The introduction of property taxation in transitional economies offers a unique perspective from which to study fiscal and governmental decentralization, land privatization and market development. These reforms all involve fundamental changes from the centrally controlled and planned societies of the communist period. The Lincoln Institute has a particular interest in the experiences of countries that are adopting property taxation and is underwriting a series of case studies in consultation with research associates in Armenia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, Russia and the Slovak Republic.
These studies demonstrate similarities in the challenges and problems faced by countries in transition and the extraordinary changes that have taken place in less than a decade since the fall of communism. At the same time, each country has followed a somewhat different path, adopting strategies that reflect its unique set of past traditions and current circumstances.
Decentralization and Privatization
Among the challenges facing these countries after nearly 50 years of communist rule are the decentralization of fiscal and political control and the reduction of the role of government in favor of private-sector ownership and activity. Privatization of land ownership has been a particularly sensitive issue. Taxes on real property have been introduced as part of a strategy to provide a revenue source to local governments, to encourage privatization of government-owned real estate assets, and to improve land utilization. Although in most cases the central governments continue to play a dominant role, a degree of local fiscal authority and autonomy has been introduced. Poland and Estonia have assigned these taxes to local self-governments, with authority to determine tax rates within limits established by their national parliaments.
In the other countries, national law sets the rate of taxation, but some local control is achieved by adjusting the coefficients applied to area measures that establish the tax base. The revenues raised from land and building taxes are still a relatively modest source of local revenue, and generally benefit rural communities more than urban areas. Although property taxes raise a minor portion of these countries’ total taxes at present, central governments envision a larger role for them in improving inter-governmental finance systems.
Privatization of state assets and ownership rights to real property is an essential yet complicated process that is still underway in each of the countries studied. In Estonia, for example, the desire to restitute land to pre-Soviet-period owners or their heirs initially complicated the determination of property rights. The adoption of a land tax in 1993, within two years of independence, was an essential element of Estonia’s land reform program, which also included privatization and market development. Limiting the tax base to land alone was intended to encourage its productive use, stimulating owners of restitution rights “to develop the property or sell it.”
In the former Soviet satellites, considerable private ownership remained under communism, but the formal cadastral systems were not maintained and the recording of property rights is still far from complete. During the Soviet period, land was treated separately from buildings, and this practice has continued in some countries, making real estate units more difficult to assemble for investment purposes. Property (buildings and structures) is treated separately from land for taxation purposes in Armenia, the Czech and Slovak Republics, and Russia.
While housing and business privatization has progressed to a degree in all countries, the release of land to private ownership and especially to ownership by foreigners has been a contentious issue. In Russia, although the Constitution and Civil Code provide for private property, the government and the Duma have failed to agree on a Land Code to provide a legal basis for land ownership. Most countries have placed some restrictions on foreign ownership, but permit long-term leases. Land taxation offers a potentially broad and expanding revenue base as privatization continues.
Market-based Reforms
In the absence of secure property rights and developed property markets, most countries have taken an incremental approach to incorporating market-based elements into their property tax bases. With the exception of Estonia, the countries in this study levy taxes on the basis of land or building area, adjusted by coefficients related to location, population, usage or other factors not derived directly from market indicators. As a logical step in their transitional reforms, Armenia and the Czech Republic are each exploring the addition of ad valorem elements to their area-based property tax, and Poland is considering proposals to shift to a market-based system. Plans for an ad valorem tax in the Slovak Republic await further fiscal, governmental and market reforms.
Estonia’s strong ideological commitment to a market economy led its Parliament to take the bold step in 1992 to base its land tax on market value. The first valuation assigned price zones to each assessment area, with the expectation that the methodology could be refined as understanding of real estate markets improved and as the markets matured. The collection of land tax information has strengthened real estate market activity and has been a catalyst for the development of land records, sales registries and cadastral maps. A revaluation in 1996 incorporated the expanded market databases.
Recent efforts to develop a pilot project for market value-based real property taxation in two Russian cities illustrate both the potential and the frustration of tax reform in the current Russian fiscal climate. The program began with funding from USAID in 1995, and federal legislation authorized the “experiment” in 1997. Before the current fiscal crises, the city of Novgorod anticipated implementation of the new tax in 1999 to replace the three existing non-value-based taxes on land, property of individuals and assets of enterprises. Whether the local officials will consider it possible to risk implementation under current conditions is now unclear.
Other Challenges
The reorganization of administrative functions and the cost of integrating and collecting property tax information are other challenges to the development of modern market-based property tax systems. Each country is struggling with structural reforms of Soviet-based administration and are seeking to improve inter-agency cooperation and efficiency in planning for property tax reforms.
The case studies illustrate the complex transitions that are underway in each of these countries. At the same time, the studies point out the important role that property taxation can play in providing a stable source of independent revenue to local governments, developing democratic and accountable public institutions, and maintaining a public claim on property entering the private market.
The potential benefits of market value-based taxation in stimulating real estate markets and promoting urban revitalization and efficient land use are just beginning to be recognized. The financial hardships still experienced by many people in these countries may keep property taxes at very modest levels for some time, making the design of a broad-based system with limited exemptions particularly important to the viability of property taxation in these new economies.
Note:
1. “Unlikely Icon,” Economist (February 28, 1998): 78.
Jane H. Malme is a fellow of the Lincoln Institute specializing in the development and implementation of property taxation in diverse international contexts.
She is coordinating the preparation of case studies with colleagues for the following transition countries:
Armenia: Richard R. Almy, consultant, Almy, Gloudemans, Jacobs & Denne, Chicago, Illinois, with Varduhi Abrahamian, International City/County Management Association, Yerevan, Armenia
Czech Republic: Gary Cornia and Phillip Bryson, Romney Institute of Public Management, Marriott School of Management, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah, with Dr. Alena Rohlícková, Ministry of Finance, Czech Republic
Estonia: Jane H. Malme with Tambet Tiits, director, AS Kinnisvaraekspert, Tallinn, Estonia
Poland: Jane H. Malme with W. Jan Brzeski, president, Cracow Real Estate Institute, Cracow, Poland
Russia: Jane H. Malme with Dr. Natalia Kalinina, Center for Real Estate Analysis, Moscow, Russia
Slovak Republic: Gary Cornia and Phillip Bryson with Ing. Sona Capová, Univerzita Mateja Bela, Banská Bystrica, and Milos Koncek, Ministry of Finance, Slovak Republic
Sources: These figures are based on official country data sources and were provided by the research associates. No data was available from Russia.
Land and housing markets, and any other market for that matter, can be approached as arenas in which persons exchange rights to assets subject to constitutional rules, statutory and common law rules, and administrative rules and procedures. The value of land is often believed to be determined by expectations about what land uses will be legally permitted over time and the return from such uses. However, there is substantial evidence, international as well as U.S.-based, that markets and prices are also shaped by expectations about what is legally prohibited yet is nonetheless achievable through extra-legal or illegal means.
Scholars since Jeremy Bentham have linked markets and their viability to a legal regime of property rights which clearly defines, safeguards and facilitates the transfer of such rights through legal means. How then do we explain illegal or extra-legal property transactions: the buying and selling of stolen goods; subdivision of single-family houses into one-room rentals; and squatter settlements.
In all these contexts, assets are being acquired and used, hence there is property. There are also markets, frequently thriving, to exchange such assets. What is absent from these markets are legally defined rights. Their absence, however, does not prevent these markets from emerging and affecting supply and demand in the legal market. It is crucial, therefore, that such markets be understood, not just as an exotic feature of the developing world, but as alternatives to which actors in the market turn under certain conditions.
What happens if property rights are not clear, are contested or are not well enforced? Policy advisors rarely address this question, not because they fail to see that property regimes are frequently lacking in stability and security, but rather because they see their function as one of putting in place the ideal set of laws, regulations, and administrative and enforcement mechanisms that would guarantee stable expectations, secure rights and efficient markets (see Figure 1).
The only problem is that putting in place such laws and regulations rarely happens in a vacuum. Rather, it happens in a landscape of existing interests, entitlements, conventions and practices. It is the interaction between these new interventions and existing norms and practices that determines who is able to do what with which assets in society. Three examples illustrate my point.
Farm Restructuring in Eastern Europe
Until the late 1980s, farmland in Eastern Europe was organized within state farms, collective farms, or, in some cases, small private farms owned by farmers who had the right to cultivate but not sell or develop the land. The absence of competitive agricultural and land markets prevented many necessary adjustments from taking place: labor mobility, adjustment in farm sizes, incentives to invest or increase labor productivity, and moving land to better uses.
Some policy advisers have argued that unless the New Independent States establish family-based farms with legally, well-defined and well-protected private property rights that can be transferred easily, little can be done to promote necessary adjustments. How do farmers adjust to the new realities of the transition while constitutions are amended, laws are promulgated, cadasters are compiled and land registers are established?
The answer lies in short-term informal leasing, which is the most common land transaction in Eastern Europe for several reasons. First, informal leases occur mostly between neighboring farmers who know each other and the quality of the land being traded. Second, most leases are short-term, allowing farmers to reduce the uncertainty associated with long-term commitments in inflationary and politically unstable environments. Finally, short-term leases allow farmers to adjust their farming units, which speeds up the economic restructuring of the farming sector. Farmers conduct these short-term transactions not because they are legally permitted but because of norms, conventions and local networks.
Squatter Housing in Developing Countries
Conventional wisdom on squatter housing in developing countries has been that lack of tenure security is responsible for the poor quality of housing in these settlements. Granting legal titles, the argument goes, would provide the necessary security and unleash household savings into investment in better housing. Recent empirical work, however, suggests that legal title is neither necessary nor sufficient for tenure security to exist.
Furthermore, absence of land title does not prevent squatters from renting or selling their houses. Indeed, except when an eminent threat of eviction exists, informal markets evolve to reduce the uncertainty associated with illegal transactions. Rules and arrangements evolve over time to provide information about who owns what, enforce contracts and resolve property disputes. For example, neighborhood associations in Brazilian favelas maintain an informal register of residents and issue documents as proof of ownership. Middlemen and land subdividers in Jordan play a crucial role in finding buyers and even financing them. These roles substitute for, duplicate or manipulate the legal system that functions in formal markets.
Illegal Housing Conversions in the U.S.
A recent series of articles in the New York Times documents the surge of illegal apartments throughout the City of New York in response to continuing poverty and the dwindling supply of affordable housing. In Queens, for example, one- and two-family units are being converted into multiple apartments, turning even attics and basements into makeshift flats.
These apartments are not registered with the city and are, therefore, not regulated. Firefighters estimate that as many as 80 percent of the homes in Queens are illegally subdivided. Needless to say, landlords, tenants, developers, brokers and contractors operate in these markets. They rely on evading, manipulating, and breaking laws and regulations to allow these markets to function. By necessity, they also have to rely on extra-legal means to enforce some of their contractual arrangements or resolve their disputes.
An Alternative Model
To understand how land markets operate, we need a “lens” that captures a wider array of rules and market arrangements. We need to examine not only what constitutional, statutory and common laws permit, but also what social norms and conventions permit. We need to go beyond property rights to include the range of property interests that are not necessarily based in law. We also need to go beyond the formal means of contracting and enforcement to include informal means based on ethnic, territorial and associational networks. This approach amounts to an alternative framework (see Figure 2) for understanding market actors’ expectations about the ability to use, develop, transfer and derive income from land.
The wider lens approach to market institutions also allows us to shift emphasis from institutional forms to institutional substance. The important question is not whether a particular institution (such as a land registry) exists, but rather how information about land and housing markets is provided, how risk is reduced, and how enforcement is made effective.
Omar Razzaz is Ford International Assistant Professor in the Department of Urban Studies and Planning at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He previously worked at the World Bank on property rights under transition in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Africa.
References
Bruni, Frank, with Deborah Sontag. “Behind a Suburban Facade in Queens, A Teeming, Angry Arithmetic,” The New York Times, October 8, 1996, p. A1.
Razzaz, Omar. “Contestation and Mutual Adjustment: The Process of Controlling Land in Yajouz, Jordan,” Law and Society Review 28, no. 1. 1994.
“Examining Property Rights and Investment in Informal Settlements: The Case of Jordan,” Land Economics, November 1993.
World Bank, “Regional Study: Farm Restructuring and Land Tenure in Reforming Socialist Economies: A Comparative Analysis of Eastern and Central Europe,” 1994. Prepared by Euroconsult/Center for World Food Studies, Washington, DC.