations on future taxpayers if the high rates of return are not achieved. Worse, there is an incentive for plan managers to seek high-risk portfolios in order to get a higher discount rate and lower ARC.
There are strong arguments that the 8 percent discount rate used by many public pension plans is too high, but there is less agreement on just how much lower the appropriate rate should be. Rather than review the arguments, we report one estimate of just how much of an impact a lower rate would have. Munnell et al. (2012) calculate the would-be change in reported liabilities if all plans used a 5 percent rather than an 8 percent discount rate. They estimate that state and local liabilities would increase from $3.6 trillion to $5.4 trillion and aggregate funding ratios (Assets/AAL) would fall from 75 to only 50 percent. This is a huge change, and represents a doubling of unfunded liabilities (UAA L = AAL – Assets).
Recent Changes in GASB Standards
GASB (2012) has released new accounting standards to take effect in 2013 and 2014. The key change requires state and local governments to apply different discount rates to the funded and unfunded portions of liabilities. An earnings-based rate will still be applied to the funded portion, but a lower, riskless rate will be applied to UAA Ls. The impact of this change on reported liabilities depends on how well funded a plan is: no change for fully funded plans; a small change for well funded plans; and large increases in reported liabilities and decreases in funding ratios for poorly funded plans. The new standards also require that the UAA L be shown on the government’s balance sheet, which will increase the visibility of unfunded liabilities to voters.
What Do We Know About Local Pensions?
Despite mounting concerns about the fiscal health of local pension plans, systematic knowledge about them is rare. The best available information comes from the U.S. Census Bureau’s (2012) Annual Survey of State and Local Public Employee Retirement Systems. Detailed data for each government entity is reported every five years. Plan-level data for a sample that includes roughly half of the 3,200 local plans is reported each year and is used to create estimates of totals for each state by type of government. Tables 1 and 2 exemplify the types of information in the survey.
The main virtues of the Census Bureau’s employee retirement survey are its quality and comprehensiveness. A key disadvantage is lack of timeliness, since the most recent local data available is for fiscal year 2010. Another problem is that the Bureau only recently began reporting plan liabilities, and it does so only for state plans. Like other pension data sources, the Census Bureau does not collect information on DC plans or other post-employment benefits (OPEBs).
Nevertheless, the employee retirement survey provides some insights into local pensions. For example, the number of local plans per state varies greatly: 7 states have no local plans; 20 states have fewer than 10; Florida and Illinois have over 300 each; and Pennsylvania has over 1,400. The number of active members per beneficiary is a crude measure of how well employee contributions can fund the plan. Table 1 indicates the national average for local plans is 1.4 workers per retiree, but there is considerable variation across states. This support ratio is less than 1 in 12 states; between 1 and 2 in 31 states; and over 2 in 7 states, with Utah having the highest ratio at 6.8.
Neither of these pieces of information tell us how well funded local pensions are. For this information, we must turn to independent surveys. Most have good coverage of state plans, but they generally survey only a few of the larger local plans: e.g., the National Association of State Retirement Administrators’ (NASRA ) annual survey of member plans. A small number of national studies have focused on local, as opposed to state, pension liabilities. For example, Novy-Marx and Rauh (2011) analyze local pension finances using data from Consolidated Annual Financial Reports (CAFRs) for city and county plans holding more than $1 billion in assets as of 2006.
The Boston College Center for Retirement Research (CRR) maintains a Public Plans Database (PPD) for the largest state and local plans with data from individual plan actuarial reports and local government CAFRs. Using the PPD plus information on some additional local plans, CRR recently issued a report with data for 2010 from a sample of 97 plans in 40 states (Munnell et al. 2011). This is a modest sample relative to the total of 3,200 local plans, but by concentrating on large plans it covers 59 percent of local pension assets and 55 percent of participants.
An important finding is the wide dispersion around the average funding ratio of 77 percent in 2010 (figure 3). Of 95 large plans in the CRR sample with usable information, only 16 had assets covering more than 90 percent of liabilities. At the other tail are 9 plans with below 50 percent funding (Munnell et al. 2011). This study also shows the ARC as a percent of local government payroll. The overall average for 2010 is 22 percent, and again there is wide dispersion (figure 4). Of 91 large plans in the CRR sample with usable information, more than half (49) have ARC below 20 percent of payroll, but 16 have shares in the less manageable 30 to 80 percent range. Five plans have such large pension obligations that if paid in full they would cost more than 100 percent of payroll.
Keep in mind that local governments in most states are not required to pay the full amount of the ARC. We do not have data at the local level, but a state-level study reported wide variation in the percent of ARC actually paid across plans, across years, and across states (State Budget Crisis Task Force 2012). Munnell et al. (2011) calculate pension payments actually made as a share of local budgets and again find considerable variation, with 14 percent of the sample governments devoting more than 12 percent of their budgets to pay for pensions.
Conclusions
Local government pensions are on average significantly underfunded. The key reason is that, absent a legal compulsion to do so, many governments have not set aside enough funds each year to cover the extra pension liabilities incurred in that year, much less to amortize unfunded liabilities from earlier years. In effect, they are borrowing to pay for current labor services and shifting the burden to future taxpayers.
We know much less about the 3,200 locally administered plans that we do about the 220 state plans. The best information on local plans comes from researchers who review the detailed financial reports of the plans and local governments. Of necessity, these studies concentrate on the larger plans. We do know that there is wide variation across plans on key measures: the share of liabilities that are covered by assets; the would-be full contribution to cover both current year pension costs and amortization of unfunded liabilities (ARC) relative to payroll or annual revenues; the share of ARC that is actually paid; and the share of the current budget that goes to pension costs. A significant fraction of local governments are in trouble by one or more of these measures.
Worse, what we know about liabilities comes from municipalities’ self-reported data and their own choice of discount rate. In almost all cases this discount rate is inappropriately high, and the use of a lower discount could more than double unfunded liabilities. The result is a big problem with local pension liabilities that threatens local government finances, but we do not know how big, and we do not know how unequally it is distributed.
About the Authors
Richard F. Dye is a visiting fellow of the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. He is also a professor at the Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of Illinois at Chicago, and professor of economics emeritus at Lake Forest College.
Tracy Gordon is a fellow in Economic Studies at the Brookings Institution, Washington, DC. Her research focuses on state and local public finance, political economy, and urban economics.
References
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 2012. Flow of funds accounts of the United States, June 7. http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/data.htm
Brown, Jeffrey R., and David W. Wilcox. 2009. Discounting state and local pension liabilities. American Economic Review 99(2): 538–542.
Gordon, Tracy M., Heather M. Rose, and Ilana Fischer. 2012. The state of local government pensions: A preliminary inquiry. Working Paper. Cambridge MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB). 2012. GASB Improves Pension Accounting and Reporting Standards. Press Release. June 25. http://www.gasb.org/cs/ContentServer?c=GASBContent_C&pagename=GASB/GASBContent_C/GASBNewsPage&cid=1176160126951
Joint Economic Committee (JEC). 2011. States of bankruptcy, part I: The coming state pensions crisis. Republican Staff Commentary, Washington, DC, December 8.
Joint Economic Committee (JEC). 2012. States of bankruptcy, part II: Eurozone, USA? Republican Staff Commentary, Washington, DC, May 15.
Munnell, Alicia H., Jean-Pierre Aubry, Josh Hurwitz, and Laura Quimby. 2011. An update on locally administered pension plans. Center for Retirement Research at Boston College Policy Brief, July.
Munnell, Alicia H., Jean-Pierre Aubry, Josh Hurwitz, and Laura Quimby. 2012. The funding of state and local pensions: 2011–2015. Center for Retirement Research at Boston College Policy Brief, May.
Munnell, Alicia H., Kelly Haverstick, Steven A. Sass, and Jean-Pierre Aubry. 2008. The miracle of funding by state and local pension plans. Center for Retirement Research at Boston College Policy Brief, April.
Novy-Marx, Robert, and Joshua Rauh. 2011. The crisis in local government pensions in the United States. In Growing old: Paying for retirement and institutional money management after the financial crisis, Robert Litan and Richard Herring, eds., 47–74. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
Nuschler, Dawn, Alison M. Shelton, and John J. Topoleski. 2011. Social Security: Mandatory coverage of new state and local government employees. Congressional Research Service, July. http://www.nasra.org/resources/CRS%202011%20Report.pdf
Snell, Ronald K. 2012. State pension reform, 2009–2011. Washington, DC: National Council of State Legislatures, March.
State Budget Crisis Task Force. 2012. Report of the State Budget Crisis Task Force. http://www.statebudgetcrisis.org/wpcms/wp-content/images/Report-of-the-State-Budget-Crisis-Task-Force-Full.pdf
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2011. Employee benefits survey, retirement benefits: access, participation, and take-up rates. March.
U.S. Census Bureau. 2012. 2010 annual survey of state and local public employee retirement systems. http://www.census.gov/govs/retire
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Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 4 del libro Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.
Los instrumentos de captura de plusvalía, aunque difíciles de aplicar, son ampliamente reconocidos como mecanismos beneficiosos de planificación fiscal. En América Latina, Colombia se ha destacado por su larga y particular tradición de institucionalización de la captura de plusvalías mediante la contribución de valorización (una especie de tasación especial) y la contribución de desarrollo municipal (Ley 9 de 1989), la cual antecedió al actual instrumento de participación en plusvalías.
Desde 1921, año de introducción de la primera de estas leyes, Colombia ha desarrollado una cultura fiscal en la cual los ciudadanos están conscientes de los instrumentos de captura de plusvalía, y los aceptan como un mecanismo legítimo de recaudación de ingresos. Como ejemplo, en 1968 (en su época de mayor uso), la contribución de valorización representó el 16 por ciento de los ingresos municipales en Bogotá y aproximadamente el 45 por ciento en Medellín; a principio de la década de 1980 recaudó un 30 por ciento de los ingresos totales en Cali. No obstante, debido a que el suelo aún desempeña un papel importante como defensa contra la inflación en países como Colombia -donde los mercados de capital no están muy desarrollados-la puesta en práctica de tales instrumentos sigue enfrentando una fuerte resistencia política por parte de muchos y variados grupos de interés, desde propietarios y promotores poderosos hasta familias de bajos y medianos recursos para quienes la tierra es una importante fuente de ahorros.
Sobre la base de esta experiencia, la Ley 388 de 1997 que creó la participación en plusvalías decreta que todas las municipalidades deben diseñar y aprobar un plan maestro de diez años (el Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial o “POT”) y adoptar la plusvalía como una de las fuentes principales de ingresos del plan. Las entradas recaudadas por las plusvalías deberán utilizarse principalmente para la provisión de infraestructura y viviendas sociales a vecindades pobremente dotadas de servicios públicos, así como también para obras públicas de interés general. La ley establece tres condiciones administrativas para poder aplicar las plusvalías como parte del POT, a saber:
La participación en plusvalías se basa en el derecho público y legítimo de participar en la captación de los aumentos del valor de la tierra generados por acciones administrativas tales como cambios en zonificación o densidad, que pueden generar ganancias sustanciales para el propietario de la tierra.Es importante notar que este instrumento no es un impuesto ni tampoco una contribución o tarifa, sino más bien un derecho de la comunidad a “participar” en los beneficios resultantes de las funciones gubernamentales orientadas a mejorar el desarrollo urbano. La Ley 388 y sus decretos acompañantes definen los parámetros generales para utilizar las plusvalías, pero se requiere que las municipalidades determinen sus procedimientos específicos. Sin embargo, a muchos alcaldes y funcionarios públicos les preocupan las ambigüedades de la ley, y les está costando el proceso de su aplicación, así como la del instrumento de plusvalías.
Con el objeto de abrir un espacio de debate sobre este problema entre funcionarios públicos y otros expertos, el Instituto Lincoln y el Departamento de Planeación de Bogotá organizaron un seminario en diciembre de 1999, antes de la fecha límite de aprobación del plan maestro legal (POT) (31 de diciembre). El seminario reunió a representantes de entidades y participantes activos en el proceso de ejecución, entre ellos directores de planificación de ciudades importantes, representantes de ministerios y organismos públicos nacionales, representantes de instituciones encargadas del avalúo inmobiliario, abogados y especialistas participantes en el diseño del instrumento. Un resultado inmediato del seminario fue la formación de un grupo de presión que logró cambiar la fecha límite al 30 de junio de 2000, alargando así el tiempo disponible para revisar las estipulaciones problemáticas del POT.
Aspectos claves de la implementación de la ley
Aplicación de plusvalías a diferentes situaciones.
La mayoría de los representantes municipales que asistieron al seminario coincidieron en que las plusvalías deben ser utilizadas únicamente en situaciones que redunden en ganancias claras y sustanciales, a fin de procurar una mayor aprobación por parte de los ciudadanos y de simplificar el proceso administrativo durante la primera fase de la ejecución. El consenso general es que los propietarios han aceptado la contribución de valorización y han estado dispuestos a pagar porque han entendido claramente que el aumento en el valor del suelo se debe a la inversión pública. En Bogotá, por ejemplo, la contribución de valorización ha sido una de las principales fuentes de financiamiento para la construcción de calles nuevas desde 1969.
En comparación, las plusvalías se aplican únicamente en situaciones en que el aumento en el valor de la tierra puede atribuirse específicamente a una decisión sobre el uso de tierra pública definida en el POT, tal como un cambio en la categoría de la tierra, su densidad o su uso. Una situación para la cual se evidencia el cambio en el precio de la tierra, es la extensión del perímetro urbano a fin de incluir suelo rural que podría desarrollarse en años subsiguientes. La mayoría de los representantes de municipalidades opinaron que este escenario es el más obvio para la aplicación de la ley, y que debe constituir el enfoque del instrumento durante su etapa inicial.
Exactitud de los avalúos del suelo.
La Ley 388 sugiere establecer la fecha de julio de 1997 (fecha de aprobación de la ley en el Congreso), como base de referencia para establecer las ganancias en el precio de la tierra. Sin embargo, aún no está claro cuándo ni por qué método los municipios podrán determinar el precio de la tierra en los años sucesivos. El problema es que el valor base inicial podría ya haberse alterado por los “rumores” que hayan corrido acerca de las designaciones de suelo en los planes maestros. En vista de ello se plantean varias interrogantes, por ejemplo: , ¿debería calcularse el valor antes de la circulación de rumores sobre los cambios urbanísticos, o justo antes de tomarse la decisión formal? ¿Cómo deberían las ciudades tratar los incrementos en el valor del suelo atribuidos a acciones ejecutadas entre esa fecha base y la aprobación del POT? ¿Cuánto tiempo dura la validez del avalúo? ¿Qué pasa después de cierto tiempo (por ejemplo, 15 ó 20 años)?
Estas preguntas adquieren aún más relevancia si consideramos que las normas del uso de la tierra establecidas recientemente en algunas ciudades ya han sido capitalizadas en precios de la tierra, y por ende han reducido sustancialmente los márgenes actuales para la aplicación de la participación en plusvalías.
Además, existen diferentes implicancias legales acerca de los valores relacionados que deben considerarse, es decir, el “uso real” versus el “mayor y mejor uso”. ¿En qué debe basarse el aumento del valor del suelo?: ¿en el uso potencial? ¿en el real? Y en lo que se refiere a la fórmula definida legalmente para hacer los avalúos, ¿debería aplicarse dicha fórmula al área potencialmente desarrollable, incluso si el constructor no está solicitando una autorización para desarrollar el sitio hasta su máxima densidad admisible? ¿Qué pasa si una propiedad avaluada en cierta fecha no se termina de construir? Aunque la ley define el concepto de zonas con características geoeconómicas similares, no está claro si el terrateniente puede solicitar legalmente que el avalúo se haga sobre la base de “propiedad a propiedad” o sobre la base de “zonas homogéneas”.
Otra fuente de preocupación la constituyen las estrictas fechas límites establecidas por la ley para calcular los precios comerciales antes del plan maestro y los nuevos precios de referencia después de la adopción del plan. Por ejemplo, la ley otorga a la alcaldía apenas cinco días después de la aprobación del nuevo POT para determinar los nuevos precios en las áreas afectadas, e impone además realizar todos los cálculos en el transcurso de los próximos 60 días. No está clara la estructura legal de adopción de procedimientos de costo simplificados que permitan efectuar los avalúos en áreas homogéneas de la ciudad, y no en lotes individuales.
Definición de categorías de suelo.
Las diferencias de las categorías de suelos para las leyes 9 de 1989 y 388 de 1997 conducen a interrogantes sobre su aplicabilidad. La Ley 9 incluyó una categoría de suelo suburbano que podía ser desarrollado en densidades moderadas en la periferia de las ciudades. Por ejemplo, toda la tierra desarrollable hacia el norte de Bogotá cae ahora en esa categoría suburbana, la cual permite densidades residenciales de 160 habitantes por hectárea. La zonificación propuesta por el nuevo plan maestro permite un aumento para llegar a densidades de entre 180 y 220 habitantes por hectárea. La Ley 388 establece la posibilidad de gravar la conversión del uso rural a urbano, pero no contempla la categoría suburbana, aun cuando el suelo suburbano ya posee poderosos derechos de desarrollo. Debido a estas dificultades, y para evitar problemas adicionales de implementación, muchas ciudades prefieren tratar el suelo “suburbano” como “urbano”.
Exenciones y casos especiales.
Aunque las viviendas para la población de bajos ingresos están exentas de las plusvalías, la ley impone de todas maneras calcular los aumentos en el valor del suelo. Esto constituiría un costo adicional innecesario, considerando que el 80 por ciento de todas las viviendas a construirse en Bogotá durante los próximos diez años estarán destinadas a la población de bajos recursos. ¿Qué efecto tiene este cálculo sobre la imparcialidad de este instrumento para el 20 por ciento restante de las viviendas? ¿Qué tan eficaz es la plusvalía como un instrumento de planificación que busca disminuir la especulación en la tierra designada para viviendas populares?
Otro asunto se refiere a la designación de zonas de conservación o áreas designadas para protección ambiental mediante la transferencia de derechos de desarrollo. Las protestas de agentes privados sobre las apropiaciones hechas en contra de sus derechos de propiedad plantean importantes interrogantes de compensación. Además, para el caso de áreas ya designadas para desarrollos de alta densidad pero que aún no están totalmente desarrolladas, hay también preguntas sobre las “expectativas” de los valores del suelo.
Obstáculos políticos y operativos.
Una fuente continua de confusión y malentendidos se refiere a la eficacia del cálculo del incremento en el valor del suelo. ¿Puede o debe implementarse este cálculo en los casos en que, debido a una recesión económica generalizada, los valores del suelo estén supuestamente en declive? Si el propietario pierde dinero al vender la tierra, o si no está desarrollando sus propiedades en absoluto, entonces sencillamente no habrá plusvalías disponibles para la administración local. Teóricamente bastaría con hacer una distinción entre los efectos generadores (acciones administrativas) y las tendencias en los mercados de tierras. Sin embargo, tal como está sucediendo actualmente en Colombia, en la práctica es fácil entender que los instrumentos de captura de plusvalías son más poderosos y políticamente aceptables durante los períodos de ascenso de los ciclos de precios del suelo que durante los períodos de descenso.
Las connotaciones políticas del tema se ponen de relieve si se consideran las sustanciales carteras de tierra normalmente apartadas por los promotores para fines de planificación estratégica e incluso de especulación. En efecto, muy a menudo los planificadores urbanos se ven obligados a ser más flexibles (si no magnánimos) y a aflojar los reglamentos urbanísticos a fin de motivar a los promotores durante las épocas de recesión. Claro está que esta presión por parte de los promotores podría sencillamente ser un intento de recuperar pérdidas incurridas por las decisiones equivocadas sobre inversiones en el pasado.
Algunas veces los promotores se quejan de que la municipalidad está fijando una tarifa de plusvalía demasiado alta en tiempos de economía deficiente, cuando la recesión puede desalentar las inversiones futuras en mejoras de construcción. Sin embargo, la experiencia habida con la contribución de valorización ofrece un contraargumento, sugeriendo que si la cantidad de plusvalías generadas por el cambio en el uso de la tierra se consideran sobrevaluadas, significa que el cambio carece de una buena razón costo/eficacia y por tanto no debería proponerse. Otra posibilidad es que quizás se cometió un error en los estudios o cálculos de viabilidad.
Por encima de estas dificultades prácticas, la ley impone ciertos requisitos de aplicación que afectan su operación, tales como la necesidad de notificar directamente al propietario que su propiedad está sujeta a obligaciones por plusvalías. ¿Debería esta responsabilidad correr por cuenta de la administración pública o del propietario? Existen también dificultades legales respecto a cuándo se deben cobrar las plusvalías al propietario (¿durante la liquidación de las propiedades? ¿cuando el propietario solicite la licencia de conversión del uso del suelo?). De la misma manera, si un área que se va a densificar (o sufrir cualquier cambio de zonificación) recibió una infraestructura adicional por la cual se le impuso la contribución de valorización, el propietario estaría sujeto a una doble tributación, algo que sin duda constituiría una fuente de malestar. Tal como lo establece la nueva ley, la contribución de valorización es independiente de las plusvalías, lo cual es importante debido a la opción existente de calcular y cobrar las ‘plusvalías por las obras públicas designadas por el Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial (POT).
Ajustes propuestos por funcionarios municipales
Los funcionarios públicos presentes en el seminario realizado de diciembre en Bogotá sugirieron unas cuantas maneras de simplificar la ejecución de la Ley 388, las cuales sacrifican la precisión en el cálculo de las plusvalías a cambio de conveniencia, transparencia y cumplimiento. Esta perspectiva se basa en que la voluntad política puede ser más importante que la “exactitud” técnica, al menos en las etapas tempranas y de transición de la puesta en marcha, a fin de mejorar las posibilidades de éxito a largo plazo. Un ejemplo útil y descriptivo fue el citado por los funcionarios de la ciudad de Cartagena (500 000 habitantes), la cual desde 1992 ha estado aplicando exitosamente la contribución de desarrollo municipal. Esta experiencia demuestra que los cambios de densidad de un nuevo lote deberían tener un efecto similar en la generación de las plusvalías, al de la tasa generada por el mismo tipo de cambio de densidad observada en un área distinta pero comparable de la ciudad.
Los participantes también propusieron restringir la aplicación de las plusvalías a las áreas más estratégicas y dinámicas de la ciudad, donde el potencial de ganancias sea más evidente que en áreas con poco aumento en el valor del suelo. Además, la valoración de las plusvalías debe basarse en zonas homogéneas, y no en lotes individuales. Es necesario también que el instrumento de plusvalías pase por varias fases de desarrollo escalonado conforme las municipalidades ganan conocimiento y destrezas en técnicas de valorización y avalúos. Así, el período establecido de nueve años para la validación de los avalúos de los incrementos en el valor del suelo debería ser sujeto a revisiones peródicas más frecuentes. Igualmente, la emisión de algunas reglas prácticas de transición (ausentes en la formulación original de la ley) facilitarán la introducción de un nuevo sistema fiscal.
Se hicieron otras sugerencias respecto a la adopción de planes maestros (POT). Las municipalidades deberían utilizar tales planes, en vez de algún otro mecanismo de valoración externo al POT, para identificar áreas en donde habrá un cambio en la utilización del suelo a fin de determinar si dicho cambio trae consigo un aumento en las plusvalías. Antes de adoptar el POT, las municipalidades deberán identificar tales áreas con el fin de poder tener a tiempo las técnicas de valoración y avalúos y para mitigar la sensación de incertidumbre. Algunos participantes incluso sugirieron utilizar el POT para definir el valor “anterior”, y así poder determinar el incremento neto en el valor del suelo.
En general, los participantes coincidieron en que tanto el concepto como la orientación del plan maestro y del instrumento de plusvalías son aceptables y deseables. Muchos de los problemas y asuntos discutidos en el seminario y en todo el país se refieren a la ejecución de cualquier esquema de captura de plusvalías, o simplemente de cualquier nueva legislación normativa o fiscal. En este caso el diseño de los procedimientos de ejecución puede mejorarse, dado que siempre será más fácil cambiar los aspectos operativos que la ley en sí. Sin embargo, y por encima de todas las dificultades formales remanentes, se ha demostrado claramente que la voluntad política, la experiencia técnica acumulada y el compromiso ético de los participantes son factores críticos para perfeccionar este instrumento de política del suelo y poner en práctica los principios muy encomiables que lo inspiran.
Carolina Barco de Botero es la Directora de Planeamiento de la ciudad de Bogotá, Gerente Consultora de Ciudades, Ltda. en Bogotá y forma parte del Consejo Directivo del Instituto Lincoln. Martim Smolka es Senior Fellow y Director del Programa para América Latina del Instituto Lincoln. Fernanda Furtado, Fellow del Instituto Lincoln, también participó en la elaboración de este artículo. Recientemente terminó su tesis de Ph.D. (en portugués) sobre la captura de plusvalías en América Latina, en la Facultad de Arquitectura y Urbanismo de la Universidad de São Paulo, Brasil. En uno de los capítulos de su tesis se describe la situación de Colombia.
Argumentos en favor y en contra de la participación en plusvalías
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Supporters of land taxation view it as an efficient and effective means of financing government, and the concept has wide appeal among public finance scholars. Many economists, including several Nobel Prize winners, actively endorse this method of taxation, which taxes land value separately and instead of buildings and improvements. At least from an academic perspective, then, the case for the efficiency and fairness of a land-based tax system seems irrefutable.
Despite that support, the concept of land taxation has not been widely embraced in the United States. Property tax bases are set by state constitutional or statutory law, so local governments cannot implement a land tax, or its split-rate variant, without authorization from their respective state legislatures. Other than a handful of Pennsylvania cities that have adopted split-rate or two-rate tax systems, no American jurisdictions currently place higher tax burdens on land than on buildings and other improvements. Virginia recently responded to interest in two-rate taxation with legislation allowing two local governments to adopt graded tax programs, but they have not yet done so. While split-rate taxation is discussed periodically as a reform measure, there are no current proposals for its adoption awaiting action before a state legislature (Brunori and Carr 2002).
Statutory or constitutional enactment of a land tax would entail revising property tax laws that have been substantially unchanged for more than a century. In general, state legislators are cautious about implementing dramatic reforms in any public policy area, and comprehensive tax reform has been a particularly elusive goal. Adoption of split-rate or land taxation would be a dramatic change, requiring significant awareness, advocacy and support in the ranks of the legislature and at the local level.
There are few areas of government finance in which scholarly opinion and actual public policy diverge so dramatically. This situation prompted me to undertake two nationwide research surveys. The first survey sought to ascertain the level of knowledge of land taxation on the part of the nation’s state legislators. Without an understanding of the issues presented by the taxation of land, legislators are unlikely to champion, advocate or even vote for such measures. I also surveyed local elected officials, because state legislators will not advocate any reforms without constituent support. Moreover, since the reforms at issue will affect primarily local government finances, any legislative body seeking to reform a tax system will solicit the views and advice of local officials.
The Survey Questions
To gauge general awareness of the concept of land value taxation, the survey began with a broad question, describing it as “taxing the full value of land but exempting buildings, structures and other improvements from tax.” The next question narrowed the scope to determine familiarity with split-rate taxation, the version of land taxation practiced in Pennsylvania and authorized in two Virginia municipalities. Because it entails less dramatic reforms, split-rate taxation is the version of land taxation most likely to be adopted in the U.S. This concept was described as “taxing land at a higher rate than buildings, structures and other improvements.”
Legislative research has long found that state lawmakers are likely to support policies that they believe will foster economic development and oppose policies perceived to deter development (Beamer 1999). Taxing land at a higher rate than improvements has historically been thought to encourage building and investment by eliminating or reducing the tax burdens of improving the land. Thus, the third question asked for the respondents’ opinion on the effect that taxing improvements at a lower rate than land would have on economic development, defined as capital investment and job creation.
The proliferation of suburban sprawl is a growing concern among legislators and local officials across the country. The vast academic literature suggests that policy makers view sprawl unfavorably and that most officials think that policies that promote sprawl are unsound. Some public finance scholars believe that adopting split-rate tax policies will limit the negative effects of sprawl (Brueckner 2001). If this belief is true, split-rate taxation could play an important role in the continuing debate over policies intended to deter suburban sprawl. Question four asked what effect taxing improvements at a lower rate than land would have on sprawl. Sprawl was not defined in the question because the term can refer to a number of developments affecting density, suburban growth, loss of open space and decrease in population. Indeed, scholars have lamented the lack of a single operational definition of sprawl. Still, the perception of sprawl as an undesirable land use pattern and policy outcome warranted inclusion of the question in the survey.
Finally, state and local legislators are influenced by the desires and concerns of their constituents. The more important a particular issue is to constituents, the better informed a legislator will become about that issue. Thus, survey participants were asked if during the past year any citizens or organizations had contacted their offices with respect to the issue of split-rate taxation, and if so, whether the constituent supported or opposed the idea.
State and Local Respondents
The first survey focused on state legislators who served on committees with primary responsibility for tax policy and local government finance during the period January–June 2003. There were 106 such committees in the 50 state legislatures, but I excluded those in Pennsylvania and Virginia. Since those states have either adopted or authorized graded tax systems, I assumed that their legislators would be more familiar with the concept and could bias the results.
For the second survey I chose city and county officials from 15 randomly selected local jurisdictions within the 25 largest metropolitan areas in the U.S. To insure a national perspective, I also included city council members from the largest city in each state. Again I focused on officials with primary responsibility for implementing and administering public finance policy and excluded all jurisdictions in Pennsylvania and Virginia.
The survey questions were sent to 1,284 legislators, of whom 780 responded (see Brunori 2003 for more information on methodology). An identical survey was sent to 3,298 city and county officials, of whom 430 responded. The response rate for the state legislators was far above national standards, and the response rate for the local officials was considerably below national standards, but both were statistically significant.
Before revealing the results of the survey research, I must confess that I entered this project with a bias. Having worked in the state and local tax field my entire professional life, as a lawyer, teacher and journalist, I think about tax policy more than any sane person should and have come to know many state legislators and local public officials. In my experience, these government officials are quite capable of finding revenues to pay the bills, but they generally have little in-depth knowledge of the more philosophical and theoretical underpinnings of tax policy. So I assumed that few of them would understand what I was talking about when I began asking questions about land taxation. After all, I did not think most politicians were using their spare time to read Henry George’s classic book, Progress and Poverty. I was quite surprised at the responses.
The Results
In a country where there are virtually no land tax policies in place, the survey results show that a vast majority of elected political leaders do know about land and split-rate taxation (see Table 1). More surprising, to me at least, most political leaders are aware of the benefits of adopting land tax policies. More than 70 percent of the state legislators and 65 percent of the local government officials responded that they were either very or somewhat familiar with the concept of land value taxation, and 67 percent of state legislators and 65 percent of local officials were very or somewhat familiar with split-rate taxation.
The single most important policy goal (after public safety) that concerns American politicians is economic development. When asked about the relationship between the economy and land taxation, more than 62 percent of state legislators and 76 percent of local government officials replied that adopting a split-rate tax system would promote economic development. About one-quarter of both state and local officials thought that taxing improvements at a lower rate than land would have no effect on economic development. These results are arguably consistent with the conventional view that land taxation would have a benign effect on economic decision making. Only 5 percent of the state legislators and no local officials believed that taxing land at a higher rate would deter economic development.
One of the common misperceptions about land taxation is that it will lead to more sprawl, and many, but not a majority, of the respondents shared that misperception. Forty-one percent of surveyed state legislators and 46 percent of local officials said they believed that adopting a split-rate tax system would lead to more suburban sprawl. About 51 percent of the state legislators and 53 percent of local officials surveyed said that split-rate taxation would have no effect on sprawl or would deter sprawl. The fact that so many respondents believe that split-rate taxation would foster more sprawl, presumably by encouraging development of open space in suburban and rural areas, should be troubling to advocates of land taxation.
Finally, a surprisingly small number of elected political leaders have been contacted by constituents regarding land taxation. Eleven percent of state legislators and 9 percent of local government officials said an individual constituent or organization had contacted them regarding the issue of land-based or split-rate taxation, and all were supporters of the idea.
What Does It All Mean?
What originally sparked my interest in this research project was the disconnect between scholarly opinion about land taxation and political action to promote it. I thought this discrepancy might be the result of ignorance of the concepts of land taxation on the part of state and local political leaders. If state legislators and city council members were unaware of land or graded taxation, then they could not be expected to champion such reforms.
The survey results show, however, that this discrepancy cannot be resolved by looking at level of awareness alone. Most state legislators and local officials involved in public finance and taxation issues are familiar with both land taxation and split-rate taxation, and they know that moving to a split-rate tax system would have a positive effect on economic development. Moreover, a slight majority of those surveyed believe that graded taxes would have no negative effects on sprawl.
Since state and local officials know about land taxation and believe it could lead to positive policy outcomes, why are so few local governments using this method of public finance? It is difficult to answer that question without eliciting views on more technical aspects of land or split-rate taxation. Implementation of land taxation raises complex issues as to the feasibility of adopting major property tax reforms, the effects on other revenue sources, and the administration of a land tax system, particularly with respect to valuation. Solving the mystery as to why more jurisdictions are not exploring the policy of taxing land at a higher rate than improvements may lie in analyzing these important operational factors.
References
Beamer, Glenn. 1999. Creative politics: Taxes and public goods in a federal system. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Brueckner, Jan K. 2001. Property taxation and urban sprawl. In Property taxation and local government finance, Wallace E. Oates, editor. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
Brunori, David. 2003. Awareness of land taxation: Survey of state legislators. Working paper. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
Brunori, David, and Jennifer Carr. 2002. Valuing land and improvements: State law and local government practices. State Tax Notes (September 30):1023–1033.
David Brunori is contributing editor of State Tax Notes for Tax Analysts in Arlington, Virginia, and research professor of public policy at The George Washington University in Washington, DC. This article is based on research he conducted as part of a David C. Lincoln Fellowship in Land Value Taxation, awarded by the Lincoln Institute.
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Faculty Profile of Andrew Reschovsky
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En la mayoría de los países, las propiedades del gobierno no se encuentran sujetas al impuesto sobre la propiedad; de hecho, la sola idea podría considerarse como un intercambio circular de dinero (Bird y Slack 2004; Youngman y Malme 1994). En el último tiempo, el Reino Unido ha adoptado un punto de vista muy diferente. Considerando que es muy importante que tanto el gobierno como los ocupantes del gobierno municipal estén al tanto del verdadero costo que implica tener propiedades, el Reino Unido insiste en un sistema de alquileres teóricos y garantiza la sujeción a los impuestos sobre la propiedad de ámbito municipal.
Desde la promulgación de la Ley de Asistencia a la Pobreza en 1601 (la fecha generalmente aceptada en que comenzó la tributación de inmuebles municipales en el Reino Unido) hasta el año 2000 (cuando se aprobaron los cambios a esta ley), los inmuebles ocupados por el gobierno o la Corona no se encontraban sujetos al impuesto o a las “tasas” sobre la propiedad. No obstante, la Corona, de hecho, aceptó que era apropiado realizar algún tipo de aporte con el fin de cubrir los costos de los servicios municipales, por lo que pagaba voluntariamente aportes en lugar de tasas (CILOR, por sus siglas en inglés). Este proceso conllevaba varios problemas: los aportes eran voluntarios; los inmuebles de la Corona no figuraban en los listados de valuaciones; y la base sobre la cual se realizaban los aportes carecía del rigor y la transparencia de valuación que se aplicaban al resto de las propiedades.
La Ley Municipal de Gobierno y Valuación se promulgó en 1997 para su aplicación en Inglaterra, Escocia y Gales (más tarde, en 1998, se introdujo una modificación para Irlanda del Norte) con el fin de que todos los inmuebles de la Corona estuvieran en pie de igualdad con respecto al resto de las propiedades sujetas a impuesto y pudieran ser pasibles de ser valuadas para determinar sus tasas. Estas disposiciones entraron en vigor el 1 de abril de 2000. Como resultado, edificios emblemáticos tales como el Palacio de Westminster y la Torre de Londres son valuados por primera vez en la actualidad de la misma manera que el resto de las propiedades.
Valuación de inmuebles comerciales
Los tasadores de la Agencia de Valuaciones (VOA, por sus siglas en inglés), perteneciente al Departamento de Impuestos y Aduanas de Su Majestad (HMRC, por sus siglas en inglés), son los responsables de compilar y mantener los listados de valuaciones de inmuebles comerciales (no residenciales) para Inglaterra y Gales. En Escocia, los responsables son los tasadores municipales, y en Irlanda del Norte, la responsabilidad recae sobre el Servicio de Suelos e Inmuebles. En general, el valor catastral de un inmueble no residencial está basado en el alquiler anual por el cual podría haberse alquilado en el mercado abierto a una fecha estándar (la fecha de valuación precedente). En el caso de Inglaterra y Gales, la fecha precedente para los listados de 2000 fue el 1 de abril de 1998; para los listados de 2005, el 1 de abril de 2003; y para los listados de 2010, que entraron en vigor el 1 de abril de 2010, la fecha precedente fue el 1 de abril de 2008.
La Tabla 1 muestra la cantidad de inmuebles sujetos a impuesto en Inglaterra y Gales y su valor catastral (imponible) total. Resulta un tanto difícil realizar comparaciones con los impuestos sobre la propiedad basados en el valor capital, ya que para ello es necesario conocer los rendimientos respectivos; aún así, es evidente que el nivel de tributación es extraordinariamente alto para un impuesto sobre la propiedad. El nivel del impuesto en Inglaterra y Gales es de aproximadamente el 45 por ciento, aunque esta cifra corresponde a los valores de alquiler, no de capital.
El gobierno del Reino Unido establece una tasa uniforme del impuesto en forma separada (peso por libra esterlina) para Inglaterra, conocida como el multiplicador de valuación para inmuebles no residenciales. En Escocia y Gales, esta tasa es determinada por sus respectivas asambleas y, en el caso de Irlanda del Norte, cada consejo distrital establece su propia tasa. Así se determina el monto a pagar sobre cada libra esterlina de valor catastral, a fin de obtener la factura completa de tasas del impuesto. Las autoridades municipales son las responsables de calcular el monto de las facturas y recaudar las tasas del impuesto sobre inmuebles no residenciales correspondientes a las propiedades que se encuentran dentro de sus áreas de influencia. No obstante, las autoridades no conservan los montos que cobran, sino que los depositan en un fondo nacional (uno para Inglaterra y otro para Gales). El dinero que conforma dicho fondo se redistribuye luego entre las autoridades municipales, con ciertos acuerdos especiales para la ciudad de Londres.
Antecedentes de la exención a la Corona
Antes de que se emitieran los listados de valuaciones en el año 2000, ciertas propiedades ocupadas por la Corona, tales como las instalaciones donde funcionan las oficinas del gobierno central y el Ministerio de Defensa, se encontraban exentas de la valuación y no figuraban en ningún listado de valuaciones. No obstante, la Corona realizaba un CILOR en forma voluntaria en base a un valor catastral teórico.
La Corona no figuraba expresamente ni en la Ley de Asistencia a la Pobreza de 1601 (la ley original de valuaciones se conocía también como la Ley de Isabel) ni en la Ley de Tasas Generales de 1967 que la reemplazó. Debido a que uno de los principios del derecho del Reino Unido consistía en que la Corona no se encontraba sujeta a ningún acto parlamentario a menos que se la mencionara específicamente, no era susceptible a las tasas. Además, no podía imponerse tasa alguna sobre aquellos inmuebles ocupados por sus funcionarios cuando dicha ocupación se entendía como ocupación por la Corona. Este fue el punto de vista mantenido en la causa Jones contra Mersey Docks 11 HL Cas. 443 (1865).
Sin embargo, ya en 1860 el gobierno aceptó el principio de que la Corona pagara alguna suma en forma de CILOR voluntario respecto de los inmuebles ocupados a los fines públicos. Dicha práctica se volvió uniforme en 1874. El Tesoro del Reino Unido adoptó, mediante acta formal, el principio de que los inmuebles ocupados para las funciones públicas debían pagar tasas municipales de la misma manera que otros inmuebles de los condados en los que estaban ubicados, teniendo en cuenta las características de cada caso. El acta del Tesoro estableció el Departamento de Valuaciones de Propiedades del Gobierno (RGPD, por sus siglas en inglés) para evaluar todos los inmuebles del gobierno con el fin de adoptar, en cada caso y hasta donde fuera posible, los mismos principios que se aplicaban a la valuación de inmuebles particulares.
El derecho consuetudinario del siglo XIX establecía que la exención sólo se aplicaba a las propiedades ocupadas por la Corona misma o sus funcionarios, y no al resto de los inmuebles ocupados con fines públicos. Por lo tanto, la exención se aplicaba generalmente a los inmuebles ocupados para usos del gobierno central y a los palacios y parques reales, así como también a otros inmuebles ocupados por funcionarios de la Corona (por ejemplo, la ocupación por parte de los ministros de gobierno o el personal militar de la base naval real, del ejército y de la fuerza aérea real).
En 1896, mediante otra acta del Tesoro se reafirmó el principio de aporte equitativo y se establecieron ciertas concesiones a fin de que entrara en plena vigencia. Estas concesiones consistían en una revaluación periódica, el pago dentro de los plazos establecidos y una contribución con respecto a las cámaras del Parlamento.
A continuación se detallan las principales características del CILOR en los últimos años de su existencia:
Los acuerdos del CILOR se diferenciaban del resto de los procedimientos de valuación estándar en los siguientes aspectos principales:
Fundamentos para eliminar la exención a la Corona
El gobierno ha estado debatiendo la eliminación de la exención a la Corona ya desde la Segunda Guerra Mundial. El Comité Central de Valuaciones, en una carta fechada el 21 de enero de 1947 y dirigida al Ministro de Salud, de hecho sugería dicha eliminación, a la vez que declaraba que su punto de vista, desde hacía mucho tiempo, era que los acuerdos de valuación de inmuebles ocupados por la Corona vigentes hasta ese momento eran en muchos aspectos injustos e insatisfactorios para las autoridades municipales, quienes, en ese entonces, establecían sus propios niveles de tasas. En la década de 1950, las asociaciones de autoridades municipales inglesas expresaron su descontento con la exención aplicable a la Corona y llegaron hasta el punto de declarar que la forma de calcular los CILOR era completamente arbitraria y que con frecuencia representaba un perjuicio para las autoridades municipales. En 1952 calcularon el valor catastral de los inmuebles de la Corona en Inglaterra y Gales en aproximadamente £14 millones, de un valor catastral total de cerca de £341 millones, lo que equivaldría a £2.200 millones según los niveles de valores en la revaluación del año 2010.
A mediados de la década de 1990, el gobierno consideró varios aspectos impulsores para un cambio:
La Ley Municipal de Gobierno y Valuación de 1997 estableció la eliminación de la exención que gozaba la Corona de tasas por inmuebles no residenciales en Inglaterra, Gales y Escocia con vigencia a partir del 1 de abril de 2000. Las autoridades responsables de la valuación cobrarían las tasas correspondientes a los inmuebles de la Corona directamente a los respectivos departamentos, en lugar de cobrarlos a la CPU. Dichas autoridades también podrían iniciar procedimientos de ejecución en contra de la Corona, tal como lo harían con otros contribuyentes. Aunque esto ocurriría solamente en raras ocasiones, las autoridades responsables de las valuaciones podrían, en principio, tomar medidas contra un departamento del gobierno con el fin de obtener una orden de apremio por falta de pago de tasas, en el caso de que fuera necesario.
Los profesionales de la valuación en el Reino Unido han sugerido que, debido a que la valuación es un impuesto, tasar y sujetar a impuesto los inmuebles ocupados por entes públicos representa un derroche de recursos públicos. Las propiedades que podrían incluirse en esta categoría incluyen aquellas ocupadas por el Ministerio de Defensa, el Servicio Nacional de Salud y las autoridades municipales. Superficialmente, el hecho de valuar y sujetar a impuesto estas propiedades puede parecer injustificado. La dificultad reside en que muchas de las actividades que tradicionalmente son llevadas a cabo por el gobierno central o los gobiernos municipales ahora son también realizadas por el sector privado. Un ejemplo de ello son los centros de recreación. Aplicar la exención de tasas a las propiedades de las autoridades municipales cuando estas compiten directamente con el sector privado podría considerarse injusto, ya que le brindaría una ventaja fiscal al sector público.
Aunque el sector público ocupa otros edificios cuya utilización actual evidentemente no compite con el sector privado, resulta difícil justificar la exención de ciertos inmuebles ocupados por el sector público, mientras incluye otros. La justificación original para valuar edificios ocupados por los entes públicos (incluyendo la eliminación de la exención a la Corona en 2000) fue establecer una base en condiciones de igualdad, garantizar que los costos de ocupación se reconocieran en su totalidad y brindar transparencia en cuanto a la contribución de los entes del sector público para cubrir los costos relacionados con los servicios públicos brindados.
Valuación de edificios emblemáticos
La eliminación de la exención a la Corona precipitó la necesidad de valuar una amplia gama de inmuebles fuera de lo común. La valuación en el Reino Unido es un impuesto que se aplica al ocupante y no al propietario, y está basado en la utilización real amplia en lugar de la mayor y mejor utilización del inmueble. Los edificios muy antiguos con frecuencia deben ser valuados, aunque muchos de ellos se han modernizado y se utilizan para diferentes fines, tales como oficinas, usos comerciales mixtos o, al menos en parte, atracciones turísticas.
El tradicional enfoque de comparación de valuaciones pudo aplicarse en inmuebles que tenían un uso similar, con el fin de permitir la determinación de un valor de alquiler indicativo para algunas estructuras, aunque, en el caso de otras, la tarea resultó mucho más difícil. Por ejemplo, la Casa Somerset, sobre el río Támesis, es un bloque de oficinas construido a tal fin, pero es además el primer bloque de oficinas del gobierno que fue construido a tal fin, data de 1776 y ha sido utilizado en filmaciones comerciales, por lo que resulta difícil compararlo con otros edificios.
La valuación de inmuebles fuera de lo común no se limita a las propiedades de la Corona o a aquellas en las que el método de comparación de alquileres no puede usarse porque no existen comparaciones de interés. En tales casos, la aplicación del método de ingresos y gastos o el método de las ganancias puede resultar mucho más confiable a la hora de determinar el valor de mercado en cuanto al alquiler de una propiedad. Este método es apropiado si el inmueble sujeto a valuación es comercial por naturaleza o posee cierto grado de monopolio, y si la principal motivación del ocupante para utilizar el inmueble fuera obtener ganancias y, de hecho, estuviera obteniéndolas (Bond y Brown 2006).
En el caso de no poder utilizar ni el método de la comparación ni el método de ingresos y gastos, se aplica entonces el método de base de contratistas o método de costos cuando el inmueble sirve principalmente para fines públicos y no se encuentra ocupado para beneficio comercial, o cuando el inmueble en cuestión es comercial pero no constituye un centro de ganancias con sus propias cuentas. En ambos casos, el ocupante (o propietario) debería soportar el costo de un inmueble de reemplazo para poder continuar con la utilización del inmueble.
Además del problema de la valuación, nos enfrentamos a la complejidad que existe en el Reino Unido en cuanto a tener un impuesto separado sobre propiedades residenciales. En Inglaterra, Escocia y Gales, este tributo se denomina impuesto municipal, mientras que en Irlanda del Norte, el sistema tiene que ver con tasas residenciales. Si alguna parte del inmueble se utiliza para fines residenciales, según se define en la legislación, entonces se determina el impuesto residencial sobre dicha porción del inmueble. De esta manera, en cuanto al Palacio de Buckingham y al Castillo de Windsor, ambos palacios reales, se aplica una valuación sobre la porción no residencial y comercial, y un impuesto municipal sobre las secciones residenciales de dichos edificios.
Palacio de Westminster
El Palacio de Westminster, también denominado Parlamento, es un palacio real y el lugar donde las dos cámaras del Parlamento del Reino Unido celebran sus sesiones, es decir, la Cámara de los Lores y la Cámara de los Comunes. El Palacio es el centro de la vida política y “Westminster” se ha convertido en una metonimia que refiere al Parlamento del Reino Unido y al sistema de gobierno de Westminster, del cual se origina su nombre. La Torre de Isabel, a la cual generalmente se la llama por el nombre de su campana principal, Big Ben, es un hito emblemático de Londres. La arquitectura del Renacimiento Gótico, obra de Sir Charles Barry, data de 1840, pero el extraordinario Salón de Westminster con su techo de cerchas se remonta al año 1097.
El Palacio de Westminster ha sido parte del patrimonio de la humanidad desde 1987. Este Palacio tenía un valor catastral de £14.700.000 en el listado municipal de valuaciones de 2010 (£5.500.000 en el listado de valuaciones de 2000). Si se aplica la tasa estándar del impuesto del 45,8 por ciento, la deuda impositiva ascendería, sin tener en cuenta ninguna exención, a aproximadamente £6.730.000 por año. La tasación en realidad combina cuatro edificios: el Palacio, la Casa Portcullis, la Puerta Derby 1 y los edificios Norman Shaw. Todas estas secciones se valúan según el método comparativo respecto de las oficinas, y se aplican descuentos por diseño y tamaño, de corresponder. En el caso del Palacio, ambas Cámaras se encuentran valuadas al 65 por ciento de la tasa principal por metro cuadrado. Existe también otro descuento con el fin de reflejar la superficie cubierta total en la propiedad.
Palacio de Buckingham
El Palacio de Buckingham es la residencia oficial y principal lugar de trabajo de Su Majestad la Reina Isabel II en Londres, tanto respecto de su posición como monarca británica y jefe de estado de varios países en todo el mundo, como de cabeza de la Mancomunidad Británica. Este Palacio, ubicado en la ciudad de Westminster, es la sede donde se desarrollan los eventos de estado y donde se brinda hospedaje real. El edificio que hoy en día forma el centro del palacio, y que anteriormente se denominaba Casa Buckingham, era una gran residencia urbana que se construyó para el Duque de Buckingham en 1705. El Palacio de Buckingham se convirtió en el palacio real oficial de los monarcas británicos cuando la Reina Victoria ascendió al trono en 1837.
El Palacio de Buckingham se utiliza en parte como una de las residencias del monarca, aunque principalmente consiste de oficinas. Hace poco se ha permitido cierto uso comercial limitado, ya que algunos sectores del edificio se encuentran abiertos a los visitantes. La parte comercial posee un valor catastral de £1.300.000 según el listado de valuación municipal de 2010. El Palacio se valúa utilizando dos métodos. En primer lugar, se aplica el método de ingresos y gastos o de ganancias a fin de reflejar el componente comercial (aproximadamente 400.000 personas lo visitaron en el año 2011). La propiedad está abierta durante 63 días al año en horarios limitados, por lo que los ingresos respectivos se consideran anualizados y luego se agrega el 5 por ciento a fin de reflejar el hecho de que, si estuviera abierto al público durante más horas, se generarían más ingresos por entradas. Las cuentas comerciales, según los informes publicados, muestran que el valor catastral fue equivalente al 6,3 por ciento de los ingresos corrientes de mantenimiento. En segundo lugar, el método de contratistas o de costos se aplica a la Galería de la Reina. El componente residencial del Palacio posee 775 habitaciones, entre las que se cuentan 52 dormitorios reales y para huéspedes, 188 dormitorios para el personal, 19 salas de estado y 78 baños. En el período 2011-2012, la factura del impuesto municipal ascendió a £1.369.
Torre de Londres
El Palacio Real y Fortaleza de Su Majestad, comúnmente conocida como la Torre de Londres, es un castillo histórico que descansa sobre la ribera norte del río Támesis en la zona central de Londres y data de la conquista de Inglaterra por parte de los Normandos en el año 1066. La Torre Blanca, que le otorga su nombre a todo el castillo, fue construida por Guillermo el Conquistador en 1078. La Torre ha tenido diferentes funciones: arsenal, oficina del tesoro, prisión, zoológico, sede de la Casa de la Moneda Real y oficina de registros públicos. En la actualidad, la Torre alberga las joyas de la Corona y es una de las atracciones turísticas más conocidas del país: en el año 2011 recibió aproximadamente 2,55 millones de visitantes.
La Torre se encuentra protegida ya que ha sido declarada patrimonio de la humanidad por la UNESCO (además de estar protegida por muros muy altos y sistemas de alarma muy elaborados). El inmueble se valúa según el método de ingresos y gastos, debido a su valor particular en calidad de atracción turística. El valor catastral equivale aproximadamente al 4,7 por ciento de los ingresos corrientes de mantenimiento. En el listado municipal de valuaciones del año 2010, la propiedad tenía un valor catastral de £1.790.000 (en el listado de valuaciones del año 2000 el valor fue de £1.180.000).
Stonehenge
Stonehenge es un círculo de piedras prehistórico que se encuentra en la llanura de Salisbury. Está integrado por un monumento de rocas megalítico formado por 150 piedras enormes colocadas siguiendo un diseño circular, que data del año 3.000 A.C. Aunque existen otros círculos de piedras mucho más grandes en otros lugares del mundo (inclusive uno cercano en Averbury), Stonehenge es único debido a que las piedras de arenisca se encuentran coronadas por dinteles que se empalman unos con otros y que, alguna vez, formaron un círculo completo y conectado. Stonehenge fue construido a lo largo de un período de 1.500 años. Se lo ha declarado patrimonio de la humanidad y atrae aproximadamente un millón de visitantes al año. Debido al funcionamiento comercial de esta propiedad, se la valúa aplicando el método de ingresos y gastos, a un valor catastral de £700.000.
Resumen
Los inmuebles que son propiedad de la Corona y ocupados por esta se valúan actualmente de acuerdo con los métodos y principios normales de valuación. La eliminación de la exención a la Corona ha dado como resultado la valuación “correcta” de ciertos edificios históricos únicos y, muchas veces, emblemáticos. Los métodos de valuación aplicados deben reflejar la utilización que se hace de cada edificio y, donde las comparaciones de alquileres sean limitadas, es posible que deba aplicarse el enfoque basado en los costos. Este último enfoque implica importantes dificultades cuando se aplica a edificios con una antigüedad de varios centenares de años. En tales casos, los tasadores deben ser creativos, artísticos y científicos en sus valuaciones.
Sobre los autores
William McCluskey es investigador del Instituto de Investigaciones sobre el Entorno Construido de la Universidad de Ulster, Irlanda del Norte, Reino Unido. Contacto: wj.mccluskey@ulster.ac.uk.
David Tretton FRICS FIRRV es profesor invitado en la Facultad de Entorno Construido de la Universidad de Ulster, Irlanda del Norte, Reino Unido. Anteriormente fue jefe de departamento y director de Tasación en la Agencia de Valuaciones de Londres. En la actualidad es el editor técnico de RICS Valuation – Professional Standards (libro rojo). Contacto: dtretton@rics.org o djtretton@btinternet.com.
Los autores desean agradecer a Patrick Bond, BSc FRICS Dip. Rating IRRV (Hons), jefe de la Unidad de Especialistas Nacionales en Asuntos Comerciales, Cívicos y de Ocio de la Agencia de Valuaciones de Londres.
Referencias
Bird, R. M. y E. Slack. 2004. International handbook of land and property taxation. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Bond, P. y P. Brown. 2006. Rating valuation: Principles and practice. Londres: Estates Gazette.
Informe Oficial de la Carta de Ciudadanos. 1991. Citizens Charter Open Government, Cm 2290, HMSO, Londres.
Youngman, J. M. y J. H. Malme. 1994. An international survey of taxes on land and buildings. Boston, MA: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers.
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Value capture instruments are widely considered to be beneficial fiscal planning mechanisms, even though they are difficult to implement. Colombia is notable in Latin America for its unique and long-standing experience with institutionalizing value capture through collecting the Contribución de Valorización, a kind of special assessment, and the Contribución de Desarrollo Municipal (Law 9 of 1989), which preceded the current instrument, Participación en Plusvalías.
Since 1921 when the first such legislation was introduced, Colombia has developed a fiscal culture in which people are aware of and accept value capture instruments as a legitimate revenue-raising mechanism. For example, in 1968, at the height of its use, the Contribución de Valorización accounted for 16 percent of local revenues in Bogotá and about 45 percent in Medellín; in the early 1980s it raised about 30 percent of total revenues in Cali. Nevertheless, because land still plays an important role as a hedge against inflation in places like Colombia, where capital markets are not highly developed, the implementation of such devices still meets with strong political resistance from many constituencies, ranging from powerful landowners and developers to low- and moderate-income families for whom land is an important source of personal savings.
Building on this experience, Law 388 of 1997 creating Participación en Plusvalías decrees that all municipalities must design and approve a ten-year master plan (Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial-POT) and adopt plusvalías as one of the plan’s main sources of income. The revenues raised through plusvalías are to be used primarily for the provision of social housing and infrastructure in under-served neighborhoods, as well as for public works of general interest. The law establishes three administrative conditions for applying the plusvalías instrument as part of the POT:
1. when land changes from one category to another, especially when rural land with low development potential is included within the master plan’s growth boundary and therefore becomes designated as land for urban expansion or as suburban land;
2. when additional development (density) rights are authorized in an area; or
3. when an area changes use, especially from residential to commercial use.
The Participación en Plusvalías is grounded in the legitimate public right to participate in capturing land value increments resulting from administrative actions such as changes in zoning or density that may generate substantial windfalls for the landowner. It is important to note that this instrument is not a tax, a contribution or a fee, but rather a mandated right of the public to ‘participate’ in the value generated by government functions aimed at enhancing urban development. Law 388 and its accompanying decrees define the general parameters for using plusvalías, but the municipalities are required to determine its specific procedures. However, many mayors and other public officials are concerned about the law’s ambiguities and are struggling with the process of applying both the law and the plusvalías instrument.
To address the need for a forum in which public officials and other experts could discuss this problem, the Lincoln Institute and the Bogotá Planning Department held a seminar in December 1999, before the deadline for approval of the legal master plan (POT) on December 31. The seminar convened practitioners actively involved in the implementation process, including planning directors from major cities, representatives of national public agencies and ministries, representatives of institutions in charge of property assessments, lawyers, and scholars involved in the design of the instrument. One immediate outcome of the seminar was a successful lobbying effort to change the deadline to June 30, 2000, to allow more time to review and revise the problematic POT provisions.
Key Implementation Issues
Application of plusvalías to different situations. Most municipal representatives at the seminar agreed that plusvalías should be used only in those situations that result in a clear and substantial windfall, in order to generate greater citizen approval and a simpler administrative process during the first phase of implementation. The general consensus is that Contribución de Valorización has been accepted because the increase in the value of land that benefited from public investment was clearly understood by the owners, so they have been willing to pay the fee. In Bogotá, for example, Contribución de Valorización has been one of the major means for building new streets since 1969.
By comparison, plusvalías are applied only to situations in which a higher land value is specifically associated with a public land use decision defined in the POT, such as changing the land category, its density or its use. Extending the growth boundary to include rural land that can be developed in subsequent years is an explicit situation in which the change in land price is evident. Most representatives of municipalities felt this was the most obvious scenario for application and should be the main focus of the instrument in its first phase.
Accuracy of land value assessments.
Law 388 suggests that the date for the base land price against which the gain is measured is to be July 1997, the date when Congress approved the law. However, it is not clear whether and how the municipalities can determine that land price in subsequent years. The problem is that the initial base value to be compared to the current value may already be influenced by ‘rumors’ circulating about land designations in the master plans. Should the value be calculated before the rumors of urbanistic changes begin to circulate, or just before the actual decision is made? How should cities treat land value increments generated by actions occurring between that base date and the approval of the POT? For how long is the assessment valid? What happens after, say, 15 or 20 years?
These questions are all the more relevant considering that land use norms established recently in some cities have already been capitalized in land prices, thus reducing substantially the current margins for the application of Participación en Plusvalías.
Furthermore, there are different legal implications about which relevant values should be considered (i.e., current use vs. highest and best use). Should the land value increment be based on the potential or the actual value? Should the legally defined formula for assessments apply to the potential buildable area even if the builder is not requesting a license to develop the site to its full allowable density? What happens when a property that has been assessed on a certain date is not completed? Although the law defines the concept of zones with similar geo-economic characteristics, it is not clear whether the landowner may legally request the assessment to be done on a property-by-property basis or on the basis of homogeneous zones.
The short deadlines established by the law for calculating both commercial prices before the master plan and new reference prices after adoption of the plan also cause serious concerns. For example, the law states that the mayor has only five days after the new POT is approved to determine new prices in the affected areas, and that all calculations must be accomplished within the next 60 days. The legal structure for adopting simplified cost procedures to allow assessments for homogeneous areas of the city rather than for individual plots is not clear on this point.
Definition of land categories.
Differences in land categories between Law 9 of 1989 and Law 388 of 1997 have led to questions of applicability. Law 9 included a suburban land category that could be developed at moderate densities on the outskirts of cities. For example, all of the developable land to the north of Bogotá is now in that suburban category, which permits residential densities of 160 inhabitants per hectare. The zoning proposed by the new master plan permits an increase to between 180 and 220 inhabitants per hectare. Law 388 states that the change from rural to urban use may be taxed, but does not address the suburban category, even though suburban land already has strong development rights. Because of these difficulties, many cities prefer to treat suburban land as similar to urban land in order to avoid further implementation problems.
Exemptions and special cases.
Land for low-income housing is exempted from plusvalías, but the law states that the land value increments must be calculated anyway. This may constitute an unnecessary additional cost, considering that 80 percent of all housing to be built in Bogotá within the next ten years will be low-income housing. How does this affect the fairness of this instrument on the remaining 20 percent of housing? How effective will plusvalías be as a planning instrument seeking to decrease speculation on land designated for social housing?
Another issue deals with wipeouts resulting from master plan designation of conservation zones or areas set aside for environmental protection through transfer of development rights (TDRs). Complaints from private agents of ‘takings’ against their full rights of ownership raise important questions of compensation. Areas that already have been designated for high-density development but are not yet fully built also raise questions about the expectation component of land values.
Political and operational obstacles.
A continuing source of confusion and misunderstanding concerns the technical issues associated with the effective calculation of the land value increment. Can it or should it be implemented in cases when, due to general economic recession, all land values are allegedly declining? If landowners are either selling land at a loss or not initiating development on their properties at all, then, quite simply, no plusvalías would be available to the local administration. Theoretically, all that is needed is to distinguish generating effects (administrative actions) from trends in land markets. In practice, however, it is easy to understand that instruments of value capture are more robust, and more palatable politically, during the upswing of land price cycles than the downswing, as is currently the case in Colombia.
The political overtones of this issue become clearer when considering the substantial land portfolios that developers normally hold for strategic planning motives, including for speculation. In effect, urban planners are hard pressed to be more flexible, if not magnanimous, in relaxing urbanistic norms and regulations in order to motivate developers during times of recession. However, this kind of pressure from developers may be simply an attempt to gain compensation for poor investment decisions in the past.
Sometimes developers complain that the municipality is setting the plusvalías fee too high in times of declining prices when recession may create disincentives for future investments in building improvements. However, a counter-argument based on the experience with Contribución de Valorización suggests that if the amount of plusvalías on the changing land use is considered to be overvalued, it follows that the change is probably not cost-effective and should not be proposed. It is also possible that a mistake was made in the feasibility study or the calculations.
Over and above these practical difficulties are certain implementation requirements in the law that affect its operation, such as the need to directly notify the landowner that the property is ‘liable’ for plusvalías. Should the burden reside with the public administration or with the owner? Similarly, there are legal difficulties surrounding the moment when plusvalías should be charged to the property owner, as in the liquidation of properties or in the request for a license to change the use of land. Some grounds for complaints of double taxation could also be raised if an area to be densified (or receive any change in zoning) has received additional infrastructure on which the Contribuición de Valorización provision was charged. The independence of this instrument from plusvalías, as stated by the new law, is important because of the existing option of calculating and charging the plusvalías for public works designated by the POT.
Adjustments Proposed by Municipal Officials
Public officials at the December seminar in Bogotá suggested a few ways to simplify the implementation of Law 388 by sacrificing precision in the calculation of the plusvalías in favor of expediency, transparency and compliance. This perspective is based on the belief that political will may be more important than technical consistency, at least in the early, transitional stages of implementation, in order to improve the chances of long-term success. A very telling and useful example was given by officials from the city of Cartagena (500,000 inhabitants), which has been applying the Contribución de Desarrollo Municipal effectively since 1992. Their experience shows that the effect of density changes to a new lot should be similar with regard to the generation of plusvalías to the rate generated by the same kind of density change already observed in a different but comparable area of the city.
Participants also proposed restricting the application of plusvalías to the more strategic and dynamic areas of the city where the windfall potential is most apparent and expressive, rather than in areas where the land value increments are small. Furthermore, assessment of plusvalías should be based on homogeneous zones, not on individual plots. The plusvalías instrument also needs to be developed and phased in over time as the municipalities gain greater knowledge and sophistication in valuation and assessment techniques. The established nine-year period for the validation of the assessments of land value increments, therefore, should be subject to more frequent periodic review. Some practical transition rules, absent in the original formulation of the law, also will help facilitate the introduction of a new fiscal system.
Other suggestions were made regarding the adoption of master plans (POTs). Municipalities should use these plans, rather than some other valuation mechanism external to the POT, to identify areas where there will be a change in land use in order to determine whether, in fact, it is a higher use and thus subject to an increase in plusvalías. Before adopting the POT, the municipalities should identify such areas so the valuation and assessment techniques could be worked out ahead of time and the sense of uncertainty could be mitigated. Some participants even suggested using the POT to define the relevant ex-ante situation (or prior value) to determine the net land value increment.
In general, the participants agreed that the concept and aims of the master plan and plusvalías instruments are both acceptable and desirable. Many of the problems and issues discussed at the seminar and throughout the country pertain to the implementation of any value capture scheme, or any new fiscal or normative legislation for that matter. In this case there is certainly substantial room for improving the design of the implementation procedures, since changes to operational aspects are always easier to achieve than changes to the law itself. But, over and above the remaining formal difficulties, it has been clearly demonstrated that political will, accumulated technical expertise and the ethical commitment of the participants are all critical to perfecting this land policy instrument and implementing the highly commendable principles that inspire it.
Carolina Barco de Botero is the planning director for the city of Bogotá. She is also a managing consultant with Ciudades, Ltda. in Bogotá and a member of the Lincoln Institute Board of Directors. Martim Smolka is senior fellow and director of the Institute’s Latin America and Caribbean Program.
Fernanda Furtado, a fellow of the Lincoln Institute, also contributed to this article. She recently completed her Ph.D. thesis (in Portuguese) on value capture in Latin America, at the Faculty of Architecture and Urbanism of the University of São Paulo, Brazil. One of her thesis chapters describes the situation in Colombia.
Pros and Cons of Participación en Plusvalías
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After spending more than a decade on restructuring central-provincial fiscal relations, the Chinese government is advancing its efforts to reform local public finance. In 2003 the central government issued a directive to ameliorate the real property tax system in China. To fulfill this mandate, tax authorities are reviewing international property taxation experiences, sending officials overseas to study pertinent models and inviting foreign experts to China for consultation. Yet comparable cases from which the government can draw relevant lessons for tailor-making a Chinese property tax system are few. The danger is that when public officials are under pressure to move the reform forward, they may be tempted to adopt concepts that do not match the country’s conditions.
One recent proposal that may develop into such a scenario is to establish an ad valorem property tax system in which leasehold land would be taxed as if it were freehold. This article explains what the Chinese government’s current proposal entails, why it may not be consistent with existing land tenure arrangements and, more tentatively, how the establishment of a land rent system could mediate potential contradictions of taxing land that is not private property.
China’s Property Tax Reform Proposal
The Chinese property tax system currently has as many as nine property taxes, depending on the definitions (see Hong 2003; 2004). The central government has proposed to consolidate three of these taxes into a single levy to simplify the existing tax structure. One of them is the Township and Urban Land Use Tax (LUT), which all land users (except foreign entities, government and nonprofit agencies, and agricultural industries) are required to pay. To collect this tax, local governments divide their jurisdictions into different taxing zones according to population size or land use. Land in different zones is taxed at an array of tax rates preset by the central government, ranging from 0.2 to 10 yuan per square meter (1 yuan = US$0.122). Some Chinese officials have admitted that the tax rates for the LUT have been set too low; hence its collections have little impact on local revenue. The government plans to eradicate this tax.
The other two taxes, the Building (or House) Tax and Urban Real Estate Tax (URET), will also be subject to reform. While the Building Tax is imposed on income-generating properties held by Chinese nationals, the URET is levied on all real estate owned by foreign entities and overseas Chinese. Both are ad valorem taxes whose bases can be the discount original purchasing cost, assessed capital value or gross annual rental value of the property.
When the assessed capital value (or the purchasing cost for the Building Tax) is used as the basis for tax assessment, the tax rate is 1.2 percent for the Building Tax and 1.5 percent for the URET. If an estimated rental value is used instead, the tax rates for the Building Tax and URET will be 12 and 15 percent, respectively. In some locales, like Beijing, if actual rental value is available because individual property owners rent their dwellings to another party at the market rate, the Building Tax rate will be 4 percent of gross rental income of the property. In view of this discrepancy in taxing local- and foreign-owned real estate, the government would replace these two levies with a single property tax as part of the upcoming reform.
The proposed new property tax would be imposed on both land and buildings at a uniform rate. The tax base would encompass all properties, domestic and foreign, located in rural as well as urban areas. As some public officials argue, a standardized property tax could have at least three advantages. First, the new property tax system may ease tax administration. Instead of administering the collection of the LUT, Building Tax and URET separately, local tax bureaus will be able to concentrate their effort on just one tax.
Second, the new property tax would be a value-based tax, which allows the government to capture future land value increments if property reappraisal can be done regularly. Third, one key purpose for creating the new property tax is to convert selected real estate development charges into a unified tax. Many scholars argue that some local governments might have abused the current system of user charges, thereby making payments for public services unduly cumbersome.
Collecting these charges through the new property tax may lower the transaction costs of doing business. As well-intentioned as the proposal may sound, policy designers might have underestimated the importance of one fundamental matter: the integration of the new property tax system with the current land tenure arrangements.
Property Taxation and Public Leaseholds
As specified in the Chinese Constitution, urban land is owned by the state and rural land is owned by collectives. Local governments, empowered by the state, can assign land use rights to users through a set of leasing arrangements. Lease terms are 40 years for commercial land, 50 years for industrial land and 70 years for residential land. If a local government wants to lease an urban land site to a private entity, it must be assigned through a bidding process. The winning bidder must pay the total set of leasing fees (including a “conveyance fee,” expropriation costs if land is acquired from the collective, and various land allocation charges) in a lump sum and immediately to obtain the land use rights.
The payment of the market-determined conveyance fee allows the lessee to transfer or rent the land use rights to another party and to use them as collateral. In the past, land rights were allocated mainly to private entities through negotiation, but this method failed to collect proper fees due to personal connections or corruption and it was suspended by the central government in 2002.
Users of land assigned administratively to public agencies or state-owned enterprises are not required to pay the conveyance fee, but must compensate the state for any allocation costs. The assignment of the land rights has no term limit. According to the law, if a state-owned enterprise wants to transfer its land rights to a private entity for commercial purposes, it must pay the conveyance fee to the state before doing so. For the transfer of rural land into urban uses or to nonmembers of the collective, the state will first expropriate the land from the collective with compensation and then lease the use rights to interested users for the payment of the conveyance fee and other leasing charges.
Owing to a long bureaucratic process and high transaction fees, many users have transferred their land rights to other parties without going through the proper procedure and registration. As such informal exchanges have gained in popularity, the official land leasing record is no longer reliable. Hence, any future attempt to identify the actual landholders, delineate their land rights, and estimate the leasehold value for tax purposes would no doubt be a difficult task.
The design of the new property tax system must take these unique land tenure arrangements into consideration. Aside from the extensive informality involved in land transaction and possession—a topic that is beyond the scope of this article—the most basic question is: How can the government convince lessees to pay property tax on lands that they do not own?
Certainly not all property tax systems are based on the premise that property owners should be taxpayers; occupiers are sometimes liable for tax payment. In some countries, such as Australia, the Netherlands and United Kingdom, taxes paid by occupiers are referred to as rates, a council tax or a user tax to avoid any confusion. Despite the different names, the calculation of these levies is still based on either the capital or rental value of the property, which is the same approach as for the property tax.
More fundamentally, since the supply of land is fixed, the landowner (the state government in the case of China) would bear the ultimate tax burden even if land users paid the property tax directly to the government. This is because the new tax would dampen the demand for land use rights and in turn reduce the fees that local governments could receive from leasing public land.
Because the Chinese government is both the landowner and property tax collector, lessees who leased land in the past and paid the entire leasehold value without anticipating the additional property tax burden would wonder why they should pay more land tax to the government. Thus it is essential to have a rationale for taxing leasehold land, so as to convince lessees to comply with their property tax obligation.
One way to analyze the matter is to treat property rights as a bundle of rights, which includes the right to own, use, develop, transfer, bequest and benefit from land. This bundle also comprises the right to exclude others from enjoying these privileges.
Viewing the Chinese land tenure arrangements through this lens, the government holds the ownership of land and leases other attributes of the bundle of land rights to private entities. So long as the privileges and obligations of holding the leased land rights are fully delineated and recognized, both legally and by the society, there is no reason why leasehold rights cannot be regarded as private property of the lessees for a specific period of time as stipulated in the lease.
In 1988 the Chinese National People’s Congress amended the Constitution to acknowledge the transferability of the right to use land. Further amendments are needed to explicitly recognize leaseholds as private property and empower the state to establish special legislation for the enforcement and protection of leasehold rights. In this way, the implicit contradiction in imposing property tax on leased public land would be clarified and resolved.
One technical issue remains, however: valuation of leasehold rights for tax purposes. Since the new property tax will be value-based, assessors will face the challenges of estimating the leasehold value of land independently, based on market data that normally reflect a combined value of land and all improvements. Most property valuation methods presume that land is freehold, and that developed real estate markets are present. Neither of these assumptions can be applied to China. Although there are practices that separate land and building values for tax purposes, the divisions are generally based on crude assumptions. How can assessors modify the existing (or invent new) valuation techniques to accommodate these special Chinese conditions?
More important, leasehold value is highly sensitive to the lease term and conditions, both of which can vary significantly from one case to another. At this moment, time-tested mass appraisal techniques for assessing large numbers of leasehold sites do not exist. Do these issues imply that property assessment for tax purposes under the Chinese leasehold system requires a case-by-case approach? If so, do local governments have the capability to carry out such detailed property appraisals for the collection of the new property tax? The Chinese government must find ways to deal with these practical matters if it decides to tax leasehold rights as private property.
It is also extremely important to educate would-be taxpayers and public officials about the distinctions between freehold and leasehold systems. Lessees must recognize that they possess only the leased land rights that are not designed to last in perpetuity. If the rights and obligations of both the state and lessees are not clearly delineated, taxing leasehold rights as if they were freehold could complicate the implementation of future land and tax policy. For example, in Canberra, Australia, and Israel, lessees are requested to pay the entire leasehold value up front, and thereafter they pay an annual property tax (or rates in Australia) for leasing public land. Lease terms in both cases are long and renewable—99 years in Canberra and 49 years in Israel with four automatically renewable terms totaling 196 years.
This method of collecting leasehold charges and taxes is tantamount to the payment system for land in countries where land is freehold. Due to this similarity, lessees have developed the perception that land is privately owned (Hong and Bourassa 2003). This view, albeit legally a fiction, has engendered the expectation that any government’s attempt to exercise its rights as the landowner to retake land for public uses or to demand additional payments from lessees for enlarging or extending land use rights would constitute an infringement on private property.
This expectation has added conflict to government efforts to redistribute land and land value between private landholders and the state on behalf of the public. As Neutze (2003) argued, had the Canberra government provided enough public education about its leasehold system, it would have spared the Australian capital from many intractable disputes over land ownership.
The Chinese government has no immediate plan to give fee simple deeds to private landholders. Thus, if local governments continue to collect all leasehold charges up front and then levy the new property tax on both land and buildings, they may be at risk of creating the same mistaken expectations, that is, that land is privately owned. This may put the government and lessees at odds with each other when there is a later need to reallocate land from private to public uses. Designing a real property tax that will not add more complications to the already unsettling land tenure system is a critical task that policy makers should not overlook.
Land tenure reform is a long, controversial process, however, and the Chinese government would be ill-advised to delay the implementation of the new property tax system until land reform is completed. What the government needs is a transition system in which property tax reform can proceed as planned without interfering with its endeavors to restructure land ownership. Establishing a land rent system seems to be an option.
Land Rent System
Under a land rent system, leasehold charges would be paid in the form of an annual land rent, not a one-time leasing fee. Local land bureaus could continue to assign land use rights by public auction, but the bidding would be to determine the amount of annual land rent. Similarly for lands that were assigned to state agencies administratively, users would pay their conveyance fee for transferring land rights to other private parties in annual installments, which would be equivalent to the yearly rental payments. The land rent system has pros and cons (see Hong 2004 for a detailed discussion); four important advantages are discussed here.
First, collecting a land rent is the most straightforward way to characterize the landowner-tenant relationships between the state and lessees. More important, requesting lessees to make their rental payments annually would serve as a constant reminder of their leasehold relationships with the state.
Second, if leasehold charges were paid in annual installments, local officials would no longer be able to generate a large amount of cash instantly to cover short-term fiscal shortfalls. This in turn may lower their incentive to lease land rapidly—a major malady of the current land leasing system.
Third, research using the input-output (I/O) technique and the 1997 I/O Table of China found that collecting land rent could facilitate the transition to the new property tax system (Hong 2004). Had the central government required all land users to pay an annual land rent in 1997, rental income would have added 29.8 billion yuan (US$3.6 billion) to the government treasury, representing a 2.9 percent increase in total tax revenue (see Table 1). This revenue increase would represent a net gain over estimated tax revenue losses under the proposed property tax reform.
The land rent system, however, may generate a cash flow problem for local governments. When leasing fees are deferred and paid by lessees in annual installments, fewer funds would be immediately available for local governments to cover public expenditures. To resolve this problem, local jurisdictions may borrow money from the central government or other financial intermediaries, using perhaps the future land rent collections as collateral. Loans would then be repaid in annual installments by funds gathered from yearly rental payments made by lessees.
Had the government decided to keep the total tax revenue approximately the same, it could have set the new property tax rate at 4 percent, which is the same as the Building Tax rate for personal dwellings rented at market prices, and then discounted the land rent by as much as 47 percent (see Table 1). With a reasonable tax rate and a substantial reduction on rental payment, taxpayers would be less resistant to the reform.
Table 1 also shows several possible combinations of rent level and property tax rate to produce a revenue-neutral shift. If the government were to increase the new property tax rate to deepen the tax reform, it could lower the rent level to avoid antagonizing taxpayers. This approach would provide local governments with an array of options to adopt the new property tax system in stages and at a pace that suits their economies.
Fourth, the proposed land rent system could keep future tenure choices open. If the sociopolitical sentiment of the country favors public leaseholds, local governments could continue to levy the land rent and property tax at the ratio that matches local needs. Subsequent adjustments to the rent-tax ratio could also be made when new circumstances arise.
If central authorities, in response to popular demand, were to grant fee simple deeds to all lessees, it could order local governments to phase out the collection of land rent and raise the new property tax rate accordingly. As shown in Table 1, directing the reform toward either path would not create adverse effects on local government budgets.
This analysis shows that choices available to the Chinese government are not limited to privatizing land ownership and relying solely on real property taxation to recoup land value. Undeniably, the Chinese government may eventually choose to do just that because it is indeed an option, but there are many other possibilities as well. Why, then, should the government make such a decision now, when there may be other viable alternatives that can keep all options open? Recognizing that there are many choices could unleash the creative powers of policy makers and scholars to imagine a unique Chinese system to capture land value.
References
Director General of State Statistics Bureau. 1999. Input-output table of China, 1997. Beijing: China Statistical Press.
Hong, Yu-Hung. 2003. The last straw: reforming local property tax in the People’s Republic of China. Working paper. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
_____. 2004. Assessing property tax reform in China. Report for the David C. Lincoln Fellowship Program. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
_____ and Steven C. Bourassa. 2003. Why public leasehold? Issues and concepts. In Leasing public land: Policy debates and international experiences, Steven C. Bourassa and Yu-Hung Hong, eds., Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
Neutze, Max. 2003. Leasing of publicly owned land in Canberra, Australia. In Leasing public land: Policy debates and international experiences, Steven C. Bourassa and Yu-Hung Hong, eds. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
Yu-Hung Hong is a fellow of the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. This article reports on selected preliminary results of his research funded by the David C. Lincoln Fellowship in Land Value Taxation.
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