Between 1970 and 1989, 17 progressive urban reform projects were submitted to the Colombian Congress, but all failed due to opposition from the conservative party supported by the influential private sector including the construction industry and real estate developers. In 1989, after three years of parliamentary debates, Law 9a (for urban reform) was approved, despite opposition from FEDELONJAS, the entity representing the real estate and development groups. After the law was approved, FEDELONJAS brought a lawsuit before the Constitutional Court with reference to the owners’ loss of rights of those lands that were not developed during the time defined by the master plan (Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial or POT). The court ratified Law 9a, and the real estate sector protested throughout the country for what was deemed unfair expropriation without compensation. The law was considered “communist” and dangerous for the private capital linked to construction and real estate.
The city of Cali, with 2.5 million inhabitants and a large housing deficit in the early 1990s, applied Law 9a with its threat of a property taking to a large area of the city whose lands were held by a small number of owners. In anticipation, developers and builders in Cali suggested that these landowners join together in an association to develop a large amount of social housing on their properties.
As a result of this positive experience, the Cámara Nacional de la Construcción (CAMACOL, the national union of the construction industry, including developers, constructors and promoters of urban projects) supported these development processes in other cities, especially Bogotá and Medellín. The way was paved so that the private real estate sector accepted Law 388 in 1997, which was an enhancement of Law 9a, and that support has revolutionized urban land management in Colombia. The new law grants municipalities the authority to manage urban land, promotes the master plan (POT), allows urban value capture and generates instruments for land use regulation.
By 2000, discussions were no longer focused on lawsuits but rather on the advantages of obtaining land to develop projects at a lower price. The Colombian construction and real estate sectors have entered the twenty-first century with a proactive attitude toward the public capture of the land value increments (plusvalías) and other instruments of urban land management. They now understand that this legislation releases land for development, generates land sharing in large projects, and facilitates the production of social housing. Urban land prices have been moderated, and the financial capital is now used more efficiently for home building in Colombian cities. Opposition to the reforms remains, especially in intermediate-sized cities, but it is not as strong as in the 1970s and 1980s.
The change of attitude in the private real estate sector brings its interests closer to other social and collective concerns. It is clear that the proprietor owns the land, but that the right to develop land is owned by the public and may be granted through instruments such as the participation in plusvalías, transfer of development rights, or the sale of building rights. Profits from urban land development are now better distributed among all three stakeholders: the capital investor, the landowner and the municipality.
Oscar Borrera Ochoa is an economist and private urban consultant in Bogotá. He was president of FEDELONJAS from 1981 to 1990.
Lawrence Susskind is the Ford Professor of Urban and Environmental Planning at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and president of the Consensus Building Institute, in Cambridge, Massachusetts. He graduated from Columbia University and received his Masters of City Planning and his Ph.D. in Urban Planning from MIT. As current head of the Environmental Policy Group in MIT’s School of Architecture and Planning, he teaches courses on international environmental treaty negotiation, public sector dispute resolution and environmental planning. He also holds a joint appointment at Harvard University as visiting professor of Law and director of the Public Disputes Program at the interuniversity Program on Negotiation, which he helped to found. Susskind has published many books and reports and held many visiting appointments and guest lectureships. He is a faculty associate of the Lincoln Institute.
Land Lines: How did you become interested in land use mediation?
Lawrence Susskind: Land use planners are supposed to ensure that the public is involved in all growth management decisions. Yet, most efforts to ensure such public participation lead to protracted political battles. Within the planning profession it is not clear how competing conceptions of appropriate land uses ought to be reconciled. Since the early 1970s I have been trying to introduce the concept of mediation as well as other conflict management tools into the lexicon of professional planners. In my view, in the absence of consensus building strategies of some kind, most communities are doomed to use resources inefficiently, unfairly and unwisely. I got interested in land use mediation as a way of helping the planning profession do a better job.
LL: What types of land use disputes are most difficult to resolve?
LS: Land use disputes that revolve around values or identity are the most difficult to resolve. When values (as opposed to economic interests) are at stake, people often feel that their identity is threatened and in such situations they are rarely open to considering the views of others. For example, proposed changes in land use that would eliminate agriculture as a way of life are not likely to be accepted, even if financial compensation is offered to the landowners involved.
LL: When did you start collaborating with the Lincoln Institute?
LS: My ties to the Lincoln Institute go back a long time. When Arlo Woolery was executive director in the late 1970s, we worked together on a multiyear effort to analyze the impacts of the Property Tax Limitation Law (Proposition 2 1/2) in Massachusetts and on the state’s Growth Policy Development Act. Two decades later, in 1997, I began working with Rosalind Greenstein and later Armando Carbonell, co-chairs of the Institute’s Department of Planning and Development, on a series of research projects that evolved into the training programs on land use mediation that we (LILP and CBI) currently offer together.
LL: Explain a little more about CBI.
LS: The Consensus Building Institute is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1993 to provide consensus building services to clients involved in complex disputes. Building on the “mutual gains” approach to negotiation developed at the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School, CBI offers conflict management assistance, negotiation training, dispute system design services and evaluative research to public agencies, corporate clients and nongovernmental agencies on five continents.
Our staff now includes a dozen full-time professionals, mostly based in Cambridge, and a network of more than 30 experienced affiliates around the world. We have become known as expert public and environmental dispute mediators and have helped to resolve complex disputes related to the siting of controversial facilities, the setting of public health and safety standards, the formulation and implementation of development plans and projects, and conflicts among racial and ethnic groups.
LL: When did the joint Lincoln and CBI training programs begin?
LS: After several years of careful analysis of land use mediation efforts throughout the United States, CBI developed a curriculum with Lincoln Institute for public officials and planners, and that course has been offered since 1999 at a number of locations. During the first few years we offered only a basic course designed to familiarize participants with assisted negotiation as a method to resolve land use disputes, and then we expanded our offerings to include more detailed skill building for experienced mediators and practitioners. Today we offer a full range of courses at multiple locations around the country.
LL: Who are the primary participants in these introductory and advanced courses?
LS: We are trying to reach three different audiences. First, we have identified and invited local elected and appointed officials who preside over land development disputes and administer land use regulatory systems at the local, regional and state levels. They need to know that there are techniques they can use to help resolve land use disputes before they escalate.
Second, we are trying to attract real estate developers and their attorneys so they know how to participate effectively in dispute resolution efforts when they are offered or suggested by public officials. Third, we have a special interest in attracting professionals of all kinds who want to learn how to be better facilitators, particularly of multiparty land use dialogues that involve complex technical dilemmas.
LL: What are the key goals and lessons of these programs?
LS: The introductory course offers a quick overview of the reasons that land use disputes seem to escalate so quickly and often end up in court. We then introduce the basic principles and tools of dispute resolution and show how they can head off such escalation. They are presented in a very interactive way using gaming and simulations. Participants are given a number of hands-on opportunities to apply what they are learning in hypothetical situations and to bring their own cases before the group. We spend some time talking about techniques for overcoming resistance to the use of mediation and other consensus building strategies.
The advanced course is aimed at experienced mediators or planners and lawyers who think they might want to become mediators. It assumes that the participants have mastered the material presented in the introductory course and moves to a set of dilemmas at the next level, including methods of handling science-intensive disputes through the use of joint fact finding. We also review key theoretical debates, such as managing unequal power relationships in a mediation context.
LL: How do you incorporate both theory and practice into the curriculum?
LS: We expect many of the participants to bring their own stories about land use disputes in which they have been intimately involved. We model in real time how the theory we are teaching can be applied in their cases. We also try to ground all of our theoretical presentations in detailed case accounts of actual practice. Finally, as mentioned above, we use role playing simulations. Students can’t just sit back and take notes. They have to wrestle with the application of the ideas we are presenting.
LL: What other projects have you undertaken with the Institute?
LS: About a year ago, in May 2004, I joined Institute President Jim Brown at a Lincoln-sponsored seminar in Cuba on the problems of restoring and redeveloping Havana Harbor. Energy production and inadequate attention to pollution control have spoiled one of the most beautiful harbors in this hemisphere. Some of the many different committees and groups concerned with economic development, environmental cleanup, restoration of the harbor ecology, historic preservation of Old Havana, and enhanced tourism are seeking advice on strategies for balancing these (sometimes) competing objectives.
CBI is beginning to develop a new joint course with the Lincoln Institute and some of its partners involved in local economic development efforts around the country. We believe conflict resolution tools and negotiation skills can be of great use in neighborhood development disputes, not just growth management conflicts in the suburbs. With Roz Greenstein CBI is creating a new set of training programs for community-based organizations that we plan to offer for the first time next summer.
Another new initiative is a collaborative Web site that highlights recent research by the Lincoln Institute and CBI, as well as timely news articles, background material on consensus building, and links to related programs and publications. One section of the site will provide an interactive platform that will permit hundreds of alumni of our joint courses to remain in touch with each other and share their mediation experiences. This “virtual learning community” will be a valuable resource for public- and private-sector stakeholders involved in land use disputes (even if they haven’t taken the course).
LL: What is the outlook for future joint programs?
LS: I believe our ongoing CBI–Lincoln Institute partnership holds incredible promise. We have conducted an Institute-sponsored study on the use of consensus building to resolve land reform disputes in Latin America and hope to expand on that work, as well as to address land issues facing China and the newly independent states of Eastern Europe. The Institute is already involved in research and training programs in these regions, and land use disputes are at the core of many of the challenges facing national and local policy makers.
The Lincoln Institute is an ideal partner for CBI. We both care about applied research, theory building and sharing new knowledge through educational programs of all kinds. We both measure our success in terms of real improvements on the ground, and we share interests in both domestic and international arenas.
Faculty Profile of Fernanda Furtado
A medida que una ciudad crece, tanto en tamaño como en su densidad de edificación, una parte de este proceso de crecimiento consiste, por lo general, en las mejoras que se realizan en el suelo a raíz de los nuevos desarrollos. No obstante, la combinación de la demanda de sitios de construcción adicionales y de la cantidad limitada de espacio físico disponible para el desarrollo generalmente da como resultado un aumento en los precios de los terrenos.
Esta escasez de suelo se debe a tres factores principales: la capacidad de los propietarios de no poner a disposición del mercado sus terrenos con servicios (una causa que se atribuye a la concentración de la propiedad de terrenos y a otras limitaciones legales e institucionales); las dificultades para tener acceso a ciertas áreas que aún no están listas para ser ocupadas debido a la falta de infraestructura; y las restricciones impuestas por las normas de zonificación. Cada uno de estos factores presenta su propia dinámica, aunque no necesariamente aparecen al mismo tiempo. Este es el caso de las ciudades brasileñas, particularmente São Paulo, donde estos factores restrictivos no siempre se presentan de la misma manera en relación con el precio de los terrenos.
Por ejemplo, las normas de edificación pueden reducir el precio de los lotes individuales, pero pueden aumentar el precio general cuando dichas normas afectan a todos los lotes y, como consecuencia, restringen la oferta de viviendas. Una gran oferta de terrenos vacantes controlados por unos pocos propietarios puede ocasionar el aumento de los precios, mientras que la falta de accesibilidad puede dar como resultado la reducción de los precios.
El precio de los terrenos también depende de las características de las normas sobre el suelo. A medida que la ciudad crece, la mayor demanda de terrenos urbanos edificables por lo general genera valores más altos si la infraestructura existente tiene la capacidad de contener una ocupación de terrenos más intensa y si las normas sobre zonificación (o las modificaciones a dichas normas) permiten además una mayor densidad de edificación.
Con el fin de examinar estas cuestiones, debemos, en primer lugar, considerar de qué forma se financia la inversión en infraestructura que brinda o intensifica los medios para acceder a los terrenos y utilizarlos y, en segundo lugar, analizar cómo se distribuyen los beneficios y costos derivados de las mejoras al suelo. Por lo general, el costo de los servicios públicos (tales como calles, puentes, alcantarillado, alumbrado público, agua potable, etc.) se financia mediante los fondos públicos, mientras que las mejoras o el valor agregado a los terrenos como resultado de la inversión pública en infraestructura son aprovechados, salvo pocas excepciones, por los propietarios de los terrenos mejorados sin ningún tipo de costo.
El aumento en los valores de las propiedades también puede provenir de simples cambios en la utilización del suelo que ya se encuentra accesible, como por ejemplo cuando un terreno que anteriormente se consideraba rural ahora se redefine como urbano. Los cambios en las posibles densidades como consecuencia de nuevas normas de zonificación pueden generar grandes beneficios para las propiedades afectadas, aunque en este caso, como en el caso anterior, la presión futura en cuanto a la infraestructura requerirá una importante inversión pública.
Marco legal
Los propietarios de inmuebles mejorados en Brasil tradicionalmente se apropiaban, tal como ocurre en la mayoría de los países, del valor agregado que se derivaba de la inversión del sector público y de los cambios en la zonificación. El concepto de que los propietarios no deberían ser los únicos beneficiarios de dichas mejoras se introdujo en forma gradual en Brasil durante la década de 1970, y este principio se incorporó en los artículos 182 y 183 de la Constitución Federal de 1988. Con posterioridad, dichos artículos se regularon mediante la Ley Federal Nº 10.257 del año 2001, conocida también como la Ley de Desarrollo Urbano o Estatuto de la Ciudad (Estatuto da Cidade).
Desde 1988, el desarrollo urbano se ha convertido en una cuestión del derecho federal. En la práctica, la legislación federal ratificó el principio de la función social de la propiedad de terrenos urbanos y la separación del derecho a la propiedad del derecho de edificar. Sobre la base de la ley de 2001, la ciudad de São Paulo aprobó su Plan Estratégico de Ordenamiento Territorial en el año 2002, así como también la Ley sobre la Utilización del Suelo Nº 13.885 en 2004. Las mencionadas leyes introdujeron el mecanismo de Compensación Monetaria por el Derecho de Edificación (Outorga Onerosa do Direito de Construir u OODC), establecieron coeficientes de utilización del suelo (o coeficientes de edificabilidad) mínimos, básicos y máximos, y limitaron la oferta de superficies edificables. La utilización de estas herramientas en conjunto permitió al municipio mejorar la eficiencia en la gestión del suelo, promover los resultados sociales deseados y aumentar los ingresos.
El coeficiente de edificabilidad (CE) mínimo se refiere a la utilización mínima que se espera de un lote para que cumpla con su función social; el CE básico se relaciona con la superficie edificable que todo propietario tiene el derecho de desarrollar en virtud de su propiedad; y el CE máximo es la cantidad de desarrollo permitida por la infraestructura existente y las normas de zonificación. Los cargos asociados con la OODC se aplican sobre la diferencia existente entre el CE máximo y el CE básico de un lote.
Administración de los derechos de edificación
La OODC es la compensación monetaria que pagan aquellos a quienes el gobierno les otorga nuevos derechos de edificación (superficie edificable). Esta concesión de desarrollo (establecida en los artículos 28, 29, 30 y 31 de la Ley Federal Nº 10.257 de 2001 y definida en los artículos 209 a 216 del Plan Estratégico de Ordenamiento Territorial de 2002) es una de las herramientas normativas que se utilizan a los fines de administrar los derechos de edificación en la ciudad, con excepción de aquellas áreas destinadas a proyectos urbanos a gran escala en los que se utiliza una herramienta legal especial cuyo fin es fomentar las intervenciones públicas y privadas (Biderman, Sandroni y Smolka 2006).
El CE básico de utilización del suelo establecido en el año 2004 varía entre 1 y 2, dependiendo del área de la ciudad a considerar. El CE máximo puede ser 1, 2, 2,5 ó 4, dependiendo asimismo del área. En algunas áreas urbanas, estas nuevas normas redujeron los derechos de edificación, estableciendo un CE básico de 1 para aquellos terrenos que se habían clasificado como 2 o más según la legislación anterior. En forma paralela, el municipio de São Paulo utilizó la OODC para extender el potencial de edificación o el CE máximo hasta 4 en aquellos terrenos que, según la legislación anterior, solo podían desarrollarse hasta 1 ó 2.
Como resultado, en algunas áreas en las que se redujo el CE de 2 a 1, los emprendedores pudieron presentar proyectos utilizando el CE 2 anterior, o hasta el CE máximo de 3 ó 4, siempre y cuando pagaran al gobierno el monto relativo a la superficie edificable adicional correspondiente a la diferencia entre el CE básico y el CE utilizado en el proyecto. Suponiendo que los cargos sean efectivos en cuanto al costo para los emprendedores, este instrumento los beneficia, ya que les permite edificar hasta un CE 4 en áreas en donde previamente el máximo era de CE 2. No obstante, el propietario promedio no siempre considera que esta herramienta sea una ventaja, debido a que el potencial de edificación de su terreno podría verse reducido y se le podría aplicar un cargo sobre lo que anteriormente percibía como un derecho de edificación libre de todo cargo.
Los propietarios de pequeños lotes y viviendas de baja densidad tal vez no se den cuenta de lo que podrían estar perdiendo cuando se modifica el CE, debido a que, por lo general, consideran su propiedad como una combinación del terreno, la edificación y otras mejoras. Resulta difícil separar el valor del terreno del valor de las mejoras, por lo que una futura reducción en el valor del terreno no se percibe en forma inmediata. Asimismo, la expansion del mercado inmobiliario en São Paulo coincidió con la aprobación de la nueva legislación en el año 2004, por lo que el aumento general en los precios de los terrenos puede haber compensado la futura reducción de los precios de los terrenos asociada con las modificaciones del CE. Debe destacarse además que la expansión del crédito gubernamental destinado a la financiación de la vivienda desde el año 2006 contribuyó a un aumento en la demanda de terrenos y, en consecuencia, a un aumento en los precios de los mismos.
Para los emprendedores, el aumento del CE a 4 en aquellas áreas en las que el máximo había sido 1 ó 2 constituyó una situación favorable, ya que pudieron invertir más capital en los terrenos y llevar a cabo proyectos más lucrativos que compensaron los pagos adicionales realizados en concepto de la diferencia entre el CE básico y el CE máximo. En forma gradual, los emprendedores se convencieron de que era mejor pagar este aumento en el valor del terreno al gobierno que a los propietarios privados, ya que el gobierno convertía dichos pagos en mejoras que, por lo general, generaban un beneficio para los proyectos de los emprendedores.
El Plan Estratégico de Ordenamiento Territorial de 2002 y la Ley 13.885 de 2004 también limitaron la oferta de potencial edificable, tanto residencial como no residencial, en todos los distritos municipales, estableciendo una superficie edificable adicional total de 9.769 millones m2: 6.919 millones m2 para uso residencial y 2.850 millones m2 para uso no residencial (ver tabla 1). Dicho potencial no incluyó las superficies edificables que se encontraban dentro del perímetro de los 13 proyectos urbanos de São Paulo. Las superficies adicionales se distribuyeron entre 91 de los 96 distritos municipales, exceptuando cinco áreas destinadas a la protección ambiental. Esta definición y delimitación de la oferta de edificación potencial introdujo un nuevo elemento en el mercado inmobiliario.
Una vez que los emprendedores supieron cuál era la superficie edificable máxima, previeron la escasez de terrenos en aquellos distritos en los que la oferta era baja y la dinámica inmobiliaria era alt y, así, desataron una tendencia hacia un aumento de los precios de terrenos. A su vez, la falta de superficie edificable originó presiones por parte de los emprendedores inmobiliarios para que el gobierno aumentara la oferta, es decir, modificara los límites de la superficie edificable en algunos distritos durante la revisión del Plan Estratégico que se llevó a cabo en el año 2007, aunque no tuvieron éxito. Hacia octubre de 2010, la oferta de terrenos se había agotado totalmente (o casi por completo) para la utilización residencial en 17 distritos, y para la utilización no residencial en 5 distritos (ver figura 1).
Factores de planificación e interés social
La fórmula para calcular la OODC, adoptada en el Plan Estratégico de Ordenamiento Territorial de 2002 de São Paulo, tiene en cuenta factores de planificación e interés social, además de las características de la parcela en cuestión y del beneficio económico real que se le asigna a la propiedad como resultado de la OODC. El factor de la planificación es un instrumento cuyo fin es el de fomentar o desalentar densidades altas en ciertas áreas dependiendo de la infraestructura existente, en particular del transporte público y el tránsito masivo. El factor de la planificación también se utiliza con el fin de obtener una mayor compensación económica derivada de la venta de derechos de edificación para empresas ubicadas en áreas de la ciudad que han experimentado mejoras, ya que el coeficiente varía según los terrenos se utilicen con fines residenciales o no residenciales.
El factor del interés social establece exenciones o reducciones en los cargos financieros, dependiendo del tipo de actividad que se desarrollará en la parcela en cuestión. El coeficiente varía de 0 a 1 y se aplica sobre una variedad de actividades. A modo de ejemplo, el coeficiente correspondiente a viviendas económicas o de interés social es 0, lo que significa que los emprendedores de este tipo de viviendas nopagan compensación alguna por los derechos de edificación adicionales. De manera similar, las instituciones sin fines de lucro, tales como hospitales, escuelas, clínicas de salud y maternoinfantiles, centros culturales, instituciones deportivas y recreativas y centros religiosos, poseen un coeficiente 0.
Los mencionados factores actúan a modo de incentivos para lograr los resultados sociales deseados, ya que cuanto menor sea el coeficiente correspondiente al factor de planificación e interés social aplicable a un área determinada, menor será el cargo que se abonará, y mayor será el incentivo para llevar a cabo proyectos de desarrollo en dicha área.
Los efectos en los ingresos y la asignación de fondos
Los ingresos totales provenientes de los pagos de la OODC alcanzaron los R$650 millones (US$325 millones) en aproximadamente cinco años, a pesar de la crisis económica mundial que restringió el crédito hacia finales del período (ver tabla 2). Dichos fondos se depositan en el Fondo de Desarrollo Urbano (FUNDURB), creado con el fin de llevar a cabo planes y proyectos en áreas urbanas y de protección ambiental, u otros tipos de intervenciones contempladas en el Plan Estratégico de 2002.
Para septiembre de 2008, los proyectos aprobados para ser financiados por el FUNDURB fueron 15 parques lineales (R$42,5 millones), mejoras en las aceras y calles (R$21,2 millones), drenajes y obras sanitarias (R$108 millones), instalaciones comunitarias (R$21,1 millones), regularización de asentamientos informales (R$50 millones) y restauración de edificios del patrimonio cultural (R$37 millones).
Comentarios finales
Después de que la ciudad de São Paulo aprobó el Plan Estratégico de Ordenamiento Territorial de 2002, el principio de concesiones de desarrollo y terrenos edificables se aplicó en todo el territorio de la ciudad. Cuando un proyecto inmobiliario excede el CE básico y el emprendedor desea edificar hasta un máximo de 4, deberá abonar al gobierno ciertas compensaciones económicas. Desde que se introdujo la OODC, los ingresos han aumentado todos los años. Debe tenerse en cuenta que dichos ingresos son netos de los más de mil millones de dólares generados por 2 de los 13 proyectos urbanos de la ciudad (Faria Lima y Agua Espraiada) donde están ocurriendo los mayores cambios en cuanto a zonificación y densidad (Biderman, Sandroni y Smolka 2006). En dichas áreas, los nuevos derechos de edificación obtienen su precio a través de la subasta de Certificados de Potencial Adicional de Construcción (CEPAC), y los ingresos deben invertirse en el área correspondiente al proyecto urbano, en lugar de colocarse en el FUNDURB para el beneficio de toda la ciudad (Sandroni 2010).
El cargo correspondiente a derechos de edificación en São Paulo parece no haber afectado el rendimiento económico de los emprendedores. Por el contrario, el aumento del CE máximo hasta 4 en algunas áreas de la ciudad contribuyó a mejorar las tasas de rendimiento de los emprendedores. Sin embargo, el establecimiento de una reserva máxima para derechos de edificación parece haber generado una tendencia de aumentos en los precios de los terrenos, en particular en aquellos distritos en los que la oferta de superficies edificables es baja. En algunos distritos, los emprendedores agotaron rápidamente la oferta de derechos de edificación residencial. Este tipo de respuesta tal vez se intensifique en el futuro, lo que dará como resultado que el gobierno municipal se vea presionado para aumentar la oferta máxima de superficies edificables y/o el CE máximo. De ser así, existe el riesgo de que la motivación para aumentar los ingresos municipales tal vez llegue a tener más peso que los criterios de planificación urbana y las limitaciones de la infraestructura, en particular el transporte público y el tránsito masivo.
Por otro lado, el flujo de compensación económica no será continuo. A diferencia de los ingresos derivados de impuestos inmobiliarios, que se repiten en forma anual, los ingresos generados por la venta de derechos de edificación irán desapareciendo con el tiempo a medida que se agote el potencial de edificación adicional. En algunos sectores de la ciudad, la oferta de superficies edificables ya se encuentra agotada y la ciudad ya ha llegado al límite de densidad de edificación definido en la normativa. No obstante, las modificaciones que se realicen en un futuro al Plan Estratégico tal vez establezcan un mayor potencial de edificación para dichas áreas, dependiendo de las recomendaciones técnicas y las condiciones políticas para que ocurran dichos cambios.
En resumen, la aplicación del principio de la función social de la propiedad, incluido en el Plan Estratégico de Ordenamiento Territorial de 2002 de la ciudad de São Paulo, permitió la promulgación de una legislación municipal que separa claramente el derecho a la propiedad del derecho a edificar.
Como resultado, ya no se sostiene la noción tradicional de los derechos de propiedad globales, por lo que el hecho de poseer la propiedad de un terreno no puede invalidar el interés público ni estar por encima de la función social de la propiedad. En consecuencia, los derechos de edificación existents pueden reducirse sin que los propietarios tengan el derecho a recibir una compensación económica por el simple hecho de que se han frustrado sus sueños.
Sobre el Autor
Paulo Henrique Sandroni es economista y fue director de planificación urbana y transporte público de la ciudad de São Paulo desde 1988 hasta 1993 y, por un breve período, fue viceministro de administración del gobierno federal. Ha publicado artículos y libros sobre economía, entre los que se cuenta un diccionario considerado como referencia principal en temas de economía en Brasil. Sandroni es, además, profesor de la Facultad de Economía y Negocios en la Fundación Getulio Vargas de São Paulo, consultor independiente en temas de desarrollo urbano y transporte y conferencista en programas patrocinados por el Instituto Lincoln.
Referencias
Biderman, Ciro, Paulo Sandroni y Martim O. Smolka. 2006. “Large-scale urban interventions: The case of Faria Lima in São Paulo”. En
Ayuntamiento Municipal de São Paulo, Secretaría de Finanzas. www.prefeitura.sp.gov.br/cidade/secretarias/financas.
Sandroni, Paulo. 2010. “A new financial instrument of value capture in São Paulo: Certificates of additional construction potential”. En Municipal revenues and land policies, Gregory K. Ingram y Yu-Hung Hong, editores, 218–236. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
SECOVI. 2010. Estoque de Outorga Onerosa Residencial. Septiembre. www.geosecovi.com.br.
Antonio Azuela, fellow del Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, posee títulos de grado en Derecho de la Universidad Iberoamericana (México) y de la Universidad de Warwick (Inglaterra), así como también un doctorado en Sociología por la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM). Desde finales de la década de 1970, Azuela se ha dedicado a la investigación y la enseñanza del derecho urbano y medioambiental desde una perspectiva sociolegal. Su libro “Visionarios y pragmáticos: Una aproximación sociológica al derecho ambiental”, México: UNAM, 2006, es una reconstrucción sociológica de sus experiencias como procurador general en la Procuraduría Federal de Protección al Ambiente (PROFEPA) de México desde 1994 hasta 2000. Recientemente editó el libro “Expropiación y conflicto social en cinco metrópolis latinoamericanas”, publicado por la UNAM y el Lincoln Institute of Land Policy en 2013.
Land Lines: ¿Cómo se involucró usted con el Lincoln Institute of Land Policy?
Antonio Azuela: En 1991, conocí a varios funcionarios del Instituto mientras realizaban un viaje de exploración por México. Mantuve el contacto con ellos porque me interesaba el enfoque del Instituto respecto de la política urbana. Mi relación con el Instituto se afianzó en el año 1998 en una reunión que tuvo lugar en El Cairo, organizada por el Grupo Internacional de Investigaciones sobre Derecho y Espacio Urbano (IRGLUS), en la que el Instituto expresó su interés en un enfoque sociolegal de los problemas del suelo urbano. En el año 2000, tuve el honor de que me invitaran a formar parte del directorio del Instituto. Desde entonces, he mantenido un contacto permanente con el equipo y los programas del Instituto Lincoln.
Land Lines: ¿Por qué la adquisición pública de suelo se ha convertido en un problema tan crítico, en especial en América Latina?
Antonio Azuela: La expropiación (es decir, la adquisición obligatoria de suelo por parte del Estado) es un tema muy importante en todo el mundo, ya que es una manera de obtener terrenos para proyectos urbanos públicos. Sin embargo, en América Latina este problema es aún más crítico, debido a la naturaleza débil del Estado en cuanto a los asuntos urbanos. Antes de la transición democrática que experimentó la región, los gobiernos obtenían terrenos fácilmente mediante el uso de mecanismos que se considerarían cuestionables en una democracia. Pero la transición fortaleció al poder judicial, que, por lo general, no es proclive a las intervenciones del gobierno en el mercado. Hoy en día, los propietarios privados tienen cada vez más posibilidades de interferir en la adquisición pública de suelos en la región (con la notable excepción de Colombia, donde una amplia coalición de diferentes profesionales, jueces y organizaciones sociales apoya la doctrina de la función social de la propiedad). Esta tendencia puede observarse, por ejemplo, en la compensación exorbitante que algunos tribunales han otorgado en casos de expropiación de suelo en la ciudad de México y en São Paulo.
Land Lines: ¿Cuáles son los principales puntos en conflicto?
Antonio Azuela: El primero es la adopción de políticas económicas que defienden un rol menor del Estado. El segundo tiene que ver con la condición legal de los derechos de propiedad. Cuando las reformas constitucionales permiten a los jueces limitar la facultad de expropiación, dicha restricción no es necesariamente mala, ya que puede dar como resultado una administración pública de mayor calidad, aunque, a corto plazo, ha interferido en la facultad del gobierno de adquirir terrenos urbanos para proyectos públicos. Existen dos excepciones notables: en Brasil y en Colombia, las reformas constitucionales han establecido políticas urbanas inspiradas en ideas de justicia social, aunque solamente en Colombia existe una nueva generación de jueces que actúan conforme a estos principios. En Brasil, los tribunales se encuentran dominados por la visión liberal clásica de la propiedad privada, lo cual interfiere en la capacidad de implementar la función social de la propiedad, una idea que ha circulado por América Latina durante casi un siglo.
Land Lines: Muchas jurisdicciones prefieren adquirir terrenos en el mercado abierto en lugar de utilizar instrumentos tales como la expropiación.
Antonio Azuela: La expropiación no debería ser la primera opción para adquirir terrenos. El desafío es que el gobierno pueda regular diferentes clases de instrumentos con el fin de lograr un objetivo general: reducir el componente del suelo en el costo total del desarrollo urbano. La utilización de la expropiación debe estar garantizada por un marco legal sólido que establezca un equilibrio adecuado entre el poder del Estado y el poder de los propietarios, y debería representar la última alternativa a la hora de adquirir terrenos para proyectos urbanos públicos.
El gran problema es el costo del suelo, pero los mecanismos de intervención del gobierno pueden inflar los precios. Por ejemplo, si no se espera que el uso de la expropiación aumente el valor del suelo y los jueces determinan que la expropiación es el enfoque adecuado, entonces este instrumento puede tener un impacto positivo en los mercados inmobiliarios. Al menos, podemos esperar que la adquisición de terrenos por parte del gobierno no genere un aumento de precios.
Land Lines: ¿Cuáles son los principales resultados de su investigación en torno a la utilización de la expropiación para el desarrollo urbano en la región?
Antonio Azuela: Aunque existe una tendencia general de fortalecer los derechos de propiedad, que interfiere en la facultad de expropiación, se observan diferentes variaciones en dicha tendencia dependiendo de la relación entre el poder judicial y el poder ejecutivo en los gobiernos post autoritarios de la región. El proceso de cambio institucional depende menos de las tendencias mundiales que de las fuerzas nacionales o incluso locales, ya que puede observarse que ciertas ciudades siguen caminos diferentes a otras ciudades de un mismo país. Aun cuando los gobiernos municipales adoptaran la misma estrategia, los tribunales de una región protegerán a los propietarios en mayor medida que los tribunales de otras regiones. El área metropolitana de Buenos Aires, por ejemplo, ilustra de qué manera el sistema institucional de la expropiación no es homogéneo, aun dentro de la misma área metropolitana. Así, en la Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires, las personas que viven en asentamientos informales (denominados “villas miseria”) han recurrido a los tribunales y han impedido el desalojo. Sin embargo, en la provincia de Buenos Aires, el clima político es tal que no existe amenaza de desalojo: la expropiación se utiliza con el fin de garantizar a las personas la permanencia en el lugar donde se han asentado.
Otra lección importante que podemos extraer es que, en América Latina, no existe un diálogo auténtico acerca de la importancia de la expropiación o de las diferentes maneras en que los tribunales han abordado los dilemas que la expropiación presenta. Aunque el pensamiento constitucional de la región es muy rico en ideas sobre ciertos problemas legales, tales como los derechos de los aborígenes y de los ancianos, las políticas urbanas (en particular, la expropiación) no han generado debates profundos entre los juristas. Lamentablemente, estos problemas parecen ser considerados como excepciones, a pesar de la enorme cantidad de personas que vive, ya sea sufriendo o disfrutando, en los grandes centros urbanos.
Land Lines: ¿Las compensaciones por expropiación son arbitrarias o injustas? De ser así, ¿para quién?
Antonio Azuela: La compensación inadecuada es, sin duda alguna, uno de los mayores desafíos para el futuro desarrollo de la expropiación como instrumento de política de suelo. En algunos casos, los gobiernos pueden aprovecharse de la impotencia de ciertos grupos sociales y ofrecerles una compensación ridículamente baja por sus tierras o casas. En otros casos, el poder económico y la influencia de ciertos propietarios pueden generar compensaciones exorbitantes. Pero más allá de estos dos casos extremos, en los que el propietario afectado es o muy vulnerable o muy poderoso, resulta difícil discernir una tendencia dominante.
Una respuesta más precisa a su pregunta requeriría un estudio de mercado sobre una gran cantidad de casos de expropiación a fin de determinar si la compensación es alta o baja al compararla con criterios preestablecidos. No obstante, según las investigaciones existentes, los tribunales generalmente no poseen criterios claros o ampliamente compartidos para determinar si las compensaciones son justas. Además, los tribunales carecen de la capacidad de comprender lo que está en juego en un proceso de transformación urbana en el que se utiliza la expropiación. Consideremos, por ejemplo, el caso de una familia prominente de Ecuador que recibió una compensación muy alta por la expropiación de suelo de cultivo que poseía en la periferia de Quito. Lo notable aquí fue que el organismo que falló en este caso fue el Tribunal Interamericano de Derechos Humanos, y resulta evidente que este tribunal no estableció criterios claros para determinar la suma de la compensación, sino que simplemente realizó un promedio de las valuaciones presentadas por cada una de las partes. La compensación zen este caso fue la más alta que haya otorgado este tribunal superior, que fue creado con el fin de atender las violaciones a los derechos humanos cometidas por dictadores, aunque terminó beneficiando a los propietarios privados a expensas del interés público. El hecho de que este caso no haya generado un escándalo entre los constitucionalistas de la región indica el grado de marginalización que presentan los problemas legales urbanos en América Latina.
Land Lines: ¿Cuáles son las tendencias que usted ha observado que están cambiando?
Antonio Azuela: Observo con cierto optimismo que muchos tribunales y gobiernos municipales de la región están atravesando un proceso de aprendizaje e intentando no repetir los errores judiciales del pasado. Lamentablemente, estas lecciones raramente trascienden el área local afectada para incorporarse al saber jurídico regional común.
Land Lines: ¿Qué tipo de educación o capacitación recomendaría usted?
Antonio Azuela: Lógicamente, debemos intensificar el intercambio entre las diferentes disciplinas y países y colocar a los tribunales en el centro del debate, ya que estos son los que tomarán las decisiones finales. Sus fallos deberían expresar la mejor síntesis posible de un acervo de conocimientos que debemos construir en torno a la dinámica urbana de la región. En los contactos que hemos tenido con diferentes tribunales, con el apoyo del Instituto Lincoln, descubrimos que, una vez establecido el diálogo, los jueces ven la necesidad de aprender más a fin de comprender los efectos de sus decisiones. En otras palabras, aunque los tribunales parecen no mostrar un gran interés en los problemas urbanos, tal como se demuestra en la actitud rutinaria de sus decisiones diarias, pueden igualmente entrever nuevas perspectivas para su propio desarrollo profesional dentro del contexto de un análisis crítico de problemas urbanos.
Land Lines: ¿Cuáles son los problemas críticos que deben analizarse en mayor profundidad? ¿Qué es lo que aún no sabemos?
Antonio Azuela: Deberíamos intentar comprender la lógica de las decisiones emanadas de los tribunales de la región. Con frecuencia interpretamos de manera simplista las medidas tomadas por los tribunales, ya que los medios de comunicación tienden a amplificar los peores casos. No obstante, muchos jueces se esfuerzan por encontrar la mejor solución posible para cada caso. ¿Y en qué condiciones realizan su labor? Uno de los desafíos que conlleva investigar estos problemas en América Latina es el de comprender el mundo real en el que se toman dichas decisiones, además de los temas de la corrupción y la incompetencia, tan comunes pero siempre relevantes. Debemos analizar los datos estadísticos con el fin de obtener tendencias generales, junto con la aplicación de un enfoque etnográfico sobre el funcionamiento de los tribunales. Sólo entonces seremos capaces de entender qué es lo que debe reformarse para mejorar el rendimiento de los tribunales en los conflictos urbanos. Aunque es muy importante determinar quién resulta favorecido por las decisiones de los tribunales (lo que puede lograrse analizando el contenido de los fallos judiciales), necesitamos comprender mejor las condiciones en las cuales se toman dichas decisiones. Y para ello, debemos acercarnos mucho más a los tribunales.
When people think of growing food in the United States, the images that come to mind are vast stretches of vegetable and fruit tree farms in California’s Central Valley, golden fields of wheat in the Plains states, and cows grazing on verdant rural landscapes in the Midwest and New England. Rarely is the image one of farming inside American cities. Yet, in an increasing number of cities today—especially those substantially affected by structural economic change and population loss over the past several decades—community-based organizations are growing food for the market on vacant lots, in greenhouses, and even in abandoned warehouses. Some of these groups market their products at local farmers markets, roadside stands, restaurants and supermarkets. Others convert their harvests into value-added products like salad dressings, jams and salsas for sale in regional markets.
A Conceptual Three-Legged Stool
Our recently completed study, supported by the Lincoln Institute, explored the characteristics of entrepreneurial urban agriculture in the U.S., key obstacles to its practice, and ways of overcoming these obstacles. The study framework can be visualized as a wobbly three-legged stool that needs to be made sturdier. One leg of the stool represents inner-city vacant land and the government agencies and their policies that affect its disposition and management. The scale of the vacant land problem in many American cities, particularly in the Midwest and Northeast, is significant. Philadelphia, for example, has an estimated 31,000 vacant lots and as many as 54,000 vacant structures that, if demolished, would add considerably to its vacant land supply. Detroit’s inventory of 46,000 city-owned vacant parcels is accompanied by an estimated 24,000 empty buildings. Even smaller cities are faced with a stockpile of vacant land. In Trenton, New Jersey, a city of 85,000 people, eighteen percent of the land is vacant. Despite the spread of gentrifying neighborhoods and new in-town developments in many cities, considerable amounts of vacant land, especially in disadvantaged neighborhoods, will likely continue to lie fallow because of limited market demand.
The second leg represents for-market urban agriculture, a movement of individuals and organizations who wish to produce food in cities for direct market sale. The initiators of these projects are a diverse group-community gardeners, community development corporations, social service providers, faith-based organizations, neighborhood organizations, high schools, animal husbandry organizations, coalitions for the homeless, farmers with a special interest in urban food production, and profit-making entrepreneurs. Proponents of for-market urban agriculture put forth a wide range of benefits, such as instilling pride and greater self-sufficiency among inner-city residents; using vacant lots in disadvantaged neighborhoods to nurture growth rather than to collect trash; supplying lower-income residents with healthier and more nutritious foods; providing local youth with jobs in producing, processing and marketing organically grown food; and reducing the amount of unproductive city-owned vacant land.
The third leg of the conceptual stool represents the institutional environment for urban agriculture within cities. Is it accommodating, neutral, skeptical or restrictive? The more that entrepreneurial urban agriculture is seen positively by local government officials, local foundations and the public, the greater the likelihood of a smoother future. But, when the institutional climate is indifferent or cool, then urban farming advocates will clearly encounter more difficulties. We found the overall climate for entrepreneurial urban agriculture to be mixed, with some supporters, many who seemed indifferent, some skeptics, and even a few who were decidedly hostile to the idea.
A Medley of Projects
Our study uncovered more than 70 for-market urban agriculture projects throughout the country. Four representative examples are summarized here.
Greensgrow Farms, Philadelphia
This small for-profit producer of hydroponically grown vegetables epitomizes the potential that agriculture offers as an urban land use. Greensgrow began in 1997, when two former chefs envisioned a practical way to meet the demand from Philadelphia restaurateurs for fresh, organically grown produce. Greensgrow occupies a three-quarter-acre site in North Philadelphia that has been cleaned of the contamination left from its former use as a galvanized steel plant. After a site lease was arranged through the New Kensington Community Development Corporation, the partners built an extensive hydroponic system to produce gourmet lettuces.
Greensgrow has since taken advantage of an EPA sustainable development grant and a donated greenhouse to grow and market lettuce, heritage tomatoes, herbs and cut flowers to 25 area restaurants after the outdoor growing season ends. The for-profit side of Greensgrow expects to break even in 2000 with revenues of $50,000. Its community-based side has hired three welfare-to-work participants and intends to develop a job training and entrepreneurial program in collaboration with the nearby Norris Square CDC.
Growing Power, Milwaukee
In some cities, farm sites may be part of a larger enterprise. For example, inner-city youth in Milwaukee are providing horticulture and landscaping services on a number of central city sites under the auspices of Growing Power, Inc., which is co-directed by an African-American farmer and a woman active in youth gardening and training. The organization aims to help inner-city youngsters attain life skills by cultivating and marketing organic produce, and to operate a community food center that can serve the broader community through education and innovative programming.
Growing Power’s nerve center, on a 1.7-acre site on Milwaukee’s north side, is a collection of five renovated greenhouses that were in dilapidated condition when purchased from the city in 1992. The center also features a farmstand, a vegetable garden and fruit trees, and an area where food waste from a local supermarket is being converted into compost. The greenhouses contain thousands of starter vegetable and flower plants, ten three-tank aquaculture systems (where tilapia, a freshwater fish, grow in inexpensive 55-gallon plastic barrels) and a vermiculture project consisting of wooden bins in which worm castings are collected by youngsters and sold back to Growing Power for use in its city gardens. Marketing some of its products to the public is also part of Growing Power’s mission.
The Food Project/DSNI Collaboration, Boston
The Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative, a well-known example of community organization and empowerment, considers urban agriculture essential to the transformation of its section of Roxbury into an urban village. Since 1993, this effort has been aided by DSNI’s collaboration with The Food Project, based in the Boston suburb of Lincoln. Like Growing Power, The Food Project aims to link youth development with the enhancement of urban food security. Its core activity is a summer program involving up to 60 high school students, some from the suburbs and some from Roxbury, in cultivating organic produce on a 21-acre farm in Lincoln and on two parcels within DSNI’s target area.
Collards, tomatoes and herbs now grow within sight of the new housing units developed by DSNI’s associated organizations. Much of the harvest is sold at a weekly farmers’ market in the nearby Dudley Town Common. The young farmers have become proficient at presenting their activities to Bostonians visiting the market and at youth gatherings nationwide. For the future, DSNI and The Food Project have identified other sites in Roxbury on which to expand urban food production. In addition, DSNI will convert a former garage in the neighborhood into a 10,000 square foot community greenhouse.
Village Farms, Buffalo
A corporate presence in urban agriculture is rare, but a notable exception is Village Farms in Buffalo. The goal of Village Farms’ parent corporation, AgroPower Development (APD), is simply to maximize profits, although it does provide jobs for central city residents. In its 18-acre greenhouse, the company uses a Dutch growing method whereby tomato plants are grown in porous, rock-wool blocks to produce up to eight million pounds of tomatoes a year, which are marketed primarily to area supermarkets.
A number of incentives lured Village Farms to a vacant 35-acre industrial site close to the downtown that sits in both a federal Enterprise Zone and a city economic development district. Although APD does not release sales figures, it is satisfied with the operation and hopes to replicate it in other cities. For its part, the city of Buffalo points to Village Farms as a success story-an innovative, nonpolluting business that is using vacated industrial land.
Overcoming Obstacles
The obstacles to urban agriculture can be formidable, but persistence, organizational capacity, political savvy, outside support, and some good fortune have demonstrated that they are not insurmountable.
Site-related Obstacles
Several critical problems in producing food inside cities are tied to attributes of the sites themselves. First, vacant urban parcels give visible and sometimes less-visible evidence of past use. While they may be cleared of debris and rubble, almost all sites have some subsurface contaminants that may affect the safety of any produce harvested. This obstacle can be overcome through several approaches that together have come to characterize urban agriculture practice. Planting crops in raised beds of clean, imported soil is the most straightforward approach, and is less costly than the more involved practice of amending existing urban “soil” with truckloads of compost and humus. Soil-free hydroponic practices avoid the contamination issue, as in the elaborate Greensgrow system that sits four feet above cracked concrete, and give urban agriculture the cutting-edge feel displayed at Village Farms.
A second, more challenging site-related obstacle is lack of tenure, since the majority of urban agriculture activities are on sites owned by private landowners or public agencies who view urban food production as a temporary use. This is a common concern for community gardeners, and has carried over into entrepreneurial city farming endeavors. One solution is represented by the growing number of open space land trusts that acquire title to properties on which urban farming is already being practiced.
The logic of the urban land market results in a third site-related obstacle-the view that the value of a vacant parcel is primarily economic and that urban agriculture produces low revenues compared to other forms of land development. One way to overcome this perception is to emphasize that most urban agriculture activities are initiated by non-profit organizations for the community good. Thus, city farming should be seen by the public as a combination of earned revenue (in the case of market operations) and less quantifiable social benefits that are equally if not more important to the larger community interest.
Perceptual Obstacles
The greatest overall obstacle to urban agriculture is skepticism among those who, in different ways, can support and influence its initiation and practice-local government, private landowners, financial supporters and community residents. Their skepticism is based on either a simple lack of awareness or the conventional means of valuing urban land based on market factors. Another group of concerns reflects doubts about the wisdom of growing food in cities because of site contamination, security and vandalism, or the “highest and best land use” argument. A related perception is simply that agriculture is a rural activity that does not belong in the city.
A key to effectively overcoming these perceptions is to understand that the future of city farming depends on the level of acceptance and support it can garner from institutions such as local and state governments, the federal government, local philanthropic foundations, CDCs, the media and neighborhood organizations. Time after time, the city farming advocates we interviewed stressed the importance of “packaging” their activities to decision makers and the public so that the multiple benefits could be seen and valued clearly.
Conclusion
Both vision and reality informed this study. The vision foresees a scenario where vacant land in parts of American cities would be transformed into bountiful food-producing areas managed by energetic community organizations that market some or all of the food they grow for the benefit of community residents. Proponents of such a vision would clearly like to see urban farming’s small footprint enlarged in cities with increased supplies of vacant land. The reality, however, is more sobering. Many for-market urban agriculture projects are underfunded, understaffed, and confronted with difficult management and marketing issues. Nor is urban agriculture on the radar screens of many city government officials as a viable use of vacant inner-city land.
Yet, signs of a more hopeful reality are apparent. A diverse array of innovative for-market city farming ventures are making their presence known, and pockets of support for city farming are found among local and higher-level government officials, community organizations, city residents and local foundations in several cities. Some entrepreneurial urban agriculture projects are beginning to show small profits, while many more are providing an array of social, aesthetic, health and community-building benefits. The legs of the nascent movement of for-market city farming are gradually becoming sturdier.
Reference
Kaufman, Jerry and Martin Bailkey. 2000. “Farming Inside Cities: Entrepreneurial Urban Agriculture in the United States.” Lincoln Institute Working Paper.
Jerry Kaufman, AICP, is a professor in the Department of Urban and Regional Planning at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He teaches and does research on older American cities and community food system planning. Martin Bailkey, a senior lecturer in the Department of Landscape Architecture at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, is conducting research on how community organizations gain access to vacant land in U.S. cities.
Conservation easements have become an important new tool for protecting environmentally significant open space. In the past, permanent restrictions against development often required outright purchase of the property by a governmental entity, land trust or other conservation organization. If the land remained in private ownership there was no assurance that a future heir or purchaser might not undertake construction on the site or sell it for development.
Conservation easements, which may be donated by landowners or purchased by conservation organizations or governmental agencies, provide permanent protection against development, but allow land to remain in private hands. This combination of open space protection and private ownership is a significant innovation that can address the conservation, planning and fiscal goals of landowners, conservation organizations and communities simultaneously.
Often those with the strongest appreciation for open space and commitment to its preservation are the families who have preserved their own land for generations and have no interest in selling it to a local government or environmental organization. Such organizations, in turn, rarely have the funds necessary for the outright purchase of all the land they seek to protect, and may not have the resources even to maintain land received by gift. Finally, ownership by governmental entities or charitable organizations generally results in an outright exemption of the land from property taxation. Continued private ownership coupled with a transfer of development rights leaves at least some portion of the property value on the tax rolls, thus benefiting the community at large.
What portion of the unrestricted land value remains taxable is a contentious and in many instances unanswered question, however. Some states that have adopted legislation permitting the establishment of conservation easements have determined that assessment of the land for property tax purposes must take this diminished development potential into account. Idaho statutes on the other hand assert that imposition of a conservation easement is not to affect property tax value. Many state laws are silent on the point, as is the Uniform Conservation Easements Act, a model law that serves as the pattern for a number of state enactments.
In many cases valuation of conservation land with restrictions is essential not only for property tax purposes but for calculation of a federal income tax deduction as well. Stephen Small is a Boston attorney who drafted the U.S. Treasury regulations on treatment of conservation easements as charitable donations of development rights. At a Lincoln Institute conference in Phoenix, Arizona, in February, he explained the detailed requirements that owners must meet in claiming this deduction.
Small also described the conservation implications of the demographic distribution of land ownership in this country. A large amount of property is now held by an older generation that has experienced enormous appreciation in the value of this asset. Estate tax planning will be crucial to the future use of this land. Small explained that in many cases conservation easements could reduce or eliminate pressure to sell family land for development in order to meet estate tax obligations.
The Phoenix conference brought together more than 120 specialists in land use, property taxation, appraisal and environmental issues to discuss valuation and legal aspects of conservation easements. Cosponsored with the Arizona chapter of the Nature Conservancy and the Sonoran Institute, this meeting was one in a series of similar conferences held by the Lincoln Institute over the past five years. The Institute welcomes inquiries from potential participants and cosponsors of future courses on this topic.
Joan Youngman is a senior fellow of the Lincoln Institute and director of the program on the taxation of land and buildings.
In preparation for the 2003–2004 academic year, the Lincoln Institute has made some changes in its departmental structure. We established the Department of International Studies to integrate the Institute’s international research and educational programs that address key land and tax policy issues identified by the existing departments of Valuation and Taxation and Planning and Development. This new department’s work includes the well-established Program on Latin America and the Caribbean and a new Program on the People’s Republic of China, as well as ongoing programs in Taiwan, Central and Eastern Europe and other areas of the world.
Cities in developing nations, and in Latin America in particular, vividly illustrate the contemporary relevance of Henry George’s concerns about progress engendering poverty through constraints on access to land ownership and persistent informality in land markets. The ten-year retrospective article on the Latin America Program (see page 8) provides an overview of the changing context of land and tax policy in the region and a review of the Institute’s current programs.
The new Program on the People’s Republic of China addresses the fundamental problems of land allocation, land taxation and the development of land markets in one of the world’s fastest growing economies. The Institute has an agreement with the Ministry of Land and Resources in Beijing to collaborate on researching and teaching land and tax policy (see Land Lines April 2003). Other partners in this initiative are the National Center for Smart Growth and the Institute for Global Chinese Affairs at the University of Maryland; the Development Research Center of the State Council; the China Development Institute in Shenzhen; and several university and local government departments.
China initiated fundamental and revolutionary land use reforms during the mid-1980s, addressing privately held land use rights, land banking, land trusts, land readjustments, and development of land markets in both urban and rural areas. The Institute will contribute to the implementation of these reform measures by sponsoring educational and training programs for Chinese public officials and practitioners and by supporting research and publications by both international and Chinese scholars. Institute faculty with expertise in urban and regional planning, real estate development, land economics and property taxation will introduce curriculum materials designed for China that build on our work in Latin America and other regions of the world.
The Institute is also continuing its long-term educational and research programs in collaboration with the International Center for Land Policy Studies and Training in Taiwan, including the annual cosponsored course on “Infrastructure Planning and Urban Development” for public officials from developing countries. Institute faculty associated with the Department of Valuation and Taxation are involved with officials from the public and private sectors in Central and Eastern European countries as they develop and implement land and tax reforms
I believe this new department will help us operate more efficiently abroad and better integrate our international experiences in all areas.
The Lincoln Institute’s China Program was established several years ago, in part to develop training programs on property taxation policy and local government finance with officials from the State Administration of Taxation (SAT). The Institute and SAT held a joint forum on international property taxation in Shenzhen in December 2003, and more than 100 participants attended another course held in China in May 2004. In January 2005, 24 Chinese tax officials from 15 provinces visited the United States for additional programs; many of them are developing property tax systems in six pilot cities. The Institute also supports the Development Research Center (DRC) of the State Council to research property tax assessment in China, and they jointly organized a forum in February 2005.
Economic growth and institutional reforms in China over the past two decades have created profound changes within the society. The central authorities now need to set forth new policies and procedures for modern governance to address devolution of certain authority to local governments, rapid urban and rural development, and changes in land uses and land and fiscal policies. The national government’s commitment to further modernization is most evident in the effort to develop and implement a new property taxation system.
This article describes the current system and discusses issues and challenges that must be overcome to implement a successful property tax policy in China. Given the complexity of this endeavor and the huge variation in economic development across the country, a gradualist approach, which has proved effective in China’s modernization process, may be the best way to initiate property tax reform and development.
Current Taxation System
China collects 24 types of taxes. The central and local governments share the value added tax (VAT) and business tax revenues; the former tax is the primary revenue source for the central government, whereas the latter is the most important tax for local governments. Two other important tax sources for the central government are the consumption (excise) tax and the personal income tax. Twelve taxes are related to land and property, but most do not generate significant revenues. The business tax accounted for 14.41 percent of total central and local government revenues in 2002, but only a small portion of that amount was generated from property-related sources. The reason is that business and income taxes are collected only when land or property is rented or sold, and thus do not provide a steady stream of revenue. It is hard to imagine that any of the 12 property-related taxes could play a key role in resource allocation and local government finance over the long term.
An evaluation of the current tax system reveals additional concerns.
The shortcomings in the current taxation system have resulted in major fiscal problems for the central government, such as declining revenue mobilization and ineffective use of tax policy to leverage macroeconomic policy (Bahl 1997). When the government conducted tax reform in 1993 to overcome some of the problems, one of the largest initiatives shifted responsibility for urban and public services to local governments.
This measure was successful in improving the central government’s fiscal condition; however, the revenue share for local governments was not increased at a level commensurate with their increased responsibility. Consequently, many local governments face increasing budgetary deficits. Figure 1 illustrates the financial deficit for local governments after the 1993 tax reform. More than one-third of county-level governments have serious budget problems and over half of the local governments directly below the provincial level have budgets that merely cover the basic operations of public entities.
Public Land Leasing
One of the means by which local governments increase revenues in the absence of an effective taxation system is through public land leasing. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the state introduced market principles into the decision-making process regarding land use and allocation by separating land use rights from ownership. This separation promotes the development of land markets, which in turn have created tremendous impacts on real estate and housing development, urban land use and land allocation. Except for a short yet dramatic drop in the early 1990s due to a macroeconomic policy designed to prevent the national economy from overheating, the prices for access to land use rights and public land leasing rates have been increasing steadily.
Despite the significant number of land leasing transactions, the government closely regulates and controls the amount of land being leased by maintaining a monopoly on land supply (Ding 2003). Most land in rural areas still belongs to the collectives, and urban construction is prohibited on rural land unless it is first acquired by the state. Land developments that occur on collectively owned rural land are considered illegal, and administrative efforts such as monitoring and inspecting have been implemented to eliminate these violations.
General land use plans and regulations to preserve cultivated land further control the amount of land available for urban development. The land use plans determine the total amount of land that can be added to existing urbanized areas through an annual land supply quota. At the same time, China’s preservation policy for cultivated land influences both land supply and the location of land available for urban development. The Land Administration Law specifies that at least 80 percent of cultivated land should be designated as basic farmland and prohibited from land development. Land productivity is the dominant factor used to delineate the boundaries of basic farmland. Since most cities are located in areas with rich soil resources, farmland protection designations commonly exist in urbanizing areas. Thus farmland protection inevitably results in urban sprawl and leapfrog development patterns requiring costly infrastructure investments and land consumption.
Financing Local Government. As a result of the government’s regulations and monopoly on selling land use rights, local authorities use the public land leasing system to increase their revenues through land use conveyance fees. For instance, Hangzhou City, the capital of Zhejiang Province with a population of almost four million, is among the top five in per capita national income and GDP. The city generated land conveyance fees of more than six billion YMB in 2002, more than 20 percent of the total municipal government revenues.
Interestingly, these fees were generated largely from selling to commercial users the right to access the state-owned land, yet commercial land development represented only 15 percent of total land uses in newly developed areas. The rest of the land was allocated to users through negotiation in which the sale price either barely covered the costs of acquiring and improving the land, or land was offered free to generate competition for businesses and investments.
Local governments can raise enormous revenues from limited-market transactions of land use rights, in part because land conveyance fees represent lump-sum, up-front land rent payments for a leasing period and in part because local governments exercise their strong administrative powers to require farmers to sell their land at below-market rates. When the government later resells the land at market rates, the price could be more than 100 times the purchase price. After considering the costs of land improvement, however, net revenues may be only ten times the total cost of the land.
Rising land prices resulting from the government monopoly allow local governments to use the land as collateral to borrow money from banks. These loans plus the revenue generated from conveyance fees accounted for 40 to 50 percent of the Hangzhou municipal government budget in 2002. In turn these revenues were used to fund more than two-thirds of the city’s investments in infrastructure and urban services.
Hangzhou City specializes in textiles, tourism, construction and transportation, and generates substantial revenue from business and value-added taxes, although the city’s share of income generated through the public land leasing system is also large. Many smaller cities and towns with fewer commercial and business resources use land leasing directly through land conveyance fees or indirectly as collateral to support up to 80 or 85 percent of their total investments in urban initiatives. These smaller cities must turn to land to generate revenues to fuel economic growth, launch urban renewal projects, and provide infrastructure and urban services that were neglected for a long time prior to the reform era. Land-generated revenue is also used to improve the overall financial environment, attract businesses and investments, and support the reform and reallocation of state-owned enterprises.
Negative Consequences. Despite the importance of public land leasing for income generation, the practice of using this tool to finance local governments may have serious consequences in the long run. The fiscal incentives that compel local governments to control and monopolize the land markets will negatively impact real estate and housing development, industrialization and land use. Furthermore, land is a fixed resource and ultimately there will be no more land left to lease for revenue.
Increasing pressure to protect the rights of farmers also makes it more difficult and costly to acquire land from farmers. As a result, local governments must increase land prices or face reduced revenues from land leasing. Finally, not only does land scarcity and farmer compensation pose a challenge to income generation, but recent policy reform now permits land owned by a collective to enter the land market directly. This change will prevent local governments from acquiring collective lands and exacting conveyance fees for these transfers.
Taxation Reform: Principles and Challenges
The fiscal deficits experienced by local governments and the problems with the resulting public land leasing system provided the impetus for the central government to restructure the entire taxation system. That reform is based on four guiding principles: (1) simplify the tax system; (2) broaden the tax base; (3) lower tax rates; and (4) strictly administer tax collection and management. The central authorities in charge of tax policy and administration offer several specific goals with respect to property-related taxes.
Considerable debate exists over the merits of the proposed property-related tax reform. Despite the lack of consensus as to the best option, the costs and benefits must be assessed to effectively guide the development and implementation of a new property tax system. In addition, several outstanding issues need to be resolved in order to implement the proposed land and property tax reform.
The implementation of a value-based tax also will require the assembly and cataloguing of massive quantities of data, which historically have not been collected systematically. Furthermore, the data that have been collected are stored in different locations and in paper format. The Ministry of Land and Resources records and handles land-related data and information, whereas the Ministry of Construction is in charge of structure-related information. Matching related records from different ministries and digitizing this data will take years if not decades and will require a huge investment of resources.
The Chinese public has limited understanding of property taxation systems, so education will be required to avoid potentially significant political resistance. Capacity building within the Chinese government also will require professional training in appraisal, evaluation, appeals and collection to achieve effectiveness and efficiency in the new tax system.
Conclusions
Despite these unanswered issues and challenges, the Chinese government appears committed to implementing property taxation reform. The application of the widely used and successful gradualist approach for implementing policy and institutional reforms will ensure that the development and institutionalization of the property tax system proceeds on course. For example, data for industrial and commercial structures is more complete and of higher quality than data for residential structures. Furthermore, newer structures tend to have better records than older structures, and records are more complete for structures in urban areas than in rural areas. Thus, applying the property taxation system first to commercial and industrial structures, newly developed land with residential structures, and urban areas will allow the system to take hold before attempts are made to implement change in the areas with greater obstacles to overcome.
References
Bahl, Roy. 1997. Fiscal policy in China: Taxation and intergovernmental fiscal relations. Burlingame, CA: The 1990 Institute.
Development Research Center. 2005: Issues and challenges of China’s urban real estate administration and taxation. Report submitted to the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
Ding, Chengri. 2003. Land policy reform in China: Assessment and prospects. Land Use Policy 20(2): 109-120.
Liu, Z. 2004. Zhongguo Suizi Gailan. Beijing: Jinji Chuban She. (China’s taxation system. Beijing: Economic Science Publisher).
Lu, S. 2003. YanJiu ZhengDi WenTi TaoShuo GaiKe ZhiLu (II). Beijing: Zhongguo Dadi Chuban She. (Examination of land acquisition issues: Search for reforms (II). Beijing: China Land Publisher.)
Chengri Ding is associate professor in the Department of Urban Studies and Planning at the University of Maryland, in College Park. He specializes in urban economics, housing and land studies, GIS and spatial analysis. He is also special assistant to the president of the Lincoln Institute for the Program on the People’s Republic of China.
Report from the President on Property Rights