The Lincoln Institute sponsored a wide-ranging international conference in June on “Land Policies for Urban Development.” A few of the major themes and messages from the presentations are summarized below.

The three most populous developing countries, China, India, and Indonesia, with 40 percent of the world’s population, are entering the stage of rapid urbanization simultaneously. By 2030, they are projected to add an additional 2.2 billion persons to urban areas, increasing the world’s urban population by nearly 80 percent over the 2000 figure of 2.8 billion. The related infrastructure investment needs are likely to reduce or eliminate any perceived savings surplus in the world. Economic growth and urbanization in most East Asian countries have occurred in coastal regions and near ports. In India, however, urbanization and growth are currently focused on inland cities and on information technology rather than on labor-intensive manufacturing. This may be due to weaknesses in traditional infrastructure services, particularly in transport.

A review of property tax practices across 25 countries found an extremely wide range of practices in terms of tax base definitions, tax rate levels, and assessment practices. In most developing countries property tax rates are very low (a fraction of one percent of market values). Nevertheless, property taxes are one of the few revenue sources under local control and are an important component of local government revenues. Simplicity was found to be a virtue of property tax regimes in developing countries, because complexity raises administrative costs and erodes public support for property taxes.

Efforts to measure land values in urban areas of the United States—either by analyzing vacant land sales or by subtracting the value of the structure from property sales—indicate that they have appreciated more rapidly than construction costs since 1985, with a 2005 value between $12 and $24 trillion. This compares to estimates for 1980 of about $3 trillion, suggesting that land values have increased four to eight times in a period when consumer prices have increased only 2.4 times. In addition, land values have been volatile, falling by around 40 percent from 1989 to 1995 in many urban markets before increasing rapidly in the past 10 years.

While average housing prices across the United States have increased faster than construction costs, increases in housing prices have been particularly sharp in urban areas on the West Coast and on the East Coast from the mid-Atlantic region to New England. In these coastal metropolitan areas, median single-family housing prices are nearly five times larger than median prices in the least expensive metropolitan areas in other regions.

Analysis across all U.S. metropolitan areas shows a strong association between the level of housing market regulation and the level of prices—metropolitan areas with the most regulations on residential development have the highest housing prices. Moreover, areas with the highest prices also have low growth rates of housing stocks. Together these findings suggest that rapid growth in housing prices in coastal cities is due in large part to growing impediments on the supply side of the market. Supply constraints may not be only a U.S. phenomenon. A review of planning experience in the United Kingdom showed that urban development corporations, which have the power to overrule local regulations, have been more effective than most other approaches in fostering urban revitalization.

The ownership of second homes (for own use, not for rent to others) has been growing rapidly in the United States, and about 5.6 percent of all U.S. housing units were second homes in 2004. The main determinants of second-home ownership are income, wealth, and age of the household head. Second-home ownership is highest for those in their sixties, suggesting that the aging of the baby boom generation will increase second-home ownership. Additional research (and better data) is required to determine if this trend is related to the location or characteristics of a household’s primary residence.

The complete collection of papers and commentaries presented at the conference will be published as an edited volume in 2007.

We suggest that a better approach is to link IH to the ongoing process of rezoning—either by the developer or by local government initiative—thus treating it explicitly as a vehicle for recapturing for public benefit some part of the gain in land value resulting from public action.

From 2000 to the end of 2005, the value of U.S. residential land and dwellings increased from $14 trillion to $24 trillion. Until about 2002, housing price increases had followed the normal pattern from the mid-1980s, and housing prices grew along with household incomes. But starting in 2002 housing prices began to grow much faster than incomes in most metropolitan areas.

There were three main causes for this acceleration in housing prices. First, the interest rate for 30-year fixed rate mortgages declined from 7 percent in 2001 to 4.6 percent in 2003, buoying housing prices. Second, starting in the early 2000s mortgage originators began to reduce lending standards and to offer high-risk mortgage instruments such as no-document mortgages and other subprime mortgage instruments. Finally, the national policy to increase home ownership supported the latter trend because increased mortgage availability seemed to increase housing affordability.

These changes led to the rapid growth in mortgages with high loan-to-value ratios and to the approval of borrowers with modest financial reserves. This increasing risk of mortgages was assuaged by the belief that “housing prices could not decline,” which was based on national housing price indices dating back a few decades. Of course, in several metropolitan areas housing prices had declined from 1989 to the mid-1990s, but the national price index had only flattened out in this period.

Nationally, house prices softened in 2006 and fell 30 percent to the present time, while housing starts declined precipitously from 2.27 million in 2006 to 500,000 now, a level well below the typical low point of 1 million starts experienced in the past half dozen recessions. The reduction in housing starts eliminated millions of construction jobs and contributed significantly to the rapid increase in the unemployment rate.

The accompanying financial crisis reduced employment more broadly as part of a severe recession. Mortgage defaults and subsequent foreclosures spiked, caused by the severe housing price decline that left many homeowners “under water” with a mortgage greater than their house value, combined with the loss of household income from unemployment and the tightening of lending standards that made refinancing impossible for many households. From 2006 through 2009, 6 million homes were foreclosed, and 2010 has seen another 2.9 million foreclosure filings. Foreclosure rates are likely to have peaked, and filings in December 2010 were a quarter lower than those in December 2009. But foreclosure rates remain far above historic levels—in 2005 banks foreclosed on about 100,000 homes. The lack of recovery in housing and other construction has in turn been a factor in the slow reduction in unemployment.

House prices may now be stabilizing—national housing prices rose in the second quarter of 2010, but have declined modestly in the third and fourth quarters. This has led some analysts to forecast a possible second round of price declines. In any case, the likely slow decrease in unemployment will continue to restrain income growth and demand for home ownership. Clearly, housing will not lead the economy out of this recession. Needed now is regulatory reform to prevent the repetition of a housing bubble and an inevitable subsequent housing bust and its related financial meltdown.

While some modest steps have been taken in this direction, much remains to be done and the announced reform of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have increased uncertainty about the course of future mortgage finance. The realization by households that housing price appreciation is not inevitable will likely slow the shift to ownership by younger households and encourage older empty-nesters to move their assets to investments less risky than housing. The resulting growth in rental demand will focus in denser parts of metropolitan areas and give some impetus to smart growth outcomes. Housing demand will be robust only in several years, driven by long-term growth in incomes, population, and household formation.

The United States is emerging from a great recession whose major hallmark has been the collapse of national housing prices, which grew by 59 percent from 2000 to 2006 and then fell 41 percent by 2011, all in constant dollars. Nationally, real house prices in 2011 were 6 percent below levels in 2000. The housing price collapse had unanticipated contagion effects that helped produce the accompanying financial crisis and the most severe economic downturn since the Great Depression. The share of U.S. mortgages that were delinquent by 90 days or more rose from about 1 percent in 2006 to over 8 percent in 2010. The economic and social costs of this house price bubble and subsequent collapse have been immense.

The benefits of preventing future house price bubbles is obviously great, but realizing such benefits will require that policy makers learn to detect price bubbles as they are forming and then implement policies that will attenuate or mitigate them. A recent Lincoln Institute policy focus report, Preventing House Price Bubbles: Lessons from the 2006–2012 Bust, by James Follain and Seth Giertz, addresses the challenges of diagnosing and treating price bubbles in the real estate market. Their report builds on extensive statistical analysis available in several Lincoln Institute working papers.

While it is common to summarize the recent housing market bust using national indicators (as in the first paragraph above), these national indicators don’t account for great variations in both the levels and changes in housing prices across metropolitan areas. For example, from 1978 to 2011, constant dollar housing prices in Dallas, Texas and Omaha, Nebraska varied by less than 20 percent from their 1978 levels; those in Stockton, California nearly tripled from 1978 to 2006, but by 2011 fell back to their 1978 levels. Local housing markets are all influenced by national economic and financial policies and conditions, but these large differences across metropolitan markets indicate that local conditions play a very important role as well.

A key element of the statistical work by Follain and Giertz is to use metropolitan housing markets as the unit of observation for their analyses, which are based on annual data (for 1980 to 2010) and quarterly data (for 1990 to 2010) for up to 380 metropolitan areas. Their econometric work indicates that house price bubbles can be detected across metropolitan areas and that price changes and the accompanying credit risk vary greatly in size. Stress tests, such as those used to evaluate mortgage credit risk, can be useful indicators of potential price bubbles at the metropolitan level.

Because the levels and changes in housing prices vary greatly across metropolitan areas—with bubble-like price increases in some and essentially stable prices in others—Follain and Giertz conclude that policy measures to mitigate housing bubbles should be tailored to target metropolitan areas or regions rather than be applied uniformly across all metropolitan areas at the national level. Thus monetary policy would be an unattractive intervention to counter house price increases in a few metropolitan areas, because it would affect financing terms across both frothy and stable housing markets. Instead, Follain and Giertz favor policy interventions that would target those metropolitan areas with high price increases. The policy they advance would raise the capital reserve ratio that banks are required to hold against mortgages that they finance in those areas. Such countercyclical capital policies would both dampen house price increases and strengthen the reserves of the issuing banks, improving their ability to withstand any unexpected financial shocks.

Applying prudential housing market policies at the metro-politan level seems to be an obvious thing to do; so why has it not been done before? A major part of the answer is that housing market analysis is benefitting from a revolution in the availability of spatially disaggregated data at the metropolitan, county, and even zip code level. The data required to inform policy interventions targeted at the metropolitan level have only recently become widely available, and such data underpin the empirical work carried out by Follain and Giertz. For more information on their analysis, see http://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/2245_Preventing-House-Price-Bubbles.

Las personas que trabajan conmigo por lo general se sorprenden de hasta qué punto mi canon filosófico deriva de las películas no convencionales de bajo presupuesto, especialmente de la década de 1980. Cuando busco sabiduría, suelo recurrir a las enseñanzas de la película “Repo Man” (traducida al español como “Los recolectores”) o, en el caso de este ensayo, a la obra maestra alegórica de Terry Gilliam, “Time Bandits” (“Bandidos del tiempo”). En esta película, un grupo de trabajadores públicos son empleados por el Ser Supremo para rellenar los agujeros que quedaron en el continuo espacio-tiempo por el apresuramiento de haber creado el universo en siete días: “Verán, fue un trabajo algo chapucero”.

Igual que los bandidos del tiempo, los gestores de políticas generalmente tienen la tarea de rellenar agujeros: agujeros literales, como los baches de las calles, o agujeros más teóricos, que son los artefactos de los mercados privados disfuncionales. Uno de los grandes agujeros que la política ha tratado de rellenar durante décadas es la oferta inadecuada de viviendas sociales. Por ejemplo, los economistas especializados en vivienda de los Estados Unidos se han vuelto bastante expertos en hacer el seguimiento del tamaño de este agujero, que cada vez es más difícil de rellenar desde que el gobierno federal se comprometió a tratar el tema como una prioridad de política nacional a partir de la Ley de Vivienda de 1949, que fue parte de la legislación conocida como Fair Deal del expresidente Harry S. Truman.

Tal vez nuestro fracaso colectivo para resolver el déficit de viviendas sociales en los últimos 66 años tenga que ver con un análisis incorrecto del problema y con la conclusión de que pueden diseñarse soluciones basadas en el mercado con el fin de resolver la discordancia entre la oferta de viviendas sociales y la demanda de las mismas. En su discurso del Estado de la Unión de 1949, el presidente Truman resaltó que, para poder suplir las necesidades de millones de familias sin una vivienda adecuada, “la mayoría de las viviendas que necesitamos deberán ser construidas por el sector privado sin subsidios públicos”.

Para apoyar esta idea, me desviaré brevemente hacia la teoría del mercado. Partiendo del enfoque matemático para analizar la economía que predomina hoy en día, un mercado es, simplemente, un sistema de ecuaciones diferenciales parciales que se resuelve mediante un único precio. Las ecuaciones diferenciales parciales captan las decisiones complejas que toman los consumidores y los productores de bienes, y concilian los gustos, las preferencias y los presupuestos de los consumidores con las complejidades técnicas derivadas de producir un bien para así llegar a un precio que despeje el mercado mediante el acuerdo de todas las operaciones que los proveedores y consumidores de bienes están dispuestos a realizar.

Los prestigiosos economistas Arrow, Debreu y McKenzie demostraron la existencia teórica de un conjunto único de precios capaz de resolver simultáneamente la cuestión del “equilibrio general” de todos los mercados en una economía nacional o mundial. Un importante aspecto de esta contribución (que obtuvo el Premio Nobel) fue la observación de que un único precio despejaba cada mercado: un mercado, un precio. No se esperaba que un único precio mantuviera el equilibrio en dos mercados. Pero este es el defecto fundamental del mercado de la vivienda: en realidad, no es un mercado, sino dos. Los mercados de la vivienda proporcionan tanto lugares para vivir a los consumidores locales como bienes de inversión comercializables en todo el mundo, gracias a los grandes mercados de capital al servicio de los inversores a nivel mundial. Esta condición de mercado doble describía más al sector de viviendas ocupadas por sus propietarios; sin embargo, con la proliferación de los fideicomisos de inversión inmobiliaria (REIT, por su sigla en inglés), los mercados de alquiler se encuentran ahora en la misma situación.

Los mercados de bienes de consumo se comportan de manera muy diferente a los mercados de inversión, ya que responden a “reglas básicas” distintas. En lo que a la oferta se refiere, los precios de los bienes de consumo se derivan de los costos de producción, mientras que los precios de los mercados de inversión tienen que ver con los beneficios esperados. En relación con la demanda, factores tales como gustos y preferencias, ingresos de las familias y características demográficas determinan el precio de la vivienda como lugar donde residir. La demanda de vivienda con fines de inversión está relacionada con aspectos tales como la liquidez y las preferencias de liquidez de los inversores, las ganancias esperadas de inversiones alternativas, o las tasas de interés.

En los países desarrollados, los mercados de capitales mundiales y el mercado de la vivienda colisionan a nivel local, con pocas probabilidades de reconciliación. Los hogares a nivel local compiten con los inversores a nivel mundial para decidir el tipo y la cantidad de viviendas que se producen. En los mercados que atraen la inversión mundial se produce una gran cantidad de viviendas, aunque la falta de viviendas sociales es aguda y empeora con el paso del tiempo. Esto se debe a que una gran parte de las viviendas nuevas se produce para maximizar las ganancias de la inversión y no para suplir las necesidades de vivienda de la población local. Por ejemplo, no escasean los inversores mundiales dispuestos a participar en el desarrollo de apartamentos de US$100 millones en la Ciudad de Nueva York; sin embargo, escasean las viviendas sociales por la dificultad de conseguir fondos para desarrollarlas. En los mercados que han sido abandonados por el capital mundial, los precios de las viviendas caen por debajo de los costos de producción, por lo que existe un excedente de viviendas que se acumula y se deteriora. En casos extremos como el de Detroit, el orden del mercado sólo puede recuperarse mediante la demolición de miles de viviendas y edificios abandonados.

Tal vez sea este el momento de reconsiderar el análisis que llevó al presidente Truman (y a miles de gestores de políticas de vivienda después de él) a concluir que podemos forjar soluciones basadas en el mercado ante el desafío de proveer de vivienda a la población del país. Truman concluyó que “al producir pocas unidades de alquiler, frente a una proporción demasiado grande de viviendas de alto precio, la industria de la construcción se está excluyendo a sí misma rápidamente del mercado debido a los precios”. No obstante, Truman se refería al mercado de la vivienda para residir, no para invertir. Resulta importante destacar que la cantidad de unidades habitacionales en oferta en los países desarrollados como los Estados Unidos excede en mucho la cantidad de hogares. En el año 2010, el Censo de los EE.UU. calculó que en el país existían 131 millones de unidades habitacionales y 118 millones de hogares, y que una de cada siete unidades habitacionales se encontraba vacante. Resulta aún más impactante que, en los Estados Unidos, este excedente de la oferta de viviendas es una característica de todos los mercados metropolitanos del país, incluso de aquellos mercados metropolitanos con una escasez extrema de viviendas sociales. En 2010, el 8,5 por ciento de las unidades habitacionales se encontraban vacantes en el Gran Boston, un 9,1 por ciento en el área de la Bahía de San Francisco, y un 10,2 por ciento en Washington D.C. El problema radica en que muchas familias no tienen suficientes ingresos para acceder a las viviendas que están disponibles.

Al final, los bandidos del tiempo decidieron, en lugar de rellenar los agujeros que existían en el tejido de espacio y tiempo, aprovecharse de ellos para “hacerse indecentemente ricos”. Los bandidos querían capitalizar las imperfecciones celestiales de la misma manera que los inversores mundiales desean obtener rentabilidad de las dislocaciones del mercado a corto plazo. A fin de ilustrar los peligros de la especulación desmedida en los mercados no regulados, consideremos un relato apócrifo de un mercado muy diferente. En 1974 en Bangladesh, se sugirió que, debido a las copiosas lluvias que habían caído durante la temporada de siembra, era posible que existiera una escasez de arroz en la temporada de cosecha. Para anticiparse a dicha escasez, el precio del arroz comenzó a subir. Especuladores expertos en bienes comercializables se dieron cuenta de que obtendrían una buena rentabilidad del arroz que mantuvieran fuera de mercado. A pesar de que la cosecha real produjo abundante arroz, la interacción entre las expectativas del mercado y las manipulaciones del mercado por parte de los inversores en bienes comercializables generó una de las peores hambrunas del siglo XX, que causó aproximadamente un millón y medio de muertes relacionadas con el hambre. Esta hambruna no fue el resultado de una escasez real de alimentos. La colisión entre el mercado de bienes y el mercado de inversión especulativa causó tal aumento del precio del arroz que hizo que quedara fuera del alcance de las poblaciones locales, lo que dio como resultado que las familias sin tierras sufrieran una tasa de mortalidad tres veces más alta que las familias con tierras.

Tal vez la vivienda y el alimento sean aspectos demasiado importantes para ser administrados por los mercados no regulados. En vista de los daños que puede provocar el conflicto entre el mercado de bienes y el mercado de inversiones en las poblaciones locales, quizá las políticas públicas deberían concentrarse en proteger una parte del mercado —y del público— de los estragos de la especulación. En este número de la revista Land Lines, describimos algunas medidas incipientes para producir constantemente viviendas sociales, aislándolas de la especulación mediante fideicomisos de suelo comunitario, viviendas inclusivas y cooperativas de vivienda. Miriam Axel-Lute y Dana Hawkins-Simons examinan los mecanismos necesarios para organizar fideicomisos locales de suelo comunitario. Loren Berlin describe las medidas tomadas a fin de preservar la vivienda social en forma de viviendas prefabricadas y promover la accesibilidad permanente a dichas viviendas mediante la conversión de comunidades de viviendas prefabricadas en cooperativas de patrimonio limitado.

En artículos más admonitorios, Cynthia Goytia analiza las formas en que las comunidades de bajos ingresos en ciudades de toda América Latina eluden las regulaciones sobre vivienda que aumentan los costos de la misma, y producen sus propias viviendas accesibles pero por debajo de los estándares en asentamientos informales. Finalmente, el artículo de Li Sun y Zhi Liu trata de la precaria condición del 25 por ciento de los hogares urbanos en China que compraron viviendas sociales con derechos de propiedad inciertos en terrenos de propiedad colectiva ubicados en la periferia en rápido desarrollo de las ciudades y en “aldeas urbanas”, es decir, asentamientos que, anteriormente, eran rurales y en la actualidad están rodeados de construcciones modernas. A medida que los mercados de capital se intensifican en estos países, la rivalidad entre la vivienda como un bien de inversión y la vivienda como un lugar para vivir probablemente exacerbará la informalidad en las ciudades de América Latina y hará más precarios los derechos de propiedad de las familias chinas. Después de casi setenta años de medidas fallidas para lograr que los mercados privados suplan las necesidades de vivienda social de la población, tal vez sea el momento de desarrollar, y de exportar, otro enfoque que se fundamente en una comprensión más realista de la complejidad del mercado de la vivienda y del mercado del capital.

Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 5 del libro Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.

¿Es la segregación espacial urbana una consecuencia del funcionamiento normal de los mercados inmobiliarios urbanos, reflejo de las preferencias individuales acumulativas, o es más bien resultado del mal funcionamiento de mercados inmobiliarios urbanos que privatizan los beneficios sociales y socializan los costos privados? ¿Proviene quizás de prejuicios contra ciertas clases o razas? ¿Crean guettos las políticas de viviendas de interés social, o los crean las acciones de agentes y prestamistas inmobiliarios que ponen sus prejuicios personales por encima de toda objetividad, generando y alimentando estereotipos sobre conciudadanos y vecindades? ¿Podrían cambiar los patrones de asentamiento intrametropolitanos si se modifica la política del suelo, o para ello es imperativo que se produzcan transformaciones sociales profundas relacionadas con valores como tolerancia, oportunidad y derechos humanos?

Treinta y siete académicos y asesores de trece países se enfrentaron a éstas y otras preguntas afines en el “Seminario Internacional sobre Segregación en la Ciudad” organizado por el Instituto Lincoln en Cambridge, Massachusetts durante el pasado mes de julio. Los organizadores del seminario, Francisco Sabatini (Universidad Católica de Chile) Martim Smolka y Rosalind Greenstein (Instituto Lincoln) plantearon una amplia gama de aspectos para explorar las dimensiones teóricas, históricas y prácticas de la segregación. Los participantes, procedentes de países tan diversos como Brasil, Israel, Kenya, Países Bajos, Irlanda del Norte y los Estados Unidos, trajeron consigo su formación profesional como juristas, sociólogos, economistas, planificadores urbanos, científicos regionales y geógrafos. A medida que intentaban llegar a un acuerdo sobre el significado de la segregación, las fuerzas diversas que la crean y la refuerzan, y las respuestas políticas posibles, se fue haciendo obvio que no hay respuestas simples y que muchos puntos de vista contribuyen al debate interminable. Este breve informe sobre el seminario ofrece una muestra de esta discusión.

¿Qué es la segregación y por qué es tan importante?

El trabajo de Frederick Boal (Escuela de Geografía, Universidad de Queens, Belfast) es fruto del gran caudal de literatura sociológica sobre segregación y su propia experiencia de vida en medio de los conflictos entre católicos y protestantes en Irlanda del Norte. Boal sugirió que la segregación debe entenderse principalmente como parte de un espectro que abarca desde el movimiento extremista de limpieza étnica hasta el más idealista de asimilación (véase la fig. 1). Tal como pasa con tantos temas vinculados con políticas, para estudiar el problema de la segregación es preciso observarla, más que como una dicotomía, como un continuo de grados o niveles de separación, cada uno con diferentes manifestaciones espaciales.

Para Peter Marcuse (Escuela de Posgrado de Arquitectura, Conservación y Planificación, Universidad de Columbia, Nueva York), la segregación supone la imposibilidad para elegir o la presencia de coerción, o ambas. Marcuse llama “agrupaciones en enclaves” a grupos de diferentes razas o etnias que deciden vivir juntos por voluntad propia. Por otra parte, llama “segregación en guettos” cuando a los grupos se los obliga a vivir aparte, bien sea explícitamente o a través de mecanismos más sutiles. La clave que distingue a estos dos patrones—la imposibilidad para elegir—invita a una respuesta del orden público.

El significado y la importancia de la segregación varía según el contexto histórico. Para William Harris (Departamento de Planificación Urbana y Regional, Universidad Estatal de Jackson, Mississippi), escritor de temas de segregación espacial en el sur de los Estados Unidos, la segregación no puede entenderse ni tampoco enfrentarse sin un conocimiento profundo del papel que ha desempeñado y sigue desempeñando la raza en la historia de los Estados Unidos y del orden público. Flavio Villaça (Escuela de Arquitectura y Urbanismo, Universidad de São Paulo, Brasil) entiende la segregación dentro de un marco conceptual de clases, en donde los factores principales que influyen en los patrones residenciales son el nivel de ingresos y el estatus social, y no la raza. En Brasil y muchos otros países con larga historia de regímenes autoritarios, el estado suele encargarse de prestar los servicios urbanos. En estos países, los patrones residenciales urbanos determinan el acceso a agua y a instalaciones sanitarias (y por tanto, a la salud) así como a medios de transporte, infraestructuras de servicios públicos y otros servicios urbanos.

Según Villaça y otros, en muchos casos la actividad del mercado del suelo y las regulaciones y los códigos urbanos se han aplicado de maneras furtivas o incluso abiertamente para crear vecindades selectas bien dotadas de servicios que separan las clases superiores del resto de la sociedad, al cual prácticamente se le hace caso omiso. Este cuadro tiene paralelismos en los Estados Unidos, en donde el acceso a escuelas de alta calidad y a otras valiosas amenidades lo determinan fundamentalmente patrones residenciales que tienen estrecha relación con la segregación, ya sea por nivel de ingresos, raza u otras características demográficas. Igualmente, los participantes del seminario señalaron la correlación entre las comunidades precarias y la situación de los peligros ambientales. Las zonas de barrios o guettos pobres, habitadas generalmente por personas de raza negra, son el vertedero de los aspectos negativos del mundo urbano moderno, como lo son desechos peligrosos y otros usos indeseados del suelo.

Ariel Espino (Departamento de Antropología, Universidad de Rice, Texas) presentó un análisis del uso de la distancia para reforzar desigualdades sociales, políticas y económicas en la vivienda. Cuando las diferencias sociales y económicas están claramente especificadas y entendidas, las élites dominantes “toleran” la proximidad física. Por ejemplo, los sirvientes pueden vivir cerca de sus patrones, incluso en la misma casa, porque las relaciones económicas y las normas de comportamiento dictan la separación por clases.

¿Por qué persiste la segregación?

Una suposición que prevaleció a lo largo del seminario fue la de que todos los residentes de la ciudad (es decir, los ciudadanos) deberían tener acceso a los servicios urbanos, o al menos a un nivel mínimo de servicios. Sin embargo, Peter Marcuse lanzó al grupo la idea de pensar más allá de un nivel mínimo y de considerar el acceso a amenidades urbanas en el contexto de los derechos. Se cuestionó si la riqueza, la herencia familiar, el color de la piel o la identidad étnica deberían ser los factores determinantes en el acceso a los bienes públicos, no sólo educación, salud y abrigo, sino también a otras amenidades directamente relacionadas con la ubicación física. Expresándose en un lenguaje evocador de las ideas de Henry George sobre la propiedad común a finales del siglo XIX, Marcuse preguntó si era justo o correcto, por ejemplo, que los ricos disfrutaran de las mejores vistas de océanos, ríos u otras bellezas naturales, mientras que los pobres estuvieran relegados a zonas menos atractivas.

Robert Wassmer (Departamento de Orden Público y Administración Pública, Universidad Estatal de California) describió los procesos económicos involucrados en la ubicación residencial, tal como los entienden los economistas de la escuela del “public choice” (decisiones públicas). Según esta perspectiva, los compradores de viviendas eligen no sólo una casa y su terreno, sino también un diverso grupo de ventajas que varían según el sitio. Algunos compradores pueden optar por un paquete de conveniencias que ofrece más sistemas de transporte público y menos vistas panorámicas, mientras que otros pueden preferir mayor acceso a autopistas y a escuelas públicas de mejor calidad. Sin embargo, no todos los ciudadanos tienen las mismas oportunidades para hacer esas selecciones. Varios participantes añadieron que este debate forma parte de una discusión más amplia sobre acceso y selección en la sociedad, dado que casi todas las opciones están restringidas hasta cierto grado, y que muchas restricciones varían sistemáticamente entre los grupos sociales.

Otros participantes señalaron las maneras en que las políticas gubernamentales (p. ej., sistemas tributarios, legislación de vivienda) e instituciones privadas (p. ej., agentes de bienes raíces, instituciones prestamistas) actúan en conjunto para influir en el comportamiento de los mercados inmobiliarios, y por consiguiente, en el efecto de las políticas del suelo en acciones públicas y privadas. Greg Squires (Departamento de Sociología, Universidad de George Washington) informó de un estudio sobre el proceso de búsqueda de vivienda en Washington, DC. Sus hallazgos ponen en evidencia el papel que desempeñan los agentes de bienes raíces al “orientar” a compradores e inquilinos hacia vecindades de las mismas razas. Como resultado fundamental, los negros no disfrutan de las mismas oportunidades que tienen los blancos y sus posibilidades de obtener su solución habitacional preferida son menores, lo cual se contrapone al modelo de “public choice”. Entre los hallazgos de Squires está el hecho de que la selección de la vivienda está determinada por el estatus social o económico. Por ejemplo, en el proceso de búsqueda de vivienda, las amenidades más solicitadas por los clientes negros difirieron de aquéllas preferidas por los blancos, en parte porque aquéllos disponían de menos recursos particulares (tales como automóviles) y requerían viviendas situadas cerca de servicios centralizados tales como transporte público.

John Metzger (Programa de Planificación Urbana y Regional, Universidad del Estado de Michigan) examinó la influencia del mercado privado en la perpetuación de la segregación. Metzger presentó investigaciones sobre perfiles grupales demográficos usados por compañías como Claritas y CACI Marketing Systems para caracterizar los vecindarios. Dichos perfiles se venden a una amplia gama de industrias, entre ellas agencias inmobiliarias y financieras, como también a entidades públicas. La industria inmobiliaria se vale de los perfiles para alimentar el proceso decisorio de comercialización, planificación e inversión, y —señala Metzger— para propiciar enclaves de razas y la persistencia de la segregación. Las instituciones de préstamos hipotecarios se valen de los perfiles para determinar la demanda del consumidor. Los planificadores urbanos, tanto asesores privados y del sector público, usan los perfiles para la determinación de usos futuros del suelo, para la planificación a largo plazo y para guiar las actividades de planificación e inversión de distritos comerciales centrales, mientras que los promotores de bienes raíces los usan para definir sus mercados y demostrar las demandas aceleradas de sus productos. Los perfiles en sí suelen estar basados en estereotipos raciales y étnicos, y a su vez refuerzan la separación de grupos raciales y étnicos dentro de los mercados de bienes raíces regionales.

Xavier de Souza Briggs (Escuela de Gobierno John F. Kennedy, Universidad de Harvard) introdujo la idea de “capital social” en la discusión. El término “capital social”, tal como lo emplean actualmente sociólogos y expertos en teoría sociológica, encarna las redes y relaciones sociales dentro las comunidades, que pueden aprovecharse para el logro de metas individuales y comunes. Briggs argumentó que si bien el capital social es, al mismo tiempo, causa y efecto de la segregación en los Estados Unidos, también puede utilizarse para crear cambios positivos. Otros participantes cuestionaron la eficacia de la teoría y las investigaciones en capital social para resolver el problema de la segregación espacial urbana, señalando que éstas tendían a limitarse a la cuestión de “cómo mejorar la situación de los pobres” en vez de estudiar los mecanismos estructurales e institucionales que contribuyen a la segregación residencial y a la desigualdad de la renta. No obstante, los sociólogos opinan que el capital social es justamente lo que necesitan las comunidades para tener cierto control sobre sus ambientes inmediatos, en vez de ser simples receptoras de las consecuencias previstas e imprevistas de la economía política.

Justicia social y política del suelo

Durante el seminario, participantes de distintas partes del mundo dieron ejemplos de casos de segregación espacial utilizada como estrategia política por los poderes estatales:

• El gobierno colonial británico de Kenya instituyó leyes de planificación y de zonificación de exclusión para separar a los africanos nativos de los británicos. Esos patrones residenciales, establecidos hace casi un siglo, se reflejan en la Nairobi de hoy.
• Durante el régimen británico en Palestina, el gobierno militar forzó a los palestinos árabes a vivir en un solo sector de la ciudad de Lod, lo que facilitó la transformación de esta ciudad antiguamente árabe en lo que hoy en día se conoce oficialmente como Israel.
• El régimen militar de Augusto Pinochet desalojó a miles de chilenos de la clase trabajadora de ciertos sectores de sus ciudades para dar paso a pequeños enclaves exclusivos para familias de clase media y alta.
• El régimen del Apartheid de la República Sudafricana creó sectores residenciales separados por raza y mantuvo un aislamiento sistemático de grupos en prácticamente todos los aspectos de la sociedad.

Las conexiones entre estas formas extremas de segregación espacial y las fuerzas de mercados y políticas inmobiliarias de la mayoría de las ciudades modernas son complejas y difíciles de articular. Uno de esos vínculos se refleja en las maneras como se continúan aplicando las políticas inmobiliarias y las instituciones que apoyan los mercados inmobiliarios para brindar legitimidad a las prácticas discriminatorias.

Al imaginarse un mundo de ciudades cuyos habitantes tengan verdadera libertad para escoger dónde vivir, los planificadores del seminario se concentraron en políticas y programas gubernamentales que facilitan la integración, tales como el programa “Moving to Opportunity” del Departamento de Vivienda y Desarrollo Urbano de los Estados Unidos. Sin embargo, Stephen Ross (Departamento de Economía, Universidad de Connecticut) cuestionó los supuestos beneficios de las políticas de integración o repoblación lanzando esta pregunta: “¿Qué pasaría si dispersáramos personas de altos ingresos por toda la ciudad? ¿Qué cambiaría? ¿Nos ayuda esto a considerar con más detenimiento la importancia del espacio?”

Otra pregunta de Xavier Briggs obligó a los participantes a pensar en dónde se producen la mayoría de las interacciones sociales significativas. Específicamente, ¿qué debe pasar —y en qué circunstancias— para ir desde el movimiento extremo de limpieza étnica (según el espectro étnico urbano mencionado por Boal) al extremo opuesto de la asimilación? Briggs sugirió que es posible que instituciones como escuelas y lugares de trabajo estén en más capacidad de facilitar la diversidad en las interacciones sociales, que los vecindarios residenciales.

Al fin y al cabo, los planificadores urbanos desearían que se usen sus herramientas para formar ciudades que ofrezcan justicia para todos. Hablando de las condiciones de los ciudadanos árabes en la ciudad mixta de Lod, Haim Yacobi (Departamento de Geografía, Universidad de Ben-Gurion, Israel), tocó los cimientos de los ideales democráticos occidentales al preguntar lo siguiente: “Si una persona no tiene acceso total a la ciudad, si no puede participar de lleno en la vida de la ciudad, ¿está esa persona viviendo en una ciudad verdadera?”

William Fischel is professor of economics and the Patricia F. and William B. Hale ’44 Professor in Arts and Sciences at Dartmouth College in Hanover, New Hampshire. He was a member of the Hanover zoning board for 10 years, and has long served on the teaching and research faculty of the Lincoln Institute. He has written more than 50 articles and three books about the related topics of local government, land use controls, school finance and property taxation. Fischel’s most recent book pulls those themes together under the title The Homevoter Hypothesis (Harvard University Press 2001), and he will discuss them at a course at the Lincoln Institute on April 25.

Land Lines: The term homevoter doesn’t seem to be in any dictionary. What does it mean?

William Fischel: I coined the word to convey the theme of my book. My original title was Municipal Corporations and the Capitalization Principle, but when I tried it out on people their eyes glazed over. I had to think of something catchier, and homevoter popped into my head. In local government elections, residents tend to “vote their homes.” For example, if the school board proposes a tax increase to reduce class size, most homeowners will consider the impact of the taxes and the better school quality on the value of their homes as well as on their personal situations.

LL: What’s the difference between people voting their personal situations and voting their homes?

WF: If people voted only according to their immediate situation, almost every school referendum would be voted down. Since the last of the baby boomers graduated from high school in the late 1970s, only about a third of all American households have any children in public school. If people only cared about whether school expenditures benefited them directly, the two-thirds of voters without kids in school would vote down school referenda and save themselves some taxes. The reason they usually don’t is that they know that scuttling the local schools will drive their home values down. They may not like paying taxes, but most voters will not actively oppose a reasonable school budget.

LL: Why would home values override immediate concerns about taxes, since most homeowners plan to keep their houses for a long time?

WF: For the great majority of homeowners, the equity in their home is much larger than their holdings of stocks and bonds and savings accounts. An owner-occupied home is a huge asset, and it is nearly impossible to diversify the financial risk of holding on to it. People who own a lot of stocks can diversify their holdings by buying mutual funds. But you cannot diversify your homeownership portfolio by buying a tenth of a house in Cambridge, a tenth in Springfield, a tenth in Pittsburgh, and so forth. You are stuck with all your homeownership eggs in one local basket. If the schools are declining, so is much of your investment. You don’t have to plan to sell a home soon to be concerned about its value, just as you don’t have to be ready to retire to be concerned about your retirement investments.

LL: So even people who will never have kids are interested in the quality of public schools?

WF: They sure are, especially when they are buying a house. Many economic studies of housing values have found that the major determinant of house price differences among communities is the quality of public schools. Further, the difference in home values is not reflected in the cost of the structure but in the land value. If your home burned down and you decided to sell your lot instead of rebuilding, the price of the lot would reflect the value of the community’s public assets such as its schools. The structure itself would just reflect the cost of building it.

LL: What other community assets do homevoters pay attention to?

WF: Lots of things, including neighborhood traffic, local parks, good (or bad) views, local air quality, open space, crime rates and public libraries. Like school quality, all of these community characteristics are capitalized in home values if they are better or worse than average.

LL: Capitalized? As in the stock market?

WF: Yes, just as in the stock market. If Merck Pharmaceuticals develops an effective drug to treat cancer, the value of Merck stock will go up. That good news is quickly capitalized in (or reflected in) the price of the stock. If a particular city found a good way to control traffic noise and congestion, the value of homes there would rise. In both cases, the stockholders would be pleased.

LL: How is a city like Merck?

WF: They are both corporations. One is a municipality and the other is a business, but each has a corporate identity that is independent of its owners or residents. The main difference is that a city’s major stockholders, its homeowners, cannot diversify their assets. So unlike most business stockholders, residents pay close attention to what their corporation’s managers are doing. They make managers do their business in the open most of the time, and they make their board of directors—the city council—stand for election more frequently than business corporation boards.

LL: What about the role of other stakeholders, such as local business owners?

WF: Business people are usually behind development plans, and city councils pay attention to them. But in the municipalities where most people live—cities and towns of less than 120,000 population—homeowners have to be persuaded that the proposed development will do them some good. Just creating jobs and lowering taxes is not enough in most places. A job-creating, tax-paying factory whose traffic, noise and pollution devalue the homes of nearby residents will have a hard time getting permission to locate there. Homevoters may not be as active as developers, but they are usually more numerous and vocal, and few city councils can afford to ignore their concerns.

LL: And how do renters benefit from the system?

WF: Renters get the benefit of municipal services that are more consumer-oriented as a result of homevoters’ activism. But renters have a shorter time horizon because when they move they neither gain nor lose from the local improvements they leave behind. This may explain why renters tend to participate in local government less than homeowners. They don’t have the long-term financial stake that even the short-term homeowner has.

LL: What’s the downside of homevoters’ influence?

WF: The downside is exclusionary zoning. Zoning is a necessary tool for local governments to rationalize development. The problem is that homevoters can overuse this tool. Because homes are not a diversifiable asset, homeowners often become risk averse to any development that might reduce their home’s value. The NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) syndrome is most often seen in homeowners, and my theory says they are rational to behave this way. But what is rational for the homeowners in a single community might not be rational for the larger region. Siting low-income housing, power plants, half-way houses and the other necessary but sometimes unlovely developments is impeded by having people too worried about their home values.

LL: Is there a way to control the bad side of homevoting and still keep the good side?

WF: Understanding where the problem comes from is a start. People who oppose low-income housing projects are not necessarily opposing low-income people. They may be mainly worried about their home values. One way to deal with that would be to offer home-value insurance for neighborhoods that feel threatened by proposed land use changes. An innovative program in Chicago offered home-value insurance to help forestall “panic selling” and thus stabilize neighborhoods with respect to both home values and socioeconomic composition. It might be worth extending home equity insurance to other situations in which neighborhood change raises the anxieties of homeowners.

LL: But people have lots of reasons to oppose neighborhood changes besides loss of property value.

WF: It is rare for people to mention property values in public discussions. It sounds too selfish to talk about in a public forum. But economists know that most of the things that people do talk about, such as traffic, noise, open space and service costs, clearly affect people’s home values. Whether owners are consciously relating these characteristics to home values or simply intuitively aware of this connection is hard to say. If developers could take home values off the table in such debates, it might go a long way to overcoming the NIMBY problem.

LL: You mentioned earlier that the quality of community life was reflected in land values. Would this argue for a tax on land rather than improvements in order to finance local services?

WF: I think it does, and in fact that’s what most property taxes really do tax. Local development is a highly regulated activity because of zoning laws, planning reviews and environmental impact statements. I believe that local land use regulation is tight enough to make buildings essentially indistinguishable from land as a tax base. Take the example of the home that burns down. The buyer of the lot typically has to put up another home of the same type, and the tax payment on land and structure will be the same as before. For the most part, owners of homes and businesses in zoned communities have only one allowable use for their land, so that increasing or decreasing local taxes is not going to affect that use. That’s exactly the same virtue as a tax on land. Beyond that, taxing property value gives voters cooperative incentives on the zoning front. Homevoters won’t want to trash another side of town with an unfriendly land use, because devaluing other people’s property would cause property taxes to be shifted to the remaining homeowners.

LL: A land tax is what Henry George advocated more than 100 years ago. Are you saying that the local property tax already is a land tax?

WF: Yes, within certain contexts. It is quite a bit like a land tax in largely residential communities and for most new development. Zoning limits a developer’s alternatives, so the tax rate will not alter his behavior. A general property tax would not be like a land tax, however, if it were administered by a large jurisdiction such as a state or national government, unless those governments also had local zoning controls in place. It is the combination of local zoning plus the property tax that approximates a land tax. Henry George’s ideas came in through the back door of suburban zoning and property taxation rather than through the front door of state and national taxation.

In the past decade, nearly 50 mansions have been demolished and replaced in the historic Chicago suburb of Kenilworth. Four demolition permits are currently pending review, while permits have been approved for two other historically significant houses. To slow the teardown trend, Kenilworth has enacted a nine-month waiting period between issuance of a demolition permit and initiation of the teardown process. However, the village does not have a historic preservation ordinance, and local officials generally support the rights of property owners to demolish and replace their houses. The National Trust for Historic Preservation included Kenilworth on its 2006 list of the 11 most endangered places nationwide (Black 2006).

The practice of demolishing and replacing houses in high-priced areas generates passionate controversy. The fight to save the Skiff House in Kenilworth is illustrative (Nance 2005). That property at 157 Kenilworth Avenue is one of the premier locations in one of Chicago’s most expensive suburbs, three blocks west of Lake Michigan and five blocks from the commuter train station in the village center.

The house was built in 1908 for Frederick Skiff, the first director of Chicago’s Field Museum of Natural History. This beautiful and historically significant house was designed by the architectural firm of Daniel H. Burnham, who was considered the preeminent architect in America at the turn of the twentieth century. He oversaw the construction of the 1893 World’s Columbian Exposition and helped design a series of lakefront parks as part of the 1909 Plan of Chicago.

Plans to demolish the Skiff House shortly after it was purchased in 2004 for $1.875 million created an uproar. While many neighbors supported the owner’s right to tear down the property—after all, they might want to do the same—others saw it as an assault on the community’s character. “Save 157 Kenilworth” signs began to appear in front yards throughout the village, and a neighborhood group, Citizens for Kenilworth, led a campaign to save the house. After months of controversy, and only days after an auction to sell off valuable parts of the house before demolition, a neighbor purchased the house for $2.35 million in order to save it.

Historic houses continue to be torn down in Kenilworth and elsewhere, but not all teardowns generate controversy. Residents of many Chicago suburbs have been supportive of the teardown trend. Naperville is a representative case. Founded in 1831 and incorporated in 1857, Naperville grew slowly until plans for the East-West Tollway (I-88) were announced in 1954. The population grew from 7,013 in 1950, to 21,675 in 1960, to 140,106 today.

Naperville’s downtown has undergone a renaissance over the last decade, attracting new restaurants, shops, and residences. Although the city has a historic district just to the east of the downtown area, teardown activity has been concentrated in what were formerly more humble areas. Small, older houses are being purchased for about $400,000 and replaced by much larger houses that may sell for $1 million.

The teardown trend in Naperville is illustrated by one small house being sold as a teardown, with an announcement of an upcoming public hearing posted in the yard. It is likely to be replaced by a house that is similar to the recently constructed house next door (see pages 6 and 7). Though teardown activity is not entirely without controversy in Naperville, it does not generate the same passion as the Skiff House did.

How Widespread is the Teardown Phenomenon?

Nationwide the teardown phenomenon has attracted much media and public attention. The decennial Census of Population and Housing offers a way to quantify the practice using the “net replacement method.” For example, suppose the Census lists 10,000 housing units in an area for 1990 and 10,500 units in 2000—an increase of 500 units. Now suppose the Census shows that 800 housing units were built during the decade. Then 300 of the newly built units must have simply replaced existing units. The 300 replacement units are a crude but nonetheless enlightening measure of teardown activity in that community.

Figure 1 shows counties where at least one census tract had a net replacement rate in excess of 4 percent. Teardown activity is clustered in older urban areas in the Northeast, Midwest, and California. In fact, the map does not look substantially different from a map of population density in the United States. This simple analysis shows that replacement of the preexisting housing stock is an extensive phenomenon that is national in scope.

Nevertheless, it is surprisingly difficult to track teardown activity on a case-by-case basis. The classic teardown is a house whose sale is followed by the issuance of both demolition and building permits, but timing is a key factor in tracking these permits. If a demolition permit is issued four years after a sale, was the house really sold as a teardown? Similarly, a building permit may be issued long after a dilapidated house was demolished, yet this situation is not what most people have in mind when they think of teardowns.

Some teardowns are carried out by the current owner without a sale. Other houses are so extensively remodeled that they are effectively teardowns, even though no demolition permit is issued. Even when data on sales, demolition permits, and building permits are available, it is difficult to merge the different sources of information since they frequently come from different agencies that vary in the quality of their database management.

The National Trust for Historic Preservation has described the Chicago metropolitan area as the “epicenter of teardowns.” Aside from Kenilworth, teardowns are common in both the city of Chicago and its suburbs. The Village of Skokie (2005) surveyed 20 of its neighbors in Chicago’s near north suburbs and compared the number of detached single-family housing unit demolition permits from 2000 to 2003 to the total number of such units as reported in the 2000 U.S. Census. Thirteen of the 20 communities reported demolition permits representing more than 1 percent of the housing stock over the four-year period.

Richard Dye and I (forthcoming) have used data from Chicago and six suburban communities to document the degree of teardown activity in the region. We were able to obtain data on house sales and demolition permits for Chicago; one of its suburbs to the west, Western Springs; the northwest suburb of Park Ridge; and four suburbs on the North Shore—Glencoe, Kenilworth, Wilmette, and Winnetka.

Between 1996 and 2003, the number of demolition permits ranged from 29 in Kenilworth to 273 in Winnetka and 12,236 in Chicago. Of course, Kenilworth has only 2,494 residents, whereas Winnetka’s population is 12,419, and Chicago has 2.9 million residents. Figure 2 shows the number of demolition permits as a percentage of total housing units for each community. More than 9 percent of Winnetka’s housing stock was torn down between 1996 and 2003, and teardown rates were also quite high in Winnetka and Kenilworth. Even Chicago, with more than 400,000 housing units, had a demolition rate near 3 percent.

These six suburbs were not chosen randomly. All had high median incomes in 2000, ranging from $73,154 in Park Ridge to more than $200,000 in Kenilworth. All of these suburbs have stations on commuter train lines to downtown Chicago, little or no vacant land on which to build, and good schools and other local public services. In other words, demand to live in these suburbs is high. Teardown activity in Chicago is concentrated in comparable neighborhoods within the city, such as Lincoln Park, West Town, and Lakeview on the near north side.

The Costs and Benefits of Teardowns

Teardowns can impose significant social costs. Local residents often complain that new houses destroy the character of a neighborhood. Those houses may be built to the limits of the zoning code, tower above their neighbors, and reach to the edge of the property line. Sometimes neighbors simply dislike the design of new buildings, particularly those that replace historic houses. When tall apartment buildings replace single-family houses or two-family houses in the city, neighbors complain of the loss of sunlight, lack of parking spaces, and increased traffic congestion. The construction process itself can be noisy and disruptive. New, expensive houses may cause assessments to increase in the neighborhood. And, teardowns may reduce the stock of affordable housing.

Teardowns also carry some benefits, however. In places that rely on the property tax to fund local services, the additional revenue from high-priced replacement houses is often quite welcome. Not all teardown buildings are historic, architecturally significant, or mourned when they are demolished. Some teardowns are simply eyesores.

Some of the new houses being built today will eventually be viewed as historically significant properties in their own right. Once entire blocks are rebuilt, the new housing no longer looks out of place. It is surprising to discover how stark and incompatible some properties built in the early 1900s appear in historic photographs taken before trees grew and the neighborhood filled in with similar houses.

It also is important to recognize that teardowns may help to curb sprawl. One reason people move to the urban fringe is to build a new house in a contemporary construction style. Allowing people to tear down a small, outdated house and replace it with a modern house may induce them to stay in centrally located areas. In general, encouraging housing and economic growth helps maintain the vitality of previously developed areas, which is a strategic complement to anti-sprawl policies designed to limit growth at the fringe.

Policy Responses

Local jurisdictions have been creative in responding to teardowns. Some policies are designed to the slow the amount of teardown activity by making it more costly, through demolition fees and fines for illegal demolitions. Others, such as a moratorium on new demolition permits or an enforced waiting period between permit issuance and the time when demolition can start, are simply designed to cool a potential teardown fever. Such policies also raise the cost of teardowns by making developers wait for some time after purchasing a property before being able to recoup their costs. Complementary policies include landmark designation and historic district designation, which make it more difficult or even impossible to tear down existing structures.

Policies on the other side of the balance sheet may give developers an incentive not to demolish existing structures. Communities may offer tax breaks to owners who rehabilitate existing houses rather than demolish them to build new ones. Or, owners may be granted variances from restrictive zoning provisions in order to enlarge rather than demolish an existing house.

At the same time, jurisdictions often use zoning to influence the type of new housing that is built in their community. Lot-coverage and floor-area restrictions are used to ensure that new structures do not dwarf their neighbors. Other policies include maximum building sizes; set-back and open space requirements; and restrictions on such design elements as garage and driveway locations, roof pitch, bulk limits, solar access, and the alignment of the new house with neighboring structures. Many communities have design review boards that can revoke building permits for structures that are not in compliance. These standards are not always clear beforehand, however, and they can increase the level of uncertainty for developers, delay construction, and raise costs.

Even if communities do not attempt to curb teardown activity, they often adopt policies designed to reduce the disruption caused by new construction. The builder may be required to notify neighbors when construction is about to begin, and a time window may be imposed for completion of the building. Construction activity may be limited to certain hours of day, the site may need to be fenced, and work vehicle and dumpster location requirements are often imposed. Communities also may require that contractors be bonded and certified.

How successful are these policies in slowing the rate of teardown activity? As we have seen, the Skiff House was saved because Kenilworth’s nine-month waiting period between permit issuance and the start of demolition provided enough time for a buyer to step forward before the house was razed. However, the potential for profits in such transactions make it difficult to stop teardowns completely. If a developer can purchase an existing property for $300,000, demolish it for $20,000, and spend $400,000 to build a new house according to current construction standards, then he has incurred $720,000 in costs. With new upscale houses routinely selling in excess of $1 million in communities with many teardowns, it should not be surprising that developers continue this practice.

Implications for Land Values

Assessors encounter enormous difficulties in placing a value on land in built-up areas. When few vacant lots exist, it is nearly impossible to find enough sales of vacant land to assess the value of land accurately. In the absence of direct land sales data, land values can be estimated by subtracting construction costs less depreciation from the sale price of improved properties in the area.

Statistical analysis of mass appraisal data can account for such structural characteristics as square footage in order to control for the contribution of the building to total property value. With a complete set of these characteristics, the residual from the regression reflects the contribution of location to property value—in other words, land value. Unfortunately, any unobserved structural characteristic will also be part of the residual.

Teardowns can help estimate the value of land in developed areas. Consider the earlier example of a property that is purchased for $300,000, demolished for $20,000, and replaced by a million-dollar house. If the developer could purchase a vacant lot of the identical size next door for $290,000, which property would he prefer? If there is no salvage value for parts of the existing house, it will cost the developer $320,000 before it is possible to build on the lot with the existing house. Yet the vacant lot is available in the same general location for $30,000 less. The vacant lot is preferable even though it does not include a house—in fact, it is preferable precisely because it does not include an existing structure.

If the price of the vacant lot rises to $310,000, the developer still obtains a lot that is ready to build upon for $10,000 less than the cost of building on the neighboring lot. Only at $320,000 will the developer be indifferent between the two lots. It follows that the value of land in this case is $320,000. This key insight leads to an extremely useful method of valuing land in areas experiencing teardowns. The value of land is simply the sales price of a teardown property plus any demolition cost.

An important implication of this line of reasoning is that only location determines the value of a teardown property; characteristics of the structure are irrelevant except insofar as they influence demolitions costs or salvage value. This implication is somewhat surprising to people who think that a historic house has intrinsic value. Though it is tempting to think that the Skiff House in Kenilworth is worth approximately $2 million because of its historic and architectural value, a vacant lot next door would sell for nearly the same price. Any house near Lake Michigan in Kenilworth will sell for well more than $1 million. The conclusion to be drawn is simply that land is expensive along Chicago’s North Shore.

Richard Dye and I (forthcoming) test the prediction that only location characteristics influence sales prices in our sample of seven communities in the Chicago area. Our measures of location include such variables as lot size, distance from the nearest commuter train station, and proximity to Lake Michigan. Structural characteristics include such variables as building size, age, and whether the house is built of brick and has a basement, garage, or fireplace. We identify teardowns as houses for which a demolition permit was issued within two years of a sale. As predicted, structural characteristics do not significantly influence the sales price of teardown properties. Teardowns are purchased for the land underneath.

Final Thoughts

The teardown phenomenon is not new. Houses have been demolished and replaced for as long as they have been built. American cities grew rapidly in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and again in the years just after World War II. Tastes now appear to be changing toward larger houses with spacious rooms and high ceilings. Many people find the existing housing stock less desirable than new construction. In this situation, it is not surprising that buyers purchase, demolish, and build new houses, especially in high-demand areas. The trick for local governments is to keep the costs of teardown activity from overwhelming the less obvious benefits.

Daniel P. McMillen is professor in the Department of Economics and the Institute for Government and Public Affairs at University of Illinois at Chicago. He has published widely in urban economics, real estate, and applied econometrics. He is a visiting fellow in 2006–2007 at the Lincoln Institute.

References

Black, Lisa. 2006. Kenilworth added to list of endangered historic towns. Chicago Tribune, May 20.

Dye, Richard, and Daniel P. McMillen. Forthcoming. Teardowns and land values in the Chicago metropolitan area. Journal of Urban Economics.

Nance, Kevin. 2005. Teardown ‘madness has to stop’: Developer rescues historic Burnham house, but says it’s just a start. Chicago Sun-Times, November 6.

Village of Skokie. 2005. Comprehensive Plan Appendix C: Near north suburban housing activity study. http://www.skokie.org/comm/Appendix%20C.pdf.

The character of institutions, political settings, and social relationships is critical in determining whether nonprofit developers are effective in reusing vacant, abandoned, and contaminated properties in their communities.

Over the last several years, growing public attention has centered on the fallout from the subprime lending debacle—an unprecedented event that has resulted in massive foreclosures and widespread housing vacancy in what had been the perennially growing Sunbelt (Goodman 2007; Leland 2007). Across the southern United States, from Atlanta, to Fort Meyers, to Phoenix, massive new housing developments are largely unoccupied while older housing is abandoned due to foreclosure. Cities in the Sunbelt now exhibit housing vacancy rates akin to those observed in former industrial Rustbelt cities.

This situation leads to two critical questions: Can Sunbelt cities manage the land use changes that this unstable (and unpredictable) economic market has created, while still maintaining at least the status quo for remaining residents? Are these changes providing new planning opportunities for urban sustainability?

In our work with the Lincoln Institute, we conducted an empirical study to begin to answer those questions (Hollander et al. 2010). The United States Postal Service (USPS) regularly releases datasets that provide information on occupied housing units for each zip code. We were able to obtain household residential delivery data for all zip codes in the lower 48 states for three time periods: the beginning of the real estate boom (February 2000); the peak of the real estate market (February 2006); and a time of high foreclosures and significant decline in real estate markets (February 2009).

The key indicator employed in our study was derived from the USPS dataset: occupied housing units. The USPS data lists how many housing units received mail during a given month in each zip code. When no one is receiving mail at a location, it is considered vacant. After 90 days of vacancy, the USPS no longer lists the unit as active and, for our purposes, removes it from the occupied housing unit list.

Following a methodology developed by Hollander (2010), we noted changes in occupied housing unit density from one period to the next. It was possible to analyze this because zip code boundaries remained constant in our study sample. We focused on broad shifts in occupancy in a given zip code as being indicative of widespread vacancy and abandonment.

Two time intervals were selected for analysis: February 2000 to February 2006, and February 2006 to February 2009. The first period corresponds with the housing boom years, and the second period with the slowing of the boom into the foreclosure crisis. Change for each time interval and each zip code was calculated by subtracting the total count of households at the end of each interval from the count at the beginning.

Data Tabulation, Mapping, and Analysis

In addition to comparing national indicators of household change between the two periods, each dataset was separated into urban, suburban, and rural areas. Urbanized Areas, as defined by the United States Census, provided boundaries for our urban areas. Areas between the Urbanized Area and the Metropolitan Statistical Area boundary lines were considered suburban, and areas outside of Metropolitan Statistical Areas were considered rural.

For each of these regions and for both time intervals, we analyzed the following factors for both declining and gaining zip codes:

• number of zip codes with a net decline or gain in housing occupancy;
• total square mileage within those zip codes;
• total net housing loss (or gain) for all declining (and gaining) zip codes; and
• percentage of the total housing units lost (or gained) in declining (or gaining) zip codes.

The data were also mapped in three categories to display which zip codes were losing and gaining housing units for each time interval. Zip codes that had a net loss of 30 or more housing units were mapped as “losing,” those that gained 30 or more units were mapped as “gaining,” and those that lost or gained up to 29 units were considered as having no significant change.

Two measures of spatial autocorrelation—Global Moran’s I and a Univariate Local Indicator of Spatial Association (LISA)—were used to explore spatial clustering of USPS’s housing unit occupancy change data and thus identify broad areas that were impacted most severely. In this analysis, the GeoDA software package was used to run the Global Moran’s I and Univariate LISA tests, with results shown only for zip code clusters with significance at 0.01 for the Global Moran’s I test and 0.05 for the LISA test.

Four possible results are derived from the Univariate LISA test, in which “high change” refers to an increase in housing occupancy of more than 30 units in a zip code and “low change” refers to a decrease of more than 30 housing units.

1. High-high clustering: high change zip codes surrounded by high change zip codes

2. Low-low clustering: low change zip codes surrounded by low change zip codes

3. Low-high clustering: low change zip codes surrounded by high change zip codes

4. High-low clustering: high change zip codes surrounded by low change zip codes

The high-high and low-low results indicate local clustering, while the high-low and low-high results indicate outliers or “islands” (Anselin 1995).

Findings

This analysis of the USPS occupied housing dataset revealed a number of trends that provide a spatial and statistical context for understanding the foreclosure crisis and numerous paths for further investigation. We had anticipated finding significantly more zip codes with a decline in occupied housing in the 2006–2009 period than the 2000–2006 period. Though the latter period did have 16.4 percent more declining zip codes than the former period, this increase was not as high as expected given the assumption of a boom vs. bust comparison.

However, when the dataset was separated into urban, suburban, and rural areas, much more distinctive trends were evident (tables 1 and 2). Suburban areas registered 42.8 percent more declining zip codes in the latter (2,333) than the former period (1,634) and rural zip codes registered 13.8 percent more declining zip codes in the latter (2,189) than in the former period (1,924), whereas urban areas had only 1.9 percent fewer declining zip codes in the latter period (2,084 versus 2,124).

Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the occupied housing unit gains and losses during both periods. The 2006–2009 interval was marked not only by an increase in the size and number of declining (red) zip codes but a slowing of growth in previously expanding areas, as indicated by the increase in no-change (yellow) zip codes in many previously expanding regions. Decline also became more prevalent in new areas. The upper Midwestern states (Michigan, Wisconsin, Northern Illinois, and Minnesota) and the Sunbelt region (including Phoenix, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, the San Francisco Bay Area, New Orleans, and the outskirts of Florida’s coastal cities) showed noticeable increases in declining zip codes. In contrast, declines in the Great Plains, Mississippi River corridor, western Pennsylvania, and the Pacific Northwest were either less pronounced or reversed in the latter period.

The results of the Global autocorrelation tests indicated spatial clustering existed in the dataset. Not surprisingly, the LISA analysis found declining clusters prevalent in regions that had high percentages of declining zip codes, generally in both intervals (figures 3 and 4). However, it was surprising that fewer low-low (declining) clusters were found in the 2006–2009 period. The 2000–2006 period shows low-low clusters, particularly in the Great Plains states, the Mississippi River corridor, and western New York and Pennsylvania. Despite having more total declining zip codes, less low-low clustering occurred in the 2006–2009 period. However, clustering did occur in new territory including the upper Midwest, South Florida, New Orleans, the Southwest, and California.

Application of the Findings

Since completing the working paper on which this article is based, its findings have influenced further on-the-ground research. Widespread instances of decline in metropolitan areas in the Sunbelt led to more targeted research in cities shown to be among those most severely impacted by the recession of the late 2000s. Three cities are examined as case studies by Hollander (2011): Phoenix, Orlando, and Fresno (figures 5, 6, and 7).

In Phoenix, a fire-hot real estate market led to widespread overbuilding of housing in recent years. Developers converted farms in the Laveen neighborhood into housing subdivisions, in some cases finishing only half of them. In Orlando, inner city neighborhoods that had experienced rebirth in the mid-2000s are stricken by widespread foreclosures today, leading to arson and high vacancy levels. Many of the grand older houses of Fresno are now overrun with weeds and decay as demand for housing has plummeted in this center of California’s agricultural industry. With jobs scarce, people are fleeing former boomtowns and leaving behind a new type of vacancy and abandonment. In these cities and others, entire blocks that had been fully occupied now have half or more of the housing stock unoccupied.

Additionally, the number of new declining zip codes found in Metropolitan Statistical Areas in this study raises more specific questions about how the recent recession has impacted different parts of the country. This finding challenges the belief that urban cores are most prone to decline while suburban growth will continue in perpetuity.

This shift in declining neighborhoods from urban to suburban areas spurred another related study that broke metropolitan regions down into central cities, inner ring suburbs, and outer ring suburbs (Zinder 2010). It used statistical metrics to compare trends within those subsets of the metropolitan region and added another round of evidence that suburban decline is becoming more pervasive in most regions of the country.

Zinder found more new declining zip codes in all suburban regions during the recent recession than in the previous period and determined that outer ring suburbs sustained the largest increase of new zip codes with a net decline in housing occupancy. In contrast, the total number of declining zip codes in central cities decreased. This study also provided additional support for the regional trends reported here showing particularly deep impacts in southwestern cities and outer ring suburbs in the Midwest, South, and Northeast.

Concluding Remarks

The findings from this research effort indicate that the face of declining cities and regions in America has begun to change. Though many areas previously hit by economic downturns have continued to feel their impacts, decline is no longer limited primarily to older manufacturing towns, urban cores, and declining rural farming communities. Places that had prospered in more recent times, including Sunbelt cities and remote suburbs, have begun to see declines in occupied housing stock as well and were, in fact, the places hit hardest by the subprime lending crisis. It is important to note that housing abandonment (i.e., a drop in occupied housing unit density) is one manifestation of neighborhood change, but it is only part of a larger story of metropolitan growth and decline. We focus here on those neighborhoods in decline, but in the future we will be attuned to growing neighborhoods as well.

Our research located some statistically significant clusters of zip codes experiencing home abandonment in recent years. The next question to answer is: What social processes and factors explain this clustering? In future phases of this research, we plan to examine how changes in occupied housing density have been dispersed throughout major Census-defined Urbanized Areas and begin to employ advanced multivariate statistical techniques to understand the key attributes associated with clusters of decline.

Should current trends persist in years to come, planners and policy makers will need to be better prepared, perhaps by looking to models adopted by other communities to build upon existing assets while embracing population decline. Understanding these complex dynamics will help community leaders come to terms with the challenges their cities and regions face. This article provides an introduction to a methodological approach to identify these trends in nearly real time to help quantify impacts on a given zip code, city, or region.

References

Anselin, Luc. 1995. Local indicators of spatial autocorrelation–LISA. Geographical Analysis 27:93–115.

Goodman, Peter S. 2007. This is the sound of a bubble bursting. The New York Times. December 23.

Hollander, Justin B. 2010. Moving towards a shrinking cities metric: Analyzing land use changes associated with depopulation in Flint, Michigan. Cityscape: A Journal of Policy Development and Research 12(1):133–151.

Hollander, Justin B. 2011. Sunburnt cities: The great recession, depopulation, and urban planning in the American Sunbelt. London/New York: Routledge.

Hollander, Justin, Colin Polsky, Dan Zinder, and Dan Runfola. 2010. The new American ghost town: Foreclosure, abandonment, and the prospects for city planning. Working Paper. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Leland, John. 2007. Officials say they are falling behind on mortgage fraud cases. The New York Times. December 25.

Zinder, Daniel H. 2010. Through the rings: A study of housing occupancy declines across major urbanized areas in the United States. Medford, MA. Tufts University.

Acknowledgments

Many thanks go to Nick Giner for his contributions to the spatial autocorrelation analysis used in this research. Much of the methodological explanation is based directly on his work on the spatial distribution of lawns in Massachusetts.

About the Authors

Justin B. Hollander is an assistant professor in the Department of Urban and Environmental Policy and Planning at Tufts University in Medford, Massachusetts, and a research scientist at the George Perkins Marsh Institute at Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts.

Colin Polsky is an associate professor at the Graduate School of Geography and associate dean for Undergraduate Research & Active Pedagogy at Clark University. He is a geographer specializing in the human dimensions of global environmental change.

Dan Zinder is a recent graduate of masters degree program in Urban and Environmental Planning at Tufts University. His research interests include land use policy, declining cities, GIS, and sustainability.

Dan Runfola is a Ph.D. student at Clark University. His research interests include remote sensing, GIS, land change science, and vulnerability.