Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 3 del libro Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.

El impuesto brasileño a la propiedad es un gravamen anual administrado por los gobiernos municipales a los propietarios de edificios y tierras urbanas. Si bien los procedimientos para establecer la base impositiva y las alícuotas varían considerablemente, la base impositiva se deriva del valor en el mercado y se estandariza a través de diferentes autoridades municipales.

En la ciudad de Porto Alegre, el método tradicional empleado para tasar bienes inmuebles para fines impositivos se basa en los costos. No existen requisitos legales referentes a lapsos transcurridos entre las valuaciones, y el último avalúo general se llevó a cabo en 1991. En los años en que no ha habido valuaciones, se ha hecho un reajuste uniforme de la base impositiva según las tasas de inflación imperantes. Las alícuotas del impuesto a la propiedad son progresivas, con tasas móviles para seis niveles de valuaciones catastrales a fin de introducir un elemento de “capacidad de pago” en el sistema. El impuesto se calcula sumando cada porción del valor catastral y multiplicando la suma por la tasa respectiva para dicha clase. La tasa máxima para inmuebles residenciales llega al 1,2 por ciento.

Análisis del sistema actual

Recientemente se realizó un estudio del sistema de tributación inmobiliaria en Porto Alegre con la finalidad de examinar la relación que existe entre los valores catastrales y los valores comerciales. A continuación se resumen algunos resultados del estudio.

Nivel de tasación y uniformidad

Se encontró que la valoración media de apartamentos residenciales en Porto Alegre fue de apenas un 34 % de su valor de venta, un porcentaje mucho menor que el nivel regulativo del 100 %. Al aplicar el coeficiente de dispersión (COD) a la mediana de la relación entre el valor catastral y el precio de venta como medida de la variabilidad, se obtienen resultados que reflejan una baja uniformidad de valuación (36 % aproximadamente). En Brasil no existen normativas municipales ni nacionales para evaluar el rendimiento de las valuaciones catastrales. A modo de comparación, un nivel aceptable de uniformidad para viviendas unifamiliares en los Estados Unidos es un coeficiente del 10 al 15 %. En la fig. 1 se ilustra el amplio margen de desviación de las relaciones de valuación identificadas en este estudio.

Factores determinantes de la falta de uniformidad en las valuaciones

Se creó un modelo multivariante para estudiar los efectos simultáneos de los factores determinantes de las faltas de equidad, tanto verticales como horizontales. De esta manera fue posible identificar un gran número de factores responsables por las diferencias sistemáticas de los niveles de valuación, a saber: características del lugar, calidad de la edificación, año de construcción, presencia de ascensores, y otras variables similares. También se halló regresividad de valuación vertical.

Método de valuación

Podemos aseverar que la causa principal de la falta de uniformidad en las valuaciones es el método de costo utilizado tradicionalmente para adjudicar valores a las propiedades inmobiliarias. Algunas debilidades teóricas del método están relacionadas con la gran cantidad de simplificaciones que las autoridades locales hacen para facilitar su aplicación, y es muy posible que las desigualdades se deban a tales ajustes. Entre algunos de los problemas del método del costo figuran la desvinculación que hay entre las tablas de costos y el rendimiento del mercado de bienes raíces, y la baja correlación que existe entre las tasas de depreciación adoptadas y la reducción del precio debido a la edad, caída en desuso o deterioro de las edificaciones. Otro factor que parece haber contribuido a la alta discrepancia en las valuaciones es la falta de un control sistemático en el rendimiento de las valuaciones.

Intervalos entre valuaciones

Claramente, la reducción de la base impositiva se debe al método utilizado para ajustar las valuaciones inmobiliarias, basado en las tasas inflacionarias existentes para los años en que no hubo valuaciones. Por ejemplo, en 1993 la valoración media de las propiedades fue de un 38 % de su valor comercial, pero sólo un 27 % en 1995.

Comparación entre las tasas de impuestos a la propiedad: efectivas y regulativas

Las tasas para propiedades residenciales son progresivas según seis niveles de valuaciones. El cálculo de la tasa efectiva se obtiene a partir del tributo inmobiliario real (sin considerar la evasión fiscal), dividido por el precio de venta. La tasa regulativa se obtiene a partir del tributo por propiedad que se obtendría si los impuestos fuesen establecidos según el precio de venta, dividido por el precio de venta. La tasa efectiva es mucho más baja que la regulativa, y su mediana representa apenas un 0,17 por ciento del precio de venta. La distribución de la carga de impuestos se ha visto afectada por los métodos impropios de valuación, no sólo por la falta de relación entre los valores catastrales y los comerciales, sino también por la clasificación incorrecta de las propiedades. Durante el período del estudio, el monto del tributo inmobiliario recaudado fue aproximadamente un 25 por ciento de los ingresos que podrían haberse adquirido si los valores catastrales hubiesen sido equivalentes a los comerciales.

Tabla 1: Comparación de las tasas de impuesto a la propiedad efectivas y regulativas

MEDIDA TASA (%)

Efectiva Regulativa

Mediana 0,17 0,75

Coeficiente de dispersión 56,87 18,26

Tasa mínima 0,02 0,29

Tasa máxima 1,18 1,15

Causas de las deficiencias del sistema fiscal sobre la propiedad inmobiliaria

La mala administración de los impuestos a la propiedad en Porto Alegre y su ineficacia como fuente de recursos podrían explicarse por factores históricos. Durante los años setenta, el gobierno central y fortunas privadas transfirieron grandes sumas de dinero a las municipalidades para complementar las recaudaciones al nivel del gobierno municipal. Como resultado, las autoridades no se preocuparon por recaudar sus propios impuestos y los contribuyentes se acostumbraron a pagar sumas insignificantes de impuestos a la propiedad. La tarea de procurar un buen rendimiento en términos de valuaciones y un nivel aceptable de equidad de las valuaciones fue relegada a un plano secundario.

Ahora bien, las crisis financieras en décadas recientes y la necesidad urgente de inversiones públicas en servicios y equipos de infraestructura han forzado a las autoridades locales a mejorar sus sistemas fiscales. Sin embargo, los esfuerzos para incrementar los recaudos y la equidad de las valuaciones provocan malestar general debido a la alta notoriedad de los impuestos a la propiedad y a la falta de aceptación por parte de los contribuyentes. Además, cualquier cambio de la base impositiva debe ser aprobado por los miembros de la Cámara de Concejales elegidos por el municipio. Siempre que se hagan planes para una nueva valuación, los miembros del concejo son responsables por apoyar sistemas que establezcan límites con el fin de proteger a los contribuyentes de bajos recursos o jubilados. No obstante, tales límites favorecen verdaderamente sólo a los sectores de altos recursos puesto que las personas de bajos ingresos o jubiladas pueden recibir descuentos según los ingresos que perciban.

Desde 1991, dos propuestas para alterar la base impositiva de Porto Alegre han sido rechazadas por la Cámara de Concejales debido a que la inflación del momento habría determinado los ajustes sobre los valores estimados de algunas de las propiedades. Sin embargo, la falta de equidad de valuación vertical conduce a que los inmuebles más costosos sean los beneficiados del deficiente sistema fiscal inmobiliario.

Recomendaciones

Para mejorar un sistema tributario es primordial conocer a fondo las fallas del mismo. El análisis llevado a cabo en Porto Alegre ofrece un mayor entendimiento del sistema, así como del grado de falta de equidad de las valuaciones y de sus causas principales. Por primera vez se midieron y cuantificaron las fallas y desventajas del sistema, se identificaron las propiedades beneficiadas del mismo y la cantidad de recaudos desperdiciados. Porto Alegre tiene ahora la oportunidad de mejorar su sistema de recaudación de impuestos inmobiliarios utilizando datos exactos y no por conveniencias políticas.

Varias medidas podrían contribuir a aumentar la equidad general del sistema de valuación, y al mismo tiempo mejorar la recaudación de recursos y el nivel de vida de la comunidad; entre ellas se tienen las siguientes:

• Revaluar las propiedades según los valores comerciales actuales. Se pueden emplear métodos de comparación de ventas a fin de avaluar inmuebles residenciales (métodos tales como valor de regresión múltiple, redes neurales artificiales o modelos de niveles múltiples [modelos de jerarquía lineal]).
• Efectuar un control sistemático de los valores de las propiedades avaluadas, incluyendo el pase de pruebas antes de la divulgación de las listas de valores, a fin de identificar y ajustar las desviaciones de la base impositiva estimada.
• Fijar valuaciones periódicas.
• Hacer ajustes de mercado a las valuaciones, basados en estudios de relación para los años en que no haya avalúos.
• Procurar una transparencia total en la administración de los impuestos a la propiedad, especialmente en lo que se refiere a la graduación de la carga impositiva, en vez de anular arbitrariamente los estimados de los valores comerciales.
• Definir niveles mínimos de rendimiento de las valuaciones, tanto en el ámbito nacional como en el local.

Lograr la equidad de los tributos inmobiliarios y mejorar los niveles de rendimiento de los servicios públicos son metas comunes de políticos, miembros de la comunidad y administradores (entre otros). Se debe aprovechar las nuevas tecnologías para evaluar los impuestos a la propiedad y recolectar datos a fin de procurar el funcionamiento justo y eficiente de los sistemas fiscales. Sin embargo, las mejoras técnicas son sólo una parte del proceso; es también crítico ganar la aceptación del público, y para ello hay que concertar diálogos entre los habitantes de la comunidad y los políticos, donde se expliquen las desventajas del sistema actual y las consecuencias de mantenerlo. Al organizar discusiones serias dentro del dominio público, aumentará la confianza colectiva en el sistema fiscal.

Claudia M. De Cesare es consultora del Departamento de Tributación Local de la municipalidad de Porto Alegre. En 1999 obtuvo una beca de tesis del Instituto Lincoln para financiar la investigación comunicada en este informe y en su tesis de doctorado en la Universidad de Salford en Inglaterra. El Instituto Lincoln continúa desarrollando programas educacionales con administradores, políticos, expertos y miembros de la comunidad de Porto Alegre para ayudar a mejorar la equidad y eficacia del sistema de impuestos a la propiedad.

William Fischel is professor of economics and the Patricia F. and William B. Hale ’44 Professor in Arts and Sciences at Dartmouth College in Hanover, New Hampshire. He was a member of the Hanover zoning board for 10 years, and has long served on the teaching and research faculty of the Lincoln Institute. He has written more than 50 articles and three books about the related topics of local government, land use controls, school finance and property taxation. Fischel’s most recent book pulls those themes together under the title The Homevoter Hypothesis (Harvard University Press 2001), and he will discuss them at a course at the Lincoln Institute on April 25.

Land Lines: The term homevoter doesn’t seem to be in any dictionary. What does it mean?

William Fischel: I coined the word to convey the theme of my book. My original title was Municipal Corporations and the Capitalization Principle, but when I tried it out on people their eyes glazed over. I had to think of something catchier, and homevoter popped into my head. In local government elections, residents tend to “vote their homes.” For example, if the school board proposes a tax increase to reduce class size, most homeowners will consider the impact of the taxes and the better school quality on the value of their homes as well as on their personal situations.

LL: What’s the difference between people voting their personal situations and voting their homes?

WF: If people voted only according to their immediate situation, almost every school referendum would be voted down. Since the last of the baby boomers graduated from high school in the late 1970s, only about a third of all American households have any children in public school. If people only cared about whether school expenditures benefited them directly, the two-thirds of voters without kids in school would vote down school referenda and save themselves some taxes. The reason they usually don’t is that they know that scuttling the local schools will drive their home values down. They may not like paying taxes, but most voters will not actively oppose a reasonable school budget.

LL: Why would home values override immediate concerns about taxes, since most homeowners plan to keep their houses for a long time?

WF: For the great majority of homeowners, the equity in their home is much larger than their holdings of stocks and bonds and savings accounts. An owner-occupied home is a huge asset, and it is nearly impossible to diversify the financial risk of holding on to it. People who own a lot of stocks can diversify their holdings by buying mutual funds. But you cannot diversify your homeownership portfolio by buying a tenth of a house in Cambridge, a tenth in Springfield, a tenth in Pittsburgh, and so forth. You are stuck with all your homeownership eggs in one local basket. If the schools are declining, so is much of your investment. You don’t have to plan to sell a home soon to be concerned about its value, just as you don’t have to be ready to retire to be concerned about your retirement investments.

LL: So even people who will never have kids are interested in the quality of public schools?

WF: They sure are, especially when they are buying a house. Many economic studies of housing values have found that the major determinant of house price differences among communities is the quality of public schools. Further, the difference in home values is not reflected in the cost of the structure but in the land value. If your home burned down and you decided to sell your lot instead of rebuilding, the price of the lot would reflect the value of the community’s public assets such as its schools. The structure itself would just reflect the cost of building it.

LL: What other community assets do homevoters pay attention to?

WF: Lots of things, including neighborhood traffic, local parks, good (or bad) views, local air quality, open space, crime rates and public libraries. Like school quality, all of these community characteristics are capitalized in home values if they are better or worse than average.

LL: Capitalized? As in the stock market?

WF: Yes, just as in the stock market. If Merck Pharmaceuticals develops an effective drug to treat cancer, the value of Merck stock will go up. That good news is quickly capitalized in (or reflected in) the price of the stock. If a particular city found a good way to control traffic noise and congestion, the value of homes there would rise. In both cases, the stockholders would be pleased.

LL: How is a city like Merck?

WF: They are both corporations. One is a municipality and the other is a business, but each has a corporate identity that is independent of its owners or residents. The main difference is that a city’s major stockholders, its homeowners, cannot diversify their assets. So unlike most business stockholders, residents pay close attention to what their corporation’s managers are doing. They make managers do their business in the open most of the time, and they make their board of directors—the city council—stand for election more frequently than business corporation boards.

LL: What about the role of other stakeholders, such as local business owners?

WF: Business people are usually behind development plans, and city councils pay attention to them. But in the municipalities where most people live—cities and towns of less than 120,000 population—homeowners have to be persuaded that the proposed development will do them some good. Just creating jobs and lowering taxes is not enough in most places. A job-creating, tax-paying factory whose traffic, noise and pollution devalue the homes of nearby residents will have a hard time getting permission to locate there. Homevoters may not be as active as developers, but they are usually more numerous and vocal, and few city councils can afford to ignore their concerns.

LL: And how do renters benefit from the system?

WF: Renters get the benefit of municipal services that are more consumer-oriented as a result of homevoters’ activism. But renters have a shorter time horizon because when they move they neither gain nor lose from the local improvements they leave behind. This may explain why renters tend to participate in local government less than homeowners. They don’t have the long-term financial stake that even the short-term homeowner has.

LL: What’s the downside of homevoters’ influence?

WF: The downside is exclusionary zoning. Zoning is a necessary tool for local governments to rationalize development. The problem is that homevoters can overuse this tool. Because homes are not a diversifiable asset, homeowners often become risk averse to any development that might reduce their home’s value. The NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) syndrome is most often seen in homeowners, and my theory says they are rational to behave this way. But what is rational for the homeowners in a single community might not be rational for the larger region. Siting low-income housing, power plants, half-way houses and the other necessary but sometimes unlovely developments is impeded by having people too worried about their home values.

LL: Is there a way to control the bad side of homevoting and still keep the good side?

WF: Understanding where the problem comes from is a start. People who oppose low-income housing projects are not necessarily opposing low-income people. They may be mainly worried about their home values. One way to deal with that would be to offer home-value insurance for neighborhoods that feel threatened by proposed land use changes. An innovative program in Chicago offered home-value insurance to help forestall “panic selling” and thus stabilize neighborhoods with respect to both home values and socioeconomic composition. It might be worth extending home equity insurance to other situations in which neighborhood change raises the anxieties of homeowners.

LL: But people have lots of reasons to oppose neighborhood changes besides loss of property value.

WF: It is rare for people to mention property values in public discussions. It sounds too selfish to talk about in a public forum. But economists know that most of the things that people do talk about, such as traffic, noise, open space and service costs, clearly affect people’s home values. Whether owners are consciously relating these characteristics to home values or simply intuitively aware of this connection is hard to say. If developers could take home values off the table in such debates, it might go a long way to overcoming the NIMBY problem.

LL: You mentioned earlier that the quality of community life was reflected in land values. Would this argue for a tax on land rather than improvements in order to finance local services?

WF: I think it does, and in fact that’s what most property taxes really do tax. Local development is a highly regulated activity because of zoning laws, planning reviews and environmental impact statements. I believe that local land use regulation is tight enough to make buildings essentially indistinguishable from land as a tax base. Take the example of the home that burns down. The buyer of the lot typically has to put up another home of the same type, and the tax payment on land and structure will be the same as before. For the most part, owners of homes and businesses in zoned communities have only one allowable use for their land, so that increasing or decreasing local taxes is not going to affect that use. That’s exactly the same virtue as a tax on land. Beyond that, taxing property value gives voters cooperative incentives on the zoning front. Homevoters won’t want to trash another side of town with an unfriendly land use, because devaluing other people’s property would cause property taxes to be shifted to the remaining homeowners.

LL: A land tax is what Henry George advocated more than 100 years ago. Are you saying that the local property tax already is a land tax?

WF: Yes, within certain contexts. It is quite a bit like a land tax in largely residential communities and for most new development. Zoning limits a developer’s alternatives, so the tax rate will not alter his behavior. A general property tax would not be like a land tax, however, if it were administered by a large jurisdiction such as a state or national government, unless those governments also had local zoning controls in place. It is the combination of local zoning plus the property tax that approximates a land tax. Henry George’s ideas came in through the back door of suburban zoning and property taxation rather than through the front door of state and national taxation.

The core competence of the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy is the analysis of issues related to land, and ours is one of the few organizations in the world with this focus.

The Institute’s current work program, both in the United States and in selected countries around the world, encompasses the taxation of land, the operation of land markets, the regulation of land and land use, the impacts of property rights, and the distribution of benefits from land development. This focus on land derives from the Institute’s founding objective—to address the links between land policy and social and economic progress—as expressed by Henry George, the nineteenth-century political economist and social philosopher.

The Institute plays a leading role in the analysis of land and property taxation, land valuation and appraisal, the design of land information and cadastral systems, and the reform and establishment of property tax systems. Work on the operation of land markets includes the analysis of transit-oriented development and research on urban housing and the expansion of urban areas. The regulation of land encompasses work on smart growth and growth management, visualizing density and the physical impact of development, mediating land use disputes, land conservation, and the management of state trust lands in the West. Analysis of property rights includes research on diverse topics including informal markets and land titling in developing countries, the establishment of conservation easements, and the preservation of farmland. Much work is underway on the distribution of benefits from land development, including value capture taxation, tax increment financing, university-led development, and community land trusts that seek to promote affordable housing.

While the Institute’s work in recent years has emphasized urban land issues, it has also addressed problems beyond urban boundaries such as conservation, management of state trust lands, and farmland preservation. A balance of activities across urban and rural topics will persist as the Institute’s work program continues to focus on land issues of relevance to social and economic development. The Institute will not normally address topics that lack a strong link to land policy.

Communicating new findings through education programs, publications, and Web-based products is a core Institute activity. The overarching objective is to strengthen the capacity of public officials, professionals, and citizens to make better decisions by providing them with relevant information, ideas, methods, and analytic tools. The Institute offers traditional courses and seminars, and is moving aggressively to make many of its offerings available on the Web as either programmed instruction or as online courses with real-time interactions between students and instructors. The Institute also develops training materials and makes them available to others, for example through activities in several developing countries that involve the training of trainers in topics such as appraisal and tax administration.

Research strengthens the Institute’s training programs and contributes to knowledge about land policy generally. The Institute supports both mature scholars who conduct groundbreaking research and advanced students who are working on their dissertations or thesis research. The Institute offers several fellowship programs and other opportunities for researchers to propose work on important topics that can contribute to current debates on land policy. The results of this research are regularly posted on the Institute Web site as working papers and are published in books, conference proceedings, and policy focus reports.

Demonstration and evaluation activities constitute the third major component of the Institute’s agenda. Recently the Institute has begun to combine education, training, research, and dissemination in demonstration projects that apply knowledge, data collection, and analysis to the development and implementation of specific policies in the areas of property taxation, planning, and development. These projects are being expanded to include the analysis of policies as they are applied, and to assess and evaluate outcomes in terms of the intended objectives of the policies. The goal is to provide more rigorous evidence about how well and in what circumstances specific land and tax policies achieve their objectives so that information can be incorporated into future research and training programs.

For many years, researchers have puzzled over the causes and consequences of voter-approved tax and expenditure limits (TELs), a fiscal rule that weakens the ability of elected officials to raise revenues or make expenditures.

More than 50 years ago, a slowly unfolding but fundamental process began to transform property taxation in the United States. Because this process took place at the state and local, not federal, levels of government, and because the almost universal adoption of preferential assessment spanned several decades, most citizens are unaware that owners of rural parcels often enjoy such treatment of their properties. As a result, millions of acres of rural land are now assessed far below fair market value for purposes of local property taxation.

These modifications of the property tax began in Maryland in 1957, when the General Assembly enacted an agricultural use assessment law. This statute provides that farm fields and pastures can be assessed below market value as long as they are being “actively used” for agricultural purposes. As evidence of active agricultural use, an owner can document that the property had generated $2,500 or more of annual gross revenue from the sale of agricultural products during recent years.

Several factors prompted dozens of state governments to emulate Maryland and enact use value assessment (UVA) programs during the 1960s and 1970s. First was the massive expansion of U.S. metropolitan regions after World War II, which led to the conversion of tens of millions of acres of farm, ranch, forest, and other rural lands to residential and other nonagricultural uses. Alig et al. (2003) estimate that the nation’s developed area more than doubled between 1960 and 1997, from 25.5 to 65.5 million acres. Rapid urbanization of rural land had come earlier to Maryland than other states because its populations in Montgomery and Prince George’s Counties, near the fast-growing nation’s capital in Washington, DC, quadrupled from 1940 to 1960.

Second, agricultural land on the fringe of metropolitan regions escalated in price during the postwar decades because of its development potential, causing some farmers to face escalating property tax bills because of higher land value assessments. From 1950 to 1971, for example, there was a 330 percent increase in the ratio of farmland prices to net farm income in Maryland (Gloudemans 1974). A study of the two-state, seven-county Kansas City region in the early 1960s found that the proportion of gross farm income absorbed by the property tax in the most urbanized county was four times greater than in the metropolitan region as a whole (Blase and Staub 1971). Hence, adoption of preferential assessment of rural land was often justified as a policy measure to protect family farmers and ranchers from financial stress or even ruin.

A third and more subtle reason for the adoption of UVA programs reflects how the property tax had been administered in many states before 1957. Until that moment in U.S. history, county and municipal assessors had frequently given de facto tax preferences to farmers despite state constitutional provisions requiring uniformity and equality of taxation. These informal assessment practices were intended to provide property tax relief to “deserving citizens,” but often resulted in dramatic differences in assessment ratios among taxable properties within the same community.

The expansion of state aid programs for local governments after World War II exposed some of these discrepancies. Property wealth per resident or pupil often played a major role in determining the formulas used to allocate state grants. Thus, pressure mounted at the state level for uniform local assessment practices to ensure an equitable distribution of state grants. The elimination of de facto tax preferences that had been granted by tax assessors to farmers and ranchers within their communities fueled efforts to gain de jure tax preferences for rural land via state statutes or constitutional amendments.

California was one of the early adopters of use value assessment of rural land. In 1965, its legislature passed the California Land Conservation Act, commonly known as the Williamson Act. The goals of this statute are to preserve agricultural land in order to ensure adequate food supply, to discourage premature conversion of farmland to urban uses, and to preserve agricultural properties for their open-space amenity values.

The Williamson Act enables counties and cities to offer preferential assessment of agricultural land to an owner in return for a contract barring land development for a minimum of ten years. After the first decade of the contract, an automatic extension continues every year unless the owner files a notice of contract nonrenewal. If such a notice is filed, the property’s assessment rises annually until it reaches fair market value and the contract finally terminates after nine years.

Diversity and Extent of Use Value Assessment Programs

With little fanfare in the national media, preferential assessment of rural land has become a central feature of local property taxation across the United States. In California, for example, over 16.5 million acres of agricultural land were subject to Williamson Act contracts in 2008–2009. According to the California Department of Conservation, Williamson Act properties comprised nearly one-third of the state’s privately owned land at the beginning of 2009.

More than 16 million acres of Ohio farmland had been enrolled in that state’s current agricultural use value (CAUV) program by 2007. On average, those acres had been lightly assessed at only 14.2 percent of market value. In December 2011 the Ohio House of Representatives voted unanimously to expand the state’s CAUV program to include land used for biomass and biodiesel energy production.

In New Hampshire, 2.95 million acres were enrolled in the state’s current use assessment program in 2010. These preferentially assessed parcels comprised over 51 percent of the Granite State’s total land area. Since agriculture plays a minor role in the New Hampshire economy, over 90 percent of this undeveloped acreage consisted of forests and wetlands, not farm fields and pastures.

Because economic, political, and legal circumstances vary substantially among the 50 states, it is not surprising that state governments have adopted diverse UVA programs. By 1977, eleven states had implemented programs in which eligible parcels enjoyed automatic enrollment. In another 38 states these programs required owners to file applications for preferential assessment. Nearly all states offered assessments below market value to agricultural land, but only 21 states extended preferential assessment to timberlands and forests.

From a land conservation perspective, the most important difference among the states is that 15 do not collect a penalty if a landowner converts his property to an unqualified use (figure 1). Another seven states levy a percent payback penalty on development of enrolled land parcels. That is, the owner has to pay the state or town a percentage of the parcel’s market value during the year of property development.

Far more common is the rollback penalty, a development deterrent that requires the landowner to pay the difference between property taxes actually paid during recent years of use value assessment and the taxes that would have been paid during those years with market-value assessment (plus accrued interest on that difference in some cases). Twenty-six states utilize this form of development penalty. Economic research has demonstrated that failure to levy a development penalty severely weakens the capacity of a UVA program to delay development of rural land at the edge of metropolitan regions (England and Mohr 2006).

The practice of use value assessment sometimes creates political tension within a community and can even damage the legitimacy of property taxation as a local revenue source. In November 2011, a Wisconsin TV station reported that owners of vacant lots in an upscale residential subdivision had harvested weeds from their parcels and successfully applied for agricultural assessment of their house lots pending construction. This allegation led at least one state representative to call for legislative hearings about abuses of the state’s use value assessment program. According to Rep. Louis Molepske, “It should upset every Wisconsinite because they are being duped by those who… [want] to shift their property taxes to everybody else, unfairly” (Polcyn 2011).

Saving Family Farmers and Rural Landscapes

Have UVA programs “saved the family farmer” as some proponents had originally predicted? Not exactly. During the 1980s, the U.S. farm population fell dramatically by 31.2 percent. From 1991 to 2007, the number of small commercial farms continued its decline, from 1.08 million to 802,000. During that same time period, very large farms (with at least $1 million of gross cash income) increased their share of national farm production from nearly 28 percent to almost 47 percent (USDA Economic Research Service n.d.).

If preferential assessment of rural land has not prevented the decline of family farming, has it slowed the rate of land development in rural America? The evidence on this question is positive, but modestly so. A study of land use change in New Jersey from its adoption of use value assessment in 1964 to 1990 found that the program had a very modest impact on the rate of conversion of agricultural land to urban uses (Parks and Quimio 1996). After her 1998 study of nearly 3,000 counties across the U.S., Morris (1998) concluded that, on average, UVA programs resulted in roughly 10 percent more of the land in a county being retained in farming after 20 years of program operation. After their detailed study of land use changes in Louisiana, Polyakov and Zhang (2008) concluded that an additional 162,000 acres of farmland would have been developed during the five years after 1992 if there had been no UVA program in the state. It seems, then, that UVA programs have slowed down metropolitan sprawl somewhat during recent decades.

Shifting the Tax Burden to One’s Neighbors

Although slowing the rate of land development is an environmental and public benefit of UVA programs, it entails a social cost. When the properties of farmers, ranchers, and forest owners are assessed far below market value, local governments collect fewer property tax receipts unless they raise the tax rate that is levied on all taxable properties. If they raise their property tax rates to maintain public expenditure levels, rural towns and counties increase the tax bills of non-UVA owners, primarily homeowners.

This potentially regressive impact of UVA programs has been known for decades. In its 1976 report on preferential assessment of farms and open space, the President’s Council on Environmental Quality (1976, 6–8) stated clearly that these state programs result in tax expenditures of significant magnitude that redistribute income among taxpayers:

“All differential assessment laws . . . [entail] ‘tax expenditures,’ by means of which the tax bills of some taxpayers are reduced. . . . In most cases, the cost of this reduction is spread over all the other taxpayers. . . . The effect of a tax expenditure is precisely the same as if the taxpayers who receive the benefit were to pay taxes at the same rate as other, non-preferred taxpayers, and then were to receive a simultaneous grant . . . in the amount of the tax benefit.”

The magnitude of this tax shift among property owners can be quite substantial. Anderson and Griffing (2000) report estimates of the tax expenditures in two Nebraska counties associated with the state’s UVA program. The average tax expenditure is approximately 36 percent of revenue in Lancaster County and 75 percent of revenue in Sarpy County.

Dunford and Marousek (1981) have studied the impact of the 1970 Open Space Tax Act (OSTA) in Washington State on the distribution of the property tax burden in Spokane County. Eight years after enactment of the OSTA program, roughly 444,000 acres in Spokane County had been enrolled—about 40 percent of the county’s total land area.

The authors calculate that the revenue-neutral increase in property taxes paid by nonparticipating properties to offset the tax cuts enjoyed by owners of enrolled parcels would equal 1.3 percent. Hidden within this countywide average, however, are huge differences among communities. Although the tax shift to nonparticipating properties would be 1–2 percent in many localities, it would range as high as 21.9 percent in one community. The implication of this and other studies is that granting preferential assessment to rural landowners might help to delay development of their properties, but it might also impose a fiscal burden on homeowners as well as owners of commercial and industrial properties.

Reform of Use Value Assessment Programs

Because many states have had nearly half a century of experience with their UVA programs, this is a good time for state legislatures and tax departments to pause and ask whether this feature of their state and local tax system should be reformed or not. The shift in property tax burden caused by UVA programs in many communities can be justified only if this tax preference serves the broader public interest. The case for reform seems stronger when one realizes that 94 percent of farm households have a net worth greater than the median for all U.S. households.

After the severe downturn in residential and commercial real estate markets in 2008–2010, the rate of conversion of rural land to urban uses slowed in many states, at least for the moment. It might be easier for communities to consider and adopt reforms of UVA programs during this period when many owners of rural land do not expect to sell to real estate developers in the near future. After an extensive review of the research literature on state UVA programs, I recommend the following set of reforms (England 2011).

Those states that do not yet levy a penalty when land is removed from their UVA programs should do so. Unless the owner of rural land faces a penalty at the moment of development, he or she will simply collect the property tax saving offered by the UVA program until the market price of developed land is attractive enough. On the other hand, enactment of a high penalty per acre that declines with years of enrollment in the program could induce the owner of rural land to defer development for years. During those years, land trusts and state agencies have an opportunity to place conservation easements on those rural parcels that deserve permanent protection from development. In an era when few owners of rural land are poor working farmers, UVA programs should help to protect rural landscapes and conserve ecosystem services, not subsidize wealthy landowners.

States should also reconsider three categories of rural land that are eligible for use value assessment. (1) Farm and ranch land should not be enrolled automatically, as is the practice in some states. Rather, landowners should be required to document substantial net income from the sale of agricultural commodities during the previous tax year. This would prevent the owner of idle land that is about to be developed from receiving a property tax break. (2) Agricultural parcels should not be eligible for use value assessment if subdivision plans have already been filed or if the parcels have been rezoned for residential, commercial, or industrial use. If there is substantial evidence that a landowner will soon develop a parcel, there is no reason to continue the UVA tax preference. (3) Forest, wetland, and other nonagricultural parcels should be eligible for use value assessment if they generate public goods such as flood protection, wildlife habitats, and scenic views. On the other hand, barren land with great development potential on the fringe of a metropolitan region should be assessed at market value if it does not produce ecosystem services that benefit society at large.

States should carefully review the income capitalization methods they employ to estimate the agricultural use value of rural properties. The guidelines for estimating the net income of agricultural land and for selecting the discount rate that capitalizes that income stream should be based on sound economic principles and should be presented to taxpayers in a transparent fashion. Because income capitalization calculations are so sensitive to choice of discount rate, that choice needs to be justified and should not be ad hoc. In principle, the risk-free rate of discount needs to be adjusted for inflation, default risk, maturity risk, and liquidity constraints.

State governments should acknowledge that, although their UVA programs generate environmental benefits for the general public, they also impose fiscal burdens on those localities in which private owners of rural land enjoy preferential assessment. For example, California enacted its Open Space Subvention Act in 1972 to mitigate the impact of the Williamson Act on local government budgets by providing state grants to partially replace foregone local property tax revenues. From 1972 through 2008, those subvention payments from Sacramento to the cities and counties totaled $839 million. (Subvention payments were suspended during 2009, however, because of the state’s mammoth budget deficit.)

Since preferential assessment of rural land has become such a central feature of property taxation in the United States, governors and state legislatures need to pause and consider whether these types of reforms would improve the performance of and increase popular support for their UVA programs.

About the Author

Richard W. England is a professor of economics and natural resources at the University of New Hampshire. He is also a visiting fellow with the Department of Valuation and Taxation at the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

References

Alig, Ralph J., Andrew J. Plantinga, SoEun Ahn, and Jeffrey D. Kline. 2003. Land use changes involving forestry in the United States: 1952 to 1997, with projections to 2050. Technical Report. Portland, OR: U.S. Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Research Station.

Anderson, John E., and Marlon F. Griffing. 2000. Measuring use-value assessment tax expenditures. Assessment Journal (January/February): 35–47.

Blase, Melvin G., and William J. Staub. 1971. Real property taxes in the rural-urban fringe. Land Economics (May): 168–174.

Council on Environmental Quality. 1976. Untaxing open space: An evaluation of the effectiveness of differential assessment of farms and open space. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Dunford, Richard W., and Douglas C. Marousek. 1981. Sub-county property tax shifts attributable to use-value assessments on farmland. Land Economics (May): 221–229.

England, Richard W. 2002. Current-use property assessment and land development: A theoretical and empirical review of development penalties. State Tax Notes, 16 December: 795.

———. 2011. Preferential assessment of rural land in the United States: A literature review and reform proposals. Working paper. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

England, Richard W., and Robert D. Mohr. 2006. Land development and current use assessment. In Economics and contemporary land use policy: Development and conservation at the rural-urban fringe, ed. S.K. Swallow and R.J. Johnston. Washington, DC: Resources for the Future.

Gloudemans, Robert J. 1974. Use-value farmland assessments: Theory, practice, and impact. Chicago: International Association of Assessing Officials.

Morris, Adele C. 1998. Property tax treatment of farmland: Does tax relief delay land development? In Local government tax and land use policies in the United States, ed. Helen F. Ladd, 144–167. Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar.

Parks, Peter J., and Wilma Rose H. Quimio. 1996. Preserving agricultural land with farmland assessment: New Jersey as a case study. Agricultural and Resource Economics Review (April): 22–27.

Polcyn, Bryan. Lawmaker calls for hearing after farmland tax loophole exposed. WITI–TV, Twin Lakes, Wisconsin, 22 November 2011.

Polyakov, Maksym, and Daowei Zhang. 2008. Property tax policy and land-use change. Land Economics (August): 396–408.

USDA Economic Research Service. n.d. Washington, DC. U.S. Department of Agriculture. http://www.ers.usda.gov

Nueva colaboración editorial: El impuesto sobre la propiedad y el financiamiento de la educación primaria y secundaria—Un número especial de Education Finance and Policy (Finanzas y política educativa)

Daphne A. Kenyon y Andrew Reschovsky

Consecuencia de la gran recesión, el financiamiento del sistema de educación primaria y secundaria pública en los Estados Unidos ha sido particularmente problemática, dado la estrecha relación entre las finanzas escolares y el tributo sobre la propiedad. A lo largo del país, la caída abrupta de los precios de las viviendas que dieron lugar a la recesión también redujo la recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad. Más del 80 por ciento de los ingresos de las escuelas públicas provienen del impuesto local sobre la propiedad (McGuire, Papke y Reschovsky 2015) y casi la mitad del total recaudado por ese concepto en los Estados Unidos se usa para financiar la educación pública primaria y secundaria (Oficina del Censo de los EE.UU. 2014, Oficina del Censo de los EE.UU. 2013).

Para fomentar nuevas investigaciones sobre estos temas, el Instituto Lincoln de Políticas de Suelo organizó una conferencia sobre “Impuesto sobre la propiedad y el financiamiento de la educación primaria y secundaria” en Cambridge, MA, EE.UU., en octubre de 2013. El número de otoño de 2014 de Education Finance and Policy (Finanzas y política educativa) contiene cinco ponencias de la conferencia, junto con dos trabajos adicionales presentados como parte de la convocatoria para la publicación de este número especial, que fueron sometidos a un proceso de revisión por parte de los colegas de la revista. Nosotros cumplimos la función de editores invitados, trabajando en estrecha colaboración con los editores de la publicación, Thomas A. Downes y Dan Goldhaber. Gracias al financiamiento del Instituto Lincoln, este número especial se puede descargar gratis hasta enero de 2016 en el sitio web de la Asociación de Finanzas y Política Educativa (www.aefpweb.org/journal/free-fall-2014).

Desafíos para financiar la educación primaria y secundaria

Usando los datos de recaudación de fondos del Centro Nacional de Estadísticas Educativas (2014), determinamos que los ingresos totales dedicados a la educación pública, medidos en términos reales por alumno, cayeron un 6,2 por ciento desde septiembre de 2008 a junio de 2012. Aunque todavía no hay cifras totales disponibles para los años más recientes, los datos existentes apuntan a una disminución sostenida en el apoyo financiero a la educación pública. Los datos del Resumen trimestral de ingresos tributarios estatales y locales de la Oficina del Censo de los EE.UU. señalan que los ingresos reales per cápita por el impuesto sobre la propiedad de los gobiernos locales (tanto para fines escolares como no escolares) fueron 2,7 por ciento menores al finalizar el año fiscal 2014 que al final del año fiscal 2011. Y una encuesta realizada por el Centro de Prioridades Políticas y Presupuestarias concluyó que, por lo menos en 35 estados, la ayuda estudiantil estatal real por estudiante fue menor en el año fiscal 2014 que en el año fiscal 2008 (Leachman y Mai 2014).

Muchos distritos escolares del país respondieron a la reducción de ingresos despidiendo a empleados. De hecho, la Oficina de Estadísticas Laborales de los EE.UU. (2013) reporta que entre el pico de empleo en junio de 2009 y el valle en octubre de 2012, el empleo en educación por parte de los gobiernos locales se redujo en 357.400 puestos, lo cual corresponde a una disminución del 4,4 por ciento. En este mismo periodo, la inscripción en la escuela pública creció un 0,9 por ciento (Centro Nacional de Estadísticas Educativas, 2013).

Las proyecciones actuales pronostican un incremento significativo tanto en la inscripción de primaria y de secundaria como en el costo por alumno. El Centro Nacional de Estadísticas Educativas (NCES 2013) proyecta que los gastos por alumno aumentarán de un promedio de US$10.518 en el año escolar 2009–10 a US$12.530 en 2021–22. El NCES también proyecta aumentos sustanciales en la inscripción en la escuela pública, si bien las proyecciones de crecimiento en estados específicos varían, y en general son mucho mayores en los estados del sur y el oeste (8,9 por ciento y 12,7 por ciento respectivamente entre 2010 y 2021) que en el noreste y el medio oeste (2,2 por ciento y 2,4 por ciento). Si bien las políticas y prioridades públicas pueden cambiar dependiendo de las políticas actuales y las proyecciones de recaudación, es poco probable que la recaudación para el sostenimiento de la educación pública crezca con la suficiente rapidez como para ajustarse al crecimiento proyectado en la inscripción estudiantil y los costos.

Los datos nacionales indican que en 2011–12, el 10 por ciento de los ingresos totales de educación pública provinieron del gobierno federal, y el resto se repartió por igual entre fuentes de financiamiento estatal y local (Oficina del Censo de los EE.UU. 2014). Los programas del gobierno federal de apoyo a la educación se clasifican como gastos discrecionales domésticos. Si bien el Congreso ha hecho poco a la fecha para controlar el crecimiento de los gastos en programas de ayuda social, ha impuesto límites estrictos sobre el crecimiento de los gastos discrecionales internos por medio de la Ley de Control Presupuestario de 2011 y el acuerdo presupuestario del Congreso para el año fiscal 2014. La Oficina Presupuestaria del Congreso (2013) pronostica que los gastos discrecionales internos disminuirán, en proporción al PIB, por lo menos hasta 2023. Dados los límites impuestos a los gastos totales, junto con la competencia de otras necesidades internas urgentes, es probable que se produzcan reducciones en el apoyo educativo federal por alumno.

Los sistemas de financiamiento escolar varían mucho entre un estado y otro, y las tendencias futuras en el apoyo estatal para la educación pública también variarán mucho entre estados. No obstante, muchos gobiernos estatales tienen problemas estructurales que a la larga probablemente limiten el financiamiento estatal de la educación pública en el futuro. Por el lado de los ingresos, muchos estados tienen bases impositivas reducidas sobre las ventas, que excluyen muchos servicios y, en consecuencia, no crecen en forma proporcional a la economía. Los problemas de ingreso se ven agravados por la imposibilidad de los estados para cobrar impuestos sobre las ventas por Internet y por correo. En el último par de años, una serie de estados han adoptado recortes en los impuestos individuales sobre las ganancias. Estos recortes de impuestos en general han sido promulgados sin un aumento compensatorio en los ingresos, o se han financiado usando ingresos de superávits no recurrentes del presupuesto estatal.

Por el lado de los gastos, el financiamiento de la educación primaria y secundaria compite con otras prioridades. En muchos estados, los gastos de Medicaid (seguro de salud para las personas sin recursos) crecerán más rápido que los ingresos tributarios estatales, una tendencia agudizada en parte por el envejecimiento de la población. Muchos estados también están enfrentando un considerable y creciente pasivo de pensiones sin dotación financiera. Para liquidar estas obligaciones sin fondos hará falta sin duda aumentar las contribuciones para las pensiones del gobierno estatal. Aun cuando las encuestas indican que los votantes están a favor de un aumento del gasto en educación más que en otras áreas, las obligaciones crecientes en Medicaid y pensiones de los estados pueden reducir los gastos en educación primaria y secundaria, a menos que los gobiernos estatales tomen decisiones políticas difíciles para aumentar los impuestos (Pew Research 2011).

Con esta perspectiva de reducción en el financiamiento de los gobiernos federal y estatal, es probable que los distritos escolares locales jueguen un papel cada vez más importante en el financiamiento de la educación pública. El incremento del financiamiento del gobierno local para la educación pública exigirá que se tome el paso políticamente difícil de aumentar los impuestos sobre la propiedad o, si esto fuera imposible, el desarrollo y adopción amplia de fuentes alternativas de ingresos para el gobierno local. Ninguna de las estrategias será fácil de implementar.

Este sombrío panorama de las perspectivas de financiación de la educación pública da lugar a una serie de preguntas de investigación. Por ejemplo: ¿Pueden los gobiernos estatales adoptar políticas para que el impuesto sobre la propiedad sea más aceptable políticamente? ¿Qué papel pueden jugar las fuentes alternativas de ingreso local en el financiamiento de la educación pública? ¿Puede incrementarse este papel? ¿Es posible diseñar sistemas estatales de ayuda a la educación que se traduzcan en un flujo más estable de ayuda estatal durante los momentos de recesión económica? ¿Se puede aumentar la efectividad de las políticas estatales para proporcionar alivio tributario en el impuesto sobre la propiedad? ¿Se pueden reformar los sistemas de ayuda estatal para aumentar las oportunidades educativas de todos los estudiantes? El impuesto sobre la propiedad y el financiamiento de la educación primaria y secundaria considera esta y otras cuestiones.

Conclusión

En este número especial hay tres temas centrales que emergen. El primero es la posibilidad de que la legislación estatal tenga consecuencias imprevistas. Eom et al. concluyen que el programa de descuentos al impuesto sobre la propiedad (STAR, por su sigla en inglés) de Nueva York induce a los votantes a aumentar el gasto escolar y aumentar los impuestos sobre la propiedad, reduciendo así la efectividad de la reducción fiscal prevista. Jeffrey Zabel concluyó que las exenciones fiscales sobre la propiedad en Massachusetts han causado un aumento de la segregación racial. Y Phuong Nguyen-Hoang determinó que el uso de recuperación de plusvalías en Iowa condujo a reducciones modestas en los gastos de educación.

El segundo tema es la posibilidad de que el financiamiento escolar estatal y las políticas de impuestos sobre la propiedad proporcionen mayores ventajas para los distritos escolares ricos o con mayores ingresos que para los de bajos recursos o con menores ingresos. En algunos casos, el sesgo hacia la riqueza es una característica explícita del programa. Por ejemplo, el factor de ajuste del diferencial del precio de venta del programa STAR desvía una cantidad desproporcionada del descuento al impuesto sobre la propiedad a los distritos escolares más ricos. En forma similar, el sistema de ayuda estatal de Michigan envía alrededor del 7 por ciento más de ayuda estatal por alumno a los distritos más ricos. En otros casos, el sesgo hacia distritos más ricos se manifiesta de maneras más indirectas. Chakrabarti et al. determinaron que los distritos escolares ricos tenían mayor probabilidad de aumentar los ingresos por el impuesto sobre la propiedad como reacción a los recortes en la ayuda estatal. Zabel notó que las comunidades de ingresos más altos tenían una mayor probabilidad de aprobar exenciones a los límites de aumento del impuesto. Nguyen-Hoang estableció que las medidas de recuperación de plusvalías tienen un efecto negativo mayor sobre los gastos escolares en distritos de bajos ingresos o escasos recursos que en los distritos de altos ingresos o gran riqueza. Finalmente, Nelson y Gazley encuentran que los distritos acomodados tienen una mayor probabilidad de recibir ingresos de organizaciones sin fines de lucro que respaldan las escuelas, y que sus contribuciones por alumno tienden a ser mayores.

Un tercer tema es la importancia sostenida del impuesto sobre la propiedad como fuente de financiamiento de la educación pública en los Estados Unidos. Los artículos de Nelson y Gazley, y de Downes y Killeen, demuestran que los ingresos no tributarios juegan un papel relativamente pequeño en el financiamiento de las escuelas públicas. Y no hay ninguna evidencia que demuestre que la proporción de ingresos obtenidos de las tasas y cargos a los estudiantes, organizaciones sin fines de lucro que dan apoyo a escuelas, o de ingresos no tributarios varios haya aumentado durante o después de la Gran Recesión.

Estas conclusiones sugieren que para garantizar suficiente financiamiento para la educación pública en el futuro, se deben hacer esfuerzos para que el impuesto sobre la propiedad sea una fuente más atractiva de ingresos. Estas mejoras del impuesto sobre la propiedad podrían incluir la expansión de programas de descuentos tributarios bien dirigidos y diseñados, como por ejemplo la adopción de “fusibles”, programas de postergación del impuesto sobre la propiedad para contribuyentes que tienen una carga tributaria pesada o sufren un incremento muy rápido en sus facturas de cobro de impuestos sobre la propiedad, y mejoras en la administración tributaria que se concentren en una mayor transparencia.

Dada la gran diversidad en el financiamiento escolar y los sistemas de impuestos sobre la propiedad en los EE.UU. y los problemas fiscales que se avecinan, los artículos de este número especial no pueden cubrir la gama completa de políticas necesarias que aseguren un financiamiento adecuado y equitativo de la educación pública. No obstante, esperamos que estos artículos constituyan un motivo de reflexión tanto para los dirigentes políticos como los investigadores, y que también inspiren investigaciones adicionales sobre la tributación de la propiedad y el financiamiento escolar.

Índice

Introduction to Special Issue on the Property Tax and the Financing of K–12 Education
(Introducción al número especial sobre el impuesto a la propiedad y el financiamiento de la educación primaria y secundaria)
Daphne A. Kenyon y Andrew Reschovsky

Did Cuts in State Aid During the Great Recession Lead to Changes in Local Property Taxes?
(Los recortes en la ayuda estatal durante la Gran Recesión, ¿produjeron cambios en los impuestos locales sobre la propiedad?)
Rajashri Chakrabarti, Max Livingston y Joydeep Roy

Michigan and Ohio K–12 Educational Finance Systems: Equality and Efficiency
(Sistemas de financiamiento de la educación primaria y secundaria en Michigan y Ohio: Equidad y eficiencia)
Michael Conlin y Paul Thompson

The Unintended Consequences of Property Tax Relief: New York’s STAR Program
(Las consecuencias imprevistas de descuentos en el impuesto sobre la propiedad: El programa STAR de Nueva York)
Tae Ho Eom, William Duncombe, Phuong Nguyen-Hoang y John Yinger

Unintended Consequences: The Impact of Proposition 2½ Overrides on School Segregation in Massachusetts
(Consecuencias imprevistas: El impacto de las exenciones a la Propuesta 2½ sobre la segregación escolar en Massachusetts)
Jeffrey Zabel

Tax Increment Finance and Education Expenditures: The Case of Iowa
(Financiamiento por aumento de impuestos y gastos educativos: El caso de Iowa)
Phuong Nguyen-Hoang

The Rise of School-Supporting Nonprofits
(El ascenso de organizaciones sin fines de lucro que respaldan escuelas)
Ashlyn Aiko Nelson y Beth Gazley

So Slow to Change: The Limited Growth of Non-Tax Revenues in Public Education Finance, 1991–2010
(Un cambio muy lento: El crecimiento limitado de los ingresos no tributarios para el financiamiento de la educación pública, 1991–2010)
Thomas Downes y Kieran M. Killeen

Sobre los autores

Daphne A. Kenyon, Ph.D., es economista y fellow del Instituto Lincoln de Políticas de Suelo, y socio fundador de D. A. Kenyon & Associates.

Andrew Reschovsky, Ph.D., es fellow del Instituto Lincoln de Políticas de Suelo y profesor emérito de la Universidad de Wisconsin-Madison.

Referencias

Congressional Budget Office. 2013. Updated Budget Projections: Fiscal Years 2013 to 2023. Washington, DC (May). www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/44172-Baseline2.pdf.

Leachman, Michael y Chris Mai. 2014. “Most States Funding Schools Less Than Before the Recession,” Washington, DC: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, actualizado 12 de septiembre. www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=4011.

McGuire, Therese J., Leslie E. Papke y Andrew Reschovsky. 2015. “Local Funding of Schools: The Property Tax and Its Alternatives,” chapter 22 in Handbook of Research on Education Finance and Policy, revised edition, edited by Helen F. Ladd y Margaret Goertz, Routledge, 376–391.

National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). 2014. “National Public Education Financial Survey Data,” School Year 2010–11. http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/stfis.asp.

National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). 2013. “Projections of Education Statistics to 2021.” http://nces.ed.gov/programs/projections/projections2021/index.asp.

Pew Research. 2011. “Fewer Want Spending to Grow, But Most Cuts Remain Unpopular.” Center for People and the Press. 10 de febrero. www.people-press.org/2011/02/10/fewer-want-spending-to-grow-but-most-cuts-remain-unpopular.

U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2013. Table B-1a: Employees on Non-Farm Payrolls by Industry Sector and Selected Industry Detail, Seasonally Adjusted. Current Employment Statistics, Establishment Data. www.bls.gov/web/empsit/ceseeb1a.htm.

U.S. Census Bureau. 2013. 2011 Annual Survey of State and Local Government Finance, State and Local Government Data. www.census.gov/govs/local/.

U.S. Census Bureau. 2014. 2012 Data, Public Elementary-Secondary Education Finance Data. www.census.gov/govs/school/.

The property tax in Brazil is an annual tax on urban land and buildings administered at the local government level. The tax base is derived from market value and is standardized across different local authorities, although procedures for establishing the tax base and rates vary considerably.

In the city of Porto Alegre, the cost approach is the method traditionally employed for assessing real estate property for taxation purposes. No legal requirement exists concerning intervals between valuations, and the last general valuation took place in 1991. In years without valuations, the tax base has been readjusted uniformly according to prevailing inflation rates. The property tax rates are progressive, with sliding rates for six classes of assessed values to insert an element of “ability-to-pay” into the system. The tax is calculated by the sum of each portion of the assessed value multiplied by the respective rate for that class. The maximum rate for residential property reaches 1.2 percent.

Analysis of the Current System

A recent analysis of the property tax system in Porto Alegre sought to provide a full examination of the relationship between assessed values and sale prices. Some of the results are summarized below.

Assessment level and uniformity

Residential apartments in Porto Alegre were assessed on median at only 34 percent of their sale prices, much less than the statutory level of 100 percent. Using the coefficient of dispersion about the median [COD] of the assessed value to sale price ratio as a measure of variability, the results showed a low degree of assessment uniformity (approximately 36 percent). In Brazil, there are neither local nor national standards for evaluating assessment performance. By comparison, a commonly accepted degree of uniformity for single-family residential property in the United States is a coefficient between 10 and 15 percent. Figure 1 illustrates the ample spread of the assessment ratios in this study.

Factors determining assessment inequity

To examine the simultaneous effects of the factors determining assessment bias, a multivariate model was used to investigate both vertical and horizontal inequities. The model detected a large number of factors causing systematic differences in assessment levels, including location attributes, building quality, building year, presence of elevators and similar variables. Vertical assessment regressivity was also identified.

Assessment method

It is plausible to assert that the method traditionally employed for assessing real property, that is, the cost approach, is a major cause of the lack of assessment uniformity identified in this study. Some theoretical weaknesses of the approach are associated with the extensive number of simplifications implemented by the local authority to make its application easier, and these adjustments are likely to have determined assessment bias. Inconsistencies with the standard cost model include the lack of connection between cost tables and the performance of the real estate market, and low correlation between the ad hoc depreciation rates adopted and the reduction in price caused by age, obsolescence, or deterioration of building structures. Furthermore, lack of systematic control over valuation performance seems to have contributed to the high inaccuracy of assessed values.

Time lags between valuations

The method used to make an overall adjustment to assessed values based on prevailing inflation rates for years without valuation has clearly contributed to the reduction of the tax base. For instance, properties were assessed on median at 38 percent of their sale prices in 1993, but only 27 percent in 1995.

Effective versus statutory rates of property tax

Rates for residential property are progressive according to six classes of assessed value. The effective rate results from the actual amount raised from property taxation, without regard to tax evasion, divided by the sale price. The statutory rate results from the expected tax that could be raised per property, if the tax were established on the basis of sale price, divided by its sale price. The effective rate is much lower than the statutory rate and represents on median only 0.17 percent of sale price.

Improper assessment practices have affected the distribution of the tax burden, not only because assessed values do not bear a consistent relationship to sale prices but also because many properties are classified incorrectly. The actual property tax revenue collected in the period under study represented approximately 25 percent of the potential revenue to be raised if assessed values were equal to sale prices.

Causes of Poor Property Tax Administration

Historical factors may help to explain the current poor administration of the property tax in Porto Alegre and its inefficient use as a revenue source. During the 1970s, large transfers of revenue from the central government and private estates to municipalities complemented the revenue raised at the local government level. Consequently, local authorities were not interested in collecting their own taxes, and taxpayers were used to paying insignificant property tax bills. The achievement of good performance in terms of valuation and an acceptable degree of assessment equity were secondary issues.

Recent financial crises combined with the urgent need for public investment in infrastructure equipment and services have stimulated some local authorities to improve their tax systems. However, due to the high visibility of the property tax and taxpayer antipathy, efforts to recover revenue and achieve assessment equity often result in tax revolts. Furthermore, changes in the tax base must be approved by locally elected members of the Chamber of Councilors. Whenever general valuations are planned, the Council members are responsible for supporting capping systems in the name of protecting the poor and retired taxpayers. However, the capping systems actually favor high-income and wealthy taxpayers because low-income and retired taxpayers can receive relief based on their income.

Since 1991, two proposals for altering the property tax base in Porto Alegre have been rejected by the Chamber of Councilors because the estimated value of some properties would have been adjusted over the inflation rate at the time. However, the existing vertical assessment inequity means that high-valued properties are the ones benefiting from poor property tax administration.

Recommendations on Revising Practices and Attitudes

Knowledge about the weaknesses of a particular tax system is fundamental for its improvement, and the analysis undertaken in Porto Alegre provides greater understanding of the current system, the degree of assessment inequity and its main causes. For the first time, the drawbacks and weaknesses of the system are both quantified and measured, including which properties are benefiting from the system and the amount of revenue being lost. Now Porto Alegre has the opportunity to improve its property tax system on the basis of accurate data rather than political expediency.

Several measures would contribute to the overall equity of the tax system while also improving revenue collection to provide the community with higher standards of living:

§ Reassessment of properties based on current market values using the sales comparison approach to assessing residential property, such as multiple regression analysis (MRA), artificial neural networks (NN), or multilevel modeling (hierarchical linear models – HLMs).

§ Systematic control over assessed property values, including testing before the release of the valuation roll to recognize and adjust for eventual bias in the estimated tax base.

§ Assurance of regular assessment updates.

§ Establishment of market adjustments to assessed values based on ratio studies for years without valuation.

§ Transparency in the administration of the property tax, especially in graduating the size of the tax burden, instead of overriding estimates of market values arbitrarily for this purpose.

§ A definition of minimum standards for assessment performance at the local or national level.

The achievement of property tax equity and the provision of a high standard of public services are common goals for politicians, the community, administrators and others. Public officials need to take advantage of new technologies for property tax assessment and data gathering to make tax systems operate both efficiently and fairly. However, technical improvements are just a part of the process. It is also vital to work on public opinion. An important step is to encourage dialogue between community residents and politicians, showing the drawbacks of the current system and the consequences of keeping its structure. Confidence in the property tax system is likely to increase if revisions are discussed seriously in the public domain.

Claudia M. De Cesare is an assessor in the Department of Local Taxation for the Municipality of Porto Alegre. She received a Lincoln Institute Dissertation Fellowship in 1999 to support the research reported here and in her Ph.D. thesis, which she completed at the University of Salford in England. The Lincoln Institute is continuing to develop educational programs with administrators, politicians, scholars and the community in Porto Alegre to help improve the equity and efficiency of the property tax system.