Recent court decisions have made economic development and tax policy front-page news. The recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Kelo v. City of New London raised a public outcry when it allowed local governments dramatic latitude in acquiring private property for economic development purposes. This case had a fiscal aspect as well, for it illustrated how financial pressures can lead local governments to seek alternatives to direct investment for economic revitalization and redevelopment.
Economic development was also the focus of a major lower court decision on state tax policy. In Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals found that Ohio’s investment tax credit, intended to attract businesses from other states, violated the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution (Hellerstein 2005). These and other, similar cases raise many questions about the connections between economic development and tax policy.
Is there a relationship between economic development and infrastructure spending?
Infrastructure, that vast network of capital-intensive services including roads, water provision, sewer services, and electrical supply, is critical to current and future economic activity. However, serious economic examination of the link between infrastructure spending and economic productivity only began in the late 1980s. Aschauer (1989, 194–197) argued that declining infrastructure spending resulted in less economic growth. More recently, Bougheas et al. (2000, 520) reported findings that “highlight the importance of infrastructure accumulation” for productivity gains.
Other researchers have pointed out that the most significant recent changes in infrastructure spending have occurred at the state and local levels, rather than the federal level. Gramlich (1994, 1178) argued that federal infrastructure spending has been fairly consistent over time, but state and local spending has decreased. Holtz-Eakin (1993) cautioned that while public expenditures on infrastructure may be important, they may not directly affect economic productivity. He argued that differing state and local needs may account for many infrastructure spending disparities, and that maintenance of existing infrastructure assets may be more important than new spending for capital acquisition. Boarnet (1997) considered efficient pricing for infrastructure use as important as its actual provision.
Nevertheless, the American Society for Civil Engineers (ASCE) is sufficiently concerned about the condition of infrastructure in the U.S. to assign it a grade of “D.” ASCE (2005) argues that the country needs to spend about $1.6 trillion over the next five years to improve the situation.
What is the relationship between infrastructure spending and local tax systems?
The mechanisms for funding infrastructure and its role in state and local spending are complex. Research in this area deals with such topics as fiscal illusion (i.e., when the complexity of the revenue system obscures the true cost of public goods and services) and specific capital financing strategies used to fund infrastructure. However, there has been little research on the impact of local tax structures on infrastructure spending.
Economists have long argued that the value of publicly provided goods and services, such as infrastructure and its maintenance, are reflected in the value of the property served by those goods. Accordingly, a tax that captures the value of these public goods and services may be an important revenue source for funding them. However, in the last 30 years, local governments have moved away from such a tax, the property tax, to other sources of revenue. In many communities, this shift has produced an increased reliance on state aid, local sales tax revenues, and user fees.
In analyzing infrastructure spending in Utah, it is clear that the local revenue structure affects per capita operating and maintenance spending and new capital acquisition expenditures. Preliminary analysis indicates that communities are more likely to increase per capita infrastructure spending when it is financed by property taxes, all other funding sources held constant. It also appears that as per capita sales tax revenue increases, per capita spending for infrastructure services declines.
How constrained are local revenue systems?
One reason that local government revenue structures affect spending on infrastructure is that the states impose various constraints on local revenue sources. Although the past ten years have seen no dramatic changes in the roles of the property tax, intergovernmental aid, or the sales tax in overall local government revenues, the ratio of total revenues to personal income has fallen about 7.5 percent. This real decline highlights the increasing pressure on local governments to identify new revenue sources.
Yet, local governments face serious constraints when they seek to change their revenue systems. States impose intergovernmental restrictions, such as limits on sales tax rates that localities can impose. Less tangible but equally important is political opposition to tax increases. The third factor is the set of tax and expenditure limitations that many states have enacted, ranging from Proposition 13 in California in 1978 to the more recent taxpayer bill of rights enacted in Colorado, which drastically limited increases in government spending.
These constraints have forced local governments to become more innovative in their revenue-raising methods. An entire cottage industry of financial advisors, bond attorneys, and other public and private sector innovators has emerged to help local governments find ways of loosening or circumventing these limitations. Some strategies may have increased economic efficiency, although they give rise to equity concerns (for example, the movement toward the increased use of fees and charges); others are nearly invisible to the taxpayer. In nearly all cases, local governments have been seeking to use land as a revenue-generating device—a trend that shows no sign of abating.
What are alternative ways to finance capital infrastructure?
Two types of debt traditionally have financed infrastructure projects: general obligation (GO) bonds, backed by the full faith and credit of the issuing locality; and revenue bonds, backed by income from the capital project. Both types of debt have significant restrictions on their use, such as voter approval requirements and caps on maximum indebtedness. These debt limitations, the difficulty in raising property taxes, and the fear of political opposition have increased the use of alternative capital finance methods based on land use.
One longstanding method, tax increment financing (TIF), utilizes the increases in property value to help finance redevelopment projects. Originally designed as a financial instrument to eliminate blight and provide affordable housing, this instrument has become increasingly popular in many states for a variety of projects. Forty-seven states and the District of Columbia now allow this technique.
Capturing the property tax increment attributable to government-sponsored redevelopment in order to service this debt makes economic sense if the new development would not have occurred without the formation of the tax district. Moreover, this debt does not have to be approved by voters, but rather by a group designated by the city government. Not even these two factors explain the extraordinary recent growth in the number and size of TIF districts, however, raising suspicion that this tool may be used more often to attract and subsidize economic growth than to eliminate blight. For example, in 2003–2004, California had 33 TIF redevelopment projects, each of which covered more than 6,000 acres, a surprisingly large area to be declared “blighted” in any one jurisdiction (see Figure 1).
Another popular tool in several states is the community facilities district (CFD), which usually funds new development. Landowners within a region form a CFD to issue debt to finance the infrastructure needed to develop raw land. District members’ votes are typically a function of the amount of property each landowner holds. The local government must approve CFDs, although they are not a formal part of the government and their debt issuance is not subject to approval by the general public.
A lien for CFD assessments is placed on each lot in the district, and the CFD tax liability appears on the property tax bill of each district member as a separate line item. Variations of this technique may utilize sales taxes, impact fees, and user charges. Many rapidly growing local governments encourage the formation of these districts to help finance their community’s growth. Nevertheless, CFDs can be very complex, and may fail if anticipated growth does not occur (see Figure 2).
TIFs, CFDs, and other such techniques present an ethical dilemma to local government. Sometimes they are not fully understood by the political decision makers who authorize their use, let alone by members of the general public who will bear the burden of paying this debt in the future. Yet they remain a popular tool to finance crucial infrastructure that is basic to improving the economic well-being of the community.
Could a land tax help finance infrastructure for economic development?
The land component of property value is another potential source of revenue to encourage economic development. Since the supply of land is fixed in the short run, an increase in a land tax will not affect the tax base. However, it will encourage more intensive use of the land and may slow urban sprawl. Unfortunately, the lack of empirical data makes it difficult to determine if this theory is accurate. One example in the U.S. is the City of Pittsburgh, which in 1979–1980 restructured the tax on land to be five times that on improvements. Building activity showed a dramatic increase, although other factors may have contributed to the change as well (Oates and Schwab 1997). Pittsburgh later returned to a single-rate property tax system.
Increased use of a land tax poses significant problems. In particular, accurately assessing land can be challenging, although statistical and econometric techniques may help address this in the future. A second concern is that more intensive use of land value taxation will lead to denser development, exacerbating many of the problems associated with congestion. These effects must be weighed against the positive benefits of reducing long-distance commuting. A third problem concerns equity. Owners whose property has a high land/improvement ratio will face an increased tax liability. This shift might be mitigated by adjustments in the tax rate, special exemptions or targeted tax credits.
A land tax has the important advantages of transparency and accountability. In particular, if land value increases because of government activities, there is strong justification for recovering at least some of those costs through a tax on the land component. We would even propose a name for this additional tax—a positive externality tax (PET). We recognize that, like any proposed increase in the property tax, such a shift would be politically controversial.
Conclusions
Our current research analyzes relationships among economic development, infrastructure, and the tax system. The fiscal problems of local jurisdictions are made more complex by the use of intricate methods of infrastructure financing, such as TIFs and CFDs, to fund economic development. The use of financing mechanisms based on a land tax may be one part of a potential response to this challenge.
Jeffrey Chapman is professor and director of the School of Public Affairs at Arizona State University in Tempe. He specializes in state and local finance and administration of financial resources, and has recently published in the area of local land use responses to fiscal stress.
Rex L. Facer II is assistant professor of public management at the Romney Institute of Public Management of the Marriott School of Management at Brigham Young University in Provo, Utah. He specializes in city management, public finance, public management strategy, and public policy analysis.
Faculty profile of Ming Zhang
Over the last several years, growing public attention has centered on the fallout from the subprime lending debacle—an unprecedented event that has resulted in massive foreclosures and widespread housing vacancy in what had been the perennially growing Sunbelt (Goodman 2007; Leland 2007). Across the southern United States, from Atlanta, to Fort Meyers, to Phoenix, massive new housing developments are largely unoccupied while older housing is abandoned due to foreclosure. Cities in the Sunbelt now exhibit housing vacancy rates akin to those observed in former industrial Rustbelt cities.
This situation leads to two critical questions: Can Sunbelt cities manage the land use changes that this unstable (and unpredictable) economic market has created, while still maintaining at least the status quo for remaining residents? Are these changes providing new planning opportunities for urban sustainability?
In our work with the Lincoln Institute, we conducted an empirical study to begin to answer those questions (Hollander et al. 2010). The United States Postal Service (USPS) regularly releases datasets that provide information on occupied housing units for each zip code. We were able to obtain household residential delivery data for all zip codes in the lower 48 states for three time periods: the beginning of the real estate boom (February 2000); the peak of the real estate market (February 2006); and a time of high foreclosures and significant decline in real estate markets (February 2009).
The key indicator employed in our study was derived from the USPS dataset: occupied housing units. The USPS data lists how many housing units received mail during a given month in each zip code. When no one is receiving mail at a location, it is considered vacant. After 90 days of vacancy, the USPS no longer lists the unit as active and, for our purposes, removes it from the occupied housing unit list.
Following a methodology developed by Hollander (2010), we noted changes in occupied housing unit density from one period to the next. It was possible to analyze this because zip code boundaries remained constant in our study sample. We focused on broad shifts in occupancy in a given zip code as being indicative of widespread vacancy and abandonment.
Two time intervals were selected for analysis: February 2000 to February 2006, and February 2006 to February 2009. The first period corresponds with the housing boom years, and the second period with the slowing of the boom into the foreclosure crisis. Change for each time interval and each zip code was calculated by subtracting the total count of households at the end of each interval from the count at the beginning.
Data Tabulation, Mapping, and Analysis
In addition to comparing national indicators of household change between the two periods, each dataset was separated into urban, suburban, and rural areas. Urbanized Areas, as defined by the United States Census, provided boundaries for our urban areas. Areas between the Urbanized Area and the Metropolitan Statistical Area boundary lines were considered suburban, and areas outside of Metropolitan Statistical Areas were considered rural.
For each of these regions and for both time intervals, we analyzed the following factors for both declining and gaining zip codes:
The data were also mapped in three categories to display which zip codes were losing and gaining housing units for each time interval. Zip codes that had a net loss of 30 or more housing units were mapped as “losing,” those that gained 30 or more units were mapped as “gaining,” and those that lost or gained up to 29 units were considered as having no significant change.
Two measures of spatial autocorrelation—Global Moran’s I and a Univariate Local Indicator of Spatial Association (LISA)—were used to explore spatial clustering of USPS’s housing unit occupancy change data and thus identify broad areas that were impacted most severely. In this analysis, the GeoDA software package was used to run the Global Moran’s I and Univariate LISA tests, with results shown only for zip code clusters with significance at 0.01 for the Global Moran’s I test and 0.05 for the LISA test.
Four possible results are derived from the Univariate LISA test, in which “high change” refers to an increase in housing occupancy of more than 30 units in a zip code and “low change” refers to a decrease of more than 30 housing units.
1. High-high clustering: high change zip codes surrounded by high change zip codes
2. Low-low clustering: low change zip codes surrounded by low change zip codes
3. Low-high clustering: low change zip codes surrounded by high change zip codes
4. High-low clustering: high change zip codes surrounded by low change zip codes
The high-high and low-low results indicate local clustering, while the high-low and low-high results indicate outliers or “islands” (Anselin 1995).
Findings
This analysis of the USPS occupied housing dataset revealed a number of trends that provide a spatial and statistical context for understanding the foreclosure crisis and numerous paths for further investigation. We had anticipated finding significantly more zip codes with a decline in occupied housing in the 2006–2009 period than the 2000–2006 period. Though the latter period did have 16.4 percent more declining zip codes than the former period, this increase was not as high as expected given the assumption of a boom vs. bust comparison.
However, when the dataset was separated into urban, suburban, and rural areas, much more distinctive trends were evident (tables 1 and 2). Suburban areas registered 42.8 percent more declining zip codes in the latter (2,333) than the former period (1,634) and rural zip codes registered 13.8 percent more declining zip codes in the latter (2,189) than in the former period (1,924), whereas urban areas had only 1.9 percent fewer declining zip codes in the latter period (2,084 versus 2,124).
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the occupied housing unit gains and losses during both periods. The 2006–2009 interval was marked not only by an increase in the size and number of declining (red) zip codes but a slowing of growth in previously expanding areas, as indicated by the increase in no-change (yellow) zip codes in many previously expanding regions. Decline also became more prevalent in new areas. The upper Midwestern states (Michigan, Wisconsin, Northern Illinois, and Minnesota) and the Sunbelt region (including Phoenix, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, the San Francisco Bay Area, New Orleans, and the outskirts of Florida’s coastal cities) showed noticeable increases in declining zip codes. In contrast, declines in the Great Plains, Mississippi River corridor, western Pennsylvania, and the Pacific Northwest were either less pronounced or reversed in the latter period.
The results of the Global autocorrelation tests indicated spatial clustering existed in the dataset. Not surprisingly, the LISA analysis found declining clusters prevalent in regions that had high percentages of declining zip codes, generally in both intervals (figures 3 and 4). However, it was surprising that fewer low-low (declining) clusters were found in the 2006–2009 period. The 2000–2006 period shows low-low clusters, particularly in the Great Plains states, the Mississippi River corridor, and western New York and Pennsylvania. Despite having more total declining zip codes, less low-low clustering occurred in the 2006–2009 period. However, clustering did occur in new territory including the upper Midwest, South Florida, New Orleans, the Southwest, and California.
Application of the Findings
Since completing the working paper on which this article is based, its findings have influenced further on-the-ground research. Widespread instances of decline in metropolitan areas in the Sunbelt led to more targeted research in cities shown to be among those most severely impacted by the recession of the late 2000s. Three cities are examined as case studies by Hollander (2011): Phoenix, Orlando, and Fresno (figures 5, 6, and 7).
In Phoenix, a fire-hot real estate market led to widespread overbuilding of housing in recent years. Developers converted farms in the Laveen neighborhood into housing subdivisions, in some cases finishing only half of them. In Orlando, inner city neighborhoods that had experienced rebirth in the mid-2000s are stricken by widespread foreclosures today, leading to arson and high vacancy levels. Many of the grand older houses of Fresno are now overrun with weeds and decay as demand for housing has plummeted in this center of California’s agricultural industry. With jobs scarce, people are fleeing former boomtowns and leaving behind a new type of vacancy and abandonment. In these cities and others, entire blocks that had been fully occupied now have half or more of the housing stock unoccupied.
Additionally, the number of new declining zip codes found in Metropolitan Statistical Areas in this study raises more specific questions about how the recent recession has impacted different parts of the country. This finding challenges the belief that urban cores are most prone to decline while suburban growth will continue in perpetuity.
This shift in declining neighborhoods from urban to suburban areas spurred another related study that broke metropolitan regions down into central cities, inner ring suburbs, and outer ring suburbs (Zinder 2010). It used statistical metrics to compare trends within those subsets of the metropolitan region and added another round of evidence that suburban decline is becoming more pervasive in most regions of the country.
Zinder found more new declining zip codes in all suburban regions during the recent recession than in the previous period and determined that outer ring suburbs sustained the largest increase of new zip codes with a net decline in housing occupancy. In contrast, the total number of declining zip codes in central cities decreased. This study also provided additional support for the regional trends reported here showing particularly deep impacts in southwestern cities and outer ring suburbs in the Midwest, South, and Northeast.
Concluding Remarks
The findings from this research effort indicate that the face of declining cities and regions in America has begun to change. Though many areas previously hit by economic downturns have continued to feel their impacts, decline is no longer limited primarily to older manufacturing towns, urban cores, and declining rural farming communities. Places that had prospered in more recent times, including Sunbelt cities and remote suburbs, have begun to see declines in occupied housing stock as well and were, in fact, the places hit hardest by the subprime lending crisis. It is important to note that housing abandonment (i.e., a drop in occupied housing unit density) is one manifestation of neighborhood change, but it is only part of a larger story of metropolitan growth and decline. We focus here on those neighborhoods in decline, but in the future we will be attuned to growing neighborhoods as well.
Our research located some statistically significant clusters of zip codes experiencing home abandonment in recent years. The next question to answer is: What social processes and factors explain this clustering? In future phases of this research, we plan to examine how changes in occupied housing density have been dispersed throughout major Census-defined Urbanized Areas and begin to employ advanced multivariate statistical techniques to understand the key attributes associated with clusters of decline.
Should current trends persist in years to come, planners and policy makers will need to be better prepared, perhaps by looking to models adopted by other communities to build upon existing assets while embracing population decline. Understanding these complex dynamics will help community leaders come to terms with the challenges their cities and regions face. This article provides an introduction to a methodological approach to identify these trends in nearly real time to help quantify impacts on a given zip code, city, or region.
References
Anselin, Luc. 1995. Local indicators of spatial autocorrelation–LISA. Geographical Analysis 27:93–115.
Goodman, Peter S. 2007. This is the sound of a bubble bursting. The New York Times. December 23.
Hollander, Justin B. 2010. Moving towards a shrinking cities metric: Analyzing land use changes associated with depopulation in Flint, Michigan. Cityscape: A Journal of Policy Development and Research 12(1):133–151.
Hollander, Justin B. 2011. Sunburnt cities: The great recession, depopulation, and urban planning in the American Sunbelt. London/New York: Routledge.
Hollander, Justin, Colin Polsky, Dan Zinder, and Dan Runfola. 2010. The new American ghost town: Foreclosure, abandonment, and the prospects for city planning. Working Paper. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
Leland, John. 2007. Officials say they are falling behind on mortgage fraud cases. The New York Times. December 25.
Zinder, Daniel H. 2010. Through the rings: A study of housing occupancy declines across major urbanized areas in the United States. Medford, MA. Tufts University.
Acknowledgments
Many thanks go to Nick Giner for his contributions to the spatial autocorrelation analysis used in this research. Much of the methodological explanation is based directly on his work on the spatial distribution of lawns in Massachusetts.
About the Authors
Justin B. Hollander is an assistant professor in the Department of Urban and Environmental Policy and Planning at Tufts University in Medford, Massachusetts, and a research scientist at the George Perkins Marsh Institute at Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts.
Colin Polsky is an associate professor at the Graduate School of Geography and associate dean for Undergraduate Research & Active Pedagogy at Clark University. He is a geographer specializing in the human dimensions of global environmental change.
Dan Zinder is a recent graduate of masters degree program in Urban and Environmental Planning at Tufts University. His research interests include land use policy, declining cities, GIS, and sustainability.
Dan Runfola is a Ph.D. student at Clark University. His research interests include remote sensing, GIS, land change science, and vulnerability.
Infrastructure, defined to include transport, telecommunication, electric power, water, and sanitation, is high on the agenda of both industrial and developing countries. In the United States, concern has been mounting about insufficient maintenance and the resulting decline in the quality of infrastructure facilities and services, especially in transport. Additional investments in infrastructure have also figured heavily in proposals to stimulate demand, employment, and economic growth. In developing countries, infrastructure’s challenges relate more to increasing capacity to provide services to both existing urban residents and the two billion new urban residents projected to arrive by 2050. The Lincoln Institute’s seventh annual land policy conference, held in early June 2012, addressed many aspects of infrastructure including investment, maintenance, and its externalities.
Economic aspects.
Empirical work carried out over the past 25 years on the macroeconomic returns to infrastructure investment have produced a wide range of outcomes–from negative returns to those above 30 percent annually. A careful survey of more recent studies indicates that infrastructure investment in transport, power, and telecom is likely to have positive macroeconomic effects and raise productivity.
At the same time, many countries allocate only modest sums to infrastructure maintenance, even though a broad consensus of opinion and empirical evidence indicate that the returns to maintenance–particularly transport–are very high. Inadequate maintenance may result from donor preferences to fund new capacity in developing countries, but maintenance shortfalls are also common in developed countries, suggesting that other institutional factors are likely to be important.
Networked infrastructure normally is subject to scale economies, and some networks are natural monopolies. Such infrastructure must be subject to economic regulation to prevent firms from engaging in monopoly pricing. While the need for regulation is most apparent when infrastructure is provided by private firms, regulatory oversight is often necessary when provision is by a public enterprise.
Spatial aspects.
Infrastructure has a strong influence on spatial development patterns and can be used to direct growth and–along with zoning and other incentives–to encourage more dense and compact development patterns. While only a few studies are available, however, empirical work indicates that the cost of redeveloping brownfield sites exceeds the cost of greenfield development including the costs of new infrastructure service.
The de-industrialization of cities has been going on for a long time, but recently some cities, such as San Jose, California, have stopped supporting the conversion of industrial or office space to residential or commercial use. They seek to maintain appropriate space for employment when economic growth returns so that they can compete for new firms and encourage local job creation.
Externalities.
Metropolitan areas produce about three-quarters of global anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions annually, with a large share coming from transport and electric power. The replacement of aging systems and installation of new capacity provide a major opportunity to switch to more energy- and emission-efficient systems in urban areas. System management also can be improved with congestion tolls, parking fees, and transit expansion; by ensuring that tariffs cover the costs of water and electric power; and by promoting green buildings.
Relocating households in the path of infrastructure expansion involves a large number of people displaced by new roads or the widening of existing roads, the location of new facilities such as power plants, and reservoirs that flood broad areas behind dams. Estimates indicate that between 10 and 23 million persons are resettled involuntarily in developing countries each year, and that the majority of relocations are related to infrastructure. Some of these involuntary resettlements meet the safeguard standards promulgated by the World Bank or other standards such as the Equator Principles, but most resettlement is subject to only national or provincial policies.
These topics and many others–including the impacts on infrastructure of mega-events such as the Olympics, the taxation of utilities, the locational effects of congestion tolls, the variation in quality of infrastructure services, and the remarkable impacts of mobile telephony in Africa–will be covered in the conference proceedings that will be available as a printed volume in May 2013 and later as an eBook.
Housing is an important component of both a household’s net worth and aggregate national wealth or stock of residential capital. Aggregate residential wealth is the sum of the values of all housing units. In Brazil, residential structures represent about one-third of total net fixed capital, so their value is important for economic and social policy. This analysis asks: What variables determine the stock values of residential property? How do location and neighborhood conditions affect these values? What is the aggregate residential wealth in the Rio de Janeiro Metropolitan Region (Metro Rio)? What is its distribution among household income and housing value groups? In other words, what generates residential wealth? How much residential wealth is there? Who holds it? Where is it located? (Vetter, Beltrão, and Massena 2013.)
Methodology for Estimating Residential Wealth
To address these questions, we first calibrated a hedonic residential rent model with sample microdata from the 2010 population census conducted by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE). The units of analysis are households living in private, permanent housing units in urban areas of Metro Rio. The total number of households in 2010 was 3.9 million, and our sample is 223,534 (5.7 percent). We used the 41,396 renters in the sample to calibrate our model and then estimated the rents for homeowners and the landlords of rent-free units. Finally, we transformed the actual and imputed rents into housing values by dividing them by the monthly discount rate of 0.75 percent (9.38 percent annual rate), as is standard practice for Brazilian residential wealth studies (Cruz and Morais 2000, Reiff and Barbosa 2005, and Tafner and Carvalho 2007).
The underlying assumption in these studies is that the hedonic prices of the characteristics in the model and the discount rate are similar for rental and nonrental units. These are strong but necessary assumptions for the application of the methodology with the existing census microdata. The sum of estimated housing values is our measure of residential wealth. The objective is to estimate the aggregate value of all housing units and their average values.
In calculating average housing prices for these groups, we do not control for housing size or other characteristics, as would be done for hedonic housing price indices. Using census microdata, we can also estimate the residential wealth by household income as well as for smaller spatial units within municipalities, such as neighborhoods or districts. Even though the sample of rental units is relatively large, sample size drops rapidly as rents and household incomes rise, and the variances are particularly high for the open group at the top end of the distribution. Because we do not have data on the value of mortgages, our measure is of gross rather than net residential wealth.
Using rents from the census or a household survey compares favorably with other commonly used methods for estimating residential wealth for the Brazilian national accounts and related studies (Garner 2004), such as asking homeowners to estimate the selling price or monthly rent of their homes, using the asking prices for home sales, or using the prices registered when recording the sale. Whereas renters know their monthly rent payment, the informants may have little understanding of current trends in housing prices, and the original asking price is often higher than the final sale price. In Rio de Janeiro, the municipal government uses its own estimates of the sale prices based on asking prices, rather than the value registered in calculating the real estate transfer tax, because buyers and sellers often register lower prices.
In our hedonic residential rent model, the dependent variable is a vector of residential rents, and the independent variables are matrices of the structural characteristics of the housing unit, access to employment, and neighborhood characteristics, including indicators of access to urban infrastructure and services. The variables used are for the household per se and also for the census area in which it is located. Figure 1 shows Metro Rio’s 336 census areas and the larger municipal boundaries grouped into six subregions based on indicators analyzed in this and previous studies (Lago 2010).
The indicator for access to employment measures the average commute time to work for residents in each of the census areas. Figure 2 (p. 16) shows that the average commute time increases with distance from the center, but not by as much as one might expect—partly due to increased traffic congestion in all areas and to the fact that Metro Rio is polycentric with many subordinate centers.
The indicators of the quality of neighborhood infrastructure and services include the household`s access to the public sewer and water systems, garbage collection, and block conditions (e.g., street paving and drainage). As these indicators are highly intercorrelated, the component scores from a principal components analysis serve as the independent variables in the hedonic model. Component 1 explains 46.6 percent of the variance and shows high positive loadings on adequate block conditions and infrastructure, and high negative loadings on inadequate block conditions (e.g., garbage in the street and open sewers), indicating which areas have a higher level of attractiveness or desirability (figure 3). Although the lowest scores are clearly concentrated in the outlying areas, the patterns of attractiveness vary considerably. As with commute times, the distribution pattern of the attractiveness scores reveals the complexity of Metro Rio’s spatial structure.
Our hedonic model explains 73 percent of the variance of residential rent. The key independent variables are statistically significant; neighborhood quality and access to employment explain nearly two-thirds of the variance, while the structural characteristics of the housing explain only about one-third of the variance. In other words, the bulk of housing value is the capitalized value of access to employment and to neighborhood infrastructure and services, all of which are determined in large part by public expenditures. Figure 4 (p. 18) shows the distribution of average estimated housing values for census areas in US$ determined by our methodology. (The average exchange rate for 2010 is US$1=R$1.76.) These values tend to be highest in areas affording relatively low commute times and good access to urban infrastructure and services.
Distribution of Residential Wealth
How much residential wealth is the property of homeowners versus the landlords of rental properties and rent-free units used by employers, family members, or others? Our estimate of Metro Rio’s aggregate residential wealth of both occupied and unoccupied units in 2010 is US$155.1 billion (94.2 percent of Metro Rio’s 2010 GDP of US$164.4 billion) and US$140.2 billion for occupied units only (84.2 percent of Metro Rio’s GDP). Among total occupied units, 74.8 percent of this residential wealth (about US$105 billion) belongs to owner-occupied units, and the rest belongs to landlords of rented and rent-free units. In the case of lower-income households, the landlords could be another lower-income family.
Table 1 shows that the percent of homeowners is quite similar for all household income groups. For example, homeowners occupy nearly three-quarters of the households in the lowest household income group (with fewer than two minimum salaries or an average annual income of only US$4,407). A key reason for these high homeownership levels is that those living in favelas, squatter settlements, or other types of informal housing can declare themselves homeowners, even if they do not legally own the land on which their home is located. The 2010 Census showed more than 520,000 households (more than 15 percent of the total private permanent urban households) living in these types of settlements in Metro Rio. Land ownership in these settlements is a complex legal question on which even lawyers may not agree, since the chances of removal (at least removal without compensation) are quite low, and those living on land without a legal title may be eligible for squatter’s rights after five years under Brazilian law.
Although 25.3 percent of total households earned less than two minimum salaries (US$ 6,960 per year), the homeowners in this group held only 15.3 percent of the aggregate residential wealth of all homeowners. By contrast, only 15.6 percent of households earned 10 or more minimum salaries (US$34,800 per year), but homeowners in this income group held 34.5 percent of the aggregate residential wealth. Nonetheless, lower income households have more residential wealth than one might expect, in part because they are often homeowners in informal settlements.
Figure 5 (p. 19) shows the Lorenz Curve for the distribution of aggregate residential wealth of homeowners by housing value groups. This distribution is quite unequal, because the nearly 23.7 percent who are not homeowners have no such wealth (as shown where the Lorenz curve runs along the bottom of the axis) and because those living in higher-priced housing have greater residential wealth.
Distribution of Residential Wealth by Subregions
The bulk of aggregate residential wealth is held by those living in the suburbs and periphery around Metro Rio, although the average value of their housing units is lower. Table 2 shows that those subregions (4 and 6) together represent 79 percent of Metro Rio’s total households (3.1 million) and 58.1 percent of aggregate residential wealth (US$80.9 billion). Subregion 2 (the older, higher-income neighborhoods along the bay and coast) holds only 6.3 percent of Metro Rio’s households (about 242,000) and 19.0 percent of its residential wealth.
The percentage of renters is highest in the large squatter settlements (subregion 5), at 28.6 percent, with an additional 2.7 percent of rent-free units. Homeownership rates are highest (80.4 percent) in the periphery (subregion 6), where many owners live on land for which they do not have full legal title, though these areas generally are not squatter settlements as defined by IBGE.
Spatial Distribution of Household Income
One result of the interplay of market forces that shape residential rent and housing prices is that the distribution of aggregate household income tends to mirror the distribution of aggregate residential wealth. In other words, there is a relatively high residential segregation by income groups, with lower-income families concentrated in the large squatter settlements and in the suburbs and periphery (subregions 4, 5, and 6). High spatial concentration of higher-income households generates higher aggregate income and demand in areas that support higher-level services—in turn making these areas more attractive to higher-income homebuyers and renters. Figure 6 (p. 20) shows that the average annual household incomes for the census areas in 2010 reflect to a large extent the distribution of average housing values (figure 4), commute times (figure 2), and neighborhood attractiveness (figure 3).
In 2010, the high-income Barra da Tijuca area (subregion 3) held only 2.1 percent of total households in Metro Rio but 8.1 percent of aggregate household income and 7.6 percent of aggregate residential wealth. By comparison, the four large squatter settlements of subregion 5 held 2.5 percent of total households but only 1.0 percent of aggregate household income and 1.4 percent of residential wealth. Nonetheless, the aggregate residential value in these four squatter settlements was nearly US$2 billion, and the average housing value was almost US$21,000. These results show a relatively high spatial concentration of both aggregate household income and residential wealth that is tempered slightly by the home-ownership rate in squatter settlements.
Implications for Methodology and Policy Decisions
The methodology used in this analysis provides interesting insights into the macroeconomic and social importance of residential wealth; the variables that generate it; its distribution among household tenure, income, and housing value groups; and its allocation among subregions ranging from high-income neighborhoods to squatter settlements. The strong assumptions required in using the methodology must be taken into account when interpreting the results. Data from property registries or other sources with more detailed information on unit size could eventually be used to complement this methodology.
Government services, investments, and regulatory actions can result in benefits (e.g., access to employment, urban services, and amenities) and costs (e.g., taxes, fees, and negative environmental impacts) that are capitalized into the value of housing in the affected neighborhoods. For homeowners, positive net benefits from government actions increase their residential wealth, because they are capitalized in the value of their housing. However, for renters and new homebuyers, these same government actions can cause rents and housing prices to rise along with the net benefits. Some households, especially the lower-income renters and homebuyers, may have to leave the benefited area, and other potential new owners may be unable to locate in the area. Thus, housing tenure is important in determining whether or not a household receives the net benefits of government investments and regulatory actions.
Capitalization of the net benefits of government actions would clearly be an issue for the more than 30 percent of households in the four large squatter settlements that are not homeowners, as well as for those entering the housing market. Although there are no reliable data on housing turnover, we know that the total number of urban households in Metro Rio increased more than 20 percent, by almost 657,000, between 2000 and 2010. This increment was 14 percent higher than the total number of households in the Municipality of Curitiba (the state capital of Paraná) in 2010 and well over twice the number in Washington, D.C. All these new households, plus all the renters (about one-fifth of total households) and homeowners wishing to move, would be subject to increased rents and housing prices generated by the net benefits of government actions.
These results demonstrate a need for policies to ensure that rising rents and housing prices do not exclude some households from areas where public services and infrastructure are being improved. For example, financial assistance for home purchases could be part of the improvement program. One way of financing the needed lower-income housing and investment programs would be to capture part of the value being generated by infrastructure investments from higher-income households. Capturing part of the value generated by urban investments could help finance additional housing subsidies for lower-income families, as well as added investment, thereby providing a kind of investment multiplier.
About the Authors
David M. Vetter (Ph.D. University of California) has worked for more than four decades on urban finance and economics issues in Latin America for Brazilian entities, at the World Bank and Dexia Credit Local, and also as a consultant.
Kaizô I. Beltrão (Ph.D. Princeton University) was the dean and a senior researcher at the National Statistics School (an entity of IBGE) and is now a full professor and senior researcher at the Fundação Getúlio Vargas.
Rosa M. R. Massena (Doctorate, Université de Bordeaux) was a senior researcher at the IBGE for 23 years and since then has worked as a consultant on social indicators programs for Habitat, the World Bank, UNDP, and other entities.
Resources
Cruz, Bruno. O. and Maria P. Morais. 2000. Demand for Housing and Urban Services in Brazil: A Hedonic Approach. Paper presented at the European Network for Housing Research Conference, Gavle, Sweden (June).
Garner, Thesia I. 2004. Incorporating the Value of Owner-Occupied Housing in Poverty Measurement. Prepared for the Workshop on Experimental Poverty Measures, Committee on National Statistics. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies.
Lago, Luciana C. 2010. Olhares Sobre a Metrópole do Rio de Janeiro: Economia, Sociedade e Território. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Observatório das Metrópoles, FASE, IPPUR/UFRJ.
Reiff, Luis. O. and Ana L. Barbosa. 2005. Housing Stock in Brazil: Estimation Based on a Hedonic Price Model. Paper No. 21. Basel, Switzerland: Bank for International Settlements.
Tafner, Paulo and Marcia Carvalho. 2007. Evolução da Distribuição Familiar da Riqueza Imobiliária no Brasil: 1995–2004. Revista de Economia 33(2) (Julho-Dezembro): 7–40.
Vetter, David M., Kaizô I. Beltrão, and Rosa R. Massena. 2013. The Determinants of Residential Wealth and Its Distribution in Space and Among Household Income Groups in the Rio de Janeiro Metropolitan Region: A Hedonic Analysis of the 2010 Census Data. Working Paper. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
El fortalecimiento de la salud fiscal municipal en China
Desde el año 2013, Zhi Liu se ha desempeñado como investigador senior y director del Programa para China del Instituto Lincoln de Políticas de Suelo. También es director del Centro para el Desarrollo Urbano y Políticas de Suelo de la Universidad de Pekín y el Instituto Lincoln (PLC). Anteriormente, Zhi fue especialista principal en infraestructuras en el Banco Mundial, donde trabajó durante 18 años y obtuvo experiencia operativa en varios países en vías de desarrollo.
Zhi obtuvo el título de grado (BS) en Geografía Económica por la Universidad Dr. Sun Yat-Sen (China), el título de maestría (MS) en Planificación Municipal y Regional por la Universidad de Nanjing (China) y el título de doctorado (Ph.D.) en Planificación Urbana por la Universidad de Harvard.
LAND LINES: Hace poco el Instituto Lincoln comenzó un plan de investigación sobre la salud fiscal municipal en todo el mundo. Esta tarea surgió al detectar que algunas ciudades de los Estados Unidos y de muchos otros países, como China, enfrentan dificultades financieras. ¿Cuál es la naturaleza de los problemas fiscales municipales en China?
ZHI LIU: Es muy diferente de las dificultades económicas que enfrentan las ciudades de los Estados Unidos. Estos dos países se encuentran en etapas de urbanización muy distintas. Mientras que los EE.UU. tiene un alto nivel de urbanización (más del 80 por ciento de los ciudadanos vive en áreas urbanas), según el censo de 2010, China todavía está a medio camino del proceso de urbanización. Hoy en día, 750 millones de ciudadanos chinos viven en ciudades, lo que representa el 55 por ciento de la población total. Para el año 2050, se espera que la población urbana alcance 1,1 mil millones de habitantes, es decir, el 75 por ciento de la población total. En los últimos veinte años, con la excepción de unas pocas ciudades mineras, casi todos los municipios han experimentado un rápido crecimiento de la población y una expansión espacial, lo que ha generado una gran demanda de inversiones públicas en infraestructura urbana.
En China, las principales fuentes de financiamiento para inversiones en infraestructura urbana son los ingresos provenientes de las concesiones del suelo y los préstamos que los municipios solicitan a los bancos comerciales, por lo general usando el suelo como garantía. El suelo urbano es de propiedad del Estado, y el suelo rural es de propiedad conjunta de las aldeas. La Ley de Administración del Suelo establece que sólo el Estado tiene el poder para convertir suelo rural en suelo de uso urbano, lo que crea el marco propicio para que los gobiernos municipales tomen suelo rural con el fin de realizar un desarrollo urbano mediante el proceso de concesión del suelo. De hecho, los gobiernos municipales expropian el suelo rural, lo dotan de infraestructura y venden los derechos de uso del suelo a desarrolladores inmobiliarios. La compensación que reciben los agricultores por el suelo que se les expropia no es muy alta, ya que se calcula según el valor de producción agrícola del suelo en lugar del valor de mercado del suelo para uso urbano. Cuando la demanda de desarrollo inmobiliario es alta, los precios de licitación para la concesión del suelo son altos, y los gobiernos municipales comienzan a recaudar grandes sumas de dinero. En los últimos diez años, los ingresos derivados de las concesiones del suelo han representado más de un tercio del total de los ingresos fiscales municipales.
Además, los gobiernos municipales expanden aun más su capacidad financiera mediante la utilización de propiedades de suelo a modo de garantías con el fin de obtener préstamos de los bancos comerciales. La Ley de Presupuesto Chino, antes de una reciente modificación, no permitía que los gobiernos municipales solicitaran préstamos. Sin embargo, la mayoría de los gobiernos municipales superó las restricciones de la ley mediante la creación de sus propios vehículos financieros municipales, conocidos como sociedades anónimas de inversión en desarrollo urbano (sociedades anónimas de inversión en desarrollo urbano, UDIC, por sus siglas en inglés). Las UDIC solicitaban préstamos comerciales o emitían bonos privados para los gobiernos. Las deudas municipales pendientes de pago han crecido rápidamente en los últimos años, y en la actualidad han alcanzado al menos un tercio del PIB.
El mecanismo de financiamiento basado en el suelo ha ayudado a los gobiernos municipales de China a recaudar una suma significativa de fondos destinados a la inversión de capital. No obstante, este éxito también ha generado un incentivo para que los gobiernos municipales dependan demasiado de las concesiones del suelo y de las UDIC. Hoy en día, la economía de China crece mucho más lentamente que antes, por lo que este mecanismo está perdiendo fuerza en muchos municipios donde la conversión del suelo rural en suelo de uso urbano excede la demanda real. Algunas ciudades han obtenido más préstamos de los que podían devolver, y han quedado fuertemente endeudadas.
Según muchos estudios empíricos, incluidos algunos financiados por el Instituto Lincoln, el mecanismo de financiamiento basado en el suelo en China es una de las principales causas de otros problemas urbanos que enfrentamos en la actualidad, tales como precios exorbitantes de la vivienda, deudas municipales en aumento, excesiva expropiación del suelo, creciente tensión entre agricultores y gobiernos municipales en torno a la expropiación del suelo, y brechas cada vez mayores en la distribución de los ingresos y la riqueza entre las poblaciones urbanas y las rurales.
LL: Los medios de comunicación internacionales han estado realizando informes acerca de estos problemas. ¿De qué manera afrontará China estas cuestiones?
ZL: Existe un alto nivel de consenso acerca de las causas profundas de estos problemas. En noviembre de 2013, el gobierno central anunció una serie de reformas, algunas de las cuales están directamente relacionadas con políticas de urbanización y finanzas municipales. Por ejemplo, los alcances de las expropiaciones del suelo se limitarán a los fines públicos, por lo que las aldeas podrán desarrollar su suelo para uso urbano según la premisa de que se realice de acuerdo con lo planificado. Las reformas también requieren la aceleración de la legislación sobre el impuesto a la propiedad, la reforma del hukou (el sistema de inscripción residencial para familias, que ayuda a los agricultores a convertirse en residentes urbanos) y la toma de medidas por parte del gobierno para poner los servicios públicos urbanos básicos a disposición de todos los residentes permanentes de las ciudades, incluso a los que migran del suelo rural al urbano.
LL: ¿Cuáles son los efectos de la reforma del hukou en las finanzas municipales?
ZL: El gobierno chino está eliminando gradualmente el antiguo sistema del hukou, y los efectos de esta decisión sobre las finanzas municipales serán importantes. El hukou se diseñó con el fin de identificar a un ciudadano como residente de una cierta ciudad, aunque durante décadas el gobierno utilizó este sistema para controlar la migración de áreas rurales a urbanas. Una persona inscrita como hukou rural no podía cambiar su inscripción a hukou urbano sin la autorización del gobierno. Y sin la inscripción como hukou urbano, un trabajador rural migrante no tiene derecho a recibir los servicios públicos que proporcionan los gobiernos urbanos.
A partir de la reforma económica, la economía urbana en expansión ha absorbido una gran cantidad de trabajadores migrantes que pasan de áreas rurales a urbanas. Anteriormente mencioné que el índice de urbanización de China es del 55 por ciento y que la población urbana es de 750 millones de habitantes. Estas cifras incluyen a los 232 millones de trabajadores rurales migrantes que permanecen en ciudades durante más de la mitad del año. Si se los excluyera del cálculo, el nivel de urbanización sería sólo del 38 por ciento. Sin embargo, debido a su inscripción como hukou rural, los trabajadores migrantes no tienen acceso a muchos de los servicios de los que gozan los inscritos como hukou urbano, a pesar de que muchos han trabajado y vivido en ciudades durante varios años. Los gobiernos municipales determinan el alcance de muchos de los servicios públicos urbanos, tales como las escuelas públicas y las viviendas económicas, de acuerdo con la cantidad de inscritos como hukou urbanos que existen dentro de la jurisdicción municipal. La eliminación gradual del hukou aumentaría significativamente la carga fiscal de los gobiernos municipales para proporcionar servicios públicos. Ciertos académicos en China estiman que el costo de prestar la totalidad de los servicios públicos urbanos a cada trabajador rural migrante ascendería al menos a RMB 100.000 (unos US$16.000). El desembolso total para todos los trabajadores rurales migrantes actuales sería al menos de RMB 23 billones (cerca de US$3,8 billones).
LL: China está introduciendo el impuesto sobre la propiedad residencial. ¿En qué estado se encuentra esta iniciativa?
ZL: El gobierno está redactando la primera ley nacional del impuesto sobre la propiedad como parte de la reforma de finanzas públicas actualmente en marcha. China es uno de los pocos países que no poseen impuestos municipales sobre la propiedad. El actual sistema impositivo depende en gran manera de los impuestos sobre los negocios y las transacciones y muy poco de los impuestos sobre los ingresos y la riqueza de los hogares. En una China más urbanizada con una población que tenga mayor poder adquisitivo para ser propietaria de sus propios inmuebles residenciales, el impuesto sobre la propiedad sería una fuente más viable de recaudación municipal. Hoy en día, el 89 por ciento de los hogares urbanos tiene la propiedad de una o más unidades residenciales, y el valor de dichas propiedades tiene mucho que ver con los servicios públicos urbanos. El impuesto sobre la propiedad permitirá que las ciudades impongan este tributo sobre las propiedades residenciales cuyo valor se vería beneficiado por una mejora de los servicios públicos que se brindarían gracias a los ingresos derivados de dicho impuesto. También cubriría una parte de la brecha fiscal que se generaría como consecuencia de la disminución prevista en la recaudación proveniente de las concesiones del suelo. No obstante, el impuesto sobre la propiedad no será una fuente principal de ingresos municipales en el corto plazo, ya que al Congreso Popular Nacional le llevará uno o dos años más aprobar la nueva ley. Además, a las ciudades les llevará dos o tres años establecer la base de datos de propiedades y el sistema de valuación y administración de las mismas.
LL: Debe de ser difícil para las ciudades tener que enfrentar una reducción de los ingresos derivados de las concesiones del suelo sin una alternativa inmediata, especialmente cuando están experimentando una creciente deuda municipal, tal como se ha informado ampliamente. ¿Cómo saldrán de esta situación las ciudades chinas?
ZL: La situación es verdaderamente difícil. La economía de China está en retroceso. El sector inmobiliario ya no es tan pujante como en los últimos diez años, lo que ha dado como resultado una menor demanda de suelo y, como consecuencia, los gobiernos municipales están obteniendo una recaudación derivada de las concesiones de suelo menor. Ahora las ciudades están experimentando una brecha fiscal. Una posible forma de cerrar esta brecha sería que los gobiernos municipales pudieran obtener préstamos. Sin embargo, tal como mencioné anteriormente, muchas ciudades están endeudadas y tienen poca capacidad para seguir pidiendo préstamos. De hecho, la mayoría de las ciudades en China no tiene una capacidad adecuada de gestión de deudas. La ley de presupuesto recientemente modificada permite que los gobiernos provinciales emitan bonos dentro de los límites establecidos por el Concejo del Estado, pero también cierra la posibilidad a los gobiernos municipales de recurrir a otras formas de obtener préstamos. Actualmente, el gobierno central promueve activamente el financiamiento de infraestructura a través de asociaciones público-privadas (PPP, por sus siglas en inglés). Aunque es un buen avance, no será suficiente para cerrar la brecha de financiamiento para infraestructuras, ya que las PPP resultan útiles principalmente en los casos de proyectos de infraestructura que poseen un sólido flujo de ingresos. Existen muchos otros proyectos de infraestructura urbana que generan muy pocos ingresos o directamente ninguno. A la larga, creo que China debería establecer de forma activa un mercado de bonos del gobierno municipal para canalizar los fondos provenientes de inversores institucionales hacia la inversión de infraestructura municipal y permitir que los gobiernos municipales tengan acceso a préstamos comerciales según su solvencia crediticia. A este fin, los gobiernos municipales deben desarrollar su capacidad institucional en varios frentes, tales como la gestión municipal de deudas, la planificación de una mejora de capital, la planificación del financiamiento para varios años, y la gestión municipal de bienes de infraestructura.
LL: ¿El trabajo del PLC es relevante para la reforma actual?
ZL: El PLC fue establecido en forma conjunta por el Instituto Lincoln y la Universidad de Pekín en el año 2007. Cuando ingresé en 2013, el Centro ya había construido su reputación como una de las principales instituciones de investigación y capacitación de China en cuestiones de desarrollo urbano y políticas de suelo. El Centro apoya diferentes actividades, como investigación, capacitación, intercambio académico, diálogo sobre políticas, becas de investigación, proyectos de demostración y publicaciones. Nos enfocamos en cinco temas principales: tributación sobre la propiedad y finanzas municipales, políticas de suelo, viviendas urbanas, desarrollo y planificación urbana, y medio ambiente urbano y su conservación. En los últimos años, nuestros proyectos de investigación han tocado temas como las finanzas dependientes del suelo, las deudas municipales, los precios de la vivienda, la inversión y el financiamiento del capital para infraestructura, y otras cuestiones relevantes para la salud fiscal municipal. Además, hemos brindado capacitación a diferentes agencias gubernamentales de China sobre las experiencias internacionales relativas al análisis y gestión del impuesto a la propiedad. Podría decirse que nuestro trabajo es muy pertinente en lo que respecta a la reforma actual.
La implementación de las nuevas reformas integrales de las políticas está generando una importante demanda de conocimientos internacionales y asesoramiento sobre políticas en las áreas de interés del programa para China, particularmente lo que tiene que ver con los impuestos a la propiedad y las finanzas municipales. Nuestra idea es comenzar un proyecto piloto de demostración en una o dos ciudades chinas seleccionadas, a fin de generar la capacidad institucional que se requiere para desarrollar un nivel de salud fiscal municipal a largo plazo. Nuestro equipo ha comenzado un estudio para desarrollar una serie de indicadores con el fin de medir la salud fiscal municipal de las ciudades chinas. Es el momento oportuno para que iniciemos este plan en China.
The Lincoln Institute, with the Land Trust Alliance and the National Park Service Conservation Study Institute, is working with two dozen senior conservation practitioners from public, private, nonprofit and academic organizations across the nation to consider the grand challenges facing the North American land and biodiversity conservation community in the twenty-first century. The conservationists, who shared ideas electronically for several months prior to their March 2002 meeting in Cambridge, explored emerging and needed conservation innovations that may prove commensurate with the challenges. Organized by James Levitt of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, Armando Carbonell of the Lincoln Institute and Fara Courtney, an environmental consultant based in Gloucester, Massachusetts, the group exchanged ideas through presentations, case studies and working groups. E.O. Wilson, the distinguished author and biodiversity scholar at Harvard University, addressed the session and participated in the discussions. This article presents several highlights of that leadership dialogue on conservation in the twenty-first century (C21).
“We have entered the twenty-first century, the century of the environment. The question of the century is, how can we best shift to a culture of permanence, both for ourselves and for the biosphere that sustains us?” E.O. Wilson
The Historical Context
Ask almost any American concerned with natural resources, “How and when did we start practicing conservation in this country?” In most cases, the response involves the role of the federal government at the turn of the twentieth century under President Teddy Roosevelt. While Roosevelt and his close associate Gifford Pinchot do stand as giants in the history of conservation in this nation, the record shows that Americans have a remarkable tradition of conservation that stretches back at least to the early days of the Republic.
Individuals and organizations in the private, nonprofit, public and academic sectors have throughout our history brought landmark conservation innovations to life, and they continue to do so. They have focused their attention on sites that span the urban-rural continuum, from city parks to remote wildernesses. In the context of repeated waves of immigration and population growth, a chain of stunning technological advances and a pattern of long-term economic growth, American conservation innovators have acted creatively and often with considerable passion to protect and manage natural and scenic wonders, working landscapes, native wildlife and recreational open space for their own benefit, for the benefit of the public at large, and for the benefit of future generations.
Consider the history of the land trust movement. Thomas Jefferson set an early precedent for private and nongovernmental protection of natural beauty in America. In 1773, three years before he penned the Declaration of American Independence, Jefferson purchased a parcel of land known as Natural Bridge near the Blue Ridge Mountains. He treasured the parcel throughout his adult life, inviting writers, painters and dignitaries to visit the site and record its wonders. By 1815 he wrote to William Caruthers to say that he held Natural Bridge “to some degree as a public trust, and would on no consideration permit the bridge to be injured, defaced or blocked from public view.”
Some 60 years after Jefferson’s death, Charles Eliot, son of the president of Harvard University and a protégé of Frederick Law Olmsted, took another historic step toward the nongovernmental protection of open space. He proposed the formation of a private association to hold parcels of land for the enjoyment of the citizens of Massachusetts, particularly the less affluent residents of Boston who needed an escape from the “poisonous” atmosphere of the crowded city so closely associated with the technological progress and demographic turmoil of the Gilded Age. With a charter from the Commonwealth granted in 1891, that organization, now known as The Trustees of Reservations, became the first statewide nongovernmental land trust.
Eliot’s innovation has proved to be truly outstanding, a landmark conservation innovation that meets all the criteria for outstanding innovations in the public interest set out by the Innovations in American Government program at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. The notion behind the Trustees has proved to be novel in conception, measurably effective, significant in addressing an important issue of public concern, and transferable to a large number of organizations around the world. Furthermore, and critically important in the field of conservation, Eliot’s innovation has demonstrated its ability to endure and remain vibrant after more than a century. The Trustees’ current director of land conservation, Wesley Ward, emphasizes that nongovernmental conservation organizations will continue to be called upon in the twenty-first century to “provide leadership by identifying challenges, advocating effective responses and providing relevant models of conservation and stewardship.”
The Lincoln Institute played an important role in the resurgent growth of the land trust movement in the early 1980s, when it focused its resources as an academic institution on how an exchange of information among several dozen land trusts in the U.S. might strengthen conservation standards and practices throughout the entire land conservation community. Jean Hocker, at that time organizing the Jackson Hole Land Trust, remembers well the early discussions convened at Lincoln House by Boston-area lawyer Kingsbury Browne. She explains that emerging from those deliberations was the idea that “we ought to form a new organization called the Land Trust Exchange that could help us all do our jobs better.” Hocker moved to Washington, DC, in 1987 to run the group, which became known as the Land Trust Alliance (LTA). Under her leadership, the organization led the land trust movement into a period of rapid growth and enduring achievement. In 2002, there are more than 1,200 local and regional land trusts in the U.S. that have helped to protect more than six million acres of open space. Furthermore, the LTA’s annual Rally is a now a high point of the year for more than a thousand land conservation volunteers and professionals spread across the continent and beyond who convene to share their best ideas.
The Trustees’ long history of conservation innovation and achievement is paralleled by the histories of many other public, nonprofit, academic and private sectors organizations represented by C21 participants. Nora Mitchell and Michael Soukup of the National Park Service underscore the significance of America’s creation of the world’s first national park at Yellowstone in 1872, an innovation of worldwide significance that was in part the brainchild of two private railroad entrepreneurs, Jay Cooke and Frederick Billings. Laura Johnson, president of the Massachusetts Audubon Society, takes justifiable pride in the achievement of her organization’s “Founding Mothers,” two women who established the nation’s oldest continuously operating Audubon society in 1896 and catalyzed the campaign that led to the signing of the first international migratory bird treaty. Robert Cook, director of Harvard’s Arnold Arboretum, explains the pivotal role of that institution in the emergence of American forestry policy as far back as the1870s. And Keith Ross of the New England Forestry Foundation, who spearheaded the precedent-setting effort concluded in 2000 to place a conservation easement on more than 760,000 acres of forest land owned by the Pingree family in Maine, emphasizes that the family’s private forest stewardship practices date back to the 1840s.
Complex Conservation Challenges
Notwithstanding the conservation community’s collective record of achievement, the land and biodiversity conservationists at the C21 meeting foresee grand challenges of extraordinary complexity and difficulty in the coming 50 to 100 years. In the context of expected growth in North American and world populations, changes in demographic patterns and ongoing technological development, as well as systemic changes in climate and other earth systems, they express deep concern regarding myriad potential changes on the landscape. These may include the accelerating loss of open space; intensified landscape fragmentation; further degradation of wildlife habitat; alarming declines in the viability of a wide range of biological species; and potentially significant stresses to earth systems that provide essential ecosystem services. Will Rogers, president of the Trust for Public Land, notes, “from a conservation viewpoint, the pace of growth and development is rapidly running us out of time.”
The concern of many C21 participants regarding the potential impact of growing human populations starts with the straightforward projection of the U.S. Census Bureau that the population of the U.S. will grow from some 280 million Americans in 2000 to about 400 million by 2050. Beyond the numbers, it is critical for conservation planners to understand that the diversity of the American population is forecast to change significantly, with particularly strong growth in the ranks of Hispanic Americans and Asian Americans. Jamie Hoyte, an authority on conservation and diversity at Harvard University, explains, “one of the most significant challenges we face is broadening and diversifying the community of conservation-minded citizens. Those who advocate for conservation must do so in a way that speaks to people of all backgrounds and races, demonstrating an understanding of the needs of a broad range of people.” Robert Perschel of the Wilderness Society expands on the idea, advising that we need to “enter into a new dialogue with the American people … to touch the hearts and spirits and wisdom of our citizenry.”
C21 participants also pointed out that new conservation initiatives are likely to be launched in the context of continuing economic growth and personal affluence. For perspective, note that real U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) grew more than five-fold between 1950 and 2000, and many economists expect to see comparable growth in coming decades. To protect open space and biodiversity in the midst of such great affluence, conservationists will need to leverage the nation’s economic power. According to Chip Collins of The Forestland Group, “North America’s economic growth has helped fuel the loss of biodiversity. At the same time, North America has led the world in the development and implementation of conservation strategies in large measure because of the extraordinary growth and vigor of its economy. One of the great challenges will be to manage this seeming dichotomy by effectively harnessing the private sector and redirecting its immense capital power base toward constructive conservation initiatives. The private sector, in stride with its nonprofit, public and academic counterparts, must be a full and constructive partner.”
As in the past, new and increasingly powerful technologies are likely to continue to proliferate. While offering considerable social and economic benefits, the new technologies may also be closely associated with large-scale environmental disturbances. In the past half-century, for example, the spread of interstate highways has effectively stimulated the American economy but has also been associated with pervasive environmental disruptions such as urban and rural landscape fragmentation, the creation of unhealthy air quality conditions, and the generation of significant volumes of gases associated with global climate change. Similarly, more recently introduced networked technologies, such as the Internet and advanced wireless communications networks, appear to be enabling continued net migration of Americans to formerly remote and highly environmentally sensitive locations across the continent. Technology-related change is not limited to the U.S., of course. Larry Morris of the Quebec-Labrador Foundation explains that new communications and transportation networks are influencing where and how people live worldwide, from Atlantic Canada to the Middle East.
Biodiversity scientists E.O. Wilson of Harvard and Leonard Krishtalka of the University of Kansas point out that while emerging technologies may be associated with environmental disruptions in coming decades, the same technologies are also proving critical to advancing our understanding of the diversity of life on earth. Krishtalka explains that “researchers are now learning how to harness the vast store of authoritative biodiversity information in natural history museums worldwide (about three billion specimens of animals and plants) and integrate it with other earth systems data for predictive modeling of environmental phenomena.” Such a predictive model was recently built by researchers in Kansas, California and Mexico to examine the fate of a wide variety of Mexican species under a range of global warming scenarios. The outcome of this and similar studies should be particularly useful to organizations striving to prioritize land and habitat protection opportunities in ecosystems throughout the western hemisphere that may be facing significant disruption in future.
In sum, despite remarkable progress, conservationists are in no position or mood to rest. John Berry of the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation advises, “if our standard is that of the ancient Greeks, that is, to leave our nation ‘not only not less, but richer and more bountiful than it was transmitted to us,’ than we have not yet earned the laurel crown.”
A New Generation of Conservation Innovators
Inspired by the precedents set by creative American conservationists in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, twenty-first century conservation practitioners are highly motivated to identify and implement new initiatives commensurate with the complex challenges of our day. C21 participants expressed interest in a wide variety of areas ripe for game-changing innovation, including the following.
Winning Hearts and Minds
Bill Weeks of The Nature Conservancy emphasizes that “the grandest challenge is to complete the task of getting the overwhelming majority of the public to care and act and vote like they care.” Rand Wentworth of the Land Trust Alliance agrees that conservationists should use the “tremendous power” of mass marketing to help create a national mandate for land conservation. Clare Swanger of the Taos Land Trust adds that the insight of mass marketers, but also of people living on the land, should be employed in such an effort. The outstanding question facing these conservationists is how to leverage modern marketing tools in a truly historic fashion. The aim would be to put together an effort comparable to the highly effective antismoking campaign of the last several decades, so as to build sustained momentum for the long-term protection and stewardship of “land for life.”
Building the Green Matrix
Addressing the multiple problems of open space consumption, loss of working landscapes, habitat fragmentation and biodiversity decline is a job that no single sector can tackle alone. Larry Selzer, president of the Conservation Fund and a proponent of smart conservation that balances economic returns with environmental principles, explains that effective action will require the cooperative efforts of landowners, policy makers and a wide diversity of individuals working across sectors. Furthermore, as Charles H.W. Foster of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government points out, effective conservation efforts are at least as likely to take place at local and regional levels as at federal and international ones. Just how effective “green matrix” landscapes and organizational structures can be effectively assembled and maintained over the long term remains an area for thorough exploration and experimentation. Among other C21 participants, Peter Stein of the Lyme Timber Company, Jay Espy of the Maine Coast Heritage Trust, and Ian Bowles of the Kennedy School and the Moore Foundation are actively advancing the evolving art of assembling protected landscapes where economic and conservation goals can be pursued simultaneously.
Following Through with Stewardship
Achieving long-term conservation goals, of course, requires that once protection is gained for a given area a well-crafted stewardship plan, and in some cases an environmental restoration plan, must be conceived, agreed to by the relevant parties and then implemented. Getting this done has proved to be neither simple nor easy. Financing and organizing such stewardship efforts is too often overlooked during intense, short-fused campaigns to protect given parcels of land. Bringing a new level of attention and expertise to land and habitat stewardship and restoration efforts will be an ongoing challenge to the conservation community, particularly as its portfolio of protected lands grows in coming decades.
Fortunately, conservationists can point to some forward-looking stewardship efforts now underway. For example, Ralph Grossi, president of the American Farmland Trust, notes that the 2002 Farm Bill will provide significant levels of funding for USDA-sponsored stewardship efforts on agricultural lands. Similarly, Jaime Pinkham, a member of the Nez Perce Tribe in Idaho, offers eloquent testimony about how tribes can work with local, federal and other authorities to restore keystone species to entire ecosystems, as was accomplished with the gray wolf in the Northern Rockies. Still, there is room for a great deal of progress and innovation in this area.
Synthesizing Conservation Science
Conservation scientists E.O. Wilson, Leonard Krishtalka and Douglas Causey all underscore the argument that very significant progress can be made in the coming century to build large-scale syntheses in conservation biology and ecology. Wilson is particularly emphatic about the need to catalog all living species, a global work-in-progress that is only about 10-percent complete. The All Species Foundation that Wilson helped to form proposes to “complete the censusing of all the plants, animals and micro-organisms in the world in 25 years.” “Is this a pipe dream?,” asks Wilson, rhetorically. “No way,” he answers. “It is megascience backed by the same sort of technology drivers as the Human Genome Project. The important thing is to see the exploration of the biosphere as a crucial task.”
Gaining a comprehensive understanding of the biosphere and the ability to predict ecosystem outcomes under a variety of possible futures is indeed a grand challenge for conservation scientists. Kathy Fallon Lambert of the Hubbard Brook Research Foundation adds, “a complementary challenge is to find clear and concise ways to explain significant field and laboratory research findings to the general public and to key decision makers so that they can carry out policy debates with the best available scientific information.”
From our vantage point at the commencement of this century we cannot accurately predict just what future generations, 50 or 100 years from now, will judge to be our generation’s most significant conservation innovations, comparable to earlier creations of the world’s first statewide land trust or national park. We do know, however, that we face significant and complex conservation challenges, and our ideas for powerful innovation will only yield results if we act on them with great personal and organizational energy and intensity. There is no argument that the best time to begin such efforts is now.
James N. Levitt is director of the Internet and Conservation Project, Taubman Center for State and Local Government, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. His research focuses on the potentially constructive and disruptive impacts of new communications and transportation networks on land use and the practice of conservation, as well as opportunities for landmark conservation innovation in the twenty-first century.
The property tax in Brazil is an annual tax on urban land and buildings administered at the local government level. The tax base is derived from market value and is standardized across different local authorities, although procedures for establishing the tax base and rates vary considerably.
In the city of Porto Alegre, the cost approach is the method traditionally employed for assessing real estate property for taxation purposes. No legal requirement exists concerning intervals between valuations, and the last general valuation took place in 1991. In years without valuations, the tax base has been readjusted uniformly according to prevailing inflation rates. The property tax rates are progressive, with sliding rates for six classes of assessed values to insert an element of “ability-to-pay” into the system. The tax is calculated by the sum of each portion of the assessed value multiplied by the respective rate for that class. The maximum rate for residential property reaches 1.2 percent.
Analysis of the Current System
A recent analysis of the property tax system in Porto Alegre sought to provide a full examination of the relationship between assessed values and sale prices. Some of the results are summarized below.
Assessment level and uniformity
Residential apartments in Porto Alegre were assessed on median at only 34 percent of their sale prices, much less than the statutory level of 100 percent. Using the coefficient of dispersion about the median [COD] of the assessed value to sale price ratio as a measure of variability, the results showed a low degree of assessment uniformity (approximately 36 percent). In Brazil, there are neither local nor national standards for evaluating assessment performance. By comparison, a commonly accepted degree of uniformity for single-family residential property in the United States is a coefficient between 10 and 15 percent. Figure 1 illustrates the ample spread of the assessment ratios in this study.
Factors determining assessment inequity
To examine the simultaneous effects of the factors determining assessment bias, a multivariate model was used to investigate both vertical and horizontal inequities. The model detected a large number of factors causing systematic differences in assessment levels, including location attributes, building quality, building year, presence of elevators and similar variables. Vertical assessment regressivity was also identified.
Assessment method
It is plausible to assert that the method traditionally employed for assessing real property, that is, the cost approach, is a major cause of the lack of assessment uniformity identified in this study. Some theoretical weaknesses of the approach are associated with the extensive number of simplifications implemented by the local authority to make its application easier, and these adjustments are likely to have determined assessment bias. Inconsistencies with the standard cost model include the lack of connection between cost tables and the performance of the real estate market, and low correlation between the ad hoc depreciation rates adopted and the reduction in price caused by age, obsolescence, or deterioration of building structures. Furthermore, lack of systematic control over valuation performance seems to have contributed to the high inaccuracy of assessed values.
Time lags between valuations
The method used to make an overall adjustment to assessed values based on prevailing inflation rates for years without valuation has clearly contributed to the reduction of the tax base. For instance, properties were assessed on median at 38 percent of their sale prices in 1993, but only 27 percent in 1995.
Effective versus statutory rates of property tax
Rates for residential property are progressive according to six classes of assessed value. The effective rate results from the actual amount raised from property taxation, without regard to tax evasion, divided by the sale price. The statutory rate results from the expected tax that could be raised per property, if the tax were established on the basis of sale price, divided by its sale price. The effective rate is much lower than the statutory rate and represents on median only 0.17 percent of sale price.
Improper assessment practices have affected the distribution of the tax burden, not only because assessed values do not bear a consistent relationship to sale prices but also because many properties are classified incorrectly. The actual property tax revenue collected in the period under study represented approximately 25 percent of the potential revenue to be raised if assessed values were equal to sale prices.
Causes of Poor Property Tax Administration
Historical factors may help to explain the current poor administration of the property tax in Porto Alegre and its inefficient use as a revenue source. During the 1970s, large transfers of revenue from the central government and private estates to municipalities complemented the revenue raised at the local government level. Consequently, local authorities were not interested in collecting their own taxes, and taxpayers were used to paying insignificant property tax bills. The achievement of good performance in terms of valuation and an acceptable degree of assessment equity were secondary issues.
Recent financial crises combined with the urgent need for public investment in infrastructure equipment and services have stimulated some local authorities to improve their tax systems. However, due to the high visibility of the property tax and taxpayer antipathy, efforts to recover revenue and achieve assessment equity often result in tax revolts. Furthermore, changes in the tax base must be approved by locally elected members of the Chamber of Councilors. Whenever general valuations are planned, the Council members are responsible for supporting capping systems in the name of protecting the poor and retired taxpayers. However, the capping systems actually favor high-income and wealthy taxpayers because low-income and retired taxpayers can receive relief based on their income.
Since 1991, two proposals for altering the property tax base in Porto Alegre have been rejected by the Chamber of Councilors because the estimated value of some properties would have been adjusted over the inflation rate at the time. However, the existing vertical assessment inequity means that high-valued properties are the ones benefiting from poor property tax administration.
Recommendations on Revising Practices and Attitudes
Knowledge about the weaknesses of a particular tax system is fundamental for its improvement, and the analysis undertaken in Porto Alegre provides greater understanding of the current system, the degree of assessment inequity and its main causes. For the first time, the drawbacks and weaknesses of the system are both quantified and measured, including which properties are benefiting from the system and the amount of revenue being lost. Now Porto Alegre has the opportunity to improve its property tax system on the basis of accurate data rather than political expediency.
Several measures would contribute to the overall equity of the tax system while also improving revenue collection to provide the community with higher standards of living:
§ Reassessment of properties based on current market values using the sales comparison approach to assessing residential property, such as multiple regression analysis (MRA), artificial neural networks (NN), or multilevel modeling (hierarchical linear models – HLMs).
§ Systematic control over assessed property values, including testing before the release of the valuation roll to recognize and adjust for eventual bias in the estimated tax base.
§ Assurance of regular assessment updates.
§ Establishment of market adjustments to assessed values based on ratio studies for years without valuation.
§ Transparency in the administration of the property tax, especially in graduating the size of the tax burden, instead of overriding estimates of market values arbitrarily for this purpose.
§ A definition of minimum standards for assessment performance at the local or national level.
The achievement of property tax equity and the provision of a high standard of public services are common goals for politicians, the community, administrators and others. Public officials need to take advantage of new technologies for property tax assessment and data gathering to make tax systems operate both efficiently and fairly. However, technical improvements are just a part of the process. It is also vital to work on public opinion. An important step is to encourage dialogue between community residents and politicians, showing the drawbacks of the current system and the consequences of keeping its structure. Confidence in the property tax system is likely to increase if revisions are discussed seriously in the public domain.
Claudia M. De Cesare is an assessor in the Department of Local Taxation for the Municipality of Porto Alegre. She received a Lincoln Institute Dissertation Fellowship in 1999 to support the research reported here and in her Ph.D. thesis, which she completed at the University of Salford in England. The Lincoln Institute is continuing to develop educational programs with administrators, politicians, scholars and the community in Porto Alegre to help improve the equity and efficiency of the property tax system.
In the context of entirely new fiscal policies and new approaches to property rights in central and eastern Europe over the past decade, taxes on land and buildings have taken on significant new roles—politically as adjuncts to privatization, restitution and decentralization, and fiscally as revenue-raising tools for local governments.
The Lincoln Institute is particularly interested in the complex debate over property-based taxes and in how different countries experience the transition from communism to democracy and from planned to market-driven economies. Over the past four years, the Institute has undertaken a series of educational programs to help public officials and business leaders in eastern Europe understand both underlying principles and practical examples of property taxation and valuation through offering varied perspectives and frameworks for decision making.
The Institute is also sponsoring a series of case studies to compare the implementation of ad valorem property tax systems in eastern European countries. These studies provide a unique perspective from which to review the initiation of land privatization, fiscal decentralization and land markets, as well as to compare the various legal and administrative features adopted for the respective tax systems.
Programs in Estonia
The Baltic country of Estonia was the first of the new independent states to recognize the benefits of land taxation and thus has been the focus of several Lincoln Institute programs. The Institute’s work in Estonia began in September 1993 when Fellow Jane Malme and Senior Fellow Joan Youngman participated in a conference with the Paris-based Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) on the design of a property taxation system. Estonia had just instituted its land tax program, and since then the Institute has continued to support programs there relating to land reform and property taxation.
The most recent education program, on “Land and Tax Policies for Urban Markets in Estonia,” was presented in the capital of Tallinn in May to nearly 30 senior-level state and city officials interested in public finance, land reform and urban development. President H. James Brown, Jane Malme, Joan Youngman and a faculty of international experts explored current issues concerning land reform, valuation and taxation. They also discussed methods of urban planning, land management and taxation to both encourage development of urban land markets and finance local governments.
Estonia is also serving as the pilot case study for a survey instrument to gather and analyze information from countries adopting new fiscal instruments for market-based economies. Malme and Youngman are working closely with Tambet Tiits, director of a private real estate research and consulting firm in Tallinn, to draft the survey, research and collect data, and analyze the results.
Other Case Studies and Conferences
A second case study examines Poland, where an ad valorem property tax law is under legislative consideration. Dr. Jan Brzeski, director of the Cracow Real Estate Institute, serves as the country research director and liaison with the Institute. Subsequent studies will survey Latvia, Lithuania and Russia. In addition, Professors Gary Cornia and Phil Bryson of the Marriott School of Management at Brigham Young University in Utah are using the Lincoln Institute survey instrument to study property tax systems in the Czech and Slovak Republics.
The Lincoln Institute was a sponsor of the fourth international conference on local taxation and property valuation of the London-based Institute of Revenues, Rating and Valuation (IRRV) in Rome in early June. The conference attracts about 300 senior level officials from central as well as local governments throughout Europe. Dennis Robinson, Lincoln Institute vice president for programs and operations, was on the conference advisory committee and chaired a session on “Case Studies in Local Taxation in the New Democracies,” at which Jane Malme and Joan Youngman discussed the Institute’s case studies on land and building taxation in transitional economies. Other participants in that session were Institute associates Tambit Tiits of Estonia and Jan Brzeski of Poland. Board member Gary Cornia spoke about his research on property taxation in the Czech Republic. Martim Smolka, senior fellow for Latin America and the Caribbean, presented a paper on “Urban Land Management and Value Capture” at another session chaired by Joan Youngman. Jane Malme also was a discussion leader for a session on “Tax Collection and Administration.”
The Institute is planning another program with OECD in December 1997 for public officials and practitioners in the Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to examine policy aspects of land valuation and mass appraisal concepts for ad valorem taxation.
The land market allocates land and access to urban amenities, and it does so with impressive efficiency. Yet, economists and planners continue to debate the extent to which the market fails to achieve broader social goals, how far regulation can offset for that failure, and even whether regulation results in land market outcomes being even farther from the socially desired outcome than would be the case without any regulation. To examine this debate and the underlying issues, more than 30 economists and planners met at the Lincoln Institute in July 2002 to encourage new policy-relevant analysis on land markets and their regulation, and to foster more fruitful communication between the disciplines.
At the center of the substantive debate was the basic question of regulation within a market economy and the unintended consequences that can result. The discussions touched upon many themes including gentrification, the use of public resources for private consumption, distributional issues, urban form and its regulation. If perspectives regarding market regulation differed between the two disciplines, so too did views regarding the strengths and limitations of the analytic tools that academics from different disciplines bring to such thorny problems. Among the challenges are the basic questions of how to define the problem, how to measure the current conditions in light of limited data, and how to interpret findings. Throughout the conference, the differences in the perspectives, assumptions, tools and references between planners and economists were ever present, in particular with regard to the role of politics in planning and policy making.
Unintended Consequences of Land Market Regulations
Despite their differences, concern for land markets and their centrality to social, political and economic life was the common focus of both economists and planners at the conference. They agreed that land markets are about far more than land. These markets have an important role in delivering life experiences and conditioning the welfare of the majority of people in developed and developing countries alike who live and work in cities. In addition, their regulation has both direct and indirect economic effects that extend into many areas of economic life and public policy. For example, the urban poor are likely to have worse schools and to experience higher levels of neighborhood crime because land markets capitalize the values of neighborhood amenities, such as better school quality and lower crime, thereby pricing poorer households into less desirable neighborhoods.
This power of land markets to reflect and capitalize factors that affect a household’s welfare was revealed in a study of impact fees levied on new development in Florida. Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy found that impact fees appear to be fully capitalized into house prices for owners of new and existing houses by redistributing the costs of new infrastructure provision from existing taxpayers to a reduced value of development land. In fast-growing Miami the cost of impact fees was borne by developers, yet offset by the increases they received in higher prices for new housing, “while buyers of new homes are compensated for a higher price by the property tax savings they experience. In contrast to the neutral effects that fees have on developers, landowners, and purchasers of new housing, impact fees provide existing homeowners a capital gain” (Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy, 26).
One complement to their story of Florida’s impact fees was illustrated in several other papers concerned with the unintended outcomes of regulation. British participants reported that Britain’s containment policy has generated higher densities within urbanized areas, but cities leapfrog out across their Greenbelts (or growth boundaries) to smaller satellite settlements; the consequence is that development becomes less contiguous and travel times increase. Villages become high-density suburbs surrounded by a sea of wheat: London in functional terms extends to cover most of southeastern England.
In a U.S. example based on an econometric simulation, Elena Irwin and Nancy Bockstael found that a clustering policy intended to preserve open space could instead backfire. Using Maryland data, they simulated the effects of a policy that was intended to preserve rural open space and found that it would instead accelerate development if “small to moderate amounts of open space are required to be preserved (specifically, 20 acres or less) and would slow the timing of development if larger amounts of open space are required to be preserved” (Irwin and Bockstael, 26). Their simulation results yield an interpretation that is highly nuanced and requires careful thought. That is, under certain conditions the cluster policy can backfire, while under other specific conditions the policy can yield an intended policy outcome.
These hypothetical clusters in Maryland may be echos of a real situation that Jean Cavailhès and his colleagues observed in the French countryside, where some urban dwellers moved to farm regions to create a mixed-use area that is neither entirely urban nor entirely rural. These former urbanites appear to value their proximity to a functioning rural landscape in exchange for longer commutes and (surprisingly) smaller residential lots. The authors hypothesize that these peri-urban dwellers benefit in different ways from living among the farmers.
In another example of the unintended consequences of regulations, Donald Shoup analyzed curbside parking. Many U.S. municipalities require developers to provide minimal parking per square foot of new commercial or, in some communities, residential space. The requirement for off-street parking, coupled with a systematic underpricing of curbside parking, has a double impact, according to Shoup. It imposes a substantial tax on affected developments (equivalent to up to 88 percent of construction costs), increases land taking, and means that public revenues annually lost an amount equal to the median property tax.
In these cases of unintended consequences of policy or regulatory interventions in the market, the authors argued for more careful design of both policies and regulations so state and local governments could reasonably achieve their policy goals. Despite the fact that the conference debate tended to pit regulation against the market, there was probably a tendency—if not full-fledged consensus—to favor market incentives and disincentives to achieve policy goals, rather than to rely strictly, or even largely, on regulation. Roger Bolton’s comments on Shoup’s paper cogently reflected this viewpoint. He said that Shoup’s work was valuable because it urges us to pay attention to a whole package of “important and related phenomena: inefficient pricing of an important good, curb parking; inefficient regulation of another good, privately owned off-street parking; and missed opportunities for local government revenue.”
Data and Measurement Challenges
Growth management and urban form were referenced extensively throughout the conference. The paper presented by Henry Overman, and written with three colleagues (Burchfield et al.) provided useful grounding to that conversation. They attempted to measure the extent of sprawl for the entire continental U.S. Using remote sensing data they calculated and mapped urban development and the change in urban land cover between 1976 and 1992. They defined sprawl as either the extension of the urban area, or leapfrog development, or lower-density development beyond the urban fringe. They concluded that only 1.9 percent of the continental U.S. was in urban use and only 0.58 percent had been taken for urban development in the 16-year period covered by the study. Furthermore, during this period, urban densities were mostly on the increase.
This study found development to be a feature of the “nearby urban landscape,” whether that was defined as close to existing development, or near highways or the coasts, and thus was perceived as encroaching on where people lived or traveled. The authors use this last observation to reconcile the apparent contradiction between their finding that less than 2 percent of the continental U.S. has been developed and the fact that containing and managing sprawl is at the center of policy agendas in many states and regions across the U.S. While relatively little land might have been consumed by new development in aggregate during the study period, many people see and experience this development on a daily basis and perceive it to represent significant change, often the kind of change they do not like.
The conference discussion touched upon some of the data questions raised by this work. The paper’s discussant, John Landis, noted some challenges he has faced in working with these and similar data to measure growth patterns in California. The estimates by Burchfield et al. are extremely low, possibly for technical reasons, according to Landis. Among the reasons is the difficulty in interpreting satellite images and the different outcomes that can occur when different thresholds are used for counting density, for example. That is, an area can be classified as more or less dense depending on what threshold the analysts establishes. “Ground-truthing” is required to remove some of the arbitrariness from the analysis, but this is an enormously costly undertaking.
Policy analysts are always faced with data limitations. Sometimes the problem is missing data, while other times it is data with questionable reliability. Yet, all too often researchers spend very little time paying attention to how serious that deficiency is for the policy problem at hand. When the available data is a very long time series with frequent intervals that relies on a well-structured and well-understood data collection method, and where few transformations occur between data collection and data use, most researchers and policy analysts would feel extremely comfortable interpolating one or two or even a handful of missing data points. Econometricians relying on data collected at regular intervals from government surveys frequently face this situation and are quite adept at filling in such “holes in the data.” In the world of limited data, that might be considered the best-case scenario.
At the other extreme we might have data that are collected using relatively new methods and that require significant transformation between collection and use. Data reliability likely decreases under these circumstances. Given the imperfect world in which we live, the answer is probably not to insist on using only the “best data.” However, researchers and policy analysts do have the obligation to use care in interpreting results based on weak data and to convey that weakness to their audience.
Another side of the limited data problem is the translation from concept to measure, and it explains why the conference participants spent so much time discussing “What is sprawl?” For researchers this question becomes “How does one define sprawl in such a way that one can measure it?” Burchfield et al. define sprawl as leapfrog or discontiguous urban development. Landis argues for “a more multi-faceted definition of sprawl, one that also incorporates issues of density, land use mix, and built-form homogeneity.”
Definitions are not trivial in policy analysis. If we cannot define the problem or the outcome, and we cannot measure it, how can we know if it is getting better or worse, and if our policies are having an impact? On the other hand, a very precise definition of a different but perhaps related concept may lead to unnecessary intervention. The new policy may improve the score on the measure but have little or no effect on the problem. For a variety of reasons (perhaps in part the customs and cultures within different disciplines) the economists at the conference tended to favor concepts that are simple and for which the data exist. On the other hand, the planners tended to favor concepts that are messy. In the end, one is left with weaknesses on both sides. The uni-dimensional definition, and therefore the uni-dimensional measure, may provide many of the desirable properties that allow statistical analyses. Multi-dimensional concepts are difficult to translate into measures. Which is better for policy making?
The Political Nature of Land Policy
Planning as a political activity was emphasized by several authors, notably Chris Riley (discussant of papers by Edwin Mills and Alan Evans), to emphasize the importance for economists to recognize this role and the constraints it imposes on significant change (particularly given the capacity of land markets to capitalize into asset values the amenities generated by planning policies themselves). Richard Feiock added there was also evidence that the forms of planning policies that communities selected (both the severity of such policies and the degree to which they relied on regulation in contrast to market instruments) could be largely accounted for by the political structure and socioeconomic and ethnic composition of those communities.
Participants reacted differently to the political nature of land policy and planning. For some this was problematic: it meant that the market was not being allowed to work. For others, it meant that the political process in a democracy was being allowed to work: the people had spoken and the policy reflected the expressed will of the body politic.
Reflections on Debate
The differences between economists and planners will continue, and differences among practitioners in different countries and even different parts of the same country (notably the large United States) can either stimulate or thwart future debates over the study of land market policies and implementation. Perhaps, though, the word debate itself thwarts our efforts. In debates, the debaters rarely change their minds. They enter the debate with their point of view firmly fixed and do not get “points” for admitting that their debating opponent taught them something or that they have consequently changed their own mind. However, one purpose of a professional conference is, indeed, for thoughtful people to consider their own assumptions and to be informed and changed by the points of view of others. In the future, perhaps debates will be supplanted with reflective conversation.
Paul Cheshire is professor of economic geography at the London School of Economics, England; Rosalind Greenstein is senior fellow and cochair of the Department of Planning and Development at the Lincoln Institute; and Stephen C. Sheppard is professor in the Department of Economics at Williams College, Massachusetts. They jointly organized the Lincoln Institute conference, “Analysis of Urban Land Markets and the Impact of Land Market Regulation,” on which this article is based.
Conference Papers
The conference participants whose papers are cited in this article are noted below. All conference papers and discussants’ comments are posted on the Lincoln Institute website (www.lincolninst.edu) where they can be downloaded for free
Burchfield, Marcy, Henry Overman, Diego Puga and Matthew A. Turner. “Sprawl?”
Cavailhès, Jean, Dominique Peeters, Evangelos Sékeris, and Jacques-François Thisse. “The Periurban City.”
Feiock, Richard E. and Antonio Taveras. “County Government Institutions and Local Land Use Regulation.”
Ihlanfeldt, Keith R. and Timothy Shaughnessy. “An Empirical Investigation of the Effects of Impact Fees on Housing and Land Markets.”
Irwin, Elena G. and Bockstael, Nancy E. “Urban Sprawl as a Spatial Economic Process.”
Shoup, Donald. “Curb Parking: The Ideal Source of Public Revenue.”