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My father John C. Lincoln (1866-1959) had a strong code of ethics that played a prominent role in both his practice of business and his ideas about land. In 1895 he founded the Lincoln Electric Company of Cleveland, Ohio, which became the world’s leading manufacturer of arc welding equipment. He drew his ideas about land from the 1879 book Progress and Poverty, by the American political economist and social philosopher Henry George.
My father’s core ethical principle was to treat people as you would like to be treated. This implied the following precepts:
1) Treat people with absolute fairness. This means all people. In business it includes all the constituents of a company—employees, customers, owners, and the community. In society it means government must treat individuals fairly, and vice versa.
2) Whoever creates something should be entitled to keep it. Receiving the fruits of someone else’s labor—a windfall—often occurs. But for each windfall there is a wipeout—someone doesn’t get all he or she produced. Both the windfall and the wipeout are unethical.
3) People are important. They should be treated with respect and dignity, not as machines or cogs in a wheel.
Ethics in Business
Largely as a result of following these principles, the Lincoln Electric Company has demonstrated superior performance for its entire 100-year history. Many things have to happen to run a business ethically. One of them is making an adequate profit, which benefits the shareholders. But in my opinion, any company and all its constituents are better served if the customer comes first.
At Lincoln Electric, most employees are on piece work. If they produce more, they get more. The company has an annual bonus program, and the kitty for this bonus is composed of the extra profit beyond the returns required to run the business. Running the business includes providing a fair but not excessive dividend to shareholders and investing in new products and production methods. Beyond these costs, employees at Lincoln Electric get to keep any extra profit they produce. Recently bonuses have been about 50 to 60 percent of annual salaries. There are no windfalls, and no wipeouts.
Nowadays, manufacturing is no longer as much the “thing” as it once was. Making Lincoln Electric a successful global company requires more emphasis on company-wide teams. Individual pay is more dependent upon cooperation across departmental lines. This can work just as well as more individual programs of the past, but it is more difficult to manage. Incentives must be tailored to each location where we operate.
Ethics in Land
The heritage of the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy stems from my father’s interest in the ideas of Henry George, especially the land value tax. The ethics of this tax concept are parallel to those used at Lincoln Electric.
Someone who works the land should be entitled to keep the fruits of his labor. If he produces more because of increased skill or effort, he should reap a higher reward. However, Henry George said that land is a natural monopoly. Its value is largely created by things unrelated to the actions of the land’s owner, such as population pressure or mineral deposits. The landowner or user has nothing to do with these factors, yet if they cause the land value to increase, the owner gets a windfall.
This ethical dilemma disturbed my father, as it disturbs me. He subscribed to the remedy proposed by Henry George, which is to take as a tax each year the full rental value of land produced by natural or social factors. This would eliminate the windfall. It would still leave for landowners and users the value created by their own investments and labor.
A hundred years ago land was considered one of the three factors of production, along with labor and capital. Land was essential as both a place to work and a source of raw materials. Things are more complex today. A great deal of the economy has to do with telecommunications and computer software, which allow businesses to locate anywhere and use few or inexpensive natural resources. These changes may not negate the basic economic theories of Henry George’s time, but they do make it a bit more difficult to analyze the role of land in the economy.
There are many positive illustrations that ethical business practices lead to economic success. Unfortunately, there are not clearcut illustrations showing that land value taxation produces broad economic benefits. Nevertheless, economic research suggests that land value taxation could encourage the productive and careful use of land. Individuals who used the land in ways that increased its production would be able to keep the full value they had created, and society would keep the value it created.
I believe ethical practices will benefit all sides in any transaction. Ethical land taxation should lead to an improved economy, just as ethical business practices lead to more successful companies. One should get to keep the fruits of one’s labor, but the fruits of speculation or monopolies should accrue to the community as a whole, not to individuals as windfalls. Both the private sector and the public sector would benefit. Good ethics is good business. Good ethics is good for society as well as the economy.
___________________
David C. Lincoln, president of the Lincoln Foundation and former chairman of the Lincoln Institute, presented the annual Founder’s Day lecture on August 1 at Lincoln House. He had served as chairman for the Institute’s first 22 years before stepping down in May 1996. His talk, excerpted here in part, commemorated the 130th anniversary of the birth of his father, John Cromwell Lincoln, the Cleveland, Ohio, industrialist who founded the Lincoln Foundation in 1947.
Over the last two decades, and especially in the last few years, land regularization and upgrading programs have been implemented in informal settlements by central, regional and local governments in several Latin American countries. Important lessons must be learned from this incipient practice of urban policy making, not only to contribute toward improving existing experiences, but also to guide those governments that are confronting the phenomenon for the first time, or more likely are confronting the need to design policies to deal with significant increases in informal urban development.
To address this need, the Lincoln Institute sponsored its third offering of the course Informal Markets and Land Regularization Programs in Urban Areas, in November 2003. It was held in Recife, Brazil because of the city’s historic tradition of urban policy making, including its regularization program (PREZEIS), which for the past 20 years has been a pioneering instrument, despite its many shortcomings. The course brought together about 35 people with varied academic backgrounds and institutional positions representing 10 Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.
The 13 intertwined lessons offered here draw on the papers presented in Recife and on experiences discussed in the two previous courses in 2001 and 2002, as well as ideas generated in the meeting of the Institute’s Latin American Network on Land Regularization in Brasília, Brazil, in July 2003. This brief, critical analysis of land regularization programs reflects contributions from many people, but the authors take full responsibility for any misrepresentations that a general synthesis like this one may produce (see Figure 1).
1. The Process of Favelización
The process of informal production of urban space is increasing at a significant pace in Latin America, despite the fact that, unlike Africa and Asia, the region has been solidly urbanized for many decades. Occupied areas are becoming denser, and new settlements are being formed daily. Increasingly, these occupations encroach on environmentally sensitive areas, near protected water reservoirs, on public land, and in other areas not suitable for human occupation or economically feasible in the formal land market. This process has created all sorts of harmful repercussions—socio-environmental, legal, economic, political and cultural—not only for the millions of residents living in informal settlements, but also for city governments and the entire urban population. Despite the many regularization and upgrading programs implemented in the last few decades, the development rate of new informal settlements has been twice and even three times that of urban population growth. Thus, increasing informality is not exclusively the result of demographic change or even the increase in urban poverty, which also has been growing but at a much lower rate.
2. The Vicious Cycle of Informality
Multiple factors are responsible for the establishment of informal settlements. Over and above demographics and macroeconomic factors affecting urban poverty (employment and income policies), local variables contribute to the “unexplained variance” of increasing informality. By acting or failing to act, local authorities have fomented the growth of the phenomenon through exclusionary land use regulation, favoring wealthy neighborhoods in the spatial allocation of public investments, outright complicity with the delinquent practices of land subdividers, and inadequate local fiscal policies.
The corollary of this tolerance of informality is of great importance for land pricing policy. The informal market values and benefits from greater regulatory freedom and from the social values associated with traditional networks among residents within the settlements. Both of these dynamics affect prices in the informal market, which are reaching absurd levels. For example, a 6-square-meter (60-square-foot) wooden shack on a mangrove swamp in Recife has been valued at US$1,300. Such extremes and variations in prices reflect the diversity of informal processes at work in the access to urban land and housing, both among different settlements and within each settlement. Attacking the factors responsible for the vicious cycle of price formation should be an indispensable ingredient of any policy seeking to mitigate the consequences of informality.
3. A World of Diversity
Far from being a homogeneous phenomenon, informality manifests itself in many forms, contexts and places. Enormous differences may be found within and between settlements in the same city, not to mention among cities within a country and among cities in different countries. Each informal area has good and bad neighborhoods; relatively high-valued and low-valued areas; an uneven distribution of whatever services are available; and properties with different types of tenure rights. The income levels of many families in informal areas also are variable and in some cases are well above those of families in formal areas who are typically expected to pay for certain publicly provided services and benefits.
In comparing the archipelago of informal settlements distributed within formal neighborhoods in Latin America, property price gradients have been found to be uncorrelated, revealing altogether different market forces. Although both formal and informal areas are subject to vigorous land markets, the intervening price determinants are of different orders of magnitude. As mentioned above, regulatory freedoms, as well as longstanding informal networks that support the exchange of intangible benefits, affect property values. These realities must be taken into account when designing regularization programs that can offer positive reform of traditional practices.
There is also a need to adjust the programs to the different conditions of newly occupied areas and long-established settlements in consolidated areas. A clearer chain of market transactions can be traced in the newer occupations, whereas there is usually no linear succession of transactions in older areas. Furthermore, established settlements reflect a complex overlay of informally defined rights and transactions, such as rooftops sold to a third party as buildable “land,” which in turn may give rise to an additional living space. It is by no means clear whether regularization programs should start with recent occupations, where the costs of upgrading are lower and degrees of freedom are greater, or with older, consolidated areas that present more pressing social consequences, but where some legal rights may already exist.
4. Tolerance of Informality
Despite all the negative implications, public authorities have tolerated informal urban development processes, whether because of neglect, political convenience, ambiguous actions or even direct promotion of informal occupations. There is, however, little understanding that such tolerance generates rights over time and little information about the extremely high costs, both absolute and relative, of what is involved in upgrading programs. At the same time, tolerance of informal occupations is accompanied by a growing acceptance by both public authorities and public opinion that consolidated settlements should be upgraded with services, equipment and infrastructure. A recent study conducted by Cities Alliance in Brazil shows that the decision to regularize an irregular settlement is often made more quickly than the decision to approve a new regular settlement (six months versus two or three years).
This official tolerance also applies to the acceptance of “second-class solutions” for “second-class citizens” and often results in the early deterioration of upgraded areas. The combination of poor-quality materials and low-cost, unconventional techniques used in upgraded areas, as well as greater pressure on the existing infrastructure because of increased densification, renders the infrastructure obsolete and incurs high maintenance costs. Moreover, upgraded areas usually are not properly integrated into the municipal fiscal system. Throughout the region, the fiscal irresponsibility of municipal administrators is aggravated further by their failure to take responsibility for the broader scope of territorial development, as well as for their negligence or at best paternalistic attitude toward these regularized settlements.
5. Expectations and Land Values
Regularization programs to date have addressed a very small percentage of existing informal settlements, and as a result the vast majority of people living informally have not benefited from any type of public intervention. Furthermore, many regularization programs have been formulated without a proper understanding of the causes of informality, and they often deliver counterproductive results that contribute to the process of increasing socio-spatial segregation.
The mere expectation of upgrading puts a premium value on the land designated for improvements, thus significantly impacting prices in the informal market. The higher the expectation that an area will be regularized in the future, the higher the premium on that land and the higher the market demand for lower-priced subdivisions elsewhere. This suggests two approaches to upgrading: comprehensive programs for everyone in a few places coordinated with policies to change future expectations about cost recovery schemes; or partial upgrading in all informal areas of the city so expectations about market activity will be more balanced and consistent. The importance of integrating upgraded areas into municipal fiscal systems is not yet properly understood.
6. Isolated and Fragmented Policies
Public intervention in informal settlements through regularization programs has been promoted in an isolated, sectoral way without the necessary integration between such programs and the wider context of urban land management policies that have a direct bearing on such settlements. These policies include construction of social housing; rehabilitation of dilapidated urban centers; occupation of vacant areas and buildings; broader spatial allocation of public investments in urban infrastructure and services; modernization of tax collections and cadastres; and public-private partnerships. Moreover, most regularization programs have been limited to residential areas and have rarely been extended to informal industrial and commercial businesses, vacant public buildings and land in central areas, or informal settlements in rural areas.
At all levels of government, regularization programs have been marked by structural fragmentation— within programs, between secretariats and ministries, and among national, state and local levels—and as a result existing resources are often misspent or fail to reach all intended beneficiaries. The programs also have suffered from a lack of administrative continuity due mostly to changes in local political contexts. Rather than supplementing other initiatives, regularization programs often absorb much of the (limited) financial capacity of local municipalities, causing other social housing programs to be sacrificed or neglected. This problem has its origins in both the broad credit lines opened by national and international multilateral agencies and the absence of a requirement that local administrations match the financial burden of the program with efforts to expand their own revenue sources. In general, credit lines for regularization programs have been established without careful consideration of the financial capabilities of municipalities.
7. Lack of Financial Resources
As if the above problems were not enough, regularization programs have not been supported by adequate financial resources. The budgetary provisions are not compatible with the proposed and sometimes ambitious objectives, and often there are no specific funds for the programs. Revenues resulting from urban planning operations (such as earmarking resources from the sale of building rights in formal and high-income areas) have not been properly used to support upgrading. Resources from international agencies have been poorly spent, especially because there has not been a rigorous evaluation of the programs, nor a firm demand that their targets or objectives are fully accomplished. In addition, there are no adequate micro-credit policies in place to support or encourage community organizations.
8. Dissociation Between Upgrading and Legalization
Although it could be argued that illegality is a consequence of the insufficient supply of serviced land at affordable prices, in the vast majority of regularization programs the greater emphasis on upgrading has been dissociated from housing improvement and socioeconomic programs aimed at integrating communities, as well as from specific policies to legalize areas and plots. The components of upgrading and legalization have been conceived as if they were separate processes, or, frequently, as if legalization were an automatic result of the upgrading process. Most upgrading programs seem to fall short of what is required for land occupations to be legalized in the first place. As a result, those few programs that have reached the legalization stage have had to invent legal-political solutions, which often do not reflect the urban conditions actually in force in the area.
Despite the publicity given to regularization programs, the number of titles that actually result in a document issued by the property registration office is disappointingly low. The complexities imposed by law and the resistance and conservative attitudes of notaries and registration offices have been identified as some of the most critical bottlenecks to overcome. It should be added that most families, once they receive a title recognizing their legitimate right to their property, simply do not bother to complete the registration process, often because they do not understand its legal overtones or because it is too expensive or cumbersome. This situation has led to an outcry for the simplification of titling and registration systems and an associated need to disempower the existing bureaucratic entities.
9.The Importance of Titling
Given these problems, few programs have reached the legalization stage, and even fewer have achieved the registration of legalized plots. Perhaps because of that failure, many analysts have come to believe that titles are not important, that the mere perception of security of tenure would suffice. Although it is true that such a perception is indeed the main factor that encourages people to start investing in their houses, titling is important for two reasons: the personal interests of the occupiers (security of tenure, protection against forced eviction, domestic conflicts, marital separation, inheritance, problems with neighbors, access to an address and to forms of credit); and the interest of the city as a whole, since legal titling can contribute to the stabilization of land markets and allow for more rational and better articulated forms of public intervention.
There is still great resistance to land titling programs, especially on the part of the judiciary and the general public. However, it is important to note that individual beneficiaries of titling programs often do not have a full understanding of the protections and limitations of their title—What is it good for? Why does one need to actually register the title? All this suggests that educational programs for both city officials and residents should accompany the introduction of any regularization programs.
In addition, there has been little reflection on the implications of the kinds of instruments used to legalize plots. The emphasis placed on individual freehold titles has ignored the need for collective legal solutions for collective social problems; whenever such legal instruments have been used, they have not been introduced in a way that renders the new legal order compatible with the existing urban order and with the legal implications of the instruments. Most existing legal options have not been fully explored and generally lack creativity. Moreover, a consistent effort has yet to be made to have the new legal instruments fully validated by credit agencies, and by society at large.
10. The Fallacy of Popular Participation
The political quality of regularization programs has varied enormously, but in general the processes of popular participation in formulating and implementing the programs have been of little significance. This situation has been further aggravated by the creation of artificial forms of participation as a result of demands from financing agencies. The designed mechanisms for popular participation are in general a sheer formality, if not a farce from the outset. Very few programs have assimilated solutions proposed by the affected community. The political-institutional and cultural framework within which most regularization programs have been formed, along with the constraints imposed by the way these programs are financed, virtually eliminates any room for a truly effective public role, since public participation normally implies major challenges to the status quo. Regularization programs are more often perceived as solutions from or for the establishment than as a response to the real needs of the majority of the low-income population.
11. Compatible Scale, Patterns and Rights
Perhaps the main problem with regularization programs is the difficulty in making the scale of the interventions compatible with the technical, urban and environmental patterns proposed for the settlements, as well as with the nature of the rights to be recognized for the occupiers. These factors of scale, patterns and rights have to be discussed together to guarantee the sustainability of the programs and their impact on reality.
12. The After-effects of Regularization Programs
After an area is upgraded or a settlement is legalized, the public authorities normally do not maintain their presence in the areas. They should perform many important functions, from monitoring and evaluating the maintenance of installed equipment (notably water and sewage systems) to creating new guidelines or rules governing new occupations. As a result of the absence of official oversight and intervention, many areas rapidly begin to deteriorate. Moreover, the legitimization provided by the regularization program may make neighboring (originally formal) areas more prone to being “contaminated” by new informal land use practices. In general, regularization programs have not led to the promised urban, social and cultural integration of upgraded areas, and the informal areas remain stigmatized as second-rate long after they have been upgraded. The idea that regularized areas are placed in a new, virtuous trajectory rarely survives beyond the original documents setting the justifications for the program.
13. Balancing Individual Freedoms and Public Functions
In spite of their concern with the need to guarantee that the beneficiaries of public intervention are indeed the occupiers of informal settlements, regularization programs have not met a proper balance between respect for individual rights and freedoms and the programs’ public functions (the recognition of the social right to housing and the need to set aside urban areas for that purpose). Frequently the adopted legal solutions embed restrictions intending to freeze the mobility process within the areas (affecting terms of sale, acquisition, rent and so forth), which only helps to generate more informality.
The strategy of focusing on an area or social group seems to ignore the very nature and origins of informality, which is in fact a Catch-22 situation. The lack of sufficient finances in most programs would, on one hand, suggest that beneficiaries should not be able to cash in their benefits and move on to a new informal occupation to be similarly regularized in the future. On the other hand, the cost of monitoring and controlling such practices may be too high, if not unfeasible. Restrictions on transactions would simply generate new kinds of informal arrangements.
Interestingly, very few regularization programs actually accommodate or adjust to the potential upward and downward mobility of the affected occupants. They are formulated with a static community in mind. Intra-urban mobility, particularly among informal settlements and between formal and informal areas, is not well understood and thus is largely ignored. A possible way out of this conundrum would be to establish a cost-recovery scheme or value capture mechanism at the very beginning of planning for a new regularization program.
Conclusion
Regularization programs are typically not formulated with well-defined goals and timetables, and the problem is made worse by the lack of suitable evaluation indicators. In short, the declared objectives of regularization programs in Latin America (promotion of security of tenure and socio-spatial integration) have not been translated into an adequate combination of a comprehensive diagnosis, effective instruments and a clear implementation strategy, not to mention deficiencies in management capacity. As a result, the Latin American experience with regularization so far can not be considered fully successful.
It may be said, however, that regularization programs have shown merit in raising public awareness about the legitimacy of claims for more effective and comprehensive responses to the needs of a significant and growing group of citizens now excluded from the formal socioeconomic system. These programs have enabled some of the urban poor to remain in central, serviced areas of Latin American cities and have improved the livelihood and conditions of those living in regularized settlements, notwithstanding this discussion of their shortcomings. Given the cruel dynamics of socio-spatial segregation in the region, this fact is in itself of great importance.
Edésio Fernandes is a part-time lecturer in the Development Planning Unit of University College London.
Martim O. Smolka is senior fellow and director of the Lincoln Institute’s Program on Latin America and the Caribbean.
Related Land Lines Articles
Angel, Shlomo, and Douglas Keare. 2002. Housing policy reform in global perspective. April: 8–11.
Calderon, Julio. 2002. The mystery of credit. April: 5–8.
Fernandes, Edésio. 2002. The influence of de Soto’s The Mystery of Capital. January: 5–8.
———. 2002. Faculty profile. July: 12–13.
Smolka, Martim O. 2003. Informality, urban poverty and land market prices. January: 4–7.
Smolka, Martim O., and Laura Mullahy. 2003. A decade of changes: A retrospective of the Latin America program. October: 8–12.
Figure 1:
Dos and Don’ts of Regularization Programs
Dos
Don’ts
One of the characteristics that makes working on land policy in Latin America so fascinating is the ever-present contrast between the characteristics that are common throughout the region and the anomalies that make each country’s relationship with land unique.
The confusing and contradictory responses by Latin America experts who participated in our survey call attention to potentially misleading policies that might be fomented by erroneous perceptions and weak indicators.
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Sonia Rabello de Castro has a Ph.D. in law and is a professor of administrative law and urban law at the University of the State of Rio de Janeiro (UERJ). She was elected in 2008 as a member of the Municipal Legislative Council of the City of Rio de Janeiro, representing the Green Party. She is also a member of the Ethics and Mores Parliamentary Committee and represents the Legislative Municipal Council at the Environmental Municipal Council.
From 1992 to 1996 she was attorney general for the Municipality of Rio de Janeiro, where she collaborated in the development of several far-reaching urban projects, including the Favela-Bairro program. She has also worked as director of legal services for a number of public entities and has published numerous articles on urban development, housing, governance, public administration, and preservation of the cultural patrimony. Her book on Preservation of the Brazilian Cultural Patrimony (Preservação do Patrimônio Cultural Brasileiro) is considered a basic reference for administrative and juridical decisions on this topic.
Land Lines: How did you become associated with the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy?
Sonia Rabello: I met Martim Smolka, the director of the Program on Latin America and the Caribbean, in the late 1990s, when I was researching how the traditional concept of property rights based upon civil law could be transformed in the context of urban law. The development of new urban laws could lead to conceptual changes in the way the right to property was originally understood, given the need to adapt the concept to meet the social and economic requirements of urban development. At that time, Brazil had not yet approved the federal urban development law known as the City Statute (Estatuto da Cidade), although the Brazilian Federal Constitution of 1988 had introduced the principle of urban development as a social function subject to public policy.
As a visiting fellow at Lincoln House in 2000 I became convinced of the need to create a new, more modern concept of property rights that would reflect the current urban reality in Latin America and allow for the use of the city by all citizens, whether they are property owners or not.
Land Lines: Can you explain this property rights concept further?
Sonia Rabello: It is the need to distinguish the right to own land from the right to build on that land. The Civil Code in Latin American countries follows the French model, which defines real estate property rights as having three components guaranteed to the owner: the right to use the property; the right to receive income accruing from the property; and the right to dispose of the property. Only the owner can exercise these rights. The right to build is not in itself an inherent component of this property right, but a condition for the owner to use the property, without which the utility of the property would be voided—and in this case the very meaning of the property right would be lost.
For the owner to exercise her ownership right to use the property, the public authority, through established urban planning regulations, must allocate a minimum building coefficient to that land. The building coefficient refers to the amount of development allowed on a parcel, also known as floor-area-ratio (FAR). The allocation of an equitable and free minimum building coefficient applied to all properties uniformly has a double function. First, it guarantees to all owners and possessors an economic use of their property. Second, it precludes the occurrence of unjust differences in the allocation of building coefficients among owners.
Land Lines: Why is this concept important for Latin America?
Sonia Rabello: All Latin American countries, including Brazil, have been addressing urban regulation and land policy at the national level, especially since the economic stabilization and redemocratization during the 1990s, when the need to consider the so-called accumulated social debt became a prominent issue. At the time, Latin American cities were experiencing acute problems due to the lack of basic infrastructure services such as sewer systems, public spaces, transportation, and access to affordable housing, as well as the challenge of creating a more equitable distribution of costs and benefits in the urbanization process.
Land Lines: How relevant is Brazil’s City Statute in this process?
Sonia Rabello: The City Statute, which was approved in 2001, confirms the distinction between the right to own land and the right to build, a distinction that had been discussed and implemented since the 1970s in São Paulo and other Brazilian cities. The expression “right to build” as used in the Brazilian Civil Code had led many landowners to assume that their right to own land also included the right to build on the land, in keeping with urban legislation and norms.
How much and what can be built is reflected in the price of land. That is, parcels with a higher building coefficient than others, or parcels where commercial use is permitted as well as residential use, sell at prices that incorporate the benefits freely given to landowners by the public authorities. When this happens, landowners appropriate as their private good the building rights provided by urban law, even though they had not invested in the infrastructure or services needed to support the land development. As a result, the costs of urbanization fall entirely on the public authority while private citizens profit, contradicting the general legal principle barring enrichment without just cause.
Land Lines: What does the principle of “enrichment without just cause” mean?
Sonia Rabello: This general principle of law, accepted in most Latin American countries, deems unacceptable an increase in private wealth that does not result from the person’s own labor or investment—that is, a legitimate cause pertaining to the person who benefits financially. In Brazil this principle is explicit in the legislation, specifically in the Civil Code, and is applicable to the entire juridical system.
Land Lines: How does the City Statute provide for the separation of the right to own land from the right to build?
Sonia Rabello: This concept was introduced through the instrument known as “charge for awarded building rights” (outorga onerosa do direito de construir) in Art. 28: “The master plan may delineate areas where the building right can be exercised above the basic coefficient adopted, given a counterpart payment by the beneficiary.” It is important to emphasize that the City Statute is a federal law that addresses the content of real estate property rights and has the same hierarchical standing as the Civil Code. Thus, if the law states that the public authority shall charge for a given right, then that right does not belong to the person to whom it is given.
Land Lines: In what way does the “charge for awarded building rights” help to preclude enrichment without just cause?
Sonia Rabello: The charge extracts the corresponding value of such rights from the land price. In other words, without that charge, the land price would include the value of the building rights freely granted to the landowner by the urban planning legislation. Without the charge, when the landowner sold the land he would be paid according to its market value, which includes the maximum use permitted on that land.
Land Lines: However, if I buy land expecting to build at a given floor-area-ratio that exceeds the basic coefficient and the public authority charges for these awarded building rights, wouldn’t that imply paying twice for the land?
Sonia Rabello: No, as long as the system of acquiring building rights from the public authority is well-established. Under the new law, building rights above the minimum coefficient belong to the city as a whole and must be purchased separately from the public authority. As a result, when paying the landowner, the buyer discounts from the land price the value of the additional awarded building rights.
Land Lines: In what other ways is this charge implemented to benefit society?
Sonia Rabello: In addition to addressing unjust enrichment, the principle concerns the legitimacy of recovering the added land value generated by public sector interventions in the urbanization process, and to prevent the added value accruing to the landowner. This principle is also reflected in the compensation paid for urban land expropriation. When not recovered by the public authority, the value of the additional building rights becomes an integral part of the market price. If the public authority expropriates that land, the landowner will receive compensation equivalent to the market price, which includes the land value plus the value of the building coefficient granted by the public authority free of charge.
Land Lines: Since the property tax is imposed on real estate property, wouldn’t this charge constitute double-taxing?
Sonia Rabello: To understand why this is not the case we need to look at the important distinction between the Colombian and Brazilian legislation. The Colombian law classifies the value capture charge as a tax, but in Brazil it is defined as an instrument for the public authority to recover a good that belongs to society. That is, the nature of the charge is a responsibility relative to the costs of urbanization. A decision by the Brazilian Supreme Court (RE509422 STFSC of 2008) resolved this issue by ruling that the charge for awarded building rights is not a tax but a payment for which the landowner is responsible.
I think this juridical opinion is coherent given that a tax corresponds to a contribution to the public treasury from one’s private assets, but, as noted, awarded building rights are not privately owned but are a public good that belongs to the city as a whole. To classify the value capture charge as a tax suggests a juridical inconsistency, since taxation is a form of assessing private wealth to finance public goods and services. This is not the case in Brazil, since the charge is levied on an essentially public asset.
Land Lines: Does the judiciary in Latin America accept and implement these concepts?
Sonia Rabello: Not uniformly or consistently. These juridical concepts fundamentally change the traditional understanding of property rights. Because of that, the principles upon which they are based and the logic behind them must be disseminated and assimilated more broadly. This is a judicial evolution that has to happen in order to reduce the exacerbated social exclusion that characterized Latin American cities.
Land Lines: How has the Lincoln Institute’s Program on Latin America and the Caribbean contributed to this new vision of land policy in the region?
Sonia Rabello: The Institute has been a very important influence in clarifying land policy issues among public officials and politicians in Latin America, especially through its training programs in which participants can be exposed to such principles, concepts and ideas, exchange experiences, and build a new land policy culture. The Institute has developed a critical mass of people committed to improving the quality of land policies and promoting new strategies to finance urban development. Understanding that individual property rights can coexist with social rights to the city has been a critical factor driving the evolution of urban thinking in the region.
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Five years ago, New Orleans resident Mandy Pumilia was concerned about the number of apparently blighted structures in her neighborhood, known as Bywater, where she is currently vice president of the neighborhood association. Despite post-Katrina recovery efforts, it was hard to identify and track truly troubled properties, and she didn’t have access to city data that could have helped. Instead, she built her own Google spreadsheet and filled it in with the results of her own research and legwork. “It was an arduous process,” she recalls. And despite her tech savvy and determination, it was a solution with limits: it wasn’t easy to share the information beyond people she knew directly, and keeping up with property-specific city hearings was a chore.
Since then, a web app called BlightStatus (blightstatus.nola.gov) has become a valuable new tool for her neighborhood recovery efforts. Created in 2012 by Code for America, a nonprofit specializing in open-source projects that benefit local government, BlightStatus makes it simpler for citizens like Pumilia to access property details, more deeply engaging them in managing blight and other planning challenges. The effort caught the attention of other cities and led to a spinoff startup called Civic Insight, which is now deploying its technology in Dallas, Atlanta, Palo Alto, Sacramento, and other places.
In New Orleans, BlightStatus aggregates information on inspections, code complaints, hearings, judgments, foreclosures, and more. This data is generally siloed or hard to access, but the app gathers and updates most of it daily. Users can search by address or use an interactive map to search at the neighborhood or citywide level. Particularly useful: a “watch list” feature that lets someone like Pumilia keep tabs on specific properties, and sends timely alerts about hearings and other developments. “And it makes it easier for me to empower other residents,” she adds, “so I’m not the only keeper of information.”
When other cities noticed New Orleans’ embrace of the app and expressed interest in a similar tool, Code for America adapted the technology to work elsewhere. “We seemed to hit a nerve,” says Eddie Tejeda, one of the BlightStatus creators. Specifics varied from place to place, but grappling with official property data was clearly a widespread frustration. Lots of people want information about buildings and property, Tejeda continues, but what’s available is often “really hard to work with”; digging through it requires knowledge and experience.
With an investment from the Knight Foundation, the group formed Civic Insight in 2013, using their New Orleans work as a template that could be scaled for other cities large and small, with varied needs and data sets. (Setup and annual subscription-like fees vary by population: roughly $1,000 to $10,000 for the base rate plus 20 to 70 cents per capita.) Among its newer clients, Dallas is proving a particularly important case study. A sprawling metropolis with wildly diverse neighborhoods, from pricey and thriving to severely economically challenged, it’s helping demonstrate that this approach to open-data technology isn’t just for triage in a place like post-Katrina New Orleans.
The connection came via Habitat for Humanity. The nonprofit’s New Orleans chapter has been an enthusiastic user of BlightStatus. Members passed the word to colleagues in Dallas, where the city has been grappling with strategies for using data to define, track, and address blight and related issues, such as identifying problem landlords. Launched in late 2014 with data similar to the information collected in New Orleans, the Dallas version will incorporate additional crime and tax-related statistics that locals want to access more readily, says Theresa O’Donnell, the city’s chief planning officer, who spoke about the app at the Lincoln Institute’s Big City Planning Directors conference in Cambridge in October 2014. “As we get these programs up and started,” she says, “we can rely more on citizens to let us know if [our blight efforts] are working or not.”
Atlanta and Sacramento are rolling out their own programs to make use of the app this year, and other Civic Insight efforts are forthcoming in Fort Worth, Texas, and elsewhere. Client goals aren’t limited to blight issues, notes Tejeda, now Civic Insight’s CEO: in Palo Alto, where zoning, development, and construction are hot topics, architects and homeowners use the app to keep up with permitting processes. That flexibility is by intent. “It’s relatively quick for us to map [raw data] to our application,” he explains. “The role we play is being the translator between what the city has, and what the public needs.” (The app is also built to accommodate new data sets—and it’s no surprise that active citizens like Pumilia, in New Orleans, have lots of suggestions that Civic Insight is working to accommodate.)
Comprehensive data sets and other digital tools have helped to guide planners and other city officials for years, but what Civic Insight is up to is the next logical step. “There’s this great opportunity to harness this data—sort of hidden data, for many cities—and bring it to life” in ways that are useful to citizens and planners alike, points out Lincoln Institute fellow Peter Pollock, the former head of planning in Boulder, Colorado.
Such accessibility matters because policy makers must “coproduce the good city” with residents, Pollock continues. “Planners are in the business of harnessing community energy around a vision for the future,” he says. That means zoning and permitting—but also maintenance and compliance. “It’s not just building the city; it’s care and feeding of the city over time.”
Still, the Civic Insight proposition may seem confusing at first: How does a city benefit by hoping citizens will pore over information that it already owns? But that’s the point. Opening up data to people who really know the neighborhoods where they live and work amounts to a kind of crowd-sourcing strategy for planning-level city maintenance.
Just ask Pumilia. This is the essence of what she was trying to do in New Orleans with her DIY spreadsheet and a whole lot of grit a few years ago. Now she can monitor her neighborhood more easily and direct others to BlightStatus so they too can quickly round up the information they need and prod the city about troublesome properties.
Dipping into the data as we speak, she calls up the history of one local address: “So there are one, two, three, four, five cases against this property,” she says. In short, she has just whipped up a ready-made dossier of neglect—one that helped persuade officials to start a process that should lead to the auction of that property.
Sometimes, Pumilia says with a laugh, “It requires citizen action to inspire people to do their jobs.”
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Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 2 del libro Perspectivas urbanas; Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.
La introducción de programas de adjudicación de títulos de propiedad al mercado informal del suelo parecía ser la solución mágica al problema de la pobreza en países del tercer mundo. Varios gobiernos suspiraron de alivio al pensar que la lucha contra la pobreza ya no requeriría las complejas y estresantes medidas de redistribución, eternas causantes de conflictos entre clases y grupos sociales. Según esta fórmula mágica, bastaría con que los habitantes urbanos informales (alrededor del 50 % de la población de las grandes ciudades) registraran sus propiedades formalmente para obtener los títulos de propiedad, para entonces poder obtener préstamos hipotecarios de bancos privados. Con sus títulos y su recién adquirido acceso a los préstamos, la población necesitada podría aumentar su capital inmobiliario, mejorar sus viviendas y establecer pequeños negocios (de Soto 1986; 2001).
Con objeto de someter esta hipótesis a prueba y a petición del Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas e Informática del Perú (INEI), el autor realizó un estudio de la política de registro predial oficial del Perú, bajo la cual se otorgaron más de un millón de títulos de propiedad entre 1996 y 2000. Los encargados de ejecutar esta política fueron la Comisión de Formalización de la Propiedad Informal (COFOPRI) y el Registro Predial Urbano (RPU). Tal como se estableció en el Decreto de Ley 803 del Perú de marzo de 1996, la política de registro predial se propuso establecer una relación formal entre la distribución de títulos de propiedad, el acceso a mecanismos formales de crédito y el mejoramiento de las condiciones de vida de la población. Basado en la información aportada por las Encuestas Nacionales de Hogares (ENAHO) de 1998 y 1999 realizadas por el INEI, en el estudio se analizaron datos de viviendas que habían sido adquiridas a través de invasiones u otros medios ilegales y que carecían de títulos de propiedad o bien se los había otorgado COFOPRI a través del proceso de regularización. La base de datos del estudio incluyó 913.335 unidades en 1998 y 1.033.480 en 1999, de un total de 3.572.091 unidades habitacionales urbanas para ambos años. El indicador utilizado para determinar el acceso al crédito fue el financiamiento obtenido para la ampliación de la vivienda u otros gastos para el hogar, mientras que para determinar las condiciones de vida se utilizaron como indicadores la estructura de la vivienda y la existencia de servicios básicos.
Los promotores de la regularización de la propiedad en Perú sostienen la necesidad de otorgar títulos de propiedad a gran escala reconociendo la ocupación informal (es decir, legalizando la tenencia del suelo) y adjudicando títulos de propiedad registrada, a fin de establecer los vínculos necesarios para abrir las puertas al crédito formal. El registro oficial es el procedimiento jurídico por el cual los derechos a la propiedad llevan a la tenencia legal. En forma particular, el registro formal establece vínculos entre la legalización de suelo y propiedades y el acceso a hipotecas a través de la banca privada. Tal como lo establece la Asociación Path to Property (una organización dedicada a promover estas políticas a nivel mundial), detrás del proceso de registro formal se esconde la filosofía de que la prosperidad de los países con economías de mercado se debe principalmente a sus adecuados sistemas de propiedad, que permiten operar sus mercados mediante derechos de propiedad intercambiables en un mercado amplio.
Los derechos de propiedad deben formalizarse y los instrumentos de intercambio de acceso universal deben registrarse en un sistema central regido por reglamentos y normas legales. Así, los tenedores pueden tener pruebas irrefutables de su propiedad y protegerse contra el fraude y la incertidumbre. Por consiguiente, el registro oficial de la propiedad facilita canalizar la “energía” del sector informal hacia economías de mercado organizadas y prósperas. Vista desde esta perspectiva, la informalidad no es otra cosa que la incapacidad de los gobiernos de hacer que sus leyes coincidan con las verdaderas circunstancias en que su gente vive y trabaja. No obstante, tal punto de vista no logra reducir un fenómeno complejo a su dimensión jurídica y descuida sus aspectos económicos.
Política y resultados de la titulación del suelo
Con el objeto de acelerar la distribución de los títulos de propiedad y evitar problemas burocráticos, se transfirió esta responsabilidad de las municipalidades a COFOPRI. El Banco Mundial apoyó esta política y otorgó a COFOPRI un préstamo de US$38 millones en diciembre de 1998. Entre 1996 y 2000 se otorgaron 1.134.000 títulos de propiedad debidamente inscritos, 645.165 de ellos en Lima, 112.631 en Arequipa y 74.180 en Trujillo (las tres ciudades más grandes del Perú, en ese orden). Si bien es innegable el éxito de la política de registro formal en términos de distribución y registro de títulos de propiedad, es cuestionable el haber eliminado la figura de las municipalidades en el proceso y mermado su función jurídica en el sistema urbano.
Una vez ejecutada la política, se observó una estrecha relación entre el registro oficial de propiedad y las condiciones de vida en Lima. Entre 1998 y 1999, las viviendas regularizadas (antiguamente ilegales o informales) de la ciudad capital mostraron mejoras de construcción en paredes, pisos y techos; sin embargo, también se observaron mejoras de paredes y pisos en las viviendas no regularizadas. En el resto del país, el número de viviendas informales de las áreas urbanas sobrepasa al de viviendas regularizadas.
Si bien entre 1998 y 1999 el número de viviendas regularizadas fuera de Lima aumentó (de 17.929 a 48.869), también aumentaron las carentes de títulos de propiedad (de 371.005 a 392.436), lo cual pone en evidencia la persistencia de los mecanismos de invasión. Entre 1998 y 1999 aumentó la disparidad entre los diferentes tipos de mejoras hechas a las viviendas regularizadas y las informales fuera de Lima para la mayoría de las categorías (véase la tabla 1).
Tabla 1: Mejoras de viviendas regularizadas e informales fuera de Lima, 1998-1999 (%)
1998 1999
Regularizadas Informales Diferencia Regularizadas Informales Diferencia
Mejoras de paredes 67,0 41,5 25,5 78,5 44,0 34,5
Mejoras de pisos 75,6 48,0 27,6 80,0 54,0 26,0
Mejoras de techos 61,0 21,0 40,0 78,0 23,0 55,0
Si se observa la relación entre los títulos de propiedad oficiales y el acceso al crédito, los resultados del estudio muestran que el 34 % de las viviendas de Lima a las que COFOPRI otorgó títulos de propiedad en 1998 (23.965 de un total de 70.725 viviendas) consiguieron varios tipos de financiamiento provenientes de bancos, agencias de préstamo o familiares, para efectos de hacer mejoras o renovaciones en sus hogares. En 1999, alrededor del 18,3 % de las viviendas tituladas (23.804 de un total de 129.588) obtuvieron tal financiamiento. Si bien no se dispone de información oficial sobre el número de solicitudes de crédito que fueron rechazadas, tal resultado demuestra que los hogares oficialmente registrados que adquieren acceso a los préstamos constituyen una minoría, y que de hecho, el número de ellos está en descenso. Varios factores complejos pueden explicar esta situación, entre ellos la recesión económica, la tasa de incumplimiento de pago del 10 % para los préstamos de la banca privada, la renuencia a otorgar préstamos al sector pobre de la población y los temores que tienen estos propietarios a hipotecar sus hogares y sus tierras.
De la misma manera, el número de préstamos bancarios otorgados en Lima a propietarios debidamente titulados disminuyó entre 1998 y 1999 (de 12.750 a 8.993). En cambio, en el mismo período aumentó el uso de recursos propios para financiar las mejoras a las viviendas (de 12.282 a 14.811). Como puede verse, no sólo una gran mayoría de los propietarios está gastando fondos propios en sus viviendas, sino también que se les está dificultando lograr el acceso a instituciones de crédito, todo esto a pesar de tener el registro formal de sus propiedades. Un estudio realizado por COFOPRI-DESCO (Riofrío 2001) identificó varias características que comparten las personas que están dispuestas a hipotecar sus propiedades:
De los 12.750 hogares oficialmente registrados y regularizados en Lima que también recibieron préstamos bancarios en 1998 para fines de renovaciones y mejoras, el 52,6 % los obtuvo a través del Banco de Materiales y el 47,4 % de la Empresa Nacional de Construcciones y Edificaciones (ENACE). En 1999, 8.993 hogares oficialmente registrados y regularizados recibieron préstamos para renovaciones y mejoras, el 84,43 % del Banco de Materiales y el 15,57 % de la ENACE. Puesto que ambas son entidades públicas que otorgan préstamos subsidiados (a la misma tasa de interés anual de 7 %), no hay conexión entre el registro proprietario oficial a través de los programas de regularización y el acceso a préstamos de la banca privada.
En cuanto al financiamiento para otras clases de gastos domésticos, en 1999 apenas el 8,7 % de los hogares registrados en Lima (11.323 de un total de 129.588) recurrieron a alguna clase de ayuda financiera. Dado que ninguna entidad pública otorga préstamos para este tipo de gastos, la mayoría de los hogares recibe el financiamiento por parte de amigos y parientes (47 %) u otras fuentes como agencias de préstamos (25 %). Sólo el 28 % de estos 11.323 hogares registrados obtuvieron préstamos de la banca privada para gastos del hogar.
En otras áreas urbanas, la situación de los hogares oficialmente registrados es diferente a la de Lima. En 1998 el uso de fondos propios superó a los préstamos bancarios para efectos de realizar mejoras a la vivienda (78,7 % en comparación con 21,2 %), mientras que lo contrario ocurrió en 1999 (51,3 % de préstamos bancarios en comparación con 42,9 % de fondos propios). En 1998, todos los préstamos fueron préstamos públicos otorgados por el Banco de Materiales, mientras que en 1999 el 93 % provino de dicha fuente. En cuanto a los préstamos para otros gastos domésticos, sólo el 13 % de los hogares oficialmente registrados (6.163 de un total de 47.302) recibieron en 1999 algún tipo de financiamiento. De este pequeño grupo, el 45 % recibió asistencia financiera de agencias de préstamos y otras fuentes; el 34 %, de amigos y parientes, y el 21 % de sus empleadores o centros de trabajo. Ninguno de ellos obtuvo fondos de la banca privada.
Conclusiones
El estudio arrojó las siguiente conclusiones en cuanto a la relación que hay entre el registro oficial de títulos y el acceso al crédito:
Como puede observarse, no existe una relación directa entre el número de títulos de propiedad otorgados a los ocupantes informales y su subsiguiente acceso a préstamos de la banca privada. Esta conclusión fue confirmada cuando el gobierno de transición, luego de la salida del expresidente Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000), reveló en 2001 que se habían registrado apenas 12.388 hipotecas en el RPU en todo el país, lo cual equivale a apenas un 5 % de los beneficiarios potenciales. Si bien los centros de registro pueden ser útiles, ciertamente no hay suficientes para incrementar el acceso al crédito. Una política eficaz requiere el estudio profundo de un número de factores diferentes, entre ellos:
Este artículo y la investigación hecha para el mismo no pretenden menoscabar la importancia de las políticas diseñadas para facilitar el acceso al crédito de la población pobre mediante programas de regularización. Por el contrario, dichas políticas son importantes y deben incentivarse, aunque no podemos sugerir que constituyan el único medio para atacar la pobreza urbana. Para que el sistema pueda mejorar, es fundamental contar con un mejor entendimiento del sistema de crédito y de la cultura de crédito popular, así como también desarrollar programas de asistencia financiera que hagan frente a la resistencia que tienen los pobres y la banca a las hipotecas.
Julio Calderón Cockburn, sociólogo y estudiante de doctorado de la Universidad de San Marcos en Lima, Perú, es autor de muchos libros y artículos publicados en las Américas y Europa y actualmente se desempeña como asesor independiente y profesor universitario. Igualmente es investigador asociado al Instituto Lincoln, el cual apoyó el estudio aquí referido además de otros proyectos de investigación y enseñanza en el pasado.
Referencias
Calderón Cockburn, Julio A. 2001. Comparative Analysis of the Benefited and Non-benefited Population by the National Formalization Plan. In Has the Well-being of the Population Improved?: A Balance of the Main Social Policies and Programs. Lima: National Institute of Statistics and Data Processing (INEI): 65-92.
de Soto, Hernando. 1986. The Other Path. London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd.
_____. 2002. The Mystery of Capital. London: Bantam Press.
Fernandes, Edesio. 2002. The Influence of de Soto’s The Mystery of Capital. Land Lines 14 (1): 5–8.
Riofrío, G., J. Calderón y M. Zolezzi. 2001. Estudio sobre cultura registral. Lima: COFOPRI-DESCO. Agosto.
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Brasilia, the capital of Brazil, was inaugurated in the early 1960s as a “new city” that was to usher in a new era for Latin American metropolises, demonstrating how the government’s efficient use of land would allow for orderly urban growth. Two basic instruments were provided for this purpose: normative control of the use of land based on a master plan devised by Lucio Costa; and government ownership of land in the federal capital, which would permit the capital to be planned without the kinds of restrictions and conflicts that normally result from private land ownership. However, three and a half decades later, the problems associated with urban development in Brasilia do not differ substantially from those experienced by other large cities in Latin America.
Land Tenure Shortsightedness and Administrative Patronage
Brasilia presents a unique example of urban land management in Latin America because the administration of public land has always been the responsibility of the local government. Nevertheless, the city’s periphery has experienced an explosive rate of growth with its concomitant pattern of irregular land occupation, illegal subdivisions and lack of infrastructure. In Brasilia the possibility of steering the process of urban growth by means of an explicit policy of access to public land has been slowly and irreparably jeopardized by spontaneous (and illegal) land occupation. This shortsighted use of public land is generally dysfunctional for both urban density and public finance, thus hindering the local administration’s efforts to provide infrastructure to these irregular sites.
Furthermore, political influences on the development process have significantly compromised the chances of efficiently managing the supply of public land in Brasilia. In the early 1990s the government distributed about 65,000 lots in areas without any basic infrastructure. Besides reducing the stock of public land, this “land tenure patronage” created the need for new funding sources to finance new infrastructure. Since the main resource available to the Federal District’s Development Agency (Terracap) is the land itself, this patronage policy resulted in the sale of additional public lands to finance infrastructure in irregular settlements. This vicious cycle has caused serious distortions that the present local administration aims to solve by using public land as “capital” to create an effective policy to manage land tenure revenues and urban costs.
The Brasilia experience seems to confirm the arguments of Henry George and others that public land ownership does not per se lead to more balanced and socially egalitarian urban growth. The current local government strategy to define ways to manage revenue from public lands in order to manage the use of urban land indicates a new form of government interaction with the land market. In this sense, the government changes its role from being the principal landowner to becoming the administrator of land benefits.
Public Land as Land Tenure Capital
The core principle of Brasilia’s new strategy of administering land equity is the definition of public land as “land tenure capital.” The use of this land is submitted to a set of strategic actions that transform public land capital into a factor that induces the consolidation of the Federal District’s technological complex. This is the public counterpart in the process of reconverting land use in the city center into an instrument of social promotion in the land tenure regulation program: public lands are used as land assets through sales, leases and partnerships in urban projects.
The use of differentiated land tenure strategies lends more flexibility to the government in coordinating its actions. The search for a balance between initiatives of a social nature and others where the government seeks to maximize its income is now taking on the appearance of an actual policy of public land administration that breaks with former patronage practices.
In this context of exploring new approaches to the use of public land to control urban development in Brasilia, the Lincoln Institute, the Planning Institute of the Federal District and Terracap organized an International Seminar on Management of Land Tenure Revenue and Urban Costs in June 1998.
The program brought together international experts, government secretaries and local administrators with a view to evaluating international experiences in using public lands to finance urban growth in Europe, the United States and Latin America. Martim Smolka of the Lincoln Institute described the relationships between land market operations, land use regulations and the public capture of land value increments. Alfredo Garay, an architect and former planning director for the city of Buenos Aires, reported on experiences in the development of public land around the city’s harbor.
Bernard Frieden of Massachusetts Institute of Technology described how commercial activities on public trust lands in the western United States are used to raise funds for education and other local purposes. Henk Verbrugge, director of Rotterdam’s fiscal agency and The Netherlands’ representative to the International Association of Assessing Officers, described the country’s system of hereditary tenure, a legal regulation by which land can be used for full private use and benefit while remaining under municipal control and economic ownership.
The participants discussed how these experiences compared with the situation in Brasilia and concluded that the success of various strategies for the use of public land depends on the suitability of specific projects to the respective country’s business culture and the institutional practices in effect in the local administration.
Pedro Abramo is a professor at the Institute of Urban and Regional Research and Planning at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
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The idea of reducing or abolishing capital gains taxes to encourage private investment and general economic growth often comes up in state and national political campaigns. Advocates of cutting these taxes argue that if investors could keep their gains, they would invest them in new enterprises, thereby creating new jobs and strengthening local economies.
The public discussion usually focuses on stock market investments, but most capital gains are generated in the real estate sector where most of the economy’s assets are based. In 1994, the Federal Reserve Board estimated that real estate accounted for 67 percent of the nation’s total economic assets, including land worth about $4.4 trillion, homes worth $5.9 trillion, and other buildings (stores, factories, office buildings) worth an additional $3.1 trillion.
There are no comprehensive national statistics on capital gains from real estate or other assets. But the most recent survey by the Internal Revenue Service, conducted in 1985, estimated that land and buildings accounted for at least 58 and perhaps as much as 70 percent of the total of $208 billion in capital gains that year.
Federal statistics also report that the annual cost of doing business in real estate often exceeds the taxable income generated from land and buildings. It follows that many real estate investors receive a net benefit only when they eventually sell their properties for more than they originally cost. In effect, they are willing to turn over most current income to their mortgage bankers, in the hope of reaping a capital gain at the end of the process.
How Much Total Income Does Real Estate Generate?
There are no adequate national statistics on how much real estate is worth or the total income it generates. It is possible, however, to estimate real estate cash flow by starting from the income reported by the owners of real estate and adding to that some of the major expenses they paid before paying taxes. In 1993, the owners of real estate reported receiving about $209 billion in cash flow (earnings plus depreciation), though the amount depreciated was not taxable. In addition, the real estate industry paid about $515 billion in a combination of mortgage interest and property taxes. Thus real estate generated at least $724 billion in total earnings in 1993 (see chart 1).
The portion of this total paid out as interest to lenders since the end of World War II has grown much faster than any other part of the total. Between 1945 and 1993, the share of real estate earnings paid out as interest grew from about 10 percent to about 50 percent. This reflects the fact that about 70 percent of private sector lending is committed to real estate mortgages. This two-way street—with money flowing from real estate into financial institutions, then back out into real estate loans—is one reason why federal statistics lump real estate and finance together as the “finance, insurance, and real estate” sector, or FIRE for short.
Who Receives Income Generated by Real Estate?
Federal income and tax statistics attribute income from real estate to three categories of owners: persons, corporate real estate and noncorporate real estate. These categories are not self-explanatory. They are based on the motives and behavior of real estate owners, and do not refer simply to individual people, partnerships and companies.
“Persons” receive some income from real estate, though it is not their primary way of earning a living. They may rent out an apartment in a two-family house or a second home during the off-season, for example; or, they may own an apartment building or small commercial property.
“Corporate real estate” is a relatively small category, consisting only of land and buildings that are owned and used for non-real estate business purposes. For example, manufacturing companies typically own their own corporate headquarters and industrial plants. To capture tax advantages, however, these companies may spin off their facilities as “noncorporate” real estate, then lease them back.
The “noncorporate real estate” category is the least obvious. Owners in this category participate either full- or part-time in real estate as a business, mostly through partnerships. The category includes a wide range of people and organizations, from professional developers or property management companies to doctors who own nursing homes.
In 1993, the annual earnings for these three categories were $86 billion for persons, $3 billion for corporate owners, and $120 billion for noncorporate owners (see charts 2-4).
How Is Real Estate Income Taxed?
Since 1970, when the federal government began separating real estate statistics from those for the finance and insurance sectors, real estate has shown little taxable income. Corporate and noncorporate real estate businesses enjoy several tax advantages that help to account for this seeming anomaly of the economy’s major asset generating such low reported earnings:
(a) Like other business owners, they can deduct the cost of maintaining their property (painting, landscaping, replacing a leaky roof, etc.) as an expense before paying taxes on their business income. The purpose of this spending is to preserve the value of their real estate.
(b) They can also claim depreciation (“capital consumption allowances”) for their buildings (technically land does not depreciate). In most businesses, this allowance is a way to compensate for wear-and-tear on machinery, which must be replaced when it becomes obsolete. In practice, real estate owners have often been allowed to depreciate their buildings even though their market value is not declining at all.
(c) When owners sell their properties, any positive difference between the depreciated price received and the price originally paid is taxed as a capital gain. Capital gains are taxed at a lower rate than other income. Thus, over-depreciation turns out to be a way of minimizing tax liability.
The combination of (b) and (c) raises what might seem like an obvious question: how can real estate depreciate, losing value and eventually needing replacement, yet end up selling for more than its purchase price, generating capital gains? Of course a given piece of real estate does not always do both. Some real estate is indeed sold at a loss–for example, if property values in a whole neighborhood or city decline. But land, unlike machinery or even buildings, cannot wear out. Since World War II, urban land in particular and real estate holdings in general have gained in value far more often than they have declined.
How Should Real Estate Income Be Taxed?
In a rising market, federal tax policy allows real estate investors to earn several times more than they could simply by making smart buying and selling decisions. Writing off maintenance expenses and the supposedly declining value of the property before calculating taxable income means that the same property can produce a steady income for realtors and potential investors, but appear to lose money as far as the federal tax collector is concerned.
A tax-smart investor in a rising real estate market will own a piece of property only until it has been fully depreciated. It then has a “book value” of zero—like a piece of machinery so worn out or outdated that it cannot be sold at any price. The owner of such a machine has to junk it and buy a new one. The real estate investor, in contrast, can sell the “zero value” property to new owners, who can depreciate it all over again starting from the new, higher price they paid.
The upshot of these tax policies is that an industry with large total earnings reports little or no taxable income. Charts 3 and 4 show that real estate businesses have reported a negative taxable income frequently since the mid-1980s, despite the fact that real estate values in many places were rising. Since the real estate industry pays hardly any income taxes on its rental income, the major federal tax it does pay is the capital gains tax—for that is where the accumulated rental earnings are taken, when the building is sold for its depreciated value.
Does such favorable tax treatment for real estate benefit the economy as a whole? That question cannot be answered from tax statistics alone. The answer depends in part on whether all real estate projects that are taxed the same way are equally good at generating public benefits, such as jobs in construction and property maintenance, or other needed goods such as housing, shopping, and manufacturing facilities. If the answer to that question is “no,” then the public interest might be better served if funds now invested in real estate for tax advantages alone were invested in new technologies or public infrastructure.
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Michael Hudson is a research associate at the Jerome Levy Economics Institute at Bard College in New York. He is writing a book about how federal income and capital gains taxes on land and buildings affect national taxation and investment patterns, and he spoke on this topic at the Lincoln Institute in October 1995.
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Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 1 del libro Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.
Las políticas de gestión del suelo urbano y el funcionamiento de los mercados de suelo urbano han pasado a ocupar un papel más importante en el debate de políticas públicas urbanas, así como en el trabajo académico y las agendas de desarrollo en varios países de esta región. En los últimos diez años, la red de académicos y funcionarios apoyada por el Programa para América Latina del Lincoln Institute of Land Policy ha desarrollado seminarios, promovido investigaciones, organizado debates públicos, asesorado a tomadores de decisión, y publicado los resultados de su trabajo sobre estos temas tan pertinentes. Los miembros de dicha red se reunieron en Buenos Aires en abril de 2004 para evaluar sus actividades y preparar esta declaración sobre los temas centrales de políticas del suelo, los cuales son claves para la búsqueda de programas de desarrollo urbano más sostenibles en el futuro.
En América Latina, las políticas urbanas y las formas de funcionamiento de los mercados de suelo tienden a producir ciudades económicamente desiguales, política y socialmente excluyentes, espacialmente segregadas y ambientalmente no sustentables. Entre las consecuencias de dichas políticas están los altos y a veces irracionales precios de la tierra, producto, en parte, de la ausencia de efectivas formas de gestión de la tierra urbana.
La situación actual
Los mercados de suelo son estructuralmente imperfectos. Sin embargo, el funcionamiento de los suelos urbanos depende de relaciones sociales, que a su vez son afectadas por los resultados de las operaciones de dichos mercados. Esta conexión entre las relaciones sociales y los mercados de suelo hace a la vez posible y necesario influenciar dichos mercados. Lejos de neutralizar dichas imperfecciones, muchos de los instrumentos y políticas implementados más bien han contribuido a distorcionar aun más el funcionamiento del mercado de tierra urbana. Más aún, las políticas han mantenido las ‘reglas del juego’ inmobiliario urbano inalteradas y aparentemente intocables.
Una lectura más amplia del problema revela que, más que una racionalización inconsecuente, la disfuncionalidad de los mercados de suelo es el resultado de un conjunto de oportunidades perdidas para el desarrollo socialmente sostenible de las ciudades latinoamericanas. Sin embargo, existen oportunidades prometedoras e innovadoras para superar los cuellos de botella evidenciados en las políticas inadecuadas y destructivas del Estado, la dificultad de financiar el desarrollo urbano, y su capacidad deficiente de gestión.
Uno de los resultados negativos más sobresalientes de la situación actual es el relativo peso, importancia y persistencia de los mercados informales de suelo urbano caracterizado por prácticas exclusionarias, la entrega ilegal de títulos, la carencia de servicios urbanos y otros problemas. La desregulación en lugares donde habría que regular (las periferias pobres) y la sobre-regulación de las áreas ricas y reguladas, así como la privatización sin criterios sociales, son todos factores que contribuyen a impulsar estos procesos, especialmente la concentración espacial de la pobreza urbana. Si bien la mayoría de los programas de regularización están bien intencionados, la mayoría de ellos provoca efectos perversos, entre ellos los elevados costos del suelo para los sectores más pobres.
La planificación urbana y las normas urbanísticas tradicionales han perdido importancia y efectividad como instrumentos para orientar el desarrollo urbano, especialmente los mecanismos existentes para la gestión del suelo. Esta situación abre, no obstante, espacios de oportunidad para pensar en formas innovadoras de gestión y planificación urbana. En algunos lugares, ya se ha aprovechado dichas oportunidades a través de nuevos experimentos y propuestas que han provocado intensos debates al cuestionar los enfoques tradicionales.
En este marco, la creación de nuevas formas de gestión de la tierra tiene un requisito ineludible: repensar la tributación de la tierra urbana incorporando nuevos métodos y estar abierto a considerar instrumentos fiscales alternativos, entendidos como herramientas para reorientar el actual desarrollo de las ciudades y disciplinar el funcionamiento del mercado de tierra urbana. Dichas herramientas deben ser diseñadas no sólo para captar fondos para la construcción de infraestructura y la prestación de servicios urbanos, sino también para contribuir a una distribución más equitativa de los costos y beneficios, especialmente aquellos asociados con el proceso de urbanización y el retorno de las plusvalías de la tierra recuperada a la comunidad.
Propuestas de Acción
Reconocer el rol indispensable del Estado. Es impresdindible que el Estado (tanto a nivel local como nacional) tenga un rol activo en la promoción del desarrollo urbano. El nivel local debe comprometerse más con los cambios estructurales en la gerencia del suelo, y el nivel nacional debe fomentar dichas iniciativas locales activamente. El gobierno no debe ignorar su responsabilidad de adoptar políticas en torno al mercado de suelo urbano que reconozca el valor estratégico de la tierra y las características particulares del funcionamiento de sus mercados, para impulsar un uso sostenible del suelo al incorporar objetivos sociales y ambientales y beneficiar a los segmentos más vulnerables de la población urbana.
Quebrar la compartamentalización entre las autoridades fiscales, normativas y jurídicas. La falta de cooperación entre autoridades locales es responsable por importantes ineficiencias, políticas poco efectivas, desperdicio de recursos escasos y poca transparencia pública. Más aún, las acciones incongruentes de diversas autoridades públicas dan señales confusas a los agentes privados y crean incógnitas, si no oportunidades, para que los intereses especiales puedan modificar planes gubernamentales. La complejidad y escala de los desafíos planteados por la realidad social urbana de las ciudades latinoamericanas requieren la toma de acciones multilaterales por parte de numerosos actores para incidir en el funcionamiento de los mercados de tierra urbana (formales e informales), asegurando de esta manera el logro de objetivos conjuntos: la promoción de un uso sostenible y justo de este recurso, la reducción de precios, la producción de suelo con servicios, el reconocimiento de los derechos al suelo por los pobres urbanos, y una repartición más equitativa de las cargas y los beneficios de la inversión urbana.
Estas autoridades también deben articular las políticas de desarrollo urbano con las políticas de tributación del suelo. Deben promover una nueva visión con una legislación urbanística que diferencie el derecho de propiedad del derecho de edificación y del uso del suelo, comprendiendo que las plusvalías generadas de los derechos de construcción no pertenecen exclusivamente a los propietarios de la tierra. Los gestores urbanos también deben también diseñar mecanismos creativos a través de los cuales las plusvalías se pueden usar para producir tierra urbana equipada para los sectores sociales de menores ingresos, compensando de esta manera las desigualdades urbanas.
Reconocer los límites de lo posible. Transformar los marcos regulatorios actuales que rigen la utilización de la tierra urbana exige desarrollar un nuevo pensamiento urbanístico y jurídico que reconozca que las desigualdades urbanas y la exclusión socio-espacial son un fenómeno intrínseco al predominante modelo de desarrollo de las ciudades. Incluso en los marcos de los modelos vigentes, hay grados de libertad no despreciables para políticas más socialmente responsables y transparencia del gobierno. Las regulaciones y normas urbanísticas deben considerar la complejidad de los procesos de valorización del suelo y asegurar el cumplimiento de los principios efectivos tradicionales tales como aquellos que limitan la capacidad de las agencias gubernamentales para disponer de recursos públicos o prohibir el “enriquecimiento sin causa” de los propietarios privados.
Revertir círculos viciosos. Se necesitan alternativas a los programas de regularización para romper el círculo vicioso de reproducción de la pobreza que los actuales programas de regularización perpetúan. Es importante reconocer el carácter paliativo de dichos programas y la necesidad de integración de las políticas urbanas, de vivienda y de tributación de la tierra. La dependencia de los subsidios a la vivienda, aunque inevitable, puede quedar anulado si no se cuenta con mecanismos que impidan que estos subsidios se traduzcan en aumentos de los precios del suelo. Los funcionarios de las ciudades deben priorizar la generación de oferta de tierra equipada sobre los programas de regularización ya que el derecho a la vivienda es un derecho social a ocupar un hábitat viable y con dignidad. También es importante entender que la baja producción de suelo servido per se contribuye a la retención de la oferta y por consiguiente a su alto precio, afectando así todos los aspectos del desarrollo urbano.
Además, las soluciones individuales (tales como procesos de titulación predio-por-predio o la entrega de subsidios caso por caso a familias individuales) son en última instancia más onerosas para la sociedad que las soluciones colectivas y más amplias que incorporan otros valores agregados, como la construcción de espacios públicos, la inversión de infraestructura y otros mecanismos que fortalecen la integración social. Muchos países latinoamericanos han sido testigos de programas de subsidios habitacionales, muchas veces con el apoyo de agencias multilaterales, que no consideran o menosprecian el componente suelo. Tales programas buscan suelo público rápidamente disponible o simplemente ocupan suelo en las áreas intersticiales de la ciudad. Tal desinterés en una política de suelo más amplia compromete la replicabilidad, expansión y sostenibilidad de estos programas de vivienda en una escala más amplia.
Repensar los roles de las instituciones públicas y privadas. La gestión de la tierra, dentro de una gran diversidad de intervenciones urbanas – desde la producción en escala masiva de suelo con servicios para los pobres hasta las operaciones de redesarrollo urbano mediante grandes proyectos, pasando por las intervenciones del tipo ‘face-lift’ o los proyectos de recuperación ambiental — obliga a pensar en las más variadas formas de intervención de parte de las instituciones públicas responsables del desarrollo de las ciudades y en diferentes modalidades de asociación público-privada. La utilización de las tierras vacantes y la flexibilización de usos e intensidades de ocupación pueden jugar un papel crucial siempre que tales proyectos cumplan con las orientaciones estratégicas de las instituciones públicas, sean sujetas a la contraloría ciudadana, e incorporen una visión compartida y participativa del desarrollo urbano.
La ejecución de proyectos demostrativos como El Urbanizador Social en Porto Alegre, Brasil, el proyecto de vivienda Nuevo Usme y la legislación sobre la recuperación de plusvalías de Bogotá, Colombia, constituyen ejemplos de esfuerzos sensibles y creativos que reconocen la importancia de una adecuada gestión de la tierra urbana y de un nuevo pensamiento sobre el papel de la tierra, en particular del potencial del valor del suelo como instrumento para promover un desarrollo más sostenible y equitativo para los pobres de nuestras ciudades.
Un pensamiento creativo y balanceado también queda de manifiesto en proyectos conjuntos de capital público y privado en La Habana, Cuba, con plusvalías capturadas a través de la mejoría de áreas históricas densamente pobladas.
Potencializar el papel de la tributación de la tierra en el financiamiento público para promover el desarrollo urbano. Los gobiernos nacionales, estaduales o provinciales y locales deben compartir la responsabilidad por la promoción del impuesto predial como un mecanismo idóneo y socialmente aceptable para el financiamiento y promoción del desarrollo urbano. El impuesto predial no se debe aplicar con criterios generalizados, sino que debe ser sensible a las ciudades latinoamericanas que tienen un fuerte legado de desigualdades económicas y socio-espaciales. Pueden existir buenos argumentos para gravar a todos los terrenos con una tasa más alta que las edificaciones, de forma racional y diferenciada, en particular en los terrenos periféricos sujetos a la especulación urbana y las tierras ofertadas ex-ante a los sectores sociales de menores ingresos, (asegurándose que su pago contribuye, además, a la construcción de ciudadanía de estos sectores). Y como ya se aseveró, es esencial crear instrumentos impositivos innovadores y adecuados a cada realidad y otras modalidades para captar las plusvalías generadas.
Educar a los actores en la promoción de nuevas políticas. Todos los actores involucrados en estos procesos, desde los jueces a los periodistas pasando por los académicos y por supuesto los funcionarios públicos y sus mentores internacionales, requieren contar con formación y capacitación en profundidad sobre el funcionamiento de los mercados y la gestión de la tierra urbana para lograr estos objetivos. Es indispensable identificar los “campos de resistencia mentales”, particularmente en el pensamiento urbanístico, económico y en las doctrinas jurídicas, que constituyen obstáculos que hay que superar. Debemos reconocer, por ejemplo, que existe y opera un “derecho informal” que legitima social, si bien no jurídicamente, muchas transacciones sobre la tierra y crea redes y espacios de solidaridad e integración. Es urgente realizar acciones para introducir estos temas y propuestas en las agendas políticas en los distintos niveles gubernamentales, los partidos políticos, las organizaciones sociales, la academia y los medios de comunicación social.
