Mark Skidmore es profesor de Economía en la Universidad Estatal de Michigan, donde también es titular de la cátedra Morris en Finanzas y Políticas del gobierno estatal y municipal; también colabora en el Departamento de Agricultura, Economía de Alimentos y Recursos y en el Departamento de Economía. Recibió su título en Economía por la Universidad de Washington en 1987, y un doctorado en Economía por la Universidad de Colorado en 1994. Se desempeña como coeditor del Journal of Urban Affairs.

Las investigaciones del profesor Skidmore se han centrado en la economía pública y la economía urbana y regional. Sus intereses de investigación actuales son los siguientes: política tributaria del gobierno estatal y municipal, relaciones intergubernamentales, relación entre las decisiones al nivel del sector público y la actividad económica, y la economía de las catástrofes naturales. Sus trabajos han recibido el financiamiento del Programa Fulbright, el Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, la National Science Foundation, el Urban Institute y USAID.

Los artículos del profesor Skidmore han aparecido en revistas profesionales tales como Economic Inquiry, Economics Letters, Journal of Urban Economics, Kyklos, Land Economics, National Tax Journal, Public Choice, Regional Science and Urban Economics y Southern Economic Journal. Asimismo, sus investigaciones han sido objeto de citas en medios noticiosos importantes, tales como la BBC, China Post, The Economist, Europe Intelligence Wire, Forbes, International Herald Tribune, Los Angeles Business Journal, MSNBC, Newsweek, The New Yorker, The New York Times y PBS News Hour.

Land Lines: Durante este año, usted se desempeña como investigador visitante en el Instituto Lincoln. ¿Sobre qué temas está trabajando?

Mark Skidmore: Hace aproximadamente dos años, junto con mi colega Gary Sands recibimos una invitación del concejal Kenneth Cockrel de la ciudad de Detroit para evaluar el deteriorado entorno del impuesto sobre la propiedad en dicha ciudad. El concejal Cockrel se preguntaba qué ganaría Detroit si se volcara a un impuesto basado en el suelo. Nos dieron acceso a información detallada sobre más de 400.000 parcelas inmobiliarias dentro de la ciudad a fin de llevar a cabo una evaluación. En este sentido, estamos agradecidos al Instituto por el apoyo que nos brindó para realizar dicho proyecto. En nuestro informe identificamos una importante erosión de la base del impuesto sobre la propiedad y analizamos distintas opciones con el fin de expandir dicha base imponible, tal como cambiar el enfoque hacia un impuesto basado en el suelo. Nuestra evaluación mostró que un impuesto basado en el suelo serviría para ampliar la base imponible, aunque también generaría cambios significativos en las cargas fiscales de los propietarios de inmuebles residenciales, comerciales e industriales.

En el año 2013, los problemas fiscales de Detroit llegaron a un punto crítico cuando el gobernador Rick Snyder designó a un gerente financiero de emergencia, quien, a su vez, inició el proceso de declaración de quiebra. El 3 de diciembre de 2013, el juez Rhodes emitió un fallo en el que establecía que la ciudad de Detroit era elegible para recibir la protección ante quiebras establecida en el capítulo 9. A pesar del colapso casi completo del mercado inmobiliario dentro de la ciudad durante la Gran Recesión, el impuesto sobre la propiedad continúa siendo una importante fuente de ingresos y, según cómo se lo administre, puede ayudar u obstaculizar la recuperación económica y fiscal. Durante el año en curso, mi idea es utilizar los datos a nivel de parcelas para analizar algunos problemas importantes, tales como la evasión impositiva, la sobrevaluación de propiedad, el valor de terrenos vacantes y las políticas relacionadas con la transferencia de títulos de propiedad del sector privado al sector público debido a las ejecuciones fiscales y la posterior transferencia de los mismos nuevamente al sector privado.

Land Lines: ¿Cuáles son algunos de los factores subyacentes tras de los problemas actuales que enfrenta Detroit?

Mark Skidmore: Cerca del 48 por ciento de los propietarios de inmuebles en Detroit son evasores fiscales, lo que refleja la erosión del contrato social entre los ciudadanos y la ciudad. Esta tasa de evasión fiscal tan alta es el resultado de una confluencia de factores. En primer lugar, la ciudad no ha logrado hacer cumplir las obligaciones tributarias, particularmente en lo relacionado con las propiedades de bajo valor. En segundo lugar, muchos ciudadanos perciben que el impuesto es injusto debido a la sobrevaluación de sus propiedades. Finalmente, la experiencia indicaría que los ciudadanos no pagan sus impuestos porque las autoridades municipales no les brindan los servicios públicos básicos, tales como la iluminación de calles, el barrido de nieve y la seguridad pública.

Una de las causas principales de la alta tasa de evasión de impuestos es la sobrevaluación de las propiedades para fines fiscales. La crisis inmobiliaria fue particularmente grave para Detroit. En 2010, el precio de venta promedio de una parcela residencial con una estructura era de menos de US$10.000; no obstante, el valor tasado promedio de dicha propiedad para fines fiscales era de US$54.000. Según las pautas del estado, la relación entre el valor tasado y el precio de venta debería ser aproximadamente de 1:1. En septiembre de 2013, los funcionarios municipales anunciaron que, en el plazo de los 3 a 5 años siguientes, todas las propiedades de la ciudad se someterían a una revaluación.

En segundo lugar, Detroit ha tenido la costumbre de demoler estructuras deterioradas sujetas a ejecución fiscal. En consecuencia, es una de las pocas grandes ciudades de los Estados Unidos que presenta una gran cantidad de ventas de terrenos vacantes. Por lo general, resulta difícil establecer el valor de los terrenos vacantes en áreas altamente urbanizadas, aunque resulta esencial determinar valuaciones exactas si se desea imponer un tributo al suelo o un impuesto de dos niveles sobre el suelo y sobre las estructuras. La gran cantidad de operaciones de venta de terrenos vacantes en Detroit brinda una oportunidad para estimar el valor del suelo. Curiosamente, en 2010, el valor promedio de una parcela sin mejoras según los datos de venta era de US$34.000, es decir, un valor mucho mayor que el precio promedio de parcelas residenciales con estructuras, el cual, según se mencionó anteriormente, era inferior a los US$10.000.

En la actualidad, el gobierno municipal posee y administra más del 25 por ciento de la superficie del suelo de la ciudad, y la titularidad de propiedades por parte del gobierno continúa creciendo debido a que las ejecuciones fiscales han superado en rapidez a la transferencia de parcelas públicas a manos privadas. Algunas de las cuestiones que me encuentro investigando son las siguientes: ¿Cuáles son las políticas apropiadas que deben tomarse en una sociedad orientada al mercado con el fin de administrar las operaciones inmobiliarias urbanas de bajo valor? ¿Por qué es tan alta la tasa de evasión fiscal, y qué puede hacerse para mejorar el cumplimiento de las obligaciones fiscales en cuanto al impuesto sobre la propiedad en el contexto de un mercado inmobiliario urbano al borde del colapso? ¿Qué rol desempeña la percepción de valuaciones “injustas” por parte de los contribuyentes en la evasión fiscal?

Land Lines: ¿Cuál sería el pronóstico a largo plazo para Detroit?

Mark Skidmore: La problemática fiscal de la ciudad es un síntoma de problemas subyacentes más profundos. Ya sea que consideremos el redesarrollo de un área urbana en franco deterioro o la reconstrucción posterior a una catástrofe natural de grandes proporciones, los elementos más importantes en cualquier recuperación son el capital humano y los atributos sociales y culturales. Si aceptamos la premisa de que estos elementos son los factores esenciales de cualquier redesarrollo, y si dichos elementos escasean, la prioridad principal será entonces considerar la adopción de políticas y medidas que faciliten su desarrollo. En el año 2011, la tasa de graduación de la escuela secundaria en Detroit fue del 62 por ciento. El porcentaje de hogares conformados por sólo uno de los padres fue del 62 por ciento. Según algunas mediciones, la tasa de alfabetización funcional entre los adultos es de solamente el 53 por ciento. Resulta difícil construir una economía urbana dinámica y sólida sobre un fundamento tan débil.

Queda claro entonces que los encargados de elaborar políticas deben tratar los problemas fiscales inmediatos, pero el pronóstico a largo plazo para Detroit dependerá de las medidas que se tomen para mejorar la base económica subyacente, es decir, el capital humano y social. Si no se abordan estos profundos desafíos, Detroit continuará tambaleándose. No existe una solución rápida. Para que Detroit tenga una oportunidad de prosperar nuevamente, Michigan deberá comprometerse a largo plazo a mejorar dichas condiciones de fondo.

Land Lines: ¿Puede considerarse a Detroit como un indicador para otras ciudades de los EE.UU.?

Mark Skidmore: Sí y no. Otros gobiernos municipales también enfrentan problemas fiscales significativos, como Chicago, Jacksonville, Los Angeles, Oakland y Providence, por nombrar sólo algunos. Uno de los principales problemas es el de los planes de aportaciones para el futuro pago de jubilaciones sin suficientes fondos. Aun así, muchas de estas ciudades tienen una probabilidad razonable de resurgir y, posiblemente, prosperar en un futuro no muy lejano, debido a que las agudas crisis que están atravesando son un resultado de la recesión y no necesariamente de problemas fiscales crónicos. No obstante, las ciudades que presentan problemas crónicos debido a déficits importantes en su capital social y humano podrán considerar a Detroit como un indicador de su propio futuro. Espero que los encargados de elaborar las políticas estatales y municipales en todo el país puedan aprender de la experiencia de Detroit y comenzar así a realizar las inversiones a largo plazo que sean necesarias en su activo más importante -las personas y, en particular, los niños- a fin de evitar los problemas económicos y fiscales crónicos que se han observado en Detroit.

Land Lines: ¿De qué manera el proyecto de Detroit encaja en sus tareas de investigación en general?

Mark Skidmore: Una gran parte de mi investigación tiene que ver con las relaciones entre la toma de decisiones en el ámbito público y la actividad económica. Con el correr de los años he analizado cuestiones como la efectividad de las finanzas basadas en el aumento de los impuestos, las implicaciones que conlleva imponer tarifas de impacto a fin de solventar los costos de infraestructura asociados con el desarrollo, y los efectos que los impuestos sobre la propiedad, las reducciones impositivas y otros subsidios tienen sobre el desarrollo. También he estudiado otras cuestiones relacionadas con las finanzas públicas, como las loterías estatales, los impuestos a las ventas y los impuestos a las ganancias. En particular, me interesan las relaciones espaciales, dinámicas y competitivas entre jurisdicciones tributarias adyacentes y superpuestas.

Land Lines: Una gran parte de su investigación gira en torno a las políticas y finanzas gubernamentales en los Estados Unidos. ¿Qué otros trabajos ha realizado usted a nivel internacional?

Mark Skidmore: En los últimos años, recibí, junto con mis colegas de la Universidad Estatal de Michigan (MSU), una subvención financiada por la Agencia Estadounidense para el Desarrollo Internacional (USAID) en Mali. Mi tarea ha sido analizar de qué manera el sistema de gobierno recientemente descentralizado de Mali puede utilizarse en forma más efectiva en los ámbitos de seguridad de los alimentos y gestión del uso del suelo. El cambio climático afecta a Mali en formas muy tangibles: debido a que el suelo en el norte se ha vuelto más árido, se ha observado una migración significativa hacia el sur, que posee un mejor acceso al agua. Esta migración ha dado como resultado una violencia cada vez mayor debido a que los derechos de posesión y propiedad del suelo son ineficaces. Ahora que se ha reestablecido el gobierno democrático, estamos trabajando nuevamente junto con nuestros socios de Mali a fin de desarrollar sistemas que involucren a las autoridades municipales para gestionar la seguridad de los alimentos, el acceso al suelo, los derechos de propiedad y los conflictos relacionados con el suelo. Curiosamente, el problema relativo a qué hacer con todos los terrenos de propiedad pública en Detroit ha dado forma a nuestro trabajo en Mali y viceversa.

Por otro lado, actualmente también estoy investigando sobre la economía de las catástrofes naturales. En uno de mis artículos publicados recientemente (cuya autoría comparto con Hideki Toya), se utilizaron miles de catástrofes ocurridas en todo el mundo para demostrar que los países con sistemas gubernamentales más descentralizados sufren una cantidad significativamente menor de muertes por dichas catástrofes. Según nuestra investigación, existen pruebas de que los gobiernos descentralizados brindan servicios esenciales de manera más efectiva que los sistemas más centralizados.

Un tercer proyecto recientemente concluido demuestra que, en diferentes países, la confianza de la sociedad tiende a aumentar en los años posteriores a las catástrofes climáticas. La relación que observamos es sólida, por lo que podemos sugerir la hipótesis de que dichas catástrofes requieren y brindan oportunidades para que las personas trabajen salvando las barreras de las clases sociales a fin de superar sus desafíos, lo que genera confianza y capital social. Aunque las catástrofes naturales pueden tener un terrible impacto humano y económico, un posible efecto beneficioso derivado de la exposición a una catástrofe de grandes magnitudes podría ser una sociedad mucho más unida.

Land Lines: ¿De qué manera su investigación refleja los intereses y valores del Instituto Lincoln?

Mark Skidmore: El Instituto Lincoln es reconocido en todo el mundo como una organización líder en temas del uso, regulación y tributación del suelo (impuestos sobre la propiedad, reducción de impuestos, políticas de desarrollo económico y sistemas fiscales descentralizados), temas todos que son el centro de mi investigación. A lo largo de los años, el Instituto Lincoln ha apoyado mi trabajo relacionado con las finanzas basadas en el aumento de los impuestos en Wisconsin, el estrés fiscal del gobierno municipal de Michigan y mi actual investigación sobre el entorno del impuesto sobre la propiedad en Detroit. El sistema estadounidense de un gobierno nacional y varios gobiernos subnacionales en gran medida autónomos brinda un campo fértil a los investigadores que desean estudiar y aprender qué “experimentos en política” obtienen mejores o peores resultados. De verdad me encanta este trabajo y estoy agradecido por tener al Instituto como socio en mis investigaciones.

Este artículo es un extracto de A Good Tax: Legal and Policy Issues for the Property Tax in the United States (Un buen impuesto: temas legales y de política del impuesto sobre la propiedad en los Estados Unidos), de Joan Youngman, a ser publicado en abril de 2016.

 

Algunos de los debates políticos más significativos acerca del impuesto sobre la propiedad no tienen que ver con el impuesto en sí sino con el uso de su recaudación para financiar las escuelas públicas locales. Esta controversia intensa y ya antigua acentúa el papel del impuesto sobre la propiedad, pero el impuesto en sí es de importancia secundaria frente a los puntos sustantivos en discusión, como el monto total de gastos en educación, su distribución entre los diferentes distritos escolares y los niveles de gobierno que deben proporcionar estos fondos. Si el impuesto sobre el ingreso fuera la fuente principal de los ingresos locales, y el impuesto sobre la propiedad se gravara a nivel estatal, el debate sobre el financiamiento escolar podría continuar de la misma manera, sustituyendo simplemente el vocablo “propiedad” por el vocablo “ingreso”.

El desafío del financiamiento escolar generalmente comienza con un problema básico: cómo aumentar de la mejor manera posible los ingresos disponibles a las escuelas de los distritos más pobres, cuyos recursos propios no pueden sostener adecuadamente la educación pública, incluso con tasas tributarias mucho más altas que las impuestas en jurisdicciones más acomodadas. Este no es un problema del impuesto sobre la propiedad sino un problema del impuesto local. Un área necesitada limitada a su propio impuesto sobre el ingreso o sobre las ventas encontraría la misma dificultad para financiar un sistema escolar exitoso, no importa cuán alta sea la tasa tributaria. Es esencial que haya una transferencia de recursos externos hacia distritos que no pueden financiar sus servicios indispensables de forma independiente. Este enunciado puede parecer obvio, pero a veces representa el límite del consenso en este debate extremadamente caldeado.

Por sí mismo, este consenso sólo estipula que no se puede depender sólo del impuesto local para financiar servicios básicos cuando la base tributaria local no alcanza para ese fin. Esto dista mucho de demostrar la inequidad del impuesto sobre la propiedad o cualquier otro impuesto local. Pero el uso tradicional del impuesto sobre la propiedad como sostenimiento principal para las escuelas locales a veces ha dado lugar a esta inferencia.

Si bien el impuesto sobre la propiedad generalmente funciona como un impuesto local en los EE.UU., y brinda la proporción más grande de ingresos locales independientes, esto no ha sido siempre así. Antes de la adopción generalizada del impuesto estatal sobre las ventas y el ingreso en el siglo XX, los impuestos sobre la propiedad eran la fuente principal de ingresos a nivel estatal. Al mismo tiempo, muchas jurisdicciones locales también imponen otros tributos, como impuestos sobre las ventas o los ingresos. De todas maneras, la gran mayoría de la recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad en los EE.UU. financia las operaciones del gobierno local, y el impuesto sobre la propiedad sigue siendo la fuente principal de ingreso autónomo para la mayor parte de las jurisdicciones locales, incluyendo los distritos escolares. Por lo tanto, el debate sobre la dependencia de recursos locales para financiar la educación generalmente cuestiona la equidad de usar el impuesto sobre la propiedad como método principal de financiamiento de las escuelas locales. Es importante aclarar hasta qué punto se debate el tema del impuesto sobre la propiedad en sí, y hasta qué punto es este simplemente el instrumento más común utilizado para recaudar ingresos, y lo que se discute es su uso y distribución.

El impuesto sobre la propiedad y la igualación del financiamiento escolar

El impuesto sobre la propiedad se vinculó en forma más visible con la igualación del financiamiento escolar en la decisión Serrano de California en 1971, que inauguró una nueva era de disputas constitucionales estatales sobre el financiamiento de la educación. En ese caso, la Suprema Corte de California dictaminó que las bases divergentes del impuesto sobre la propiedad causaban variaciones constitucionalmente inaceptables en los presupuestos escolares: “La fuente de estas disparidades es inequívoca: en Baldwin Park el valor de tasación inmobiliaria por niño fue de sólo US$3.706; en Pasadena, el valor de tasación por niño fue de US$13.706; mientras que en Beverly Hills, el monto fue de $50.885, o sea una relación de 1 a 4 a 13. Por lo tanto, las subvenciones estatales son insuficientes para compensar las inequidades inherentes a un sistema de financiamiento que depende de bases tributables locales de gran variabilidad.”[1] En el plazo de una década, California puso en práctica un nuevo sistema de financiamiento escolar centralizado. En vez de que los distritos fijen sus presupuestos con base en los ingresos locales, estas decisiones se efectúan para cada distrito a nivel estatal.[2] La fase inicial de la reforma financiera escolar en California se enfocó firmemente en la igualación del financiamiento básico, y las primeras decisiones judiciales trataron de limitar las variaciones en el gasto por alumno en todo el estado a no más de US$100.[3]

En la misma década, los votantes de California impusieron una serie de limitaciones al impuesto sobre la propiedad, con la aprobación de la Propuesta 13 en 1978. A raíz de esta iniciativa, la legislatura estatal cambió también el sistema para distribuir la recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad. Como resultado de estas medidas, las leyes estatales gobiernan la tasa del impuesto sobre la propiedad, los presupuestos de los distritos escolares locales y la distribución de la recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad. Aproximadamente un tercio de la recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad es asignado a distritos escolares que ofrecen desde preescolar hasta los primeros dos años en universidades terciarias (K-14).[4] La experiencia de California demuestra que el impuesto sobre la propiedad puede ser una herramienta para la centralización e igualación del financiamiento escolar, así como para la descentralización y la variación local.

Complejidades del financiamiento escolar centralizado

Si bien la Propuesta 13 se aprobó muy poco después que la reforma financiera escolar en California, la conexión causal entre las dos sigue siendo motivo de controversia. Una perspectiva considera que el financiamiento y la administración escolar centralizada y normalizada erosionan el apoyo de los propietarios al impuesto sobre la propiedad.[5] “Los propietarios estaban dispuestos a pagar impuestos más altos sobre la propiedad en el convencimiento de que ello llevaría a crear escuelas de alta calidad. El movimiento que creó el litigio sobre las finanzas escolares ha quebrado este vínculo: los ingresos del impuesto local sobre la propiedad ahora tienden a ser redistribuidos en el resto del estado y se dedican sólo marginalmente a las escuelas locales.”[6] Al mismo tiempo, otros académicos refutan con vehemencia esta teoría por razones estadísticas e históricas: “Las pruebas no sostienen el argumento de que Serrano fue la causa de la Propuesta 13.”[7]

Sea cual fuere la conexión, estos dos elementos —las disputas constitucionales y las limitaciones al impuesto sobre la propiedad— se reforzaron mutuamente al desplazar la autoridad y responsabilidad del financiamiento escolar desde las municipalidades al gobierno estatal. Este proceso también expuso los presupuestos escolares a nuevas presiones políticas. A nivel local, el gasto escolar es frecuentemente el elemento más importante del presupuesto, pero las necesidades estatales son más amplias: incluyen salud y seguridad pública, transporte, sistema penitenciario y educación superior. Si las decisiones educativas cruciales parecen estar a cargo de funcionarios estatales o de mayor rango, la centralización también presenta el desafío de mantener el contacto con los padres y conseguir que participen.

La experiencia de California ha demostrado que estas preocupaciones se deben tomar en serio. En 1969–1970, antes de la centralización de sus finanzas escolares y la introducción de la Propuesta 13, California ocupaba el 11.o lugar entre todos los estados y el Distrito de Columbia, en gastos por alumno, desde preescolar hasta el terminar el colegio, o secundaria (K-12). Para 2013, había caído al puesto 36.[8] Su déficit es aún mayor que lo que indica el monto gastado por alumno, porque los salarios de los maestros en California, para ser competitivos, superan el promedio nacional. Eric Brunner y Jon Sonstelie observan: “Los estudiantes de California tuvieron un desempeño considerablemente mejor en el periodo anterior al traspaso de las finanzas del nivel local al estatal […]. Esta disminución aparente en el desempeño promedio sería menos problemática si viniera acompañada de una igualación entre distritos y niveles de ingreso. Sin embargo, hay muy poca evidencia de igualación entre distritos escolares”. Hacen notar que la disminución del desempeño no se puede atribuir solamente a los recursos. “El mal desempeño de los estudiantes de California en las pruebas de nivel es decepcionante, pero este desempeño se debe más a la ineficiencia en la asignación de fondos que a la escasez de los mismos”.[9] Esta situación es consecuencia de muchos factores complejos, pero está claro que el respaldo estatal a la educación local en California no ha cumplido con las altas expectativas de los partidarios iniciales de la reforma del financiamiento escolar.

Michigan llevó a cabo una centralización importante de su sistema de financiamiento escolar en 1994, pero las continuas dificultades económicas del estado han reducido su capacidad para mantener sus niveles de financiamiento. Como en el caso de California, los cambios en el financiamiento escolar fueron parte de una colección de objetivos a veces contradictorios, como mejora educacional, mayor equidad y alivio tributario. La “Propuesta A” de Michigan, aprobada en 1994, redujo drásticamente el impuesto sobre la propiedad y lo sustituyó con una serie de fuentes de recaudación alternativas, como porciones del impuesto estatal sobre el ingreso y un incremento en el impuesto estatal sobre las ventas, que se dedicó a las escuelas.

Diez años más tarde, dos analistas juzgaron que los resultados de la centralización de Michigan fue “decididamente positiva”, aunque expresaron su preocupación de que la base de recaudación estatal para el fondo de ayuda escolar era “peligrosamente vulnerable a fluctuaciones cíclicas”.[10] En 2010, El Consejo de Investigación Ciudadana de Michigan elaboró este informe:

Dadas las realidades prácticas del sistema de financiamiento actual, los ingresos controlados (directa o indirectamente) por el estado suman casi el 85 por ciento de los fondos operativos totales de las escuelas locales. Por lo tanto, son los dirigentes estatales, no los locales, los que controlan la caja en las escuelas locales de Michigan […]. Además de los problemas fiscales debidos a la crisis económica de casi una década de duración en Michigan, que han sido exacerbados por la Gran Recesión, las finanzas de la educación pública también enfrentan otro problema grave a largo plazo. Desde principios de la década del 2000, el estado no ha podido controlar los dos déficits estructurales que afectan a sus fondos operativos principales: el Fondo General y el Fondo de Ayuda Escolar.[11]

Una disposición poco advertida de la legislación de Michigan de 1994, típica de la complejidad de estas promulgaciones, transfirió a los gobiernos locales los pagos anuales al fondo de jubilación escolar, que antes estaba a cargo del gobierno estatal.[12]

La adopción de un financiamiento escolar centralizado no resuelve por sí mismo los problemas de adecuación y eficiencia, que son cruciales en toda reforma educativa, independientemente del impuesto que se use como fuente de ingresos educativos. Los desafíos sustanciales de una reforma educativa son mayores que la simple elección de un instrumento tributario.

El impuesto sobre la propiedad y los gastos locales suplementarios

Los impuestos locales también pueden ser controvertidos cuando se usan para suplementar niveles de gasto fijados por el gobierno central. Es poco probable que un estado financie todas las escuelas al mismo nivel que los distritos más pudientes establecerían para sí mismos si elaboraran su presupuesto de manera independiente. Esto presenta un dilema cuando un estado interviene para asegurar que los distritos menos ricos reciban el financiamiento necesario. El estado puede asignar recursos a los distritos necesitados sin garantizarles un presupuesto por alumno igual al de las jurisdicciones que gastan más. O puede imponer restricciones que limiten la capacidad de los distritos ricos para suplementar su presupuesto con recursos propios. En el primer caso, el uso del impuesto sobre la propiedad para aumentar el presupuesto escolar local sería aceptable; en el segundo caso no lo sería. Por ejemplo, Michigan no permite a los distritos locales la obtención de recursos tributarios adicionales para el funcionamiento de las escuelas. Los distritos que gastan más, y cuyo nivel de financiamiento ha disminuido, han creado una nueva dimensión en el litigio sobre el financiamiento escolar al considerar la posibilidad de iniciar una acción legal contra el estado.[13]

Uno de los abogados que inició la disputa por el financiamiento de la educación en California argumentó que no era justo permitir que los padres recauden fondos para sus escuelas locales: “Si tenemos un sistema educativo malo, los padres de los ricos tienen que estar igualmente preocupados como los padres de los pobres”.[14] La posición contraria considera que es legítimo que existan ciertas variaciones en los niveles de gasto escolar, particularmente si los padres que no pueden suplementar los presupuestos de base se retiran del sistema escolar público y envían a sus hijos a escuelas privadas.

Vermont adoptó una estrategia única al problema de gastos mayores al promedio después de que la Suprema Corte estatal revocó su método de financiamiento escolar.[15] La legislatura respondió con la Ley 60, que entre 1999 y 2004 proporcionó una asignación estatal uniforme para todos los estudiantes de educación primaria y secundaria. En ese momento, el 90 por ciento de los distritos escolares de Vermont ya estaban gastando más del monto estándar por alumno. No obstante, bajo la Ley 60, los distritos que eligieron gastar más tenían que aportar fondos locales adicionales a un fondo estatal para beneficiar a las áreas más pobres. Cuanto más rico era el distrito, más tenía que aportar a este “fondo compartido”. El estado podía reasignar más de dos tercios de los fondos recaudados de los distritos más ricos a escuelas de los distritos más pobres. En 2004 se informó de que “aproximadamente el 91 por ciento de los distritos escolares de Vermont recibieron más fondos bajo el nuevo régimen, y los residentes de distritos con propiedades de bajo valor tuvieron que pagar menos impuestos. Los impuestos en los distritos más ricos se habían más que duplicado y, sin embargo, los gastos por alumno en esos distritos habían disminuido. Estos resultados generaron una intensa respuesta por parte de los distritos más ricos de Vermont, creando situaciones de desobediencia civil, retención local de los fondos estatales para la educación, evasión del ‘fondo compartido’ por medio de deducciones tributarias y un fracasado pleito contra la constitucionalidad de la Ley 60”.[16]

Esta controversia fue una de las razones principales por las que se produjo posteriormente un cambio legislativo. En Vermont, como en otros estados, las limitaciones de los presupuestos escolares también dieron lugar a campañas privadas de recaudación de fondos y el uso de subvenciones de fundaciones de caridad para reemplazar los fondos tributarios que las escuelas locales habían perdido. En California, por ejemplo, sólo en 2011 las contribuciones voluntarias no tributarias a las escuelas públicas ascendieron a US$547 millones.[17]

Para algunos observadores, la capacidad de los padres de mayores ingresos para comprar recursos educativos adicionales para las escuelas de sus hijos significa un retorno a la situación que dio lugar en primera instancia a los litigios judiciales sobre el financiamiento educativo. Un maestro de Nueva York expresó que el concepto mismo de educación pública “suprime todas las distinciones entre grupos de individuos, por ser inherentemente injustas”.[18] Por otro lado, la oportunidad de contar con respaldo local ayuda a promover un compromiso amplio con las escuelas públicas.

De la igualación a la adecuación

Una decisión judicial de California tomada en 1986 como parte de la larga serie de casos relacionados con Serrano ofreció otra perspectiva sobre los problemas de igualación de gastos. “Las consecuencias adversas de años de nivelación hacia abajo han sido particularmente perjudiciales en distritos de gastos altos con grandes concentraciones de estudiantes pobres y minoritarios. Algunos de los distritos más urbanos del estado, con altas concentraciones de estudiantes de escasos recursos y minoritarios, son distritos de alta recaudación.”[19] Según la opinión del tribunal, las jurisdicciones de “alta recaudación” con grandes concentraciones de propiedad comercial o industrial pueden albergar a residentes urbanos de bajos ingresos que en realidad perderían fondos bajo una política de igualación estricta. Muchas ciudades grandes con estudiantes pobres tienen que gastar en educación pública más, y no menos, que el promedio estatal por estudiante.[20]

Los esfuerzos para suplir las necesidades de estudiantes marginados han desviado el foco de la reforma de las finanzas escolares, desde la igualación al suministro de fondos suficientes para lograr un desempeño adecuado. “En 1989, la Suprema Corte de Kentucky declaró que todo el sistema estatal de educación pública primaria y secundaria era inconstitucional y sostuvo que todos los estudiantes de Kentucky tenían el derecho constitucional a recibir una educación adecuada. La decisión trajo como consecuencia una reorganización drástica en todo el sistema escolar público del estado, y creó lo que muchos académicos han llamado el ‘movimiento de adecuación’”.[21] Sin embargo, es mucho más fácil calcular las diferencias en financiamiento que proporcionar una definición operativa de educación adecuada. Esta importante decisión de la Suprema Corte de Kentucky interpretó el requisito constitucional estatal de “un sistema eficiente de escuelas comunes” en función de siete objetivos bastante abstractos, incluyendo “destrezas de comunicación oral y escrita suficientes para que los estudiantes puedan funcionar en una civilización compleja y rápidamente cambiante” y “autoconocimiento y conocimiento suficiente de su bienestar mental y físico”.[22]

A falta de una disposición constitucional a nivel federal de equidad en el financiamiento escolar[23], estos casos se dirimen en los tribunales estatales. No obstante, el desafío judicial a los sistemas estatales no pueden abordar la fuente más importante de falta de uniformidad en los gastos educativos: las diferencias de gastos entre los distintos estados. Estas son mucho más significativas que las diferencias entre los distritos de cualquier estado individual. “Aproximadamente dos tercios de la inequidad de gastos nacional se deben a los gastos entre distintos estados, y sólo un tercio se refiere a los gastos dentro de los estados, y por lo tanto los litigios sobre la reforma escolar sólo pueden resolver una pequeña parte de esta inequidad”.[24]

Complejidades de los gastos por alumno

El desplazamiento en el enfoque de una igualación estricta a proporcionar recursos adecuados a los distritos necesitados puede debilitar el argumento que prohíbe a los distritos locales recaudar más impuestos para suplementar los ingresos dispuestos por el estado. Si muchos distritos urbanos necesitados y de bajo desempeño tienen que gastar mucho más que el presupuesto promedio por alumno, la uniformidad no será la meta óptima.

De todas maneras, la uniformidad de gastos siempre tendrá un atractivo intuitivo. En California, las décadas de financiamiento escolar centralizado han roto prácticamente la conexión entre los gastos en educación y la riqueza inmobiliaria local. No obstante, el informe “California Watch” del Centro de Informes de Investigación en 2011 ilustró cómo los gastos por alumno seguían variando mucho entre un distrito y otro. El informe citó al presidente de la Asociación de Educación de Alameda: “Para nosotros, el hecho de no recibir la misma cantidad que otros distritos cerca del nuestro es como decir que vamos a valorar a un niño más que a otro”. Este informe describió también el sistema de financiamiento pos-Serrano en California:

En el fallo histórico de 1971 de Serrano vs. Priest, el tribunal determinó que el uso del impuesto local sobre la propiedad para financiar las escuelas creaba grandes diferencias entre un distrito rico como Beverly Hills y Baldwin Park, una comunidad de bajos ingresos al este de Los Ángeles.

La Suprema Corte estableció que las diferencias en el monto básico de fondos erogado por alumno —llamado también “límite de ingresos”— tenía que ser menor o igual a US$100 en todos los distritos. Si tenemos en cuenta la inflación, la diferencia permisible es ahora de US$350 por estudiante. Aun cuando sigue habiendo diferencias importantes entre algunos distritos, las disparidades en el monto básico que los distritos reciben del estado se han reducido sustancialmente.

Pero dicha reducción ha sido neutralizada por fondos locales, estatales y federales aportados por casi cien programas distintos. Una gran parte del dinero se basa en fórmulas establecidas en la década de 1970 para comida, transporte y otros servicios que frecuentemente tienen poco que ver con las necesidades actuales de los estudiantes.

Las inequidades que el tribunal trató de aliviar con el fallo de Serrano persisten. Alrededor de dos tercios de los distritos gastan ahora por lo menos US$500 por encima o por debajo del promedio estatal, según el análisis de California Watch.

“Lo que pasó desde el caso Serrano es que tratamos de igualar el financiamiento de base de los estudiantes en todo el estado”, dijo [Julia] Brownley, asambleísta de Santa Mónica. “Pero desde entonces hemos creado cientos de fondos con categorías distintas que se sumaron a la base. Esto ha llevado el financiamiento a un nivel distinto y ha sesgado de nuevo los gastos”.[25]

Hay varios aspectos de este informe que vale la pena hacer notar. Desde la perspectiva del impuesto sobre la propiedad, quizás la conclusión más importante es que las disparidades persistentes en los presupuestos distritales no son el resultado de diferencias en la recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad, puesto que la asignación de los recursos del impuesto sobre la propiedad es establecida por la legislatura y el gobernador.

Más aún, el objetivo de igualar los gastos dentro del límite de unos pocos cientos de dólares por estudiante en un estado tan extenso y variado como California es inadecuado. Los costos de bienes y servicios varían significativamente entre regiones y entre centros urbanos y rurales. Una de las críticas más importantes a la centralización del financiamiento escolar en Michigan ha sido que no tuvo en cuenta las diferencias de costos de los distritos escolares en distintas áreas y con poblaciones distintas.[26] Esta misma crítica se puede aplicar al caso de California.

Muchas de las deficiencias del sistema de financiamiento pos-Serrano en California fueron eliminadas en la histórica legislación firmada por el Gobernador Jerry Brown en 2013, “el cambio más importante en la forma en que California financia sus escuelas públicas de los últimos 25 años”.[27] Esta legislación se propone asignar más fondos a los distritos necesitados, como aquellos que albergan estudiantes de bajos ingresos o cuyo idioma nativo no es el inglés, en vez de igualar los gastos entre distritos.

Como medida cuantitativa, el gasto por alumno puede dar una idea equivocada de exactitud. Los cálculos varían en función de una multitud de opciones sobre los montos que se incluyan, como gastos de capital, servicio de la deuda, educación para adultos, programas educativos extraescolares, contribuciones de jubilación y gastos administrativos estatales, sin mencionar las formas en que se mide la inscripción de alumnos.[28] Las asignaciones pueden ser distintas que los montos establecidos en el presupuesto, y ambas pueden diferir de los gastos reales. Por lo tanto, es posible que la Oficina del Censo de los EE.UU. calcule que los gastos por alumno en la Ciudad de Nueva York en 2011 fueron de US$19.770 y que la Oficina Presupuestaria Independiente de la Ciudad determine que ese monto fue menor a US$8.000.[29] Las comparaciones de los presupuestos individuales de los distritos escolares pueden quedar distorsionadas también si unos pocos distritos pequeños o remotos tienen gastos por alumno muy altos. Y, por supuesto, es el uso de los fondos escolares, no su cantidad solamente, lo que vale para mejorar los resultados educacionales.

Todos estos asuntos cruciales están muy alejados de la política sobre el impuesto a la propiedad. Sin embargo, este sigue siendo utilizado a la hora de encontrar culpables por el bajo desempeño escolar. Un editorial del New York Times de 2013 consideró las razones por el lugar distante que ocupa el país en las pruebas internacionales de matemáticas y ciencias:

Los distritos escolares de los EE.UU. dependen demasiado del impuesto sobre la propiedad, lo cual significa que las áreas ricas recaudan más dinero que las pobres. El dinero de impuestos estatales para cubrir esta brecha en general no puede suplir las necesidades de los distritos con mayores niveles de pobreza y otros desafíos […].

[…] Ontario [Canadá], por ejemplo, trata de eliminar, o por lo menos minimizar, el desequilibrio de fondos que existiría de otra manera entre los distritos pobres y ricos. En la mayoría de los estados de los EE.UU., sin embargo, los distritos más ricos gastan alrededor del doble por alumno que los que menos gastan, de acuerdo a un informe de una comisión asesora federal. En algunos estados, como California, esta relación es mayor que tres a uno.[30]

Después de más de cuatro décadas de una reforma financiera escolar, centralización e igualación extremadamente ambiciosas, las deficiencias del sistema educativo escolar de California no se pueden achacar al impuesto sobre la propiedad. La crítica fácil al impuesto evade los problemas enormes y mucho más complicados de cómo mejorar los desempeños educativos.

Impuesto estatal sobre la propiedad

La equidad del impuesto sobre la propiedad es un tema de debate debido a que el financiamiento local parece injusto, y sólo en la medida en que se usa el impuesto sobre la propiedad para proporcionar ingresos a nivel local. Por lo tanto, un impuesto sobre la propiedad a nivel del estado no se consideraría injusto de la misma manera. Algunos estados imponen un pequeño tributo adicional sobre el impuesto local sobre la propiedad, y usan lo recaudado para financiar la educación. Pero un impuesto estatal sobre la propiedad puede crear problemas graves cuando se impone sobre valores inmobiliarios calculados por medio de prácticas de tasación local que no son uniformes.

Esta fue la situación que tuvo que enfrentar Nueva Hampshire con su sistema de financiamiento escolar, que dependía principalmente del impuesto local sobre la propiedad y fue declarado inconstitucional por la Suprema Corte estatal en 1997.[31] Nueva Hampshire es el único estado del país que no tiene un impuesto estatal sobre las ventas ni un impuesto general sobre el ingreso, por lo que la fuente de ingresos esencial para ofrecer servicios públicos es el impuesto sobre la propiedad. Como respuesta, el estado creó un impuesto inmobiliario a una tasa del 0,66 por ciento sobre los valores de tasación locales equiparados por el Departamento de Administración de Ingresos de Nueva Hampshire. Un tribunal de primera instancia dictaminó que un impuesto a nivel estatal no se podía basar en tasaciones locales no uniformes.[32] No obstante, la Suprema Corte estatal, profundamente dividida, rápidamente revocó esta decisión, determinando que sólo se podía establecer una violación de la cláusula estatal de uniformidad por “medio de hechos específicos que demuestren un ‘designio amplio de discriminación intencional)’”.[33]

Otros estados también han hecho uso del impuesto local sobre la propiedad para financiar presupuestos escolares centralizados. En Michigan, un impuesto sobre las propiedades que no son bienes de familia, como las residencias de vacaciones y segundas residencias, se ha dedicado para financiar la ayuda escolar estatal. Este no es formalmente un impuesto estatal sobre la propiedad, pero los distritos que no tributan el impuesto no reciben el financiamiento estatal pleno de su subvención educativa. Como en el caso de Nueva Hampshire, un impuesto administrado localmente se ha convertido en el fondo en un gravamen estatal.

En California, las tasaciones inmobiliarias y la recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad siguen siendo responsabilidad local, pero es la legislación estatal la que determina el uso de los fondos. Con respecto a la educación, el estado determina el financiamiento de acuerdo a una fórmula conocida como límite de ingresos. Según la explicación del Departamento de Educación estatal: “El límite de ingresos totales del distrito se financia por medio de una combinación de impuestos sobre la propiedad locales y el fondo de Ayuda General del estado. De hecho, el estado suple la diferencia entre los ingresos del impuesto sobre la propiedad y el límite total de ingresos para financiar a cada distrito.”[34] En 2009–2010, el promedio de ingresos para los distritos escolares de California fue de US$8.801, y el impuesto sobre la propiedad promedio asignado a cada alumno fue de US$2.210; la diferencia viene de la ayuda estatal. Un aumento en la recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad daría como resultado una reducción similar en la ayuda estatal. El impuesto sobre la propiedad funciona como un instrumento del financiamiento centralizado estatal de las escuelas. Como ya se ha mencionado, esto no ha eliminado de ninguna manera las objeciones a las disparidades de financiamiento entre distritos escolares. Un informe concluyó que en los distritos primarios pequeños el límite de ingresos más alto por alumno fue de US$31.234 en 2005–2006 y el menor fue de US$4.727.[35]

El impacto de la capitalización

Las finanzas escolares a veces tienen una relación singular con el impuesto sobre la propiedad debido al proceso de capitalización. Los beneficios de servicios públicos locales superiores pueden tener una clara influencia positiva sobre el valor inmobiliario dentro de una jurisdicción. Es intuitivamente obvio que si dos casas son comparables en todos los demás aspectos, incluyendo sus responsabilidades tributarias, la que se encuentre en una municipalidad donde los servicios públicos sean mejores se venderá por un mayor precio. Al mismo tiempo, casas equivalentes en distintas municipalidades que reciban servicios similares pero tengan responsabilidades tributarias desiguales se venderán por precios distintos que reflejarán esta diferencia en los pagos tributarios.

Estos dos aspectos de la capitalización —el aumento de precio causado por servicios superiores y la reducción de precio causada por un aumento en los impuestos— influyen en el debate sobre las finanzas escolares.[36] Es de suponer que los sistemas escolares excelentes aumentarán el valor de las propiedades locales, proporcionando un incentivo para respaldar gastos efectivos en educación, aun para propietarios que no tengan hijos en las escuelas locales. Esta es también una razón para oponerse a gastos superfluos o inefectivos que pueden reducir el valor de la propiedad local. No hay un incentivo financiero similar para que los propietarios respalden el gasto escolar financiado por el estado, porque sus pagos de impuestos estatales no afectan los valores inmobiliarios locales. Esta es una ventaja potencial de la participación local en el financiamiento y las decisiones operativas escolares, y una de las razones para sustentar la hipótesis de que las finanzas escolares centralizadas contribuyeron a obtener el apoyo a la Propuesta 13 en California.

Clarificación del debate

La reforma financiera escolar es un desafío inmenso que involucra muchas cuestiones, desde las definiciones fundamentales de cuál es un desempeño adecuado hasta interpretaciones legales de los mandatos estatales y la medición de costos. Los funcionarios públicos a veces tienen que equilibrar preocupaciones que compiten entre sí, como igualación, adecuación de fondos, centralización y autonomía local. Más aún, la reforma financiera escolar es sólo una parte del desafío aún mayor de cómo mejorar el desempeño escolar. En muchos casos, el papel del impuesto sobre la propiedad es sólo incidental en estos temas fundamentales. El funcionamiento del impuesto y el uso de su recaudación se pueden estructurar para respaldar una serie de resultados financieros deseados, y el foco en el impuesto sobre la propiedad como causa de las deficiencias educativas puede distraernos de la tarea esencial e inmensa de mejorar la calidad escolar. Los esfuerzos para reducir la dependencia de las escuelas del impuesto sobre la propiedad pueden recoger tanto o más apoyo de activistas antitributarios que de aquellos que creen que estos pasos pueden promover una mayor equidad o efectividad educativa. El debate sobre el impuesto a la propiedad debería avanzar en función de sus propias características y distinguir claramente entre los problemas operativos y el uso de la recaudación.

 

Joan Youngman es senior fellow del Instituto Lincoln de Políticas de Suelo, donde es directora del Departamento de Valuación y Tributación.

 

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Referencias

[1] Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 594; 487 P.2d 1241, 1248; 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 608 (1971) (cita omitida).

[2] Brunner, Eric J., y Jon Sonstelie. 2006. “California’s School Finance Reform: An Experiment in Fiscal Federalism.” En The Tiebout Model at Fifty: Essays in Public Economics in Honor of Wallace Oates, ed. William A. Fischel. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

[3] Fischel, William A. 1989. “Did Serrano Cause Proposition 13?” National Tax Journal 42(4): 465–473.

[4] California Legislative Analyst’s Office. 2012. Understanding California’s Property Taxes, 19. Sacramento, CA: Legislative Analyst’s Office.

[5] Fischel, William A. 1996. “How Serrano Caused Proposition 13.” Journal of Law and Politics 12(Otoño): 607–636.”

[6] Brunori, David. 1999. “Interview: Steven M. Sheffrin on the ‘Worst Tax,’ Local Options, and Prop 13.” State Tax Notes (27 de diciembre): 1721–1723.

[7] Stark, Kirk, and Jonathan Zasloff. 2003. “Tiebout and Tax Revolts: Did Serrano Really Cause Proposition 13?” UCLA Law Review 50(Febrero): 853. Ver también Martin (2006).

[8] U.S. Census Bureau, Education Finance Branch. 2015. Public Education Finances: 2013.

[9] Brunner and Sonstelie (2006), 73, 88.

[10] Arsen, David, y David N. Plank. 2004. “Michigan School Finance under Proposal A: State Control, Local Consequences.” State Tax Notes (15 de marzo): 903–922.

[11] Citizens Research Council of Michigan. 2010. State and Local Revenues for Public Education in Michigan, Report 363 (Septiembre), vii, 50. Livonia, MI: Citizens Research Council of Michigan.

[12] Thiel, Craig. 2012. “Rising School Retirement Contribution.”

[13] Coffman, Jennifer. 2012. “AAPS Mulls Suing State Over School Aid Fund.” Ann Arbor Chronicle, 22 de enero.

[14] Seligman, Katherine. 1988. “Creative Fund-Raisers for Schools Keep Affluent Districts Humming.” San Diego Union-Tribune, 18 de noviembre.

[15] Brigham v. State, 166 Vt. 246, 692 A.2d 384 (1997).

[16] Obhof, Larry J. 2004. “Rethinking Judicial Activism and Restraint in State School Finance Litigation.” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 27: 569–607. 593 (citas omitidas).

[17] Weston, Margaret. 2015. Voluntary Contributions to California’s Public Schools. San Francisco: Public Policy Institute of California.

[18] Becker, Sidney. 1997. Carta al director. New York Newsday, Queens Edition, 14 de octubre: A39.

[19] Serrano v. Priest, 200 Cal. App. 3d 897, 226 Cal. Rptr. 584, 619 (1986).
Shelby County Assessor v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 994 N.E.2d 350 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2013).
Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 105 Neb. 843, 182 N.W. 485 (1921), rev’d, 260 U.S. 441 (1923).

[20] Minorini and Sugarman. 1999b. “School Finance Litigation in the Name of Educational Equity: Its Evolution, Impact, and Future,” 38. En Equity and Adequacy in Education Finance, ed. Helen F. Ladd, Rosemary Chalk, y Janet S. Hansen. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.

[21] Minorini, Paul A., and Stephen D. Sugarman. 1999a. “Educational Adequacy and the Courts: The Promise and Problems of Moving to a New Paradigm.” 175. En Equity and Adequacy in Education Finance, ed. Helen F. Ladd, Rosemary Chalk, y Janet S. Hansen. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.

[22] Rose v. Council for Better Education, 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989).

[23] San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).

[24] Murray, Sheila E., William N. Evans, y Robert M. Schwab. 1998. “Education-finance Reform and the Distribution of Education Resources.” 808. American Economic Review 88(4): 789–812.

[26] Freedberg, Louis, y Stephen K. Doig. 2011. “Spending Far from Equal Among State’s School Districts, Analysis Finds.” California Watch, 2 de junio.

[26] Arsen y Plank (2004).

[27] York, Anthony. 2013. “Jerry Brown Signs School Funding Overhaul.” Los Angeles Times, 1 de julio.

[28] California Department of Education (2013). Comparison of Per-Pupil Spending Calculations. Sacramento, CA: California Department of Education.

[29] U.S. Census Bureau (2013); New York City Independent Budget Office (2014). U.S. Census Bureau. 2013. “Per Student Public Education Spending Decreases in 2011 for First Time in Nearly Four Decades, Census Bureau Reports.” Comunicado de prensa. 21 de mayo.

[30] New York Times. 2013. “Why Other Countries Teach Better.” Editorial, 18 de diciembre: A22.

[31] Claremont School District. v. Governor, 142 N.H. 462, 703 A.2d 1353 (1997).

[32] Sirrell v. New Hampshire (Rockingham Superior Court, 17 de enero, 2001).

[33] Sirrell v. New Hampshire, 146 N.H. 364, 373, 780 A.2d 494, 501 (2001).
Sirrell v. New Hampshire, 146 N.H. 364, 780 A.2d 494 (2001).

[34] California Department of Education. 2008. “School District Revenue Limit.” http://www.cde.ca.gov/fg/fo/profile.asp?id=1296.

[35] Weston, Margaret. 2010. Funding California Schools: The Revenue Limit System. San Francisco: Public Policy Institute of California.

[36] Oates, Wallace E. 1969. “The Effect of Property Taxes and Local Public Spending on Property Values: An Empirical Study of Tax Capitalization and the Tiebout Hypothesis.” Journal of Political Economy 77: 957–971. ———. 2006. “The Many Faces of the Tiebout Model.” En The Tiebout Model at Fifty: Essays in Public Economics in Honor of Wallace Oates, ed. William A. Fischel. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Thomas J. Nechyba is professor of economics at Duke University in Durham, North Carolina, where he also serves as director of undergraduate studies for the Department of Economics. In addition, he is a research associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, and he serves as associate editor for the American Economic Review and the Journal of Public Economic Theory. His research and teaching focus on the field of public economics, in particular primary and secondary education, federalism and the function of local governments, and public policy issues relating to disadvantaged families.

Professor Nechyba has lectured and taught in courses at the Lincoln Institute for several years, and he recently completed a working paper based on Institute-supported research, “Prospects for Land Rent Taxes in State and Local Tax Reform.” This conversation with Joan Youngman, senior fellow and chairman of the Institute’s Department of Valuation and Taxation, explores his interest in land taxation and his research findings.

Joan Youngman: How is a land tax different from a conventional property tax?

Thomas Nechyba: It’s really a question of tax efficiency. Any tax has two effects, which economists call the income and substitution effects. The income effect of a tax is the change in the choices made by the taxpayer because payment of the tax has reduced the taxpayer’s real income. The substitution effect arises because the very existence of the tax changes the relative prices of the taxed goods, and therefore gives an incentive to taxpayers to substitute non-taxed goods for taxed goods. The income effect does not give rise to any efficiency problems; it simply implies that some resources are transferred from taxpayers to the government, and we hope the government will do something useful with the money. But, the change in behavior from the substitution effect causes an economic distortion that does not benefit anyone. That is, when the higher price of a taxed good causes me to substitute to a different non-taxed good purely because of the distorted prices, then I am worse off and the government gets no revenue. This is the source of the loss of economic efficiency from taxation, because people are worse off than they were previously, and by a larger amount than the tax collections themselves. This phenomenon is sometimes called a deadweight loss.

Once I asked my students to react to the following statement on an exam: “People hate taxes because of income effects, but economists hate taxes because of substitution effects.” One student wrote that it was undeniably true because it showed that economists aren’t people! Well, I think at least some economists are also people. However, it is true that people dislike taxes primarily because they don’t like paying money to the government. Economists especially dislike those taxes that cause greater deadweight losses, i.e., taxes that have greater substitution effects.

A land tax is a very unusual tax. It does not carry this deadweight loss because it does not give rise to a substitution effect. No one can make a decision to produce more land or less land, and the fact that land is taxed will not distort economic decisions. If we think of the price of land as the discounted present value of future land rents, a tax that reduces expected future rents will cause the price of land to drop. But the total cost of the land, which is the purchase price plus the tax, remains unchanged. Those who are considering the purchase of land therefore face the same cost before and after the tax: before the tax, they simply pay a single price up front; after the tax, they pay a lower price up front but they know they will also have to pay all the future taxes. There is no substitution effect, only an income effect for those who currently own land, because now they can sell it for less than before. Property taxes that tax both land and buildings, on the other hand, do give rise to substitution effects because they distort the cost of making improvements to the property.

A revenue-neutral shift to land value taxation would reduce other, distortionary taxes. A shift to a more efficient tax can improve economic welfare without a loss in tax collections. This much is well known. What is not well known is the magnitude of this benefit and of the cost to landowners in terms of lower land prices. Conventional wisdom predicts that a shift to an efficient land tax would increase income and output but reduce land prices. This kind of general statement isn’t much help to policy makers. If one is suggesting major changes in a tax system, policy makers need to know whether the benefits and the costs are going to be large or small. My recent Lincoln Institute working paper, “Prospects for Land Rent Taxes in State and Local Tax Reform,” constructs a model of state economies in the U.S. to help us think about the effects of such changes.

JY: How did you become interested in developing an economic model for land taxation?

TN: A few years ago, Dick Netzer, professor of economics and public administration at New York University, suggested that I look at the implications for the U.S. economy of replacing capital taxes with land value taxes. Most economists know of the Henry George Theorem and recognize that land taxation is efficient, but they associate his ideas with nineteenth-century economic thought. We assume that all the changes in the economy since then, and changes in the economic role of land, have left these ideas inapplicable to contemporary tax systems. So I was quite surprised that my model indicated that substituting a land value tax for capital taxes on a national level would not only be efficient, as expected, but would actually raise the value of many types of land. However, property taxes are state and local taxes, and the U.S. constitution places special impediments to a national property tax, so a land tax would not be possible on a national level. Further, since each state economy is different, the results of substituting land value taxes for other taxes will also vary from state to state.

JY: How can a tax on land increase land prices?

TN: In and of itself, a tax on land does not increase land prices; it actually reduces land prices, because it reduces the discounted present value of land rents. My research does not consider a land value tax in isolation, but as part of a revenue-neutral tax reform that replaces other, distortionary taxes with a land value tax. Lower taxes on capital will increase capital usage, and more intensive use of capital will raise land prices. For example, if constructing a building becomes more profitable because the tax on the building is lowered or eliminated, an investor may be willing to pay a higher price for its components, including the land.

JY: How did you go about estimating the magnitude of these effects?

TN: I developed a general equilibrium model of an economy that uses land, man-made capital and labor in production. A general equilibrium model is one that examines how changes in one kind of market affect all other markets. This model is then applied to different states, as well as to one hypothetical “average” state, to see how various tax reforms that substitute land value taxes for taxes on capital or labor would affect prices and production. The division of capital into land and man-made capital is a departure from standard analysis, which generally looks at capital as a single category.

One critical element is the elasticity of substitution among these factors; that is, the ease with which one can be substituted for another. Technically, it is the percentage change in one factor that results from a 1 percent change in the other. This is the key to efficiency gains from reducing the tax on man-made capital and on labor and increasing the tax on land. A lower tax on man-made capital will increase the use of that capital, which in turn will produce greater output and more hiring of labor. The easier it is to substitute man-made capital and labor for land, the greater the benefit from a switch to land value taxation.

JY: Where do the elasticity numbers come from?

TN: I use a range of estimates drawn from the economic literature. For example, most studies of the substitution between capital and land give elasticity estimates between 0.36 and 1.13. My paper uses the relatively conservative estimates of 0.75, 0.5 and 0.25 as high, medium and low values, and looks at the result under each assumption. This number is then adjusted to reflect the amount of land in the state devoted to farming, on the assumption that farmland is less easily substituted for capital in the production process. I also ask similar questions with regard to substitution between land and labor.

The elasticities of the actual supplies of man-made capital and labor are also crucial. If taxes on them are reduced, how much extra capital and labor will be available as a result of the increased after-tax return? Often in studies of this sort we make what is called a “small open economy assumption.” We assume that the economy we are looking at is small in relation to the rest of the world, and that capital and labor flow freely into and out of the jurisdiction. In that case, the elasticity of supply is infinite. The opposite extreme would be an economy with the equivalent of closed borders, where no capital could enter or leave. In that case the elasticity of supply would be zero. In looking at U.S. states, the small open economy assumption is not completely accurate, and zero elasticity is not accurate either. The right number is somewhere in between. Neither capital nor labor is as mobile internationally as within the U.S., and labor in particular is less mobile across state boundaries than within a state or a small region. The small open economy assumption may be appropriate in some circumstances for smaller states, but we have to introduce more complex assumptions in other cases.

JY: How does your model compute taxes on land and labor and man-made capital? This isn’t a standard classification of taxes.

TN: This is complicated, because it involves payroll taxes, federal and state corporate taxes, federal and state income taxes, property taxes, sales taxes, and so on. So the model looks at all these taxes and makes assumptions about who is paying them to estimate an overall tax rate on labor from all sources—federal, state and local. Similarly, the model estimates an overall tax rate on land and on man-made capital. This allows us to move from an illustrative example in which taxes on labor and capital are replaced by land value taxes to considering changes in real-world taxes, which of course are never based solely on labor or capital.

JY: How do you represent the shift in taxes from labor and man-made capital to land?

TN: This is a hypothetical policy experiment in the model. Suppose, for example, you wanted to eliminate all sales taxes in a revenue-neutral way, making up the lost collections through a land value tax. Sales taxes are the average state’s largest revenue source, so this shift would be quite ambitious. The model shows what would happen under various elasticities of substitution and elasticities of supply, as described above. The tables in the paper show what land tax would be necessary to maintain revenue, and the changes in capital investment and land prices that would result.

JY: How do you move from the hypothetical average state to the 50 individual states?

TN: You have to begin by asking what factors might cause states to have different experiences with land value taxation. We consider each state’s taxes, because the benefits of shifting to a more efficient system will vary according to how much current taxes distort economic choices. Some states have no income taxes. Some states tax property heavily, while others tax sales heavily. The other critical component concerns the state’s sources of income—how they are divided among land, labor and man-made capital. The Bureau of Economic Analysis reports income from various sources by state, but does not account separately for income from land. For that information we draw on the Census of Agriculture data on the amount and market value of farmland to estimate an income figure.

JY: What kinds of results did you obtain?

TN: Since taxation of land is always economically efficient, and since taxation of other factors is always economically inefficient, a shift to land taxes always increases capital, income and labor use. For the “typical” state it seems that most of the simulated tax reforms are feasible, particularly those that reduce taxes on capital. A 20 percent cut in the sales tax, for instance, requires a nearly 24 percent increase in the tax on land, while a similar cut in property taxes requires virtually no change (0.2 percent) in the tax on land. Even a complete elimination of the state and local property tax calls for only a 23 percent increase in the tax on land, while an elimination of the sales tax would require a whopping 131 percent increase. Landowners would be deeply and adversely impacted by reforms that cut the sales tax (losing up to two-thirds of their wealth under a complete elimination of the sales tax), while they would barely feel the impact of most reforms focused on the property tax. They would experience at most a 7 percent decline in their wealth under the complete elimination of the property tax, and an actual increase in their wealth for less dramatic property tax reforms.

But these results differ substantially by state. For instance, the percentage change in the tax on land required to maintain constant state and local government revenues as taxes on capital are eliminated ranges from -1.91 percent to over 104 percent. Similarly, the impact on land prices varies greatly, with prices barely declining (or even increasing) in some states while falling by as much as 85 percent in others. While the elimination of all state and local taxes on capital is therefore technically feasible in all states, it is clearly politically more feasible in some states than in others. Overall, of course, replacing distortionary taxes with nondistortionary taxes on land always brings growth in the employment of capital and labor and increases output—but the size of these impacts also varies greatly. Given that the main political hurdle to land taxation is the expected adverse impact on landowners, these results seem to indicate that, as in the case of the “typical” state, such reforms should emphasize the simultaneous reduction in taxes such as the corporate income tax or the property tax.

JY: What do you take as the central lessons of this work?

TN: Several broad lessons emerge from the analysis of a typical state. First, elasticity assumptions are crucial to the exercise of predicting the likely impact of tax reforms. Second, under elasticity assumptions that are both plausible and relatively conservative, this model predicts that some types of tax reforms are more likely to succeed than others. In particular, tax reforms that reduce taxation of capital in favor of land taxation will have more positive general welfare implications while minimizing the losses to landowners. So policy makers might consider reforming corporate income and property taxes rather than sales and personal income taxes. Third, since elasticities tend to be lower in the short run, it is likely that some of the positive gains of tax reforms that reduce distortionary taxes in favor of land taxes will emerge only with time.

The most striking lesson from simulating tax reforms for the 50 different states is how greatly results can vary depending on underlying economic conditions and current tax policies in those states. Thus, far from arriving at “the answer” regarding the impact of land tax reforms, this study suggests that such answers are likely to differ greatly depending on the context in which the reforms are undertaken. Reforms that raise the tax on land are likely to be more effective the larger the size of the reform, the higher the initial distortionary taxes in the state, and the lower the current level of state income. And, reforms are more likely to be politically feasible (in the sense of not causing great declines in land values) when they involve reductions in taxes on capital.

The idea that land value taxation is unrealistic or would drive land prices into negative numbers is based on a static view of the economy, where no one responds to tax changes by substituting one factor for another. Once you accept that behavior will change in response to taxes, that static view no longer applies. Under these fairly conservative assumptions, tax reforms that use land taxes to eliminate entire classes of distortionary taxes are economically feasible in virtually all states. This work shows that, far from being quaint or outmoded, the idea of taxing land value is quite relevant to the contemporary policy debate.

Working Paper Information: Thomas Nechyba. 2001. “Prospects for Land Rent Taxes in State and Local Tax Reform.” 70 pages. The complete paper is posted on the Lincoln Institute website at www.lincolninst.edu and may be downloaded for free.

The potential for sharp and unpredictable assessment increases is an important source of dissatisfaction with the property tax. Rapid price rises that are accurately and promptly reflected in assessed valuations can leave homeowners responsible for cash payments on paper gains that are unexpected, uncontrollable, and possibly short-lived. Two decades ago, this situation paved the way for adoption of California’s Proposition 13, which rejected fair market value as a basis for assessment.

Increasing valuations do not necessarily produce a corresponding rise in property tax bills, since a higher assessment base could raise equivalent revenue with a smaller tax rate. This solution is not feasible, however, when prices increase disproportionately only in particular neighborhoods or for particular types of property.

What other means are available to address price volatility and its impact on property tax rates? A number of states have recently introduced limitations on annual valuation increases. These measures avoid extreme assessment increases but may still allow assessments to match fair market values at some point in the future. They substitute a non-market value basis for assessment and diminish uniformity by distinguishing between those properties that are assessed on the basis of current values and those that are not.

Assessment Limitations in Washington and Texas

In the November 1997 elections, voters in Washington state approved a referendum generally limiting increases in assessed valuation to 15 percent a year on all classes of taxable property. If a property’s market value rises more than 60 percent, one year’s assessment may reflect no more than one-quarter of that increase. A similar measure strongly supported by business representatives was passed by the Republican legislature but vetoed by Gov. Gary Locke (D), who would have limited it to homeowners.

This case raises an important point concerning uniformity and distribution of the tax burden. Phase-in provisions ease the burden on owners of rapidly appreciating property but correspondingly increase the relative share of the tax borne by owners experiencing slower growth, or no growth, in property value. While tax limitations are generally promoted as protection for homeowners, residential benefits may pale in comparison to commercial gains.

Supporters of the Washington referendum urged passage “to soften a tax blow that could be devastating to a homeowner on a fixed income.” Yet major funding for the campaign came from industrial giants, including Microsoft, Intel, Hewlett Packard, Boeing and Weyerhaeuser. Opponents, including King County assessor Scott Noble, argued that the tax benefits “will go disproportionately to the large corporations that are bankrolling the campaign because of their much higher property values.” On the other hand, restricting such provisions to residential property introduces another level of non-uniformity to the tax.

Texas voters chose this split valuation alternative in November, approving a measure that limits increases in assessed values of residential homestead property, but not business property, to 10 percent a year. The president of the Texas Taxpayers and Research Association said this provision will “keep a terribly hot neighborhood from getting sort of a sticker shock.”

Critics saw the irony of this action. One wrote, “If the Texas Legislature had offered voters a chance to cap appraisal increases on their homes a few years ago, lawmakers would have been lauded as heroes. Angry homeowners were storming the offices of appraisal districts in the early and mid-1990s, demanding relief from double-digit increases in the appraised value of their homes and the prospect of significant property tax hikes. . . Nothing happened. Now that appraisal increases have fallen to three percent or so, the Legislature is offering voters a chance to cap the increases by changing the state Constitution. . . .” Ironically, before the price rises of the 1990s, Texas tax protests centered on whether assessments reflected falling property values quickly enough in the regional recession of the 1980s. For example, Harris County, which includes Houston, saw challenges to one-quarter of all its tax valuations in 1984 and 1985.

A Legislative Approach in Montana

Annual increases of 10 or 15 percent do not necessarily prevent assessed valuations from reaching full market levels. However, Montana lawmakers responded this year to dramatic value increases with an even more drastic measure. After studies reported that residential and commercial property values had increased by an average of 43 percent statewide since the last reassessment, the legislature required this change to be phased in at a rate of only two percent annually-taking 50 years to enter the tax rolls completely. Court challenges to this provision could raise an interesting question as to how long a phase-in period is compatible with state constitutional provisions requiring uniformity in assessment.

Assessment Reform in Ontario

Large valuation increases may be due to assessment lags as well as to price rises. One of the most startling examples of outdated tax valuation is found in Toronto-a surprise to U.S. observers who normally expect a high level of administrative efficiency from their northern neighbor. At the September conference of the International Association of Assessing Officers (IAAO) in Toronto, a panel of speakers brought together by the Lincoln Institute explored this situation. The potential for huge valuation increases stems not so much from extraordinary market activity as from extraordinary assessment inactivity. Metropolitan Toronto has not had a full-scale reassessment since1954-and that was based on 1940 market values.

Attorney Jack Walker described the public as generally supportive of current tax reform efforts, which encompass the entire province of Ontario. By contrast, a 1992 reassessment proposal for Metropolitan Toronto alone sparked such protest from residential and small business taxpayers that the proposal was abandoned. As a result, the 1997 measure explicitly addresses the concerns of many taxpayers groups. Professor David Amborski of Ryerson Polytechnic University explained that it would ensure current value assessments and regular updates. In addition, it will eliminate the business occupancy tax, permit different tax rates for different classes of property, provide special treatment for senior citizens and disabled taxpayers, and reduce taxes on agricultural and open space lands.

Thus, Toronto has also chosen to soften the impact of large assessment increases at the expense of uniformity. In this case, where municipal valuations were so out of date, the net effect may be judged an improvement in assessment equity. It will be important to evaluate the experiences of other jurisdictions struggling with the challenge of balancing uniformity and acceptability to see if they can make the same claim.

Joan Youngman is senior fellow and director of the Institute’s Program in the Taxation of Land and Buildings. An attorney specializing in property tax issues, she also writes a column for State Tax Notes, published by Tax Analysts.

Notes

Joseph Turner, “Ref. 47 Debate: Do Tax Savings Justify Change?” Takoma News-Tribune, October 23, 1997, p. A1 (quoting Rep. Brian Thomas (R-Renton))

2 Tom Brown, “Big Guns Back Property-Tax Lid,” Seattle Times, October 24, 1997, p. B3.

3Clay Robison, “Measure Would Cap Hike in Residential Appraisals,” The Houston Chronicle, November 2, 1997, p.2.

4Michele Kay, “Tax Appraisal Cap on Ballot,” Austin American-Statesman, October 20, 1997, p. A1.

Supporters of land taxation view it as an efficient and effective means of financing government, and the concept has wide appeal among public finance scholars. Many economists, including several Nobel Prize winners, actively endorse this method of taxation, which taxes land value separately and instead of buildings and improvements. At least from an academic perspective, then, the case for the efficiency and fairness of a land-based tax system seems irrefutable.

Despite that support, the concept of land taxation has not been widely embraced in the United States. Property tax bases are set by state constitutional or statutory law, so local governments cannot implement a land tax, or its split-rate variant, without authorization from their respective state legislatures. Other than a handful of Pennsylvania cities that have adopted split-rate or two-rate tax systems, no American jurisdictions currently place higher tax burdens on land than on buildings and other improvements. Virginia recently responded to interest in two-rate taxation with legislation allowing two local governments to adopt graded tax programs, but they have not yet done so. While split-rate taxation is discussed periodically as a reform measure, there are no current proposals for its adoption awaiting action before a state legislature (Brunori and Carr 2002).

Statutory or constitutional enactment of a land tax would entail revising property tax laws that have been substantially unchanged for more than a century. In general, state legislators are cautious about implementing dramatic reforms in any public policy area, and comprehensive tax reform has been a particularly elusive goal. Adoption of split-rate or land taxation would be a dramatic change, requiring significant awareness, advocacy and support in the ranks of the legislature and at the local level.

There are few areas of government finance in which scholarly opinion and actual public policy diverge so dramatically. This situation prompted me to undertake two nationwide research surveys. The first survey sought to ascertain the level of knowledge of land taxation on the part of the nation’s state legislators. Without an understanding of the issues presented by the taxation of land, legislators are unlikely to champion, advocate or even vote for such measures. I also surveyed local elected officials, because state legislators will not advocate any reforms without constituent support. Moreover, since the reforms at issue will affect primarily local government finances, any legislative body seeking to reform a tax system will solicit the views and advice of local officials.

The Survey Questions

To gauge general awareness of the concept of land value taxation, the survey began with a broad question, describing it as “taxing the full value of land but exempting buildings, structures and other improvements from tax.” The next question narrowed the scope to determine familiarity with split-rate taxation, the version of land taxation practiced in Pennsylvania and authorized in two Virginia municipalities. Because it entails less dramatic reforms, split-rate taxation is the version of land taxation most likely to be adopted in the U.S. This concept was described as “taxing land at a higher rate than buildings, structures and other improvements.”

Legislative research has long found that state lawmakers are likely to support policies that they believe will foster economic development and oppose policies perceived to deter development (Beamer 1999). Taxing land at a higher rate than improvements has historically been thought to encourage building and investment by eliminating or reducing the tax burdens of improving the land. Thus, the third question asked for the respondents’ opinion on the effect that taxing improvements at a lower rate than land would have on economic development, defined as capital investment and job creation.

The proliferation of suburban sprawl is a growing concern among legislators and local officials across the country. The vast academic literature suggests that policy makers view sprawl unfavorably and that most officials think that policies that promote sprawl are unsound. Some public finance scholars believe that adopting split-rate tax policies will limit the negative effects of sprawl (Brueckner 2001). If this belief is true, split-rate taxation could play an important role in the continuing debate over policies intended to deter suburban sprawl. Question four asked what effect taxing improvements at a lower rate than land would have on sprawl. Sprawl was not defined in the question because the term can refer to a number of developments affecting density, suburban growth, loss of open space and decrease in population. Indeed, scholars have lamented the lack of a single operational definition of sprawl. Still, the perception of sprawl as an undesirable land use pattern and policy outcome warranted inclusion of the question in the survey.

Finally, state and local legislators are influenced by the desires and concerns of their constituents. The more important a particular issue is to constituents, the better informed a legislator will become about that issue. Thus, survey participants were asked if during the past year any citizens or organizations had contacted their offices with respect to the issue of split-rate taxation, and if so, whether the constituent supported or opposed the idea.

State and Local Respondents

The first survey focused on state legislators who served on committees with primary responsibility for tax policy and local government finance during the period January–June 2003. There were 106 such committees in the 50 state legislatures, but I excluded those in Pennsylvania and Virginia. Since those states have either adopted or authorized graded tax systems, I assumed that their legislators would be more familiar with the concept and could bias the results.

For the second survey I chose city and county officials from 15 randomly selected local jurisdictions within the 25 largest metropolitan areas in the U.S. To insure a national perspective, I also included city council members from the largest city in each state. Again I focused on officials with primary responsibility for implementing and administering public finance policy and excluded all jurisdictions in Pennsylvania and Virginia.

The survey questions were sent to 1,284 legislators, of whom 780 responded (see Brunori 2003 for more information on methodology). An identical survey was sent to 3,298 city and county officials, of whom 430 responded. The response rate for the state legislators was far above national standards, and the response rate for the local officials was considerably below national standards, but both were statistically significant.

Before revealing the results of the survey research, I must confess that I entered this project with a bias. Having worked in the state and local tax field my entire professional life, as a lawyer, teacher and journalist, I think about tax policy more than any sane person should and have come to know many state legislators and local public officials. In my experience, these government officials are quite capable of finding revenues to pay the bills, but they generally have little in-depth knowledge of the more philosophical and theoretical underpinnings of tax policy. So I assumed that few of them would understand what I was talking about when I began asking questions about land taxation. After all, I did not think most politicians were using their spare time to read Henry George’s classic book, Progress and Poverty. I was quite surprised at the responses.

The Results

In a country where there are virtually no land tax policies in place, the survey results show that a vast majority of elected political leaders do know about land and split-rate taxation (see Table 1). More surprising, to me at least, most political leaders are aware of the benefits of adopting land tax policies. More than 70 percent of the state legislators and 65 percent of the local government officials responded that they were either very or somewhat familiar with the concept of land value taxation, and 67 percent of state legislators and 65 percent of local officials were very or somewhat familiar with split-rate taxation.

The single most important policy goal (after public safety) that concerns American politicians is economic development. When asked about the relationship between the economy and land taxation, more than 62 percent of state legislators and 76 percent of local government officials replied that adopting a split-rate tax system would promote economic development. About one-quarter of both state and local officials thought that taxing improvements at a lower rate than land would have no effect on economic development. These results are arguably consistent with the conventional view that land taxation would have a benign effect on economic decision making. Only 5 percent of the state legislators and no local officials believed that taxing land at a higher rate would deter economic development.

One of the common misperceptions about land taxation is that it will lead to more sprawl, and many, but not a majority, of the respondents shared that misperception. Forty-one percent of surveyed state legislators and 46 percent of local officials said they believed that adopting a split-rate tax system would lead to more suburban sprawl. About 51 percent of the state legislators and 53 percent of local officials surveyed said that split-rate taxation would have no effect on sprawl or would deter sprawl. The fact that so many respondents believe that split-rate taxation would foster more sprawl, presumably by encouraging development of open space in suburban and rural areas, should be troubling to advocates of land taxation.

Finally, a surprisingly small number of elected political leaders have been contacted by constituents regarding land taxation. Eleven percent of state legislators and 9 percent of local government officials said an individual constituent or organization had contacted them regarding the issue of land-based or split-rate taxation, and all were supporters of the idea.

What Does It All Mean?

What originally sparked my interest in this research project was the disconnect between scholarly opinion about land taxation and political action to promote it. I thought this discrepancy might be the result of ignorance of the concepts of land taxation on the part of state and local political leaders. If state legislators and city council members were unaware of land or graded taxation, then they could not be expected to champion such reforms.

The survey results show, however, that this discrepancy cannot be resolved by looking at level of awareness alone. Most state legislators and local officials involved in public finance and taxation issues are familiar with both land taxation and split-rate taxation, and they know that moving to a split-rate tax system would have a positive effect on economic development. Moreover, a slight majority of those surveyed believe that graded taxes would have no negative effects on sprawl.

Since state and local officials know about land taxation and believe it could lead to positive policy outcomes, why are so few local governments using this method of public finance? It is difficult to answer that question without eliciting views on more technical aspects of land or split-rate taxation. Implementation of land taxation raises complex issues as to the feasibility of adopting major property tax reforms, the effects on other revenue sources, and the administration of a land tax system, particularly with respect to valuation. Solving the mystery as to why more jurisdictions are not exploring the policy of taxing land at a higher rate than improvements may lie in analyzing these important operational factors.

References

Beamer, Glenn. 1999. Creative politics: Taxes and public goods in a federal system. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Brueckner, Jan K. 2001. Property taxation and urban sprawl. In Property taxation and local government finance, Wallace E. Oates, editor. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Brunori, David. 2003. Awareness of land taxation: Survey of state legislators. Working paper. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Brunori, David, and Jennifer Carr. 2002. Valuing land and improvements: State law and local government practices. State Tax Notes (September 30):1023–1033.

David Brunori is contributing editor of State Tax Notes for Tax Analysts in Arlington, Virginia, and research professor of public policy at The George Washington University in Washington, DC. This article is based on research he conducted as part of a David C. Lincoln Fellowship in Land Value Taxation, awarded by the Lincoln Institute.

Past trends will not foretell the future, but charting how state and local finances weathered the 2001 recession suggests viable ways to navigate going forward. Lacking the deficit finance ability of the federal government, states and localities must set a spending course based on anticipated taxes and revenues. An unexpected crisis-like the stock bubble burst at the beginning of this century and the subsequent economic slowdown-that throws budgets into fiscal chaos requires such unpopular bailouts as tax increases or cuts in services and welfare. Did that happen?

Participants at a Lincoln Institute-sponsored conference in March 2007 gathered at the Urban Institute in Washington DC, to discuss the recession and share findings on how states and localities determined various actions and policies to address its impacts. This conference, titled “State and Local Finances after the Storm: Is Smooth Sailing Ahead?”, was also hosted by the Urban Institute-Brookings Institution Tax Policy Center, and by the Kellogg School of Management and the Institute for Policy Research, both at Northwestern University.

Cities face major difficulties when attempting to introduce a more efficient property tax system. One such challenge is controlling volatile political issues associated with taxes levied directly on assets, such as the highly visible property tax. The close proximity between the taxing authority and the taxpayer translates into political pressure to reduce taxes and avoid updating property valuations. City officials become an easy target of criticism and may suffer electoral consequences.

Although the property tax is recognized internationally as a preferred instrument to finance urban public services, in most Latin American countries the tax has limited significance as a source of revenue, representing on average 0.32 percent of GDP (De Cesare 2010). Brazilian cities collect an average of about US$46.50 per capita in property taxes per year. However, most cities do not reach the national average. In more than half of the municipalities, revenues do not exceed US$5.00 per capita (Afonso et al. 2010).

The Brazilian Property Tax Model

The property tax (IPTU: Imposto sobre a Propriedade Predial e Territorial Urbana) is a direct tax paid to the local municipality based on the estimated fair market value of real estate property. In Brazil, much of the potential for collecting this tax is lost because local authorities fail to administer the tax correctly and effectively. Discussions of legislative revisions of the IPTU always result in heated debates and intense political response, in many cases causing mayors and other officials to avoid embarking on the process.

An added problem is the strict legal requirement that valuation criteria must be approved by law before the tax base can be updated. The criteria must include the characteristics of the property and its components, as well as the monetary value attached to each component. In other words, it is not enough for Brazilian legislators to set criteria to determine that one property is more valuable than another and therefore must pay a higher tax. The law itself must clarify how a property with certain characteristics will be appraised in monetary terms.

After years of debate, Brazil’s Superior Court ruled in 1996 that a municipal law would be required to update the IPTU tax base whenever the adjustment is higher than the official consumer price index (Statement 160). Before this ruling, cities used to reappraise the property values for tax purposes by executive acts (decrees), independently of the municipal legislature. Since this legal requirement was introduced in 1996, many local governments chose not to send the necessary bills to the municipal legislature for the much-needed updates of property valuation.

In some cases the resulting political disasters served as an alarming inhibitor to any new attempt to revise the tax base. To resolve this dilemma, several cities opted instead to raise the IPTU tax rates to compensate for their reluctance to reappraise properties. Moreover, for each new law approving an assessment update, new types of exemptions or tax reductions tend to be created, often cancelling the efforts to enhance the performance of the IPTU.

As a result of political resistance, the IPTU was often disregarded as a revenue source for municipal finance in Brazil. The largest cities, with more than 500,000 inhabitants, began to concentrate their efforts on the tax on services (ISS: Imposto Sobre Serviços); smaller cities relied more on funds transferred from state and federal government through the municipal revenue-sharing fund (FPM: Fundo de Participação dos Municípios) (table 1).

The federal Applied Economic Research Institute (IPEA 2009) reports the loss of IPTU’s importance as a share of direct municipal revenues at the national level and the rise in revenues from the service tax—an indirect tax that tends to be regressive. The share of the IPTU in direct municipal revenues decreased from 38 percent to 28 percent between 1991 and 2007, causing it to lose its position to the ISS as the principal source of direct municipal revenue (table 2).

An important change that directly affected the IPTU came in December 2009, when the Ministry of Cities published Resolution Act No. 511 establishing National Directives for the Multipurpose Cadastre (CTM: Cadastro Técnico Multifinalitário). This law provided local governments with a valuable standard instrument on which to base their legislative proposals to update the IPTU tax base. The Lincoln Institute of Land Policy had a major role in supporting the development of the technical aspects of this legislation.

The Resolution Act states that property assessment for fiscal purposes is a technical process that must be carried out according to guidelines from the Brazilian Technical Standards Association (ABNT) to reflect fair market value. It also states that an effective IPTU promotes fiscal and social justice by ensuring equitable treatment of taxpayers. Periodic updating of the IPTU tax base is recommended either (1) every four years for cities of 20,000 inhabitants or more (smaller cities may adopt longer cycles); (2) when the assessment ratio is less than 70 percent or greater than 100 percent compared to the market value; or (3) when cumulative property values are not distributed equally, as measured by a dispersion coefficient greater than 30 percent.

What Prompted the Property Tax Reform?

Combined with a strengthened institutional framework, two other factors have put the IPTU back into the current debate about sources of municipal financing in Brazil. The first was the accelerated appreciation of urban land in both large and mid-sized cities. This appreciation was caused principally by economic growth, the housing credit explosion, low taxation, and low risk compared to investment in financial assets from 2003 to 2007 (Carvalho Júnior 2010). The expansion of the real estate sector exposed the discrepancy between the collection potential and the actual flow of funds into the public treasury from the property tax.

A second factor that unleashed the discussion about updating tax assessments to enhance the performance of the IPTU was the global economic crisis that began in 2008 and reached Brazil in 2009. As economic activity declined, reflecting lower consumption and production and a credit contraction, federal transfers to municipalities declined as well. The cities facing this loss of revenue had little alternative but to revive the IPTU, the oldest and most traditional local tax.

In this context, some of the larger Brazilian cities updated their property value maps with revised land value estimates, as well as the construction cost tables used to assess property values, both of which were extremely undervalued. Belo Horizonte, São Paulo, and Salvador are among the cities that acted to strengthen their revenues by updating the tax base for the IPTU. These cities also introduced new policies to guide the implementation of the property tax.

It should be noted that to keep the IPTU tax base unchanged is a risk. One of the major sources of tax injustice, along with the problem of omissions in registering land or development areas, is the use of outdated appraisals when imposing the IPTU (Smolka and De Cesare 2009).

The Case of Belo Horizonte

Belo Horizonte is the capital and largest city of the state of Minas Gerais, located in the southeastern region of Brazil. With a population of 2.4 million, it is the fifth largest Brazilian city and the center of a metropolitan region with a population of approximately 5 million.

The local government has a long history of innovation and good governance. It was a pioneer in introducing the participatory budgeting process in 1993, in adopting GIS applications to improve city management, and in carrying out a widely successful campaign to eradicate hunger, among other noteworthy initiatives. Belo Horizonte collected approximately $332 in property tax per capita per year in 2007, prior to the reform, ranking seventh among Brazil’s large capital cities (Afonso et al. 2010).

The property tax reform started in Belo Horizonte with a revision of the tax base and was guided by the dual desire to eliminate distortions created by its antiquated model and to introduce a new fiscal culture that would support a permanent process of updating property valuation to reflect market variations.

The need for additional revenues and the experience of the 2009 financial crisis also influenced the mayor’s decision. The subsequent reductions in economic activity and federal transfers convinced the local government that it had to establish more sustainable financial conditions to maintain administrative autonomy. Intensifying the use of the IPTU and convincing the lawmakers of this necessity was the first step on the road to update the property tax base.

In devising a strategy for tax reform, the city government realized the change could not be presented simply as a revision of property valuation driven by the need to increase revenues. It also had to involve other aspects, such as measures to mitigate the impact of the tax increase and to provide incentives for taxpayer compliance. Smolka and De Cesare (2009) note that despite the accuracy of valuation estimates, if the reassessment generates large differences in the amount of taxes due, there will be a reaction from taxpayers who are substantially burdened. In this case, plans must be offered that ease such impacts.

The Legislative Process

Once the reform was designed and its virtues and vulnerabilities were identified, the project was submitted first to the municipal legislative council to keep the focus on those empowered to vote and approve the bill. It is a common mistake to seek popular support before or during the voting process, and the executive often loses the battle if it tries to act on two fronts at the same time.

Voting processes in the case of the IPTU are established by municipal law. However, intimate knowledge of the legislative process is necessary, and it is a trump card at the same time. In Belo Horizonte it was important to avoid having either a long, drawn-out process that could leave room for extended questioning or too short a process because an unexpected event could put voting off indefinitely.

Once presented to the lawmakers, all points of the tax reform project were thoroughly clarified. All aspects, positive or negative, were discussed at the council and, of course, favorable aspects were always compared to any noted weaknesses. Legislators must be sheltered from the doubts that are always posed to them and constantly be well-informed and committed to the tax justice criteria embedded in the project. This is the main role of the mayor’s representative, a key member of the core group that implemented the reform. As expected, at the end of November of 2009, the project was approved in its second and final round.

The legislative debate on the bill was both an end in itself and a preparation for the public presentation of the project. During the legislative approval process many expectations were created about the reform, especially by the press. From that point on, the strategy was to promote all of the benefits of the new IPTU system of assessment and collection to quell fears until the actual arrival of the tax bill in January 2010.

The Public Information Campaign

The main instruments used to present the reform to the public were launching a public information campaign and setting up information desks throughout the city to resolve citizen’s queries. The next phase implemented the measures intended to mitigate the impact of the reform and to provide incentives for taxpayer compliance.

In the campaign, the administration emphasized the message that all the revenues from the IPTU are used for works that transform people’s lives. The goal was to make the benefits of IPTU revenues concrete and visible, and that proved to be an efficient way of showing citizens the practical importance of the tax for the development of the city and for the well-being of its citizens. This message was repeated frequently.

In January of 2010, ten taxpayer assistance desks were operating in different parts of the city. Around 200 municipal staff participated directly in assisting taxpayers in more than 20,000 personal consultations. Of these, 26 percent became requests for review of the tax bill. This number was higher than in 2009, but much lower than the pessimistic expectations of those who foresaw a flood of claims (figure 1).

The overall strategy was to determine how well the situation was controlled, which involved implementing a tax structure compatible with the level of claims expected. Building this structure requires extraordinary foresight and attention to soothing the taxpayer and concentrating his attention on what really matters—the correct calculation of the tax and its payment within the timeframe established by law.

However, a good tax structure is not enough. Also important is training staff to provide taxpayer services. Trustworthy, relaxed, quick attention precludes spoiling the quality of the process, the revision of the tax base, and the new tax policies; good taxpayer services also lower the political risks of periodically updating property valuations.

Managing the Process

Among the useful lessons from the Belo Horizonte tax reform process is to avoid updating the tax base only in times of financial crises as an effort to boost revenues. Doing so may undermine the work of instituting accurate valuation practices. Instead, it is advisable to adopt and maintain a permanent updating policy that ensures fairness.

Second, the fairness of the revaluation process should be emphasized in light of the ever-changing market, which imposes price variations that require tax adjustments. Consumption taxes are indiscriminate as to the taxpayer’s economic condition and have a regressive effect, whereas IPTU permits progressive rates and thus helps to improve equity, which in turn improves access to housing, contributes to municipal autonomy, and leads to efficient city planning. Instead of relying primarily on indirect taxes or federal transfers, the municipality that uses the property tax efficiently can reduce social inequalities and better order urban spaces, while also avoiding speculation and helping to preserve the environment (IPEA 2009).

A third important point is to establish clear channels for discussing the reform plan. Preferably, policy steps should be taken by a trusted representative of the mayor who is authorized to negotiate on his behalf through a democratic and collective process. Belo Horizonte established a core group with one person named to coordinate what information will be disclosed and how it will be discussed with the public.

A misunderstanding of the process can create insurmountable resistance and place the complete project in jeopardy. Thus, a key factor is having a well-informed press agent who is capable of dealing with the criticism and inquiries that will surely come, as well as a technical person who knows the reform project well and can offer the explanations required by the different actors involved in the process.

Property Tax Relief Measures

Belo Horizonte succeeded in achieving its goal through arguments for justice and administrative autonomy that culminated in the approval of a complete revision of the property tax system, including the following relief measures.

• Tax rate reductions. These were introduced after updating the tax base to avoid a tax burden beyond the capacity of the taxpayer to pay.
• Adjustment of the progressive tax. The city also introduced graduated tax rate brackets consistent with property values, effectively replacing what had been, in practice, a single tax rate.
• Expansion of the exemption value threshold. This would correct for the fact that, in a dynamic real estate market, many older properties or those belonging to lower-income owners would be priced out of the IPTU exemption band once the revaluation is completed. To avoid this situation, the threshold was raised for property values exempt from the tax.
• Spreading the impact of the reform over two fiscal years. Even for taxpayers who have the capacity to pay, an increase in the IPTU could cause an imbalance in their personal budgets because of other financial commitments. Thus, the city allowed payment of half of the increase in 2010 and the full amount in 2011.
• Deferred payment. Special circumstances, such as unemployment, illness, or prior debt, can affect one’s ability to pay the property tax. The reform established that a taxpayer who demonstrates conditions of duress could request the postponement of a portion of his tax until 2013.
• Creation of discount programs. One of the objectives of the tax reform in Belo Horizonte was to make the IPTU a tax that promotes redistribution of income and contributes to a higher quality of urban life. Thus, the city offers tax discounts in exchange for citizen’s participation in social, health, education, and economic development programs that foster development.
• Discounts for early payment. The annual IPTU in Belo Horizonte can be paid in eleven equal installments, due on the 15th of each month between February and December. Taxpayers who make a minimum of two installments by January 20 receive a 7 percent discount for paying in advance, and historically a large number of taxpayers chose this option. These advance payments guarantee sufficient revenues to meet financial commitments in the beginning of the fiscal year, which runs from January to December.

Evaluating the Results

The final part of the reform is to verify the results. In Belo Horizonte, this evaluation confirmed the success of the entire planning and implementation process, and is a source of information for future improvements. This success can be measured in part by the increase in early payments, which illustrates taxpayer acceptance of the model. Table 3 compares increases in numerous measures from 2009 to 2010, and table 4 compares increases in IPTU revenues for the first six months of both years.

Nevertheless, all of these achievements can be lost over the long term if certain conditions are not met. One such condition is to institutionalize the periodic updating of property values used to calculate the property tax. This is critical since the strategic planning for this reform was motivated precisely by the long period during which the Belo Horizonte land values map had remained unchanged, creating discrepancies from actual market prices and eroding city revenues.

A second condition is to create mechanisms that both guarantee the technical quality of tax assessments and relieve the local government of the political burden of performing the necessary updates. The objective is to make the updating procedure a legal obligation of a technical nature instead of a political decision.

Another option considered was the creation of an assessment committee to perform mass valuations coordinated by municipal authorities. Such a committee would bring together collaborators from entities that operate in the real estate market, such as brokers, builders, private assessors, or financing entities. This measure could help to mollify the political overtones that permeate the property tax system and develop property reassessment programs that rely on participants instead of critics.

Belo Horizonte’s successful experience (albeit with room for improvement) can serve as a reference for other cities that expect to update their property cadastre and their guidelines for mass assessment. Table 5 outlines some of the issues to be considered.

References

Afonso, José, et al. 2010. The urban property tax (IPTU) in Brazil. Unpublished research report. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Carvalho Júnior, Pedro Humberto Bruno de. 2010. Defasagens na cobrança de IPTU. Desafios do Desenvolvimento 61 (January/February): 32.

De Cesare, Claudia M. 2010. Overview of the property tax in Latin America. Working Paper. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

IPEA (Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada). 2009. https://www.ipea.gov.br/portal/images/stories/PDFs/comunicado/090827_comunicadoipea28.pdf (27August).

Smolka, Martim, and Claudia De Cesare. 2009. Necessária, revisão requer transparência. Folha de São Paulo, October 14.

About the Author

Omar Pinto Domingos has a law degree from the Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG) and has a postgraduate degree in administration of municipal taxation from the Center for Specialization in Law, in association with the Gama Filho University. He is a fiscal auditor and property tax manager in the Municipality of Belo Horizonte, and has participated on many tax reform commissions. He is also a frequent lecturer on fiscal and taxation themes in programs sponsored by the Lincoln Institute’s Program on Latin America and the Caribbean. This article is based on his presentation to a seminar in Curitiba cosponsored with Brazil’s Ministry of Cities in May 2010.

Mark Skidmore is professor of economics at Michigan State University, where he holds the Morris Chair in State and Local Government Finance and Policy, with joint appointments in the department of agricultural, food and resource economics and the department of economics. He received his doctorate in economics from the University of Colorado in 1994, and his bachelor’s degree in economics from the University of Washington in 1987. He serves as coeditor of the Journal of Urban Affairs.

Professor Skidmore’s research has focused on public economics and urban/regional economics. Current research interests include state and local government tax policy, intergovernmental relations, the interrelationship between public sector decisions and economic activity, and the economics of natural disasters. His work has been funded by the Fulbright Program, the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, the National Science Foundation, the Urban Institute, and USAID.

His articles have appeared in journals such as Economic Inquiry, Economics Letters, Journal of Urban Economics, Kyklos, Land Economics, National Tax Journal, Public Choice, Regional Science and Urban Economics, and the Southern Economic Journal. His research also has been cited in prominent news outlets such as the BBC, China Post, The Economist, Europe Intelligence Wire, Forbes, International Herald Tribune, Los Angeles Business Journal, MSNBC, Newsweek, The New Yorker, The New York Times, and PBS News Hour.

Land Lines: This year, you are a Visiting Fellow at the Lincoln Institute. What issues are you working on?

Mark Skidmore: About two years ago, my colleague Gary Sands and I were invited by City of Detroit Councilman Kenneth Cockrel to evaluate Detroit’s ailing property tax environment. Councilman Cockrel wondered what gains might result if Detroit were to shift to a land-based tax. We were given access to detailed data for more than 400,000 property parcels within the city, in order to conduct an evaluation, and we are grateful for the Institute’s support to pursue that project. Our report identified significant erosion of the property tax base and explored options for expanding the base, including a shift to a land-based tax. Our evaluation showed that a land-based tax would serve to broaden the tax base but also would produce substantial shifts in the tax burdens of residential, commercial, and industrial property owners.

In 2013, Detroit’s fiscal challenges came to a head when Governor Rick Snyder appointed an emergency financial manager who subsequently set in motion a filing for bankruptcy. On December 3, 2013, Judge Rhodes ruled that the City of Detroit is eligible for Chapter 9 bankruptcy protection. Despite the near-complete collapse of the real estate market within the city during the Great Recession, the property tax remains an important revenue source, and its administration can help or hinder economic and fiscal recovery. This year, I plan to use the parcel-level data set to examine important issues such as tax delinquency, the over-assessment of property, the value of vacant land, and policies related to transfer of property ownership from the private sector to the public sector due to tax foreclosure, and transfers back to the private sector.

Land Lines: What are some of the underlying factors behind Detroit’s current problems?

Mark Skidmore: About 48 percent of Detroit property owners are delinquent on their tax bills, a fact that reflects the erosion of the social contract between citizens and the city. This extraordinarily high delinquency rate is the result of a confluence of factors. First, the city has failed to enforce tax compliance, particularly for low-valued properties. Second, many citizens perceive the tax to be unfair because of the over-assessment of their property. Finally, anecdotal evidence suggests citizens are not paying taxes because local authorities are failing to provide basic public services such as street lighting, snow plowing, and public safety.

One key cause of the high delinquency rate is the over-assessment of property for tax purposes. The real estate crisis hit Detroit particularly hard. In 2010, the average selling price of a residential parcel with a structure was less than $10,000, yet the average assessed value of such properties for tax purposes was $54,000. According to state guidelines, the ratio of assessed value to sales price should be close to one. In September 2013, city officials announced that over the next three to five years all properties within the city would be reassessed.

Second, Detroit has a history of tearing down dilapidated tax-foreclosed structures. As a result, it is one of the few large cities in the United States with frequent sales of vacant land. The value of vacant land is often difficult to ascertain in highly urbanized areas, but accurate valuations are essential if one wants to impose a land tax or a two-tier tax on land and structures. The large number of sales transactions of vacant land in Detroit provides an opportunity to estimate land value. Interestingly, the average value of an unimproved parcel in 2010 based on sales data was $34,000—much higher than the average price of residential parcels with structures, which, as mentioned, was less than $10,000.

The city government now owns and manages more than 25 percent of the city’s land area, and public ownership continues to grow because tax foreclosures have outpaced the transfer of publicly owned parcels back into private hands. Some of the questions I am investigating are: What are the appropriate policies in a market-oriented society for managing low-valued urban land transactions? Why is the delinquency rate so high, and what can be done to improve property tax compliance in the context of a nearly collapsed urban real estate market? What role does the perception of “unfair” assessments play in tax delinquency?

Land Lines: What is the long-term prognosis for Detroit?

Mark Skidmore: The city’s fiscal challenges are a symptom of deep underlying issues. Whether one considers the redevelopment of a declining urban area or reconstruction in the wake of a major natural disaster, the most important elements in any recovery are human capital and social/cultural attributes. If one accepts the premise that they are essential building blocks for redevelopment, and if these elements are lacking, then a top priority is to consider policies and actions that can develop them. In 2011, the high school graduation rate in Detroit was 62 percent. The percentage of households headed by a single parent was 62 percent. By some measures, the functional literacy rate among adults is just 53 percent. It is difficult to build a dynamic and robust urban economy upon such a weak foundation.

Clearly, policy makers must address the immediate fiscal challenges, but the longer-term prognosis for Detroit will depend on actions aimed at improving the underlying economic base—human and social capital. Without addressing these deep challenges, Detroit will continue to flounder. There is no quick fix. In order for Detroit to have a chance to prosper once again, Michigan needs to make a long-term commitment to improving these underlying conditions.

Land Lines: Is Detroit a harbinger for other U.S. cities?

Mark Skidmore: Yes and no. A number of other local governments face significant fiscal challenges—Chicago, Jacksonville, Los Angeles, Oakland, and Providence, to name a few. Underfunded retiree compensation promises are often cited as a major issue. Yet, many of these cities stand a reasonable chance of re-emerging and potentially prospering in the not-too-distant future because they suffer from acute crises brought on by the recession, but not necessarily from chronic fiscal challenges. However, cities with chronic challenges due to significant deficits in social and human capital can look to Detroit as an indicator of their future. My hope is that state and local policy makers from around the country can learn from the Detroit experience and begin making the necessary long-term investments in their most important asset—people, particularly children— so they can avoid the chronic economic and fiscal challenges seen in Detroit.

Land Lines: How does the Detroit project fit into your larger research agenda?

Mark Skidmore: Much of my research has addressed the interrelationship between public decision making and economic activity. Over the years, I have examined issues such as the effectiveness of tax increment finance, the implications of imposing impact fees to cover the infrastructure costs associated with development, and the effects on development of property taxation, tax abatements, and other subsidies. I have also considered other public finance issues such as state lotteries, sales taxes, and income taxation. I am particularly interested in the spatial-dynamic-competitive relationships between adjacent and overlying taxing jurisdictions.

Land Lines: Much of your research has focused on government policy and finance in the United States. What other work have you done internationally?

Mark Skidmore: In recent years, I have partnered with my MSU colleagues on a USAID-funded grant in Mali. My role has been to consider how Mali’s recently decentralized governmental system can be utilized more effectively in food security and land use management. Climate change is affecting Mali in very tangible ways—as the land in the north has become more arid, there has been significant migration to areas in the south, which has better access to water. This migration is resulting in increased violence due to ineffective land tenure and property rights. Now that democratic rule has been re-established, we are again working with our Malian partners to develop systems that involve local authorities in managing food security, land access, property rights, and land-related conflicts. Interestingly, the issue of what to do with all the publicly owned land in Detroit has informed our work in Mali, and vice versa.

I also have ongoing research in the economics of natural disasters. One of my recently published articles (with coauthor Hideki Toya) used thousands of disaster events from all over the world to show that countries with more decentralized governmental systems have significantly fewer disaster-induced fatalities. Our research provides evidence that decentralized governments provide essential services more effectively than more centralized systems.

A third recently completed project shows that societal trust tends to increase in countries in the years following climatic disasters. The relationship we observe is robust, and we hypothesize that such disasters require and provide opportunities for people to work across social classes to address their challenges, thus building trust and social capital. While natural disasters can have devastating human and economic impacts, a potential spillover benefit of greater disaster exposure may be a more tightly knit society.

Land Lines: How does your research reflect the interests and values of the Lincoln Institute?

Mark Skidmore: The Lincoln Institute is recognized worldwide as a leading organization concerning the use, regulation, and taxation of land—property taxation, tax abatements, economic development policies, decentralized fiscal systems—and all of these are topics of my research. Over the years, the Institute has supported my work on Wisconsin tax increment finance, Michigan local government fiscal stress, and my ongoing evaluation of the Detroit property tax environment. The U.S. system of national and largely autonomous subnational governments provides fertile ground for researchers to study and learn about which policy “experiments” lead to better, or worse, outcomes. I really love doing this work and am thankful to have the Institute as a partner.

Over the past decade of transition from communist to market economies, property taxation has taken on economic, political and legal importance as the countries in Central and Eastern Europe have developed new fiscal policies and new approaches to property rights. Taxes on land and buildings have served not only as revenue instruments but also as adjuncts to decentralization and privatization. In spite of the complex and varied national differences in this region, a number of common issues have emerged in regard to property-based taxes.

A period of transition places a premium on revenue sources that impose a minimum burden on the functioning of nascent market economies. Many of these postcommunist nations seek to strengthen local government, and all must adjust their tax systems to account for emerging markets for land and buildings at a time when state administrative capacity is challenged by the introduction of new income and consumption taxes. There is often strong support for retaining a public interest in land as a fixed, nonrenewable element of the common heritage which, once sold, cannot be reproduced. This sentiment coexists with an equally strong impetus for development of private business and private ownership of property. Each of these concerns raises special questions with regard to the role of land and building taxes in the transition.

Such taxes on land and buildings have already been designated as local revenue sources in many nations of Central and Eastern Europe. As a tax base that cannot relocate in response to taxation, real property permits an independent local revenue source. Times of fiscal stringency at national government levels dramatize the importance of such revenue for local governmental autonomy. Moreover, the goal of eventual international integration through the European Union and other trade arenas encourages development of taxes not subject to international competition.

Two primary difficulties confront efforts to implement land and building taxes in these countries. First, in the absence of developed property markets, the tax base requires a choice among formulary values, price approximations, and non-value means of allocating the tax burden. Second, times of financial hardship present special problems in imposing taxes on assets that do not produce income with which to pay the tax. This dilemma has left many property taxes at nominal levels.

These problems are closely related because the lack of reliable market prices, together with the legacy of officially determined price levels, can encourage legislation that assigns specific, sometimes arbitrary values to various classes of property for tax purposes. Given these difficulties, it is particularly significant that many of these nations have either adopted or are seriously considering some form of value-based taxation of immovable property as a source of local government finance.

The Case of Lithuania

Since declaring its independence from the USSR in 1991, the Republic of Lithuania has made rapid strides in economic reforms, privatization and government reorganization. Its plans for market value-based taxation of land and buildings reflect the country’s transition to a market economy and private ownership of property. Municipalities will receive the revenues from the new tax and will have the power to choose the tax rate, subject to an upper limit set by the national government. The Lithuanian Parliament has recently prepared draft legislation for this tax which assigns responsibility for developing a valuation system to the State Land Cadastre and Register (SLCR).

The SLCR was created in 1997 to consolidate a number of functions: registration of property rights, maintenance of a cadastre of property information, and valuation of real property for public purposes, including taxation. Since then the agency has organized a central data bank for legally registered property rights, land and building information, and Geographic Information System (GIS) maps. The data bank currently holds information on more than four million land parcels and structures, and it is linked to mortgage and other related registers and to branch offices throughout the country.

The proposed market value-based real property tax will replace two existing taxes on real property commonly found in post-Soviet systems: a land tax on privately owned land and a property tax on buildings and other property (not including land) owned by corporate entities, enterprises and organizations. Taxable values are currently set by the SLCR through application of varying “coefficients” that adjust base prices to reflect land use and location. The resulting values do not reflect current market prices. The tax rate of 1.5 percent of the taxable value for land and 1 percent of the taxable value of property yielded represent approximately 7 percent of local budgets and 2.5 percent of the national budget in 2000.

Lithuania’s growing demand for market-based property valuation data requires an increase in professional appraisal skills and experience with assessment administration. To address these needs, an Association of Property Valuers and a system of professional certification were established in the mid-1990s, in collaboration with other international valuation associations. Lithuania has also joined Estonia and Latvia in publishing periodic reviews of real estate markets in the Baltic states. Information regarding market activity is posted on the SLCR’s website www.kada.lt.

Lincoln Course

The Lincoln Institute has taught courses on property taxation in transition countries for nearly a decade, and in February the Institute collaborated with SLCR to develop a curriculum for seven senior public officials from Lithuania. The week-long program was based on the course that the Institute presented, in cooperation with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in the Lithuanian capital of Vilnius in December 1997, for government officials from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Recognizing the importance of this year’s program to Lithuanian public policy, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provided support for the delegation’s travel to Cambridge.

The program offered a policy-oriented analysis of issues relating to market-based tax systems. It included guidance in developing a strategic plan and a legal and administrative framework for a computer-assisted mass appraisal (CAMA) system suitable to Lithuania. Technical subjects were presented in the context of larger economic and political issues in land and property taxation. The course combined lectures, discussions with experienced practitioners, case studies, and field visits to state and local agencies in Massachusetts. Lectures addressing introductory, policy-focused subjects were supplemented by more specialized presentations covering market value appraisal techniques, mass appraisal, CAMA and tax law.

The Lincoln Institute will offer similar courses to public officials from other transition countries, and is continuing to develop other educational programs with Lithuania and its Baltic neighbors.

Jane H. Malme is an attorney and a fellow of the Lincoln Institute in the Program on Taxation of Land and Buildings. She has developed and taught courses on property taxation and has been a legal advisor to public finance officials in Central and Eastern Europe. She is co-editor with Joan Youngman of The Development of Property Taxation in Economies in Transition: Case Studies, a book being published in 2001 by the World Bank.

Public officials from Lithuania and Lincoln Institute faculty members met at Lincoln House in February to learn from each other about market value-based taxation policy and plans for introducing property taxation in Lithuania.

Delegates from Lithuania: Arturas Baksinskas, Vice-Minister of Finance; Dalia Bardauskiene, Advisor to the Prime Minister on Rural and Urban Development and Planning; Algirdas Butkevicius, Member of Parliament on Budget and Finance Committee; Rimantas Ramanauskas, First Deputy Director, SLCR; Albina Aleksiene, Advisor to the General Director on Property Valuation, SLCR; Arvydas Bagdonavicius, Deputy Director, SLCR; Algimantas Mikenas, Deputy Head of Property Valuation and Market Research Department, SLCR.

Lincoln Institute Faculty: Joan Youngman, Senior Fellow and Director, Lincoln Institute Tax Program; Jane Malme, Fellow, Lincoln Institute Tax Program; Dennis Robinson, Vice President, Lincoln Institute; Richard Almy and Robert Gloudemans, partners, Almy, Gloudemans, Jacobs and Denne , LaGrange, Illinois; John Charman, Consultant Valuation Surveyor, London; David Davies, Director of Information Technology, Massachusetts Department of Revenue; Jeffrey Epstein, Consultant, Quincy, Massachusetts; Sally Powers, Former Director of Assessment, City of Cambridge.

Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 3 del libro Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.

La inversión de fondos públicos en áreas urbanas suele traer como resultado un aumento en el valor de la tierra que solamente beneficia a un grupo pequeño de propietarios privados. En una iniciativa sin precedentes, la ciudad brasileña de Porto Alegre está usando el impuesto a la propiedad como un instrumento para recuperar la plusvalía de los bienes raíces, con lo cual logran frenar la especulación en el mercado inmobiliario y promueven el desarrollo urbano racional.

Contexto económico y social

Porto Alegre es la capital y la ciudad más grande del estado brasileño de Río Grande do Sul, el más meridional del país. Con una población de 1,5 millones de habitantes y aproximadamente 450.000 unidades inmobiliarias en 1994, las autoridades de la ciudad estimaron una escasez de más de 50.000 unidades residenciales. No obstante, los mayores problemas económicos y sociales limitaban la capacidad que tenía la ciudad para proporcionar viviendas a las familias de ingresos bajos y medianos.

Al igual que en muchos países en desarrollo con ciclos económicos inestables, la tierra es uno de los principales medios para acumular riqueza en Brasil. En Porto Alegre, la existencia de grandes predios sin urbanizar cerca del centro de la ciudad propicia la propagación urbana en la periferia. El principal factor causante de esta situación es la especulación con las tierras por parte de propietarios adinerados que poseen grandes extensiones de terreno baldío y esperan un momento favorable para realizar inversiones o vender los terrenos con enormes ganancias.

A medida que las familias de ingresos bajos son empujadas hacia la periferia, su segregación lleva a una exclusión social más acentuada y mayores demandas de servicios. No obstante, la dotación de infraestructura básica, como los servicios de transporte público en rutas largas entre la periferia y los núcleos de comercio, industria o entretenimiento, exige que el gobierno haga inversiones considerables.

Las autoridades de la ciudad de Porto Alegre se habían fijado una meta fundamental de proveer servicios urbanos de calidad para la comunidad de las afueras, entre ellos una infraestructura básica, educación, transporte público, limpieza de calles y seguridad. Sin embargo, un diagnóstico financiero de los ingresos de la ciudad hizo que las autoridades se percataran de la escasez de recursos para tal inversión. En contraste, muchos distritos en áreas más centrales estaban bien dotados de infraestructura, equipos y servicios, y su densidad de población era menor a la prevista en el plan de desarrollo urbano de la ciudad.

Era obvio que la especulación obstaculizaba el desarrollo de la tierra, pero las autoridades gobernantes creían que el ambiente político era favorable para un cambio. Después de un período en el que el gobierno se enfrentó a una inflación crónica en Brasil, se introdujo un programa de estabilización económica en julio de 1994. Antes del plan económico, la inflación anual llegó a alcanzar el asombroso nivel del 7.000 por ciento. A partir de la aplicación del plan, el índice promedio de la inflación mensual osciló entre el 0,7 y el 1,7 por ciento. La medición de la economía en términos del producto interno bruto (PIB) arrojó índices positivos de crecimiento anual a partir de 1993. El gobierno local tenía confianza en que el momento era ideal para recuperar la inversión y las actividades productivas que se habían paralizado durante el anterior período de inflación alta.

En resumen, los siguientes factores fomentaron la iniciativa de Porto Alegre de usar el impuesto a la propiedad como instrumento para simultáneamente recuperar la plusvalía de la tierra, refrenar la especulación en el mercado inmobiliario y promover la justicia social y el crecimiento económico:

• Estimulación de la ocupación y desarrollo de tierras urbanas, puesto que el mercado privado no respondía de forma positiva a la demanda de los residentes de ingresos bajos y medianos.
• Reducción de la escasez de viviendas.
• Asistencia a las familias de bajos recursos, para garantizarles mejores oportunidades de vida y trabajo.
• Recuperación del valor de la tierra generado por la inversión pública, motivando a aquellos individuos que habían sido favorecidos por la inversión pública para que retribuyeran los beneficios a la comunidad.
• Limitación de las inversiones adicionales a gran escala en infraestructura y servicios públicos mediante la utilización racional de los recursos financieros.

Medidas gubernamentales

La constitución de Brasil (1988) define el impuesto a la propiedad como un tributo aplicado a la tierra e inmuebles urbanos y especifica que puede utilizarse como un instrumento de las políticas urbanas a fin de promover un uso racional de la tierra que genere beneficios sociales para toda la comunidad. Esta disposición permitió que Porto Alegre emprendiera las siguientes acciones:

• Definir las zonas urbanas prioritarias para el desarrollo y la ocupación. El proceso implicaba la selección de cinco áreas distintas caracterizadas por su alta calidad en infraestructura urbana, equipos y servicios. Estas áreas acogerían una mayor densidad de población sin necesidad de inversiones públicas adicionales.
• Localizar 120 predios vacantes, cuya área oscilaba entre 3.000 y 360.000 metros cuadrados (m2) en las zonas prioritarias.
• Introducir una legislación local que estipulaba el desarrollo de las propiedades seleccionadas en lapsos de tiempo específicos. La ley establecía que si no se cumplía con dichos lapsos para el desarrollo de los predios, se aplicaría progresivamente el impuesto a la propiedad correspondiente. La tasa del impuesto aumentaría en intervalos de 20 por ciento anualmente hasta alcanzar un tasa máxima del 30 por ciento. Las tasas básicas para tierras vacantes varían entre el 5 y el 6 por ciento del valor de la propiedad en el mercado.
• Otorgar prioridad a los proyectos de construcción en los terrenos seleccionados. Las entidades del Ayuntamiento encargadas de los permisos de planificación facilitarían la construcción y la ocupación.

Efectividad de la iniciativa

La legislación fue promulgada a finales de 1993 y el gobierno comenzó a aplicarla en 1994. La propuesta contó con el apoyo de los miembros del Ayuntamiento, tanto los pertenecientes al partido de gobierno como los de la oposición; esta instancia tiene la responsabilidad de aprobar las decisiones en materia de legislación municipal.

A la fecha de octubre de 1997 la iniciativa no ha dado los resultados esperados. Sólo se han desarrollado cinco de los 120 predios vacantes. Los propietarios de 50 inmuebles están pagando el impuesto a la propiedad con una tasa de aumento progresivo. Tres de las propiedades fueron eliminadas de la lista porque habían sido incluidas incorrectamente desde un principio debido a registros inexactos sobre sus características físicas.

No se ha descrito el estado de desarrollo de las 62 propiedades restantes. Algunas pertenecen a terratenientes acaudalados y políticamente influyentes que apelaron ante el Tribunal Supremo contra la constitucionalidad de las medidas aplicadas por el gobierno de la ciudad. De hecho, dos terratenientes (A y B) que poseen casi el 44 por ciento de los terrenos baldíos están apelando y otros terratenientes aparentemente están a la espera de la decisión judicial para tomar sus propias decisiones. (Véase el cuadro.)

Solamente será posible evaluar la efectividad que ha tenido la iniciativa del impuesto a la propiedad en Porto Alegre después de que se conozcan las decisiones judiciales sobre la materia, pero otros beneficios cruciales derivados de la experiencia ya han garantizado su éxito. La legislación ha dado lugar a un debate intenso en el ámbito nacional y local sobre los derechos políticos y privados, los derechos de propiedad y los intereses públicos. La experiencia también ha servido como ejemplo para que otras autoridades gobernantes tomen conciencia de la responsabilidad que tienen de fomentar el uso racional de las tierras urbanas.

En Brasil, los factores culturales y económicos parecen seguir propiciando la especulación con la tierra, en detrimento de las actividades productivas, y la dificultad para establecer límites entre los intereses públicos y los derechos privados es, sin duda, compleja. No obstante, los esfuerzos iniciales realizados en Porto Alegre representan un paso decisivo hacia el control de la especulación privada y el fomento del desarrollo urbano responsable. Otras iniciativas similares en otros lugares ahora tienen mayores posibilidades de convertirse en alternativas viables para lograr justicia en la distribución de los recursos públicos con ventajas sociales para la comunidad.

Claudia M. De Cesare trabaja para la Municipalidad de Porto Alegre y está postulada para cursar un doctorado en el Centre for the Built and Human Environment, de la Universidad de Salford, Inglaterra.