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A large share of national energy consumption takes place in cities—in the United States about three-quarters of energy use is in or related to urban areas. Accordingly, cities offer significant opportunities for energy savings from increased efficiency, but important issues remain: Will market forces produce efficiency gains when appropriate, or will market failures such as imperfect information, unavailable financing, or misunderstood risks impede market solutions? How much do people value energy savings, and how sensitive are they to changes in energy prices? The Lincoln Institute hosted a conference on energy efficiency and cities in October 2012 to address these and related issues, and a few highlights follow.
Valuing Energy Efficiency
Consumers should be willing to pay more for built space that uses less energy. Evidence indicates that users of commercial space value energy efficiency and are willing to pay more for it, and many studies indicate that LEED-certified office and commercial space sells or rents at a premium over traditional space. There is much less evidence of such preferences for residences, in part because it is difficult for most homebuyers to determine the energy efficiency of a dwelling, especially a new one with no operating record.
Some residential developments are now being classified using procedures similar to LEED certification or to the Energy Star ratings such as those used for major appliances. Dwellings in California that have the highest energy efficiency ratings sell at a premium of about 9 percent above units with average energy efficiency. Similar price premiums have been observed in the Netherlands for houses certified at the highest efficiency level using a European certification procedure. Some of these premiums may reflect the improved comfort levels that these buildings provide in addition to energy savings. It also seems likely that the energy efficiency premium observed in California is up to three times greater than the incremental cost of the higher efficiency of these dwellings.
Determining Cost
The cost of integrating energy efficiency into new buildings is less than the cost of improving the efficiency of older buildings. A home built since 2000 uses about 25 percent less energy per square foot than one built in the 1960s or earlier. The technical potential for improved energy efficiency in older homes seems evident, but homeowners face two challenges: to determine which improvements have the highest payoff per dollar spent, and to obtain a contractor and financing for the work.
While many diagnostic tools are available to assess existing dwellings, their accuracy varies widely and depends critically on detailed inputs about both the dwelling’s attributes and the household’s living style. Obtaining a contractor and financing can involve high transaction costs for households in effort, time, and money. Many utility companies are offering both technical and financial support for energy retrofitting, but progress has been slow.
Changing Energy Consumption
It may be easier to change residential living styles than to retrofit old buildings, and many utilities are experimenting with schemes to modify household behavior. The most common program involves “nudging” households toward more efficient habits by providing periodic home energy reports that compare their recent energy use with that of their neighbors. Analysis indicates that these reports have both a short-term impact on household energy consumption and a longer-term cumulative impact that continues after the reports end. The energy savings from these programs are small, ranging from a half to one kilowatt hour per day for a household, but the program’s low cost makes the results as cost-effective as many other policies.
Recognizing John Quigley
This conference was designed with John Quigley, economics professor at the University of California at Berkeley, who passed away before the conference took place. In addition to the original papers on energy and cities, papers on urban economics were presented by some of his former students, colleagues, and coauthors. All of the papers will be submitted for a forthcoming special edition of Regional Science and Urban Economics, which will recognize his contributions over a long and distinguished career.
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The property tax is the most widely unpopular tax in America. States have responded to this public opposition by enacting a range of tax relief policies, especially for homeowners (Cabral and Hoxby 2012). Among the most commonly adopted programs are homestead exemptions and property tax credits; all but three states have at least one of these programs. But despite their broad use and their potentially large impact on the distribution of property tax burdens, there has been remarkably little data available on the tax savings generated by property tax exemptions and credits.
Two new resources, available through the Lincoln Institute’s Significant Features of the Property Tax subcenter, begin to fill this need. These tables provide information for each state on the share of homeowners eligible for these programs and the level of tax savings they receive, as well as an analysis of how eligibility and benefits vary across the income distribution (see box 1, p. 26). This article draws on these resources to provide the first national study of property tax exemptions and credits with estimates of tax savings from these programs. With this information, policy makers have a critical tool to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of their property tax relief programs.
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Box 1: State-by-State Details on Property Tax Exemptions and Credits
The Significant Features of the Property Tax sub-center provides three key resources with information on property tax exemptions and credits in all 50 states; it is accessible at www.lincolninst.edu/subcenters/significant-features-property-tax.
Tax Savings from Property Tax Exemptions and Credits
This online Excel file includes estimates of tax savings from programs in individual states (see abbreviated example below), plus overview tables that make it easy to compare across states. For each program, the file provides estimates of the number of eligible homeowners and the median benefit, as well as a distributional analysis by income quintile. This is the first time that detailed data are available for most of these programs.
Summary Table on Exemptions and Credits
This online Excel file includes a set of tables for 167 programs displaying the value of exemptions expressed in terms of market value; criteria related to age, disability, income, and veteran status; the type of taxes affected (i.e., school or county taxes); whether the tax loss is borne by state or local governments; local options; and more. The summary table makes it easy to conduct quantitative analysis of these programs or make quick state-by-state comparisons. The information in these tables was used to generate the tax savings estimates.
Residential Property Tax Relief
This section of the Significant Features website includes detailed descriptions of property tax exemptions and credits, which were used to create the online Summary Table on Exemptions and Credits. It also describes other types of property tax relief, such as circuit breakers and tax deferral programs.
Notes: Total tax savings from the Senior and Disabled Property Tax Homestead Exemption ($392M) is less than the combined total of the programs for Seniors ($378M) and the Disabled ($22M), because homeowners who are 65+ and disabled cannot claim the exemption twice. The online Summary Table shows that the Senior and Disabled Exemption is a $25,000 exemption for homeowners who are 65+ or disabled; the two Rollback programs are percentage exemptions of 2.5% and 10% for all owner-occupied residences. Source: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy (2015).
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How Property Tax Exemptions and Credits Work
Property tax relief programs come in a variety of forms. Homestead exemptions reduce the amount of property value subject to taxation, either by a fixed dollar amount or by a percentage of home value. Property tax credits, in contrast, directly reduce the homeowner’s tax bill by a fixed dollar amount or certain percentage.
As table 1 illustrates, programs designed to provide identical benefits to owners of $200,000 homes have widely different impacts on homeowners with higher- and lower-valued properties. Given a 1% tax rate, a $20,000 flat dollar exemption reduces property taxes for each homeowner by $200 ($20,000 x 1%). This program has a progressive impact on the property tax distribution because lower-income households tend to have less valuable homes, and the exemption represents a larger share of their home values. In this case, the $20,000 exemption reduces property taxes by 20% on the $100,000 home, 10% on the $200,000 home, and 5% on the $400,000 home.
A percentage exemption, in contrast, provides the same percentage reduction in taxes for all three homeowners—in this example, 10%. In dollar terms, however, percentage exemptions favor owners with higher-valued homes: a 10% across-the-board reduction lowers property taxes by only $100 on the $100,000 home but $400 on the $400,000 home.
In the case of flat dollar credits, homeowners with lower-valued homes usually receive the largest tax cuts in percentage terms. In contrast, the percentage tax credit again provides the owner of the $400,000 home the largest tax cut in dollar terms.
An important feature of property tax exemptions and percentage credits is that the dollar reduction (but not the percentage reduction) in taxes increases with tax rates. For instance, if the homes in table 1 were subject to a 2% tax rate, the dollar savings to their owners would double under the $20,000 exemption, 10% exemption, and 10% credit. While the dollar savings from flat dollar credits do not vary with tax rates, the percentage savings to homeowners decrease as tax rates rise.
Critical Features of Exemptions and Credits
The design of homestead exemption and property tax credit programs varies significantly across the 50 states. Figure 1 (p. 28) summarizes the number and share of state programs with the following key characteristics.
Benefit Calculation
Perhaps the most important feature of property tax relief programs is how benefits are calculated. In 2012, 59% of state programs provided flat dollar exemptions, 19% provided percentage exemptions, and the final fifth used property tax credits or other more complicated formulas to determine the amount of tax relief for each homeowner.
While the programs work in similar ways, their effects differ dramatically. As the examples in table 1 show, flat dollar exemptions and credits make the property tax distribution more progressive, while percentage exemptions and credits do not. As a result, to provide a certain level of tax relief for the median homeowner, percentage exemptions are more expensive than other programs because they result in larger property tax cuts for owners of higher-valued homes. Instead of changing the distribution of property taxes among homeowners, percentage exemptions are primarily a way to shift the tax burden away from homeowners as a group to businesses, renters, and owners of second homes.
State vs. Local Funding
The ultimate impact of exemptions and credits on property tax bills depends on how the programs are funded. Figure 1 shows that in 2012 only 28% of these programs included full state reimbursement to cover local revenue losses, while 57% had local governments bear revenue losses on their own. For 15% of programs, state and local governments shared the revenue loss in some way. (Broad-based programs for all homeowners or all seniors are more likely to receive state funding than programs for smaller groups such as veterans or the disabled. In 2012, 43% of tax relief programs for all homeowners or seniors were state-funded, 48% were locally-funded, and the rest split the revenue loss [Lincoln Institute of Land Policy 2014].)
The primary argument in favor of state funding of property tax exemptions and credits is that it can help mitigate disparities in property wealth across localities. Poorer communities and those without a significant business tax base typically have higher property tax rates, and these communities receive more funds per homeowner under state-funded programs. Without this assistance, communities with higher tax rates will experience larger revenue losses from tax relief programs unless they increase tax rates even further.
Seniors vs. All Age Groups
A number of states provide property tax relief for seniors. In 2012, more than a third favored seniors in some way: seven had statewide programs solely for this group, while 11 also covered younger homeowners but provided higher benefits for older homeowners. Other states provided either the same level of benefits for homeowners of all ages (15 states) or did not have broad-based programs (18 states).
Common arguments for targeting senior homeowners is that property taxes account for a larger share of their incomes, and local governments spend less on seniors than on younger homeowners with school-aged children. While it is true that property taxes account for a larger share of income for seniors than for working-age homeowners, the two groups devote nearly identical shares of their incomes to total housing costs because seniors are far less likely to have mortgages (Bowman et al. 2009, 11). In addition, property taxes are payments for public services, not user fees (Kenyon 2007, 36). Younger households without children in public schools do not benefit from property tax relief under these programs. The preferential tax treatment of seniors may simply reflect the fact that older households are a politically powerful group that votes in high numbers.
Estimating the Benefits of Exemptions and Credits
To estimate tax savings from homestead exemptions and property tax credits, the first step was to create the online Summary Table on Exemptions and Credits, which describes the key features of each program (see box 1 for description). These data draw almost entirely from the Residential Property Tax Relief Programs section of the Lincoln Institute’s Significant Features of the Property Tax database.
The second step was to combine this information with household-level data from the 2008–2012 American Community Survey (ACS). This nationally representative survey has data on more than 6.5 million U.S. households, including the household characteristics that determine program eligibility (age, income, disability, veteran status, etc.) and level of benefits received (home values and property tax bills). For a full explanation of the methodology used to estimate tax savings from exemptions and credits, see Langley (2015).
It is important to note that the estimates reported here are gross property tax savings. Tax relief programs often lead to higher property tax rates, especially under locally-funded programs where jurisdictions raise tax rates to offset the drop in the tax base from the exemptions. Estimates of net property tax savings would be lower in those communities, because the higher tax rates offset some of the direct tax relief provided from exemptions and credits.
Figure 2 shows that total property tax relief from homestead exemptions and property tax credits varies widely across states, but is generally small relative to total property tax revenues. In 14 of the 45 states with these programs, total savings are less than 0.5% of property tax revenues; in 27 states, the savings are less than 2.5%. At the same time, though, tax savings in nine states equal or exceed 10% of total property tax revenues. Indiana’s program is particularly generous, offering all homeowners a $45,000 exemption, then an additional 35% exemption for the first $600,000 in assessed value and a 25% exemption for value above $600,000.
Tax Savings for Different Types of Programs
Most states have more than one property tax exemption or credit program, with different programs targeting different groups of taxpayers—typically all homeowners, seniors, veterans, or the disabled. Figure 3 presents estimates on the share of homeowners eligible for these programs, along with the level of tax savings they receive.
Homeowners
Programs in 26 states are for nearly all homeowners, but usually limited to owner-occupied primary residences. In the typical state with these programs, the median homeowner receives a 12.5% cut in property taxes. On the high end, however, the median property tax cut was at least 25% in more than a quarter of states with these programs.
Seniors
Property tax relief programs in 18 states target older homeowners (typically at least age 65). These programs are much more generous than those covering all homeowners, with a median tax reduction of nearly 30% in the typical state. More than half of these programs provide a median tax cut of at least 25%, while only a sixth of them provide a median tax savings of less than 10%.
In the median state, 19.6% of homeowners are eligible for the programs, but eligibility rates vary greatly across states depending on whether there is an income ceiling. In the seven states that provide property tax relief to seniors regardless of income, 25–30% of homeowners are typically eligible. But in seven states with low income cutoffs ($10,000 to $30,000), only 5–10% of homeowners qualify. The other four states with property tax relief programs for seniors do not fit neatly into these two categories because they have higher income ceilings, strict wealth limits, or other eligibility criteria.
Veterans
State programs for veterans are more common than for any other group of homeowners, although eligibility is often limited to those who are disabled. Indeed, only 10 states provide property tax exemptions or credits for all veterans, even those without disabilities. In the median state with these programs, the typical beneficiary receives a property tax cut of just 3.2%.
There are 31 states that provide property tax exemptions or credits to veterans with service-connected disabilities. Because of the disability requirement, most veterans are ineligible for the programs. Indeed, only 15% of veterans qualify in the typical state. Overall, just 0.6% of homeowners are eligible for these programs in the median state.
Moreover, most of the 31 programs base eligibility and benefit levels on disability ratings from the Department of Veterans Affairs. Just seven states have programs for all partially disabled veterans, and veterans with lower disability ratings typically receive modest tax savings. On the other hand, 18 states restrict eligibility to veterans who are permanently and totally disabled. These programs benefit a very small share of veterans, but they usually provide a full 100% exemption.
Disabled
Programs in 23 states cover disabled homeowners, but really target two distinct groups: disabled homeowners and blind homeowners. In 2012, 12 states had programs for disabled homeowners, seven states had programs for the blind, and five states covered both groups. Programs for the disabled typically require beneficiaries to be permanently and totally disabled, but exact criteria vary. In the median state, 2.3% of homeowners are eligible for these programs and they receive a median property tax cut of 21%.
Conclusion
Homestead exemptions and property tax credits are an important part of the property tax system. These programs are used in nearly all states and can make the distribution of property taxes significantly more progressive. It is therefore critical that policymakers have good data on the property tax relief that these programs actually provide.
New research makes this information available for the first time. Using the Lincoln Institute’s Significant Features of the Property Tax subcenter, policymakers can easily compare key features of property tax exemption and credit programs across states, and see estimates of eligibility and tax savings. These data make it possible to evaluate the impacts of property tax exemptions and credits in their particular states as well as find ideas for program improvements.
Adam H. Langley is Senior Research Analyst at the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. Special thanks go to Andrew Reschovsky, who provided extensive comments on this article and other related papers.
References
Bowman, John H., Daphne A. Kenyon, Adam Langley, and Bethany P. Paquin. 2009. Property Tax Circuit Breakers: Fair and Cost-Effective Relief for Taxpayers. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
Cabral, Marika, and Caroline Hoxby. 2012. “The Hated Property Tax: Salience, Tax Rates, and Tax Revolts.” Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. Working paper 18514. November.
Kenyon, Daphne A. 2007. The Property Tax-School Funding Dilemma. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
Langley, Adam H. 2015. “Estimating Tax Savings from Homestead Exemptions and Property Tax Credits.” Working paper. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. 2014. Significant Features of the Property Tax. Residential Property Tax Relief Programs: Summary Table on Exemptions and Credits in 2012. www.lincolninst.edu/subcenters/significant-features-property-tax/Report_Residential_Property_Tax_Relief_Programs.aspx
Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. 2015. Significant Features of the Property Tax. Tax Savings from Property Tax Exemptions and Credits in 2012. www.lincolninst.edu/subcenters/significant-features-property-tax/Report_Residential_Property_Tax_Relief_Programs.aspx
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Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 5 del libro Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.
Actualmente se está llevando a cabo en La Habana, Cuba, un programa de estudio de aprovechamiento del suelo y de su valor para fines de facilitar la revitalización física y el desarrollo económico en Cuba. Participan en dicho estudio investigadores del Instituto Lincoln y del Grupo para el Desarrollo Integral de la Capital (GDIC).
Durante la era soviética, la economía cubana estaba caracterizada por un modelo económico de decisiones tomadas “desde arriba”, en el cual los organismos estatales eran los principales actores de la economía y del desarrollo. La planificación era autocrática e inflexible; el comercio dependía principalmente de los países del bloque socialista; la capacidad financiera estaba centralizada en el presupuesto nacional; y no existía un sistema tributario. Las reformas legales, financieras y económicas puestas en marcha desde 1990 han ayudado a crear un entorno institucional conducente al aumento de la eficiencia económica y de la participación cubana en el mercado mundial (ver tabla 1).
Así y todo, la economía de Cuba sigue tropezando con enormes dificultades que han afectado seriamente la sustentación del estándar de vida de sus habitantes, la calidad de los servicios sociales y públicos, y los programas de desarrollo económico en general. Para citar un ejemplo, en 1995 el producto interior bruto (PIB) de la isla se había reducido a la mitad de su valor de 1989, mientras que la capacidad de importación había caído de manera precipitosa, desde unos US$ 8 mil millones a US$ 2 mil millones anuales.
Tabla 1: Resumen de las principales reformas
Apertura del mercado agropecuario a partir de mecanismos de oferta y demanda
El gobierno cubano ha tratado de promover el turismo como la fuente principal de generación rápida de esas divisas tan necesarias. Siendo una isla del mar Caribe, Cuba ofrece atracciones turísticas significativas que abarcan desde magníficas playas hasta el patrimonio arquitectónico del Centro Histórico de La Habana (declarado “Patrimonio de la Humanidad” por la UNESCO), así como otras áreas naturales, históricas y culturales ubicadas a lo largo y ancho del país. Sin embargo, para estimular la industria turística se precisan socios internacionales que emprendan el desarrollo de hoteles, tiendas, restaurantes y la ampliación del aeropuerto. El hecho de que la mayoría de las tierras disponibles para el desarrollo está en manos del Estado, es un elemento crítico de la estrategia cubana para atraer promotores y turistas extranjeros.
El plan gubernamental de poner en marcha su propia industria turística ha mostrado resultados alentadores. Por ejemplo, en el año 1967 la isla recibió a unos 2.000 visitantes, mientras que en 1998 fue visitada por más de 1,4 millones de turistas. Sólo durante los últimos cinco años, un grupo de inversionistas extranjeros ha aumentado sus operaciones en varios sectores económicos de Cuba, particularmente en el sector turístico. Como resultado, se han construido 2.000 nuevas habitaciones hoteleras en La Habana, con lo cual la capacidad total actual alcanza más de 10.700 habitaciones. A nivel nacional hay 31.600 habitaciones hoteleras, y se planea aumentar la capacidad a 40.000 en el transcurso de los próximos dos años. Aproximadamente el 80 por ciento de las nuevas construcciones cubanas están directa o indirectamente relacionadas con el sector turístico. Ciertos estimados indican que la tierra y los inmuebles estatales ya destinados a estos nuevos proyectos representan unos US$ 500 millones. Cabe destacar que este desarrollo se ha logrado en ausencia de un mercado formal del suelo.
Políticas orientadas al suelo para estimular el desarrollo
El suelo ha sido utilizado de varias maneras para incentivar el desarrollo y generar ingresos públicos. Primero que todo, el gobierno cubano lo ha utilizado como su contribución capital en asociaciones conjuntas con promotores internacionales. Por ejemplo, la empresa canadiense VanCuba Holdings, S.A. se asoció a medias con el gobierno cubano en un proyecto de construcción de once hoteles. La participación cubana del 50 % consiste en el aporte del suelo; por su parte, se espera que la compañía canadiense invierta US$ 400 millones. Similares operaciones conjuntas se han llevado a cabo con promotores canadienses, españoles, italianos e israelíes en proyectos variados, principalmente inmobiliarios y turísticos.
Dado que la principal contribución cubana a estas asociaciones internacionales es el suelo, es fundamental verificar que su valor financiero represente el 50 por ciento del capital social del proyecto. Cuando el valor monetario de la tierra aportada ha sido inferior al 50 por ciento, el socio extranjero frecuentemente ha desempeñado un papel crítico para ayudar a su contraparte cubana a solicitar crédito de bancos internacionales o instituciones financieras a fin de compensar la diferencia. Más recientemente, el crédito para asegurar el 50 por ciento de la participación cubana ha provenido directamente del Banco Central de Cuba (a bajas tasas de interés), en vez de entidades bancarias internacionales.
Un segundo mecanismo para estimular el desarrollo, cuyo uso va en aumento, son los arriendos de tierras (leasing) para proyectos comerciales y de oficinas. Esta modalidad cuenta con muchos adeptos puesto que la venta directa de la tierra estatal es posible únicamente en situaciones muy especiales. Los alquileres se negocian según el valor específico de la tierra, y se establecen por 25 años previo acuerdo de las partes negociantes. Además, es posible revisar los contratos de alquiler y prolongarlos por otros 25 años si las partes involucradas en las renegociaciones están de acuerdo sobre los nuevos criterios. Actualmente existen varios proyectos de este estilo con inversionistas extranjeros, y el área estimada de desarrollo en La Habana sobrepasa las 100 hectáreas.
Tercero, el gobierno cubano ha celebrado acuerdos de alquileres directos en tierras estatales en zonas francas que en algunos casos generan alta rentabilidad. Ya unas 120 empresas privadas extranjeras y públicas-privadas se han establecido en dos zonas comerciales de La Habana.
Tanto los arriendos como los alquileres directos del suelo del Estado son importantes fuentes de nuevos fondos que, a su vez, se inyectan en la economía local para mejorar la calidad de vida de las comunidades locales mediante la prestación de servicios sociales (educación y salud), el desarrollo de proyectos económicos, la modernización y ampliación de la infraestructura básica, y la generación de empleos. Como ejemplos del impacto positivo generado por estos ingresos para la ciudad y la comunidad figuran el nuevo Aeropuerto Internacional de La Habana, la creación y el mejoramiento de un sistema telefónico digital, y los proyectos del parque metropolitano en la región del río Almendares.
Otro mecanismo interesante de captura de la plusvalía resultante de las inversiones públicas, es el establecido por la Oficina del Historiador, la entidad pública encargada de promover, financiar y desarrollar el programa de revitalización de La Habana Vieja. Esta oficina ya comenzó a recaudar impuestos directos e indirectos que suman el 35 por ciento de los ingresos de empresas privadas no relacionadas con la Oficina, tales como hoteles, establecimientos comerciales y restaurantes que se han beneficiado de las labores de rehabilitación del distrito histórico. Tales ingresos externos, así como también las entradas generadas por proyectos iniciados por la oficina misma, se utilizan en una especie de fondo rotativo para financiar no sólo inversiones adicionales en el ambiente construido, sino también una variedad de programas sociales entre los que figuran viviendas, hogares para ancianos y actividades educativas y culturales en La Habana Vieja. En 1998 los ingresos totales de la Oficina sobrepasaron los US$ 40 millones, y excedieron de US$ 50 millones en 1999. El gobierno también está negociando otras clases de programas de generación de ingresos para capturar los incrementos del valor del suelo, con el fin de financiar la rehabilitación de las áreas del Paseo del Prado y Rampa en La Habana, así como el proyecto de desarrollo Boca de la Chorrera, en la boca del río Almendares.
Dificultades de aplicación
La aplicación de estas diferentes herramientas de captura de plusvalía no ha sido una tarea fácil. En lo que se refiere a los gravámenes indirectos y directos introducidos en La Habana Vieja, muchos dueños de negocios aducen que sus fuentes de ingresos no son resultado de las labores de mejoramiento de la Oficina del Historiador, y que por tanto no deberían estar obligados a pagar impuestos. Por ejemplo, la empresa petrolera cubana (CUPET) tiene su sede en un área valiosa en el corazón del centro histórico, pero no paga el impuesto. La compañía argumenta que sus fuentes de ingresos (es decir, sus instalaciones y redes de distribución) están situadas fuera del centro, y que por tal motivo no se benefician del proceso de remozamiento.
Los acuerdos de alquiler por 25 años ilustran otro problema que surge del dilema implicado por las “metas a corto plazo” frente a las “metas a largo plazo”, porque los acuerdos no incluyen una actualización periódica de pagos de alquiler. Por una parte, si los pagos se establecen sobre la base del valor y uso existente, las autoridades públicas corren el riesgo de perder considerables recursos financieros que podrían derivarse de estas inversiones y otros cambios en el valor del suelo a lo largo del período de alquiler de 25 años. Sin embargo, si las autoridades intentan capturar el esperado aumento del valor inmediatamente, tendrán dificultades para vender esos costosos proyectos a inversionistas cautelosos.
La falta de un adecuado sistema legal para el desarrollo de bienes raíces y préstamos hipotecarios en Cuba es un obstáculo principal para la puesta en práctica de todos estos instrumentos. Si bien ya existen borradores de nuevas propuestas de leyes inmobiliarias, aún no se han adoptado las leyes que se esperaban introducir el año pasado. Esta situación incierta e impredecible puede entorpecer la formación de sociedades comerciales serias, que por lo general requiere estabilidad, transparencia y visión a largo plazo. Además, esta falta de protección legal puede alejar a promotores de calidad que podrían tener la capacidad de realizar proyectos más sofisticados y de mayor envergadura. Como resultado, el gobierno cubano ha recibido menos propuestas sólidas y ha estado aceptando proyectos menores con promotores internacionales menos establecidos.
Estos proyectos menores son a veces problemáticos por varias razones. Primero que todo, frecuentemente se destinan a las zonas más deseables de La Habana, aun cuando no sean necesariamente apropiados para dichas zonas. Segundo, están obligados a depender de infraestructura existente, dado que no son lo suficientemente grandes como para aportar esa inversión adicional. Tercero, la calidad estética e incluso los servicios básicos de estos nuevos hoteles o apartamentos son algunas veces cuestionables. Dado que estas edificaciones afectan la imagen general de la ciudad, pueden hasta ejercer un efecto negativo y contribuir a la desvalorización de la zona.
Otro problema relacionado es la incertidumbre que deben afrontar los promotores al tratar con nuevas instituciones y políticas que se están negociando dentro del gobierno cubano al mismo tiempo que se están implementando en la calle. Mientras las políticas están siendo objeto de revisión, el gobierno ha introducido una moratoria para nuevos proyectos de desarrollo en ciertas áreas de La Habana y ha retrasado el proceso de negociación de bienes inmobiliarios en general. La inestabilidad y falta de confianza en los organismos y políticas gubernamentales pertinentes conllevan riesgos que desalientan a los inversionistas privados de proyectos comerciales o residenciales a largo plazo. Obviamente, ello perjudica los costos de desarrollo y las tasas de rentabilidad esperadas.
Finalmente, la ausencia de mercados formales dificulta efectuar avalúos del suelo y enturbia las transacciones. Los organismos gubernamentales involucrados en proyectos de desarrollo tienen dos opciones: 1) utilizar los precios administrativos para determinar el valor de alquileres o aportes financieros, aun cuando la base de estos precios puede no reflejar el valor real de los atributos del suelo; o bien, 2) negociar el precio con promotores extranjeros sobre la base de la dinámica de la región en particular. Ambas opciones están limitadas por la carencia de transacciones comerciales continuas e independientes sobre las cuales evaluar los precios reales.
Dilemas de la política del suelo
Si bien es cierto que Cuba ha hecho avances significativos, también es cierto que se está enfrentando a muchos problemas para utilizar la tierra de una manera eficaz para estimular el desarrollo y generar recursos financieros. Por ejemplo, muchos proyectos pequeños y “convenientes” pueden acelerar los desarrollos y la generación de ingresos, pero no tienen la capacidad de crear una visión más amplia para usos futuros del suelo y frecuentemente causan daños a la infraestructura histórica y al ambiente natural. Por otra parte, los proyectos mejores financiados y de más envergadura pueden crear tal visión y mejorar el ambiente, pero son mucho más difíciles de negociar y exigen más tiempo.
Más aún, los proyectos más grandes pueden requerir inversiones cuantiosas en la infraestructura básica dada la deficiente calidad de las condiciones existentes. El gobierno ha carecido de los recursos necesarios para apoyar estas inversiones, lo cual amenaza la sustentación de las nuevas intervenciones urbanas, y los proyectos pequeños no son capaces de afrontar tales cargas. Además, incluso si los proyectos grandes pueden financiar las inversiones en infraestructura, corren el riesgo de convertirse en enclaves exclusivos separados de la comunidad vecina al proporcionar la infraestructura sólo como parte de su propio proyecto. El problema que se plantea aquí es cómo financiar la infraestructura de una manera no excluyente a fin de alentar otros proyectos de desarrollo de menor escala. Para ello se están estudiando tres opciones que actualmente son objeto de un acalorado debate:
Otro aspecto del debate entre los expertos cubanos de planificación y desarrollo se refiere a las ventajas y desventajas de introducir mercados libres de tierras acompañados de un fuerte sistema tributario, en contraposición a seguir manteniendo el manejo público de la tierra estatal. Aquellos que abogan por la idea de introducir los mercados libres de tierras opinan que es un paso necesario al desarrollo, para que así Cuba pueda beneficiarse de los vínculos con la economía mundial y con diferentes clases de inversiones extranjeras. Estos expertos también defienden la idea de desarrollar mecanismos de captura de las plusvalías urbanas.
Por su parte, el grupo que defiende la continuación del sistema actual señala el éxito cubano en aspectos tales como la reducción de la segregación espacial, el equilibrio de los servicios sociales y urbanos, la conservación del patrimonio histórico y otros valores patrimoniales de la ciudad, y la reservación de suficiente tierra para los proyectos de desarrollos futuros. También apunta a la reciente experiencia latinoamericana con los mercados libres, que han redundado en mayor segregación entre ricos y pobres, falta de servicios sociales en las zonas pobres de las ciudades, y aumentos de la violencia urbana, la especulación, y los problemas ambientales.
En resumen, la agenda cubana de desarrollo de suelo tiene dos prioridades: establecer un sistema legal con parámetros claros, e introducir mecanismos rigurosos y transparentes para efectuar los avalúos de inmuebles y suelos. Además, la diversificación de los socios cubanos disponibles para participar en proyectos de desarrollo internacionales ayudará a establecer criterios para una perspectiva de planificación a largo plazo que alentará la realización de proyectos de infraestructura de gran escala y la provisión continua de beneficios a la comunidad. En realidad, todos estos asuntos e inquietudes no son muy diferentes a los desafíos que enfrentan otros países en vías de desarrollo en lo que se refiere a las políticas del suelo. El continuado estudio del valor de la tierra como un instrumento de desarrollo en Cuba ofrece lecciones importantes para investigadores y funcionarios públicos de toda América Latina.
Ricardo Núñez es investigador del Grupo para el Desarrollo Integral de la Capital (GDIC) en La Habana, Cuba. H. James Brown es Presidente y Jefe ejecutivo del Instituto Lincoln, y Martim Smolka es Senior Fellow y Director del Programa para América Latina y el Caribe del Instituto Lincoln. También contribuyó a este artículo Laura Mullahy, asistente de investigación del Programa para América Latina y el Caribe.
En la Web
En la página Web del Instituto Lincoln, www.lincolninst.edu, hay artículos relacionados sobre Cuba, los cuales están disponibles para bajarlos sin costo alguno.
“Participatory Planning and Preservation in Havana: Q & A with Mario Coyula”. Land Lines 9:4 (julio de 1997). (Sólo en inglés.)
Ricardo Núñez. “El suelo urbano como factor de inclusión económica y social: La experiencia de La Habana.” Artículo. 1999. (Sólo en español.)
Ricardo Núñez. “La ciudad de La Habana: Prácticas y perspectivas de captura de plusvalía urbana.” Artículo. 1999. (En inglés y en español.)
Ricardo Núñez y Carlos García Pleyán. “La regeneración en La Habana Vieja: ¿Un modelo de gestión que moviliza las plusvalías urbanas?”. Artículo. 1999. (En inglés y en español.)
Peter Pollock. “Exploring Cuba’s Urban and Environmental Heritage.” Land Lines 10:5 (septiembre de 1998). (Sólo en inglés)
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Claudia De Cesare is a property tax adviser to the Secretariat of Finance for the municipality of Porto Alegre, Brazil, and she teaches courses on valuation and property taxation in the postgraduate program of the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul in Porto Alegre. She has been a course developer and instructor in the Lincoln Institute’s Latin America Program for more than five years. She is also a member of the advisory board of the International Property Tax Institute (IPTI) and is the former technical director of the Brazilian Appraisal Institute (IBAPE).
Land Lines: Porto Alegre is known internationally for its innovative and democratic local administration. What is unique about this city compared to others in Brazil or Latin America?
Claudia De Cesare: Indeed, Porto Alegre has initiated many pioneering actions in public administration, including the use of the property tax as an instrument for value capture; the sale of building rights (solo criado); the use of building rights in place of cash to pay for expropriations of real property; and the collection of rents in exchange for the use of public space by infrastructure networks, such as telecommunications, cable TV and gas. For instance, five years before the approval of the national City Statute legislation regulating the use of progressive rates for the property tax, Porto Alegre passed local legislation to address this matter. Although the Supreme Court later ruled against this local action and in favor of the need for national legislation, the city has played a leading role in promoting debate on many polemic issues, including private rights, property rights and the public interest.
I think the reasons for Porto Alegre’s innovations include a clear definition of the policies and goals to be achieved, as well as “guts” by local leaders to tackle issues even when conflict is likely to occur. Public officials have maintained an overriding vision that the city must be planned democratically for the community at large and a conviction that public assets must be taken seriously. Not all initiatives have succeeded, but citizens now have a better understanding of the local government’s responsibilities and its limitations. The fact that one political party, in this case the labor party (PT), was elected to lead the city government for more than 15 consecutive years also contributed to the continuity and coherence of these public actions. This kind of political legacy is quite unusual in Brazil and Latin America in general.
LL: How has this proactive atmosphere affected the administration of the property tax?
CD: We can identify two periods in terms of property tax performance in Porto Alegre. Before 1989, local revenue from the property tax followed the typical pattern in Latin America. It was mainly symbolic, characterized by a low level of effort in administration, negligence in local tax collection, and extreme dependence on revenue transfers from the national and state levels. Following major property tax reforms that revised exemption policies, introduced progressive rates and established a new assessment list, the property tax collection rate grew more than 300 percent over the first two years. A major public education campaign emphasized the arguments for regular property tax payments, the importance of the tax for the provision of public services, and the reasons why the local authorities would not tolerate tax evasion.
A change in attitude by the city administration also led to more effective enforcement of property tax payments and legal actions to address tax evasion or disputes over assessed values. It was made clear there would be no amnesty for property tax debts. The participatory budget process also contributed to the rehabilitation of the property tax in Porto Alegre, as overall confidence in public administration increased (see Goldsmith and Vanier 2001). Since the early 1990s, the annual revenue collected from the property tax has been stable, representing nearly 0.95 percent of local GDP. At the national level, by comparison, the property tax represents only about 0.5 percent of GDP. Subsequent improvements in the property tax have not taken place, basically because the legislature has rejected several proposals for either reforms or major revisions.
LL: How important is the property tax in Latin America?
CD: Although the simple answer to this question is “it depends on the country,” the property tax is not a significant revenue source in any Latin American country, even though most countries have long established property tax systems. Only in Argentina and Uruguay does the revenue collected from the property tax represent more than 1 percent of GDP. In Brazil the average performance is close to 0.5 percent, and in Mexico and Costa Rica it is around 0.3 percent of the GPD. Moreover, in relative terms, there is great variability in the importance of the property tax within countries and cities that is not directly explained by the local GDP or population size. Part of the performance depends on political will, which varies enormously among cities.
LL: In your opinion, what are the main controversies related to property tax collection?
CD: I would say that the controversies include the real goals to be achieved with the property tax; the degree of universality in its implementation; the changes needed to take into account social, economic and cultural concerns; and the distribution of the tax burden for regulating the tax according to ability to pay. Concerning ability to pay, principally in Brazil, there is much discussion about application of progressive rates that vary according to assessed values. The underlying issue might be how simple the system should be.
Other issues have to do with the lack of consensus about the transparency of the system, local autonomy versus a national system for tax collection, and general political and economic instability that affects property value maps and other data. Furthermore, the public disclosure of information on the property tax, such as individual property characteristics, assessed values and annual tax payments, is not always considered secure.
LL: What would it take to improve property tax collection?
CD: In my experience, the successful performance of the property tax depends on a combination of adequate fiscal policies, a consistent legal framework for tax collection and an efficient administrative structure. For instance, the application of confiscatory (high) rates to vacant sites to promote land development is likely to stimulate tax evasion instead. In addition, political will and the capacity for negotiation with stakeholders are essential for the introduction of reforms or revisions in tax administration. Making the connection between public services and revenue collected from the property tax more evident to taxpayers is likely to contribute to a better collection rate. In other words, the role of the property tax would be enhanced if the community is accustomed to paying the property tax and understands its effect on improving public services. Finally, a trend toward a participatory fiscal culture, in which the community takes part in the decisions about public revenue collection and expenditures, could increase the acceptability of the tax, making its collection easier.
LL: What is changing in the region to influence the prospects for tax reform?
CD: I believe tax administrators understand and care more today about the property tax. They are aware of the pressing need to increase revenues through better performance of the tax, in spite of challenges due to its high visibility and historically poor performance record. They also recognize the need to break this paradigm, in relation to both taxpayer expectations and the role of the property tax as a component of the national taxation system. Several isolated yet promising experiences have made it clear that property tax reform in Latin America is viable, but it requires political will, innovation and a commitment to overcome perceived barriers to its implementation.
LL: What are the main differences in the property tax environment of Latin America compared to North America?
CD: The U.S. and Canadian systems are certainly more mature and transparent than most Latin American systems, largely because information is available in the public domain and technology is easily accessible. Some of the important differences observed in Latin America are illegal occupation patterns, the lack of reliable information on land tenure, the large number of informal property transactions and the prevalence of progressive housing construction. All of these characteristics of Latin American land use present distinct challenges to developing procedures to assess property values and administer a fair and consistent tax policy. Concerning the use of technology in the administration of the property tax, last year I learned about a cadastral system in Mexico that is as effective as the best systems used in the U.S. However, this is unusual; there is great variation in the use of technology among different local authorities in Latin America.
LL: Based on your research, what are some of the positive and negative impacts of switching to a land value-based tax system for residential properties?
CD: The conclusion of my study was quite unexpected, since the hypothesis supported the opposite argument. Using a database from Porto Alegre, I found that the main result from using land value as the tax base was the tendency toward more regressivity in the distribution of the tax burden, with low-priced houses clearly identified as the potential losers. The fact that part of the tax burden would be transferred from high-priced to low-priced properties is a real cause of concern. However, further investigation is necessary to address imperfections in the valuation model used to estimate land values and to examine other databases. In any event, the lack of knowledge about the use of land value as the tax base and its perceived advantages was identified as a major obstacle for its application in Brazil.
LL: How do you use various assessment tools and techniques to determine land value?
CD: One of the main arguments against the use of land value as the tax base is the great difficulty in estimating the value of improved sites. In my study, the use of hedonic models (MRA) for estimating land values was found to be viable. To compensate for the lack of data on undeveloped sites in highly developed areas (central areas and business districts), I used a reasonable number of houses that were sold for new development. Their market value was determined entirely by the potential of the site for future development, as well as by the neighborhood characteristics. Therefore, the findings support the hypothesis that eventual difficulties in land assessment do not prevent the use of land value as the property tax base, at least, in the case of Porto Alegre. Nevertheless, a lower degree of assessment uniformity was observed in the valuation of undeveloped sites, since site prices tend to suffer strong random variations and are highly influenced by the particular characteristics of the buyer and seller involved in each transaction.
LL: What do you think are the greatest challenges facing Latin America in the next five years?
CD: As discussed before, a major challenge is to pursue more effective property tax systems. I think the promotion and implementation of national programs for the improvement of the property tax is essential to reinforce the property tax at the local level. On a more personal note, my goal is to develop a web-based system for collecting and disseminating information on property taxes in Latin America, allowing comparative analyses among municipalities according to predefined criteria. The system would have property tax administrators fill out data on the performance of the property tax on a regular basis, allowing for evaluation over time. This would greatly advance the project, now being supported by the Lincoln Institute, which uses conventional questionnaires to survey property tax information in the region.
Reference
Goldsmith, William W. and Carlos B. Vainer. 2001. Participatory budgeting and power politics in Porto Alegre. Land Lines 13 (1): 7–9.
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Information on home values is crucial for researchers and policy makers interested in analyzing and implementing well-informed public policies in the areas of taxation and infrastructure provision. The repeat sales methods, such as the S&P/Case-Shiller index, that are commonly used in the United States to study house price dynamics are not feasible in many developing countries, where declared transaction prices for homes are often underreported for various reasons.
Homeowners also need a trustworthy measure of their home value to aid personal decision making such as retirement (Lusardi and Mitchell 2007), consumption (Campbell and Cocco 2007), savings (Juster et al. 2005), and the debt composition of the household (Disney, Bridges, and Gathergood 2006).
We have assessed the reliability of household survey data on homeowner estimates of home value in Mexico and argue that on average the estimates of short-tenure owners tend to be reasonably unbiased and precise. Homeowner estimates of property market price obtained through such surveys may be the most convenient and reliable means of tracking home values under some circumstances.
Valuing Homes in the United States
All major household surveys in the United States—the decennial census, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, the American Housing Survey, and the Survey of Consumer Finances—ask a question such as: “What is the value of this property; that is, how much do you think this property would sell for if it were for sale?” The main argument favoring the use of such a question on home valuation is its ease of collection. It is also crucial to assess the reliability of these self-reported home valuations against other measures.
In Kish and Lansing (1954), homeowners in U.S. cities were asked to estimate the market value of their homes, and estimates for the same homes were later made by professional appraisers. The main finding was that the average bias in people’s estimates was around zero. That is, although individuals’ estimates could be quite different from the appraised values, the errors seemed to cancel out on average. This was an important finding, and it justifies the continued use of the question in large surveys. When the researchers focused on different subgroups, they found that new homeowners made the most precise estimates of their home value. There was no increase in accuracy if the respondent was the household head or had more education, or if the appraiser was able to enter the property during the appraisal.
Using the same methods and similar data, Kain and Quigley (1972) confirmed that errors were largely offsetting, but were correlated with the socioeconomic characteristics of the respondent. More education was associated with a smaller positive bias in the homeowner’s estimate. This research also inquired into the determinants of nonresponse to the question, and found that those with higher incomes and education but shorter tenure in the home were more likely to provide an estimate of their home value.
Because the ideal estimate of the market price of a house is the most recent sale price, some studies have compared sales data for recent transactions with owners’ estimates. Goodman and Ittner (1992), for example, compare owners’ estimates with subsequent sales prices for the same property using the 1985 and 1987 American Housing Survey. They find that the average U.S. homeowner overestimates the home value by 6 percent above its sale price, and that the average absolute error is around 14 percent. The error is largely unrelated to the characteristics of the owner, the house, or the local market.
Another approach is to compare tax assessments with homeowner self-valuations (David 1968). The obvious problem with using tax assessments is that they may not be updated constantly to reflect current market conditions, resulting in a flawed impression of housing value. Overall these U.S. studies have found that, on average, owners tend to overestimate the value of their homes by around 5 percent. This overvaluation is unrelated to owner and home characteristics other than the length of tenure in the home. Such studies can thus be used reliably to obtain reasonable estimates of home valuation at a very low cost in U.S. housing markets.
Housing Markets in Developing Countries
In developed countries, access to land occurs mainly through formal purchases, while in developing countries it is not uncommon for a substantial proportion of urban growth to occur through squatting, especially by low-income groups. They can organize themselves and invade government lands, protected areas, and even private property. By the time tribunals establish the illegality of such actions, some politicians may find it useful to provide protection and services to the squatters in exchange for their votes and political support, rather than removing them from the invaded land.
In some cases, local governments engage in expropriation of land that is later transferred to political constituents. Those who acquire their property under such conditions have a harder time determining the monetary value of the property since they did not pay for it initially. Sometimes the property cannot be sold easily since it lacks a valid title.
Another distinction of housing markets in developing countries is the large proportion of self-built housing stock where families acquire a home by building it themselves or hiring friends and family to help them over long periods of time. The prevalence of self-built homes, instead of housing developments by specialized construction companies, occurs in part because the financial system is underdeveloped, and mortgages are either nonexistent or very expensive. The lack of developed mortgage markets can force families into inefficient construction methods, because the house is built in stages using whatever building materials are affordable and available at the time. These constraints can generate unnecessarily high construction costs, as well as unregulated and inefficient building practices. If people estimate their home’s worth as the sum of the expenses incurred in building it, those homeowners in areas without mortgages would be more likely to value their self-built homes at a higher value because of their sweat equity.
Self-building can also influence access to information about the current market value of that property. Housing developments built by a construction company generally have a high degree of homogeneity, so house sales in the neighborhood will generate information on the current value of the surrounding properties. When housing is self-constructed, this information channel disappears, because such homes are not an adequate proxy for the value of another home in the neighborhood.
Jimenez (1982) provides one of the few studies of home values in a developing country. Using data from an impoverished neighborhood in the Philippines, he finds that the mean values of owner and appraiser estimates are not statistically distinguishable. His Philippine sample compares well with Kain and Quigley’s (1972) results for St. Louis, Missouri, in terms of differences in average valuations.
However, Jimenez finds the average absolute value of the differences between individual owner estimates and appraiser valuations to be approximately 55 percent of the mean appraised value, while the comparable figure for Kain and Quigley is approximately 20 percent.
Household Survey and Appraisal Data
Our analysis uses data from a household survey and appraisals for the same homes by an appraiser who is also a real estate agent. The survey, conducted between mid-February and mid-March 2006, included approximately 1,200 dwellings in the outskirts of the city of Acayucan, in the state of Veracruz in central Mexico.
The sampled homes were in the poorer districts of the city, where streets are not paved and many homes lack vital water and sewer services. The average house in the sample has 2.5 rooms. Only 63 percent of the dwellings have an indoor bathroom, and 60 percent have a roof made out of metal sheets, asbestos, or palm leaves. Further, 12 percent of homeowners reported they did not have a property title.
The interviewed families were the owner-occupants, not renters, and most of them lived in small, single-floor homes on a well-delimited lot. Among the housing questions in the survey was: “Approximately how much money do you think this house would sell for nowadays?” The average owner’s estimated home value is $19,948, while the average appraisal is only $12,123 (all figures in 2006 U.S. dollars). The median difference, although much smaller ($1,545), and the mean log difference are also significant for both measures. (See González-Navarro and Quintana-Domeque [2007; 2008] for a detailed description of the survey.)
The other source of data is the set of housing value assessments produced by a trained appraiser and real estate agent. Having only one person perform all the assessments minimized the risks of subjective decision making and varied assessment practices. The appraiser visited one out of every two homes where residents had been interviewed, and the assessments were performed within two months of the household survey, thus reducing concerns about house price inflation or volatility.
In the completed surveys, the response rate for the question on the owner’s estimate of the home value was approximately 74 percent. One important advantage of this study’s two-part procedure is the ability to investigate appraised home values for the 26 percent of respondents who did not answer the question about home value. Hence, unlike any previous study, we look at whether non-response to that question by the owner is related to the home value as measured by the appraiser.
We found evidence that the average appraised value is equal for respondents who did and did not provide a home value estimate. Additionally, age, sex, household head status, and having a property title and tenure are not related to the probability of response. This suggests that homeowners who do not provide an estimate of home value are a random subset of the sample. This is an important finding if homeowner valuations are to be used in other studies to estimate average home prices in a locality in developing countries.
We assume that the appraiser’s valuation is very close to the market value of the house. We also think it is reasonable to interpret the discrepancy between home values obtained from the owners and the appraiser as originating from homeowner’s misperceptions about market value. There are several reasons justifying such an interpretation. First, the appraiser is likely to have a more accurate estimate than the owners of the lot size (one of the most important determinants of home value). Second, the appraiser can infer other housing characteristics accurately. Third, he is likely to be cognizant of the market forces involved in home valuation in the city.
The Relationship Between Owner and Appraiser Estimates
Table 1 shows the average degree of error and lack of precision or accuracy in the owners’ estimates for several subsamples. As in previous studies, our results are shown for different measures of bias (the difference between the owner’s and appraiser’s home value estimates, and the percentage difference in terms of the appraiser’s estimate) and inaccuracy (the absolute difference and the absolute percentage difference).
Among all owners in the sample the average difference between the owner’s estimate and the appraised value is around $7,800, indicating that owners tend to overestimate the value of their homes. The mean percentage difference is 124 percent of the appraised value. In terms of inaccuracy or lack of precision, the mean absolute difference is approximately $13,500, reflecting how different the appraiser’s estimates are from those of the homeowner’s. On average, the owners in the sample have an unrealistically high estimate of the value of their home.
These results contrast with the available evidence for the United States and the Philippines. Both Kain and Quigley (1972) in St. Louis and Jimenez (1982) in the Philippines report a mean percentage difference of less than 0.5 percent. In terms of precision, we also find very different results. In our sample, the absolute percentage difference is estimated to be more than 150 percent, while it is approximately 55 percent in the Philippines and 20 percent in St. Louis. On the other hand, the error and inaccuracy results for short-tenure owners (less than two years) are statistically close to zero. The same result holds for mean percentage error, and the absolute percentage error is reduced by more than 50 percent.
As mentioned earlier, one of the differences between developed and underdeveloped housing markets is the lack of home construction by specialized companies and the lack of information about the distribution of home prices. The last column of table 1 isolates the set of homes that were constructed rather than self-built. For this subgroup, the mean error and the mean percentage error are not statistically different from zero, while the absolute percentage error (33 percent) is the smallest of the four groups. This may suggest that owners of self-built homes provide upwardly biased estimates because self-building over time is more expensive than purchasing an already constructed house.
Determinants of Individual Bias and Inaccuracy
The results suggest that long tenure is responsible for the bias and inaccuracy in homeowners’ estimates. In Gonzalez-Navarro and Quintana-Domeque (2009), we show that neither the discrepancy in the lot size estimate nor the socioeconomic characteristics of the respondent seem to be correlated with the error or the lack of precision of homeowners’ estimates. Only tenure is a significant correlate of bias and lack of precision.
Given these results, we subsequently estimated average home values at the census tract level to study the performance of the self-reported value depending on tenure status. As we argued earlier, self-reported value among homeowners with short tenure provides a more accurate estimate of average home value. One important issue with using only recent homeowners is the small sample size. Table 2 shows that the two measures of bias (mean difference and mean percentage difference) for short-tenure homeowners provide a less distorted estimate of the mean home value, as do the measures for mean absolute difference and mean absolute percentage difference.
Although we made every effort to obtain market prices to benchmark the professionally appraised values, the search proved elusive. This fact underscores the importance of assessing the reliability of self-reported home values in developing countries, where homeowners’ estimated market values seem to be the most available measure of home value.
Conclusion
In our sample, the valuation bias associated with longer tenure is positive, confirming the results found for recently transacted homes in several U.S. studies. Our main finding is that the tenure-driven bias is potentially much larger in a developing country context. Owners with long tenure largely overestimate the value of their homes, with a mean absolute percent error on the order of 150 percent. However, families with tenure of two years or less have reasonably accurate and unbiased estimates of the value of their homes. A cluster of similar homes built by a specialized construction company shows zero bias and dramatically more precise estimates with respect to the other subgroups.
We find nonresponse to the question of home value to be uncorrelated with the appraised value of the house and other demographic characteristics of the homeowner. This suggests that unbiased estimates of the average value of groups of homes can be obtained through household surveys. Additionally, bias and inaccuracy are not robustly related to socioeconomic characteristics, such as family income or level of education of the respondent.
To summarize, the results of this study caution against using homeowner estimates for analysis of individual behavior, but suggest that these estimates can be used to reasonably approximate mean home values for clusters of homes. If the objective is to estimate average home value, then the answers from homeowners with short tenure may be used successfully in future surveys in developing countries.
References
Campbell, J.Y. and Cocco, J.F. 2007. How do house prices affect consumption? Evidence from micro data. Journal of Monetary Economics 54(3): 591–621.
David, E. L. 1968. The use of assessed data to approximate sales values of recreational Property. Land Economics 44(1): 127–129.
Disney, R., Bridges, S. and Gathergood, J. 2006. Housing wealth and household indebtness: Is there a household ‘Financial Accelerator’? Unpublished manuscript. Nottingham, UK: University of Nottingham.
Gonzalez-Navarro, M. and Quintana-Domeque, C. 2007. Description of the Acayucan tandards of Living Survey. Unpublished manuscript. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University.
———. 2008. Do people know how much their house is worth? Evidence from a developing country. Working Paper. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
———. 2009. The reliability of self–reported home values in a developing country context. Journal of Housing Economics 18(4): 311–324.
Goodman, J.L. and Ittner, J.B. 1992. The accuracy of homeowners’ estimates of house value. Journal of Housing Economics 2(4): 339–357.
Jimenez, E. (1982) The value of squatter dwellings in developing countries. Economic Development and Cultural Change 30(4): 739–752.
Juster, F.T., Lupton, J.P., Smith, J.P., and Stafford F. 2005. The decline in household saving and the wealth effect. Review of Economics and Statistics 87(4): 20–27.
Kain, J.F. and Quigley, J.M. 1972. Note on owner’s estimate of housing value. Journal of the American Statistical Association 67(340): 803–806.
Kish, L. and Lansing, J.B. 1954. Response errors in estimating the value of homes. Journal of the American Statistical Association 49(267): 520–538.
Lusardi, A. and Mitchell, O.S. 2007. Baby boomers retirement security: The role of planning, financial literacy and housing wealth. Journal of Monetary Economics 54(1): 205–224.
About the Authors
Marco Gonzalez-Navarro is a Robert Wood Johnson Scholar in Health Policy Research at the University of California, Berkeley. He received his Ph.D. in economics from Princeton University.
Climent Quintana-Domeque is an assistant professor in the Economics Department at the University of Alicante, Spain. He received his Ph.D. in economics from Princeton University.
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Carlos Morales-Schechinger joined IHS, the Institute for Housing and Urban Development Studies at Erasmus University in Rotterdam, The Netherlands, in 2008. This international institute attracts students from all over the world, mostly from developing countries. Some IHS programs are sponsored jointly with the Lincoln Institute.
Previously Morales was a part-time lecturer at UNAM, the National Autonomous University of Mexico. He has been collaborating on a regular basis in seminars and courses organized by the Lincoln Institute throughout Latin America for the past 12 years. He lectures primarily on land value capture instruments, land and property taxation, and land-based preventive policies as alternatives to informal settlements.
He has held various government posts, including director of land policies and instruments in Mexico’s ministry for urban development, where he designed and implemented an ambitious program on land banking; and as director of cadastral policy for Mexico City’s government, where he managed an extensive fiscal reform of property taxes. He also held posts in both public and private banks in Mexico, dealing with property valuation, mortgages, property administration, and loans for large urban developments and for local governments.
He holds a bachelor’s degree in architecture from UNAM, a diploma in local government finance from the University of Birmingham, UK, and a Master of Philosophy in urban studies from the University of Edinburgh, UK.
Land Lines: How did you become involved with the Lincoln Institute?
Carlos Morales: My first introduction was in the early 1980s when I attended an Institute-sponsored international conference in Cambridge that related to my work for the government on urban land policy. The ideas I learned about were put to direct use two years later when I worked on a reform to increase the supply of serviced land in medium-sized cities and to subsidize sites and services for low-income households in Mexico. In the early 1990s, when I was working for the government of Mexico City on an ambitious property tax reform, I attended another Institute conference on property taxation.
From 2000 onward, I participated in many education activities organized by Martim Smolka through the Program on Latin America and the Caribbean. Around 2004 the Institute started a joint venture with IHS and I was one of the visiting lecturers hired by the Institute to teach in those programs. I was later invited to join the IHS staff full-time as the manager of this joint venture.
Land Lines: How do you compare the effectiveness of institutions such as IHS and the Lincoln Institute?
Carlos Morales: I believe they are complementary. The Institute is a leader in research and education on land policies, with an international focus on Latin America and China. IHS is recognized for its education and capacity building on urban management and development for a worldwide audience, focusing on developing and transition countries. IHS courses are open to students from all regions, but most come from countries in Africa, Asia, and Central and Eastern Europe. Through its joint venture with IHS, the Lincoln Institute is able to reach out to those from many more countries in an efficient way.
Land Lines: Conveying fundamental knowledge about land policy and urban management to practitioners is not an easy task. What have you found is the most effective approach?
Carlos Morales: Using a combination of two things is important: the profile of the lecturer and the appropriate pedagogy. Lecturers should have experience both as practitioners and as academics to be able to answer questions that are relevant to practitioners, especially when the answers imply moving away from their comfort zone and facing some kind of change.
The ultimate purpose of social science is precisely to change reality, not only to understand it. Consultancy brings academics close to practice, but it does not confront them with the moral commitment of implementing policy or the ethical responsibility for making policy work on the ground. Experience in direct practice is crucial. The Institute’s programs in Latin America employ lecturers with this profile, and they have proven effective in addressing issues such as the impacts of taxation and regulations on land markets and in choosing instruments for capturing incremental land value, both of which are hot topics in the region.
Regarding pedagogy, practitioners tend to be skeptical about theory. They regard it as impractical, and they want to test it to be convinced. Using examples of policies implemented in other cities is very useful. Some students from developing countries do not accept cases from more developed countries, arguing that their governance structure is too different. Others prefer cases from diverse situations because in spite of contextual differences they aspire to better development opportunities for their own countries. A lecturer should have an arsenal of many different cases to examine when questions rise.
Doing simulation games is also a very effective technique. Games involving role playing where participants compete against each other are the most useful for understanding land markets and helping solve problems. Role playing is revealing even when participants fail to solve problems since it prompts them to question what happened. I have seen how participants who experience failure in a game begin to cooperate and design clever regulations on their own. Another strategy is to assign participants roles contrary to their beliefs or experience. For example, government officials playing the role of pirate land developers learn about the substantial amounts of money the poor must spend just to access land.
Playing the devil’s advocate works well when discussing controversial concepts, as if the participants are in a land court. This is not a new technique except when played with a couple of twists. An example is determining the criteria for compensating eminent domain. In this game one team argues in favor of current use values and the other future use values. Background literature and practical information are provided for arguments on both sides. Practitioners from many places can relate to examples of regulatory takings, whether as expropriations in China, land restitutions in Eastern Europe, or the sale of building rights in Brazil.
Since participants have to defend a position with which they do not agree, they have to study and work harder. In many cases they end up changing their minds, or at least identifying new arguments to use later in debating their opponents in real life. At the end of a land court game the group acting as jury secretly votes twice, first on the team’s performance as advocates and second on the conceptual arguments. When a team gets more votes than the position they defended, it is clear that more research on the issue is needed. What I like best is that the game does not impose a position on the participants, but it raises the level of debate.
Land Lines: What are the main types of resistance to concepts and ideas on land policy?
Carlos Morales: Perhaps the concept most frequently resisted is how taxes and regulations are capitalized into the price of land. Resistance can come from an ideological standpoint (either left or right, both have arguments), self-interest (landowners do not readily accept sacrificing profit), or ignorance of how the capitalization concept works. As an educator I have a role to play in addressing the last challenge.
Even if theory is explained to practitioners, they remain skeptical if their experience contradicts the theory. Misunderstanding can come from referring to a tax on a commodity that is not as scarce as land, but it can also come from experience with land markets themselves. This happens when two policies with opposite effects are introduced together, for example, increasing densities and increasing taxes. The combined effect of these measures makes it difficult to understand the impact of each one. A simulation game can help isolate each impact. Practitioners need to experiment with each policy measure to better understand them both. I have noticed that they may nod with skepticism when you lecture them, but they give you a “eureka” smile when they reach understanding by playing a game.
Land Lines: How do you overcome resistance to topics such as value capture?
Carlos Morales: A charge linked to the increase in densities is a way of capturing the incremental value of land and a source of funds to finance infrastructure, as São Paulo is doing when it charges for extra building rights. The discussion about how this policy impacts market price is controversial. Landowners oppose it because it reduces their price expectations, but developers favor it because it reduces land prices and the payments are returned in the form of public works. A similar situation happened in Bogotá when a tax on the increment in the value of land was introduced.
Both cases are useful references to explain land value capture in developing countries, yet more city cases need to be documented and disseminated, and some practitioners want examples from developed countries. This is not easy, because land value capture is a buzzword in Latin American circles, but not in most developed countries. This is not because value capture is not used in the United States or other places, but rather because it is assumed as part of the operation of the land market. It is the role of lecturers to point this out and open opportunities for sharing experiences among practitioners from both developed and developing countries.
Land Lines: Please comment on the difficulties of conveying taxation concepts to planners.
Carlos Morales: Planners learn about property taxes if they are high enough to have an impact on decisions by landowners, developers, and land users, as in the United States. In developing countries these taxes generally are so low that they do not impact market decisions, so planners are not interested. When I play games that illustrate land markets to architects—who are often also planners—and they realize that the city is not going the way they expect, their most frequent reaction is to suggest more taxes and more efficient land markets. Seldom do they propose a traditional land use plan.
Land Lines: What in your opinion are the central concepts or ideas that could make the difference in the international debate on urban land markets?
Carlos Morales: Pointing out that land value capture is a significant source for financing infrastructure and preventing slums can bring more stakeholders into a serious discussion. Ideas related to security of tenure, land registration, and titling in order to increase access to loans have been dominating policy, but results have not been as positive as predicted. Slums continue to develop and service provision is still lagging behind.
Policies that have to do with land taxation and property obligations—not just property rights—have more potential to improve the functioning of urban land markets. UN-Habitat and the World Bank adopted the earlier notions of security of tenure as a solution, but are now beginning to show interest in land-based urban development instruments. Land value capture policies will have an effect tomorrow, but with a political cost today because giving titles is cheap and appeals to short-term politicians. This is the challenge that should be faced in the international debate to ensure more effective and long-term land market reform.
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Este artículo es un extracto de A Good Tax: Legal and Policy Issues for the Property Tax in the United States (Un buen impuesto: temas legales y de política del impuesto sobre la propiedad en los Estados Unidos), de Joan Youngman, a ser publicado en abril de 2016.
Algunos de los debates políticos más significativos acerca del impuesto sobre la propiedad no tienen que ver con el impuesto en sí sino con el uso de su recaudación para financiar las escuelas públicas locales. Esta controversia intensa y ya antigua acentúa el papel del impuesto sobre la propiedad, pero el impuesto en sí es de importancia secundaria frente a los puntos sustantivos en discusión, como el monto total de gastos en educación, su distribución entre los diferentes distritos escolares y los niveles de gobierno que deben proporcionar estos fondos. Si el impuesto sobre el ingreso fuera la fuente principal de los ingresos locales, y el impuesto sobre la propiedad se gravara a nivel estatal, el debate sobre el financiamiento escolar podría continuar de la misma manera, sustituyendo simplemente el vocablo “propiedad” por el vocablo “ingreso”.
El desafío del financiamiento escolar generalmente comienza con un problema básico: cómo aumentar de la mejor manera posible los ingresos disponibles a las escuelas de los distritos más pobres, cuyos recursos propios no pueden sostener adecuadamente la educación pública, incluso con tasas tributarias mucho más altas que las impuestas en jurisdicciones más acomodadas. Este no es un problema del impuesto sobre la propiedad sino un problema del impuesto local. Un área necesitada limitada a su propio impuesto sobre el ingreso o sobre las ventas encontraría la misma dificultad para financiar un sistema escolar exitoso, no importa cuán alta sea la tasa tributaria. Es esencial que haya una transferencia de recursos externos hacia distritos que no pueden financiar sus servicios indispensables de forma independiente. Este enunciado puede parecer obvio, pero a veces representa el límite del consenso en este debate extremadamente caldeado.
Por sí mismo, este consenso sólo estipula que no se puede depender sólo del impuesto local para financiar servicios básicos cuando la base tributaria local no alcanza para ese fin. Esto dista mucho de demostrar la inequidad del impuesto sobre la propiedad o cualquier otro impuesto local. Pero el uso tradicional del impuesto sobre la propiedad como sostenimiento principal para las escuelas locales a veces ha dado lugar a esta inferencia.
Si bien el impuesto sobre la propiedad generalmente funciona como un impuesto local en los EE.UU., y brinda la proporción más grande de ingresos locales independientes, esto no ha sido siempre así. Antes de la adopción generalizada del impuesto estatal sobre las ventas y el ingreso en el siglo XX, los impuestos sobre la propiedad eran la fuente principal de ingresos a nivel estatal. Al mismo tiempo, muchas jurisdicciones locales también imponen otros tributos, como impuestos sobre las ventas o los ingresos. De todas maneras, la gran mayoría de la recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad en los EE.UU. financia las operaciones del gobierno local, y el impuesto sobre la propiedad sigue siendo la fuente principal de ingreso autónomo para la mayor parte de las jurisdicciones locales, incluyendo los distritos escolares. Por lo tanto, el debate sobre la dependencia de recursos locales para financiar la educación generalmente cuestiona la equidad de usar el impuesto sobre la propiedad como método principal de financiamiento de las escuelas locales. Es importante aclarar hasta qué punto se debate el tema del impuesto sobre la propiedad en sí, y hasta qué punto es este simplemente el instrumento más común utilizado para recaudar ingresos, y lo que se discute es su uso y distribución.
El impuesto sobre la propiedad y la igualación del financiamiento escolar
El impuesto sobre la propiedad se vinculó en forma más visible con la igualación del financiamiento escolar en la decisión Serrano de California en 1971, que inauguró una nueva era de disputas constitucionales estatales sobre el financiamiento de la educación. En ese caso, la Suprema Corte de California dictaminó que las bases divergentes del impuesto sobre la propiedad causaban variaciones constitucionalmente inaceptables en los presupuestos escolares: “La fuente de estas disparidades es inequívoca: en Baldwin Park el valor de tasación inmobiliaria por niño fue de sólo US$3.706; en Pasadena, el valor de tasación por niño fue de US$13.706; mientras que en Beverly Hills, el monto fue de $50.885, o sea una relación de 1 a 4 a 13. Por lo tanto, las subvenciones estatales son insuficientes para compensar las inequidades inherentes a un sistema de financiamiento que depende de bases tributables locales de gran variabilidad.”[1] En el plazo de una década, California puso en práctica un nuevo sistema de financiamiento escolar centralizado. En vez de que los distritos fijen sus presupuestos con base en los ingresos locales, estas decisiones se efectúan para cada distrito a nivel estatal.[2] La fase inicial de la reforma financiera escolar en California se enfocó firmemente en la igualación del financiamiento básico, y las primeras decisiones judiciales trataron de limitar las variaciones en el gasto por alumno en todo el estado a no más de US$100.[3]
En la misma década, los votantes de California impusieron una serie de limitaciones al impuesto sobre la propiedad, con la aprobación de la Propuesta 13 en 1978. A raíz de esta iniciativa, la legislatura estatal cambió también el sistema para distribuir la recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad. Como resultado de estas medidas, las leyes estatales gobiernan la tasa del impuesto sobre la propiedad, los presupuestos de los distritos escolares locales y la distribución de la recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad. Aproximadamente un tercio de la recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad es asignado a distritos escolares que ofrecen desde preescolar hasta los primeros dos años en universidades terciarias (K-14).[4] La experiencia de California demuestra que el impuesto sobre la propiedad puede ser una herramienta para la centralización e igualación del financiamiento escolar, así como para la descentralización y la variación local.
Complejidades del financiamiento escolar centralizado
Si bien la Propuesta 13 se aprobó muy poco después que la reforma financiera escolar en California, la conexión causal entre las dos sigue siendo motivo de controversia. Una perspectiva considera que el financiamiento y la administración escolar centralizada y normalizada erosionan el apoyo de los propietarios al impuesto sobre la propiedad.[5] “Los propietarios estaban dispuestos a pagar impuestos más altos sobre la propiedad en el convencimiento de que ello llevaría a crear escuelas de alta calidad. El movimiento que creó el litigio sobre las finanzas escolares ha quebrado este vínculo: los ingresos del impuesto local sobre la propiedad ahora tienden a ser redistribuidos en el resto del estado y se dedican sólo marginalmente a las escuelas locales.”[6] Al mismo tiempo, otros académicos refutan con vehemencia esta teoría por razones estadísticas e históricas: “Las pruebas no sostienen el argumento de que Serrano fue la causa de la Propuesta 13.”[7]
Sea cual fuere la conexión, estos dos elementos —las disputas constitucionales y las limitaciones al impuesto sobre la propiedad— se reforzaron mutuamente al desplazar la autoridad y responsabilidad del financiamiento escolar desde las municipalidades al gobierno estatal. Este proceso también expuso los presupuestos escolares a nuevas presiones políticas. A nivel local, el gasto escolar es frecuentemente el elemento más importante del presupuesto, pero las necesidades estatales son más amplias: incluyen salud y seguridad pública, transporte, sistema penitenciario y educación superior. Si las decisiones educativas cruciales parecen estar a cargo de funcionarios estatales o de mayor rango, la centralización también presenta el desafío de mantener el contacto con los padres y conseguir que participen.
La experiencia de California ha demostrado que estas preocupaciones se deben tomar en serio. En 1969–1970, antes de la centralización de sus finanzas escolares y la introducción de la Propuesta 13, California ocupaba el 11.o lugar entre todos los estados y el Distrito de Columbia, en gastos por alumno, desde preescolar hasta el terminar el colegio, o secundaria (K-12). Para 2013, había caído al puesto 36.[8] Su déficit es aún mayor que lo que indica el monto gastado por alumno, porque los salarios de los maestros en California, para ser competitivos, superan el promedio nacional. Eric Brunner y Jon Sonstelie observan: “Los estudiantes de California tuvieron un desempeño considerablemente mejor en el periodo anterior al traspaso de las finanzas del nivel local al estatal […]. Esta disminución aparente en el desempeño promedio sería menos problemática si viniera acompañada de una igualación entre distritos y niveles de ingreso. Sin embargo, hay muy poca evidencia de igualación entre distritos escolares”. Hacen notar que la disminución del desempeño no se puede atribuir solamente a los recursos. “El mal desempeño de los estudiantes de California en las pruebas de nivel es decepcionante, pero este desempeño se debe más a la ineficiencia en la asignación de fondos que a la escasez de los mismos”.[9] Esta situación es consecuencia de muchos factores complejos, pero está claro que el respaldo estatal a la educación local en California no ha cumplido con las altas expectativas de los partidarios iniciales de la reforma del financiamiento escolar.
Michigan llevó a cabo una centralización importante de su sistema de financiamiento escolar en 1994, pero las continuas dificultades económicas del estado han reducido su capacidad para mantener sus niveles de financiamiento. Como en el caso de California, los cambios en el financiamiento escolar fueron parte de una colección de objetivos a veces contradictorios, como mejora educacional, mayor equidad y alivio tributario. La “Propuesta A” de Michigan, aprobada en 1994, redujo drásticamente el impuesto sobre la propiedad y lo sustituyó con una serie de fuentes de recaudación alternativas, como porciones del impuesto estatal sobre el ingreso y un incremento en el impuesto estatal sobre las ventas, que se dedicó a las escuelas.
Diez años más tarde, dos analistas juzgaron que los resultados de la centralización de Michigan fue “decididamente positiva”, aunque expresaron su preocupación de que la base de recaudación estatal para el fondo de ayuda escolar era “peligrosamente vulnerable a fluctuaciones cíclicas”.[10] En 2010, El Consejo de Investigación Ciudadana de Michigan elaboró este informe:
Dadas las realidades prácticas del sistema de financiamiento actual, los ingresos controlados (directa o indirectamente) por el estado suman casi el 85 por ciento de los fondos operativos totales de las escuelas locales. Por lo tanto, son los dirigentes estatales, no los locales, los que controlan la caja en las escuelas locales de Michigan […]. Además de los problemas fiscales debidos a la crisis económica de casi una década de duración en Michigan, que han sido exacerbados por la Gran Recesión, las finanzas de la educación pública también enfrentan otro problema grave a largo plazo. Desde principios de la década del 2000, el estado no ha podido controlar los dos déficits estructurales que afectan a sus fondos operativos principales: el Fondo General y el Fondo de Ayuda Escolar.[11]
Una disposición poco advertida de la legislación de Michigan de 1994, típica de la complejidad de estas promulgaciones, transfirió a los gobiernos locales los pagos anuales al fondo de jubilación escolar, que antes estaba a cargo del gobierno estatal.[12]
La adopción de un financiamiento escolar centralizado no resuelve por sí mismo los problemas de adecuación y eficiencia, que son cruciales en toda reforma educativa, independientemente del impuesto que se use como fuente de ingresos educativos. Los desafíos sustanciales de una reforma educativa son mayores que la simple elección de un instrumento tributario.
El impuesto sobre la propiedad y los gastos locales suplementarios
Los impuestos locales también pueden ser controvertidos cuando se usan para suplementar niveles de gasto fijados por el gobierno central. Es poco probable que un estado financie todas las escuelas al mismo nivel que los distritos más pudientes establecerían para sí mismos si elaboraran su presupuesto de manera independiente. Esto presenta un dilema cuando un estado interviene para asegurar que los distritos menos ricos reciban el financiamiento necesario. El estado puede asignar recursos a los distritos necesitados sin garantizarles un presupuesto por alumno igual al de las jurisdicciones que gastan más. O puede imponer restricciones que limiten la capacidad de los distritos ricos para suplementar su presupuesto con recursos propios. En el primer caso, el uso del impuesto sobre la propiedad para aumentar el presupuesto escolar local sería aceptable; en el segundo caso no lo sería. Por ejemplo, Michigan no permite a los distritos locales la obtención de recursos tributarios adicionales para el funcionamiento de las escuelas. Los distritos que gastan más, y cuyo nivel de financiamiento ha disminuido, han creado una nueva dimensión en el litigio sobre el financiamiento escolar al considerar la posibilidad de iniciar una acción legal contra el estado.[13]
Uno de los abogados que inició la disputa por el financiamiento de la educación en California argumentó que no era justo permitir que los padres recauden fondos para sus escuelas locales: “Si tenemos un sistema educativo malo, los padres de los ricos tienen que estar igualmente preocupados como los padres de los pobres”.[14] La posición contraria considera que es legítimo que existan ciertas variaciones en los niveles de gasto escolar, particularmente si los padres que no pueden suplementar los presupuestos de base se retiran del sistema escolar público y envían a sus hijos a escuelas privadas.
Vermont adoptó una estrategia única al problema de gastos mayores al promedio después de que la Suprema Corte estatal revocó su método de financiamiento escolar.[15] La legislatura respondió con la Ley 60, que entre 1999 y 2004 proporcionó una asignación estatal uniforme para todos los estudiantes de educación primaria y secundaria. En ese momento, el 90 por ciento de los distritos escolares de Vermont ya estaban gastando más del monto estándar por alumno. No obstante, bajo la Ley 60, los distritos que eligieron gastar más tenían que aportar fondos locales adicionales a un fondo estatal para beneficiar a las áreas más pobres. Cuanto más rico era el distrito, más tenía que aportar a este “fondo compartido”. El estado podía reasignar más de dos tercios de los fondos recaudados de los distritos más ricos a escuelas de los distritos más pobres. En 2004 se informó de que “aproximadamente el 91 por ciento de los distritos escolares de Vermont recibieron más fondos bajo el nuevo régimen, y los residentes de distritos con propiedades de bajo valor tuvieron que pagar menos impuestos. Los impuestos en los distritos más ricos se habían más que duplicado y, sin embargo, los gastos por alumno en esos distritos habían disminuido. Estos resultados generaron una intensa respuesta por parte de los distritos más ricos de Vermont, creando situaciones de desobediencia civil, retención local de los fondos estatales para la educación, evasión del ‘fondo compartido’ por medio de deducciones tributarias y un fracasado pleito contra la constitucionalidad de la Ley 60”.[16]
Esta controversia fue una de las razones principales por las que se produjo posteriormente un cambio legislativo. En Vermont, como en otros estados, las limitaciones de los presupuestos escolares también dieron lugar a campañas privadas de recaudación de fondos y el uso de subvenciones de fundaciones de caridad para reemplazar los fondos tributarios que las escuelas locales habían perdido. En California, por ejemplo, sólo en 2011 las contribuciones voluntarias no tributarias a las escuelas públicas ascendieron a US$547 millones.[17]
Para algunos observadores, la capacidad de los padres de mayores ingresos para comprar recursos educativos adicionales para las escuelas de sus hijos significa un retorno a la situación que dio lugar en primera instancia a los litigios judiciales sobre el financiamiento educativo. Un maestro de Nueva York expresó que el concepto mismo de educación pública “suprime todas las distinciones entre grupos de individuos, por ser inherentemente injustas”.[18] Por otro lado, la oportunidad de contar con respaldo local ayuda a promover un compromiso amplio con las escuelas públicas.
De la igualación a la adecuación
Una decisión judicial de California tomada en 1986 como parte de la larga serie de casos relacionados con Serrano ofreció otra perspectiva sobre los problemas de igualación de gastos. “Las consecuencias adversas de años de nivelación hacia abajo han sido particularmente perjudiciales en distritos de gastos altos con grandes concentraciones de estudiantes pobres y minoritarios. Algunos de los distritos más urbanos del estado, con altas concentraciones de estudiantes de escasos recursos y minoritarios, son distritos de alta recaudación.”[19] Según la opinión del tribunal, las jurisdicciones de “alta recaudación” con grandes concentraciones de propiedad comercial o industrial pueden albergar a residentes urbanos de bajos ingresos que en realidad perderían fondos bajo una política de igualación estricta. Muchas ciudades grandes con estudiantes pobres tienen que gastar en educación pública más, y no menos, que el promedio estatal por estudiante.[20]
Los esfuerzos para suplir las necesidades de estudiantes marginados han desviado el foco de la reforma de las finanzas escolares, desde la igualación al suministro de fondos suficientes para lograr un desempeño adecuado. “En 1989, la Suprema Corte de Kentucky declaró que todo el sistema estatal de educación pública primaria y secundaria era inconstitucional y sostuvo que todos los estudiantes de Kentucky tenían el derecho constitucional a recibir una educación adecuada. La decisión trajo como consecuencia una reorganización drástica en todo el sistema escolar público del estado, y creó lo que muchos académicos han llamado el ‘movimiento de adecuación’”.[21] Sin embargo, es mucho más fácil calcular las diferencias en financiamiento que proporcionar una definición operativa de educación adecuada. Esta importante decisión de la Suprema Corte de Kentucky interpretó el requisito constitucional estatal de “un sistema eficiente de escuelas comunes” en función de siete objetivos bastante abstractos, incluyendo “destrezas de comunicación oral y escrita suficientes para que los estudiantes puedan funcionar en una civilización compleja y rápidamente cambiante” y “autoconocimiento y conocimiento suficiente de su bienestar mental y físico”.[22]
A falta de una disposición constitucional a nivel federal de equidad en el financiamiento escolar[23], estos casos se dirimen en los tribunales estatales. No obstante, el desafío judicial a los sistemas estatales no pueden abordar la fuente más importante de falta de uniformidad en los gastos educativos: las diferencias de gastos entre los distintos estados. Estas son mucho más significativas que las diferencias entre los distritos de cualquier estado individual. “Aproximadamente dos tercios de la inequidad de gastos nacional se deben a los gastos entre distintos estados, y sólo un tercio se refiere a los gastos dentro de los estados, y por lo tanto los litigios sobre la reforma escolar sólo pueden resolver una pequeña parte de esta inequidad”.[24]
Complejidades de los gastos por alumno
El desplazamiento en el enfoque de una igualación estricta a proporcionar recursos adecuados a los distritos necesitados puede debilitar el argumento que prohíbe a los distritos locales recaudar más impuestos para suplementar los ingresos dispuestos por el estado. Si muchos distritos urbanos necesitados y de bajo desempeño tienen que gastar mucho más que el presupuesto promedio por alumno, la uniformidad no será la meta óptima.
De todas maneras, la uniformidad de gastos siempre tendrá un atractivo intuitivo. En California, las décadas de financiamiento escolar centralizado han roto prácticamente la conexión entre los gastos en educación y la riqueza inmobiliaria local. No obstante, el informe “California Watch” del Centro de Informes de Investigación en 2011 ilustró cómo los gastos por alumno seguían variando mucho entre un distrito y otro. El informe citó al presidente de la Asociación de Educación de Alameda: “Para nosotros, el hecho de no recibir la misma cantidad que otros distritos cerca del nuestro es como decir que vamos a valorar a un niño más que a otro”. Este informe describió también el sistema de financiamiento pos-Serrano en California:
En el fallo histórico de 1971 de Serrano vs. Priest, el tribunal determinó que el uso del impuesto local sobre la propiedad para financiar las escuelas creaba grandes diferencias entre un distrito rico como Beverly Hills y Baldwin Park, una comunidad de bajos ingresos al este de Los Ángeles.
La Suprema Corte estableció que las diferencias en el monto básico de fondos erogado por alumno —llamado también “límite de ingresos”— tenía que ser menor o igual a US$100 en todos los distritos. Si tenemos en cuenta la inflación, la diferencia permisible es ahora de US$350 por estudiante. Aun cuando sigue habiendo diferencias importantes entre algunos distritos, las disparidades en el monto básico que los distritos reciben del estado se han reducido sustancialmente.
Pero dicha reducción ha sido neutralizada por fondos locales, estatales y federales aportados por casi cien programas distintos. Una gran parte del dinero se basa en fórmulas establecidas en la década de 1970 para comida, transporte y otros servicios que frecuentemente tienen poco que ver con las necesidades actuales de los estudiantes.
Las inequidades que el tribunal trató de aliviar con el fallo de Serrano persisten. Alrededor de dos tercios de los distritos gastan ahora por lo menos US$500 por encima o por debajo del promedio estatal, según el análisis de California Watch.
“Lo que pasó desde el caso Serrano es que tratamos de igualar el financiamiento de base de los estudiantes en todo el estado”, dijo [Julia] Brownley, asambleísta de Santa Mónica. “Pero desde entonces hemos creado cientos de fondos con categorías distintas que se sumaron a la base. Esto ha llevado el financiamiento a un nivel distinto y ha sesgado de nuevo los gastos”.[25]
Hay varios aspectos de este informe que vale la pena hacer notar. Desde la perspectiva del impuesto sobre la propiedad, quizás la conclusión más importante es que las disparidades persistentes en los presupuestos distritales no son el resultado de diferencias en la recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad, puesto que la asignación de los recursos del impuesto sobre la propiedad es establecida por la legislatura y el gobernador.
Más aún, el objetivo de igualar los gastos dentro del límite de unos pocos cientos de dólares por estudiante en un estado tan extenso y variado como California es inadecuado. Los costos de bienes y servicios varían significativamente entre regiones y entre centros urbanos y rurales. Una de las críticas más importantes a la centralización del financiamiento escolar en Michigan ha sido que no tuvo en cuenta las diferencias de costos de los distritos escolares en distintas áreas y con poblaciones distintas.[26] Esta misma crítica se puede aplicar al caso de California.
Muchas de las deficiencias del sistema de financiamiento pos-Serrano en California fueron eliminadas en la histórica legislación firmada por el Gobernador Jerry Brown en 2013, “el cambio más importante en la forma en que California financia sus escuelas públicas de los últimos 25 años”.[27] Esta legislación se propone asignar más fondos a los distritos necesitados, como aquellos que albergan estudiantes de bajos ingresos o cuyo idioma nativo no es el inglés, en vez de igualar los gastos entre distritos.
Como medida cuantitativa, el gasto por alumno puede dar una idea equivocada de exactitud. Los cálculos varían en función de una multitud de opciones sobre los montos que se incluyan, como gastos de capital, servicio de la deuda, educación para adultos, programas educativos extraescolares, contribuciones de jubilación y gastos administrativos estatales, sin mencionar las formas en que se mide la inscripción de alumnos.[28] Las asignaciones pueden ser distintas que los montos establecidos en el presupuesto, y ambas pueden diferir de los gastos reales. Por lo tanto, es posible que la Oficina del Censo de los EE.UU. calcule que los gastos por alumno en la Ciudad de Nueva York en 2011 fueron de US$19.770 y que la Oficina Presupuestaria Independiente de la Ciudad determine que ese monto fue menor a US$8.000.[29] Las comparaciones de los presupuestos individuales de los distritos escolares pueden quedar distorsionadas también si unos pocos distritos pequeños o remotos tienen gastos por alumno muy altos. Y, por supuesto, es el uso de los fondos escolares, no su cantidad solamente, lo que vale para mejorar los resultados educacionales.
Todos estos asuntos cruciales están muy alejados de la política sobre el impuesto a la propiedad. Sin embargo, este sigue siendo utilizado a la hora de encontrar culpables por el bajo desempeño escolar. Un editorial del New York Times de 2013 consideró las razones por el lugar distante que ocupa el país en las pruebas internacionales de matemáticas y ciencias:
Los distritos escolares de los EE.UU. dependen demasiado del impuesto sobre la propiedad, lo cual significa que las áreas ricas recaudan más dinero que las pobres. El dinero de impuestos estatales para cubrir esta brecha en general no puede suplir las necesidades de los distritos con mayores niveles de pobreza y otros desafíos […].
[…] Ontario [Canadá], por ejemplo, trata de eliminar, o por lo menos minimizar, el desequilibrio de fondos que existiría de otra manera entre los distritos pobres y ricos. En la mayoría de los estados de los EE.UU., sin embargo, los distritos más ricos gastan alrededor del doble por alumno que los que menos gastan, de acuerdo a un informe de una comisión asesora federal. En algunos estados, como California, esta relación es mayor que tres a uno.[30]
Después de más de cuatro décadas de una reforma financiera escolar, centralización e igualación extremadamente ambiciosas, las deficiencias del sistema educativo escolar de California no se pueden achacar al impuesto sobre la propiedad. La crítica fácil al impuesto evade los problemas enormes y mucho más complicados de cómo mejorar los desempeños educativos.
Impuesto estatal sobre la propiedad
La equidad del impuesto sobre la propiedad es un tema de debate debido a que el financiamiento local parece injusto, y sólo en la medida en que se usa el impuesto sobre la propiedad para proporcionar ingresos a nivel local. Por lo tanto, un impuesto sobre la propiedad a nivel del estado no se consideraría injusto de la misma manera. Algunos estados imponen un pequeño tributo adicional sobre el impuesto local sobre la propiedad, y usan lo recaudado para financiar la educación. Pero un impuesto estatal sobre la propiedad puede crear problemas graves cuando se impone sobre valores inmobiliarios calculados por medio de prácticas de tasación local que no son uniformes.
Esta fue la situación que tuvo que enfrentar Nueva Hampshire con su sistema de financiamiento escolar, que dependía principalmente del impuesto local sobre la propiedad y fue declarado inconstitucional por la Suprema Corte estatal en 1997.[31] Nueva Hampshire es el único estado del país que no tiene un impuesto estatal sobre las ventas ni un impuesto general sobre el ingreso, por lo que la fuente de ingresos esencial para ofrecer servicios públicos es el impuesto sobre la propiedad. Como respuesta, el estado creó un impuesto inmobiliario a una tasa del 0,66 por ciento sobre los valores de tasación locales equiparados por el Departamento de Administración de Ingresos de Nueva Hampshire. Un tribunal de primera instancia dictaminó que un impuesto a nivel estatal no se podía basar en tasaciones locales no uniformes.[32] No obstante, la Suprema Corte estatal, profundamente dividida, rápidamente revocó esta decisión, determinando que sólo se podía establecer una violación de la cláusula estatal de uniformidad por “medio de hechos específicos que demuestren un ‘designio amplio de discriminación intencional)’”.[33]
Otros estados también han hecho uso del impuesto local sobre la propiedad para financiar presupuestos escolares centralizados. En Michigan, un impuesto sobre las propiedades que no son bienes de familia, como las residencias de vacaciones y segundas residencias, se ha dedicado para financiar la ayuda escolar estatal. Este no es formalmente un impuesto estatal sobre la propiedad, pero los distritos que no tributan el impuesto no reciben el financiamiento estatal pleno de su subvención educativa. Como en el caso de Nueva Hampshire, un impuesto administrado localmente se ha convertido en el fondo en un gravamen estatal.
En California, las tasaciones inmobiliarias y la recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad siguen siendo responsabilidad local, pero es la legislación estatal la que determina el uso de los fondos. Con respecto a la educación, el estado determina el financiamiento de acuerdo a una fórmula conocida como límite de ingresos. Según la explicación del Departamento de Educación estatal: “El límite de ingresos totales del distrito se financia por medio de una combinación de impuestos sobre la propiedad locales y el fondo de Ayuda General del estado. De hecho, el estado suple la diferencia entre los ingresos del impuesto sobre la propiedad y el límite total de ingresos para financiar a cada distrito.”[34] En 2009–2010, el promedio de ingresos para los distritos escolares de California fue de US$8.801, y el impuesto sobre la propiedad promedio asignado a cada alumno fue de US$2.210; la diferencia viene de la ayuda estatal. Un aumento en la recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad daría como resultado una reducción similar en la ayuda estatal. El impuesto sobre la propiedad funciona como un instrumento del financiamiento centralizado estatal de las escuelas. Como ya se ha mencionado, esto no ha eliminado de ninguna manera las objeciones a las disparidades de financiamiento entre distritos escolares. Un informe concluyó que en los distritos primarios pequeños el límite de ingresos más alto por alumno fue de US$31.234 en 2005–2006 y el menor fue de US$4.727.[35]
El impacto de la capitalización
Las finanzas escolares a veces tienen una relación singular con el impuesto sobre la propiedad debido al proceso de capitalización. Los beneficios de servicios públicos locales superiores pueden tener una clara influencia positiva sobre el valor inmobiliario dentro de una jurisdicción. Es intuitivamente obvio que si dos casas son comparables en todos los demás aspectos, incluyendo sus responsabilidades tributarias, la que se encuentre en una municipalidad donde los servicios públicos sean mejores se venderá por un mayor precio. Al mismo tiempo, casas equivalentes en distintas municipalidades que reciban servicios similares pero tengan responsabilidades tributarias desiguales se venderán por precios distintos que reflejarán esta diferencia en los pagos tributarios.
Estos dos aspectos de la capitalización —el aumento de precio causado por servicios superiores y la reducción de precio causada por un aumento en los impuestos— influyen en el debate sobre las finanzas escolares.[36] Es de suponer que los sistemas escolares excelentes aumentarán el valor de las propiedades locales, proporcionando un incentivo para respaldar gastos efectivos en educación, aun para propietarios que no tengan hijos en las escuelas locales. Esta es también una razón para oponerse a gastos superfluos o inefectivos que pueden reducir el valor de la propiedad local. No hay un incentivo financiero similar para que los propietarios respalden el gasto escolar financiado por el estado, porque sus pagos de impuestos estatales no afectan los valores inmobiliarios locales. Esta es una ventaja potencial de la participación local en el financiamiento y las decisiones operativas escolares, y una de las razones para sustentar la hipótesis de que las finanzas escolares centralizadas contribuyeron a obtener el apoyo a la Propuesta 13 en California.
Clarificación del debate
La reforma financiera escolar es un desafío inmenso que involucra muchas cuestiones, desde las definiciones fundamentales de cuál es un desempeño adecuado hasta interpretaciones legales de los mandatos estatales y la medición de costos. Los funcionarios públicos a veces tienen que equilibrar preocupaciones que compiten entre sí, como igualación, adecuación de fondos, centralización y autonomía local. Más aún, la reforma financiera escolar es sólo una parte del desafío aún mayor de cómo mejorar el desempeño escolar. En muchos casos, el papel del impuesto sobre la propiedad es sólo incidental en estos temas fundamentales. El funcionamiento del impuesto y el uso de su recaudación se pueden estructurar para respaldar una serie de resultados financieros deseados, y el foco en el impuesto sobre la propiedad como causa de las deficiencias educativas puede distraernos de la tarea esencial e inmensa de mejorar la calidad escolar. Los esfuerzos para reducir la dependencia de las escuelas del impuesto sobre la propiedad pueden recoger tanto o más apoyo de activistas antitributarios que de aquellos que creen que estos pasos pueden promover una mayor equidad o efectividad educativa. El debate sobre el impuesto a la propiedad debería avanzar en función de sus propias características y distinguir claramente entre los problemas operativos y el uso de la recaudación.
Joan Youngman es senior fellow del Instituto Lincoln de Políticas de Suelo, donde es directora del Departamento de Valuación y Tributación.
Referencias
[1] Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 594; 487 P.2d 1241, 1248; 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 608 (1971) (cita omitida).
[2] Brunner, Eric J., y Jon Sonstelie. 2006. “California’s School Finance Reform: An Experiment in Fiscal Federalism.” En The Tiebout Model at Fifty: Essays in Public Economics in Honor of Wallace Oates, ed. William A. Fischel. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
[3] Fischel, William A. 1989. “Did Serrano Cause Proposition 13?” National Tax Journal 42(4): 465–473.
[4] California Legislative Analyst’s Office. 2012. Understanding California’s Property Taxes, 19. Sacramento, CA: Legislative Analyst’s Office.
[5] Fischel, William A. 1996. “How Serrano Caused Proposition 13.” Journal of Law and Politics 12(Otoño): 607–636.”
[6] Brunori, David. 1999. “Interview: Steven M. Sheffrin on the ‘Worst Tax,’ Local Options, and Prop 13.” State Tax Notes (27 de diciembre): 1721–1723.
[7] Stark, Kirk, and Jonathan Zasloff. 2003. “Tiebout and Tax Revolts: Did Serrano Really Cause Proposition 13?” UCLA Law Review 50(Febrero): 853. Ver también Martin (2006).
[8] U.S. Census Bureau, Education Finance Branch. 2015. Public Education Finances: 2013.
[9] Brunner and Sonstelie (2006), 73, 88.
[10] Arsen, David, y David N. Plank. 2004. “Michigan School Finance under Proposal A: State Control, Local Consequences.” State Tax Notes (15 de marzo): 903–922.
[11] Citizens Research Council of Michigan. 2010. State and Local Revenues for Public Education in Michigan, Report 363 (Septiembre), vii, 50. Livonia, MI: Citizens Research Council of Michigan.
[12] Thiel, Craig. 2012. “Rising School Retirement Contribution.”
[13] Coffman, Jennifer. 2012. “AAPS Mulls Suing State Over School Aid Fund.” Ann Arbor Chronicle, 22 de enero.
[14] Seligman, Katherine. 1988. “Creative Fund-Raisers for Schools Keep Affluent Districts Humming.” San Diego Union-Tribune, 18 de noviembre.
[15] Brigham v. State, 166 Vt. 246, 692 A.2d 384 (1997).
[16] Obhof, Larry J. 2004. “Rethinking Judicial Activism and Restraint in State School Finance Litigation.” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 27: 569–607. 593 (citas omitidas).
[17] Weston, Margaret. 2015. Voluntary Contributions to California’s Public Schools. San Francisco: Public Policy Institute of California.
[18] Becker, Sidney. 1997. Carta al director. New York Newsday, Queens Edition, 14 de octubre: A39.
[19] Serrano v. Priest, 200 Cal. App. 3d 897, 226 Cal. Rptr. 584, 619 (1986).
Shelby County Assessor v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 994 N.E.2d 350 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2013).
Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 105 Neb. 843, 182 N.W. 485 (1921), rev’d, 260 U.S. 441 (1923).
[20] Minorini and Sugarman. 1999b. “School Finance Litigation in the Name of Educational Equity: Its Evolution, Impact, and Future,” 38. En Equity and Adequacy in Education Finance, ed. Helen F. Ladd, Rosemary Chalk, y Janet S. Hansen. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
[21] Minorini, Paul A., and Stephen D. Sugarman. 1999a. “Educational Adequacy and the Courts: The Promise and Problems of Moving to a New Paradigm.” 175. En Equity and Adequacy in Education Finance, ed. Helen F. Ladd, Rosemary Chalk, y Janet S. Hansen. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
[22] Rose v. Council for Better Education, 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989).
[23] San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
[24] Murray, Sheila E., William N. Evans, y Robert M. Schwab. 1998. “Education-finance Reform and the Distribution of Education Resources.” 808. American Economic Review 88(4): 789–812.
[26] Freedberg, Louis, y Stephen K. Doig. 2011. “Spending Far from Equal Among State’s School Districts, Analysis Finds.” California Watch, 2 de junio.
[26] Arsen y Plank (2004).
[27] York, Anthony. 2013. “Jerry Brown Signs School Funding Overhaul.” Los Angeles Times, 1 de julio.
[28] California Department of Education (2013). Comparison of Per-Pupil Spending Calculations. Sacramento, CA: California Department of Education.
[29] U.S. Census Bureau (2013); New York City Independent Budget Office (2014). U.S. Census Bureau. 2013. “Per Student Public Education Spending Decreases in 2011 for First Time in Nearly Four Decades, Census Bureau Reports.” Comunicado de prensa. 21 de mayo.
[30] New York Times. 2013. “Why Other Countries Teach Better.” Editorial, 18 de diciembre: A22.
[31] Claremont School District. v. Governor, 142 N.H. 462, 703 A.2d 1353 (1997).
[32] Sirrell v. New Hampshire (Rockingham Superior Court, 17 de enero, 2001).
[33] Sirrell v. New Hampshire, 146 N.H. 364, 373, 780 A.2d 494, 501 (2001).
Sirrell v. New Hampshire, 146 N.H. 364, 780 A.2d 494 (2001).
[34] California Department of Education. 2008. “School District Revenue Limit.” http://www.cde.ca.gov/fg/fo/profile.asp?id=1296.
[35] Weston, Margaret. 2010. Funding California Schools: The Revenue Limit System. San Francisco: Public Policy Institute of California.
[36] Oates, Wallace E. 1969. “The Effect of Property Taxes and Local Public Spending on Property Values: An Empirical Study of Tax Capitalization and the Tiebout Hypothesis.” Journal of Political Economy 77: 957–971. ———. 2006. “The Many Faces of the Tiebout Model.” En The Tiebout Model at Fifty: Essays in Public Economics in Honor of Wallace Oates, ed. William A. Fischel. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
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Researchers from the Lincoln Institute are working with the Group for the Integrated Development of the Capital (GDIC) in Havana to better understand how land and increments in land value can be utilized to facilitate the physical rehabilitation and economic development of Cuba.
During the Soviet era, Cuba’s economic environment was characterized by a top-down model in which state agencies were the principal economic and development actors. Planning was autocratic and inflexible; trade depended primarily on the socialist bloc countries; financial capacity was centralized in the national budget; and there was no tax system. Legal, financial and economic reforms implemented since 1990 have helped to create an institutional environment more conducive to economic efficiency and to allow Cuba’s participation in the global market (see Figure 1).
However, the Cuban economy still faces tremendous difficulties that have seriously affected the country’s capacity to maintain living standards, the quality of social and public services, and economic development programs in general. For example, Cuba’s GDP in 1995 was only one-half its 1989 level and its import capacity has fallen from roughly 8 billion to 2 billion US$ annually.
Figure 1: Summary of Key Reforms
1990 Opening of the economy to foreign investors
1991 Reinstatement of Cuban international trade
1992 Introduction of modifications to the 1976 Constitution
Introduction of new forms of non-state property Elimination of the state monopoly on international trade Expansion of foreign-owned private market enterprises 1993 Transfer of formerly state-owned rural land to workers
1994 Restructuring of the central state administration Opening of agricultural markets based on supply and demand mechanisms
1995 Reestablishment of indicative planning and introduction of financial indicators Beginning of state business restructuring Regularization of the circulation of hard currency in the banking system Enactment of new laws on foreign investments Gradual introduction of components of a tax system Enactment of the law restructuring the banking system
1997 Enactment of the law on free trade zones
The Cuban government has tried to promote tourism as its primary means to generate much-needed hard currency quickly. As a Caribbean island, Cuba offers substantial tourist attractions, ranging from magnificent beaches to the architectural heritage of Old Havana, which has been recognized on UNESCO’s World Heritage List, as well as other natural, historical and cultural sites around the country. However, stimulation of the tourist industry requires international partners to undertake the development of hotels, shops, restaurants and airport expansion. The fact that the state owns most of the land available for development is a critical element in Cuba’s strategy to attract foreign developers and tourists.
The government’s plan to build its tourist industry has shown some success. In 1967 there were about 2,000 tourists to the island annually, whereas in 1998 over 1.4 million visitors traveled to Cuba. During the last five years alone, foreign investors have increased their operations in Cuba in several economic sectors, particularly in tourism. As a result 2,000 new hotel rooms have been added in Havana, with a total capacity now surpassing 10,700 rooms. Nationwide there are 31,600 hotel rooms, and the target is to increase capacity to 40,000 over the next two years. About 80 percent of recent construction activity in Cuba is related, directly or indirectly, to the tourist sector. Some estimates indicate that state-owned land and buildings already committed to these new projects represent around 500 million US$. Significantly, this development has been achieved without the existence of a formal land market.
Land-based Policies to Stimulate Development
Land has been used in various ways to help stimulate development and to generate public revenues. First, the Cuban government has used land as its capital contribution in joint ventures with international developers. For example, VanCuba Holdings, S.A., a Canadian company, is a 50-percent partner with the Cuban government in a project to build 11 hotels. Cuba contributed the land as its 50-percent share and the Canadian company is expected to invest 400 million US$. Many such joint venture arrangements, particularly real estate and tourism projects, have been made with development companies from Canada, Spain, Italy and Israel.
Since land is Cuba’s principal contribution to these international ventures, a key issue is to assure that the financial value of the land represents 50 percent of the project’s social capital. In cases where the monetary value of the contributed land is less than 50 percent, the foreign partner has often been instrumental in helping its Cuban counterpart apply for credit from international banks or financial institutions to make up the difference. More recently, the credit to assure 50-percent Cuban participation is obtained at low interest rates directly from the Central Bank of Cuba rather than from international entities.
A second mechanism to stimulate development is the increased use of land leasing agreements for commercial and office projects. Leasing is preferred since the direct sale of state-owned land is possible only in very special situations. The leasing terms are negotiated on the basis of the specific land value, and if accepted by all parties are established for 25 years. The lease may be reviewed and extended for an additional 25 years if the parties involved in the renegotiations agree upon the new criteria. In Havana, several projects with foreign investors are currently operating under such an agreement, and the estimated area under development in the city surpasses 100 hectares.
Third, the Cuban government has entered into direct rental agreements for state-owned land in free trade zones, which in some cases generate significant revenues. About 120 foreign private and public-private enterprises have been established already in two trade zones in Havana.
Both the leasing and direct rental agreements for state-owned land provide important new funds to the national budget. These resources are then used to improve the standard of living in local communities by providing social services (education and health), developing economic projects, upgrading and enlarging major infrastructure and other amenities, and generating jobs. Some examples of city and community benefits that have been supported largely by these revenues are the new Havana International Airport, the creation and improvement of a digital telephone system, and the metropolitan park projects in the Almendares River area.
A different but very interesting set of instruments to mobilize land value increments resulting from public investment has been developed by the Office of the Historian, the public agency responsible for promoting, financing and developing the revitalization program in Old Havana. This Office has begun to collect both indirect and direct taxes totaling 35 percent of revenues from private enterprises not related to the Office, such as hotels, commercial businesses and restaurants that have benefited from the Office’s efforts to rehabilitate the historic district. These external revenues, as well as revenues generated by projects initiated by the Office itself, are used in a kind of revolving fund to support further investments in the built environment. They also fund a variety of social programs, including housing, nursing homes, and educational and cultural activities in Old Havana. The Office’s total revenues surpassed 40 million US$ in 1998 and 50 million US$ in 1999. The government is also negotiating other kinds of revenue-generating programs to capture land value increments to support the rehabilitation of the Paseo del Prado and the Rampa areas of Havana, as well as the Boca de la Chorrera redevelopment project at the mouth of the Almendares River.
Difficulties with Implementation
Cuba’s implementation of these various tools for capturing land value increments has not occurred without problems. In the case of the indirect and direct taxes on revenues introduced in Old Havana, several businesses have claimed that their revenue sources are not a result of the efforts by the Office of the Historian to improve the district, and therefore should be exempt from the tax. For example, the headquarters of the Cuban Fuel Distribution Company (CUPET) is located in a valuable area in the heart of the historic center but does not pay the tax. The company argues that its revenue sources (i.e., its facilities and distribution networks) are located outside the center and therefore do not benefit from the rehabilitation process.
The 25-year leasing agreements illustrate a different problem arising from the implicit dilemma between short-run vs. long-run goals, because the agreements do not include a periodic updating of lease payments. On one hand, if the payments are set on the basis of existing use and value, the public authorities may lose significant financial resources that could accrue from the impacts of these investments and other changes in land value over the 25-year lease. However, if the authorities attempt to capture the anticipated higher value immediately, they will have more difficulty making such expensive deals with wary investors.
The lack of an adequate legal system for real estate development and mortgage lending in Cuba is a major obstacle to implementation of all these instruments. Proposed new real estate laws have been drafted but legislation expected to be introduced last year has not yet been adopted. This uncertain and unpredictable legal situation can prevent the formation of serious business partnerships, which normally require long-term vision, stability and transparency. Furthermore, this lack of legal protection may scare away the highest quality developers who would be most able to carry out sophisticated larger projects. As a result, the Cuban government has had fewer strong proposals to evaluate and has been accepting smaller projects with less established international developers.
These smaller projects are sometimes problematic for several reasons. First, they are often located in the most desirable parts of Havana, although such developments are not necessarily appropriate for those neighborhoods. Second, they must rely on existing infrastructure since they are not large enough to provide that additional investment. Third, the aesthetic quality and even the basic service standards of these new hotels or apartments are sometimes questionable. Since these buildings affect the overall image of the city, they may even have a negative impact and contribute to the devaluation of their neighborhood.
A related problem is the uncertainty that developers experience in having to deal with new institutions and policy tools that are being negotiated within the Cuban government at the same time they are being implemented in the field. While these policies are under review, the government has introduced a moratorium on new development in certain areas of Havana and has slowed the real estate negotiation process in general. Without stability and trust in the relevant government agencies and policies, private investors for commercial or residential projects are discouraged by the risks inherent in making long-term development decisions. This has an obvious effect on the costs of development and the expected internal rates of return.
Finally, there are the difficulties of assessing land values in the absence of formal markets, let alone transparent land transactions. Government agencies involved in development have two choices. One is to use administrative prices in determining the value of leases or contributions, even though the basis for these prices may not reflect the actual value of land attributes. Alternatively, the agencies must negotiate the price with foreign developers based on the dynamics of the particular site. Both options are limited by the lack of ongoing independent land market transactions on which to evaluate actual prices.
Land Policy Dilemmas
Although Cuba has made substantial progress, it faces many challenges and dilemmas in using land efficiently to stimulate development and generate revenues. For example, the smaller, more expedient projects may result in faster development and revenue flows, but they are not able to create a broader vision for future land uses, and they frequently cause damage to the historic fabric and natural environment. The larger, better-financed projects can create such a vision and enhance the environment, but are much more difficult to negotiate and take longer to build.
Furthermore, the larger projects may require a substantial investment in basic infrastructure because of the poor quality of existing conditions. The government has not had the resources to make these investments, thus threatening the economic sustainability of new urban interventions. Small projects cannot support such investment burdens. While the large projects may be able to finance infrastructure investment, they run the risk of becoming exclusive enclaves separated from the surrounding community when they provide infrastructure only as part of their own project. The question, then, is how to finance the infrastructure in a non-exclusionary manner to encourage other small-scale development. Three alternatives are being pursued simultaneously, but are subject to continuing debate:
Another aspect of the debate among Cuban planning and development experts concerns the pros and cons of introducing open land markets with a strong tax system vs. maintaining the existing public management of state-owned land. Those who advocate for introducing open land markets feel it is a necessary step to encourage development so that Cuba can benefit from linkages with the global economy and different types of foreign investments. These experts also argue that Cuba must continue to develop mechanisms for capturing publicly created land value.
Those who argue for continuing the current system point to Cuba’s success in reducing spatial segregation, promoting balance in social and urban services, preserving historic and other patrimony values in the city, and reserving enough land for future development projects. These advocates point to the recent Latin American experience with free markets, which has resulted in increased segregation between rich and poor areas, a lack of social services in poorer areas, increases in urban violence, speculation, and growing environmental problems.
In summary, some of the priority issues on Cuba’s land development agenda are the establishment of a legal system with clear parameters and the introduction of more rigorous and transparent mechanisms for valuing land and buildings. In addition, diversification of the types of Cuba-based partners available to participate in international development projects will help establish criteria for a longer-term planning perspective that will encourage large-scale infrastructure projects and support the continuing provision of benefits to the community. These concerns are not so different from land policy challenges in other developing countries. The continued study of land value as an instrument for development in Cuba offers important lessons for researchers and public officials throughout Latin America.
Ricardo Núñez is researcher at the Group for the Integrated Development of the Capital (GDIC) in Havana, Cuba. H. James Brown is president and CEO of the Lincoln Institute, and Martim Smolka is senior fellow and director of the Institute’s Latin American and Caribbean Program. Laura Mullahy, research assistant for the Latin American and Caribbean Program, also contributed to this article.
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Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 3 del libro Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.
América Latina es una región de marcados contrastes en cuanto al uso del suelo: la extensa selva del Amazonas y crecientes áreas de deforestación, grandes regiones despobladas y enormes concentraciones urbanas, la coexistencia de la riqueza y la pobreza en los mismos vecindarios. Muchos de estos contrastes derivan de las políticas de suelos establecidas por intereses poderosos que se han perpetuado gracias a registros desactualizados o distorsionados. Esta herencia es parte del proceso de colonización de la región que se ha caracterizado por la explotación y la ocupación de tierras a cualquier precio.
El primer sistema de información para el registro de parcelas de tierra en América Latina lo estableció en 1824 la Comisión Topográfica en la Provincia de Buenos Aires de la República Argentina. Las oficinas de catastro territorial en toda la región actualmente manejan sistemas de información sobre suelos públicos en los que se registran mapas y datos sobre los terrenos sujetos a impuestos y se otorgan derechos a los propietarios u ocupantes de la tierra.
¿Qué es un catastro?
Un catastro moderno es un sistema integrado de bases de datos que reúne la información sobre el registro y la propiedad del suelo, características físicas, modelo econométrico para la valoración de propiedades, zonificación, sistemas de información geográfica, transporte y datos ambientales, socioeconómicos y demográficos. Dichos catastros representan una herramienta holística de planificación que puede usarse a nivel local, regional y nacional con la finalidad de abordar problemas como el desarrollo económico, la propagación urbana, la erradicación de la pobreza, las políticas de suelo y el desarrollo comunitario sostenible.
Los primeros registros de agrimensura de propiedades en el antiguo Egipto utilizaron la ciencia de la geometría para medir las distancias. Más tarde los catastros europeos siguieron este modelo antiguo hasta que nuevos conocimientos dieron lugar a sistemas más integrados que podían usarse para fines fiscales, como la valoración, la tributación y las transferencias legales, así como la gestión del suelo y la planificación urbana. En los Estados Unidos no existe un sistema nacional de catastro, pero los procesos municipales semejantes son reflejo de la política y el protocolo de los programas internacionales de catastro.
La Federación Internacional de Agrimensores fue fundada en París en 1878 bajo el nombre de Fédération Internationale des Géomètres y se conoce por su acrónimo francés FIG. Esta organización no gubernamental reúne a más de 100 países y fomenta la colaboración internacional en materia de agrimensura mediante la obtención de datos de las características de la tierra sobre, en y bajo la superficie y su representación gráfica en forma de mapas, planos o modelos digitales. La FIG lleva a cabo su labor a través de 10 comisiones que se especializan en los diferentes aspectos de la agrimensura. La Comisión 7, Catastro y Manejo de Suelos, se concentra en los asuntos relacionados con la reforma catastral y catastros de usos múltiples, sistemas de información sobre suelos basados en parcelas, levantamientos catastrales y cartografía, titulación y tenencia de suelos y legislación sobre los suelos y registro. Para obtener más información, visite la página Web www.fig.net/figtree/commission7/.
Catastros multifuncionales
En años recientes, la visión del catastro como un sistema de información multifuncional ha comenzado a evolucionar y a producir grandes avances en la calidad de los sistemas de información sobre suelos, pero también algunos problemas. El origen de estas inquietudes puede hallarse en el concepto mismo de los sistemas de catastros multifinalitarios y en las decisiones administrativas que se necesitan para su implementación. Existe una noción frecuente según la cual para implementar un catastro multifuncional es necesario ampliar las bases de datos alfanuméricas –incluidos los datos sociales, ambientales y también físicos (ubicación y forma), aspectos económicos y jurídicos de la parcela– y vincular esta información a un mapa de parcelas en un sistema de información geográfica (SIG). Aunque es un paso importante, no es suficiente.
La implementación de un catastro multifuncional implica un cambio de paradigma para su administración y exige una nueva estructura de usos del suelo y nuevas relaciones entre los sectores público y privado. En 1996 Brasil ideó un Congreso Nacional sobre Catastro Multifuncional que se celebraría cada dos años para evaluar sus propios programas estatales de catastro y los programas de otros países vecinos. Pese a la atención dedicada a los catastros y los muchos artículos que se han publicado desde entonces sobre el tema, no hay indicios de ninguna municipalidad en la cual el sistema catastral multifuncional opere de la manera que se esperaba.
Según las publicaciones existentes, para que un catastro sea realmente multifuncional es necesario integrar todas las instituciones públicas y privadas que trabajan al nivel de parcelas con un identificador único y definir parámetros para las bases de datos alfanuméricas y cartográficas. Chile es uno de los países donde todas las parcelas tienen un identificador común designado por la implementación del Sistema Nacional de Información Territorial, aunque el sistema todavía no ha integrado los datos catastrales alfanuméricos con los mapas a nivel de parcelas (Hyman et al. 2003).
Centralización y descentralización
La hegemonía del sistema unitario de gobierno que caracteriza a la mayoría de los países latinoamericanos ha propiciado el predominio de catastros centralizados, si bien este fenómeno también ocurre en países con gobierno federal. Brasil, por ejemplo, recientemente reestructuró su Sistema Nacional de Catastro Rural, el cual, a pesar de los avances tecnológicos propuestos en la Ley 10.267/2001, continuará bajo la administración de una institución del gobierno nacional.
En contraste, el movimiento de descentralización en la región aspira modernizar los gobiernos estatales mediante la transferencia de poderes a las jurisdicciones municipales, lo que abarca las instituciones encargadas de la administración del suelo. Por ejemplo, más de la mitad de los estados de México aún tienen datos catastrales centralizados, aunque algunos han comenzado la descentralización creando sistemas municipales compatibles con el catastro estatal. Una situación similar ocurre en Argentina, donde algunas instituciones provinciales están comenzando a transferir sistemas y datos a las municipalidades. Los administradores locales tienen un incentivo adicional por asumir la responsabilidad de organizar y mantener los sistemas catastrales debido a las oportunidades para recaudar impuestos sobre la propiedad y vender mapas o bases de datos registrados en el sistema catastral local a las compañías de servicios públicos y demás entidades del sector privado.
Sin embargo, todas estas buenas intenciones a menudo se tropiezan con el problema crónico de la escasez de personal capacitado e infraestructura. En algunos casos la descentralización puede constituir un problema más que una solución y podría poner en riesgo el mantenimiento y validación de la información. Por ejemplo, la adopción del modelo descentralizado puede conducir a la coexistencia de catastros sumamente detallados y precisos en algunos lugares y catastros casi inexistentes en otros. Tales discrepancias entre municipalidades vecinas pueden dar lugar a incongruencias cuando se incorpora la información sobre el suelo a nivel regional y nacional.
Por otra parte, un modelo centralizado puede facilitar la unificación del diseño y la estructura del catastro y garantizar la integración de sistemas geodésicos y cartográficos con la identificación de parcelas. Las dificultades de acceso y distribución de la información para satisfacer necesidades locales podrían resolverse usando Internet para organizar los datos y mapas a través de un catastro central. Algunos países, como Jamaica, Chile y Uruguay, comienzan a adoptar este enfoque para estructurar sus catastros en forma electrónica (llamados e-catastros, término derivado del concepto de eGovernment -administración electrónica- introducido por el Banco Mundial).
Al considerar las distintas etapas de desarrollo de los catastros en América Latina, podemos concluir que cada jurisdicción está obligada a analizar qué tipo de sistema resulta más adecuado para sus circunstancias particulares. Vale la pena considerar los Principios Comunes del Catastro en la Unión Europea, un documento que afirma que “no hay intención de unificar los sistemas catastrales de los Estados miembros; no obstante, si existe interés en estandarizar los productos” (Comité Permanente, 2003). Si es posible trabajar con sistemas catastrales diferentes en toda Europa, debe ser posible hacerlo en un mismo país.
Catastros públicos y catastros privados
Después de la publicación del Catastro 2014 de la Federación Internacional de Agrimensores (FIG), una de las nuevas visiones que suscitó mucho debate fue la propuesta de que el catastro debiera estar “altamente privatizado; el sector público y el sector privado trabajarán en conjunto, lo que reducirá el control y la supervisión por parte del sector público” (Kaufmann y Steudler 1998). Por ejemplo, en Japón las empresas privadas tienen el control prácticamente total de la base catastral de algunas ciudades, mientras que en los Estados miembros de la Unión Europea el catastro reside en la esfera gubernamental.
En América Latina los catastros se mantienen principalmente en manos de instituciones públicas; el sector privado por lo general participa en los procesos de implementación de actualizaciones cartográficas y sistemas de información, más no en la administración misma. La municipalidad mexicana de Guadalajara, por ejemplo, realizó un estudio comparativo de los costos y concluyó que el manejo del catastro con sus propios empleados y equipos significaría un ahorro del 50% en inversiones, lo que quedó confirmado un año después de la implementación.
Pese a los resultados positivos obtenidos en dichos proyectos desarrollados por completo dentro de la administración pública, no es posible dejar de lado al sector privado, especialmente en el contexto de la ola de privatización que ha sacudido a América Latina estos últimos años. Por ejemplo, al igual que las instituciones públicas, las compañías de teléfono, agua y energía eléctrica necesitan información territorial actualizada. El interés en común por mantener al día las bases de datos hace que las oficinas de catastro y las compañías de servicios públicos trabajen en colaboración y se repartan las inversiones, además de buscar maneras de estandarizar la información y definir identificadores comunes para las parcelas.
Conclusiones
La mayoría de los sistemas catastrales de América Latina siguen registrando tres tipos de datos según el modelo económico-físico-legal tradicional: el valor económico, la ubicación y forma de la parcela y la relación entre la propiedad y el propietario u ocupante. No obstante, existe un mayor interés en utilizar sistemas de información multifinalitarios. En este proceso de transición, algunos administradores han decidido implementar nuevas aplicaciones catastrales basadas en la tecnología, pero es evidente que no se ha logrado el éxito que ellos anticipaban. Esta incorporación de nuevas tecnologías debe estar acompañada de los cambios necesarios en los procedimientos y la legislación y de capacitación profesional de los empleados públicos.
En años recientes ciertas instituciones internacionales como el Banco Mundial, el Instituto Lincoln y muchas universidades europeas y estadounidenses han prestado su colaboración para ayudar a mejorar los catastros latinoamericanos. Ofrecen apoyo para programas educativos, actividades académicas y proyectos concretos con la finalidad de implementar sistemas de información territoriales que sean confiables y estén actualizados. A medida que continúa la transición hacia catastros multifinalitarios, se implementarán los cambios a través de una revisión minuciosa de la legislación pertinente, formas más accesibles de servicio a los usuarios, colaboración sólida entre las instituciones públicas y privadas que generen y utilicen datos catastrales, y la aplicación de estándares internacionales contemporáneos. Los catastros territoriales en América Latina llegarán a ser todavía más eficaces y útiles si generan información que propicie el desarrollo de proyectos orientados a las preocupaciones sociales fundamentales, como la regulación del suelo y la identificación de terrenos desocupados.
Diego Alfonso Erba es profesor de aplicaciones avanzadas de SIG y cartografía digital en la UNISINOS (Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos) en São Leopoldo-RS, Brasil, y docente invitado del Instituto Lincoln.
Referencias
Hyman, Glenn, Perea, Claudia, Rey, Dora Inés y Lance, Kate. 2003. Encuesta sobre el desarrollo de las infraestructuras nacionales de datos espaciales en América Latina y el Caribe. Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical (CIAT).
Kaufmann, Jürg y Steudler, Daniel. 1998. Catastro 2014: Una visión para un sistema catastral futuro.
Frederiksberg, Dinamarca: Federación Internacional de Agrimensores (FIG). Documento disponible en la página http://www.swisstopo.ch/fig-wg71/cad2014/download/cat2014-espanol.pdf.
Comité Permanente sobre el Catastro en la Unión Europea. 2003. Principios Comunes del Catastro en la Unión en la Unión Europea. Roma. 3 de diciembre. Documento disponible en la página http://www.eurocadastre.org/pdf/Principles%20in%20Spanish.pdf.
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Until recently, a foreclosure on an owner-occupied home in the United States was a relatively rare event. According to data from the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA), foreclosure proceedings were initiated on approximately 0.3 percent of all owner-occupied housing units with a mortgage in each quarter from 1979:Q1 through 2006:Q2 (figure 1). Since mid-year 2006, foreclosure proceedings have more than tripled and now occur at the rate of at least 1 percent per quarter.
To place these percentages in context, in the 27 ⅟2 year period between 1979 and mid-2006, a cumulative total of 7.5 million foreclosure proceedings had been initiated at a rate of 275,000 per year. In the 3 ⅟2 year period between mid-2006 and year-end 2009, 6 million foreclosure proceedings had been initiated, at a rate of 1.7 million per year, a more than six-fold increase. The conditions for high foreclosure rates are in place for at least the next two years, suggesting that another 4 to 5 million owner-occupied homes will enter into foreclosure in 2010 and 2011.
What is a Foreclosure?
A house is seized by a mortgage lender in a foreclosure proceeding after three steps have occurred. First, the homeowner fails to make contractually obligated mortgage payments, a condition commonly known as default. If homeowners fail to make one or two monthly payments, they are known as 30- and 60-days delinquent, respectively. In many of these cases, the homeowner “self-cures” by making the missed payment(s) in full and paying an additional (contractually pre-specified) penalty. A homeowner who misses three consecutive monthly payments is known as 90-days delinquent, and the probability increases that the house will end up in foreclosure (Tanta 2007).
In the second step, the lender initiates foreclosure proceedings. This process varies by state and can take between 6 and 18 months to complete. In the third and final step, the court system assigns the ownership of the house back to the mortgage lender. In some states, after a foreclosure occurs lenders may try to obtain a “deficiency judgment,” which implies that the foreclosed homeowner must compensate the lender in an amount equal to the difference between the value of the house after the foreclosure and the outstanding loan balance of the mortgage (Ghent and Kudlyak 2009).
What Factors Lead to Foreclosure?
We learn about the root causes of foreclosure by first exploring how foreclosure rates vary across places and over time. Figure 2 shows a graph of 90-day delinquency rates by state in the second quarter of 2009, when the 90-day delinquent rate ranged from 1 percent to 6.5 percent. Two variables explain almost three-quarters of the cross-sectional variation in delinquency rates across states: (1) the statewide unemployment rate in August 2009; and (2) the percentage change in house prices over the three-year period from 2006:Q2 to 2009:Q2.
Table 1 shows the highest and lowest five states in terms of foreclosure rates in 2009:Q2. The states with the steepest declines in house prices and highest unemployment rates have the highest percentage of seriously delinquent borrowers. The two states with the most disparate outcomes are Nevada and North Dakota. In Nevada, house prices fell almost 50 percent; the unemployment rate was 13.2 percent in August 2009; and the 90-day delinquency rate on mortgages was 6.5 percent. In North Dakota, homes appreciated by almost 11 percent; the unemployment rate was a low 4.3 percent; and the 90-day delinquency rate on mortgages was only 1.0 percent.
Figure 3 shows the time-series patterns of the nationwide 90-day delinquency rate, the national unemployment rate less 4 percent, and an index of commonly tracked house prices known as the Case-Shiller-Weiss (CSW) index. The vertical line on the graph at 2006:Q2 marks the height of the housing boom. Over the 2006:Q2–2007:Q4 period, nationwide 90-day delinquency rates started rising after house prices started to decline, despite relatively stable unemployment rates. During the recession, unemployment increased, house prices continued to fall, and the 90-day delinquency rate rose dramatically.
Both figures 2 and 3 suggest that foreclosures are associated with two “triggers”—falling house prices and rising unemployment rates. The double-trigger theory of foreclosures posits that the potential for a foreclosure is highest when (1) a homeowner is “under water,” meaning the house is worth less than the outstanding loan balance of the mortgage (plus any applicable fees); and (2) the homeowner experiences a significant disruption to income, such as unemployment, divorce, or a health event. In addition to the aggregated state-level and nationwide data shown here, the double-trigger theory of foreclosures has been shown to fit foreclosure patterns in loan-level data sets as well (Foote, Gerardi, and Willen 2010).
The double-trigger theory suggests that being under water is a necessary condition for a foreclosure, because it means the homeowner cannot sell the house unless he or she is willing to write the mortgage holder a check at closing to make up the difference of the value of the house and the outstanding loan balance of the mortgage. Recent estimates by the First American Core Logic company suggest that more than 10.5 million properties—20 percent of all residential properties with mortgages—are currently under water; many of them were purchased between 2005 and 2007.
Figure 4 shows that house prices have declined by 40 percent in nominal terms (50 percent after accounting for overall consumer price inflation) from the peak of the housing market in 2006:Q2 through the end of 2009. Standard underwriting calls for a homeowner to make a 20 percent down payment on a house. Given the decline in house prices, homeowners who bought at the peak of the market using a standard down payment are still approximately 33 percent under water. For example, if a homeowner buys a house for $100,000 with an $80,000 mortgage at origination and it then loses 40 percent of value, it is worth only $60,000. The house is now 33 percent under water ($80,000 – $60,000) / $60,000.
Most economists believe that being under water is not a sufficient condition to lead to a foreclosure, although there is some debate on this issue (Goodman et al. 2009; Foote et al. 2010). As long as the house value is not too far below the outstanding loan balance of the mortgage, there is a nontrivial probability that the house will appreciate such that its price will be greater than the mortgage in a reasonable amount of time, and this probability has value called “option value.” Given this value, and given that foreclosure is costly for homeowners, economic theory suggests that many homeowners who are under water should not “optimally” default on their mortgage. In many cases, the available data support this prediction.
Once a homeowner is under water, however, the data suggest that an additional shock to a homeowner’s income strongly increases the odds of foreclosure. Consider the experience of a homeowner who is under water and suddenly loses his or her main source of income due to unemployment or illness. In this case, the house is worth less than the mortgage, so the owner cannot sell or pull equity from the house. Furthermore, the homeowner has reduced income, so after depleting savings cannot make the mortgage payment in full.
To illustrate the quantitative relevance of this point, table 2 shows state-level maximum unemployment benefits (UI) and average mortgage payments for the set of ten states shown in table 1. In many states, UI benefits are not large enough for a one-income family to make a full mortgage payment. In all states, the average mortgage payment consumes a sizeable percentage of monthly UI benefits, leaving little income for food, transportation, clothing, health care, and other essentials.
Should Foreclosures Be Prevented?
A foreclosure seems like a simple transfer of an asset (the house) from the current equity holder (the borrower) to the current debt holder (the mortgage holder), which occurs whenever the borrower defaults on a mortgage obligation. If a foreclosure is just a simple transfer of assets across agents in the economy, then a case can be made that society should not care about foreclosures, the same way that normal people typically do not care how many electric guitars trade hands on eBay in any given month.
However, a case can be made that foreclosures are an undesirable outcome for society in some cases. Many economists think that foreclosures have externalities, meaning people not directly involved in the foreclosure process bear costs every time a house enters foreclosure. For example, foreclosures are estimated to reduce the resale value of nearby homes (Lin, Rosenblatt, and Yao 2007). In addition, foreclosures are associated with other costs that may be socially undesirable, such as the well-being of children (Kingsley, Smith, and Price 2009).
Has the Government Prevented Foreclosures?
Since 2007, the federal government has established initiatives and put into place a set of policies to try to reduce foreclosures. One of the first major initiatives, called Hope for Homeowners, was established in the spring of 2008. This program tried to address the first trigger directly to reduce the number of homeowners who were under water by encouraging institutions and investors holding mortgages to “write down” principal on those mortgages until homeowners were no longer under water. Participation in the program by mortgage holders was voluntary, and the program was structured in such a way that few mortgage holders participated (Cordell et al. 2009). For example, only one person received assistance in the first six months of the program’s launch (Arnold 2009).
In February 2009, the Obama administration announced another major initiative to reduce foreclosures, the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) program, funded with $73 billion of TARP money. Implicit in the HAMP program is the notion that delinquencies and foreclosures have occurred because mortgages underwritten during the housing boom were often exotic, expensive, and ultimately unaffordable.
Until recently, HAMP’s solution to reduce foreclosures was to modify the terms of these mortgages (by reducing the interest rate, extending the amortization period, and offering some forbearance) for the purposes of making the mortgage “affordable,” meaning the mortgage payment would not exceed 31 percent of the borrower’s income after the mortgage was modified. As originally written, the HAMP program did not require the mortgage lender to reduce any of the borrower’s mortgage balance, and many unemployed did not qualify to receive a mortgage modification.
Figure 5 shows data from the Mortgage Bankers Association on 90-day delinquency rates for subprime adjustable-rate mortgages and prime fixed-rate mortgages over the 1998–2009 period. It is clear that subprime adjustable-rate mortgages are much more likely to be seriously delinquent than prime fixed-rate mortgages. These data might help explain why policy makers crafting the HAMP program have, until recently, focused on refinancing people out of exotic or expensive mortgages and into more conventional or less expensive mortgages as a method of reducing aggregate foreclosure rates.
These policy makers might have presumed that refinancing people from mortgages associated with high default rates to mortgages associated with low default rates would, by construction, reduce the overall default rate on all mortgages. There are two problems with this logic. First, people most likely to default are least likely to get a prime mortgage. This implies the mortgage choice at origination may be indicative of the underlying default risk of the borrower. In other words, defaults of subprime mortgages are high because, in some cases, subprime mortgage borrowers had high default risk and could only get a subprime mortgage.
Second, and more important, the recent data suggest that the majority of mortgages currently in default are not subprime mortgages (table 3). Given the current situation, it seems that a program designed to reduce foreclosures in the aggregate should focus on the inherent reasons that households with good mortgages or good credit are defaulting: the double-trigger theory.
Will We Have More Foreclosures?
Both foreclosure triggers are still in place. Unemployment rates are high, and the Congressional Budget Office (2010) is forecasting the national unemployment rate will remain above 9.0 percent in both 2010 and 2011. And, many homeowners are still under water. Assuming that house prices and housing rents will increase at the same rate over the next few years—not an unreasonable assumption given the behavior of historical rent and price data prior to 1996 (Davis, Lehnert, and Martin 2008)—then house prices should be expected to rise in nominal terms by somewhere between 1 and 2.5 percent per year for the next two years. Given the slow expected pace of house-price growth, many homes now under water will continue to be under water in two years.
Against this gloomy backdrop, Congress and the Obama administration have taken steps recently to prevent more foreclosures. First, on March 26, the administration revised the HAMP program so that the recently unemployed will be offered between three and six months of payment reductions (forbearance). This adjustment to HAMP is in line with the recommendations of a well-known plan to reduce foreclosures, written by economists at the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, commonly called the Boston Fed plan (Foote et al. 2009). It is also similar to an existing plan in the State of Pennsylvania that makes loans to unemployed homeowners to enable them to pay their mortgage, called HEMAP. In addition, mortgage investors will be subsidized by the HAMP program for writing down principal when borrowers are under water.
Second, the Obama administration has set up a “Hardest-Hit” fund distributing $2.1 billion to state housing finance agencies in ten states with severe house price decline and high unemployment rates. The state agencies are free to design programs to reduce foreclosures, subject to some guidelines (Housing Finance Agency 2010).
My colleagues and I have worked on foreclosure relief policy and are hopeful these new initiatives—the modification to HAMP and the Hardest-Hit fund—might significantly reduce foreclosure activity over the next few years.
About the Author
Morris A. Davis is an associate professor in the department of real estate and urban land economics at the University of Wisconsin School of Business, and a fellow at the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. He was one of the authors of the Wisconsin Unemployment and Foreclosure Relief Plan, which was designed to reduce foreclosure activity of the unemployed. He also maintains and updates the Lincoln Institute Web site database on Land and Property Values in the U.S. (http://www.lincolninst.edu/subcenters/land-values).
Acknowledgments
I have benefited greatly from conversations, help, and advice from Chris Foote, Jeff Fuhrer, Kris Gerardi, Eileen Mauskopf, François Ortalo-Magné, Erwan Quintin, Steve Malpezzi, and Paul Willen. All mistakes and errors are my own.
References
Arnold, Chris. 2009. Investors support overhauling homeowner program. NPR broadcast, April 16. www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=103148855
Congressional Budget Office. 2010. Current Budget Projections: Selected Tables from CBO’s Budget and Economic Outlook, Table E-1 (January). www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/108xx/doc10871/economicprojections.pdf
Cordell, Larry, Karen Dynan, Andreas Lehnert, Eileen Mauskopf, and Nellie Liang. 2009. The incentives of mortgage servicers: Myths and realities. Uniform Commerical Code Law Journal 41: 347–374.
Davis, Morris A., Andreas Lehnert, and Robert F. Martin. 2008. The rent-price ratio for the aggregate stock of owner-occupied housing. Review of Income and Wealth 54(2): 279–284.
Foote, Christopher, Jeff Fuhrer, Eileen Mauskopf, and Paul Willen. 2009. A proposal to help distressed homeowners: A government payment-sharing plan. Public Policy Brief No. 09-1. Boston: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. www.bos.frb.org/economic/ppb/2009/ppb091.htm.
Foote, Christopher, Kristopher Gerardi, Lorenz Goette, and Paul Willen. 2010. Reducing foreclosures: No easy answers. NBER Macroeconomics Annual 24(1): 89–138.
Foote, Christopher, Kristopher Gerardi, and Paul Willen. 2010. Should modifications ‘re-equify’ borrowers? A look at the data. Real Estate Research Blog, March 2. http://realestateresearch.frbatlanta.org/rer/2010/03/should-modifications-reequify-borrowers-a-look-at-the-data.html#more
Ghent, Andra C., and Marianna Kudlyak. 2009. Recourse and residential mortgage default: Theory and evidence from U.S. states. Working Paper No. 09-10. Richmond, VA: Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
Goodman, Laurie, Roger Ashworth, Brian Landy, and Ke Yin. 2009. Negative equity trumps unemployment in predicting defaults. Amherst Mortgage Insight, November 23: 1–8.
Housing Finance Agency. 2010. Innovation Fund for the Hardest-Hit Housing Markets (HFA Hardest-Hit Fund): Frequently asked questions, March 5. http://makinghomeaffordable.gov/docs/HFA%20FAQ%20–%20030510%20FINAL%20%28Clean%29.pdf
Kingsley, G. Thomas, Robin E. Smith, and David Price. 2009. The impacts of foreclosures on families and communities. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute.
Lin, Zhenguo, Eric Rosenblatt, and Vincent W. Yao. 2007. Spillover effects of foreclosures on neighborhood property values. The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics 38(4): 387–407.
Tanta. 2007. Delinquencies and defaults for ubernerds. Calculated Risk Blog, July 6. www.calculatedriskblog.com/2007/07/delinquencies-and-defaults-for.html
