Access to urban land by the popular sectors in metropolitan Lima has a troubled history resulting from the combination of spontaneous, unregulated land occupation and short-sighted policies to regularize land tenancy. Policies that were designed to resolve or mitigate irregular occupations have instead exacerbated the problem.

A workshop on “Local Governments and the Management of Urban Land: Peru and Latin America” in Lima in February brought together municipal officials, Latin American experts and community leaders to address the question, “Does the current regulatory framework guarantee the orderly and fair growth of Lima and other Peruvian cities?” The program was organized by the Lincoln Institute; the Institute of Urban Development CENCA, a community-based nongovernmental organization; the Local Governments Association of Peru; and Red Suelo, the land policy network of the Habitat International Coalition.

Regularization Policies

Land regularization is generally understood as the process of public intervention in illegally occupied zones to provide urban infrastructure improvements and to recognize ownership titles or other occupancy rights. Regularization policies are needed in many developing countries to reverse irregular and sometimes illegal development patterns, such as when land is occupied and housing is built before infrastructure improvements and legal documentation are put in place.

Since 1961, the central government of Peru has supported tolerant policies that have permitted the poor to occupy vacant public land, which was seen as a natural “land bank” resource. Most of this land consisted of sandy, almost desert terrain surrounding Lima which had little commercial value and was considered unsuitable for other market uses. Some 34 percent of Lima’s population lived in irregular “barriadas” or new towns in 1993.

In the absence of policies to effectively provide for organized and legal access to land, the permissiveness that allowed irregular development of these outlying areas has led to a crisis that now dominates the urban land policy agenda (see Figure 1). Many officials and other observers acknowledge that the system itself encourages and permits informal and unregulated growth, and that some of the policies designed to regularize land have actually created more irregularities.

Urban Land Management Problems

Management of urban land policies in Peru is presently being reevaluated because of tensions between central and local government control. Between 1981 and 1995, the municipalities managed land regularization procedures, authorizations and related policies. In 1996 the Peruvian government centralized the administration of economic resources relating to habitation and urban development, thereby denying local governments the ability to manage regularization problems. This political, administrative and fiscal centralization has created serious inefficiencies, however, since local government agencies must nevertheless respond to daily demands from the population regarding land and housing concerns.

Tensions also exist because of contradictions between the legal framework of formal regulations as promulgated by public officials and the informal market transactions that occur in the “real world” on a day-to-day basis. The mismatch between these formal and informal norms is reflected in the lack of understanding and distrust between the political authorities who determine land market policies and the urban practitioners and private agents who operate outside the formal policy framework.

In spite of attempts by commercial and nongovernmental organizations to improve the coordination and implementation of land policies that affect formal and informal market mechanisms, the political leaders still make the final decision. This situation exacerbates the politicization of public management (i.e., politics for politicians and not for the community). At the same time, it encourages a short-term perspective, since a governing authority is generally more interested in the immediate work to be accomplished than in a reliable follow-up of development plans requiring longer-term execution. As a result, Lima’s serious growth problems are not being adequately addressed by the current political, legal and regulatory framework.

Common Concerns

An important result of this workshop in Peru was the sharing of experiences from other Latin American and Asian cities where local governments can use public resources to promote more orderly cities. Even though the problems regarding land management are wide-ranging and complex, some common concerns emerged for discussion in future programs:

development of public policies and community-level initiatives to capture the value of “intermediate” land that is in the process of being developed and is often the most vulnerable to speculation;

municipal housing programs that use existing legal frameworks to encourage an orderly occupation of space. Specifically, there is a need to promote coordination among various public and private agents, as well as mechanisms to support financial credit for low-income people, housing construction, basic utility services and neighborhood participation strategies.

land regularization policies and a comprehensive articulation of land access policies to break the vicious cycle of irregularities that is causing the current urban growth and management problems.

better understanding of the dynamics of both formal and informal land markets, especially on the part of those who are charged with developing and implementing appropriate policies to address complex land market activities.

Some Definitions

Illegal – land occupation that expressly contradicts existing norms, civil codes and public authorization

Informal – economic activity that does not adhere to and is not protected by institutional rules, as opposed to formal activity that operates within established procedures

Irregular – subdivisions that are officially approved but are not executed in accordance with the law

Clandestine – subdivisions that are established without any official recognition

Figure 1: Regularization Policies on Land Tenancy in Lima

February 1961-1980: Law 13517 was established to make various central government agencies responsible for regularizing land tenancy procedures, but only 20,000 titles were issued.

1981-1995: The titling function was transferred to the Municipality of Lima and the delivery of land titles increased to some 200,000. In the 1990s the delivery capacity gradually decreased until it generated a land market crisis.

April 1996: The State Commission to Formalize Informal Property (COFROPI) was given responsibilities that were formerly assigned to the municipality.

Following a presidential promise to incorporate the poor into the land market process, some 170,000 property titles were delivered between July 1996 and July 1997. An additional 300,000 titles are expected to be delivered by the year 2000. However, COFROPI states that 90 percent or 180,000 of the titles delivered prior to 1995 have recordkeeping problems, so that many of the 170,000 titles delivered since July 1996 may be redundant. Hence, it is difficult to reconstruct how many titles were properly delivered under each administration.

Julio Calderon, an urban researcher and consultant on social development programs, is affiliated with Red Suelo, the land policy network of the Habitat International Coalition.

Most countries in Latin America today have become more urban than rural, and they are trying to develop their economies as integral parts of the global marketplace. This process introduces profound cultural and spatial changes, such as increased segregation and conflicts over the use of urban land.

There is a recognized need to strengthen citizen consciousness regarding the liberalization of markets and the withdrawal of state involvement in economic and planning schemes. This changing role of the state from “provider” to “enabler” creates a gap in addressing urban social needs. Participants suggested three approaches to simultaneously improve urban land management and provide for social equity.

First, basic tools to establish and support urban information systems. These include a monitoring mechanism capable of identifying agent and transaction data, including land prices; knowledge of the ‘life cycles’ of urban zones; and utilization of forecasting models capable of establishing the relationships of the local and national economies to the real estate market.

Second, urban policies to balance existing, often inconsistent, market mechanisms. For example, it is difficult to liberalize markets and at the same time impose limits on urban expansion, while trying to provide adequate land supplies to meet the needs of the working poor.

Third, recognition and support of positive actions by community groups and nongovernmental organizations to break patterns of class segregation, as well as efforts by municipalities to utilize instruments such as territorial reserves, progressive financing mechanisms, and improvements in administrative and fiscal procedures.

A major territorial planning problem in Latin America is locating the “edge” of the city, especially when land tenure and occupation respond on the basis of social need rather than legal procedure. Among the forms of urban property outside the rules of commercial law, the most important is corporately held land (ejido), which in Mexico occupies more than 50 percent of the national territory and forms part of all major metropolitan areas. The ejido impedes the natural growth of the real estate market and allows for the expansion of uncontrolled secondary (informal) markets.

To address these and related issues, leading academics and practitioners from the region met in Mexico in April to share their insights into the processes that influence urban territorial order and the instruments available and needed for effective public intervention to achieve social equity and territorial planning objectives. While the seminar participants remain uneasy about the long-term impacts of globalization on Latin America, they agreed that the arena for action, in the next few years at least, will be at the local rather than the national level.

Luis Fernando Alvarez is senior researcher at the Center for Metropolitan Studies, College of Architecture, Art and Design, University of Guadalajara, Mexico.

William J. Siembieda is professor of planning, School of Architecture and Planning, University of New Mexico. The seminar on urban land and territorial reserve issues was cosponsored by the Lincoln Institute and the Center for Metropolitan Studies at the University of Guadalajara.

In their new book, Land Use in America, copublished by the Lincoln Institute and Island Press, Henry L. Diamond and Patrick F. Noonan propose a 10-point agenda to help America’s communities accommodate future growth in more environmentally sound and fiscally responsible ways.

Diamond is a partner in the law firm of Beveridge & Diamond in Washington, D.C., and Noonan is founder and chairman of The Conservation Fund in Arlington, Virginia. Together they founded the Sustainable Use of Land Project, from which the book is derived. Their research examined land use practices and trends over the past two decades. They report that while substantial gains have been made in many environmental areas, such as air and water quality, land use remains a highly emotional and complex topic.

The first part of the book presents Diamond and Noonan’s synthesis of the issues, numerous case studies and their agenda for community action. The second part includes the following papers contributed by leading figures in government, business, academia and the nongovernmental arena:

“Growth Management Plans”

Howard Dean, Governor of Vermont

“Ecosystem Management: An Organizing Principle for Land Use” Douglas P. Wheeler, Secretary, California Resources Agency

“Transportation: A Key Element in Sustainable Communities” James Lighthizer, Former Secretary, Maryland Department of Transportation

“Across the Barricades” William K. Reilly, Former Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

“Metropolitan Development Trends of the Late 1990s: Social and Environmental Implications” Christopher B. Leinberger, Managing Partner, Robert Charles Lesser & Company

“Our Critical Forest Resources” John A. Georges, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, International Paper Company

“Land Use Planning: A Farmer’s Perspective” Kenneth Buelt, Past President, Washington County Farm Bureau

“Patience, Problem Solving and Private Initiative: Local Groups Chart a New Course for Land Conservation” Jean W. Hocker, President/Executive Director, Land Trust Alliance

“Sustainability and Social Justice: The Changing Face of Land Use and Environmentalism” Charles Jordan, Director, Bureau of Parks and Recreation, Portland, Oregon

“Science and the Sustainable Use of Land” Norman L. Christensen, Jr., Dean, School of the Environment, Duke University

“Private Property Rights, Government Regulation and the Constitution: Searching for Balance” Jerold S. Kayden, Professor, Graduate School of Design, Harvard University

“An Economic Perspective on the Sustainable Use of Land” John A. Baden, Chairman, Foundation for Research on Economics and the Environment

Conference to Explore the Sustainable Use of Land

In conjunction with publication of this book, the Lincoln Institute is presenting a conference on June 12 in Washington, D.C. Participants will discuss varied perspectives on the important political and jurisdictional issues raised by the authors and contributors. Some of these questions may be addressed:

How might the 10 agenda recommendations be implemented in the current climate of popular reaction against federal and state government regulation of local policymaking?

What is the political feasibility of developing broad-based and long-term land use plans, especially in pro-property rights states in the South and West?

Given the likelihood of decreased federal financial support, how can states and localities be encouraged to take the initiative in future land use planning?

How can private landowners and corporate entities with large holdings be motivated to engage in regional conservation plans and provide environmentally sensitive stewardship in the face of economic pressures for development of their land?

A Land Use Agenda for 21st Century America

Item 1.

Local governments must take the lead role in securing good land use. Initiatives in land use planning and growth management need to be anchored in a community-based process that develops a vision for the future.

Item 2.

State governments must help local governments by establishing reasonable ground rules and planning requirements, assisting small and rural areas, and providing leadership on matters that affect more than one local jurisdiction.

Item 3.

The rules governing land development need to be overhauled. They need to be more efficient and more flexible, encouraging–not hindering–new approaches to land development and conservation.

Item 4.

Landowners must be treated fairly and oppressive regulations fixed. But making government pay in order to apply environmental safeguards for the common good is a bad idea.

Item 5.

Many government policies and actions–agricultural, highway, and environmental programs–impact land use. If they are not better coordinated, they will continue to result in land use policy by accident.

Item 6.

In selective situations, public land acquisition is needed, and a reliable source of funds must be available to pay for it.

Item 7.

Older areas in cities and suburbs must become a focus for renewal. Government policies should help fill in vacant land in already built-up areas and renew older properties rather than promote unplanned expansion at the urban fringe.

Item 8. As most land is privately held, private landowners must be galvanized to assure a healthy land base. Corporate and individual stewardship must be encouraged by providing education, tax incentives and other benefits.

Item 9. A constituency for better land use is needed based on new partnerships that reach beyond traditional alliances to bring together conservationists, social justice advocates and economic development interests. These partnerships can be mobilized around natural and cultural resources that people value.

Item 10. New tools are required to meet the new challenges of land use. Land use disputes should be solved through negotiation or mediation rather than through confrontation and litigation. Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and other advances in technology also offer new opportunities for improving land use decision making.

Gerrit-Jan Knaap is an economist, professor of urban studies and planning, and executive director of the National Center for Smart Growth Research and Education at the University of Maryland, in College Park. His research interests include the economics and politics of land use planning, the efficacy of economic development instruments, and the impacts of environmental policy. His research in Oregon, Maryland and elsewhere has made him a recognized expert on land use policy and planning. He is the coauthor or editor of several books, including two published by the Lincoln Institute: The Regulated Landscape: Lessons on State Land Use Planning from Oregon (1992); and Land Market Monitoring for Smart Urban Growth (2001).

Land Lines: As director of the National Center for Smart Growth Research and Education, what land policy issues are you addressing now?

Gerrit-Jan Knaap: This Center has been in existence for only three years, but this year it is finally getting established and recognized. In the past year we have been able to pull together a core group of national and international researchers who are now working in three key areas: land use and environment; transportation and public health; and international urban development. The Center is also recruiting a faculty researcher to concentrate on housing and community development.

LL: What are the Center’s most difficult challenges?

GK: Ironically, the Center’s name is a problem. While the phrase “smart growth” is helpful shorthand for describing an approach to land use planning and management, some people identify the term with liberal causes or with former Maryland Governor Parris Glendening or the Clinton-Gore administration. As a result, the phrase has been politicized in a way that causes confusion and polarized reactions. The Center does not support or oppose smart growth; it is just an adjective modifying what we do: research and education.

We have found, however, that it is more difficult to obtain funding for objective research on growth management and planning issues than it is to obtain funding for activities that advocate either for or against smart growth. The Lincoln Institute’s willingness to fund independent, objective, high-quality research in this field fills an important niche.

LL: What are some of the Center’s most significant projects?

GK: We are doing a lot of work to develop quantitative measures of urban form. We are not alone in this enterprise, but we think we’re still a step ahead of other research centers in applying such measures to policy issues. Reid Ewing, a nationally recognized expert on growth management, community development and traffic management, recently joined the staff. He and others, for example, have developed a sprawl index that they use to explore the relationship between sprawl and obesity, which is part of our public health focus.

Yan Song, a former post-doctoral fellow in the Center and now an assistant professor at the University of North Carolina, developed quantitative measures of urban form and used them to explore whether Portland, Oregon, was winning the battle against urban sprawl. She also used them to determine whether characteristics like street network connectivity, residential density, land use mix and pedestrian accessibility to commercial uses were capitalized into property values. Most recently, she has used the measures to classify neighborhoods into clusters with similar design characteristics as a means of classifying the types of neighborhood that are currently being built.

Another major focus of our work is land policy and growth management in the People’s Republic of China. As a result of recent economic growth and reforms, China’s 1.3 billion people are urbanizing at an astonishing rate, creating an unprecedented growth management challenge. The Chinese are struggling to find a way to accommodate urban growth and, at the same time, preserve their ability to feed their people. Though we certainly do not have all the answers, Chinese scholars and public officials are interested in learning from our experiences in confronting and balancing these challenges. Chengri Ding, another member of the Center’s faculty, is leading this work with support from the Lincoln Institute. He and Yan Song are editing a book on the evolution of land and housing markets in China that will be published by the Institute later this year.

Our third major focus area is land market monitoring, which grew out of my work in Oregon. Land market monitoring is based on the idea that urban growth management is partly an inventory problem: too much land can lead to urban sprawl, but too little land may create land and housing price inflation. Maintaining balance requires accurate and timely information about land supplies, development capacity, land and housing prices, natural resource constraints and urban development demands. We have conducted several workshops around the country on land market monitoring, and now we are working with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the Lincoln Institute to establish a national demonstration project.

LL: How did you develop this concept of land market monitoring?

GK: It started with my dissertation work on the price effects of the urban growth boundary (UGB) in Portland, Oregon. Later, at the University of Illinois, Lew Hopkins and I worked on a project we called, “Does Planning Matter?” We sought to develop planning support systems that not only helped to improve land use decision making, but also helped identify the effects of land use plans and regulations on urban development patterns (Ding, Hopkins and Knaap 1997). Building on this work, I organized a conference at the Lincoln Institute in Cambridge in 2000 and invited a group of leading scholars to present papers on this issue. These papers were published by the Institute in the book Land Market Monitoring for Smart Urban Growth, which was recently translated into Chinese. The idea of measuring development capacity and the need for housing is actually as old as planning itself, but recent advances in GIS technology and digital data bases makes it possible to monitor development capacity on a nearly continuous basis.

LL: How are these ideas being used by planners in the U.S.?

GK: Well, to a large extent, they are not. Typical planning practice in the U.S. still involves the formulation of a comprehensive plan—usually for a 10- to 20-year period—then implementing the plan, and then, after 5 to 10 years, formulating a new plan. With a land market monitoring system it is possible to shorten this cycle considerably. In the extreme, it is conceptually possible to monitor development capacity and urban development trends on a continuous basis and make adjustments as needed. Most planners, however, are not trained to think about growth management issues in this way.

LL: What are the obstacles to using land market monitoring in different locales?

GK: The major obstacles are: (1) the lack of quality data; (2) the lack of intergovernmental cooperation; and (3) the lack of political will to place this issue high on the agenda. The primary problem is not money. To do land market monitoring correctly requires a certain level of resource commitment, but since virtually every local government is developing GIS data and has the necessary technical capacity, it is not difficult to develop an operational monitoring system.

There are some positive examples, however. Monitoring of some kind has been required in Oregon for many years; for this reason, Metro, the regional government for the Portland metropolitan area, has developed an extensive monitoring system (Knaap, Bolen and Seltzer 2003). In its Growing Smart Guidebook, the American Planning Association recommends that any local government that adopts an urban growth boundary also should develop a land monitoring system. Most recently, Maryland Governor Robert L. Ehrlich Jr. signed an executive order that will initiate a pilot program of land market monitoring in five cities and five counties, and I will serve on the task force that oversees that demonstration project.

LL: What are your plans for the future?

GK: We have two demonstration projects under way. In the first, we are working with the Maryland Department of Planning to develop a series of indicators to assess the progress of the state’s Smart Growth program. These indicators will measure development capacity as well as housing starts and prices, acres of land protected from development, vehicle miles traveled, transit ridership and other trends that will help state officials and the public judge the effectiveness of smart growth policies.

Second, we have just completed phase one of a national demonstration project that was jointly funded by HUD, the Federal Highway Administration and the Lincoln Institute. We identified a generic protocol for conducting a development capacity analysis, applied this protocol to 15 counties in Maryland, and held workshops on monitoring in several metropolitan areas around the country. With Zorica Nedovic-Budic, we also conducted an assessment of the capacity of regional governments to use GIS for land use and transportation planning (see http://www.urban.uiuc.edu/faculty/budic/W-metroGIS.htm). We hope to begin the second phase of that project early in 2004 in five selected sites around the country. Phase two will focus first on residential development capacity, then on employment development capacity, then on how to tie together land use forecasting with transportation planning.

We’re also exploring the possibility of setting up a land market monitoring demonstration project in China, in conjunction with the Lincoln Institute’s new China program.

LL: So where does smart growth go next?

GK: What will happen to the expression “smart growth” is difficult to say. Governor Ehrlich has started calling his version of Maryland’s land use program “Priority Places,” but all of the newspapers still refer to his effort as smart growth. So, it remains to be seen whether the phrase becomes part of the national lexicon or fades like the Macarena. There is no doubt, however, that the issues associated with the term “smart growth” will not go away, in Maryland, around the country, or even overseas. We think this Center is now well-positioned to become an important and objective source of information and education on these issues well into the future.

References

Ding, Chengri, Lewis Hopkins and Gerrit Knaap. 1997. Does Planning Matter? Visual Examination of Urban Development Events. Land Lines 9(1): 4-5.

Knaap, Gerrit, Richard Bolen, and Ethan Seltzer. 2003. Metro’s Regional Land Information System: The Virtual Key to Portland’s Growth Management Success. Lincoln Institute Working Paper.

The Lincoln Institute has long been involved in international activities that deal with land policy and land taxation issues. In the 1970s those activities focused mainly on training and education. For example, Institute faculty have taught joint courses in land and tax policy issues with the International Center for Land Policy Studies and Training (formerly the Land Reform Training Institute) in Taiwan for nearly 30 years. Sponsorship of international congresses on land policy in the 1980s involved the Lincoln Institute in the dissemination of research and analysis by colleagues from both industrial and developing countries. This work heralded further international expansion in the 1990s involving both the Institute’s training programs and its support for research and analysis, particularly in developing countries.

Over the past ten years, the Institute has expanded its program of training and research in Latin America that deals with planning, property taxation, urban development, and land markets. Its program in China, begun in 2001, involves government officials, academics, and researchers with a focus on urban land markets, land taxation, and city expansion issues. The Institute has been active in many Eastern European countries, where it has been involved mainly in training on tax policy and administration. It also has contacts and modest levels of involvement in other countries, including Cuba and South Africa, which face particularly demanding or unique land and tax policy challenges.

The initial motivation for the Institute’s international work was to share its knowledge and expertise in land policy issues with others, as in transition economies seeking to establish land markets and property tax regimes. The Institute provided training in land market fundamentals and policy issues, and in the technical requirements of databases containing cadastral, ownership, and development information.

As the Institute expanded its activities abroad, academic and policy research on urban development and local public finance documented many commonalities across countries in the development patterns of large cities, in the behavior of households and firms, and in the tradeoffs households and firms face when making decisions about location, transport, space consumption, tenure choice, and local services. Predictions based on urban economic theory proved to be robust across both rich and poor countries.

The consequence of this commonality of problems and behavior is that the flow of knowledge is no longer in one direction. Solutions to problems in one city can help inform policy makers in other cities about new approaches that have worked elsewhere. For example, experience with new ways to use benefit charges to finance infrastructure, design exclusive bus lanes, structure new development, or reform housing in one country is of great interest to others. International experience also reinforces old lessons, such as the advantages of property taxation as a local revenue source or the impact of infrastructure on development.

In sum, the Institute’s international work has enriched its own knowledge and expertise as much as it has benefited those who have participated in our training and research programs.

Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 7 del CD-ROM Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.

Nuevas evidencias de Brasil indican que la regulación del uso del suelo y las normas de construcción pueden reforzar otros factores que contribuyen a la ocupación informal e irregular del suelo urbano. No es posible explicar del todo la magnitud y la persistencia de la informalidad en las ciudades de América Latina con los índices de pobreza (en descenso), la insuficiente inversión pública en vivienda social o en infraestructura urbana (en aumento), ni siquiera por la tolerancia del gobierno ante determinadas prácticas oportunistas de urbanizadores y pobladores (The Economist 2007). Si bien estos factores son sin duda importantes, el uso inadecuado del suelo y la regulación de la construcción también parecen jugar un papel en la persistencia del problema. Se puede aducir como corolario que un marco regulador alternativo puede ayudar a paliar la informalidad en los mercados del suelo urbano.

La relación entre informalidad y normas de vivienda excesivas no es nueva en la bibliografía (Turner 1972); y la relación económica entre la regulación del uso del suelo y la elasticidad de la oferta de vivienda fue propuesta por Ellickson (1977). La novedad es la aplicación del mismo marco utilizado para entender la dinámica del precio de la vivienda en los Estados Unidos a los países en desarrollo. Los pocos trabajos empíricos en economía que tratan de relacionar la regulación y el uso del suelo no han trazado de manera formal un modelo de la sustitución entre los mercados formales e informales. En consecuencia, no utilizaron las diferencias entre los dos mercados como sus variables principales.

El alcance del problema

La informalidad y la precariedad de la vivienda son grandes preocupaciones en los países en desarrollo. Según estimaciones de las Naciones Unidas, más de mil millones de personas viven en asentamientos informales, que representan un 32 por ciento de la población urbana de todo el mundo (UN Habitat 2006). En América Latina, el porcentaje de vivienda irregular medido por indicadores observables como el régimen de propiedad o la conexión con el sistema de alcantarillado está disminuyendo en algunos países, si bien en proporción desigual. Sin tener en cuenta la disputa continua sobre la forma correcta de medir la informalidad, en la mayoría de las ciudades de América Latina el problema sigue siendo de proporciones considerables, y es necesario comprender mejor su dinámica a fin de recomendar una política de vivienda razonable.

En la práctica, los indicadores conmensurables de informalidad que se basan en la ausencia de títulos de propiedad o el acceso a infraestructura y servicios son más fáciles de obtener que los basados en la falta de cumplimiento de la regulación del uso del suelo o las normas de construcción. La pobreza (en todas sus dimensiones) y la inversión pública insuficiente (en vivienda social, infraestructura y servicios) son las explicaciones más comunes de la persistencia de la informalidad. Pero también aumenta la percepción de que los mercados del suelo urbano en general y las normas y la regulación urbanística en particular son factores relevantes que contribuyen a ella.

El elevado costo de las transacciones en los mercados del suelo urbano se incrementa debido a la burocracia, la falta de información o su poca claridad, y las prácticas discriminatorias, así como por otras discordancias funcionales del mercado derivadas de la estructura de propiedad del suelo, las prácticas especulativas y de monopolio, y la regulación del uso del suelo y de la construcción, que dificultan el cumplimiento de las normas por parte de las familias con bajos ingresos. Estos factores aumentan la ineficacia del mercado y sostienen la informalidad.

En este artículo argumentamos que la regulación del uso del suelo y de la construcción administrada por los planificadores urbanos y por los funcionarios a nivel local puede contribuir efectivamente a la incidencia de la informalidad. Entre el 20 por ciento de municipios brasileños que redujeron la pobreza en mayor medida a lo largo de los últimos nueve años, un 23 por ciento también redujo drásticamente el número de viviendas sin título de propiedad, pero el 24 por ciento aumentó la informalidad en más de un 3,2 por ciento, el ritmo más rápido observado en todo el país (IBGE 1991; 2000). Tales diferencias de rendimiento del mercado de la vivienda en el segmento de bajos ingresos no puede explicarse únicamente por la incidencia de la pobreza, el ritmo de la urbanización y el crecimiento de la población u otros medidores a nivel macro.

Las ventajas e inconvenientes de la regulación urbana

La regulación urbana beneficia a las políticas de vivienda porque soluciona un problema de derechos de propiedad. Regular la distancia entre viviendas, por ejemplo, ayuda a proteger los derechos de privacidad de los demás. La regulación ayuda además a solucionar problemas de externalidad o efectos indirectos. Por ejemplo, no regular las anomalías de vivienda podría dar lugar a problemas de salud pública debido al aumento de humedad, la falta de luz o a problemas graves de seguridad. En este caso, la regulación elimina las efectos indirectos negativos y aumenta el bienestar general de los residentes.

La regulación puede tener también un efecto beneficioso al reducir el vacío de información en el mercado. Si no existen normas de construcción previamente definidas, los urbanizadores pueden aprovecharse de los compradores inexpertos y cobrarles en exceso por una vivienda que es insegura, o podrían venderles un terreno en una nueva urbanización que no proporciona servicios adecuados, como ocurre con frecuencia.

No obstante, la regulación también tiene aspectos potencialmente negativos. Una consecuencia es el inconveniente de procedimientos complicados que pueden conducir a la corrupción. Por ejemplo, no es poco frecuente que se tarde más de cuatro años en emitir una licencia de subdivisión. En su estudio clásico, Mayo y Angel (1993) asocian el complicado marco regulador de Malasia con funcionarios corruptos que intentan capturar rentas de la población a cambio de relajar las normas, agilizar la concesión de licencias o permitir excepciones al reglamento.

En segundo lugar, algunas regulaciones − como por ejemplo las ordenanzas de zonificación − pueden dar lugar a una segregación por ingresos en determinados vecindarios al establecer niveles mínimos que elevan los precios y disuaden efectivamente a las familias con ingresos más bajos de competir en el mercado formal. Los precios elevados de la vivienda pueden deberse a la gran demanda, pero también a la poca elasticidad de la oferta provocada por tales regulaciones y restricciones exclusivas. Malpezzi (1996) ha resaltado el aspecto de exclusión que tiene la regulación del uso del suelo en los Estados Unidos, que limita la integración de residentes con altos y bajos ingresos con la intención específica de evitar las subvenciones para las escuelas y otros servicios públicos locales.

Biderman (2008) ofrece evidencia sobre Brasil para apoyar el argumento propuesto de que las familias pobres a menudo eligen viviendas informales (sin título) por encima de las formales (con título) como respuesta a las regulaciones que exigen costos adicionales o “credenciales” para poder acceder al mercado formal y/o que reducen la flexibilidad del diseño en la construcción de viviendas. Este aspecto exclusivo de la regulación urbana es real en Brasil en cuanto a la infraestructura y los servicios públicos porque en cualquier caso rara vez se facilitan éstos en los asentamientos informales. De hecho, hasta 1988 la ley impedía oficialmente a los municipios facilitar servicios a los terrenos ocupados de forma irregular, aunque en la práctica algunos sí los facilitaron.

La economía política en la que se basan los aspectos de exclusión de la regulación tiene un precedente duradero en la historia de Brasil. El sistema Sesmarias de derechos de propiedad del suelo, instaurado por el rey Fernando I de Portugal en 1375, proporcionaba un régimen de propiedad mediante otorgamiento real (para la élite) o mediante una prueba de uso productivo del suelo (para quienes tenían medios de explotación del mismo). Los municipios de Brasil siguen aplicando las regulaciones urbanísticas en algunas partes de la ciudad, pero no en otras (Rolnik 1997). La retirada en lugar de la mejora de los asentamientos informales en los vecindarios del centro de la ciudad, con alto nivel de ingresos, es un caso oportuno. Este doble estándar permite alojar a los pobres en determinadas zonas sin invertir en infraestructura y provisión de servicios.

Otras razones de la presencia de regulaciones poco razonables en las ciudades de Brasil son la búsqueda de rentas por parte de los funcionarios que provoca la resistencia a la reforma reguladora, y la respuesta del regulador a la presión de los urbanizadores para mantener a las familias con bajos ingresos alejadas de ciertas zonas. Existen muchos ejemplos ilustrativos de esa corrupción y connivencia en Brasil en la bibliografía sobre planificación urbana.

Asimismo, los reguladores tienden a ignorar los efectos no intencionados de las ordenanzas sobre el uso del suelo y la construcción. No es poco frecuente que un municipio adopte simplemente las normas y las regulaciones urbanísticas de otro municipio con el fin de cumplir las órdenes federales sobre planes maestros, por poner un ejemplo. Esta práctica sólo aumenta la probabilidad de que se produzcan efectos negativos en el mercado de la vivienda porque permite que se perpetúen las políticas reguladores inadecuadas.

Un ejemplo del impacto de las regulaciones urbanísticas en el costo de la vivienda y potencialmente en la informalidad en Brasil es el Urbanizador Social, una iniciativa pública ideada para tentar a los urbanizadores informales para que cumplan con las regulaciones sobre el uso del suelo. El primer caso llevado a cabo con éxito en São Leopoldo en 2008, el urbanizador solicitó al municipio la reducción del tamaño mínimo de parcela de 300m2 a 160m2 con el fin de ofrecer opciones de vivienda más asequibles. A cambio, el urbanizador aceptó algunas imposiciones del municipio en forma de inversión directa en infraestructura y servicios urbanos (Damasio et al., próxima publicación).

Efecto de la regulación sobre la informalidad

En la década de 1990 los municipios de Brasil promulgaron diversas regulaciones sobre el uso del suelo y la construcción que pueden agruparse en cuatro tipos principales: normas de parcelación, zonificación, límites del crecimiento urbano y códigos de construcción. Algunos municipios adoptaron algunas de estas regulaciones en la década de los ochenta o incluso antes, otros lo hicieron durante la primera mitad de la década de 2000, y muchos otros aún no han adoptado todas o ni siquiera una de ellas. Estas diferencias temporales en cuanto a su adopción ofrecen una oportunidad analítica única para intentar aislar el papel desempeñado por la regulación de otros eventos que afectan al mercado de la vivienda.

Idealmente, el impacto de la regulación en el mercado de la vivienda debería evaluarse comparando municipios que son idénticos a excepción de que uno de ellos adopta una regulación particular mientras que el otro no. Sin embargo, encontrar municipios idénticos no siempre es factible. Un procedimiento estándar para solventar parcialmente este problema es utilizar los resultados de los municipios que no han adoptado la regulación a fin de estimar lo que habrían experimentado los municipios que sí la adoptaron si no hubieran introducido una regulación. La diferencia entre el resultado de adoptar o no adoptar una regulación sugeriría una estimación superficial del impacto de la regulación en la variación en la proporción de la informalidad.

Nuestro estudio aprovechó las oportunidades que ofrecía el caso de Brasil. En primer lugar, la diferencia cronológica en la adopción de regulaciones entre los municipios permite establecer comparaciones entre ellos. En segundo lugar, la información disponible en el censo y otros estudios a nivel nacional es extensa, e incluye la fecha de promulgación de la regulación, el estado de régimen de propiedad declarado por los propietarios de viviendas, y una cifra generosa de variables de control que incluyen la población, los ingresos y el nivel de pobreza. En tercer lugar, hay datos disponibles sobre más de 2.000 municipios, lo que permite realizar un análisis estadístico significativo. Tener una oportunidad como ésta de investigar los asentamientos informales es poco común, y es una de las principales razones por las que es tan difícil encontrar en la bibliografía pruebas contundentes sobre los factores determinantes de la informalidad.

Dada la naturaleza duradera de una vivienda, tanto las viviendas formales como informales se miden como proporción de todo el conjunto de viviendas, en lugar de como un número designado de viviendas. La medida de la informalidad utilizada en este estudio es la proporción de viviendas sin título de propiedad, que se define como la ocupación del terreno sin ostentar un título de propiedad declarada por propietarios de vivienda que respondieron a una pregunta en un estudio del censo sobre si eran o no propietarios del terreno en el que está ubicada su vivienda.

Según esta definición, la proporción de viviendas sin título de propiedad en las ciudades brasileñas descendió en la década de los noventa, debido en parte a los cambios institucionales asociados a la Constitución de 1988, que redujo de 25 a 5 años el tiempo necesario para legitimizar el derecho de posesión adversa de la ocupación de un terreno urbano no reclamado. Los terratenientes se volvieron menos condescendientes con respecto a tolerar la ocupación del terreno, tal y como se observa en la disminución de las invasiones de terreno y el aumento de las adquisiciones de mercado (aunque por medios informales) como la forma predominante de adquirir terrenos utilizada por los pobres. El descenso en la tendencia a la informalidad también se asocia a la estabilización económica, el fortalecimiento de las finanzas municipales locales, la revitalización del mercado hipotecario y el lento descenso de los índices de pobreza observados durante la década. El impacto de los programas de regularización, aunque su alcance es limitado, es otro factor que influye en la reducción de los asentamientos informales.

La Figura 7.2.5.1 (en anexo) presenta proyecciones utilizando parámetros estimados que comparan la disminución en el porcentaje de viviendas sin título de propiedad, que comienza en un 17,5 por ciento en 1985, con unos límites superior e inferior basados en una desviación estándar. La línea negra (naranja) de la cifra representa la tendencia exponencial en los municipios que no han promulgado regulaciones sobre el uso del suelo o sobre la construcción. Las líneas de color gris (morado o azul verdoso) representan los límites superior (más regulación) e inferior (menos regulación) de los municipios que promulgaron regulaciones en 1991, cuando la proporción de viviendas sin título de propiedad alcanzó el 14 por ciento.

Una forma de interpretar estos resultados es fijar un objetivo deseado en términos de proporción de viviendas sin título de propiedad, y después evaluar cuánto tiempo se necesita para alcanzar este objetivo dados los cambios regulatorios en los municipios. Si el objetivo es reducir la proporción de viviendas sin título de propiedad del 14 al 12 por ciento, entonces una ciudad que no promulgara regulaciones que afectaran al mercado formal de la vivienda habría alcanzado este objetivo en el año 1996, mientras que una ciudad de iguales características que promulgara regulaciones en 1991 habría tardado, en promedio, de dos a diez años más en alcanzar el mismo objetivo. En otras palabras, el plazo de tiempo será mayor en los municipios más regulados.

Los resultados muestran claramente un impacto significativo de la regulación sobre la informalidad y refutan la noción de que los mercados de vivienda formales e informales son independientes. Parece que la informalidad puede ser provocada por las mismas regulaciones que se aplican a los mercados formales, lo que significa que es incorrecto diseñar políticas circunscritas a las zonas informales. Aunque los resultados no siempre se estiman con gran precisión, las medidas de la regulación siempre tienen señales esperadas y sus niveles de confianza están siempre por encima del 81 por ciento. Asimismo, cuando comparamos los municipios que promulgaron regulaciones urbanas más cerca del año 2000, el impacto estimado sobre la informalidad disminuye como se esperaba, lo que demuestra coherencia con los resultados (Biderman 2008).

Perspectivas de futuro

El argumento y la evidencia presentados en este artículo sugieren que la regulación inadecuada en los países en desarrollo puede reducir las alternativas residenciales de las familias, incitándolas o presionándolas para buscar opciones informales. Las subvenciones podrían proporcionar una compensación adecuada a fin de mitigar los efectos de exclusión o las consecuencias imprevistas de determinadas regulaciones necesarias, al hacerlas aplicables a cada ciudadano. Pero en ausencia de tales subvenciones, los niveles de urbanización indebidamente elevados y las restricciones al uso del suelo podrían excluir a un grupo bastante numeroso. Por ejemplo, una norma de parcelación muy elevada (por ejemplo, un tamaño mínimo de parcela de 300m2 cuando los terrenos de 50m2 no son poco comunes) puede dar lugar a que existan grupos que viven en parcelas más grandes y otros en parcelas mucho más pequeñas. En lugar de garantizar niveles mínimos para todos, una norma como esta podría exacerbar las desigualdades.

Evidentemente, no se puede deducir que deberían eliminarse las regulaciones sobre la construcción y el uso del suelo. Las regulaciones desempeñan un papel importante en la creación de un entorno urbano mejor. No obstante, es necesario afrontar las consecuencias no deseadas de la inducción a la informalidad producto de los elevados precios de la vivienda. Una política de vivienda sensata debería tener en cuenta estos efectos indirectos. El desafío actual es cómo conservar los efectos indirectos positivos de las normas urbanísticas estimulando a la vez la construcción de viviendas asequibles. También se debería tener en cuenta el tema de cuántos efectos indirectos positivos pueden extraerse realmente de una regulación determinada.

Por ejemplo, el valor social del efecto indirecto externo generado por una restricción de la densidad podría no ser necesariamente mayor que el valor de la pérdida de bienestar asociada a una restricción en la oferta de suelo urbanizado. En efecto, podríamos argumentar sobre la medida en la que determinadas regulaciones aplicadas actualmente en los municipios de Brasil, proporcionan de hecho más privilegios de exclusión a determinados grupos o una burocracia flagrante y obstáculos de procedimiento que elevan los precios de la vivienda sin crear efectos indirectos positivos para el conjunto del municipio (Henderson 2007).

Ya a finales de la década de los ochenta, los planificadores urbanos de Brasil reconocieron que las normas y las regulaciones urbanísticas estaban aumentando los costos de urbanización y afectando a las viviendas sociales. A pesar de la falta de pruebas estadísticas, los profesionales se dieron cuenta de que los tamaños mínimos de parcela, los terrenos de estacionamiento obligatorios, los impedimentos a los usos mixtos (comerciales y residenciales), y otras regulaciones sobre el uso del suelo urbano no favorecían el aumento de la oferta de vivienda asequible.

Se adoptó un enfoque pragmático a fin de minimizar esas limitaciones a través de la noción ZEIS (Zona Especial de Interés Social), donde se flexibilizaban las regulaciones que incrementaban los costos con el objetivo de promover la oferta de viviendas asequibles. Las ZEIS se definen mayoritariamente de forma que coincidan con los límites de asentamientos ocupados existentes y los municipios las utilizan como herramienta para regularizar ocupaciones de suelo irregulares previas simplemente enunciando que el asentamiento no necesita cumplir las normas aplicables de forma general a las zonas urbanas del municipio. El inconveniente de esta medida paliativa es que el municipio ya no se ve obligado a intervenir en la zona puesto que, por definición, la zona ZEIS ya es conforme a la norma. En otras palabras, el doble estándar abre la vía para que el municipio ignore el problema más allá de la emisión de una ordenanza sobre zonificación.

En resumen, la reforma de la política de vivienda en Brasil exige actualmente un enfoque más amplio que estructure de forma conjunta los elementos de financiación, tecnología y gestión urbanística, y se aleje de la visión paternalista de ofrecer un cobijo o del enfoque limitado sobre los asentamientos informales. Hemos argumentado que el papel de la regulación del suelo urbano y de la construcción es un factor indispensable a tener en cuenta en cualquier intento de afrontar con seriedad el desafío que plantea la informalidad en Brasil y en otras ciudades del tercer mundo.

Referencias

Biderman, C. 2008. Informality in Brazil: Does urban land use and building regulation matter? Documento de trabajo. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Damasio, Claudia, Claudio Gutierrez, Gevaci Perfroni y Jacqueline Menegassi. Próxima publicación. Estudo de caso de urbanizaçao social no municipio de São Leopoldo. Documento de trabajo. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Ellickson, R. 1977. Suburban growth controls: An economic and legal analysis. Yale Law Journal 86 (3).

Henderson, J.V. 2007. The effect of residential land market regulations on urban welfare. Urban Research Symposium 2007. Banco Mundial, 14–16 de mayo.

IBGE (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica/Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics). 1991 y 2000. http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/

Malpezzi, S. 1996. Housing prices, externalities, and regulation in U.S. metropolitan areas. Journal of Housing Research 7(2): 209–241.

Mayo, S. y S. Angel. 1993. Housing: Enabling markets to work. A World Bank Policy Paper.

Rolnik, R. 1997. A cidade e a lei: Legislação, política urbana e territórios na cidade de São Paulo. São Paulo: Studio Nobel: Fapesp.

The Economist. 2007. Adios to poverty, hola to consumption. 16 de agosto. http://www.economist.com/world/la/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9645142&CFID=8338952&CFTOKEN=92529416

Turner, J.F.C. y R. Fichter. 1972. Freedom to build: Dweller control of the housing process. New York: The Macmillan Company.

UN Habitat. 2006. State of the world’s cities 2006. London: Earthscan y UN Habitat.

Sobre los autores

Ciro Biderman es Visiting Fellow del Lincoln Institute of Land Policy e investigador adjunto al Departamento de Planificación y Estudios Urbanísticos del Instituto de Tecnología de Massachusetts. Asimismo es profesor asociado en la Fudación Getulio Vargas e investigador asociado al Centro de Estudio de las Políticas y Economía del Sector Público (CEPESP/FGV) de São Paulo, Brasil (en licencia).

Martim Smolka es Senior Fellow y Director del Programa sobre América Latina y el Caribe del Lincoln Institute.

Anna Sant’Anna es investigadora asociada principal del Programa sobre América Latina y el Caribe del Lincoln Institute.

To enhance the Lincoln Institute’s commitment to building research capacity on international land policy issues, the Program on Latin America and the Caribbean initiated an expanded effort in 2006 to support research in that region. Since then the Lincoln Institute has issued annual public requests for research proposals that set out the criteria used to evaluate the proposals and a set of priority thematic topics, normally related to land markets, local public finance, and urban development. This year’s priorities include implementation and impacts of land use regulations; land-based instruments to finance urban development; land markets; and urban form.

Most of those who submit research proposals are affiliated with academic institutions throughout Latin America. Other applicants are typically practitioners from government entities, nongovernmental organizations, and private consultancies, as well as scholars working on Latin American themes at universities outside the region. About two-thirds of the proposals submitted and funded are from researchers having no prior affiliation with our Latin America Program, which is consistent with one objective of the research program—to widen the network of those studying land policy issues in the region.

The average size of research project funding has increased over time from around $10,000 in 2006 to about $26,000 at present. Some projects that involve extensive field work to support empirically based research have received larger amounts. Over time the program has also become more competitive, with the number of applications growing from 90 in the first year to 150 currently.

The priority topics and selection criteria are designed to encourage empirical studies, and the 18-month funding cycle allows time for data collection, analysis, and preparation of a final report. Lincoln Institute staff provide technical assistance to many researchers as they finalize their research designs and carry out their work. The participants are also invited to a methods workshop at the beginning of each research project cycle to review survey instrument and sample design, multivariate statistical analysis, experimental methods, and the use of geographic information systems.

At the end of each research project cycle all participants discuss each others’ draft papers at a research seminar. Both the methods workshop and research seminar are highly valued by the researchers, and the events have been offered in Colombia, Argentina, and Costa Rica to facilitate access from different parts of the region. Other training courses offered by the Latin America Program, such as those on urban economics and land market analysis, are also often relevant for those carrying out these research projects.

Selected final research reports are posted as working papers on the Lincoln Institute Web site. Currently 33 final papers are available and another 15 are in process. Many of these papers are downloadable in both English and either Spanish or Portuguese. In addition, seven of the completed research papers have been summarized as Land Lines articles, making their results accessible to a wide audience. This April issue presents one such report on home values in Mexico, and announces the completion of a CD-ROM that compiles more than 80 Land Lines articles that have been translated into Spanish under the title Perspectivas Urbanas.

This research program complements another long-standing Latin America Program initiative that provides support for students working on dissertation and masters theses. The graduate student program is also competitive and based on open requests for proposals. In the past two years, the Lincoln Institute has taken steps to increase the coordination between these two research support initiatives, particularly by coordinating the priority topics and harmonizing the selection criteria. By supporting both emerging graduates and more experienced researchers, these initiatives are developing an extensive network of capable analysts who can advance knowledge about land policy and its consequences in Latin America.

The request for research proposals in 2010 will be posted on the Lincoln Institute’s Web site and distributed electronically by email to those in the region who have registered on our Web site. See page 28 of this Land Lines issue for additional information.

Jay Espy joined the Elmina B. Sewall Foundation as its first executive director in January 2008. Based in Brunswick, Maine, the foundation focuses on the environment, animal welfare, and human well-being, primarily in Maine.

For the prior two decades, Espy served as president of Maine Coast Heritage Trust, a statewide land conservation organization. During his tenure, the Trust accelerated its land protection efforts along Maine’s entire coast by conserving more than 125,000 acres and establishing the Maine Land Trust Network, which helps build capacity of local land trusts throughout Maine. He also led the Trust’s successful Campaign for the Coast, raising more than $100 million for conservation and doubling the amount of protected land on Maine’s coast and islands.

Espy received his A.B. from Bowdoin College and master’s degrees in business and environmental studies from Yale’s School of Management and its School of Forestry and Environmental Studies. He serves on the board of the Maine Philanthropy Center and the Canadian Land Trust Alliance. He is a former chair of the Land Trust Alliance, a national organization serving land trusts throughout the United States. In October 2010 he was named the Kingsbury Browne Fellow for 2010–2011 through a joint program of the Land Trust Alliance and the Lincoln Institute.

Land Lines: How did you first become involved in the field of land conservation?

Jay Espy: Early in my senior year at Bowdoin College a wonderful placement counselor pointed out that some real-world experience might be useful in helping me secure gainful employment. I landed an internship documenting seabirds in Maine’s Casco Bay as part of an oil spill contingency planning project. This experience kindled an intense passion for the Maine coast and set the stage for my professional career. Following a stint working for an environmental consulting firm, graduate study in business, forestry, and environmental science at Yale, and several more internships, I was thrilled to accept an entry-level job at Maine Coast Heritage Trust (MCHT) in Topsham. At the time MCHT was a small statewide land trust and a great “school of hard knocks” for an aspiring 20-something conservationist with virtually no credentials.

Land Lines: What are some of the most significant land conservation projects in which you have been involved?

Jay Espy: In the late 1980s a 12,000-acre parcel of coastal land in far Down East Maine near the Canadian border was put up for sale by a major corporation divesting all of its timberland holdings in the northeastern United States and Maritime Canada. This was the largest remaining undeveloped block of coastal land in Maine, and one of the largest anywhere on the eastern seaboard. MCHT had never before faced such an exciting or daunting challenge.

In partnership with the State of Maine, The Conservation Fund, and the Richard King Mellon Foundation, MCHT led an effort to acquire the property and to work with local and state officials on a plan to conserve the land while incorporating appropriate working forest management, recreational trail development, and affordable housing in the Town of Cutler. Although we didn’t know it at the time, we were doing “community conservation” by engaging a wide range of constituents with varying interests. This project also put MCHT in the business of landscape-scale conservation. Dozens of projects have since been completed in that region, known as Maine’s Bold Coast. More than 20 miles of breathtaking shoreline are now accessible to the public and provide economic opportunities for the community.

I feel privileged to have helped protect many other lands, both large and small. Marshall Island, a 1,000-acre gem 15 miles offshore from the Blue Hill peninsula, was once slated for major development, but now has an extensive coastal trail system developed by MCHT. Aldermere Farm in Camden and Rockport is an iconic saltwater farm. Albert Chatfield began raising Belted Galloway cattle here in the 1950s, and the farm has been home to an award-winning breeding herd ever since. Following donation of the property in 1999, MCHT has greatly expanded farm programs for local youth and the community in general and protected additional nearby lands that are being used to support the growing local food movement.

Land Lines: When did you become aware of the Lincoln Institute’s work in land conservation, and how have you been involved in our programs?

Jay Espy: The timing of my entry into the conservation field was most fortuitous. Within months of joining MCHT, I was invited to a gathering of conservation professionals at the Lincoln Institute, co-hosted by the Land Trust Alliance (then known as the Land Trust Exchange). I had previously met Kingsbury Browne very briefly at a conference in Washington, DC, but at that gathering I had the chance to spend a full day with him and some of the other revered leaders of the modern land conservation movement.

Over the course of many years, the Lincoln Institute became a “watering hole” for conservationists, many of them originally assembled by Kingsbury, and they became valued mentors to me as I learned the trade. The Institute has continued to be a place where creative minds gather to innovate and where cutting-edge research and communication for the broader conservation community are encouraged. I am honored to be part of that legacy as a Kingsbury Browne Fellow.

Land Lines: What do you see as future trends in land conservation?

Jay Espy: The conservation field is growing, changing, and maturing in what I believe is a very healthy way. Not long ago many of us in the field thought land conservation was all about the land. I well remember early land trust brochures full of pictures of beautiful landscapes, but entirely devoid of people. Fortunately, that’s no longer true.

Today, most of us in the movement understand that land conservation is about land and people. It’s about how our communities benefit from healthy ecosystems; how outdoor recreational opportunities close to home combat youth inactivity and obesity; how protected farmland contributes to food security and the availability of nutritious local food; how outdoor spaces incorporating local arts and entertainment contribute to vibrant downtowns; how clean water, forestland, and a host of other sustainably managed natural resources support economic development and jobs; and how well-managed land allows each of us individually and collectively to live richer, fuller lives.

All across the country, the silos that have separated the work of conservation, public health, arts, education, hunger, housing, food production, and economic development are coming down. I’m encouraged by this trend. Our work today will only stand the test of time if it has direct and tangible benefit to people over many decades. Collaborative engagement of those with wide and varied interests seems an essential ingredient in any successful recipe for enduring conservation.

Land Lines: How can the challenges of funding conservation become opportunities?

Jay Espy: We do face many challenges on the funding front. Public funding from traditional federal and state government sources has been declining, private foundations have seen the corpus of their endowments erode, and individual donors have been understandably more conservative with their philanthropic investments as the markets have seesawed. As a result, fewer of the mega-scale land deals requiring tens of millions of dollars that we saw in the late 1990s and early 2000s are being launched today.

That said, there is still a great deal of very important conservation work being funded around the country. Public support for local conservation remains high, with most local bond initiatives continuing to pass by wide margins. Foundation and individual giving for conservation has not tanked as many feared. Funders remain supportive, but have become more discerning. Also, conservation projects that address multiple human interests and engage multiple partners appear to be attracting new, nontraditional sources of support. I recently spoke with a health funder who views securing more land for public recreation as a critical preventative healthcare measure. Funding for farmland conservation has also grown substantially in recent years, fueled in part by the explosive popularity of the local food movement.

Land Lines: Can you share some examples of innovative land conservation successes?

Jay Espy: In a remote area of eastern Maine, the Downeast Lakes Land Trust has been working for more than a decade to protect large swaths of forestland with extensive shore frontage near the community of Grand Lake Stream. These lands and waters have supported the timber and recreation-based economy for more than a century. With the decline in the paper and pulp industry, several large commercial timber holdings have been sold.

Rather than simply wait for the inevitable development of seasonal vacation homes and resulting loss in local culture, the community has worked in remarkable ways to acquire tens of thousands of acres and miles of shore land for use as a revenue-generating forest, wildlife preserve, and remote recreational areas. Local business owners, fishing and hunting guides, representatives from state and federal agencies, members of the Passamaquoddy Indian Tribe, and elected officials from the local to the national levels have all joined forces with the land trust to acquire these properties and manage them for sustainable timber revenue, as well as for other traditional uses, including hunting, fishing, camping, and paddling.

In the central Maine town of Skowhegan, an enterprising young woman has acquired an old county jail, which she is converting into a grain mill. Once operational, the mill will process approximately 600 tons of grain annually, an amount requiring roughly 600 acres of farmland cultivated in grain crops. This area of Maine was once a thriving wheat-growing region, and is purported to have supplied the Union troops with a substantial portion of their bread during the Civil War. Located in the heart of town, the parking lot of the old jail already serves as the site of a successful local farmers market. A commercial kitchen and several food and crafts business are co-locating in the jail, helping to create a “food hub.”

Skowhegan is the county seat of one of the most impoverished counties in Maine. Could the food hub start to change the fortunes of this region? Could a growing demand for grain stem the tide of farmland loss and result in more farmland acres being conserved and cultivated? Signs suggest the answer is to both questions is “yes.” I think what’s happening in Skowhegan is a wonderful example of the new face of conservation. It’s not yet readily recognizable, but I suspect we’ll get to know this community-based approach better in the years ahead.

Land Lines: What are your expectations about the role of conservation in the current volatile economy?

Jay Espy: I’m quite optimistic because adversity has a way of bringing people together. With less, we’re learning how to work collectively to do more. As more people participate in conservation, develop relationships with and around land, and experience the positive impact those relationships bring to their lives, I’m convinced we will see even more widespread, meaningful, and durable conservation achievements. Land, people, and community are all deeply intertwined. Ironically, these trying times may be accelerating the inevitable transformation of conservation into an endeavor that benefits even more people and more aspects of community life.

Los suelos de fideicomisos estatales en el oeste intermontañoso de Estados Unidos podrían cumplir un papel importante en el creciente mercado de energía renovable. El Congreso concedió estos territorios, que cubren 14 millones de hectáreas, a los estados tras su incorporación a la Unión, con el fin de respaldar el sistema educativo y otras instituciones públicas. Los administradores de estos suelos de fideicomisos estatales tratan de encontrar maneras innovadoras y sostenibles de arrendar y vender parcelas para generar ingresos, y la energía renovable podría proporcionar una doble ventaja: suministrar energía limpia y sostenible, y al mismo tiempo generar un flujo de ingresos significativo para el beneficio público.

Los siete estados del oeste intermontañoso (Arizona, Idaho, Colorado, Montana, Nuevo México, Utah y Wyoming — ver figura 1) están usando los suelos de fideicomisos estatales para desarrollar energía renovable, con proyectos de energía eólica, solar, geotérmica y biomasa. Sin embargo, la industria no ha alcanzado todavía su pleno potencial. En 2011, la capacidad instalada de producción de energía renovable en fideicomisos estatales era de solo 360 megavatios, lo cual no es siquiera suficiente para alimentar el 2 por ciento de los hogares de la región. Los US$2 millones de ingresos generados por estas fuentes en suelos de fideicomisos estatales son menos del 1 por ciento de los más de US$1000 millones generados anualmente por otros medios (Berry 2013; WSLCA). La energía eólica es la que está experimentando la mayor actividad; todos los estados del oeste intermontañoso han arrendado suelos de fideicomisos estatales para proyectos eólicos, y todos cuentan con parques eólicos operativos. Si bien Arizona, Nuevo México y Utah han arrendado suelos de fideicomisos estatales para operaciones solares, hay solo una planta de generación en producción en el oeste intermontañoso, en Arizona. Sólo Utah tiene una planta geotérmica en suelos de fideicomisos estatales, y no hay ningún estado en la región que cuente con plantas activas de biomasa en suelos de fideicomisos estatales.

Este artículo se enfocará en tres tipos de energía renovable en tres estados distintos: un parque eólico en Montana, proyectos geotérmicos en Utah y generación de energía solar en Arizona, y en las condiciones, legislación y otros factores que han permitido su explotación exitosa. Estos tres ejemplos demuestran que dichos territorios tienen un potencial desaprovechado en su mayor parte para este mercado naciente de energía sostenible, proporcionan oportunidades de aprendizaje en todos los estados y ayudan a satisfacer la creciente demanda de energía renovable.

Parque eólico Judith Gap, Montana

Judith Gap es el único parque eólico operativo en suelos de fideicomisos en el estado de Montana, parcialmente ubicado también en suelos privados, en el centro-este del estado. Cuenta con 90 turbinas en total, cada una con una capacidad de generación de 1,5 megavatios; 13 de ellas están en suelos de fideicomisos estatales, en el borde delantero del parque eólico, con una capacidad total de 19,5 megavatios. El arancel por megavatio de aproximadamente 2,6 por ciento de los ingresos brutos produce alrededor de US$50.000 por año, según Mike Sullivan, del Departamento de Recursos Naturales y Conservación de Montana (DNRC). En el momento de su construcción, se cobró un único arancel por la instalación de US$20.000 (Rodman 2008).

Bob Quinn, el fundador de una compañía local de desarrollo eólico llamada Windpark Solutions, inició el proyecto en el año 2000, cuando le pro-puso la idea a un pequeño grupo que incluyó a representantes de la empresa de servicios públicos local, del Departamento de Calidad Medioambiental de Montana y del DNRC. Quinn dice que la colaboración cercana entre el emprendedor y el personal de estas entidades estatales fue la clave para ubicar con éxito el proyecto en suelos del fideicomiso estatal. El personal estatal también ayudó a Quinn a navegar por los trámites burocráticos, que incluyeron demoras imprevistas en el proceso de licitación requerido por el estado.

Después de realizar estudios preliminares —con un permiso de un año otorgado por medio de una licencia del uso del suelo del DNRC— los emprendedores deben presentar una solicitud ante el DNRC para proseguir con los proyectos de energía. El estado después hace una solicitud de propuestas. Los candidatos que tienen una licencia del uso del suelo no reciben tratamiento preferencial. Después de haber identificado a un candidato competente, éste tiene que realizar un estudio medioambiental, llegar a un acuerdo de compra de energía con una empresa de servicios públicos y determinar la factibilidad económica de su proyecto antes de firmar un contrato de arriendo con el DNRC. En la actualidad, los aranceles de licencias nuevas para el uso del suelo son generalmente de US$2 por acre (equivalente a 0,40 hectáreas) al año. Los costos de los acuerdos de arriendo para nuevos proyectos eólicos incluyen un arancel de instalación único de US$1.500 a US$2.500 por megavatio de capacidad instalada, y aranceles anuales del 3 por ciento de los ingresos brutos anuales o un mínimo de US$3.000 por cada megavatio de capacidad instalada (Rodman 2008, Billings Gazette 2010).

Estructura de arriendo y aranceles

Cada estado tiene un sistema de arriendo distinto para los proyectos de energía renovable en suelos de fideicomisos estatales, pero todos siguen un patrón similar. El proceso comienza en general con un arriendo de corto plazo para planificación, que permite la realización de estudios meteorológicos y de exploración. A continuación está la fase de construcción, seguida de un arriendo de largo plazo para la producción. Los pagos a la agencia que administra los suelos de fideicomisos estatales incluyen en general un monto por hectárea durante la etapa de planificación, que puede continuar durante la etapa de producción. Hay cargos adicionales por instalación de equipos, como torres meteorológicas, turbinas eólicas, colectores de luz solar, estructuras y alguna otra infraestructura. Durante la etapa de producción, el arancel se basa generalmente en la capacidad instalada o en los ingresos brutos de la planta de generación.

Desde que se completó el parque de Judith Gap en 2005, se han propuesto varios parques eólicos en suelos de fideicomisos estatales en Montana, pero ninguno de ellos ha alcanzado todavía la fase de producción. Entre éstos se incluye el proyecto de energía eólica de Springdale, un parque eólico de 80 megavatios compuesto por 44 turbinas, 8 de las cuales estarían en suelos de fideicomisos estatales. El DNRC también ha arrendado 1.200 hectáreas cerca de Martinsdale a Horizon Wind Energy para un parque eólico de 27 turbinas, de las cuales de 7 a 15 estarían en suelos de fideicomisos estatales. El parque eólico de Martinsdale podría ampliarse en el futuro a 100 turbinas (Montana DNRC).

Para que los suelos de fideicomisos estatales sean más atractivos para estos y otros emprendedores de energía renovable, el DNRC debería simplificar el proceso. Los emprendedores que han trabajado en los suelos de fideicomisos estatales en Montana han citado problemas de demoras, financiamiento, mitigación medioambiental, falta de cooperación de las empresas de servicios públicos y transmisión (Rodman 2008). Según Quinn, Judith Gap tuvo éxito en parte debido a la dedicación y colaboración cercana entre el personal estatal y el emprendedor de energía. En el futuro, el DNRC quizá tenga que asignar personal dedicado a proyectos de energía renovable para ayudar a los emprendedores con este proceso. El DNRC también podría atraer proyectos otorgando a los licenciatarios del uso del suelo un estado preferencial en el proceso de licitación y acelerando dicho proceso. Quinn señala que el sistema podría mejorar si se evaluaran las ofertas de acuerdo a la prestación, en vez de tener en cuenta solamente el precio.

Energía geotérmica, Utah

La energía geotérmica es una fuente potencial de energía constante, al compensar las fluctuaciones de las energías renovables intermitentes como la eólica o solar. No obstante, también es técnicamente compleja y cara — y por tanto inusual en los suelos de fideicomisos estatales del oeste intermontañoso. En la actualidad, Utah es el único estado de la región con plantas geotérmicas activas en suelos de fideicomisos estatales. Por superficie, la geotérmica es la mayor fuente de energía renovable en Utah, con aproximadamente 40.000 hectáreas situadas en suelos de fideicomisos estatales. En la actualidad hay dos plantas de energía geotérmica en producción que generan ingresos de entre US$200.000 y US$300.000 al año. Para los proyectos geotérmicos, la Administración de Suelos de fideicomisos estatales e Institucionales (SITLA), que administra los suelos de fideicomisos estatales en Utah, cobra un 2,25 por ciento de las ventas de electricidad durante los primeros 5 a 10 años y un 3,5 por ciento de ahí en adelante.

La planta de 34 megavatios de PacifiCorp en Blundell, en territorio de propiedad mixta privada, federal y estatal, fue la primera construida en el estado en 1984. Blundell explota una reserva subterránea que se encuentra a 1.000 metros de profundidad, a una temperatura de más de 260° C y una presión de 34 atmósferas (500 psi). Se perfora un pozo para que el agua caliente y de alta presión suba a la superficie e impulse una turbina de vapor. La planta de Blundell tiene dos unidades, una de 23 megavatios, construida en 1984, y otra de 11 megavatios, completada en 2007.

La planta más reciente de Raser en el condado de Beaver ha tenido menos éxito. Raser pensó instalar originalmente una planta de 15 megavatios usando una tecnología modular más moderna producida por United Technologies, dijo John Andrews, subdirector de SITLA. La empresa intentó reducir el costo y el tiempo de desarrollo explorando el recurso geotérmico al mismo tiempo que construía la planta de generación, en vez de perforar primero los pozos geotérmicos y después construir la planta. Desafortunadamente, el recurso geotérmico fue más escaso de lo previsto y no pudo soportar la potencia nominal de 15 megavatios. Con ingresos limitados, Raser no pudo cubrir sus deudas y se declaró en quiebra en 2011. La planta sigue funcionando con una capacidad limitada (Oberbeck 2009).

La experiencia de Raser demuestra que los costos del desarrollo geotérmico siguen siendo desa-lentadores, y que vale la pena analizar previamente en profundidad las características del recurso geotérmico disponible antes de construir las plantas de generación, si bien este paso adicional es costoso y demora tiempo. Los futuros avances tecnológicos pueden ayudar a reducir el costo y el tiempo necesario para el desarrollo geotérmico, pero dado el estado actual de la tecnología, los proyectos geotérmicos exigen todavía importantes inversiones iniciales.

SITLA es la entidad encargada de dar respuesta a los proyectos de desarrollo de energía renovable a medida que se reciben; también puede ofrecer suelos en arriendo mediante solicitud de ofertas o proceso de licitación en pliego cerrado (Rodman 2008). El estado ha hecho un mapa de zonas de energía renovable, pero la tarea de encontrar los lugares y proponer proyectos de energía renovable recae sobre los emprendedores.

Utah también enfrenta otras dificultades para todas las formas de desarrollo de energía renovable en suelos de fideicomisos. Debido a la alta proporción y el patrón de distribución de territorios federales, las agencias nacionales a veces son las que toman la iniciativa en proyectos de desarrollo de energía. Según Andrews, la ausencia de un estándar de cartera de energía renovable (Renewable Portfolio Standard, o RPS) en Utah es otra desventaja, porque las empresas locales de servicios públicos carecen de un mandato estatal para suministrar energía renovable.

Aun sin un RPS, sin embargo, Utah está bien situado geográficamente para exportar energía a otros estados, particularmente a los centros de población en la costa oeste. Aunque la transmisión de energía puede constituir un impedimento en algunas partes del estado, existe en la actualidad capacidad de transmisión entre Utah y el sur de California. Más aún, los emprendedores pueden aprovechar una serie de recursos renovables: eólico, solar y geotérmico. SITLA podría comercializar los suelos de fideicomiso en zonas de energía renovable a emprendedores potenciales, ofreciendo aranceles reducidos para proyectos en dichas zonas.

Desarrollos solares en Arizona

Incluso en Arizona, el estado más soleado de los EE.UU., según el Servicio Meteorológico Nacional, la industria solar enfrenta varios obstáculos en los suelos de fideicomisos estatales. La única planta solar activa en suelos de fideicomisos estatales, la planta solar de Foothills, se inauguró en 160 hectáreas del condado de Yuma en abril de 2013, con la puesta en marcha de 17 megavatios. 18 megavatios adicionales entrarán en operación en diciembre de 2013. Cuando se encuentre plenamente operativa, la planta dará servicio a 9.000 clientes. El contrato de arriendo de 35 años generará US$10 millones para los beneficiarios de los suelos de fideicomisos estatales, y la mayor parte de este dinero se destinará a la educación pública.

El desarrollo lento de la industria solar en de suelos de fideicomisos refleja una tendencia más amplia a nivel nacional. En 2010, sólo el 0,03 por ciento de la energía del país provino de proyectos solares, mientras que el 2,3 por ciento fue generado por el viento (www.eia.gov). Los proyectos solares en general exigen el uso exclusivo de un sitio, lo cual genera una desventaja más grande aún en los suelos de fideicomisos estatales, donde ya hay muchas otras hectáreas arrendadas para agricul-tura, pastoreo o producción de petróleo y gas. Los proyectos eólicos, en contraste, pueden coexistir con otros usos del suelo. Los proyectos solares también requieren mucha superficie, hasta 5 hectáreas por megavatio (Culp y Gibbons 2010), mientras que las plantas eólicas tienen una huella relativamente pequeña. Y, aun cuando los precios están cayendo, las plantas de generación solar pueden ser muy caras.

A pesar de estas desventajas, hay siempre maneras en que se puede adaptar el desarrollo solar a los suelos de fideicomisos estatales. Para empezar, estos territorios no pagan impuestos ni tienen deudas; como no tienen la misma carga financiera que los propietarios privados, las agencias que administran los suelos de fideicomisos tienen una ventaja para ubicar y mantener proyectos de energía renovable. Algunos emprendedores solares encuentran atractivos los suelos de fideicomisos estatales porque permiten la utilización de grandes superficies por parte de un solo propietario. La generación solar también se adapta bien a sitios que sufrieron perturbaciones previamente, como viejos rellenos sanitarios y áreas agrícolas abandonadas, que pueden incluir los suelos de fideicomisos. Cerca de las zonas urbanas, los suelos de fideicomisos estatales que están en reserva para emprendimientos futuros se podrían usar en el ínterin para generación solar; cuando los contratos de arriendo venzan, el suelo se podría usar para emprendimientos urbanos (Culp y Gibbons 2010).

Un estándar de energía renovable estatal e incentivos tributarios también podrían alentar el desarrollo solar. Algunos estados ofrecen créditos tributarios de hasta el 25 por ciento para inversiones, exenciones del impuesto sobre la propiedad, y contratos de compra con términos estándar para energía solar, garantizando un mercado a largo plazo para la generación solar.

El Departamento de Suelos Estatales de Arizona (ASLD), uno de los terratenientes más grandes del estado, con varias parcelas consolidadas de gran tamaño, se podría posicionar como socio atractivo para la industria de energía renovable (Wadsack 2009). El ASLD está dando pasos en la dirección correcta, desarrollando un sistema de mapas de energía renovable con SIG a fin de analizar la adecuación general de los suelos de fideicomisos estatales de energía renovable para la producción solar, evitando al mismo tiempo las áreas de hábitat de vida silvestre y de preservación del desierto, y reduciendo la distancia a caminos, líneas de transmisión y centros de demanda. Pero tiene que seguir avanzando y comercializar las áreas más adecuadas para energía renovable (Culp y Gibbons 2010) y facilitar el proceso a los emprendedores, que pueden desalentarse a causa de las complejas estructuras de arriendo, los requisitos de subasta pública y las exigencias de análisis medioambiental y cultural (Wadsack 2009). Cuanta más capacidad pueda construir el Departamento para ayudar a los emprendedores en este proceso, más podría florecer la industria de energía renovable en los suelos de fideicomisos estatales. Por ejemplo, el departamento podría ofrecer contratos de arriendo de largo plazo, acelerar la venta de suelos y desarrollar un sistema de arriendo de costo reducido con participación en los ingresos, diseñado específicamente para el desarrollo de energía renovable.

Recomendaciones generales para Montana, Utah y Arizona

El arriendo para energía renovable en los suelos de fideicomisos estatales es complicado. Cada estado posee un conjunto singular de circunstancias políticas, medioambientales y económicas que hace difícil establecer un método óptimo para todos. No obstante, los logros, problemas y soluciones detalladas en los ejemplos anteriores brindan algunas recomendaciones generales para alcanzar el éxito.

A nivel de la agencia que administra el fideicomiso de suelos estatales:

• Comercializar en forma activa los sitios adecuados a los emprendedores. En algunos estados, como Arizona y Utah, las agencias de administración de los suelos de fideicomisos estatales están creando inventarios de las áreas más adecuadas para el desarrollo de energía renovable en suelos estatales. Otros estados podrían seguir este modelo (BLM 2011, Berry et al 2009), comercializar estas parcelas y ofrecer incentivos para el desarrollo, ya sea como parte del pro-ceso de arriendo o por medio de incentivos tributarios (Culp y Gibbons 2010).
• Reducir el riesgo a los emprendedores otorgándoles derechos exclusivos en la etapa temprana de descubrimiento o dando prioridad a aquellos que han efectuado la evaluación inicial del sitio en el proceso de licitación o subasta.
• Fomentar la colaboración cercana entre el emprendedor y los administradores de suelos de fideicomisos, educando al personal en temas de energía renovable para guiar a los emprendedores en el proceso de otorgamiento de permisos, financiamiento y colaboración con las agencias federales.
• Derribar silos y colaborar con otros propietarios y agencias de administración de suelos para acelerar el proceso de otorgamiento de permisos y mejorar la coordinación entre las diversas agencias a nivel local, estatal y federal.

A nivel estatal:

• Agilizar los requisitos medioambientales. La Ley Nacional de Política Medioambiental (NEPA) exige un análisis pormenorizado de impacto medioambiental para proyectos que se desarrollan en suelos federales. Montana y otros estados requieren análisis adicionales y separados para desarrollos en los suelos estatales, mientras que otros estados agilizan los requisitos permitiendo que los análisis de NEPA se usen para cumplir también con las obliga-ciones estatales en proyectos que abarcan tanto jurisdicciones federales como estatales. Esta estrategia agilizada puede ser más atractiva para los emprendedores de energía, sin dejar de proteger en forma efectiva los recursos medioambientales.
• Adoptar o aumentar los estándares de cartera de energía renovable (RPS). En el oeste intermontañoso, Arizona, Colorado, Montana y Nuevo México han instituido políticas de RPS, mientras que Utah sólo tiene un objetivo de energía renovable. Los administradores de suelos de fideicomisos en Utah y Idaho citaron la falta de estándares de carteras de energía renovable como un impedimento para la industria de energía renovable en sus estados. A lo largo de la región las metas de RPS varían del 15 al 30 por ciento de energía renovable. Los estados con metas más bajas podrían considerar la posibilidad de adoptar políticas de RPS más efectivas para fomentar el desarrollo de la energía renovable.
• Ofrecer políticas tributarias que estimulen el desarrollo renovable, incluyendo incentivos al pago de impuestos sobre la propiedad, in-centivos en el impuesto a las ventas o créditos tributarios. Cada estado podría adoptar ya sea políticas adicionales de incentivo tributario o aumentar los incentivos existentes para fomentar más aún el desarrollo de energía renovable.

Las políticas federales cumplen también un papel importante. En particular, los créditos tributarios a la producción han estimulado el desarrollo de energía renovable en las últimas décadas. Del mismo modo los créditos tributarios federales a la inversión en energía renovable, que proporcionan a los emprendedores un crédito tributario durante las fases de planificación y construcción, han ayudado al crecimiento de la industria de energía renovable en los últimos, aun cuando la economía nacional estaba en recesión. Finalmente, se han presentado varias propuestas para un estándar federal de cartera de energía renovable, si bien los investigadores no se ponen de acuerdo sobre si este tipo de política podría interferir con las políticas de RPS a nivel estatal, que han demostrado ser extremadamente efectivas.

La energía renovable ofrece a los administra-dores de suelos de fideicomisos estatales una oportunidad para diversificar sus ingresos y beneficiar el bien común. En su mayoría, los proyectos eólicos y de transmisión se pueden ubicar en terrenos que ya se han arrendado para pastoreo, agricultura, petróleo y gas. Los proyectos solares podrían tener su mayor potencial en áreas previamente alteradas o en zonas con escaso valor alternativo. Donde haya recursos geotérmicos disponibles, se podrá generar energía en forma constante para compensar las fuentes de energía intermitentes, como el viento y el sol. Los avances técnicos podrían ayudar a reducir los precios de la energía renovable, sobre todo la energía solar, geotérmica y de biomasa. A medida que nuestras demandas de energía van creciendo, los suelos de fideicomisos estatales están en condiciones de desempeñar un papel importante en el crecimiento de la industria de energía renovable.

Este artículo fue adaptado del documento de trabajo del Instituto Lincoln “Leasing Renewable Energy on State Trust Lands” (Arriendo de energía renovable en suelos de fideicomisos estatales), disponible en línea en: www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/dl/2192_1518_Berry_WP12AB1.pdf.

Sobre el autor

Alison Berry es la especialista de energía y economía en el Sonoran Institute, donde su trabajo se concentra en temas del uso del suelo en el cambiante Oeste de los EE.UU. Tiene una licenciatura en Biología por la Universidad de Vermont y una maestría en Silvicultura por la Universidad de Montana. Sus artículos han sido publicados en el Wall Street Journal, el Journal of Forestry, y el Western Journal of Applied Forestry, entre otras publicaciones. Contacto: aberry@sonoraninstitute.org.

Recursos

Berry, Jason, David Hurlbut, Richard Simon, Joseph Moore y Robert Blackett. 2009. Utah Renewable Energy Zones Task Force Phase I Report. http://www.energy.utah.gov/renewable_energy/docs/mp-09-1low.pdf.

Billings Gazette. 2010. Wind farm developers eye school trust land. April 22. http://billingsgazette.com/news/state-and-regional/montana/article_14bfb038-4e0a-11df-bc99-001cc4c002e0.html.

Bureau of Land Management. 2011. Restoration Design Energy Project. http://www.blm.gov/az/st/en/prog/energy/arra_solar.html.

Culp, Peter y Jocelyn Gibbons. 2010. Strategies for Renewable Energy Projects on Arizona’s State Trust Lands. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy Working Paper WP11PC2. https://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/dl/1984_1306_CulpGibbon%20Final.pdf.

Montana Department of Natural Resources. 2011. Montana’s Trust Lands. Presented at the Western States Land Commissioners Association annual meeting. Online: http://www.glo.texas.gov/wslca/pdf/state-reports-2011/wslca-presentation-mt-2011.pdf accessed November 23, 2011.

Oberbeck, Steven. 2009. Utah geothermal plant runs into cold-water problems. Salt Lake Tribune. September 17. And Bathon, Michael. 2011. Utah’s Raser Technologies files Chapter 11. Salt Lake Tribune. May 2.

Rodman, Nancy Welch. 2008. Wind, wave/tidal, and in-river flow energy: A review of the decision framework of state land management agencies. Prepared for the Western States Land Commissioners Association. http://www.glo.texas.gov/wslca/pdf/wind_wave_tidal_river.pdf.

Wadsack, Karin. 2009 Arizona Wind Development Status Report. Arizona Corporation Commission.

It is difficult to overstate how ongoing population loss has devastated Detroit. Between 1900 and 1950, when the rise of U.S. automobile manufacturing made the city one of America’s premier industrial and cultural centers, the population spiked from 300,000 to 1.85 million. Beginning in 1950, however, it began to fall. And its decline has been continuous to the present day, plummeting to just 700,000 in 2010, at a rate of descent nearly as swift as the rate of ascent in the first half of the 20th century.

Despite Detroit’s decades-long effort to keep pace with population loss by removing dilapidated housing stock, roughly a quarter of its 380,000 parcels are now abandoned, managed by the city or other public entities. As of July 2014, 114,000 properties have been razed, and 80,000 more are considered blighted (Austen 2014).

While the downtown is recovering and the suburbs remain vital, the “unfathomable dissolution of [the] built landscape” in vast areas of the city may shock the unsuspecting visitor (Austen 2014).

The first installment in a two-part series, this article considers the fiscal causes and repercussions of Detroit’s surplus of housing and vacant property: from the extent and location of abandoned homes and lots throughout Detroit to the downward spiral of house price declines leading to overassessment, property tax delinquency, and foreclosures; the public acquisition of that property; the pattern of land values across the city; and, finally, some potential ways to reconcile the remaining number of people with the amount of vacant and publicly held property. These measures range from targeting densely populated neighborhoods for redevelopment to establishing a greenbelt and reclaiming vacant parcels for public use as parks, forests, industrial buffers, retention ponds, and other open space (Austen 2014).

Factors Behind the Fall

The reasons for Detroit’s demise are numerous and perhaps too familiar. Federally subsidized transportation infrastructure, such as the Interstate highway system, facilitated rapid suburbanization, which was further enabled by permissive development codes. Racial tension, global economic forces, and corruption corroded what remained of the city proper. In the early stages of the malaise, higher-income residents, most of them Caucasian, left for the suburbs in search of a better quality of life, as shown in table1. By 1990, the African-American population had peaked as well and began to drop in the first decade of the 21st century. Beginning in the 1960s, Michigan auto manufacturing began its long, precipitous decline, disproportionately impacting Detroit and Flint. The loss of well-paying middle-class jobs further harmed the urban demographic and economic base, as households sought new employment opportunities elsewhere. Rising crime rates and continued erosion of public services induced another wave of exits.

Table 1 illustrates this downturn in the city’s demographic and economic conditions from 1950 through 2010. By 2012, according to government sources, median household income was just $25,000, less than half of the national median income. Poverty and unemployment rates were 38 and 27.5 percent, respectively. The labor force participation rate was 54 percent (compared to 63 percent nationwide), and for every 6.35 employed workers, there was one person receiving Social Security Disability benefits (compared to 1 of 12 nationwide). More than 34 percent of the city’s population received food stamps, and 81 percent of children in the Detroit Public Schools qualified for the Free and Reduced Lunch Program. Revenue streams became increasingly dependent on external sources, including nonresidents, as discussed in box 1. In 2013, when the city finally succumbed to the weight of accumulating fiscal challenges and declared bankruptcy, its debt and unfunded liabilities amounted to $18 billion—or $68,000 per household, which is about 2.7 times the median household income (Turbeville 2013).

The Failed Housing Market

The enormous excess supply of housing that accumulated over decades as a result of winnowing demand in Detroit corroded the value of that property. The real estate crisis of 2007–2008 dealt the final blow, resulting in the near-complete breakdown of Detroit’s housing market. By 2010, the average price of a residential property had plummeted to about $7,000 from $57,000 in 2006 (Hodge et al. 2014a). Detroit’s current excess of land and housing would likely suppress real estate price recovery in the coming years even if the population were to stabilize.

Property Tax Delinquency, Abandonment, and Public Acquisition of Property

Tax officials have not recalibrated assessment values to reflect house price declines. The resulting overassessment is as high as 80 percent (Hodge et al. 2014a), contributing to a general unwillingness to pay taxes, according to Alm et al. (2014). Their research also shows that additional factors such as high statutory tax rates and limited services such as public safety worsen this delinquency as well.

In the midst of the real estate crisis, property tax delinquency reached an alarming 50 percent (Alm et al. 2014). Figure 2 (p. 13) shows delinquency rates by neighborhood across the city in 2010. Property tax collection depends on a jurisdiction’s ability to impose sanctions for nonpayment of taxes, as noted by Langsdorf (1973). When real estate values collapse, taxing authorities have no workable enforcement mechanism; homeowners’ savings from nonpayment of property tax are greater than the value of the house they own and would lose in the instance of foreclosure. Further, proceeds from the sale of low-valued tax-foreclosed property are insufficient to cover back taxes owed and the government costs of initiating foreclosure proceedings.

Widespread failure to pay property taxes and the subsequent abandonment of homes has resulted in the public acquisition of thousands of properties throughout Detroit. Fifteen percent of the parcels within the 139-square-mile city are now empty, and nearly 25 percent of Detroit’s land area is now nontaxable, owned and managed by the city or some other public entity (Sands and Skidmore 2014), as illustrated in figure 3.

The Downward Spiral of Foreclosures

Currently, the number of properties flowing into public hands via tax foreclosure far outpaces the number of publicly held properties being purchased back by private taxpaying owners.

In Michigan, delinquent property taxes are subject to a 4 percent administration fee and 1 percent monthly interest on the delinquent amount computed at a non-compounded rate, beginning in the first month of nonpayment. After one year of delinquency, the city forfeits the property to county government, and the owner becomes subject to an additional 0.5 percent monthly interest charge. During this two-year period, owners may redeem their properties by paying all outstanding taxes and fees.

If property taxes go unpaid for more than two years, the Wayne County Treasurer initiates foreclosure proceedings. After a show cause hearing in the Circuit Court, the County Treasurer publicly auctions the foreclosed parcels. The starting bid equals the unpaid property taxes plus interest and penalties, and the proceeds are distributed proportionately to the taxing jurisdictions. If the property doesn’t sell at the first auction, the county lowers the minimum bid to $500 and holds a second auction. This procedure has led to further tax evasion, as some homeowners elect to ignore their tax bills with the expectation that they will be able to repurchase the parcel for $500 at the second auction.

Property that doesn’t sell at either auction may be transferred to a public body (city or state) or to a state or local land bank, or it may be held for a subsequent auction. County records indicate that 80 percent of the parcels sold to private buyers at auction over the past two years are once again delinquent on taxes (MacDonald 2013). Given that the tax delinquency rate is 67 percent for non-homestead property owners (Alm et al. 2014), it seems likely that a significant proportion of buyers at auction are absentee landlords who intend to reduce their operating expenses and increase their net rental income by never paying property taxes.

Property taxes are effectively optional on low-valued parcels as well. To minimize the backlog of tax-delinquent lots (MacDonald 2013), the county does not foreclose on homeowners who owe less than $1,600 in taxes and penalties in aggregate, effectively rendering these debts optional.

Expected revenue from the sale of low-valued parcels is insufficient to cover legal expenses associated with tax foreclosure and unpaid property tax balances. The end result is an increasing rate of delinquency and a growing inventory of unwanted property that ends up in the public sector, where it generates no revenue for the city.

Where to Go from Here?

Another wave of property tax-related foreclosures is expected in late 2014 and early 2015. What can be done to stabilize the situation?

Curbing Property Tax Delinquency

As mentioned, delinquency will abate when tax payers perceive that they receive commensurate returns for their money. Thus, improving the tax-service package by upgrading core services such as public safety will reduce evasion and lateness (Alm et al. 2014). Under the leadership of recently elected Mayor Mike Duggan, city government is taking steps to improve basic public service provision and put its fiscal house in order. For example, just 35,000 of 88,000 streetlights currently work, so Duggan plans to install 2,400 functioning streetlights per month (Austen 2014). He also increased the number of operating buses from 143 to 190, and improved snow plowing during the particularly harsh winter.

Lowering tax rates would modestly reduce delinquency as well (Alm et al. 2014). Roughly double the regional average, Detroit tax rates are at the state’s maximum of 67 mills and 85 mills per assessed value for homestead and non-homestead properties, respectively. While a reduction would improve the competitive position of the city relative to other communities in the region, currently there is no discussion of reducing property tax rates.

Aligning assessed values more closely with actual market conditions will also reduce delinquency. Mayor Duggan recently promised to lower assessments by 5 to 20 percent across the city to reconcile them with state guidelines. However, Duggan’s promised reductions are just a small fraction of the 80 percent cut needed to bring assesment to market levels, according to Hodge et al. (2014a).

Removing Land from the Market

In the absence of robust demand for land, which seems unlikely in the near future, the excess must be removed from the market for a period of time in order for real estate value to improve broadly across the city. Given that public entities now hold so much property, it is within the power of government authorities to credibly remove it from the market. Without this type of policy action, the possibility that these parcels could be quickly transferred to the private sector serves to hamper price recovery.

Currently, public lands are held by many public entities. Authorities from the City of Detroit, Wayne County, and state government are working to consolidate these parcels under a single entity that can manage them more effectively. Detroit Future City (2010) details the extent of the fragmented ownership of public lands:

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Public land in Detroit is held by many separate agencies, including city, county, and state agencies, as well as autonomous or quasi-governmental entities such as the Detroit Public Schools, the Detroit Housing Commission, and the Detroit Economic Growth Corporation. Few other cities have such fragmented holding of their public land inventory. There is no consistency of policy, procedure, or mission among these agencies, while many are hamstrung by burdensome legal requirements and complex procedures. The Department of Planning and Development controls the largest number of properties, yet its ability to do strategic disposition is constrained by procedural obstacles, including the need to obtain City Council approval for all transactions, however small and insignificant from a citywide perspective.

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While this consolidation process is necessary, it is not sufficient. Financial resources are required to remove blight and implement land use plans. City leaders are focused mainly on strategies to return these parcels to private ownership. If they can stimulate greater interest in Detroit property, this approach might be viable.

Indeed, opportunities for private ownership are emerging in the central business district (CBD). Daniel Gilbert, founder of Quicken Loans, has moved his headquarters to downtown Detroit and invested $1.3 billion in city real estate (Forbes 2014). And downtown renewal has led to substantial rental price increases (Christie 2014).

Land values are very high in the CBD, as depicted in figure 4 (p. 16) by the black parcels, which represent the very highest land values on the map. Detroit’s land value gradient is very steep, however. While several areas within the donut around the CBD have retained some worth, land values plunge rapidly as distance from the CBD increases, though they rise again near the city’s border, probably because amenities such as shopping are available in the nearby suburbs.

Given the weak demand outside the CBD, it may be more effective to determine which publicly held properties should return to private taxpaying parties, which properties should be taken off the market for a decade or two, with the option of returning land to the market should conditions change, and which should be permanently removed from the market.

The 2012 master plan, as outlined by Detroit Future City, calls for the reclamation of land for parks, forests, industrial buffers, greenways, retention ponds, community gardens, and even campgrounds (Austen 2014). Full implementation of this ambitious proposal requires significant financial resources. But consider how state and federal authorities intervened in the last major episode of mass tax foreclosure. During the Great Depression, many homesteaders on marginal agricultural lands in Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin were unable to pay their property taxes, and this default resulted in a mass wave of tax delinquency, foreclosure, abandonment, and eventual forfeiture. In these states, county governments frequently became the owners of thousands of acres, much of which was eventually sold to the state and federal governments. The six national forests in Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Michigan, as well as the region’s numerous state forests, all have origins in this mass land abandonment of the Depression Era, as state and federal authorities pieced together a patchwork of adjacent lands purchased from counties eager to sell off their tax-forfeited property.

Today, state and federal authorities have no taste for a Detroit “bailout.” But history suggests that state and federal governments could help Detroit regain fiscal viability by purchasing patchworks of unwanted parcels, making payments in lieu of taxes, as is typical for other publicly owned lands, and then using the land for the benefit of the general public. Potential uses are mapped out in the aforementioned city master plan which the second installment of this series will explore. A federal, state, and local government partnership to reclaim these properties could help stabilize the land market and generate a revenue stream for the city and the other overlying taxing jurisdictions (including the state government via the state education tax). Property value recovery in combination with downtown reinvestment, continued efforts to improve Detroit’s tax-service package and remove blight, and long-run investment in Detroit’s human and social capital are essential elements of a sustainable Detroit recovery.

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Box 1: Targeting Nonresidents for Revenue

Detroit’s revenue streams have become increasingly dependent on external sources, including nonresidents, as its population and economic base have declined. This shift occurred in part because over time Michigan state legislatures empowered the City of Detroit to use tax-exporting strategies to help shore up weakening fiscal conditions and deal with massive structural changes to the regional economy. While there were periods during which it appeared that Detroit was on the cusp of recovery, various forces prevented “escape velocity.”

Today, the City of Detroit relies on the income tax, property tax, casino wagering tax, state revenue sharing, a utility user’s tax, federal grants, and various fees and licenses to fund public services. Of these, the casino wagering tax and the city income tax were adopted to bolster fading revenues from more traditional sources.

The casino wagering tax, based on gamers’ winning receipts, has become particularly important to the City of Detroit over the last decade, as shown in figure 2, which summarizes trends in the city’s major revenue sources from 1960 through 2012. The state legislature authorized casino gaming activity and the wagering tax in Detroit in 1996, to help the city address its fiscal challenges. By 2001, casino construction had been completed. The $180 million in additional annual revenues helped to stave off financial pressures even as other sources, such as income taxes and state shared revenues, were in decline. Up to 85 percent of gamers at the three major Detroit casinos are nonresidents, according to recent reports and interviews with gaming experts (Miklojcik 2014).

Since 1963, the city income tax has represented Detroit’s largest and, for a number of years, fastest-growing revenue source. At the time of adoption, the majority of the income tax was paid by city residents. As Detroit’s population has declined, however, the income tax on nonresidents who work in the city has become an increasing share of the city income tax base, composed of wages and salaries earned at a city-based job. The tax rate is 2.4 percent for city residents, whereas nonresidents pay 1.2 percent. While corporations and partnerships also pay an income tax, it is a very small portion of total revenues collected. According to Scorsone and Skidmore (2014), about half of the city income tax revenue in Detroit is paid by nonresidents.

State revenue sharing continues to play a critical role in Detroit’s finances, though population loss has diminished even this income source. In Michigan, state government collects a statewide sales tax and then shares a portion of the proceeds with municipal governments. Sales tax revenues are allocated to local governments based on constitutional provisions as well as state statute. The constitutional portion of revenue sharing is based on each jurisdiction’s share of the total state population. Given the dwindling number of Detroit residents, this portion of state revenue sharing has been falling for decades. The city experienced significant growth in total revenue sharing funds through the 1970s and 1980s, due to increases in statutory revenue sharing, which is distributed by formulae that have been changed by legislators many times in recent decades. But new changes to the statute combined with stagnation in the sales tax led to declining growth and eventual decline in revenue sharing for cities across the entire state in the 1990s. As Michigan entered a decade-long recession, this decline continued for most local jurisdictions, including Detroit, through the 2000s.

Some have pointed to revenue sharing reductions as a major source of stress for the City of Detroit, and a major catalyst for the bankruptcy. However, these declines affected all cities that received revenue sharing in Michigan; while cuts to revenue sharing likely influenced the timing of Detroit’s bankruptcy, they were not the ultimate cause. Further, it is important to note that revenue sharing for Detroit represents a net positive transfer of funds from the rest of the state to the city. According to the 2007 economic census, retail sales in the City of Detroit were $3.2 billion, or about 2.9 percent of the $109 billion in the State of Michigan.

In 2012, total state revenue sharing to all municipalities in Michigan was about $1 billion, and Detroit’s share of the total was $172 million, or 17.2 percent. Given that Detroit represents just 3 percent of total state retail sales in Michigan, one can conclude that the majority of state revenue sharing that flowed to Detroit originated from retail transactions that occurred outside the city.

As of 2014, the City of Detroit had approximately a $1 billion General Fund, considerably lower than in 2002 when revenue peaked at $1.4 billion. A 30 percent drop in revenues over time without a commensurate cut in expenditures led to the Detroit fiscal crisis and the eventual declaration of bankruptcy in 2013. By 2012, Detroit had borrowed more than $1 billion in an attempt to stave off default and a liquidity crisis (Michigan Department of Treasury 2013).

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About the Author

Mark Skidmore is professor of economics at Michigan State University, where he holds the Morris Chair in State and Local Government Finance and Policy, with joint appointments in the Department of Agricultural, Food and Resource Economics and the Department of Economics.

References

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Miklojcik, J. 2014. President of Michigan Consultants. Information shared in personal interview with Eric Scorsone.

National Public Radio. 2014. “Chinese Investors Aren’t Snatching up Detroit Property Yet.” www.npr.org/2014/03/04/285711091/chinese-investors-arent-snatching-up-detroit-property-yet

Sands, G. and M. Skidmore. 2014. “Making Ends Meet: Options for Property Tax Reform in Detroit.” Forthcoming in Journal of Urban Affairs.

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