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Imagínese por un instante que usted es un líder político –un primer ministro, presidente o gobernador– y que se despierta con la noticia de que se produjo un desastre natural. Hubo víctimas, se derrumbaron edificios, la infraestructura está colapsando y los líderes locales necesitan desesperadamente recursos adicionales y soporte.
Usted responde inmediatamente, enviando personal y equipos a la zona del desastre y prometiendo ayuda adicional a los líderes locales. Su país, como muchos en el mundo, ha institucionalizado un sistema de respuesta escalonado, que va incorporando por niveles a los gobiernos regional, estatal y nacional a medida que las demandas de la catástrofe exceden la capacidad de respuesta local. Pero a los pocos días, o incluso horas –incluso antes de haber tratado a todas las víctimas y de haber hecho un recuento de todos los ciudadanos, antes de haber quitado los escombros de las calles y de haber restaurado los servicios básicos– otros líderes y los medios de comunicación ya están exigiendo respuestas a cuestiones que usted no ha tenido siquiera tiempo para considerar. ¿Cuánto dinero se destinará a la reconstrucción? ¿Qué criterios se usarán para guiarla? ¿Se permitirá a todos los propietarios que reconstruyan sus propiedades? ¿Quién dirigirá el proceso? ¿Es necesaria una nueva institución o estructura de gobierno para reducir las trabas burocráticas y acelerar la reconstrucción?
Este artículo reseña las investigaciones en curso sobre el papel de los diversos niveles de gobierno en la recuperación y reconstrucción exitosa después de una catástrofe (tabla 1). Representa la síntesis de dos décadas de investigaciones y prácticas de planificación sobre recuperación después de algunos de los desastres más grandes de nuestra era en los Estados Unidos, Japón, China, Taiwán, Indonesia, India, Nueva Zelanda, Australia, Chile y otros lugares. Su propósito es extraer lecciones comunes en estos ambientes tan diversos y ayudar a facilitar la recuperación de comunidades afectadas por desastres en el futuro.
La gestión de recuperación en el mundo
Los gobiernos responsables de la reconstrucción después de catástrofes enfrentan una serie extraordinaria de desafíos de gestión. El primer desafío es la compresión de las actividades en el tiempo y concentradas en el espacio, ya que ciudades construidas en el curso de décadas, si no siglos, se destruyen o dañan de improviso, y se deben reconstruir en una fracción del tiempo que se tardó en edificarlas. Esta tensión genera un segundo desafío: una aguda tensión entre velocidad y reflexión, ya que los diversos actores del proceso de recuperación en las comunidades afectadas tratan de tomar con urgencia decisiones bien pensadas y meditadas que aseguren recuperación óptima a largo plazo. Estos dos fenómenos generan un tercer desafío: la necesidad de acceder inmediatamente a una gran cantidad de dinero e información, las dos monedas más valiosas en la recuperación posterior a una catástrofe.
Para satisfacer estas demandas, los gobiernos de todos los países crean nuevas agencias de ayuda o reorganizan de manera significativa sus organizaciones existentes después de cada catástrofe importante. La causa más común de estas transformaciones en el gobierno después de una catástrofe es la falta de capacidad. Los gobiernos siguen teniendo que atender sus actividades diarias normales, y al mismo tiempo coordinar la reconstrucción o reinvención de las comunidades afectadas, de manera que crean o designan una entidad que pueda centrarse diariamente en la reconstrucción y coordinar las actividades pertinentes de las múltiples agencias gubernamentales. Estas agencias de recuperación, designadas generalmente para una variedad de propósitos e instancias gubernamentales, se hacen cargo de una gama de funciones esenciales, a medida que se reconstruyen la infraestructura, las viviendas y la actividad económica. Difieren en el tipo y escala de coordinación que brindan; el alcance de su autoridad, especialmente con respecto al flujo de dinero e información; y el nivel de gobierno en el que actúan, ya sea nacional, estatal o intergubernamental.
Los gobiernos nacionales gestionan las catástrofes de gran envergadura al nivel político más alto, movilizando los recursos financieros de las reservas nacionales o de ayuda internacional, y proporcionando el nivel de respaldo necesario a los niveles menores de gobierno en la localidad afectada por el desastre. Cuando se producen grandes catástrofes que transcienden los límites estatales o provinciales, los gobiernos nacionales también adoptan un papel activo en el desarrollo de las políticas de recuperación, y crean organizaciones para asistirlos. Algunos ejemplos son la Agencia de Reconstrucción Nacional de Japón, establecida después del terremoto y maremoto de 2011; la Autoridad de Recuperación del Terremoto de Canterbury en Nueva Zelanda, creada después de la secuencia de terremotos de 2010 y 2011 en Christchurch; y el Cuartel General de Ayuda para Terremotos en China, después del desastre de 2008 en Wenchuan. Cada uno de estos organismos internacionales se atenía a la dirección de la administración nacional, su autoridad derivaba de los niveles más altos de gobierno y articulaban sus políticas con la aprobación de la administración vigente.
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Tabla 1: Experiencias de gestión de recuperación alrededor del mundo
Australia
Autoridad de Reconstrucción y Recuperación de Incendios Forestales de Victoria
Autoridad de Reconstrucción de Queensland
Chile
Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo—MINVU
China
Cuartel General de Ayuda para Terremotos
India
Autoridad para la Gestión de Catástrofes del Estado de Gujarat (GSDMA)
Abhiyan
Unidad de Gestión de Proyectos
Indonesia
Agencia de Reconstrucción y Rehabilitación—BRR
Equipo de Coordinación para la Rehabilitación y Reconstrucción—TTN
Japón
Agencia de Reconstrucción Nacional
Nueva Zelanda
Autoridad de Recuperación del Terremoto de Canterbury
Taiwán
Comisión de Recuperación Post-Terremoto del 921
Consejo de Reconstrucción Post-Desastre de Morakot
Estados Unidos
Corporación de Desarrollo del Bajo Manhattan
Autoridad de Recuperación de Luisiana
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De forma similar, las agencias de recuperación a nivel estatal en general se crean como respuesta directa a catástrofes que afectan una región u otra jurisdicción subnacional. La autoridad y legalidad de estas entidades están más limitadas por la posición secundaria y subnacional de la entidad que les otorga autoridad en el gobierno. Ejemplos de estas entidades son la Autoridad de Gestión de Catástrofes del Estado de Gujarat (GSDMA), creada después del terremoto de 2001 en India Occidental; la Autoridad de Recuperación de Luisiana, fundada después del huracán Katrina en 2005; la Autoridad de Recuperación y Reconstrucción de Incendios Forestales (VBRRA) del estado de Victoria, establecida después de los incendios forestales de 2009 en Australia; y la Autoridad de Reconstrucción del estado de Queensland, establecida después de las inundaciones en Australia en el verano de 2010-2011.
Existe una tercera clase de organizaciones diseñadas para operar entre distintos niveles de gobierno, como la Corporación de Desarrollo del Bajo Manhattan, creada como una asociación entre el estado y la ciudad para planificar y financiar las actividades de recuperación después de los ataques terroristas del 11 de septiembre de 2001 en la Ciudad de Nueva York. Otro ejemplo, la Agencia de Rehabilitación y Reconstrucción (BRR), creada en Aceh, Indonesia, después del maremoto de 2004, consistía en tres agencias independientes cuya composición provenía de una amplia gama de actores locales y nacionales. En forma similar, el Equipo de Coordinación para Rehabilitación y Reconstrucción (TTN) del gobierno indonesio después del terremoto de 2006 en Yogyakarta y Java Central fue diseñado como puente entre agencias nacionales y locales, y también supervisó e investigó los problemas de implementación a nivel local.
En algunos casos, los gobiernos deciden modificar o adaptar instituciones y procedimientos existentes para ayudar a gestionar la recuperación. Por ejemplo, Chile estableció un comité interministerial a nivel nacional después del terremoto y maremoto de 2010, pero el Ministerio de Vivienda y Urba-nismo existente amplió sus funciones y responsabilidades, y coordinó los esfuerzos de planificación e implementación a nivel nacional.
El control del dinero, la información, la colaboración y el tiempo
Considerando estos factores comunes a todos los entornos de recuperación posteriores a catástrofes, nuestra investigación demuestra que la clave para gobernar efectivamente estas crisis de gran envergadura es el control del dinero, la información, la colaboración y el tiempo. Ofrecemos en este artículo algunos ejemplos de buenas prácticas y lecciones aprendidas en nuestros diversos estudios de organizaciones a nivel de país.
1. La gestión del dinero: obtención y distribución de fondos en forma eficiente, efectiva y equitativa para la recuperación
Cuando se tiene que movilizar una gran cantidad de fondos públicos en la reconstrucción después de desastres, el verdadero poder reside en el nivel de gobierno que controla el flujo de dinero y cómo lo adquiere, asigna, desembolsa y audita. A veces, la organización encargada de la recuperación asume algunos o todos estos poderes, y otras veces toda la autoridad de financiamiento reside en el mismo lugar que antes de la catástrofe: las ramas legislativa y administrativa. Algunas funciones importantes en el entorno posterior al desastre son la fijación de políticas y prioridades para asignar grandes sumas de dinero, y el establecimiento de sistemas de contabilidad que permitan el desembolso oportuno de fondos críticos, proporcionando al mismo tiempo transpa-rencia y minimizando la corrupción.
Algunas organizaciones, como la entidad a nivel estatal GSDMA de India, se establecen específicamente para reunir todos los fondos de recuperación en un solo lugar, para poder asignarlos y desembolsarlos más adelante. Algunas entidades, como una de las tres ramas de la agencia intergubernamental BRR de Indonesia, se crean para auditar y controlar en forma independiente los gastos de las organizaciones a cargo de implementar la recuperación. En contraste, la Autoridad de Recuperación de Luisiana, una agencia a nivel estatal, recomendaba las prioridades de financiamiento al estado y proporcionaba supervisión en la medida de lo necesario, pero no tenía control directo sobre los fondos. La Agencia de Reconstrucción Nacional de Japón recibió fondos nacionales y asignó el dinero a los ministerios nacionales y gobiernos locales pertinentes.
2. El aumento del flujo de información: recopilación, integración y diseminación efectivas de información para mejorar la toma de decisiones y las acciones de todos aquellos involucrados en la recuperación.
Una demanda crítica es acelerar y ampliar el flujo de información entre aquellos involucrados en la recuperación sobre la dinámica de las medidas de reconstrucción y las oportunidades emergentes. Este desafío comprende los procesos de planificación y participación pública que proporcionan información a los ciudadanos y las instituciones involucradas en la recuperación, facilitan la comunicación y las innovaciones entre los encargados de la recuperación, y comunican las inquietudes de los ciudadanos a agencias gubernamentales y ONG de manera oportuna. También exige intercambiar información entre organizaciones gubernamentales y no gubernamentales, y establecer foros para facilitar la coordinación.
En Victoria, Australia, después de los incendios forestales de 2009, los líderes nacionales y estatales colaboraron con las comunidades afectadas para formar más de 30 comités locales de recuperación, que tuvieron la responsabilidad de desarrollar un plan de recuperación comunitario e identificar prioridades y proyectos locales. Estos comités fueron utilizados por los gobiernos estatales y el gobierno nacional como puntos focales para la distribución de financiamiento local, y por las comunidades locales para recaudar fondos adicionales y establecer pautas normativas locales de reconstrucción. En Yogyakarta, Java, después del terremoto de 2006, TTN mantuvo mutuamente informadas a agencias locales y nacionales sobre las actividades realizadas por las demás, lo cual, a su vez, ayudó a alertar a los funcionarios sobre problemas potenciales.
Una función crítica, apropiadamente provista por una agencia con respaldo gubernamental, es la adquisición, síntesis y distribución de información básica sobre el daño causado, las actividades de reconstrucción, problemas sociales y económicos con la población, y varios indicadores de recupe-ración. Dichas agencias publican informes periódicos del progreso realizado y controlan los indicadores de recuperación, como lo han hecho tanto la Agencia de Reconstrucción Nacional en Japón y la Autoridad de Recuperación del Terremoto de Canterbury en Nueva Zelanda, usando una variedad de mecanismos de comunicación, como publicaciones en sitios web, comunicados de prensa, boletines y foros. La información frecuente de fuentes confiables puede ayudar a que todos los actores comprendan el entorno de recuperación actual, y también a reducir los rumores y la información falsa.
3. El fomento de la cola-boración: construcción de capacidad y competencia sustentable para una recuperación a largo plazo mediante la colaboración y coordinación genuinas, tanto horizontalmente entre grupos locales como verticalmente entre los distintos niveles de gobierno.
Las agencias jerárquicas organizadas verticalmente, con organigramas claros y canales de comunicación bien definidos, en general no se adaptan bien a la gestión de recuperación después de catástrofes, porque la falta de “conexión” a través de las jerarquías verticales limita la colaboración y el flujo de información nueva y actualizada entre las organizaciones. Las agencias nacionales de los Estados Unidos involucradas en la recuperación, por ejemplo, son más capaces de administrar programas individuales que de resolver problemas complejos que traspasan las fronteras institucionales gubernamentales.
En contraste, las agencias organizadas horizontalmente pueden promover la coordinación entre agencias y compartir información, permitiendo que grupos individuales se adapten a nuevos contextos e información sin perder su dependencia de la organización madre. Si hay múltiples estados o jurisdicciones locales involucradas, es esencial la cooperación entre ellas. La asistencia técnica y la construcción de capacidad en los organismos claves a cargo de la recuperación también son elementos importantes para que las organizaciones locales puedan adquirir la capacidad necesaria para una recuperación a largo plazo.
Después del huracán Katrina en 2005, la gobernadora Kathleen Blanco nombró a los miembros de la Autoridad de Recuperación de Luisiana, de manera que, desde el punto de vista técnico, se trataba de una extensión de la administración estatal. Pero, finalmente, la asamblea legislativa la formalizó. Como entidad bipartidaria por diseño, operaba en forma independiente en su interacción con funcionarios nacionales de los EE.UU. y gobier-nos locales, realizaba recomendaciones de política y supervisaba las actividades de recuperación de las agencias estatales. Si bien su poder se limitaba a realizar recomendaciones de políticas, pudo ejercer una influencia considerable a múltiples niveles en una atmósfera políticamente muy contenciosa. También colaboró con las agencias nacionales para establecer normas de planificación para la recuperación a largo plazo de la comunidad, y ayudó a distribuir asistencia técnica y brindar otros recursos de planificación a escala regional, local y de barrio.
Dado que su poder emanaba de los líderes estatales, la GSMDA en India y la autoridad de reconstrucción de Queensland Australia pudieron coordinar exitosamente las actividades de otras agencias estatales. De forma parecida, el MINVU de Chile y las agencias de recuperación nacional de Taiwán contaban con una autoridad centralizada para poder coordinar las actividades de otras agencias nacionales. Abhiyan, una ONG avalada oficialmente por el gobierno de Gujarat en India, pero sin una autoridad gubernamental definida, también desempeñó un papel crucial en la coordinación del trabajo de cientos de ONG y el establecimiento de una red de subcentros locales para proporcionar información y respaldo técnico.
El proceso de recuperación jerárquico después del terremoto de 2008 en Wenchuan, China, pudo reconstruir edificios rápidamente, pero dejó poco espacio para la innovación local, ya que carecía de una auténtica construcción de capacidad local ni participación en la toma de decisiones. Debido a que no siempre se tuvieron en cuenta las condiciones locales, la recuperación económica parece haber sido dispareja.
De igual manera, en muchas comunidades afectadas por el maremoto en la región de Tohoku de Japón, la recuperación se ha frenado porque el sistema jerárquico establecido bajo el gobierno nacional y la Agencia de Recuperación Nacional no deja espacio suficiente para la innovación local. Más aún, dentro del complejo y poderoso sistema ministerial japonés, la Agencia de Reconstrucción Nacional no tiene poder suficiente para forzar a otros ministerios a tomar determinadas medidas.
Cada vez más, las investigaciones demuestran que si los residentes participan en la planificación de reconstrucción, toleran más las demoras y están más satisfechos con los resultados. Sin embargo, aun el mejor ejemplo de proceso descentralizado necesita de una agencia que la encabece para establecer el marco de referencia y las reglas. Esta tendencia sugiere que los gobiernos deberían resistir el impulso de gestionar los detalles de la reconstrucción, y actuar menos como administradores y más como coordinadores y facilitadores del proceso.
4. El equilibrio en las limitaciones de tiempo: gestión efectiva de las necesidades locales inmediatas y urgentes de la recuperación, sin dejar de aprovechar satisfactoriamente las oportunidades de mejora a largo plazo.
Los gobiernos deben equilibrar las tensiones entre velocidad y reflexión, y entre restauración y mejora a largo plazo. La manera fundamental para resolver estos desafíos es aumentar el flujo de información, tal como se describió anteriormente. Pero las agencias encargadas del proceso de recuperación han encontrado varias otras maneras específicas de ser veloces y al mismo tiempo generar mejoras.
Para acelerar la reconstrucción, frecuentemente hay oportunidades para agilizar los procesos burocráticos normales de toma de decisiones, sobre todo con respecto a permisos de edificación, sin comprometer la calidad. Como estos procesos frecuentemente involucran a múltiples agencias, una agencia de recuperación puede ser útil para facilitar u obligar a las agencias implicadas a cooperar de manera más efectiva.
El parlamento de Nueva Zelanda otorgó a la Autoridad de Recuperación del Terremoto de Canterbury (CERA) y a su ministro, una amplia gama de poderes unilaterales que permitiera una recuperación oportuna y coordinada del área de Christchurch. El Parlamento extendió los poderes de emergencia otorgados bajo la legislación anterior y postergó la fecha de vencimiento de dichos poderes a cuando se considerara adecuado, permitiendo que el ministro adquisiera suelo de forma obligatoria, y consintiendo la suspensión de todos los planes o políticas de uso del suelo nacionales, de los gobiernos locales, y de administración de transporte adoptadas bajo diferentes leyes. Ordenó a CERA que preparara un borrador de estrategia de recuperación en un plazo de nueve meses después de haberle conferido dichos poderes. Similarmente, le fijó un plazo de vencimiento de nueve meses al concejo municipal de Christchurch para crear un borrador de plan de recuperación para el distrito comercial del centro de la ciudad, que se había dañado.
La mayoría de las agencias de recuperación adopta medidas de reducción del riesgo de catástrofes en sus normas de recuperación. Un lema de recuperación común es “reconstruir mejor que antes”. El lema de la Autoridad de Recuperación de Luisiana fue: “Más seguro, más fuerte, más inteligente”. La forma más fácil de mejora después de una catástrofe es la adopción de normas de edificación resistentes a desastres. La incorporación de nuevas normas estructurales no tiene por qué retrasar el proceso de reconstrucción, pero las mejoras en el uso del suelo, como la reubicación de barrios o de comunidades enteras, puede requerir un tiempo considerable para la planificación y adquisición del suelo. Estos proyectos exigen un compromiso difícil entre rapidez, calidad de diseño y participación pública. Nueva Zelanda ha iniciado un importante proceso de compra de barrios que sufrieron graves daños en los terremotos de 2010–2011, y que siguen siendo vulnerables a futuros temblores. Japón está alentando la reubicación de comunidades costeras de zonas sensibles a maremotos, y algunos de estos proyectos tardarán hasta diez años en completarse.
Una manera de gestionar estos objetivos de forma simultánea es respaldar procesos de planificación participativa para crear mejoras a largo plazo mientras se trata al mismo tiempo de satisfacer necesidades inmediatas. En muchos casos, los planificadores profesionales trabajaron con los barrios –como en Japón, Chile, Nueva Orleans y Bhuj, India–, pero cada proyecto también exigió compromisos difíciles para poder cumplir con los plazos. La creación de comités locales para planificar la recuperación en Victoria y Queensland, no obstante, es un buen ejemplo de sistemas estatales y nacionales de respaldo que ayudaron a construir capacidad local para llevar adelante los procesos de reconstrucción a lo largo del tiempo.
Próximos pasos en nuestra investigación
Los gobiernos saben que tienen el deber de gestionar la información y el flujo de dinero entre los múltiples actores en un período de tiempo comprimido. Hasta aquí hemos identificado muchos ejemplos de cómo lograrlo. Pero, mejor aún, quisiéramos estar en condiciones de crear menús de opciones organizativas y de proceso, según lo dicte la combinación de magnitud del desastre y el alcance y los contextos económico, político, medioambiental y gubernamental.
También quedan varias preguntas: ¿Por qué siguen apareciendo los mismos problemas institucionales de una catástrofe a otra? ¿Hay alguna manera de evitar repetir algunos de ellos? ¿Cuáles son los resultados –tanto negativos como positivos– de estas disposiciones institucionales de las que pueden informar a futuros líderes que se enfrentan con desafíos de reconstrucción similares? ¿En qué tipo específico de asistencia técnica y construcción de capacidad de los gobiernos locales y organizaciones no gubernamentales se deberían concentrar los donantes internacionales y los gobiernos nacionales para que puedan mejorar su tarea durante el proceso de recuperación? En catástrofes de gran escala, ¿cómo se escalonan los objetivos entrelazados de una recuperación (reconstrucción de hogares, barrios, ciudades, regiones, naciones) en términos de consistencia, eficiencia y eficacia? Y, ¿qué pasa cuando estas organizaciones creadas para gestionar la recuperación dejan de existir? ¿Queda suficiente capacidad en el lugar para sustentar a la comunidad a largo plazo? Al estudiar las diversas experiencias nacionales y organizativas, podemos comprender mejor cómo el fenómeno de compresión del tiempo en la recuperación después de catástrofes afecta otras teorías de políticas públicas y la gestión municipal; la planificación, el desarrollo y la gestión del crecimiento del suelo; y la administración fiscal y de inversión de capital.
Sobre los autores
Los coautores de Clear As Mud: Planning for the Rebuilding of New Orleans [Claro como el fango: la planificación de reconstrucción en Nueva Orleans] (2010, APA Planners Press), Laurie A. Johnson y Robert B. Olshansky están colaborando actualmente en un libro e informe sobre enfoque en políticas de suelo sobre la gestión de recuperación después de catástrofes. Han estado investigando y practicando la planificación de recuperación después de catástrofes urbanas por todo el mundo durante las últimas dos décadas. Johnson es una planificadora urbana radicada en San Francisco, especializada en recuperación de desastres y gestión de riesgo de catástrofes. Olshansky es profesor de Planificación urbana y regional en la Universidad de Illinois en Urbana-Champaign. Contacto: laurie@lauriejohnsonconsulting.com o robo@illinois.edu.
Referencias
Alesch, Daniel J., Lucy A. Arendt, y James N. Holly. 2009. Managing for Long-term Community Recovery in the Aftermath of Disaster. Fairfax, VA: Public Entity Risk Institute.
Chandrasekhar, Divya y Robert B. Olshansky. 2007. Managing Development After Catastrophic Disaster: A Study of Organizations That Coordinated Post-Disaster Recovery in Aceh and Louisiana. Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
Olshansky, Robert B., Lewis D. Hopkins, y Laurie A. Johnson. 2012. Disaster and recovery: Processes compressed in time. Natural Hazards Review. 13(3): 173–178.
Olshansky, Robert B., Laurie A. Johnson, y Kenneth C. Topping. 2006. Rebuilding communities following disaster: Lessons from Kobe and Los Angeles. Built Environment. 32(4): 354–374.
Smith, G., y Dennis Wenger. 2007. Sustainable disaster recovery: Operationalizing an existing agenda. In Handbook of disaster research (Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research). Ed. Havidan Rodriguez, 234–257. New York, NY: Springer.
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Decades before Henry George made a passionate case for the “single tax” in Progress and Poverty, the classical economists had recognized that, in theory, the land value tax was almost the perfect tax. There was a strong moral basis for the land value tax—land value increased over time because of growth in population and improvements made by the community, either as utility infrastructure or transportation investments by government and the private sector.
Today, many scholars and practitioners question whether land value tax is a serious contender as a revenue source. But, whatever its political potential may be, economists continue to find the theoretical case for land value tax compelling. This article examines the efficiency of the land value tax as well as land value tax as a substitute for other taxes;
Edwin Mills examines the issue of land value tax in the context of an urban economy, showing that the land value tax is indeed efficient in its effects on land use, as claimed.
Thomas Nechyba explores the land value tax in the context of a general model of the entire economy. He develops what is known as a “computable general equilibrium model” that quantitatively describes the changes in the macro-economy that will occur with the substitution of the land value tax for income taxation.
Author of this article, Dick Netzer, argues that, although the empirical evidence on land values is poor, some reasonable estimates suggest that, at least in the United States, the land value tax could replace the conventional local property tax at reasonable tax rates.
Andrew Reschovsky points out that the current balmy climate for state and local finance in the United States is likely to change radically, for the worse. State governments may be looking for substantial additional revenues. Is the land value tax the right, or the likely, choice for hard-pressed state governments?
Roy Bahl reviews the many difficulties and deficiencies in the use of property taxes by local governments in both developing countries and former Communist countries.
Edward Wolff suggests that substitution of the land value tax for the federal individual income tax would make the U.S. tax system less rather than more progressive with respect to income.
Decades before Henry George made a passionate case for the “single tax” in Progress and Poverty (published in 1879), the classical economists had recognized that, in theory, the land value tax was almost the perfect tax. Unlike other taxes, it causes no distortions in economic decision making and therefore does not lower the efficiency of a market economy in allocating resources. Also, it was obvious in the nineteenth century that a tax on the value of land would be highly progressive.
There was a strong moral basis for the land value tax, as well. Land value increased over time because of growth in population and improvements made by the community, either in the form of utility infrastructure or transportation investments by government and the private sector. Individual landowners did nothing to increase the value of their own land but rather realized “unearned increments” over time, unlike those who contributed labor and capital to production and thus earned their compensation.
In George’s day there was little question that the tax could provide adequate revenue, at least in the United States where the role of government was small-no more than a tenth as important relative to gross domestic product as it today. Virtually all government services were supplied by local governments, which relied entirely on property taxes. Today, many scholars and practitioners question whether land value taxation is a serious contender as an important revenue source. But, whatever its political potential may be, economists continue to find the theoretical case for land value taxation compelling.
In January, the Lincoln Institute sponsored a conference to address these issues: “Land Value Taxation in Contemporary Societies: Can It and Will It Work?” In the opening paper, William Fischel focuses on the special nature of local government in this country, stressing its importance as an instrument of enhancing property values within communities. He argues that, in pursuing that role, local land use controls actually achieve substantial efficiency advantages by more closely matching consumer preferences to local government services and taxes. This is what economists refer to as the Tiebout-Hamilton model.
Fischel maintains that there is substantial justice in this outcome, which might be improved only marginally by land value taxation. That is, land use controls permit local governments to appropriate much of the value generated by community growth. Moreover, this system is widely used, which argues that it is more workable than land value taxation, although the latter is, in principle, more fair.
Efficiency of the Land Value Tax
Two papers treated the efficiency characteristics of the land value tax. Edwin Mills examines the issue in the context of an urban economy, showing that the tax is indeed efficient in its effects on land use, as claimed. But he believes that this is immaterial because the land value tax cannot yield more than trivial revenues, even at rates that are so high that the courts would find them to be an unconstitutional “taking” of property. Moreover, it is so difficult to value land properly that the efficiency advantages cannot be realized.
Thomas Nechyba explores the land value tax in the context of a general model of the entire economy. He develops what is known as a “computable general equilibrium model” that quantitatively describes the changes in the macro-economy that will occur with the substitution of the land value tax for income taxation. Given his assumptions, the model predicts that the reduction in taxation of capital will so increase the aggregate amount of capital that the demand for land on which to use the capital will generate substantial increases in land values. That in turn will permit the land value tax to generate considerable revenues at a rate that is not confiscatory. Most economists would consider the significant increases in total national output predicted by the model to be real gains in economic efficiency.
Land Value Taxation as a Substitute for Other Taxes
Another pair of papers examines the land value tax as a substitute for other taxes used by sub-national governments in rich countries. In my own paper I argue that, although the empirical evidence on land values is poor, some reasonable estimates suggest that, at least in the United States, the land value tax could replace the conventional local property tax at reasonable tax rates. But the main thrust of my argument is that those rich countries in which substantial government spending is done by local governments are the most plausible candidates for the use of the land value tax (see Table 1). Furthermore, its use is probably most feasible in those countries familiar with the idea of valuing real property for tax purposes. The combined administrative, compliance and evasion costs of most other taxes are so large that, even if the administrative costs of land value taxation are high, land value taxation is still promising.
Andrew Reschovsky points out that the current balmy climate for state and local finance in the United States is likely to change radically, for the worse, in the not too distant future. For a variety of reasons, state governments in particular may be looking for substantial additional revenues. Is the land value tax the right, or the likely, choice for hard-pressed state governments? He concludes, first, that the economic gains from the adoption of a new land value tax would be modest, compared to increasing the rates of existing state taxes. Second, a land value tax should help improve the equity of the state tax system. Third, he believes that it would add an element of cyclical stability to state revenue systems.
Nevertheless, Reschovsky remains skeptical about the tax on administrative grounds and is not convinced that it can generate enough revenues to replace any important existing state tax source. In the case of large central cities, however, he rates the land value tax somewhat higher as a replacement for existing tax sources, largely because of the probable lack of adverse locational effects. He views it as especially appropriate for those cities like Philadelphia that now receive relatively small percentages of tax revenue from the property tax.
Roy Bahl reviews the many difficulties and deficiencies in the use of property taxes by local governments in both developing countries and former Communist countries. There is widespread agreement that the property tax is the appropriate major local government tax, and in some countries this agreement extends to site value taxation as well. But, Bahl notes, the property tax usually provides negligible revenues, because of low nominal rates, low and inaccurate valuations, and poor collection experience. Almost everywhere, the basic requisites of good administration are lacking. Moreover, the political unpopularity of the tax generally is far greater than in the United States. Nonetheless, the property tax, especially the site value tax variant, is considered the best local revenue source in these countries.
Perhaps the most surprising research finding reported at the conference was the conclusion of Edward Wolff, who has written extensively on the distribution of income and wealth in the United States. He suggests that substitution of the land value tax for the federal individual income tax would make the U.S. tax system less rather than more progressive with respect to income (see Table 2). This result may be explained by the fact that the ratio of the value of land owned to household income rises steeply with the age of the householder. That is, mean household income declines sharply with age after age 54, while the mean value of land owned declines only slowly. On the other hand, a land value tax would be much more progressive with respect to wealth than is the income tax.
Broader Principles and Questions
Nicolaus Tideman, a convinced follower of Henry George, argues that the basic principles of and justifications for land value taxation apply to much more than the problems of land use in cities and suburbs-the usual focus for discussion of this form of taxation. He offers applications to environmental, congestion and population problems and to questions of efficient resource use and economic growth on a worldwide scale. He bases his views on the general principle that “all persons have equal rights to natural opportunities and should therefore pay for their above-average appropriations of natural opportunities.”
Throughout the conference, there was lively disagreement about whether the land value tax could really produce substantial revenues. Some, like Mills, held that it could not even replace the conventional American property tax on land and buildings, much less a substantial portion of other state and local taxes as well. Others, including Tideman, Nechyba and I, presented data that suggested the possibility that land value taxation indeed could be an important factor in the American fiscal system. Participants also discussed the problems of administering a land tax so that tax liabilities actually and accurately reflect the value of individual parcels of land as bare sites, which is essential if the tax is to be a truly efficient one.
The conferees did not produce an agreed answer to the basic conference question, Can and will land value taxation work today? But they made it clear that the question remains a relevant one that deserves serious and continuing attention.
Dick Netzer is professor of economics and public administration in the Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service at New York University. He was the conference coordinator and is the editor of a book containing the eight conference papers and the remarks of the formal discussants, which will be published by the Lincoln Institute later this year.
Land Value Taxation in Contemporary Societies: Can It and Will It Work?
Authors of Conference Papers
Roy Bahl, Professor of Economics and Dean, School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University
William A. Fischel, Professor of Economics, Dartmouth College
Edwin Mills, Professor of Real Estate and Finance, Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University
Thomas Nechyba, Professor of Economics, Stanford University
Dick Netzer, Professor of Economics and Public Administration Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service New York University
Andrew Reschovsky, Professor of Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison
Nicolaus Tideman, Professor of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic University
Edward Wolff, Professor of Economics, New York University
Discussants
Alexander Anas, Professor of Economics, State University of New York at Buffalo
Daniel Bromley, Professor of Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison Karl Case, Professor of Economics, Wellesley College
Riel Franzsen, Professor of Mercantile Law, University of South Africa
Yolanda Kodrzycki, Economist, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
Daphne Kenyon, Professor of Economics, Simmons College
Therese McGuire, Professor of Economics, Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of Illinois-Chicago
Amy Ellen Schwartz, Professor of Economics, Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service New York University
Robert Schwab, Professor of Economics, University of Maryland
Robert Solow, Professor of Economics, Emeritus, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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Recent court decisions have made economic development and tax policy front-page news. The recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Kelo v. City of New London raised a public outcry when it allowed local governments dramatic latitude in acquiring private property for economic development purposes. This case had a fiscal aspect as well, for it illustrated how financial pressures can lead local governments to seek alternatives to direct investment for economic revitalization and redevelopment.
Economic development was also the focus of a major lower court decision on state tax policy. In Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals found that Ohio’s investment tax credit, intended to attract businesses from other states, violated the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution (Hellerstein 2005). These and other, similar cases raise many questions about the connections between economic development and tax policy.
Is there a relationship between economic development and infrastructure spending?
Infrastructure, that vast network of capital-intensive services including roads, water provision, sewer services, and electrical supply, is critical to current and future economic activity. However, serious economic examination of the link between infrastructure spending and economic productivity only began in the late 1980s. Aschauer (1989, 194–197) argued that declining infrastructure spending resulted in less economic growth. More recently, Bougheas et al. (2000, 520) reported findings that “highlight the importance of infrastructure accumulation” for productivity gains.
Other researchers have pointed out that the most significant recent changes in infrastructure spending have occurred at the state and local levels, rather than the federal level. Gramlich (1994, 1178) argued that federal infrastructure spending has been fairly consistent over time, but state and local spending has decreased. Holtz-Eakin (1993) cautioned that while public expenditures on infrastructure may be important, they may not directly affect economic productivity. He argued that differing state and local needs may account for many infrastructure spending disparities, and that maintenance of existing infrastructure assets may be more important than new spending for capital acquisition. Boarnet (1997) considered efficient pricing for infrastructure use as important as its actual provision.
Nevertheless, the American Society for Civil Engineers (ASCE) is sufficiently concerned about the condition of infrastructure in the U.S. to assign it a grade of “D.” ASCE (2005) argues that the country needs to spend about $1.6 trillion over the next five years to improve the situation.
What is the relationship between infrastructure spending and local tax systems?
The mechanisms for funding infrastructure and its role in state and local spending are complex. Research in this area deals with such topics as fiscal illusion (i.e., when the complexity of the revenue system obscures the true cost of public goods and services) and specific capital financing strategies used to fund infrastructure. However, there has been little research on the impact of local tax structures on infrastructure spending.
Economists have long argued that the value of publicly provided goods and services, such as infrastructure and its maintenance, are reflected in the value of the property served by those goods. Accordingly, a tax that captures the value of these public goods and services may be an important revenue source for funding them. However, in the last 30 years, local governments have moved away from such a tax, the property tax, to other sources of revenue. In many communities, this shift has produced an increased reliance on state aid, local sales tax revenues, and user fees.
In analyzing infrastructure spending in Utah, it is clear that the local revenue structure affects per capita operating and maintenance spending and new capital acquisition expenditures. Preliminary analysis indicates that communities are more likely to increase per capita infrastructure spending when it is financed by property taxes, all other funding sources held constant. It also appears that as per capita sales tax revenue increases, per capita spending for infrastructure services declines.
How constrained are local revenue systems?
One reason that local government revenue structures affect spending on infrastructure is that the states impose various constraints on local revenue sources. Although the past ten years have seen no dramatic changes in the roles of the property tax, intergovernmental aid, or the sales tax in overall local government revenues, the ratio of total revenues to personal income has fallen about 7.5 percent. This real decline highlights the increasing pressure on local governments to identify new revenue sources.
Yet, local governments face serious constraints when they seek to change their revenue systems. States impose intergovernmental restrictions, such as limits on sales tax rates that localities can impose. Less tangible but equally important is political opposition to tax increases. The third factor is the set of tax and expenditure limitations that many states have enacted, ranging from Proposition 13 in California in 1978 to the more recent taxpayer bill of rights enacted in Colorado, which drastically limited increases in government spending.
These constraints have forced local governments to become more innovative in their revenue-raising methods. An entire cottage industry of financial advisors, bond attorneys, and other public and private sector innovators has emerged to help local governments find ways of loosening or circumventing these limitations. Some strategies may have increased economic efficiency, although they give rise to equity concerns (for example, the movement toward the increased use of fees and charges); others are nearly invisible to the taxpayer. In nearly all cases, local governments have been seeking to use land as a revenue-generating device—a trend that shows no sign of abating.
What are alternative ways to finance capital infrastructure?
Two types of debt traditionally have financed infrastructure projects: general obligation (GO) bonds, backed by the full faith and credit of the issuing locality; and revenue bonds, backed by income from the capital project. Both types of debt have significant restrictions on their use, such as voter approval requirements and caps on maximum indebtedness. These debt limitations, the difficulty in raising property taxes, and the fear of political opposition have increased the use of alternative capital finance methods based on land use.
One longstanding method, tax increment financing (TIF), utilizes the increases in property value to help finance redevelopment projects. Originally designed as a financial instrument to eliminate blight and provide affordable housing, this instrument has become increasingly popular in many states for a variety of projects. Forty-seven states and the District of Columbia now allow this technique.
Capturing the property tax increment attributable to government-sponsored redevelopment in order to service this debt makes economic sense if the new development would not have occurred without the formation of the tax district. Moreover, this debt does not have to be approved by voters, but rather by a group designated by the city government. Not even these two factors explain the extraordinary recent growth in the number and size of TIF districts, however, raising suspicion that this tool may be used more often to attract and subsidize economic growth than to eliminate blight. For example, in 2003–2004, California had 33 TIF redevelopment projects, each of which covered more than 6,000 acres, a surprisingly large area to be declared “blighted” in any one jurisdiction (see Figure 1).
Another popular tool in several states is the community facilities district (CFD), which usually funds new development. Landowners within a region form a CFD to issue debt to finance the infrastructure needed to develop raw land. District members’ votes are typically a function of the amount of property each landowner holds. The local government must approve CFDs, although they are not a formal part of the government and their debt issuance is not subject to approval by the general public.
A lien for CFD assessments is placed on each lot in the district, and the CFD tax liability appears on the property tax bill of each district member as a separate line item. Variations of this technique may utilize sales taxes, impact fees, and user charges. Many rapidly growing local governments encourage the formation of these districts to help finance their community’s growth. Nevertheless, CFDs can be very complex, and may fail if anticipated growth does not occur (see Figure 2).
TIFs, CFDs, and other such techniques present an ethical dilemma to local government. Sometimes they are not fully understood by the political decision makers who authorize their use, let alone by members of the general public who will bear the burden of paying this debt in the future. Yet they remain a popular tool to finance crucial infrastructure that is basic to improving the economic well-being of the community.
Could a land tax help finance infrastructure for economic development?
The land component of property value is another potential source of revenue to encourage economic development. Since the supply of land is fixed in the short run, an increase in a land tax will not affect the tax base. However, it will encourage more intensive use of the land and may slow urban sprawl. Unfortunately, the lack of empirical data makes it difficult to determine if this theory is accurate. One example in the U.S. is the City of Pittsburgh, which in 1979–1980 restructured the tax on land to be five times that on improvements. Building activity showed a dramatic increase, although other factors may have contributed to the change as well (Oates and Schwab 1997). Pittsburgh later returned to a single-rate property tax system.
Increased use of a land tax poses significant problems. In particular, accurately assessing land can be challenging, although statistical and econometric techniques may help address this in the future. A second concern is that more intensive use of land value taxation will lead to denser development, exacerbating many of the problems associated with congestion. These effects must be weighed against the positive benefits of reducing long-distance commuting. A third problem concerns equity. Owners whose property has a high land/improvement ratio will face an increased tax liability. This shift might be mitigated by adjustments in the tax rate, special exemptions or targeted tax credits.
A land tax has the important advantages of transparency and accountability. In particular, if land value increases because of government activities, there is strong justification for recovering at least some of those costs through a tax on the land component. We would even propose a name for this additional tax—a positive externality tax (PET). We recognize that, like any proposed increase in the property tax, such a shift would be politically controversial.
Conclusions
Our current research analyzes relationships among economic development, infrastructure, and the tax system. The fiscal problems of local jurisdictions are made more complex by the use of intricate methods of infrastructure financing, such as TIFs and CFDs, to fund economic development. The use of financing mechanisms based on a land tax may be one part of a potential response to this challenge.
Jeffrey Chapman is professor and director of the School of Public Affairs at Arizona State University in Tempe. He specializes in state and local finance and administration of financial resources, and has recently published in the area of local land use responses to fiscal stress.
Rex L. Facer II is assistant professor of public management at the Romney Institute of Public Management of the Marriott School of Management at Brigham Young University in Provo, Utah. He specializes in city management, public finance, public management strategy, and public policy analysis.
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As the U.S. housing market experiences its largest contraction since the Great Depression, the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy and the Urban–Brookings Tax Policy Center took a closer look at the consequences of this crisis for state and local governments in a May 2010 conference. A major theme of the discussion was the fallibility of conventional wisdom. For example, some participants questioned whether easy credit was in fact the cause of the housing bubble and thus to blame for the subsequent loss of state and local tax revenues. Papers presented at the conference document the complexities researchers face in determining the causes and lessons of this crisis.
The Housing Market Boom and Bust
According to Byron Lutz, Raven Molloy, and Hui Shan, house prices at the national level increased by 64 percent from 2002 to 2006, before falling nearly 30 percent over the following four years. From 2006 to 2009, existing home sales dropped 36 percent and the number of newly constructed homes fell 75 percent. Could we have seen it coming? Was the housing market bust predictable? Yes, according to Yolanda K. Kodrzycki and Robert K. Triest, but only by looking at state-level data.
Conventional wisdom held that while house prices could fall in specific markets, national housing prices would not decline. This had been the historical pattern, although some markets, for example the Boston and Los Angeles metropolitan areas, experienced declines in the 1990s after strong increases in housing prices. Other areas, such as Detroit, had been declining or stagnant even when the country as a whole experienced consistent upward movement in house prices.
Much of the modeling and analysis of the housing crisis has used national-level data, which provided insufficient evidence to measure the peak of the housing bubble. Since economic cycles are more apparent at the state level and can act as early warning signs of housing trouble on a national scale, analyzing state data collectively can improve national forecasts.
Nevertheless, even the ability to recognize a housing bubble does not provide an easy prescription for preventing a crisis. Previous episodes of state-level housing price declines show that booms do not necessarily end in busts, Kodrzycki said. Rather, downturns are closely related to economic cycles. In most cases housing prices did not fall until after a recession had begun within a region—a pattern that is different from the current crisis.
The cause of the housing bubble is a crucial and unsettled question. Many economists have argued that easy credit was responsible, but Edward L. Glaeser disputed that view in a paper written with Joshua Gottlieb and Joseph Gyourko. Widely available credit and low interest rates do encourage more people to buy homes, increasing demand and raising housing prices. “This goes along with an older view,” Glaeser said, “that interest rates are very powerful in determining housing prices. There is some truth to that, but I think…those claims are overblown. Certainly the changes in the credit market can’t explain what we went through.”
Between 1996 and 2006, real housing prices rose by 42 percent, according to the Federal Housing Finance Agency price index. Glaeser and his colleagues found that low interest rates can likely explain only one-fifth of that increase. Other factors, including an elastic housing supply and credit-constrained homebuyers, can mute the effect of interest rates on prices. Buyers contemplating future moves or refinancing can take those factors into account when deciding how much to pay for a home. If the link between interest rates and house prices is smaller than expected, that knowledge can inform future federal housing policies and estimates of their effects on the housing market.
Impacts on State Revenues
State revenues plummeted in the recession, leading to record-high budget shortfalls just as demand for public services was growing. Inflation-adjusted state tax revenue fell nearly 15 percent during the downturn—the biggest drop in more than 50 years.
Donald Boyd noted that many of the first states to see their tax revenues decline also had been hit hard and early by the housing downturn. Arizona experienced its revenue peak in 2005, and by 2009 its real per capita tax revenue fell by 23.5 percent. Meanwhile, housing prices in Arizona tumbled 19.7 percent from 2006 to 2008.
States that were spared the worst of the housing crisis did not see revenue losses until the recession was in full swing. Texas had a 7.4 percent increase in housing prices from 2006 to 2008. Its tax revenues did not peak until late in 2008; roughly a year later, however, Texas saw its revenue drop by 17.5 percent.
Steven Craig and Edward Hoang examined how state government expenditures and taxes fluctuate with changes in underlying economic activity. They found that in general state responses initially tend to lag behind changes in gross state product, but in the long run states tended to overadjust to economic shocks.
Boyd found that in response to their budget gaps states cut spending in 2009 and 2010 primarily through furloughs and layoffs, and by stretching out payments of obligations into the future. States also cut grants to local governments, according to Howard Chernick and Andrew Reschovsky, who examined whether state budget crises lead to greater tax competition between states and their large cities. They find that in the long run cities with diversified revenue will be in a stronger fiscal position, but in the short run own-source revenue has declined more in cities with a diversified tax base (due in part to the strength of property tax). They also find that state aid is highly stimulative, but that increases in states sales tax rates will make it more difficult for cities to increase their sales taxes. The authors conclude that the current economic downturn will force significant public service reductions for large central cities.
Rachana Bhatt, Jonathan Rork, and Mary Beth Walker examined how higher education fared during the recession. While there have been highly publicized cuts in funding for higher education from general revenues, the overall level of expenditures for higher education has increased from 1996 to 2008. The authors find that across the business cycle states tend to substitute earmarked support for higher education (whether in the form of federal grants, lottery revenues, or other special accounts) for general fund support.
Federal stimulus spending in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) helped boost state budgets and mitigate cuts in state aid to local governments, but those funds are set to expire in 2011. Boyd examined earlier recessions and found that the declines in state revenues have been more extreme this time. The good news, Boyd said, is that state tax revenue declines are showing signs of slowing and local revenues have not yet declined in aggregate.
“We might be stabilizing,” Boyd said. But, “it’s going to be a long ways before states are likely to have the capacity to finance the kinds of spending programs they have had…which means a lot of budgetary pain ahead still.” Indeed, the stabilization of state revenues on average was due in large part to tax increases in only two states, New York and California. Boyd predicts that it will be some time before other state revenues return to prerecession levels.
But, was this damage caused by the housing crisis? The recession may have been sparked by failing subprime mortgages, but it was fueled by overleveraged financial institutions—turning a housing slump into a global economic downturn. Lutz, Molloy, and Shan sought to separate the effects of the housing downturn on state and local tax revenues from the broader impact of the recession. They identified five main revenue streams that are influenced by the housing market: property tax revenues; transfer tax revenues; personal income tax revenues (related to construction and real estate jobs); direct sales tax revenues (through construction materials); and indirect sales tax revenues (when homeowners adjust their overall spending in response to changes in property value).
Property tax revenues remained high, and even grew in some states. The other four revenue streams declined, but had only a modest effect on overall state and local tax revenues. Lutz, Molloy, and Shan estimated that the combined decreases from these four revenue streams reduced total state and local tax revenues by $15 billion from 2005 to 2009, which is about 2 percent of state and local tax revenues in 2005. They found that in aggregate housing-related declines are responsible for only a fraction of the overall decline. Widespread unemployment and shrinking family incomes are more significant in cutting personal income and sales tax revenue. Thus, while the housing market and the economy are closely intertwined, the severe drop in state tax revenues can largely be attributed to the broader economic downturn, not the housing crisis specifically.
Local Governments and Property Taxes
As state revenues fell, local government revenues as a whole continued to grow because property tax revenue, which stayed strong in the recession, supported municipal budgets. States typically rely on income and sales taxes, which are more volatile than the property taxes that largely fund local governments. From 2007 to 2009, corporate and individual income tax revenue declined rapidly and sales tax revenue fell—but property taxes grew (figure 1).
In most states, housing price declines are not immediately reflected in assessed property values, and that lag makes property taxes a fairly resilient source of revenue. Also, policy makers tend to offset declines by raising tax rates (figure 2). James Alm and David L. Sjoquist backed these findings with their study of national trends in property tax collections. Although experiences varied among cities, they noted that local governments’ reliance on property taxes has been an advantage, allowing them to avoid some of the more severe effects of the recession.
Variable Effects in Selected States
While the conference focused on national trends, a recurrent theme was the dramatically variable experience of specific states and regions. Bruce Wallin and Jeff Zabel examined the effects of an earlier decline in Massachusetts house prices in the aftermath of a tax limit. Proposition 2½, passed in 1980, is a voter initiative that limits property tax levies (to 2½ percent of assessed values) and limits revenue growth to 2½ percent per year. There are exceptions for new growth, and Proposition 2½ does allow local voters to pass overrides to increase the growth percentage. Wallin and Zabel found property tax revenues overall did grow 4.58 percent between fiscal year 1981 and fiscal year 2009, largely due to these exceptions. A maximum of 547 overrides were proposed in 1991, but as few as 51 in 1999. However, poorer towns have been less likely to approve tax increases, relying instead on spending cuts, and leading to a growing gap between poor and wealthy towns over time.
Michigan, already struggling with the loss of manufacturing jobs, provides another striking case study. Poverty and unemployment rates there are higher than the U.S. average. In Detroit, housing prices plummeted—the average home cost $97,850 in 2003, but dropped to a remarkable low of $11,533 by 2009. Mark Skidmore and Eric Scorsone found that in the recession Michigan cut spending on recreation programs and delayed capital projects and infrastructure maintenance. That strategy may be effective in the short run, Skidmore said, but will likely result in higher costs down the road. He suggested that a similar fate might be in store for Las Vegas or cities in Arizona, which also experienced severe housing price declines.
Local governments in Florida and Georgia have remained fairly stable, so far. Florida experienced a tremendous increase in house prices from 1994 to 2006, before the housing market decline caused prices to fall across the state. William M. Doerner and Keith Ihlanfeldt found that city revenues in Florida rose during the housing boom, but not solely as a result of increased property values, and those revenues have stayed fairly strong following the drop in house prices. Alm and Sjoquist reported that property tax revenues in Georgia rose slightly between 2008 and 2009, while property values declined. Local governments, in many cases, maintained collections by increasing the tax rate.
What the Housing Crisis Means for Children
The housing crisis inflicted enormous costs on individuals, communities, and governments. Residents have been hurt by foreclosures and tremendous losses in property values (box 1). Vacant, deteriorating homes have weakened neighborhoods. The children caught up in the housing crisis face uncertain living situations and may have to transfer from school to school. Although researchers know these changes can harm children, they do not yet fully understand how this crisis is affecting students and schools.
David Figlio, Ashlyn Aiko Nelson, and Stephen Ross are studying how foreclosures hurt children’s educational outcomes. Their preliminary analysis indicates that schools serving neighborhoods with high foreclosure rates may experience declines in enrollment or community resources, with spillover effects on students whose families have not lost their homes.
Box 1. Foreclosure Statistics
Source: Figlio, Nelson, and Ross (2010).
The effects of the housing crisis on children, schools, and neighborhoods are also being examined by Jennifer Comey and her colleagues. The first stage of their work in New York, Baltimore, and the District of Columbia identified areas with high rates of foreclosures. They have found that foreclosures of multifamily and rental units can lead to displacement of renters, causing many families to be harmed by the upheaval in the real estate market. The second phase will track student transfers after foreclosures, comparing their former neighborhoods and schools with their new ones.
Comey and her colleagues will also analyze these students’ school performance through attendance, test scores, and dropout rates. They stressed the importance of coordinating housing and education services. Housing counselors need to know how students are affected by foreclosure and to understand relevant local school policies. A better understanding of these issues can help schools ease the burden on displaced and homeless students.
Looking Abroad . . . and Ahead
Government responses to the global housing crisis also vary around the world, and some countries may offer lessons for the United States. For example, Christian Hilber examined whether central government grants can help maintain housing prices and found that most such grants seemed to translate into increased property values.
Joyce Yanyun Man reported that local governments in China were encouraged to invest in real estate and infrastructure to stimulate economic growth. Rather than using property taxes, they turned to land leasing fees and borrowing to finance urban development. China’s GDP growth rate is rising, but local governments are heavily in debt. Given what we are learning about the stability of property taxes in the United States, China may need to consider a similar policy instead of relying on one-time leasing fees to generate extra revenue.
Although local governments have not suffered the same fate as states, at some point assessed values will catch up to housing price declines. Indeed, recent survey results from the National League of Cities indicate that cities are beginning to see their revenues soften. John E. Anderson warned that local governments are in a precarious position—the property tax base has shrunk and ARRA funding will end, which could create a delayed blow to revenue. If these forces cause local governments to raise rates, this could cause homeowners to push for property tax limits and other initiatives to reduce property tax rates. Anderson investigated the potential adjustments local governments may have to make as they reduce reliance on the property tax in favor of alternative taxes.
Hui Shan stated, “Historical data and case studies suggest that it’s quite unlikely for property tax collections to fall steeply in the next few years.” The delay between the housing downturn and a drop in property taxes may give the national economy time to recover, making up for the loss of stimulus funds and property tax revenue through higher income and sales tax revenue. The forecast is not clear, but state and local governments should be prepared for what the conference participants agreed will be a slow economic recovery ahead.
About the Authors
Kim Rueben is a senior fellow at the Urban Institute and leads the state and local research program at the Urban–Brookings Tax Policy Center.
Serena Lei is a research writer and editor at the Urban Institute.
Acknowledgments
We thank Ritadhi Chakravarti of the Urban Institute, Tracy Gordon of the University of Maryland, and Semida Munteanu and Joan Youngman of the Lincoln Institute for assistance in writing this summary. We also thank the authors and other participants at the conference for engaging in a stimulating discussion. All mistakes and errors are our own.
Conference Authors and Papers
Alm, James, Tulane University; and David Sjoquist, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University: Rethinking Local Government Reliance on the Property Tax
Anderson, John E., University of Nebraska–Lincoln: Shocks to the Tax Base and Implications for Local Public Finance
Bhatt, Rachana, Georgia State University; Jonathan Rork, Reed College; and Mary Beth Walker, Georgia State University: Earmarking and the Business Cycle: The Case of Higher Education Spending
Boyd, Donald J., The Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government, State University of New York at Albany: Recession, Recovery and State and Local Finances
Chernick, Howard A., Hunter College and the City University of New York; and Andrew Reschovsky, University of Wisconsin–Madison: The Impact of State Government Fiscal Crises on Vertical Fiscal Competition Between States and Local Governments
Comey, Jennifer, The Urban Institute; Vicki Been, NYU/School of Law and Furman Center; Ingrid Gould Ellen, NYU/Wagner and Furman Center; Matthew Kachura, The Jacob France Institute, University of Baltimore; Amy Ellen Schwartz, NYU/Wagner-Steinhardt/IESP; and Leanna Stiefel, NYU/Wagner-Steinhardt/IESP: The Foreclosure Crisis in Three Cities: Children, Schools and Neighborhoods
Craig, Steven G., University of Houston; and Edward Hoang, University of Memphis: State Government Response to Income Fluctuations: Consumption, Insurance and Capital Expenses
Doerner, William M., and Keith R. Ihlanfeldt, Florida State University: House Prices and Local Government Revenues
Figlio, David, Northwestern University; Ashlyn Akio Nelson, Indiana University; and Stephen L. Ross, University of Connecticut: Do Children Lose More than a Home? The Effects of Foreclosure on Children’s Education Outcomes
Glaeser, Edward L., and Joshua Gottlieb, Harvard University; and Joseph Gyourko, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania: Can Easy Credit Explain the Housing Bubble?
Hilber, Christian A.L., and Teemu Lyytikainen, London School of Economics and Spatial Economics Research Center (SERC); and Wouter Vermeulen, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, VU University and SERC: Capitalization of Central Government Grants into Local House Prices: Panel Data Evidence from England
Kodrzycki, Yolanda, and Robert K. Triest, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston: Forecasting House Prices at the State and National Level: Was the Housing Bust Predictable?
Lutz, Bryon, Raven Molloy, and Hui Shan, Federal Reserve Board of Governors: The Housing Crisis and State and Local Government Tax Revenue: Five Channels
Man, Joyce Yanyun, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy: Extra-Budget Spending, Infrastructure Investment, and Effects on City Revenue Structure: Evidence from China
Skidmore, Mark, Michigan State University; and Eric Scorsone, Michigan Senate Fiscal Agency: Causes and Consequences of Fiscal Stress in Michigan Municipal Governments
Wallin, Bruce, Northeastern University; and Jeffrey Zabel, Tufts University: Property Tax Limitations and Local Fiscal Conditions: The Impact of Proposition 2½ in Massachusetts
The complete conference papers are available for free downloading on the Lincoln Institute Web site at www.lincolninst.edu/education/education-coursedetail.asp?id=720
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Imagine for a moment that you are a political leader—a prime minister, president, or governor—and you awake to the news that natural disaster has struck. Citizens died, buildings collapsed, infrastructure is hobbled, and local leaders desperately need additional resources and support.
You respond immediately, sending personnel and equipment to the disaster zone and pledging additional assistance to local leaders. Your country, like many around the world, has institutionalized a scalable, tiered response system with regional, state, and national levels of government engaging as disaster-related demands exceed local capacities to respond. Yet within days, even hours—before all the casualties are treated and citizens are accounted for, and before the streets have been cleared of rubble and basic services have been restored—other leaders and the media are demanding answers to questions you haven’t had time to consider: How much money will be pledged to the rebuilding? What standards will guide it? Will all landowners be permitted to rebuild? Who will lead the process? Is a new institution or governance structure needed to cut through bureaucratic red tape and expedite the rebuilding?
This article summarizes ongoing research into the roles of various government levels in successful disaster recovery and rebuilding (table 1). It represents the synthesis of two decades of recovery research and planning practice following some of the largest disasters of our time in the United States, Japan, China, Taiwan, Indonesia, India, New Zealand, Australia, Chile, and elsewhere. Its purpose is to find common lessons in these disparate environments and help facilitate recovery for communities struck by disasters yet to come.
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Table 1: Recovery Management Experiences Around the World
Australia
Victoria Bushfire Recovery and Reconstruction Authority
Queensland Reconstruction Authority
Chile
Ministry of Housing and Urban Development (MINVU- Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo)
China
General Headquarters for Earthquake Relief
India
Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority (GSDMA)
Abhiyan
Project Management Unit
Indonesia
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency—BRR
Coordination Team for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction—TTN
Japan
National Reconstruction Agency
New Zealand
Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority
Taiwan
921 Post-Earthquake Recovery Commission
Morakot Post-Disaster Reconstruction Council
United States
Lower Manhattan Development Corporation
Louisiana Recovery Authority
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Recovery Management Around the World
Governments tasked with post-disaster reconstruction face an extraordinary set of management challenges. The first is the compression of activities in time, focused in space, as cities built over the course of decades if not centuries are destroyed or damaged suddenly and must be rebuilt in a fraction of the time it took to construct them. From this tension develops a second challenge: a keen tension between speed and deliberation, as the various recovery actors in stricken communities move with urgency while aiming to make thoughtful and deliberate decisions, to ensure optimal long-term recovery. From both these phenomena a third challenge arises: the need for immediate access to a deep wealth of money and information—the two currencies of the post-disaster recovery environment.
To meet these demands, governments in every country after every large disaster create new relief agencies or significantly rearrange existing organizations. The most common reason for these post-disaster governance transformations is lack of capacity. Governments still need to attend to their normal daily affairs while they coordinate the reconstruction or reinvention of impacted communities, so they appoint an entity that can focus daily attention on rebuilding while coordinating the recovery-related activities of multiple government agencies. Commonly designed to serve a variety of purposes and governmental settings, these recovery agencies provide a range of substantive functions as they rebuild infrastructure, housing, and economic activity. They differ depending on the type and scale of coordination they provide; the scope of their authority, especially regarding the flow of money and information; and the level of government they serve—at either the national, state, or intergovernmental level.
National governments handle very large disasters at the top political tier, mobilizing financial resources from national reserves or international aid and providing capacity support to lower levels of government in the disaster-stricken locality. When large disasters transcend state or provincial boundaries, national governments also assume active roles in developing recovery policies, and they create recovery organizations to assist them. Examples include Japan’s National Reconstruction Agency, established after the 2011 earthquake and tsunami; New Zealand’s Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority, created after the 2010 and 2011 earthquake sequence in Christchurch; and China’s General Headquarters for Earthquake Relief following the 2008 disaster in Wenchuan. Each of these international bodies hewed to the national administrative leadership, derived authority from the top rung of government, and articulated policies approved by the reigning administration.
Similarly, state-level recovery agencies are usually created in direct response to disasters that affect a region or other subnational jurisdiction. The authorities and legalities of these entities are more limited by their authorizing body’s secondary, subnational position in government. Examples include the Gujarat State’s Disaster Management Authority (GSDMA), created after the 2001 earthquake in western India; Louisiana’s Recovery Authority, founded after Hurricane Katrina in 2005; Victoria State’s Bushfire Reconstruction and Recovery Authority (VBRRA), established after the 2009 Australian bushfires; and Queensland State’s Reconstruction Authority, founded after the summer 2010–2011 floods in Australia.
A third class of organizations are designed to operate between levels of government, such as the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation, created as a state and city partnership for recovery planning and funding following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in New York City. Another example, the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (BRR) created in Aceh, Indonesia, following the 2004 tsunami, consisted of three independent agencies whose membership came from a wide range of local and national stakeholders. Likewise, the Indonesian government’s Coordination Team for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (TTN), following the 2006 earthquake in Yogyakarta and Central Java, was designed to provide a bridge between national agencies and local agencies, and it also monitored and investigated local implementation issues.
In some cases, governments choose to modify or adapt existing institutions and procedures to help manage recovery. For example, Chile established a national interministerial task force after the 2010 earthquake and tsunami, but the existing Ministry of Housing and Urban Development took on expanded roles and responsibilities and managed the national planning and implementation efforts.
The Mastery of Money, Information, Collaboration, and Time
Considering these factors, common to all post-disaster recovery settings, our research demonstrates that the key to governing large-scale crises effectively is the mastery of money, information, collaboration, and time. For this article, we offer here some best practice examples and lessons learned from our various country-organization studies.
1. Managing Money: Sourcing and distributing recovery funding efficiently, effectively, and equitably.
When large amounts of public funds are involved in a disaster cleanup, the true power over the recovery resides with the level of government that controls the flow of money and how it is acquired, allocated, disbursed, and audited. Sometimes, the recovery organization assumes all or some of these powers, and sometimes all funding authority continues to reside where it did before the disaster, in the same legislative and administrative branches. Important functions in the post-disaster environment include setting policies and priorities for allocating large sums of recovery funding and establishing accounting systems that allow for timely disbursal of critical financing while also providing transparency and minimizing corruption.
Some organizations, such as India’s state-level GSDMA, are established specifically to collect all the recovery funds in one place and then allocate and disburse them. Some, such as one of the three legs of Indonesia’s intergovernmental BRR, are created to independently audit and monitor the expenditures of recovery implementation organizations. In contrast, the state-level Louisiana Recovery Authority recommended funding priorities to the state and provided oversight as needed, but it had no direct control over recovery funds. Japan’s National Reconstruction Agency received national funding and allocates that money to the relevant national ministries and local governments.
2. Increasing Information Flows: Effectively gathering, integrating, and disseminating information to enhance decision making and actions by all recovery actors.
A critical demand is to accelerate and broaden the flows of information among recovery actors about the dynamics of reconstruction actions and emergent opportunities. This challenge includes the planning and public engagement processes that provide information to citizens and institutions involved in the recovery, facilitate communication and innovations among recovery actors, and convey citizen concerns to government agencies and NGOs in a timely manner. It also includes providing information between both governmental and nongovernmental organizations and establishing forums to facilitate coordination.
In Victoria, Australia, after the 2009 bushfires, national and state leaders worked with affected communities to form more than 30 local recovery committees, which were then charged with developing a community recovery plan that identified local priorities and projects. These committees were used by state and national governments as focal points for local funding distribution and by local communities to raise additional funds and establish local policy guidance for rebuilding. In Yogyakarta, Java, after the 2006 earthquake, TTN kept a variety of local and national agencies mutually informed of each other’s activities—which, in turn, helped to provide early alerts to officials regarding potential problems.
A critical function appropriately provided by a government-supported agency is the acquisition, synthesis, and distribution of basic information on damage, reconstruction activities, population, social and economic issues, and various recovery indicators. Such agencies issue regular progress reports and monitor recovery indicators, as both Japan’s National Reconstruction Agency and New Zealand’s Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority have done, using a variety of communication mechanisms, including website postings, press releases, newsletters, and forums. Frequent information from credible sources can help to ensure that all actors understand the current recovery environment, and it can also help reduce the spread of rumors and misinformation.
3. Supporting Collaboration: Building sustainable capacity and capability for long-term recovery through genuine collaboration and coordination, both horizontally among local groups and vertically among different levels of government.
Vertically organized, hierarchical agencies—with clear organizational charts and streamlined channels of communication—are usually not well suited to manage disaster recovery, because the lack of “connecting flow” across vertical hierarchies limits collaboration as well as the flow of new and updated information among organizations. U.S. national agencies involved in recovery, for example, are more adept at administering individual programs than they are at solving complex problems that cut across governmental institutional boundaries.
By contrast, horizontally organized agencies can promote interagency coordination and information sharing, allowing individual groups to adapt to new contexts and information while remaining responsible to their parent organization. If multiple states or local jurisdictions are involved, cooperation among multiple jurisdictions is essential. Technical assistance and capacity building for the key recovery actors is also important for building local capabilities to sustain long-term recovery.
After Hurricane Katrina in 2005, Governor Kathleen Blanco appointed the members of the Louisiana Recovery Authority, so it was technically an extension of the state-level administration. But the legislature eventually formalized it. As an intentionally bipartisan body, it operated independently as it interacted with both U.S. national officials and local governments, made policy recommendations, and provided oversight of state agency recovery activities. Even though its power was limited to making policy recommendations, it was able to exert considerable influence at multiple levels in a very politically contentious atmosphere. It also collaborated with U.S. national agencies to set standards for long-term community recovery planning and helped match technical assistance and provide other planning resources at regional, local, and neighborhood scales.
Because they carried the authority of state leaders, India’s GSMDA and Queensland Australia’s reconstruction authority were able to successfully coordinate the activities of other state agencies. Similarly, Chile’s MINVU and Taiwan’s national recovery agencies have had the centralized authority to coordinate activities of other national agencies. Abhiyan, an NGO officially endorsed by the Gujarat government in India but without any defined governmental authority, also played a crucial role in coordinating the work of hundreds of NGOs and in establishing a network of local subcenters to provide information and technical support.
The hierarchical recovery process after the 2008 Wenchuan Earthquake in China succeeded in quickly reconstructing buildings, but it left little room for local innovation, as it lacked genuine local capacity building and involvement in decision making. Because local conditions were not always considered, economic recovery appears to be uneven.
Likewise, in many tsunami-affected communities in the Tohoku region of Japan, recovery has stalled because the hierarchical system established under the national government and the National Recovery Agency leaves insufficient room for local innovation. Furthermore, within the complex and powerful Japanese ministry system, the National Reconstruction Agency lacks power to compel actions by other ministries.
Increasingly, research shows that if residents are partners in reconstruction planning, they are tolerant of delays, and they are more satisfied with the results. Still, even the best examples of decentralized processes involve an agency at the top establishing the framework and rules. This trend strongly suggests that governments should resist the urge to manage the details of reconstruction and act less as managers and more as coordinators and facilitators of the process.
4. Balancing Time Constraints: Effectively meeting the immediate and pressing local needs of recovery while also successfully capitalizing on opportunities for longterm betterment.
Governments face a balancing act as they confront the tensions between speed and deliberation, and between restoration and betterment. The most fundamental way to address these challenges is to increase information flows, as described above. But recovery agencies have found several other specific ways to attain both speed and improvement.
To hasten reconstruction, there are often opportunities to streamline normal bureaucratic processes of decision making, especially regarding construction permits, without compromising quality. Because such processes often involve multiple agencies, a recovery agency can be helpful to the extent that it can facilitate or compel line agencies to cooperate more effectively.
New Zealand’s parliament conferred upon the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority and its minister a wide range of unilateral powers that would enable the timely and coordinated recovery of greater Christchurch. Parliament continued the emergency authorities granted under previous legislation and extended the expiration date of those authorities where appropriate; permitted the minister to acquire land compulsorily; and allowed the suspension of any part or all of the national land use, local government, and transport management, plans or policies developed under various acts. It directed CERA to prepare a draft recovery strategy within nine months of its authorization. Similarly, it issued the Christchurch city council a nine-month deadline to draft a recovery plan for the city’s damaged central business district.
Most recovery agencies include disaster risk reduction in their reconstruction policies. A common recovery slogan is “build back better.” The slogan of the Louisiana Recovery Authority was “Safer, Stronger, Smarter.” The easiest form of post-disaster betterment is to adopt disaster-resistant building standards. The incorporation of new structural standards need not slow down the rebuilding process, but land use improvements such as relocating neighborhoods or entire communities can require considerable time for planning and land acquisition. These projects involve difficult tradeoffs between speed, design quality, and public involvement. New Zealand is undertaking a major buyout of neighborhoods that sustained heavy damage in the 2010–2011 earthquakes and remain vulnerable to damage from future tremors. Japan is encouraging relocation of coastal communities from tsunami hazard areas, and some of these will likely take up to ten years to complete.
One way to manage these goals simultaneously is to support participatory planning processes to create long-term betterment while also trying to meet immediate needs. In many cases, professional planners worked with neighborhoods—in Japan, Chile, New Orleans, and Bhuj, India, for example—but each project also involved difficult compromises in order to meet time constraints. Victoria and Queensland’s creation of local recovery planning committees, however, are great examples of state and national support systems that helped build local capacity to carry forward the rebuilding processes over time.
Next Steps in our Research
Governments know that their task is to manage information and money flows among many actors in a compressed time. Up to this point, we have identified many examples of how to accomplish this. But, even better, we would like to be able to create menus of organizational and process choices, based on combinations of disaster magnitude and scope and economic, political, environmental, and governmental contexts.
We also have several remaining questions: Why do many of the same institutional problems continue to appear from one disaster to the next, and is there a way to avoid repeating some of them? What are the effective outcomes—negative and positive—of these institutional arrangements that may inform future leaders facing similar reconstruction challenges? What specific kinds of technical assistance and capacity building should international donors and national governments focus on providing for local governmental and non-governmental organizations, so they can do their jobs better during the recovery process? In large-scale disasters, how do the tiered goals of a recovery (i.e. rebuilding households, neighborhoods, cities, regions, nations) relate to each other, in terms of consistency, efficiency, and effectiveness? And what happens when these disaster-related organizations cease to exist? Is the local capacity and capability in place for long-term community sustainability? By studying varied national and organizational experiences, we can better understand how the time compression phenomenon of post-disaster recovery affects other theoretical constructs guiding public policy and city management; planning, land development and growth management; and fiscal and capital management.
About the Authors
Co-authors of Clear As Mud: Planning for the Rebuilding of New Orleans (2010, APA Planners Press), Laurie A. Johnson and Robert B. Olshansky are currently collaborating on a Lincoln Institute book and policy focus report on governing post-disaster recovery. For the past two decades, they have been researching and practicing post-disaster recovery planning following urban disasters around the world. Johnson is an urban planner based in San Francisco and specializing in disaster recovery and catastrophe risk management. Olshansky is professor of urban and regional planning at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Contact: laurie@lauriejohnsonconsulting.com or robo@illinois.edu
References
Alesch, Daniel J., Lucy A. Arendt, and James N. Holly. 2009. Managing for Long-term Community Recovery in the Aftermath of Disaster. Fairfax, VA: Public Entity Risk Institute.
Chandrasekhar, Divya and Robert B. Olshansky. 2007. Managing Development After Catastrophic Disaster: A Study of Organizations That Coordinated Post-Disaster Recovery in Aceh and Louisiana. Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
Olshansky, Robert B., Lewis D. Hopkins, and Laurie A. Johnson. 2012. Disaster and recovery: Processes compressed in time. Natural Hazards Reviews. 13(3):173–178.
Olshansky, Robert B., Laurie A. Johnson, and Kenneth C. Topping. 2006. Rebuilding communities following disaster: Lessons from Kobe and Los Angeles. Built Environment. 32(4): 354–374.
Smith, G., and Dennis Wenger. 2007. Sustainable disaster recovery: Operationalizing an existing agenda. In Handbook of disaster research (Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research). ed. Havidan Rodriguez, 234–257. New York, NY: Springer.
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The introduction of a market-oriented economic policy in Estonia after independence in 1991 set the stage for a plethora of reforms to restore property rights and establish a price system for goods, labor, capital and land. Land and ownership reforms had two goals: the restoration to former owners of land “unlawfully expropriated” during the Soviet regime, and the treatment of land as a valuable and scarce economic resource. As one might expect, these tasks have not been easy to accomplish, and frequent revisions in the laws and methods governing restitution and valuations have been made.
Historical Overview
Despite the far-reaching reforms taking place in Estonia today, the transformation of land ownership and the patterns of land use still reflect 55 years of history, including wars, occupation and annexation. In the first of three working papers I analyze the impact of these historical developments on land use, population structure and farm wealth in pre-Soviet Estonia. Prior to annexation to the Soviet Union in 1940, Estonia had a flourishing farm sector. Land was used mostly for agriculture, with the majority of the population residing in rural communes or municipalities.
Research also shows that a market for land was well established and reflected site specific characteristics. A distinguishing feature of this market was the coexistence of a sale-purchase price determined by the forces of supply and demand and other prices reflecting the “social” character of land use. For example, land acquisition for use by landless farmers (communal land) had a much lower price than the market price. This feature, although it may have served a social purpose, impacted the value of land for compensating former owners.
Another significant finding relates to the taxation of farms in pre-Soviet Estonia. Land and improvements on land (fixed assets) were subject to taxation, although the effective rate of taxation was quite small. This tax was a local tax with the receipts allocated to local government budgets.
Land Reform
The second paper provides a framework for the analysis of valuation formulae used by the Estonian Land and Tax Boards for the valuation of land for tax purposes. It includes a brief overview of the current land stock and land use, a discussion of land and ownership reforms, including valuation laws and methods, and a statistical analysis of the valuation model used by the Land Board.
Estonia’s experience with privatizing its economy is without a doubt at the forefront of liberalization efforts undertaken by the new independent states. The transformation of collective rights to land into individual rights took place in Estonia by means of legislation. First, the new Constitution in 1992 restored to citizens the rights of ownership of productive assets, including land, and property and land reform laws established a system for the restitution of land to former owners. Second, principles for establishing land value for compensation and privatization were spelled out by the valuation law(s).
A land market, especially for urban land, is likely to develop quickly, offering the Land Board useful information for adjusting their valuation models. Once a sufficient number of observations on land transactions becomes available, a hedonic price model or present value model can be developed to provide information on the marginal valuation of each land attribute, as well as the significance of other land characteristics not included in the current model. Using the Estonia Base Map, the spatial aspect of land and other amenities (GIS variables) may be incorporated in the model to yield good estimates of the marginal product of land in both urban and rural municipalities.
Given that land value is used as a tax base, it is incumbent upon public sector officials to assess it fairly and accurately. A land tax yield hinges on the size and distribution of the base. If the tax model neglects this, revenue will suffer and land use will be suboptimal. Economies in transition can ill afford this road.
Land Taxation and Tax Reform
The third paper integrates the two aspects of land reform, valuation and taxation, beginning with an historical overview of land taxation in Estonia leading up to the current (1995) land tax. It addresses the assignment of tax sources between the state and local governments, and the significance of land taxation as a revenue source for local governments. The paper also offers a statistical model for estimating land tax revenues based on the Estonian Land Board valuation maps, the land cadastre and tax rates selected by local municipalities and then contrasts the estimates with actual data obtained from the Estonian National Tax Board.
After independence in 1991, the Estonian government introduced a new tax system that replaced the Soviet system, and the state budget was completely “decoupled” from the USSR’s All-Union budget. On May 10, 1993, the Estonian parliament passed the Law on Land Tax as part of a reform agenda dealing with budgetary reform in general and land reform in particular. The path followed by Estonia is similar to that prescribed by the World Bank for many former Soviet republics. Guided by “western” principles of taxation, the Estonian tax system was designed to achieve efficiency in resource use as well as to meet national and local budgetary needs.
The land tax is one of several revenue sources collected from people and enterprises in Estonia. Although the land tax was established as a state tax with shared revenues between the state and local governments, it was quickly designated as a local tax with its proceeds dedicated for local budgets. Estonia also recognizes the efficiency of a special tax on land value, even though at the time of this study it accounted for only seven percent of local revenues.
Several conclusions emerge from this part of the study. First, a tax on land offers special efficiency benefits, although its implementation needs to be considered carefully. Second, for land to be a viable tax source serious attempts should be made to enhance the efficiency of financial and insurance markets, especially in rural areas. Third, land valuation should reflect two elements: the value of present attributes and the value of these attributes in the future, because a parcel of land valued at the best use of these attributes today may not capture their full value in the future.
Finally and perhaps most importantly for economies in transition, valuation and taxation of land should be viewed in the context of a “learning curve.” With the progress of the economy in general and land markets in particular, land taxation should be strengthened through annual valuation to enhance the tax capacity of municipal governments and to encourage the optimal development of land use over time.
Attiat F. Ott is professor of economics and director of the Institute for Economic Studies at Clark University in Worcester, MA. This article is adapted from three new working papers resulting from research supported by the Lincoln Institute.
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The Lincoln Institute sponsored a wide-ranging international conference in June on “Land Policies for Urban Development.” A few of the major themes and messages from the presentations are summarized below.
The three most populous developing countries, China, India, and Indonesia, with 40 percent of the world’s population, are entering the stage of rapid urbanization simultaneously. By 2030, they are projected to add an additional 2.2 billion persons to urban areas, increasing the world’s urban population by nearly 80 percent over the 2000 figure of 2.8 billion. The related infrastructure investment needs are likely to reduce or eliminate any perceived savings surplus in the world. Economic growth and urbanization in most East Asian countries have occurred in coastal regions and near ports. In India, however, urbanization and growth are currently focused on inland cities and on information technology rather than on labor-intensive manufacturing. This may be due to weaknesses in traditional infrastructure services, particularly in transport.
A review of property tax practices across 25 countries found an extremely wide range of practices in terms of tax base definitions, tax rate levels, and assessment practices. In most developing countries property tax rates are very low (a fraction of one percent of market values). Nevertheless, property taxes are one of the few revenue sources under local control and are an important component of local government revenues. Simplicity was found to be a virtue of property tax regimes in developing countries, because complexity raises administrative costs and erodes public support for property taxes.
Efforts to measure land values in urban areas of the United States—either by analyzing vacant land sales or by subtracting the value of the structure from property sales—indicate that they have appreciated more rapidly than construction costs since 1985, with a 2005 value between $12 and $24 trillion. This compares to estimates for 1980 of about $3 trillion, suggesting that land values have increased four to eight times in a period when consumer prices have increased only 2.4 times. In addition, land values have been volatile, falling by around 40 percent from 1989 to 1995 in many urban markets before increasing rapidly in the past 10 years.
While average housing prices across the United States have increased faster than construction costs, increases in housing prices have been particularly sharp in urban areas on the West Coast and on the East Coast from the mid-Atlantic region to New England. In these coastal metropolitan areas, median single-family housing prices are nearly five times larger than median prices in the least expensive metropolitan areas in other regions.
Analysis across all U.S. metropolitan areas shows a strong association between the level of housing market regulation and the level of prices—metropolitan areas with the most regulations on residential development have the highest housing prices. Moreover, areas with the highest prices also have low growth rates of housing stocks. Together these findings suggest that rapid growth in housing prices in coastal cities is due in large part to growing impediments on the supply side of the market. Supply constraints may not be only a U.S. phenomenon. A review of planning experience in the United Kingdom showed that urban development corporations, which have the power to overrule local regulations, have been more effective than most other approaches in fostering urban revitalization.
The ownership of second homes (for own use, not for rent to others) has been growing rapidly in the United States, and about 5.6 percent of all U.S. housing units were second homes in 2004. The main determinants of second-home ownership are income, wealth, and age of the household head. Second-home ownership is highest for those in their sixties, suggesting that the aging of the baby boom generation will increase second-home ownership. Additional research (and better data) is required to determine if this trend is related to the location or characteristics of a household’s primary residence.
The complete collection of papers and commentaries presented at the conference will be published as an edited volume in 2007.
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Ethan Seltzer is a professor in the Nohad A. Toulan School of Urban Studies and Planning at Portland State University. He previously served for six years as the director of the school, and prior to that for eleven years as the founding director of Portland State’s Institute of Portland Metropolitan Studies.
Before joining Portland State in 1992 he served as the land use supervisor for Metro, the regional government in the Portland area; assistant to Portland City Commissioner Mike Lindberg; assistant coordinator for the Southeast Uplift Neighborhood Program in Portland; and coordinator of the Drinking Water Project for the Oregon Environmental Council.
Seltzer received his Ph.D. in City and Regional Planning and Master of Regional Planning from the University of Pennsylvania. His doctoral dissertation examined the role of citizen participation in environmental planning. Current research interests include regional planning, regionalism, regional development, and planning in the Pacific Northwest.
In addition to his current work with the Lincoln Institute, his publications include chapters titled Maintaining the Working Landscape: The Portland Metro Urban Growth Boundary, in Regional Planning for Open Space, edited by Arnold van der Valk and Terry van Dijk (Routledge 2009); and It’s Not an Experiment: Regional Planning at Metro, 1990 to the Present, in The Portland Edge, edited by Connie Ozawa (Island Press 2004).
Land Lines: How did you become associated with the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy?
Ethan Seltzer: Regional planning has been at the center of my career for a long time. I used to be the land use supervisor for Metro, the regional government in the Portland metropolitan region. In the late 1980s we were just starting work on what is now the Region 2040 Growth Concept. Part of that work involved seeking out new ideas about planning, land use, land management, and related topics, and through that search, I started to engage with the Lincoln Institute. A few years later, I was part of a planning project organized through the Regional Plan Association in New York that brought U.S. and Japanese planners together. I met Armando Carbonell (chair of the Institute’s Department of Planning and Urban Form) through that process, and we have remained collaborators on a number of projects since then.
Land Lines: What was the first project you conducted for the Lincoln Institute?
Ethan Seltzer: The first one I recall had to do with re-establishing a dialogue around regional planning and building on the ideas put forth by the old Regional Plan Association of America going back to the 1920s. I was also a part of numerous Lincoln Institute seminars, including one held in Chicago on the relationships and interdependencies between cities and suburbs. The papers were published by the Institute in 2000 in the book Urban-Suburban Interdependencies, edited by Rosalind Greenstein and Wim Wiewel. Since then I have been involved in several Institute-sponsored projects and events, most recently in conjunction with the showing of the film Portland: Quest for the Livable City as part of the Making Sense of Place documentary film series.
Land Lines: How has your association with the Lincoln Institute influenced your research?
Ethan Seltzer: I think the Lincoln Institute is one of the only, maybe the only, institution that has consistently focused on the confluence of issues associated with planning practice, place, regionalism, and land use. There are few other places that address these issues in such a thoughtful, deliberate manner. The support that the Lincoln Institute provides for thinking and writing about these issues is part of what makes it possible for me to find both an audience and like-minded colleagues. There are other networks important to me as well, notably the connections provided by the Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning. Nonetheless, the Lincoln Institute is uniquely a forum for the things that I am most interested in and where I hope to contribute.
Land Lines: What are your current projects for the Lincoln Institute?
Ethan Seltzer: I am working on a book on regional planning in America with an explicit focus on practice. I teach courses in regional planning and, though there is an interesting literature on the reasons why regional planning might make sense and the stark challenges to pulling it off, there is not much information available regarding what regional planners do, and how regional planning is distinguished from other types of planning (i.e., city, urban, transportation).
With support from the Lincoln Institute, and in collaboration with coeditor Armando Carbonell, I was able to recruit a group of talented authors and put together a series of chapters that, we expect, will more completely present what gets done in the name of regional planning in the United States today. We also hope this project will provide a basis for better understanding the unique aspects of regional planning practice.
The working title for the book is American Regional Planning: Practice and Prospect. Coauthors include Tim Beatley, Robert Fishman, Kate Foster, John Fregonese and CJ Gabbe, Frank and Deborah Popper, Manuel Pastor and Chris Benner, Gerrit Knaap and Rebecca Lewis, Fritz Steiner, and Bob Yaro. The manuscript will be completed this fall and the book will be published in the spring of 2011.
Land Lines: Regional planning seems to be a really challenging idea in America. Why are you so interested in it?
Ethan Seltzer: You are absolutely right, but it’s often hard to find a place in the scheme of things for regions and regional planning. The history of America is told with broad, sweeping regions in mind—the South, New England, the West—but the history of planning in America is largely one of local institutions, states, and the federal government.
Regional planning, then, is both present at the outset and a latecomer to the planning game. The institutional turf is quite congested. Although the need for better regional coordination and planning actually predates the “invention” of modern city planning in America (consider that the Burnham Plan for Chicago was a regional plan), regional planning has never been able to mount a convincing challenge to the profoundly local emphasis of planning.
Still, it simply makes too much sense to put aside regional planning for long. One need not be a rocket scientist to recognize that many of the things we care about and depend on are not well managed or defined by local jurisdictions. When I worked as the land use supervisor for Metro in Portland, I was struck by the fact that everyone—rich, poor, and in-between—lived regional lives. That is, households in our region were working, socializing, recreating, worshipping, schooling, and sleeping in territories of their own devising, none of which corresponded to any single local jurisdiction. Consequently, planning by jurisdiction, which is the norm in Oregon and elsewhere, becomes a more complicated proposition. It really makes one wonder for whom the planning is intended. If it is simply about maintaining local property values, then we’ve both made that task overly complicated and are poorly serving a whole host of larger values, goals, and objectives.
However, the other thing that struck me while working for Metro is that if people don’t feel empowered to address the issues right in front of them when they walk out the front of their house or apartment building, then they will never relate to the kinds of things we are talking about at the regional scale. Local empowerment made regional planning and growth management possible. Local and regional, then, go hand in hand, and you cannot have one without the other.
Having worked at the regional level, served as president of my local planning commission, and provided planning assistance to neighborhood associations early in my career, I am familiar with the ongoing tensions between these scales—the scale at which we live in the region, and the scale at which we are empowered at the locality. I think this tension is always going to be present, and I am under no illusions that it will evaporate or that the region will “win” any time in the future.
Still, I, like others, keep coming back to the region because to ignore it is to give up on things that are important to our sense of place and quality of life. The region helps us understand the world and how it works, and makes one look deeply into the causal relationships that link us together and to the natural world. I guess the ecologist in me will never give up on that.
Land Lines: What other kinds of research topics have you been investigating?
Ethan Seltzer: I guess you could summarize my work under several headings. I have written about planning in Portland, particularly regional planning and the way that Metro developed a regional growth management plan. That work has been incorporated in publications and projects in the United States, Japan, and the Netherlands.
More recently, I have been engaged in the work of America 2050 on megaregions. I have provided information about Cascadia, the megaregion of the Pacific Northwest, and participated in several research seminars organized to further our understanding of the nature of megaregions, planning for megaregions, and the utility of that concept for better understanding issues associated with sustainability and competitiveness in the years ahead.
I have also worked with Connie Ozawa, a colleague at Portland State, on the kinds of skills needed by entry-level planners, and therefore the nature of the relationship between graduate planning education and planning practice. I am also working with colleagues at the University of Oregon and Oregon State University to investigate the dynamics underlying and opportunities for bridging the “urban/rural” divide in Oregon. A book on that topic will be published by Oregon State Press in 2011. The fundamental themes that tie all of this together have to do with place and practice—the place being the Portland metropolitan region and the Pacific Northwest, and the practice being what actually gets done by planners.
Land Lines: Any last thoughts?
Ethan Seltzer: In an interesting way, the Lincoln Institute’s association with the ideas of Henry George and their extension into thematic areas of land as property, taxation, and land planning is very contemporary. The challenges we face in the United States and globally due to climate change and instability, the pressure for sustainability, urbanization, and the future of our cities and metropolitan regions all come together around these themes.
Ultimately, the challenges that we talk about in sweeping terms must make sense and be addressed democratically and locally. Pulling that off in a manner that acknowledges the global context for local action is really about infusing what we do as planners and academicians with a new ethical commitment to acknowledging and acting at the true scales at which these issues operate.
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Veintitrés estados ofrecen un incentivo para preservar el espacio abierto, que consiste en un avalúo preferencial del impuesto a la propiedad sobre las parcelas elegibles (tabla 1, pág. 17). Estas reducciones en el impuesto a la propiedad pueden considerarse como gastos, ya que reducen los ingresos disponibles para otros usos con el interés de proteger la gran cantidad de atracciones y beneficios ambientales que proporciona un terreno sin desarrollar.
Los programas varían mucho de un estado a otro, pero todos los programas de avalúo preferencial para el espacio abierto deben definir el tipo y tamaño de las parcelas elegibles, los usos permitidos, los requisitos de certificación, los métodos de avalúo, la duración del plazo de inscripción y las sanciones (de corresponder) en el caso de cancelar la condición preferencial de la parcela. Varios estados ofrecen más de un programa, cada uno de los cuales establece sus propios requisitos de elegibilidad. En el presente artículo consideramos estas diferencias, ofrecemos ejemplos del cálculo del gasto fiscal y describimos los posibles beneficios y costos sociales derivados de dichos programas.
Determinación de la elegibilidad para el avalúo preferencial
Cada estado define la elegibilidad de diferentes maneras, pero los requisitos son, por lo general, relativamente sencillos de cumplir. Una parcela puede ser elegible simplemente por no estar desarrollada. Varios estados permiten que los terrenos con valor paisajístico sean elegibles siempre que la densidad de construcción no exceda los límites establecidos. Por ejemplo, en Washington se permite que los terrenos sean elegibles si cumplen al menos con uno de once requisitos muy generales, tales como la protección de corrientes de agua o recursos hídricos, la conservación o mejora de recursos naturales o paisajísticos, la preservación de la calidad visual a lo largo de los caminos o la mejora de las oportunidades recreativas.
Aunque estos criterios son muy generales, los estados pueden elevar el nivel mediante la imposición de requisitos adicionales a los propietarios. Algunos estados requieren que los propietarios elaboren un plan de gestión de la propiedad, aprobado por el estado, con el fin de fomentar los beneficios de la vida silvestre del lugar. En Vermont se establece que una organización de conservación elegible debe poseer y gestionar el espacio abierto. Uno de los dos programas vigentes en Texas requiere que los propietarios realicen actividades de gestión de terrenos y vida silvestre con el fin de propagar una población de animales salvajes indígenas, que estén criando, migrando o hibernando, para uso humano, incluidas alimentación, medicina o recreación.
Varios estados ofrecen un avalúo preferencial a las propiedades que han obtenido la condición de espacio abierto a nivel federal. Por ejemplo, las parcelas que se encuentran limitadas por una servidumbre de conservación que cumple con los requisitos del IRS (Servicio de Rentas Internas) para ser considerada una donación de beneficencia son automáticamente elegibles para un avalúo preferencial en Illinois y Oregón. En Ohio, las parcelas son elegibles sólo si son objeto de un contrato con alguno de los cuatro programas de la USDA (Departamento de Agricultura de los Estados Unidos): el Programa de Reserva de Conservación, el Programa de Mejora de Reserva de Conservación, el Programa de Reserva de Pantanos y el Programa de Preservación de Pastizales.
Además, es posible que las parcelas deban cumplir requisitos de tamaño mínimo. El mínimo más común es de 4 hectáreas contiguas, aunque algunos programas permiten propiedades más pequeñas, de hasta 0,8 hectáreas y otros programas directamente no establecen requisitos en este sentido. Unos pocos estados limitan el total de hectáreas que un propietario en particular puede inscribir en el programa. Por ejemplo, en Tennessee se limita la elegibilidad a 607 hectáreas por propietario y condado, incluyendo tierras agrícolas, bosques y espacio abierto combinados. La declaración del tipo de uso de la propiedad puede tener influencia sobre la posibilidad de que dicha propiedad sea aceptada o no, ya que algunos estados prohíben específicamente las propiedades con fines comerciales, tales como los campos de golf. No obstante, al menos dos estados tienen programas diseñados específicamente para los campos de golf y otras propiedades con fines comerciales que brindan oportunidades de recreación al aire libre.
Criterios estatales versus criterios municipales
Los gobiernos estatales por lo general autorizan la creación de programas de avalúo preferencial y los criterios de inclusión. Seis estados permiten que los funcionarios municipales o de cada condado determinen los criterios: el estado autoriza un programa y solamente establece, por ejemplo, que las parcelas estén “incluidas en un plan de preservación aprobado por una agencia de planificación estatal o municipal” (Chervin, Gibson y Green 2009, 8) o que el organismo gubernamental respectivo acepte la propiedad mediante una resolución. Los estados que establecen este requisito son California, Connecticut, Florida, Nevada, Tennessee y Oregón. Los funcionarios municipales o de cada condado deben luego escoger los criterios de elegibilidad que, en algunos casos, incluyen la denominación de parcelas específicas. En otros casos, la oficina de avalúo determina la elegibilidad teniendo en cuenta las características de la propiedad y evaluando si ésta cumple con los criterios.
Este enfoque permite a los gobiernos municipales controlar la cantidad de gastos realizados en sus respectivas jurisdicciones y adaptar el programa con el fin de proteger las cualidades específicas que resultan más importantes para esa área en particular. Por ejemplo, es posible que los funcionarios en un entorno predominantemente agrícola prefieran utilizar los gastos fiscales en bosques o pantanos, mientras que los campos abiertos tal vez sean más valorados en un entorno más urbano.
Cálculo del valor del gasto fiscal
Los programas de avalúo preferencial de espacios abiertos por lo general utilizan uno de los tres métodos para determinar el valor fiscal de la propiedad. Nueve estados valúan el espacio abierto como si estuviera inscrito en el programa del estado para agricultura o bosques, aun cuando el terreno no se utilice para ninguna de estas actividades. Otros nueve estados ordenan a los tasadores valuar las propiedades teniendo en cuenta solamente su utilización actual, sin incluir el valor de los derechos de desarrollo (es decir, el valor de mercado como si su uso futuro estuviera permanentemente limitado a su uso actual). Cuatro estados establecen que los tasadores deben determinar el valor justo de mercado como si el terreno no estuviera inscrito en el programa y luego aplicar una fórmula establecida por ley con el fin de determinar el valor fiscal preferencial. Illinois tiene tres programas de avalúo preferencial para el espacio abierto, que varían según sus criterios de elegibilidad, aunque todos ofrecen reducciones establecidas por ley que se encuentran entre el 75 por ciento y el 85 por ciento. Nevada aplica un descuento establecido por ley más reducido del 26 por ciento.
En ocasiones, los estados deciden definir valores máximos o mínimos por hectárea para las parcelas en espacios abiertos. Por ejemplo, en Maryland se estableció un valor en todo el estado de US$187,50 por acre (US$75 por hectárea) para el año 2009. En Washington se permite que los gobiernos municipales determinen el valor de uso para su región, según un sistema de calificación de beneficios públicos; en el caso de que no exista tal sistema, los terrenos en espacios abiertos pueden recibir una valuación no menor que la valuación agrícola más baja del condado. En Massachusetts se calcula el valor preferencial como valor de uso, que no debe exceder el 25 por ciento del valor justo de mercado.
Duración del programa y sanciones por rescisión anticipada
Muchos programas establecen la renovación anual automática a menos que el propietario decida retirarse del programa. En algunos casos, la duración del contrato está predeterminada: con frecuencia es de 10 años, período que generalmente se traslada al nuevo propietario cuando se vende la propiedad, a menos que el nuevo propietario altere el uso de la propiedad e infrinja los términos del programa. Los propietarios deben pagar una multa por retirarse del programa para alterar el uso del terreno o por alterarlo sin notificar esta decisión. Las sanciones suelen ser equivalentes al valor del gasto fiscal recibido para una determinada cantidad de años antes del año en curso, más los intereses sobre dichos gastos. Varios estados aplican un monto del 10 por ciento del valor justo de mercado cuando la utilización de la parcela cambia, o cobran un impuesto a la transferencia o transmisión de la propiedad cuando una parcela inscrita en el programa se vende.
Sin embargo, si un propietario retira una parcela de un programa después de transcurrida una cantidad mínima de años, el estado puede reducir o incluso eliminar las sanciones. Por ejemplo, en Vermont se les cobra a los propietarios el 20 por ciento del valor justo de mercado por retirar la propiedad durante la primera década, y un 10 por ciento por retirarla después de los 10 años. Rhode Island deduce el 10 por ciento del nuevo valor justo de mercado por retirar una propiedad del programa después de transcurridos 6 años, pero dicha multa se va reduciendo hasta que el contrato se rescinde, es decir, a los 16 años de la inscripción en el programa.
Beneficios económicos de la preservación del espacio abierto
La abundante bibliografía en torno a los efectos que las atracciones ambientales tienen sobre los valores de las propiedades circundantes sugiere que si se evita el desarrollo en una parcela, esto traerá como consecuencia el aumento del valor de las parcelas adyacentes. Sin embargo, en estas investigaciones se observaron factores de complicación que dificultan la predicción de cambios en el valor para regiones específicas. Por ejemplo, los resultados de un estudio realizado en Maryland arrojaron que los programas para espacios abiertos tienen efectos muy diferentes en el valor de las propiedades en tres condados distintos, probablemente debido, al menos en parte, a las variaciones en la cantidad de espacios abiertos que existen (Geoghegan, Lynch y Bucholtz 2003). Muchos otros estudios indican que el valor del espacio abierto para propietarios en particular disminuye a medida que aumenta la distancia desde la parcela protegida (Chamblee y otros 2011). El tipo de hábitat o espacio verde probablemente también sea un factor de influencia: según un análisis, la presencia de árboles frondosos en un barrio se asocia con valores positivos, pero la presencia de abetos tiene un efecto negativo en los valores de la propiedad (Garrod y Willis 1992). Los resultados de un análisis de precios de viviendas en Tucson, Arizona, arrojaron que existe una preferencia por viviendas en áreas con espacios verdes, inclusive el hábitat ribereño nativo (Bark y otros 2009; 2011).
El acceso público a espacios abiertos de propiedad privada con fines recreativos o educativos probablemente también brindaría grandes bene-ficios al municipio en muchos casos. Los estados casi nunca requieren que el acceso público sea una condición para el gasto fiscal, aunque tanto Maine como Nueva Hampshire fomentan esta condición, ya que ofrecen una reducción adicional en el valor fiscal del 25 por ciento y el 20 por ciento, respectivamente.
El espacio abierto protegido también puede reducir el crecimiento en la demanda de servicios provistos por el municipio y, así, evitar los efectos negativos del desarrollo, tales como el tránsito intenso o las escuelas superpobladas, que muy probablemente se traducirían en una mayor carga fiscal para los residentes actuales. La creciente bibliografía en cuanto al costo de los servicios comunitarios indica que los impuestos a la propiedad que se pagan por los terrenos desarrollados son, por lo general, insuficientes a la hora de cubrir el costo de los servicios creados con el fin de apoyar dicho desarrollo, mientras que los espacios abiertos frecuentemente generan ingresos fiscales que exceden el costo de los servicios utilizados en la propiedad. El American Farmland Trust observó, según los resultados de 151 estudios realizados en condados y municipios de 25 estados, que los propietarios de terrenos de cultivo o espacios abiertos con frecuencia pagan impuestos superiores al costo de los servicios que reciben en dichas propiedades (e incluso llegan a ser el doble), mientras que los propietarios de inmuebles residenciales por lo general pagan menos que el costo de los servicios que reciben (Farmland Information Center 2010).
Resultados de este tipo sugieren que el avalúo preferencial puede justificarse con base en la equidad, ya que es posible que los propietarios de espacios abiertos estén subsidiando servicios prestados a los propietarios de inmuebles desarrollados. Sin embargo, el hecho de que la mayoría de los programas requieran un contrato a largo plazo e incluyan sanciones por la rescisión anticipada indica que el objetivo no es la equidad sino evitar el desarrollo durante un período determinado.
Lamentablemente, existe muy poca bibliografía sobre la estimación de si los programas de avalúo preferencial pueden evitar el desarrollo futuro en parcelas que no se encuentran protegidas en forma permanente, tales como las servidumbres. Gran parte de las evidencias que existen actualmente está basada en estudios sobre los programas de protección de terrenos agrícolas en lugar de evaluaciones del impacto que los gastos del impuesto a la propiedad tienen sobre el espacio abierto. En dos estudios llevados a cabo por el programa Greenbelt (cinturón verde) de Tennessee se evaluó una encuesta realizada a propietarios de zonas boscosas inscritos en el programa y sus resultados arrojaron muy pocas pruebas que sustentaran la hipótesis de que el avalúo preferencial reducía la probabilidad de que se llevaran a cabo desarrollos en dichas parcelas (Brockett, Gottfried y Evans 2003; Williams y otros 2004).
Es mucho más sencillo evaluar los terrenos sujetos a una protección a largo plazo o permanente, ya sea mediante una servidumbre de conservación perpetua como a través de un contrato de avalúo preferencial a largo plazo que incluya importantes sanciones en caso de rescisión anticipada. En dichos casos, es posible predecir con un gran nivel de confianza la presencia continua del espacio abierto. Lamentablemente, dichos contratos de protección pueden anteceder al avalúo preferencial o, en otros casos, no estar influenciados por dicho avalúo.
Costos del avalúo preferencial para el espacio abierto
Además del gasto fiscal en sí, estos programas pueden generar otros posibles costos. Por ejemplo, aquellos programas que requieren la aprobación de un plan de conservación podrían generar un gasto particularmente significativo. Aun cuando una agencia estatal pudiera desarrollar y aprobar dicho plan, resultaría muy costoso garantizar el cumplimiento de las condiciones del mismo.
La supervisión del cumplimiento del programa requiere evaluar no sólo los cambios en el valor de mercado de la propiedad sino también los cambios en la utilización de la propiedad. Por ejemplo, si el espacio abierto se usa para pastura del ganado, este nuevo uso podría proteger la situación de no desarrollo de la propiedad pero, aun así, los beneficios ambientales podrían verse disminuidos.
Además, los resultados de los estudios sugieren que, en algunos casos, la preservación del espacio abierto puede reducir el valor de la propiedad por transferencia de los patrones de desarrollo que, generalmente, dan como resultado el desarrollo de las propiedades adyacentes (Irwin y Bockstael 2004; McDonald y otros 2007). Si el avalúo preferencial evita el desarrollo en determinadas parcelas, dicho desarrollo podría trasladarse a otras parcelas de tal manera que aumentaría la expansión urbana descontrolada. Si se da un patrón de desarrollo discontinuo a causa de un programa que evitó el desarrollo parcela por parcela, los efectos negativos (tales como mayores costos de infraestructura) podrían superar en gran medida cualquier beneficio público que generara el programa.
Debido a la naturaleza voluntaria de estos programas y a los cambios que pueden darse en los patrones de desarrollo, en el peor de los casos, las parcelas de menor calidad podrían recibir un avalúo preferencial, lo que aumentaría la presión para llevar a cabo desarrollos en las parcelas que generan mayores beneficios públicos. Por un lado, la aprobación del gobierno municipal podría disminuir este problema, ya que permitiría que las personas que tienen un mejor conocimiento del área pudieran escoger las parcelas que merecen más protección. Por otro lado, esto podría inspirar a los funcionarios municipales a proteger el espacio abierto en sus respectivas jurisdicciones, lo que incitaría el desarrollo en las comunidades vecinas y generaría patrones de desarrollo no deseados a nivel regional. Es importante destacar además que el avalúo preferencial del espacio abierto genera, hasta cierto punto, un sistema de tarifas diferenciadas, según el cual la tarifa más alta se aplica sobre los terrenos desarrollados, especialmente sobre las mejoras realizadas a los terrenos; este problema ha sido un motivo de preocupación para muchos académicos en el campo del impuesto a la propiedad y puede afectar en gran medida los patrones de uso del suelo.
Finalmente, el valor de los beneficios públicos no es estático, ya que puede aumentar o disminuir dependiendo de la condición de la propiedad y el área circundante. Los cambios pueden ser independientes de los futuros cambios en el valor fiscal o, incluso, pueden estar negativamente correlacionados con los mismos. Por ejemplo, una presión más intensa para llevar a cabo desarrollos podría aumentar el beneficio de preservar una parcela de grandes dimensiones como espacio abierto, o podría disminuir el beneficio de preservar una pequeña parcela aislada. Un espacio abierto de 10 hectáreas en medio de una ciudad podría beneficiar en gran manera a la comunidad; sin embargo, si se llevan a cabo desarrollos en 9 de esas hectáreas, esto probablemente reduciría los beneficios ambientales de la hectárea restante. Sin embargo, en ambos casos, es probable que aumenten los ahorros fiscales derivados del avalúo preferencial, ya que la presión por el desarrollo genera un aumento en los valores de las propiedades en el lugar.
Estos factores indican que, a pesar de que el avalúo preferencial ofrece a los propietarios un incentivo para preservar los beneficios públicos, la cantidad del incentivo puede no compensar, o incluso compensar de más, el beneficio generado. Esto dará como resultado un programa ineficiente en sí mismo, aunque este tipo de programas siga dando importantes beneficios netos si se compara con el hecho de no tener ningún programa.
Consecuencias en la distribución
Los gastos en el impuesto a la propiedad con el fin de proteger el espacio abierto tendrán consecuencias en la distribución. De manera más inmediata, el programa redistribuiría la carga fiscal a otros propietarios de inmuebles en los mismos distritos tributarios, a medida que los gobiernos modifican el tipo fiscal a tanto por mil a fin de mantener la recaudación presupuestada. Los propietarios de inmuebles desarrollados constituirían así una gran parte de la base imponible y, como resultado, deberían pagar una fracción mayor de la factura de cobro total del impuesto.
Debido a que los programas de avalúo preferencial se encuentran diseñados principalmente para mantener el espacio abierto existente, las parcelas inscritas en dichos programas continúan generando beneficios, aunque dichos beneficios no aumenten necesariamente. De esta manera, sería de esperar que los beneficios públicos continuaran devengándose como hasta ahora. Sólo los residentes locales se beneficiarán con los paisajes y los costos externos previstos del desarrollo, mientras que tanto residentes como no residentes por igual podrán obtener los beneficios derivados de la protección de las cuencas de agua o los hábitats de especies en riesgo (Anderson y West 2006). No obstante, podría esperarse un aumento de los beneficios si el programa requiriera a los propietarios que mejoraran el valor del espacio abierto realizando actividades tales como la restauración de hábitats.
Varias investigaciones indican que los efectos del espacio abierto en los valores de las propiedades adyacentes dependen significativamente del tipo de protección y de su capacidad para evitar el desarrollo en el futuro. Por ejemplo, los terrenos adquiridos como parques o reservas forestales o los terrenos que se encuentran sujetos a una servidumbre de conservación tienen un efecto mucho más positivo en el valor de las propiedades adyacentes que el espacio abierto que no se encuentra protegido de forma permanente (Geoghegan 2002). La inscripción en un programa de avalúo preferencial podría tener pocos efectos, o incluso ninguno en absoluto, en los valores de las propiedades adyacentes si la protección se percibe como algo temporal, lo que puede dar como resultado reducciones permanentes en la recaudación o tasas de impuesto permanentemente altas sobre las parcelas que no se encuentran inscritas.
Cálculo del costo fiscal de los gastos del avalúo preferencial
La metodología para calcular el gasto fiscal derivado del avalúo preferencial del espacio abierto es clara. El propietario del inmueble percibiría una carga fiscal reducida, resultado de la diferencia entre el avalúo sin el programa y el avalúo preferencial. Esta disminución en el valor fiscal puede reducir la recaudación fiscal debido a la reducción de la base imponible. De forma alternativa, la pérdida de recaudación podría compensarse transfiriendo dicha carga fiscal a otros propietarios de inmuebles, a los que se les aumenta la tasa del impuesto. También es posible una combinación de ambos resultados. En el informe de gastos fiscales de Oregón (tabla 2) se observó tanto la pérdida como la transferencia del impuesto; en dicho informe se indican valores de exención de US$126 millones en el ejercicio 2009–2010 para los tres programas aplicables al espacio abierto. La pérdida de recaudación estimada en dos ejercicios es de US$3,2 millones, mientras que la recaudación estimada derivada de la transferencia del impuesto durante dicho período es de US$0,7 millones.
Los datos son desiguales de un estado a otro, lo que dificulta la estimación de los efectos del avalúo preferencial en la recaudación. Los datos totales que se presentaron respecto de Oregón son mucho más útiles que los datos presentados por otros estados. Aquellos estados que no calculan los gastos del impuesto a la propiedad con regularidad no facilitan el acceso a dichos datos; como mucho, por lo general presentan cifras totales que combinan los resultados de los programas para terrenos agrícolas, bosques y espacios abiertos. En la tabla 2 también se indican los alcances relativos del espacio abierto en dicho contexto. Los valores de exención para las zonas boscosas privadas fueron superiores a los US$5 mil millones, y los valores de exención para los terrenos de labranza y las viviendas en zonas agrícolas fueron de US$14,1 mil millones. Los tres programas de conservación combinados representan aproximadamente el 0,5 por ciento del valor total de exenciones y menos del 1 por ciento de la recaudación perdida o trasladada.
Estos cálculos también dependen de otros efectos que pueden ser muy difíciles de observar. Será imposible determinar los alcances de la transferencia de la recaudación sin tener información detallada acerca de la capacidad de respuesta del gobierno municipal a la hora de modificar el tipo fiscal a tanto por mil. En este caso, la estimación sólo corresponderá a la recaudación prevista. También será necesario ignorar los posibles efectos positivos del programa en cuanto al valor inmobiliario en las parcelas adyacentes.
Conclusión
La tarea de diseñar un programa de avalúo preferencial para el espacio abierto requiere una cuidadosa consideración. Aunque los terrenos con poco desarrollo brindan atracciones y beneficios ambientales bajo numerosas circunstancias, el valor de dichos beneficios puede variar significativamente según las condiciones de cada lugar. Si el objetivo principal del programa es proporcionar beneficios a nivel municipal en vez de regional, establecer un único conjunto de criterios para todo el estado probablemente no maximizaría los beneficios. La determinación de criterios de inscripción a nivel municipal puede otorgar la flexibilidad necesaria para reaccionar ante las mencionadas condiciones variables, mientras que los criterios a nivel estatal probablemente son necesarios para proteger los recursos regionales, tales como las cuencas de agua.
La escasez de investigaciones empíricas en esta área de estudio dificulta la tarea de evaluar la efectividad de los programas actualmente en vigencia. Si el objetivo es verdaderamente evitar el desarrollo en ciertas parcelas, al diseñar el programa debería tenerse en cuenta la duración del contrato y las sanciones por rescisión anticipada del mismo. Los retrasos a corto plazo en el desarrollo generarán beneficios principalmente para los propietarios del espacio abierto. Para que un programa tenga éxito, el espacio abierto debe generar beneficios significativos para la comunidad, ya sea mediante una protección ambiental a largo plazo como la aplicación de mayores valores inmobiliarios para otros residentes del área. Si el programa establece mayores requisitos de elegibilidad, esto debería reducir la cantidad de hectáreas inscritas; no obstante, el objetivo principal del programa no debería ser la cantidad de hectáreas inscritas, a menos que la intención de los legisladores sea únicamente la reducción del desarrollo a nivel municipal. La inscripción de una significativa cantidad de parcelas en el programa podría tener importantes implicaciones fiscales para las juris-dicciones municipales, especialmente cuando el establecimiento de criterios amplios y sanciones de poco monto por rescisión anticipada permite que los propietarios fácilmente se inscriban en el programa y luego lleven a cabo desarrollos en su propiedad. El diseño de los programas debe garantizar un máximo de beneficios públicos a cambio de los efectos fiscales.
El presente artículo es una adaptación del documento de trabajo del Instituto Lincoln titulado “Avalúo preferencial para el espacio abierto”: https://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/dl/2281_1620_Sundberg_WP13JS1.pdf
Sobre el autor
Jeffrey O. Sundberg es profesor de Artes liberales y negocios en la Fundación James S. Kemper y profesor de Economía en la Universidad Lake Forest. Obtuvo su doctorado (Ph.D) en Economía por la Universidad de Stanford. Sus intereses de investigación actuales son la eficiencia de los incentivos fiscales estatales y federales para las donaciones de servidumbre de conservación y los programas de avalúo preferencial para el espacio abierto. Sundberg también se desempeñó como presidente del directorio de un fideicomiso de suelo en el condado de Lake, Illinois, durante cuatro años. Contacto: jsundber@mx.lakeforest.edu.
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