Topic: Direitos de Propriedade e Solo

Course

Vacant Land, the Compact City and Sustainability

Maio 11, 2015 - Maio 25, 2015

Free, offered in espanhol


Various countries have long used mechanisms to mobilize value increments as a fundamental component of urban policy in order to finance urban development, social housing, and public spaces, and also to conserve natural resources and heritage. This course, offered in Spanish, discusses the main instruments used in a variety of countries for the recovery/mobilization of value increment, assessing their objectives, scope, limitations and alternatives to finance urban projects.


Details

Date
Maio 11, 2015 - Maio 25, 2015
Application Period
Abril 13, 2015 - Abril 29, 2015
Language
espanhol
Cost
Free
Educational Credit Type
Lincoln Institute certificate

Keywords

Habitação, Valor da Terra, Planejamento, Políticas Públicas, Desenvolvimento Sustentável, Valoração

Course

Vacant Land, the Compact City, and Sustainability

Abril 22, 2014 - Maio 6, 2014

Free, offered in espanhol


In recent years, vacant land has developed a great influence within the realm of defining land policies. Housing programs require vacant land, yet with the increase in demand and the resulting increase in value of land, these programs become unfeasible. This course, offered in Spanish, aims to present alternatives for vacant land management during the creation of land policies, focusing on housing for low-income populations, on social facilities, on public space, and on large urban projects.


Details

Date
Abril 22, 2014 - Maio 6, 2014
Application Period
Março 28, 2014 - Abril 11, 2014
Language
espanhol
Cost
Free
Educational Credit Type
Lincoln Institute certificate

Keywords

Habitação, Valor da Terra, Planejamento, Políticas Públicas, Desenvolvimento Sustentável, Valoração

Course

Planning Basics for Land Management

Fevereiro 27, 2016 - Abril 5, 2016

Free, offered in espanhol


In this course, offered in Spanish, students discuss and debate new perspectives and practical experiences regarding land management planning while identifying weaknesses of more traditional systems. Topics covered also include the role of the State during urban construction and the impact that planning has on land markets.


Details

Date
Fevereiro 27, 2016 - Abril 5, 2016
Application Period
Fevereiro 1, 2016 - Fevereiro 14, 2016
Selection Notification Date
Fevereiro 22, 2016 at 6:00 PM
Language
espanhol
Cost
Free
Educational Credit Type
Lincoln Institute certificate

Keywords

Habitação, Monitoramento do Mercado Fundiário, Uso do Solo, Planejamento de Uso do Solo, Temas Legais, Governo Local, Planejamento, Desenvolvimento Urbano, Zonificação

Illegal But Rational

Why Small Property Rights Housing Is Big in China
Li Sun and Zhi Liu, Julho 1, 2015

“Being a migrant worker for 13 years, I have longed to own a home and live a normal family life here in Shenzhen,” said Mr. Wang, a former farmer from Sichuan Province who now earns 3,100 yuan (US$500) per month in the manufacturing sector of this sprawling city in South China. Wang recently purchased what is known as “small property rights” (SPR) housing—an illegal but widespread type of residential development built by villagers on their collectively owned land in peri-urban areas and urban villages, rural settlements surrounded by modern development in many Chinese cities. While no official statistics are available, the number of SPR units is estimated at 70 million—perhaps one-quarter of all housing units in urban China (Shen and Tu 2014). “Small property rights housing fulfills my need,” continued Mr. Wang. “It’s affordable. It is the best choice for me,” he says.

Sold primarily to individuals without local household registration, or hukou (box 1), SPR housing violates China’s Land Administration Law, which stipulates that only the state, represented by municipal governments, has the power to convert rural land into urban use. Unlike buyers of legally built homes, buyers of SPR housing do not receive a property rights certificate from the housing administration agency of the municipal government; they sign only a property purchase contract with the village committee. Because Chinese laymen often see the state as the “big” institution, housing units purchased from village committees are popularly called “small” property rights housing.

 


 

Box 1: China’s Hukou System

China is phasing out its household registration system called hukou, which dates to the 1950s. Hukou identifies a citizen as a resident of a particular locality and entitles the hukou holder to the social security, public schools, affordable housing, and other public services provided by their district, township, or village. Many urban public services are available only to urban hukou holders. Because most migrant workers hold rural hukou, they are ineligible for many public services in the cities where they work and live. Moreover, they have to return to their registered places of residence to apply for marriage certificates, passports, personal ID card renewals, and other documents—a requirement that comes at significant cost and inconvenience.

 


 

The widespread development of SPR housing raises a number of legal, political, social, and economic concerns that have prompted academic study and heated public policy debates (Shen and Tu 2014; Sun and Ho 2015). Why has SPR housing emerged in China where administrative control is generally considered tight? What drove the village committees to develop SPR housing in violation of the Land Administration Law? Do SPR housing buyers worry about their tenure security? Why has the government so far tolerated SPR housing ownership? To find answers, one has to look at a number of factors contributing to the rise of SPR housing, including China’s land management system, municipal finance, and public attitudes toward laws and regulations.

The Rise of Small Property Rights Housing

The pace of China’s urbanization is unprecedented. Between 1978 when economic reform began and 2014, the urban population more than quadrupled from 173 million to 749 million, with average annual growth of 16 million. In official counts, the urban population includes residents with hukou and, in recent years, migrants who stay in a city for more than six months. Amid such explosive growth, the government’s institutional capacity to manage urbanization has often lagged behind, at best barely responding to emerging issues.

“The informal development of SPR housing is regarded as an extra-legal practice and a type of spontaneous urbanization,” wrote Dr. Liu Shouying, a senior researcher with the Development Research Center of the State Council, in his newly published book, Land Issues in the Transitional China (Liu 2014).

“There is no law explicitly addressing the emerging issues of SPR housing,” said Peking University Professor Zhou Qiren, a well-known property rights scholar in China (Zhou 2014).

Legal and Economic Factors

Under China’s dual land management system, urban land is owned by the state, and rural land is collectively owned by the villages (figure 1). There is no private ownership. Only the state has the legal power to expropriate rural land and convert it to urban use. Villages have no land development rights. Compensation to villages for expropriated rural land is based on the land’s agricultural production value rather than its higher market value.

When the state expropriates rural land for urban use, it allocates it to residential and commercial uses through concessions to real estate developers, who pay a fee for land use rights. This system allows municipal governments to expropriate rural land for industrial and urban development at low costs, and to generate handsome revenues from land concessions.

The municipal governments’ ability to expand the urban land supply is heavily limited, however, by China’s strict farmland preservation requirements. Under this policy, 1.8 billion mu (equivalent to 1.2 million sq. km) of high-quality agricultural land nationwide must be reserved for food security. The Ministry of Land and Resources annually approves the amount of urban land for each city, and the municipal government then allocates this supply to various purposes, leaving a small fraction (usually around 30 percent) for residential development. Given the limited supply of residential land in the major cities, prices are bid up very high.

By contrast, most cities offer industrial land to manufacturing firms at very low and subsidized prices in order to compete for investment and employment. They expect these firms to yield jobs, economic growth, and tax revenues for the municipality, and then for those new jobs to generate increased demand for housing and services—in turn creating more jobs, economic growth, and tax revenues. As a result, the price for residential land is up to 15 times higher than the price of industrial land (figure 2).

Over the last few years, concession fees from commercial and residential land were typically as high as 40 to 60 percent of municipal tax revenues. With these revenues, municipal governments not only subsidize industrial land, but also fund public investment in infrastructure and other services. Because farmers’ compensation was only a tiny fraction of the value created from the state-monopolized development rights, they were keen to find ways to share in these revenues, setting the stage for SPR housing.

There are three types of rural land in China: one is used for agriculture, one is used for construction, and the third is unused. SPR housing units are usually built on rural construction land, which allows for villagers’ residential plots and public facilities. While strict enforcement of the national farmland preservation policy generally prevents conversion of agricultural land into construction land, villages are not explicitly prohibited from using construction land for village industries, restaurants, hotels, warehouses, rental plants, and rental housing. Indeed, property rental businesses have existed in rural areas for many years. For example, rural households living in urban villages and at the rapidly growing urban fringe have built multi-story housing on their residential plots and rented the units to migrant workers.

When urban housing prices started to soar in the mid-2000s, the villages saw opportunities to make handsome profits from building and selling homes. Each year from 2006 to 2014, house prices climbed about 20 percent in Beijing, 18 percent in Shanghai, 17 percent in Shenzhen, and 11 percent in Chengdu (PLC-HLCRE 2014). The rapidly rising prices of residential land drove part of these increases.

Demand for home ownership in China remains strong, thanks to the growing urban population, rising household incomes, high savings rates among urban households, and lack of alternative household investments. And SPR housing units are much less expensive than comparable formal housing units in the same location. Indeed, their prices are typically 40 percent to 60 percent cheaper, because villages do not pay land concession fees as the urban real estate developers do, and the administrative costs of providing SPR housing are also lower. Thus, SPR units became the rational housing choice for many migrant households, and even for some urban households with hukou in their city of residence.

Social and Cultural Factors

The village committees understood that building and selling SPR housing violated the Land Administration Law and the associated local land regulations, but the lure of profits drove them to test the legal limits. And once a few villages started selling SPR housing, others were quick to follow. The central government responded by issuing a series of administrative circulars calling for a halt, but took little action due to the lack of legally effective and socially acceptable measures to put an end to the practice.

Meanwhile, given the lack of legal protections, one might ask why SPR housing buyers do not opt for rental housing. The answer is that the rental market in urban China is poorly regulated, and contract enforcement is weak. Tenants often face the risk of unexpected rent hikes and premature termination of leases. In addition, participation in the affordable housing programs run by the municipal governments is not an option for most migrant workers because they do not have local urban hukou.

At the same time, Chinese households strongly prefer home ownership for a number of social and cultural reasons. Most households consider a stable home essential to their lives. As Dr. Sun Yet Sen (1866–1925) famously said: “Every household ought to have a home.” The Chinese word for “family” (jia) is literally the same as the word for “home,” both in written form and speech. Most Chinese think that an ideal home is a secure place for the family, and the most secure home is a self-owned one. One SPR housing buyer in Shenzhen said, “With my newly purchased SPR housing unit, I don’t have to worry about being forced out of the rented unit any more, and I could make my own place a real home.”

Because healthcare and educational opportunities are better in cities than in rural areas, many migrant workers purchase SPR housing units so that their families can take advantage of these services. And for young men, buying SPR housing units is a way to improve their chances in the highly competitive marriage market, where men outnumber women by 34 million, according to the National Bureau of Statistics. Moreover, herding behavior—where everyone wants to do what everyone else does—is a significant factor, and the housing purchases of some buyers heavily influence the purchase decisions of others.

As some newspaper interviews and Internet surveys reveal, buyers generally do not worry about being prosecuted for living in SPR housing. They do not believe that the government would attempt to enforce the law on millions of citizens. There is a popular saying in the Chinese legal enforcement tradition: fa bu ze zhong (the law does not punish everyone). If many people violate a law or a regulation in China, people often consider the law itself flawed.

Indeed, over the history of economic reform in China, there are celebrated cases in which mass violation of a law drove change, resulting in legalization of formerly prohibited activities. Based on this history, many SPR housing buyers expressed confidence that the government would not evict them from their homes. This confidence is evident from the fact that SPR housing owners often spend a substantial amount of their incomes, savings, or borrowed money on home improvements such as interior decoration and furnishings.

Many SPR housing owners feel that they are already a large enough group to defy any government actions that penalize them. Eviction is highly unlikely, given that the Chinese government’s top priority is maintaining social stability. One SPR housing owner in Beijing said, “I am sure that the government will not evict us from our homes. If it happens, where should we live? In front of the municipal hall?”

A Major Challenge to Government

Enforcing the law against SPR housing development on millions of households would indeed be politically unwise. Doing so would likely trigger social unrest—the last thing the government wants to see. However, amending the law is not easy, and for some time the central government seemed unable to come up with a land management system suitable for an urbanized China. Without a clear solution, the central government thus tended to tolerate SPR housing.

Local governments, however, were more uncomfortable with the growing numbers of SPR housing units because they reduced demand for government-supplied residential land and therefore revenues from land concessions. But again, the fear of social unrest left most local governments with nothing to do but repeat the central government’s rhetoric about its illegality. Government tolerance also reflects the fact that SPR housing developments afford shelter for many lower- and middle-income groups that the government and the market have been unable to provide. In the public debate, the argument for SPR housing is that it serves an important social function by housing the large number of migrant workers essential to China’s rapid urban economic growth.

Perhaps the bigger concern for government is the impacts of SPR housing development on real estate markets, municipal finance, and future urban forms. As it is, the formal urban housing market is already in over-supply. Additional provision of SPR housing units would further weaken formal market demand and increase bank credit risk. Moreover, China’s city planning efforts do not cover rural land outside designated planning areas. The spread of SPR housing in these areas would therefore lead to undesirable urban development patterns.

Recommended Reforms

In recognition of the root causes of SPR housing development, the Third Plenary Session of the Communist Party of China’s 18th Central Committee issued a document in November 2013 spelling out directions for a set of reforms directly related to land, hukou, and municipal finance.

On land: Integrate the urban and rural construction land markets. Allow the sale, leasing, and shareholding of rural, collectively owned construction land under the premise that it conforms to planning. . . . Reduce land expropriation that does not promote public welfare.

On hukou: Accelerate the reform of the hukou system to help farmers become urban residents. . . . Efforts should be made to make basic urban public services (such as affordable housing and the social safety net) available to all permanent residents in cities, including rural residents who have migrated to cities.

On municipal finance: Improve the taxation system and expand the local tax base by gradually raising the share of direct taxation (mainly the personal income tax and property tax). . . . Accelerate property tax legislation.

These reform efforts aim to dismantle the dual system of land management, allowing villages to share in the benefits of land development and raising the transaction costs of land expropriation. The hukou system will be phased out gradually, starting in the smaller cities. While detailed actions on these two reform fronts are now being worked out or tested in pilot programs, municipal finance reform remains a major concern. If the scope of land concessions is reduced and the hukou system is dismantled, cities will see significant reductions in land sales revenues and increases in public expenditures for providing services to migrant workers and their families.

While residential property taxes are expected to become a new source of municipal revenues, this change will not occur immediately. Indeed, the central government is currently drafting the property tax law, and it may be at least two years before its passage by the National People’s Congress. Since it will also take a few years for cities to establish assessment systems, residential property taxation will not support municipal budgets for some time. Nevertheless, there is hope that this new round of policy reform will properly address the critical issue of SPR housing.

 

Li Sun is a postdoctoral researcher at Delft University of Technology, Netherlands, and an affiliated researcher with Peking University–Lincoln Institute Center for Urban Development and Land Policy.

Zhi Liu is senior fellow and director of the Lincoln Institute’s China Program, as well as director of the Peking University–Lincoln Institute Center for Urban Development and Land Policy.

 


 

References

Liu, Shouying. 2014. Land Issues in the Transitional China. Beijing: China Development Press.

Liu, Zhi, and Jinke Wang. 2014. “An Analysis of China’s Urbanization, Land and Housing Problems.” In Annual Report on the Development of China’s New Urbanization, Li Wei, Song Min, and Shen Tiyan, eds. Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press (China).

PLC-HLCRE. 2014. “Report on the China Quality-Controlled Urban Housing Price Indices (CQCHPI).” Beijing: Peking University–Lincoln Institute Center for Urban Development and Land Policy (PLC) and Hang Lung Center for Real Estate (HLCRE), Tsinghua University.

Shen, Xiaofang, and Fan Tu. 2014. “Dealing with ‘Small Property Rights’ in China’s Land Market Development: What Can China Learn from Its Past Reforms and the World Experience?” Working paper. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Sun, Li, and Peter Ho. 2015. “An Emerging Phenomenon of Informal Settlement in China: Small Property Rights Housing in Urban Villages and Peri-urban Areas.” Paper presented at the Annual World Bank Conference on Land and Poverty (March 23–27).

Zhou, Qiren. 2014. “The Reform Should Not Be Self-limited” (in Chinese). http://heschina.org/archives/3211.html

The Super Ditch

Can Water Become a Cash Crop in the West?
By Scott Campbell, Outubro 1, 2015

Peter Nichols is an avid outdoorsman and one of Colorado’s leading water law attorneys. It’s not uncommon to see him enter the lobby of his Boulder office at Berg Hill Greenleaf & Ruscitti—a room with stone, hardwoods, and a sharp-dressed receptionist—in wrinkled attorney attire and a pair of worn river sandals. By his own reckoning, being a water law attorney is his sixth career. “Ski bum was my first,” he says. Then came a job with the Colorado General Assembly, positions helping western communities deal with rapid energy development, and water rights consulting work with energy companies themselves. In 2001, Nichols returned to the University of Colorado, where he received his M.P.A. in 1982, to earn his J.D., with a focus on water law. He has been setting precedents in Colorado watersheds ever since.

One of his proudest accomplishments, he says, was a 2013 Colorado Supreme Court case that affirmed the prerogative of conservation groups to encumber water rights in conservation easements, to address ecological and supply problems in Colorado’s rivers. So was giving a presentation that inspired the Colorado Interbasin Compact Committee, which oversees development of the Colorado Water Plan—a historic blueprint for collaborative, statewide water management in the face of rapid population growth. But of all his accomplishments, his work in Colorado’s Arkansas River Basin is the most important, he says. It’s “the crucible” for how the West is going to handle the severe water shortages projected across the rapidly growing Rocky Mountain region.

“The problem began here,” he says, “and if we’re going to solve it, we’re going to have to solve it here.” The problem he is referring to is an urban water acquisition trend known as buy-and-dry.

In a buy-and-dry acquisition, a municipal water utility will meet a city’s growing demand for water by purchasing interests in irrigated agricultural land, permanently fallowing that land, and diverting its water into the taps of city residents. On Colorado’s Arkansas River—where no water is available for new uses and there is a constant call for additional supplies—buy-and-dry tactics have diminished farmland across the basin. In the Lower Arkansas Valley, where the Arkansas River courses through Colorado’s eastern prairie, agricultural communities in some counties have been absolutely devastated.

Nichols says, “the Colorado Water Plan is very focused on eliminating buy-and-dry.” The question is how to do it. “We can’t stop cities from getting the water they need, but maybe we can change the rules [of the game], so it’s not a free-for-all.” The most promising game changer, he believes, is the Super Ditch.

Launch of the Super Ditch

West of the 100th meridian, where supplemental irrigation is required to grow food, irrigation ditches are a common means of delivering water from a river, lake, or reservoir to users along its course. In the Lower Arkansas Valley, there are approximately 20 major mutual irrigation ditch systems. The Super Ditch, however, is not a real ditch. Rather, it’s a corporation—the Lower Arkansas Valley Super Ditch Company, Inc.—set up to provide leased agricultural water to cities as an alternative to the buy-and-dry trend. It represents seven ditch companies operating eight ditches between two reservoirs, the Pueblo and the John Martin.

The Super Ditch began leasing water for the first time this year, through a small pilot project. But it was incorporated in 2008, with the assistance of the Lower Arkansas Valley Water Conservancy District (LAVWCD), a special district established by voters in 2002. Those who voted for the district, whether they owned water or not, were tired of seeing what they considered “their river” diverted to cities more than 100 miles away—some of which lay in completely different river basins. Even urban voters in the City of Pueblo, a steel town on the Arkansas River (population 108,000), sided with rural farmers in the face of economic hardships. “Not one more drop!” became a rallying cry against water leaving the valley.

Nichols serves as special counsel to the LAVWCD and helped the district develop the Super Ditch concept. Inspiration came from California, where the Palo Verde Irrigation District launched a long-term fallowing-leasing program with the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MWD) in 2005. The contract between the two entities seeks to supply 27 southern California coastal communities, including San Diego and Los Angeles, with 3.63 million acre-feet of Colorado River water from one ditch over a 35-year period. Participating farmers stop irrigating for a designated period of time, fallow their fields, and receive payment for their water, which bypasses their farms on its journey to MWD customers.

The LAVWCD sought to create a similar project, predicated on a rotational fallowing-leasing concept, but the Super Ditch was a much more sophisticated undertaking. Facilitating work with seven different mutual ditch companies, each with its own board and governance structure, was fraught with challenges. The cumbersome nature of Colorado water law, and the powerful market mechanisms and path dependencies that guide urban water acquisition strategies in the state complicated matters further. Colorado municipalities are hesitant to rely on water leasing, and for good reason. Certainty of supply is critical, and the temporary nature of leasing versus the permanent nature of ownership is unsettling to most urban water providers. What happens if the population grows by 50,000 people, and the leased water those people are relying upon is no longer available—or is sold to a competing water provider?

Nichols tried to develop the Super Ditch concept in ways that addressed these concerns. Supplies from different farmers are pooled by the Super Ditch, and provided to cities under long-term lease contracts. To guarantee that leased supplies are available once the lease period ends, the LAVWCD began working with farmers to place conservation easements on participating farms—protecting them from development and tying the water to the land in perpetuity to ensure future production potential. While enabling temporary transfers, the easements eliminate the possibility of any permanent water severance, diversion, or change in use. In other words: no buy-and-dry.

Conservation easements have protected the fabric of agricultural communities across Colorado and around the nation. An easement-protected land base creates assurances that the future production potential of an agricultural community will be maintained in the face of land conversion threats stemming from urban sprawl, oil and gas development, or municipal buy-and-dry. With the land base protected, related agricultural industries are able to invest in the region with confidence. That, in turn, has a net positive impact on Main Street.

In May 2015, the Super Ditch delivered its first water supplies: five farms on the Catlin Canal provided 500 acre-feet of water to the city of Fountain (pop 27,000), the city of Security (pop 18,000), and the town of Fowler (pop 1,200). Fountain Water Resource Engineer Michael Fink says, “the city took delivery without a hitch,” adding that the long-term success of the program depends on ensuring that the Super Ditch doesn’t advance a supply-side economic model.

Nichols says that’s not a problem. “Cities can lease [from farmers] three in 10 years or 30 percent of the time. They have the responsibility to let farmers know in advance [when they will be leasing]. But for the most part, cities don’t need water in dry years, they need it the year after to refill storage [reservoirs].”

By fallowing one-third of their fields three out of every ten years, farmers “rest” 100 percent of their land once in a ten-year period—a process that supports recommended practices in crop rotation and soil management, while allowing water itself to become a cash crop. Nichols reports that with three-out-of-ten-year crop rotation, a demand of 25,000 acre-feet of water can be met by involving 40 percent of the irrigators. Some farmers believe that as many as 80 percent will want to participate. Participants will certainly be needed: the supply gap in the Arkansas River Basin is projected to grow to 88,000 acre-feet or more by 2050. The litmus test for success will be if large cities responsible for the majority of buy-and-dry activity—Aurora (population 346,000) and Colorado Springs (population 440,000)—sign on to the program. “Municipal acceptance of leasing rather than buying,” Nichols says, “remains the principle challenge.”

From Pioneer to Buy-and-Dry

In the Lower Arkansas Valley, water has divided communities for much of the 20th century. In the 19th century, it divided entire nations. The river here delineated three international boundaries over time: between Spain and the United States following the Adams–Onís Treaty of 1819, which codified the border of the Louisiana Purchase between the two countries; between Mexico and the United States following Mexican independence from Spain in 1821; and between the Republic of Texas and the U.S. before Texas’s annexation in 1845. Two years after the Adams–Onís Treaty was signed, the Santa Fe Trail was established along the river’s course, bringing traders, soldiers, miners, and settlers into Colorado. Those pioneers developed some of Colorado’s earliest settlements—and, with them, water diversion projects along the river’s banks.

The West is dry, and even though the Arkansas River is the Mississippi River’s second longest tributary, it carries very little water in Colorado. Consider how quickly waters in the Lower Arkansas Valley were appropriated. Following the earliest appropriation in 1861, the Homestead Act of 1862 was enacted. More water rights were developed with settlement. By 1874, the last water rights decree still in priority 100 percent of the time (meaning there is always enough water in the river to serve it) was established—two years before Colorado gained statehood in 1876.

Water rights that were appropriated in 1887 are in priority less than 50 percent of the time today. Water rights from 1896 are in priority less than 10 percent of the time. This means that a modern farmer in the Arkansas Valley with an 1896 water right established by his great-grandfather will be able to irrigate just 10 percent of the time given average precipitation. The rest of the time, when there is a “call on the river”—meaning there is not enough water in the system to serve all rights holders—he must desist from diverting water to his fields, so that more senior water-rights holders can use it.

With the Arkansas River overappropriated before the turn of the century, cities began purchasing water from farmers as early as the 1890s. But shortages or conflicts were also addressed through the development of trans-basin diversion projects (which moved water from other river basins into the Arkansas) or storage projects (which sought to capture surplus water behind dams during high flow periods). These projects reached their thresholds in the 1970s. It was then that cities began seriously looking to irrigated lands.

During the 1970s and ’80s, Colorado Springs and Aurora, working with corporate landholders and the City of Pueblo, acquired interests in 55,000 acres of farmland served by the Colorado Canal. The cities subsequently diverted nearly 70,000 acre-feet of water for municipal use, drying up the vast majority of Crowley County. Crowley became the buy-and-dry poster child, and continues to hold that undistinguished title today. Poverty rates exceed 35 percent. Main streets are shadows of the communities that existed there in the mid-20th century. Noxious weed infestation and dust storms are common on dried-up lands. Restoring these farms to native prairie is not only expensive but, in practice, ranges from difficult to impossible.

Today, the losses of irrigated agriculture from water sales in the Lower Arkansas Valley exceed 100,000 acres, representing more than 150,000 acre-feet of water annually. Some farms continue operations by temporarily leasing land or water from the cities they sold to, but those leases will soon expire, advancing even greater losses. In a region that historically irrigated 320,000 acres of farmland, one-third of the tilled ground is now dry, few if any economically viable land use alternatives exist, and people are wondering if a tipping point is coming that will mark the collapse of irrigated agriculture in the area.

“As in much of the West, agriculture is at the heart of this region’s cultural heritage,” says Summer Waters, director of Western Lands and Communities, a joint program of the Sonoran Institute and Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. “However, we have entered an era in which cities are becoming part of our legacy too. This leaves us with a question that we have to answer collectively: what will the new West look like?”

“Ideally, both cities and agricultural areas will be able to co-exist in the new West,” Waters says. “The key to striking that balance lies in how we manage our water supplies. The Super Ditch concept is an innovative way to build flexibility into our water systems, and flexibility is critical in times when supply is uncertain.”

A Promising Pepper in an Unpromising Place

Mike Bartolo is visibly frustrated. He worries that water transfers will displace agriculture. “We’re losing some of the best growing land in the state,” he says. “These are prime soils that don’t exist in other places. How do you create certainty in the industry [when this is going on]? That’s the question.”

Bartolo, who holds a Ph.D. in plant physiology from the University of Minnesota, is a member of the water faculty at Colorado State University (CSU) and a senior research scientist at CSU’s Arkansas Valley Research Center. He sits on the Super Ditch board of directors, representing the Bessemer Ditch (one of the eight participating ditches), where he is a shareholder. With an 1861 water right, the Bessemer provides one of the most senior and reliable sources of water to farms anywhere in the Lower Arkansas Valley, and it irrigates some of the valley’s best lands. Bartolo is still grieving the 2009 loss of 28 percent of the water in the ditch—sold by farmers he knows to the Pueblo Board of Water Works (PBWW), the utility that provides municipal water to the City of Pueblo.

According to Nichols, there have been occasions when cities strategically approached farmers during the worst of times—when some combination of recession, drought, low commodities prices, overleveraging, or other factors forced their hand. But it is equally true that retiring farmers have assembled collectives to negotiate bulk water sales to cities. The Bessemer Ditch shareholders who sold 5,540 shares to PBWW for $10,150 per share (a share of Bessemer ditch water irrigates approximately one acre) were largely retiring farmers without heirs, responding to falling commodity prices and looking to capitalize on the increasing value of water following the severe drought of 2002. The eventual sale in 2009 netted them more than $56 million. Consider that dry land in this region often sells for less than $300 per acre, and you get a sense of where land values lie: in the water. Wanting to protect other producers and the agricultural fabric of the communities served by the Bessemer, Bartolo tried to convince farmers not to sell—to no avail. “I said, ‘let’s look at other options, at conservation easements, at the Super Ditch,’ but you have to realize how long these sellers had been working on this. Even if they were open to alternatives, my ideas were pie in the sky compared to the cash offer they had in hand.” (The Super Ditch was established but not operational at that time.)

Growers in the region have a great deal of respect for Bartolo. He’s a fourth-generation farmer, credited with developing the Mosco variety of Mirasol green chile pepper—the most popular variety of green chile grown locally and a centerpiece at the Pueblo Chile & Frijoles Festival, which draws more than 100,000 Coloradans each year. Whole Foods recently decided to stock stores with Mosco chiles from the Arkansas Valley rather than Hatch chiles from New Mexico—a blow to the pride of New Mexicans, whose state vegetable is the chile pepper.

Bartolo developed the Mosco chile from seeds his father gathered at the home of Mike’s uncle, Harry Mosco, following his death in 1988. Mike planted the seeds. “One plant I grew was different,” he says. “It had better yield, bigger fruit, and meatier flesh, which made it easier to roast.” Mike made single plant selections beginning with that plant. He isolated the characteristics he wanted and repeated the process, developing the chile over a fifteen-year period.

Many celebrated produce items come out of the Lower Arkansas Valley, Rocky Ford cantaloupes and Mosco chiles being principle among them. Mike has grown them all. Still, when it comes to changing the playing field, as the Super Ditch is looking to do, Mike concedes there is a lot of work ahead. “It has become politically incorrect for cities to buy-and-dry, but that hasn’t stopped other speculators [from playing the role municipal water utilities were playing].” Earlier this year, Pure Cycle, a water and wastewater services company that leases 14,600 acres of land on the Fort Lyon Canal to tenant farmers, sold the farms to an affiliate of C&A Companies and Resource Land Holdings, LLC. C&A is a company with plans to provide Arkansas River water to Front Range cities to the north. “These alternative transfer mechanisms have to be really well defined, and they have to have a history behind them to be able to compete,” Bartolo says. They need to be, he adds, just as adept and quick at providing cash in hand as an outright water sale.

Water as Cash Crop

The value of water out West is only increasing. In the Lower Arkansas Valley, a lot of wealth is embedded in the water farmers own. It seems ironic that communities in possession of such a valuable asset are confronted with poverty and decline. More puzzling still is the fact that farmers are liquidating an asset whose value only continues to grow. Ask any investment advisor, “Would you dispose of an asset predicted to continue increasing in value?” and he or she is likely to say “no . . . unless I had no other choice, or unless there was no other way to see returns from that asset.”

When it comes to water, the problem right now is that there is a strict dichotomy of choices. Farmers who own it have limited means to earn money from it except by: (1) growing food with it and planning for returns based on commodities prices, or (2) selling it and cashing out on its current value. Part of the reason choices are limited has to do with the cumbersome nature of Colorado water law. A lease of water from farm to city can necessitate a change-of-use case in the water courts. A change case involves engineering studies and legal expertise and can run tens of thousands of dollars. The change case proponent must demonstrate to the courts that third-party water rights holders, such as downstream farmers who rely on the same ditch, will not be harmed. If the courts or third parties challenge that premise, the cost of the change case can escalate into the hundreds of thousands of dollars. Going through this process for a temporary lease, coupled with cities’ desires to guarantee permanency of supply in the face of growth, is another factor that has historically limited water leasing.

The Super Ditch, through legislation advanced by Nichols in 2013, enabled these checks and balances to take place through a much more efficient administrative process overseen by the Colorado Water Conservation Board (CWCB). Now, Bartolo and Nichols hope to see what happens when farmers have more than two choices. Their belief is that if farmers can retain water ownership, grow food, and realize earnings from “commodity water” at the same time—as they would from other types of assets—the economic outlook for the Lower Arkansas Valley will change.

This outlook is borne out by economic studies. As the Super Ditch concept was gaining steam in 2007, CH2M Hill agricultural economist George Oamek compared different options for farmers: sell water, continue to farm, or continue to farm while participating in a rotational fallowing-leasing program. His projections indicated that, over a 40-year horizon, farmers who sold their water would earn more than farmers who continued to farm, but farmers who continued to farm and participated in the fallowing-leasing program stood to gain the most of all. In a comment to the Pueblo Chieftain following the study, Oamek said that the Super Ditch could ensure the best price for farmers: “In economics, you look at collaboration as a way to draw out a higher price.”

For the same reason, however, the fallowing-leasing concept is a tough sell to large cities.

Following Oamek’s principle of collaboration, cities have been working together to acquire agricultural water supplies at low prices. City skepticism is heightened by inflationary concerns. If water cost is only going to increase, why not purchase supplies now, while prices are low, in order to keep utility rates down?

To address this matter, Nichols looked at different mechanisms for establishing price escalators that would protect buyers and sellers, including:

1. a market-based escalator, based upon other water conveyances;
2. an escalator based upon average municipal water impact fee increases over time;
3. an escalator based upon average municipal water rate increases over time; and
4. a cost-based escalator, as measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and the Producer Price Index (PPI).

The pilot project with Fountain, Security, and Fowler guarantees pricing stability by adjusting the lease price every five years according to the percent change in the Colorado Municipal League’s Index of Colorado Utility Costs.

At $500 an acre-foot, the current Super Ditch lease will earn the five participating farmers a quarter of a million dollars this year in addition to the revenues they will earn from crop production on non-fallowed lands. Some of these crops, such as forage, are low-value crops, and the water lease provides good income in lieu of growing them. Others, like melons and chiles, are high-value crops. Bartolo is excited about the retention of these agricultural revenues, which he thinks will create a ripple effect across the valley’s many communities: “Two acre-feet of water grows an acre of chile—that’s 1,000 bushels,” he says, “which brings in $10,000 to $15,000 in revenue at the farm gate level.”

Although municipal water prices are increasing, considering the shortages the West faces, they’re still low by most counts. Cities have sought to keep prices low by acquiring as much water as they can, as early as they can, while keeping within the bounds of Colorado’s anti-speculation doctrine.

By blurring the lines around the “types” of water that drive prices—both at the tap (utilities prices) and at the head gate (commodities prices)—the Super Ditch may launch a disruptive innovation that could alter the price of water in ways that better reflect Western realities. If farmers retain control of water and lease to cities, prices will adjust according to increasing demand in a field of diversified ownership. That’s a new type of competition in the market, and that’s not a bad thing. Urban growth won’t have to correspond with rural decline. And a glass of water will still be the cheapest beverage to wash down a plate of locally grown chile rellenos.

 

Scott Campbell is an award-winning conservation planner and consultant whose assembles diverse teams to solve complex environmental, social, and economic problems. Scott was the 2015 Lincoln Loeb Fellow at Harvard University’s Graduate School of Design and a joint fellow at the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. Prior to his fellowship, Scott directed one of the country’s largest land trusts, the William J. Palmer Parks Foundation.

Photograph: John Wark/Airphoto NA