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Scholars and practitioners involved with the regularization of low-income settlements in Latin America shared their experiences in a forum sponsored by the Lincoln Institute last March and hosted by the City of Medellín and its regularization office, PRIMED (Integrated Program for the Improvement of Subnormal Barrios in Medellín). Participants included representatives from PRIMED, Medellín city officials, and observers from multilateral institutions including the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the World Bank, AID and GTZ (Germany).
Twelve major presentations reported on the most significant case studies from eight countries: Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Perú and Venezuela. The forum proved to be a landmark meeting whose findings, summarized below, are expected to have important implications for Latin American policymakers.
Comparative Perspectives on Regularization
Several different approaches to regularization are illustrated in the country case studies. The two primary approaches are juridical regularization, i.e., legal land entitlement procedures to convert from de facto to de jure property ownership, as in Perú, Ecuador and Mexico; and physical regularization (urbanization), including the extension of infrastructure into irregular settlements, as in Colombia, Venezuela, Brazil and other countries. A third approach, which has been emphasized only recently, puts priority on the social and civic integration of low-income settlements and their populations into the urban fabric by a combination of measures.
While most countries have elements of all three forms of regularization, they usually focus on one direction or another. In Mexico all three approaches are used simultaneously. In most other countries the emphasis depends on the relative strengths of the actors, organizations and politics on the one hand, and on the way the regularization problem is conceived (“constructed”) by federal and local authorities on the other.
Juridical Regularization: Land Title Programs
The regularization of land titles has become accepted practice by governments, international agencies and NGOs alike. (see Figure 1.) In fact, the question “Why Regularize?” that was raised at the beginning of the forum seemed to catch everyone by surprise. Yet, posing this question goes to the heart of the matter about who defines the problems regarding land tenure and who establishes policies in favor of regularization. Most of the legal titling programs examined in the case studies were lengthy and expensive, and, by the time they came on-line, did little to significantly affect the level of security or to systematically provide services in the settlements.
Figure 1 Common Arguments in Favor of Land Regularization
As far as the poor are concerned, however, several of the arguments in favor of regularization would appear to be spurious. Established households generally have de facto security and rarely prioritize the need for full legal title, the latter being a need more associated with middle-classes value systems. Moreover, once settlements are well-established, home improvements and consolidation occur at a rate that is closely tied to available resources, not to title security. As for the introduction of services, most providers follow their own internal rules for timing and procedures; rarely is legal title an important criterion.
Furthermore, low-income households do not like falling into debt and are uneasy about entering formal credit systems, even though NGOs and governments are moving towards micro-credit support. In short, where low-income groups want regularization of tenure it appears to be because the state wants them to want it and then constructs demand accordingly.
One may conceive of tenure regularization as both an end in itself and a means to an end. Regularization as an “end” emerged clearly in the Lima case, where access to land and land titling programs substitute for a systematic housing policy. The most recent round of land titling (since 1996) even includes a retitling of previously regularized lots as an arena of political patronage serving the central government at the expense of the city’s political leaders. (1) A similar situation prevailed in Mexico with the multiplex regularization agencies created during the 1970s. In both countries the commitment to tenurial regularization is clearly indicated by active programs, usually providing a large number of titles each year at low cost.
Elsewhere, regularization may also be an “end,” but it is of secondary importance. In Colombia, Brazil, El Salvador and Ecuador, for example, titling is at best only a minor part of the physical regularization package. Even so, the absence of legal tenure and the need for regularization may be used to good political effect by regulating the flow and order of infrastructure provision.
Regularization of titles as a means to an end is promoted widely by international agencies as part of the World Bank’s New Urban Management Program. Mexico is a good example of the process whereby land titling is a prerequisite to urban land management, planning and public administration. Regularization incorporates the population into the system of land registry, tax base, planning controls, construction permissions, consumption charges, and recovery of services and infrastructure. Regularization becomes the means to urban sustainability and management, and this more than any other reason explains its widespread espousal and adoption today.
One notable feature in several case studies was the apparent reluctance to regularize on private lands unless the initiative had the support of the original landowner. As a result, the settlements most likely to be regularized are those occupying public land or land whose ownership is unchallenged. With the exception of Mexico, governments are reluctant to expropriate in the social interest. Several countries have a system of land occupancy rights that permits transfer of ownership after a certain number of years of proven and appropriate use. In Brazil this usucapión system has been extended recently to allow for title transfer on privately owned urban lots of less than 250m2 that have been occupied continuously for five years.
Issues in juridical regularization programs:
Physical Regularization: Urbanization and Infrastructure Provision
The second principal arena of regularization reported by many of the case studies at the forum focused on the physical regularization process in different forms of irregular settlements. In Medellín, for example, approximately 12 percent of the total population is estimated to live in fast-growing barrios, which are often built on steep slopes like their hillside counterparts in Rio or Caracas. There are undoubted problems and dangers in these areas, but most of the participants who visited the PRIMED settlements were more encouraged by their level and rate of consolidation than the local officials appeared to be. (The discussion did not address upgrades and interventions in inner-city tenements-conventillos, vecindades, cortiços.)
It is impossible to do justice to the many innovative programs that were described at the forum, but one major success story is the Favela/Bairro program in Rio de Janeiro. This project is predicated on close collaboration with local residents to open up favela streets to vehicular access in combination with service installation. However, it is important to recognize that its success has only been possible at considerable cost: the total expenditure between 1994 and 1997 has been US$300 million, in large part provided by the IDB. This raises important questions about the replicability of such programs.
Issues in physical regularization programs:
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Regularization as a Means of Social Integration
It became apparent in the deliberations that an increasingly explicit goal of regularization is to achieve social integration by bringing low-income populations into the societal mainstream and into the urban fabric. This is most frequently observed in reference to the “rescue” of low-income populations and other marginal groups and their incorporation into the urban citizenry. This was one of the important goals in Brazil’s favela/bairro program, which, in part at least, aimed to break up the drug and delinquent youth gangs and to rescue the local population from their influence.
A potential problem with this approach is that concepts of “good citizen” and the societal mainstream are social constructions that are often highly value-laden and may derive from within a particular class and dominant power group. Regularization to achieve integration into the wider set of social opportunities such as public education and health care is one thing; regularization for social convergence and conformity is another. However, this theme remains incipient in the literature, and the whole notion of citizenship with its bundles of rights and responsibilities is part of an agenda still largely unconsidered.
Conclusion
This international forum emphasized the need to be aware of the different underlying rationales for juridical and physical regularization in individual countries, and to be aware that they are closely tied to the political and planning process. In order for regularization to work well there has to be genuine political commitment such that all departments and officials who intervene do so with greater integration, cooperation and empowerment. Policymakers should also think imaginatively about alternative, “parallel” ownership systems and opportunities for genuine public participation in decisionmaking at all stages in the regularization process.
Important, too, are financial commitment and sustainability. Unless regularization is tied to medium- and long-term cost recovery through taxes, user charges and deferred assessments, programs will continue to depend on major external funding and subsidies, which will severely limit the extent and scale of their application.
An exciting last session of the forum allowed participants to reflect on future directions for research and policy analysis on land market regularization. Five major areas emerged. First, we recognized the need to identify the various actors and interest groups involved in promoting irregular or illegal land development in the first place, and to make explicit the differences between land invasions, owner subdivisions, company subdivisions and other actions. The point here is that irregularity is produced by various actors and interests groups as a for-profit business, and is not just a result of dysfunctional urbanization.
Second, we discussed moving away from dualist thinking and breaking with the idea of conceptualizing the land market in terms of the formal and informal city, the parallel city, or normal and subnormal barrios, all of which implicitly assume that the poor are locked into a separate land market. In fact, there is a single land market that is segmented, not separated, along a continuum in terms of access and affordability.
Third, we need to confront the issue of financial replicability and the ways in which finance might be leveraged through cross-subsidies, plusvalia, valorization charges, tax-and-spend, progressive consumption charges, and other mechanisms. Fourth, we need to be less gender-blind. It is important to think more imaginatively about regularization priorities with respect to gender and to explore innovative titling schemes that address the need for women’s settlement and housing rights.
Finally, we need to be much more precise in our terminology, and, more importantly, to recognize that there is a “social construction” embedded within language. The terms adopted in any society are revealing about how that society views and diagnoses housing and related social issues. Terminology may lead to punitive or patronizing policy solutions; it may even “criminalize” local populations. Most of the differences and variations in the case studies stem from the way each society constructs its understanding of the housing problem and how it presents that vision to its people-through its terminology, through its laws, procedures and policies, and through the bureaucratic and administrative organization of the state itself.
1. Julio Calderon, “Regularization of Urban Land in Peru,” Land Lines, May 1998.
Peter M. Ward is professor of sociology and of public affairs at the University of Texas at Austin and a faculty associate of the Lincoln Institute. Among his many books is Methodology for Land and Housing Market Analysis, coedited with Gareth Jones and published by the Lincoln Institute in 1994.
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Land and housing markets, and any other market for that matter, can be approached as arenas in which persons exchange rights to assets subject to constitutional rules, statutory and common law rules, and administrative rules and procedures. The value of land is often believed to be determined by expectations about what land uses will be legally permitted over time and the return from such uses. However, there is substantial evidence, international as well as U.S.-based, that markets and prices are also shaped by expectations about what is legally prohibited yet is nonetheless achievable through extra-legal or illegal means.
Scholars since Jeremy Bentham have linked markets and their viability to a legal regime of property rights which clearly defines, safeguards and facilitates the transfer of such rights through legal means. How then do we explain illegal or extra-legal property transactions: the buying and selling of stolen goods; subdivision of single-family houses into one-room rentals; and squatter settlements.
In all these contexts, assets are being acquired and used, hence there is property. There are also markets, frequently thriving, to exchange such assets. What is absent from these markets are legally defined rights. Their absence, however, does not prevent these markets from emerging and affecting supply and demand in the legal market. It is crucial, therefore, that such markets be understood, not just as an exotic feature of the developing world, but as alternatives to which actors in the market turn under certain conditions.
What happens if property rights are not clear, are contested or are not well enforced? Policy advisors rarely address this question, not because they fail to see that property regimes are frequently lacking in stability and security, but rather because they see their function as one of putting in place the ideal set of laws, regulations, and administrative and enforcement mechanisms that would guarantee stable expectations, secure rights and efficient markets (see Figure 1).
The only problem is that putting in place such laws and regulations rarely happens in a vacuum. Rather, it happens in a landscape of existing interests, entitlements, conventions and practices. It is the interaction between these new interventions and existing norms and practices that determines who is able to do what with which assets in society. Three examples illustrate my point.
Farm Restructuring in Eastern Europe
Until the late 1980s, farmland in Eastern Europe was organized within state farms, collective farms, or, in some cases, small private farms owned by farmers who had the right to cultivate but not sell or develop the land. The absence of competitive agricultural and land markets prevented many necessary adjustments from taking place: labor mobility, adjustment in farm sizes, incentives to invest or increase labor productivity, and moving land to better uses.
Some policy advisers have argued that unless the New Independent States establish family-based farms with legally, well-defined and well-protected private property rights that can be transferred easily, little can be done to promote necessary adjustments. How do farmers adjust to the new realities of the transition while constitutions are amended, laws are promulgated, cadasters are compiled and land registers are established?
The answer lies in short-term informal leasing, which is the most common land transaction in Eastern Europe for several reasons. First, informal leases occur mostly between neighboring farmers who know each other and the quality of the land being traded. Second, most leases are short-term, allowing farmers to reduce the uncertainty associated with long-term commitments in inflationary and politically unstable environments. Finally, short-term leases allow farmers to adjust their farming units, which speeds up the economic restructuring of the farming sector. Farmers conduct these short-term transactions not because they are legally permitted but because of norms, conventions and local networks.
Squatter Housing in Developing Countries
Conventional wisdom on squatter housing in developing countries has been that lack of tenure security is responsible for the poor quality of housing in these settlements. Granting legal titles, the argument goes, would provide the necessary security and unleash household savings into investment in better housing. Recent empirical work, however, suggests that legal title is neither necessary nor sufficient for tenure security to exist.
Furthermore, absence of land title does not prevent squatters from renting or selling their houses. Indeed, except when an eminent threat of eviction exists, informal markets evolve to reduce the uncertainty associated with illegal transactions. Rules and arrangements evolve over time to provide information about who owns what, enforce contracts and resolve property disputes. For example, neighborhood associations in Brazilian favelas maintain an informal register of residents and issue documents as proof of ownership. Middlemen and land subdividers in Jordan play a crucial role in finding buyers and even financing them. These roles substitute for, duplicate or manipulate the legal system that functions in formal markets.
Illegal Housing Conversions in the U.S.
A recent series of articles in the New York Times documents the surge of illegal apartments throughout the City of New York in response to continuing poverty and the dwindling supply of affordable housing. In Queens, for example, one- and two-family units are being converted into multiple apartments, turning even attics and basements into makeshift flats.
These apartments are not registered with the city and are, therefore, not regulated. Firefighters estimate that as many as 80 percent of the homes in Queens are illegally subdivided. Needless to say, landlords, tenants, developers, brokers and contractors operate in these markets. They rely on evading, manipulating, and breaking laws and regulations to allow these markets to function. By necessity, they also have to rely on extra-legal means to enforce some of their contractual arrangements or resolve their disputes.
An Alternative Model
To understand how land markets operate, we need a “lens” that captures a wider array of rules and market arrangements. We need to examine not only what constitutional, statutory and common laws permit, but also what social norms and conventions permit. We need to go beyond property rights to include the range of property interests that are not necessarily based in law. We also need to go beyond the formal means of contracting and enforcement to include informal means based on ethnic, territorial and associational networks. This approach amounts to an alternative framework (see Figure 2) for understanding market actors’ expectations about the ability to use, develop, transfer and derive income from land.
The wider lens approach to market institutions also allows us to shift emphasis from institutional forms to institutional substance. The important question is not whether a particular institution (such as a land registry) exists, but rather how information about land and housing markets is provided, how risk is reduced, and how enforcement is made effective.
Omar Razzaz is Ford International Assistant Professor in the Department of Urban Studies and Planning at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He previously worked at the World Bank on property rights under transition in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Africa.
References
Bruni, Frank, with Deborah Sontag. “Behind a Suburban Facade in Queens, A Teeming, Angry Arithmetic,” The New York Times, October 8, 1996, p. A1.
Razzaz, Omar. “Contestation and Mutual Adjustment: The Process of Controlling Land in Yajouz, Jordan,” Law and Society Review 28, no. 1. 1994.
“Examining Property Rights and Investment in Informal Settlements: The Case of Jordan,” Land Economics, November 1993.
World Bank, “Regional Study: Farm Restructuring and Land Tenure in Reforming Socialist Economies: A Comparative Analysis of Eastern and Central Europe,” 1994. Prepared by Euroconsult/Center for World Food Studies, Washington, DC.
Public policies and actions regarding social housing in Colombia, as in other Latin American countries, have concentrated on regularization and upgrading programs, which in many cases are linked to the need for infrastructure funding. These programs also are seen as the only palliative instrument for addressing an apparently insoluble problem—illegal (pirate) urban development—although they have been found to be quite limited and even counterproductive. Here we present an alternative policy: the application of principles and instruments for land management and participación en plusvalías (public participation in land value increments resulting from administrative actions). This policy was established in the Colombian Constitution and in Law 388 of 1997, which prescribes that the revenues generated from land value increments are to be used for social investments.
Operación Urbanística Nuevo Usme is one of the strategic projects promoted by Bogotá Mayor Antanas Mockus to solve the problem of illegal developments. Located in the southeastern sector of the city, Usme is one of the areas most vulnerable to the pressures of illegal urbanization; powerful pirate subdividers have developed more than half of the 1,000 hectares already set aside for urban use. The predominant mechanism for this kind of extra-legal development, besides invasions or squatter settlements, has been the sale of plots by subdividers who buy large areas of land at rural prices and sell them without providing any services or infrastructure and without approval from the public administration. The negative consequences of this kind of development include relatively high land prices and inequitable land occupation patterns.
Usme is expected to expand into another 600 hectares of steeply sloped, ecologically fragile and still predominantly rural land, according to the city’s master plan (Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial or POT), which was approved in June 2000. Bogotá’s administration already has invested in water and sewage systems for the area and is executing other projects, including the extension of the Transmilenio public transport system and construction of 6,200 low-income housing units. In addition, under the initiative of citizens organizations, two large areas, the Parque entre Nubes and the Agroparque los Soches, have been designated by the POT as both meaningful and symbolic local landmarks. The first is a large park marking the transition area between urban and rural, which is constantly threatened with illegal development and exploitation. The second area, a type of agricultural buffer zone, was created by a peasant organization that consciously assumed an important reduction of its land price by changing the land classification from suburban to rural, in order to preserve its agrarian character. This organization is now developing innovative alternative means of land management through ecological conservation projects to benefit the city as a whole and to block the threat of illegal urban growth.
How can this diversity of elements, ranging from social housing to public transportation and agricultural land conservation, create an opportunity for sustainable living conditions for the poorest people of the city? How does one reconcile the objectives of urban policy with social justice? How can the city prevent pirate subdividers from taking undeserved advantage of Usme’s new development area? This is the challenge for the city’s administration, for popular housing organizations and for the residents living south of the city.
Alternative Mechanisms for Value Capture
One of the topics under debate with regard to Law 388 is the precedent of recovering land value increments for areas designated for social housing. Housing organizations have sought to exempt such lands from participation in plusvalías, based on a common misunderstanding about the nature of the instrument, which views the value captured as being transferred to the final price of housing (see Smolka and Furtado, page 12). Taking a different approach, the Usme project is structured around several alternative mechanisms for value capture that go beyond its restricted and misconceived role as a tax.
The first mechanism is simply the announcement of the Usme project, since Law 388 provides that in the case of public land acquisition the land’s commercial value (for compensatory purposes) cannot include the amount corresponding to the plusvalías generated by the project. This provision freezes the land price to its level prior to the announcement of the project, and therefore is an expedient instrument to reduce the cost that the local administration would otherwise pay for land for its own urban development projects.
The second mechanism is the Plan Parcial, a plan for local development parcels, which applies the principle of equitable distribution of costs and benefits that Colombian law has adopted from the Spanish law. This mode of reparcelación (or equitable land readjustment) includes the distribution of infrastructure costs as well as development rights, and allows the public administration to obtain a portion of the developed lands as a return payment for its investment in the development. Through this mechanism, the Municipality of Bogotá can obtain free or low-cost land for infrastructure or public facilities, or for social housing.
A third mechanism is the recovery of plusvalías as established by Law 388, which requires the prior approval of a specific agreement by the City Council. If the recovery plan is approved, the municipality could regain between 30 and 50 percent of the land’s price increment derived from the land’s change in classification from rural to urban, the authorization for more profitable uses, or the increment of development rights. The plusvalías could be paid in land, as a percentage of participation in the project, in infrastructure or in cash. Again, the effect is to reduce the price of land obtained by the local administration for the fulfillment of its social objectives.
A more innovative alternative is for the local administration or municipality to assign land development rights directly to the low-income beneficiaries of the housing program. This ingenious mechanism, based on the separation of building rights from ownership rights, in effect shifts the balance of power from the land subdividers to the low-income families who move to the area and subsequently share in the land value increment generated by the development. These new residents now hold the land rights that would otherwise have been sold to them by pirate subdividers who no longer have a captive market for selling irregular plots at high prices in anticipation of future upgrading programs
Taking an active role in regulating the occupation of the area through the distribution of such building rights, the municipality finds itself in a better position to negotiate directly with pirate subdividers, and to emulate in some way their actions by providing serviced land (“sites and services”) at affordable prices. This legal approach by the municipality ensures the provision of roads, public services networks, green spaces and recreational and public facilities that usually are not provided by pirate subdividers or that the original rural landowners are unable to support. In sum, the procedure assigns the building rights to the low-income inhabitants who will construct housing by their own efforts over time. Once the original owner’s development rights are reduced through the Plan Parcial, the land price is also reduced.
Broadening the Participation in Plusvalías
The plusvalías policy of capturing private land value increments for public benefit has been accepted in high-income areas, where revenues are used to subsidize social investments elsewhere. However, pirate subdividers often find ways to expropriate these investments in low-income areas through the prevailing illegal and clandestine activities used to access and occupy land. The Usme project represents an attempt to shift the bargaining power of the public vis-a-vis pirate subdividers by designing alternative urbanization processes.
The mayor’s office has already made a de facto commitment to apply value capture instruments, but they are still being explained and discussed within the broader debate over the policy of participation in plusvalías. As we have seen, the practical principle on which this policy is based is the separation of property rights from building rights. However, the policy faces enormous resistance because of the civil law tradition that unitary and absolute rights are associated with private land ownership.
The novelty of the program is its potential to directly address the challenges of low-income urbanization. Expectations have driven up the price of illegally subdivided lands in Usme and have stimulated pirate developers to “produce commercial land” by destroying peasant communities, degrading areas with environmental importance, and occupying risky zones. The tolerance of such practices reached such an extreme level that the prevailing inflated prices in these mostly informal market arrangements have been used by the local administration as the benchmark to determine just compensation for land acquisition.
In the absence of public mechanisms to intervene in the land market, such as through participation in plusvalías, landowners, particularly pirate subdividers, not only have captured all the price increments generated by the urban development but actually have taken control of the process. The resulting illegal urbanization is costly to the individual occupants of such settlements and to society as a whole, as it raises the cost of subsequent upgrading programs three to five times the cost of urbanizing unoccupied land.
Through the alternative mechanisms listed above, it is expected that more land use conversions, such as in the urbanization of Usme, will be managed in an alternative political economic environment whereby the municipality participates as an active and socially responsible regulator of the process. These projects will establish close ties between regulatory land policies and the rules under which land is publicly purchased or auctioned, the costs of infrastructure and public facilities provision are distributed, and development rights are exercised. The return to the community of the plusvalías derived from these changes in development regulations and public investments constitutes the most efficient way to construct more democratic relations based on the exercise of a renewed demand for urban reform and the right to access the city.
María Mercedes Maldonado Copello is professor and researcher at the Interdisciplinary Center for Regional Studies (Centro Interdisciplinario de Estudios Regionales, CIDER) at the University of the Andes in Bogotá, Colombia. Martim O. Smolka is a senior fellow and director of the Lincoln Institute’s Program on Latin America and the Caribbean.
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Carlos Morales-Schechinger joined IHS, the Institute for Housing and Urban Development Studies at Erasmus University in Rotterdam, The Netherlands, in 2008. This international institute attracts students from all over the world, mostly from developing countries. Some IHS programs are sponsored jointly with the Lincoln Institute.
Previously Morales was a part-time lecturer at UNAM, the National Autonomous University of Mexico. He has been collaborating on a regular basis in seminars and courses organized by the Lincoln Institute throughout Latin America for the past 12 years. He lectures primarily on land value capture instruments, land and property taxation, and land-based preventive policies as alternatives to informal settlements.
He has held various government posts, including director of land policies and instruments in Mexico’s ministry for urban development, where he designed and implemented an ambitious program on land banking; and as director of cadastral policy for Mexico City’s government, where he managed an extensive fiscal reform of property taxes. He also held posts in both public and private banks in Mexico, dealing with property valuation, mortgages, property administration, and loans for large urban developments and for local governments.
He holds a bachelor’s degree in architecture from UNAM, a diploma in local government finance from the University of Birmingham, UK, and a Master of Philosophy in urban studies from the University of Edinburgh, UK.
Land Lines: How did you become involved with the Lincoln Institute?
Carlos Morales: My first introduction was in the early 1980s when I attended an Institute-sponsored international conference in Cambridge that related to my work for the government on urban land policy. The ideas I learned about were put to direct use two years later when I worked on a reform to increase the supply of serviced land in medium-sized cities and to subsidize sites and services for low-income households in Mexico. In the early 1990s, when I was working for the government of Mexico City on an ambitious property tax reform, I attended another Institute conference on property taxation.
From 2000 onward, I participated in many education activities organized by Martim Smolka through the Program on Latin America and the Caribbean. Around 2004 the Institute started a joint venture with IHS and I was one of the visiting lecturers hired by the Institute to teach in those programs. I was later invited to join the IHS staff full-time as the manager of this joint venture.
Land Lines: How do you compare the effectiveness of institutions such as IHS and the Lincoln Institute?
Carlos Morales: I believe they are complementary. The Institute is a leader in research and education on land policies, with an international focus on Latin America and China. IHS is recognized for its education and capacity building on urban management and development for a worldwide audience, focusing on developing and transition countries. IHS courses are open to students from all regions, but most come from countries in Africa, Asia, and Central and Eastern Europe. Through its joint venture with IHS, the Lincoln Institute is able to reach out to those from many more countries in an efficient way.
Land Lines: Conveying fundamental knowledge about land policy and urban management to practitioners is not an easy task. What have you found is the most effective approach?
Carlos Morales: Using a combination of two things is important: the profile of the lecturer and the appropriate pedagogy. Lecturers should have experience both as practitioners and as academics to be able to answer questions that are relevant to practitioners, especially when the answers imply moving away from their comfort zone and facing some kind of change.
The ultimate purpose of social science is precisely to change reality, not only to understand it. Consultancy brings academics close to practice, but it does not confront them with the moral commitment of implementing policy or the ethical responsibility for making policy work on the ground. Experience in direct practice is crucial. The Institute’s programs in Latin America employ lecturers with this profile, and they have proven effective in addressing issues such as the impacts of taxation and regulations on land markets and in choosing instruments for capturing incremental land value, both of which are hot topics in the region.
Regarding pedagogy, practitioners tend to be skeptical about theory. They regard it as impractical, and they want to test it to be convinced. Using examples of policies implemented in other cities is very useful. Some students from developing countries do not accept cases from more developed countries, arguing that their governance structure is too different. Others prefer cases from diverse situations because in spite of contextual differences they aspire to better development opportunities for their own countries. A lecturer should have an arsenal of many different cases to examine when questions rise.
Doing simulation games is also a very effective technique. Games involving role playing where participants compete against each other are the most useful for understanding land markets and helping solve problems. Role playing is revealing even when participants fail to solve problems since it prompts them to question what happened. I have seen how participants who experience failure in a game begin to cooperate and design clever regulations on their own. Another strategy is to assign participants roles contrary to their beliefs or experience. For example, government officials playing the role of pirate land developers learn about the substantial amounts of money the poor must spend just to access land.
Playing the devil’s advocate works well when discussing controversial concepts, as if the participants are in a land court. This is not a new technique except when played with a couple of twists. An example is determining the criteria for compensating eminent domain. In this game one team argues in favor of current use values and the other future use values. Background literature and practical information are provided for arguments on both sides. Practitioners from many places can relate to examples of regulatory takings, whether as expropriations in China, land restitutions in Eastern Europe, or the sale of building rights in Brazil.
Since participants have to defend a position with which they do not agree, they have to study and work harder. In many cases they end up changing their minds, or at least identifying new arguments to use later in debating their opponents in real life. At the end of a land court game the group acting as jury secretly votes twice, first on the team’s performance as advocates and second on the conceptual arguments. When a team gets more votes than the position they defended, it is clear that more research on the issue is needed. What I like best is that the game does not impose a position on the participants, but it raises the level of debate.
Land Lines: What are the main types of resistance to concepts and ideas on land policy?
Carlos Morales: Perhaps the concept most frequently resisted is how taxes and regulations are capitalized into the price of land. Resistance can come from an ideological standpoint (either left or right, both have arguments), self-interest (landowners do not readily accept sacrificing profit), or ignorance of how the capitalization concept works. As an educator I have a role to play in addressing the last challenge.
Even if theory is explained to practitioners, they remain skeptical if their experience contradicts the theory. Misunderstanding can come from referring to a tax on a commodity that is not as scarce as land, but it can also come from experience with land markets themselves. This happens when two policies with opposite effects are introduced together, for example, increasing densities and increasing taxes. The combined effect of these measures makes it difficult to understand the impact of each one. A simulation game can help isolate each impact. Practitioners need to experiment with each policy measure to better understand them both. I have noticed that they may nod with skepticism when you lecture them, but they give you a “eureka” smile when they reach understanding by playing a game.
Land Lines: How do you overcome resistance to topics such as value capture?
Carlos Morales: A charge linked to the increase in densities is a way of capturing the incremental value of land and a source of funds to finance infrastructure, as São Paulo is doing when it charges for extra building rights. The discussion about how this policy impacts market price is controversial. Landowners oppose it because it reduces their price expectations, but developers favor it because it reduces land prices and the payments are returned in the form of public works. A similar situation happened in Bogotá when a tax on the increment in the value of land was introduced.
Both cases are useful references to explain land value capture in developing countries, yet more city cases need to be documented and disseminated, and some practitioners want examples from developed countries. This is not easy, because land value capture is a buzzword in Latin American circles, but not in most developed countries. This is not because value capture is not used in the United States or other places, but rather because it is assumed as part of the operation of the land market. It is the role of lecturers to point this out and open opportunities for sharing experiences among practitioners from both developed and developing countries.
Land Lines: Please comment on the difficulties of conveying taxation concepts to planners.
Carlos Morales: Planners learn about property taxes if they are high enough to have an impact on decisions by landowners, developers, and land users, as in the United States. In developing countries these taxes generally are so low that they do not impact market decisions, so planners are not interested. When I play games that illustrate land markets to architects—who are often also planners—and they realize that the city is not going the way they expect, their most frequent reaction is to suggest more taxes and more efficient land markets. Seldom do they propose a traditional land use plan.
Land Lines: What in your opinion are the central concepts or ideas that could make the difference in the international debate on urban land markets?
Carlos Morales: Pointing out that land value capture is a significant source for financing infrastructure and preventing slums can bring more stakeholders into a serious discussion. Ideas related to security of tenure, land registration, and titling in order to increase access to loans have been dominating policy, but results have not been as positive as predicted. Slums continue to develop and service provision is still lagging behind.
Policies that have to do with land taxation and property obligations—not just property rights—have more potential to improve the functioning of urban land markets. UN-Habitat and the World Bank adopted the earlier notions of security of tenure as a solution, but are now beginning to show interest in land-based urban development instruments. Land value capture policies will have an effect tomorrow, but with a political cost today because giving titles is cheap and appeals to short-term politicians. This is the challenge that should be faced in the international debate to ensure more effective and long-term land market reform.
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As interest in urban living grows, the cost of residential real estate in many hot markets is skyrocketing. According to the Joint Center for Housing Studies (JCHS 2015), in 2014 rental vacancy rates hit their lowest point in two decades; rents rose in 91 out of 93 metropolitan areas studied; and the consumer price index for contract rents climbed at double the rate of inflation—and 10 percent or more at the top end, in Denver, San Jose, Honolulu, and San Francisco. Despite some interruption from the mortgage crisis, asking prices for homes for sale have continued to rise as well, often beyond the reach of potential home buyers (Olick 2014); in Washington, DC, the median home value nearly tripled from 2000 to 2013 (Oh et al. 2015). As housing activists look for effective tools to prevent displacement of lower-income families from gentrifying neighborhoods and create inclusive communities, many are turning to community land trusts (box 1) as a way to help build the nation’s stock of permanently affordable housing.
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Box 1: The CLT Model
Under the CLT model, a community-controlled organization retains ownership of a plot of land and sells or rents the housing on that land to lower-income households. In exchange for below-market prices, purchasers agree to resale restrictions that keep the homes affordable to subsequent buyers while also allowing owners to build some equity. The CLT also prepares home buyers to purchase property, supports them through financial challenges, and manages resales and rental units.
CLTs thus bring sustainable home ownership within the reach of more families, supporting residents who want to commit to their neighborhoods for the long term. In gentrifying areas, they provide an effective way for lower-income families to retain a stake in the neighborhood because they take a single initial subsidy (which could come from a variety of sources, often public programs such as the HOME Investment Partnerships Program or Community Development Block Grants) and attach it to the building, keeping the units affordable over time without new influxes of public money. In weak housing markets, they are beneficial as well (Shelterforce 2012), providing the financial stewardship that ensures fewer foreclosures, better upkeep, and stable occupancy. In 2009, at the height of the foreclosure crisis, Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) loans were 8.2 times more likely to be in the foreclosure process than CLT loans, despite the fact that CLT loans were uniformly made to low-income households (Thaden, Rosenberg 2010), and MBA loans included all income brackets. Of the very few CLT homes that did complete foreclosure, none were lost from the CLT’s portfolio.
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Much like community development corporations (CDCs), many CLTs grew from grassroots neighborhood organizations. Traditional community organizing (distinct from broader “resident outreach”) creates a base of residents who are empowered to determine for themselves what they need and mobilize to get it; as a united front, these individuals are better able to counter-balance corporate or governmental opponents and other forms of institutional power. Strategic collaboration and strength in numbers are essential to the successful formation of a CLT. But the skills required to organize politically around local concerns are very different from the skills required to manage real estate. While both sets of skills are required to implement and sustain a CLT, growing these core competencies under the same roof might hamper the neighborhood-based organization’s ability to pursue or achieve its core founding mission.
How have community organizations that created CLTs navigated the challenge of building two seemingly incompatible skill sets? We examined the experience of five established CLTs in locations across the country to see how they addressed this challenge and how their focus evolved as a result. From Boston to Los Angeles, community organizers faced a range of conditions, from high-vacancy neighborhoods with almost no housing market to booming areas where displacement was the top concern. Yet all five organizations had remarkably similar reasons for starting a community land trust: each CLT director spoke of wanting community control of land to prevent residents from either losing a home or being unable to afford one. Even those CLTs that began in weak housing markets were located near downtowns, university districts, or other popular areas, and recognized the potential for displacement as conditions in the neighborhoods improved. All agreed that a clear community vision is essential to the success of a CLT, but some groups take direct responsibility for creating and implementing that vision, while others are devoted to housing work on behalf of a parent organization charged with shepherding the larger vision. Approaches to organizing and housing development varied as well, but all agreed that these two activities can be a difficult mix.
Dudley Neighbors Inc., Boston, MA
The oldest organization in our study, Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative (DSNI), formed in a cold market in the 1980s to fight illegal dumping on broad swaths of vacant land left behind by a wave of arson. The city was proposing a master plan for the area without seeking input from residents, and community members responded by organizing DSNI to assert the community’s right to direct decisions about land use within its boundaries. They won that right and through DSNI decided that a CLT was the best tool to help the organization implement the community’s vision. “A lot of times, groups want to jump into creating a CLT thinking it will magically solve a neighborhood’s problems,” says Harry Smith, director of DSNI’s CLT, Dudley Neighbors Inc. (DNI). “But first we say: ‘Have you written down a vision of development in your community, and can you say how a CLT fits into that?’”
Founded in 1984, DNI is an independent organization, but it maintains close ties to its parent organization. The two groups share staff, and DSNI appoints a majority of the CLT’s board. The CLT is responsible only for providing affordable housing and community control of land, freeing DSNI to make organizing and community planning its main priority. Neither DSNI nor DNI carry out development directly, but instead partner with local affordable housing developers.
Because of its long history and established relationships, DSNI engages in less confrontational organizing than it did in its earliest days. But it doesn’t shy away from it if necessary. In fact, Smith reports that maintaining a CLT can be a unique political strength. When DSNI organizes around the fate of a particular parcel of land, “Having a land trust gives us an extra level of impact,” he says.
Sawmill Community Land Trust, Albuquerque, NM
Located in Albuquerque, New Mexico, Sawmill CLT was born in 1996 when, after a decade of community organizing, low-income residents banded together to fight a nearby factory that polluted their air and threatened their health. They wanted to assert control over future use of the space. After leaders attended a conference to learn more about CLTs, they held a series of community meetings on the topic. Though some residents aired concerns about the lack of land ownership in the CLT model, a community elder reminded them that they didn’t truly have ownership of their property in any case, either because they were renting or were ill-equipped to control what happened on their land. Former executive director Wade Patterson says, “The fact that the work was specifically geared toward controlling housing costs assuaged concerns about gentrification and displacement. The fact that we got a house instead of another factory was something we couldn’t argue with.”
Sawmill CLT was created as a standalone organization dedicated to housing development, stewardship, and property management. It’s one of the largest CLTs in the country, with 34 acres, which includes rental, ownership, and senior housing. Recently, it won an RFP issued by the city of Albuquerque to revitalize an old motel in a new neighborhood in the city, and the CLT is figuring out how to enter the community respectfully from outside.
Albuquerque’s Sawmill-area neighborhood associations, including the Sawmill Advisory Council, which launched the CLT, focus on “community building” through cultural events, says Patterson. The CLT supports neighborhood organizing by offering meeting space in one of its buildings and other support. Patterson says, “Our goal isn’t to lead but to be behind them.”
San Francisco Community Land Trust, San Francisco, CA
SFCLT was launched in 2003, at a time when the city was already one of the hottest real estate markets in the country, and low-income residents were concerned about soaring rents and illegal evictions for condo conversions. Housing organizers were seeking a model that could prevent evictions and give lower-income residents more control over their living situations.
The CLT is a standalone entity, but it maintains a close relationship with the housing organizers who founded it. When its partner groups organize to prevent evictions or condo conversions in an at-risk building (generally small apartment buildings), SFCLT steps in as a preservation purchaser and converts them to co-ops on CLT-owned land. SFCLT has in-house real estate expertise, but does not develop new buildings, and it contracts out any needed rehabilitation. It handles the financial aspects of the acquisition and the conversion, the stewardship of the land, and the training and support that helped residents form a co-op board and carry out co-op governance. “Housing groups refer everyone to us; we’re the only housing organization that can help stabilize a multi-unit apartment building by buying it,” says director Tracy Parent. SFCLT organizes its member base to support the broader issues that its coalition partners push for, but it doesn’t “initiate organizing” on issues, according to Parent.
T.R.U.S.T. South LA, Los Angeles, CA
When T.R.U.S.T. South LA was formed in 2005, its target neighborhoods were filled with vacant lots and deteriorated housing, while surrounding areas were under increasing development pressures. While the founders—Esperanza Community Housing Corporation, Strategic Actions of a Just Economy, and Abode Communities—originally envisioned the CLT as primarily a housing tool, it has taken on a broader role in implementing a community vision. “Originally, we formed as a land acquisition group. Then our members wanted to organize,” says executive director Sandra McNeill. The CLT has, for example, organized against a slumlord who was trying to evict residents from a building he had strategically let deteriorate in order to cash in on expiring section 8 affordability restrictions. It has also organized to raise funding for transportation and green space improvements in its neighborhood and participated in coalitions to support broader citywide policies such as increased funding for affordable housing.
The group now describes itself as “a community-based initiative to stabilize the neighborhoods south of downtown Los Angeles.” T.R.U.S.T. South LA is a standalone organization that considers itself part of the development team on housing projects, partnering with others to purchase, finance, and construct or rehabilitate housing.
Although T.R.U.S.T. South LA does a lot of organizing, nearly all of its policy work is conducted in collaboration with other groups, including its founding partners. “Affordable housing developers generally aren’t risk takers,” says McNeill. “They may be involved in political work to ensure that funding streams are in place for affordable housing, but that’s as far as most of them go.”
Community Justice Land Trust, Philadelphia, PA
Community Justice Land Trust in Philadelphia formed in Northeast Philadelphia in 2010 amid combined cold and hot market challenges. Although the neighborhood suffered from a large number of vacant and abandoned properties, it was surrounded on all sides by booming markets, and those rising prices and development pressures seemed likely to spread. The Women’s Community Revitalization Project (WCRP), along with a coalition of local civic organizations, held dozens of public meetings to help the community members understand what forming a CLT would mean and to explore their concerns about resale restrictions. Attendees voted in favor.
Community Justice CLT is set up as a program of WCRP, which has its own in-house development and organizing expertise, including an entire department devoted to organizing.
But as WCRP’s executive director Nora Lichtash warns, “Sometimes you lose relationships when you’re organizing. . . . Sometimes people don’t like to be pushed to do the right thing.” Indeed, WCRP apparently pressured its local council person enough on certain issues that she declined to give the CLT vacant land it had hoped to secure for its first development. In the end, however, the council person helped the group establish a citywide land bank (Feldstein 2013–14), which furthers some of the same goals as the land trust.
Despite potential tensions like these, Lichtash believes that organizing and CLT functions should stay closely related. “It’s important to remember that organizing and building affordable housing fit together,” she says. “Your funders think you should be doing one or the other, but it’s not good for CLTs to be separated from organizing. You’re building your capacity for present and future work. When you organize, you’re respected because you have people power.”
To Develop or Not to Develop: A Big Decision
Affordable housing development is a complicated and expensive business that no community organization should take lightly if it is thinking about starting a CLT. As DNI’s Smith says, “If you do development work, it will take time away from organizing, which is cumulative. It takes time and a lot of sacrifice to form a truly representative, neighborhood-based organization. If you cut corners, you risk jeopardizing a lot of the power you’ve built up over the years.”
The Boston experience, for example, begins with a cautionary tale. DSNI stepped in when the original developer for the CLT’s first project backed out of the deal. It was “traumatic” for staff and board, says Smith. “It took so much time. It distracted DSNI from its core functions.”
The idea of controlling development resources and accessing developer fees can be seductive to grassroots groups, says WCRP’s Lichtash. But they should proceed with extreme care. “Becoming a developer can muddy the waters,” she says. “You have to focus on every detail in million-dollar deals. It takes you away from educational work.”
“Real estate work is very hard, speculative,” Lichtash continues. “You think you’re getting one thing and instead you get another. I tell people to partner for a long time first. It’s hard to keep both tenants and funding sources happy.”
Patterson of Sawmill agrees and adds that it’s particularly difficult “to meet all the deadlines and reporting requirements on funding [for development]. I’m always shocked by the amount of administrative overhead that’s required.” He also advises that if you can’t make the numbers work, “it’s important to know you can pull out of a project if needed.”
T.R.U.S.T. South LA’s McNeill says, “Development definitely has its own language. It’s complex stuff. Nonprofits that do it have large budgets and tend to have sizable staffs. I respect the skill it takes to pull off these deals. It’s a very different skillset from what we do.”
Another consideration is that affordable housing development is not an easy industry to break into these days. In the current funding environment, many of the subsidies that CLTs have traditionally used to develop and steward their units are being slashed, and mortgages for potential CLT home buyers are harder to find. McNeill says, “We’ve gone through enormous shifts in the housing industry. The reality is that there isn’t an opening now for new organizations to get into the development business. It’s definitely not the time.”
Even the ongoing stewardship of a CLT requires a different kind of relationship with residents than an organizer would have. “Developer fees and rent collection could impact the relationship with residents and the power dynamic,” says Smith of DNI. “You’re responsible to leaseholders and non-leaseholders in your community, so there are tensions,” according to Lichtash of WCRP. And as SFCLT’s Parent comments, “Organizers often paint issues as clear moral choices,” but when you are involved as a property manager, “there are nuances.”
Eyes on the Prize
Once a community group has determined that a CLT is an appropriate tool for keeping housing affordable to local residents, the next questions should be: How will the roles be divided up? Who is taking the lead on implementing the broader vision? Is there an organization already in place that’s committed and able to take that on, or does one need to be created? Are there groups serving the community that already have development expertise and access to funding that could partner with a CLT or even fold one into their work? How can the new CLT partner with and support the community’s organizing work rather than distract from it?
Many newer CLTs are following the lead of groups like DSNI and T.R.U.S.T. South LA by setting up a separate organization to manage the stewardship and land ownership functions, and then drawing on the capacity of existing affordable housing developers through partnerships. While every locality is different, this approach seems like a wise place for groups to start, especially if they want to preserve their energy for the important work they started with: fighting for vibrant, equitable communities.
Miriam Axel-Lute is the editor of Shelterforce, a magazine devoted to the field of community development. She has written extensively on both organizing and community land trusts.
Dana Hawkins-Simons is an award-winning journalist who has published groundbreaking investigations in U.S. News & World Report. She is also the former director of the Opportunity Housing Initiative at the National Housing Institute.
References
Beckwith, Dave, with Cristina Lopez. 1997. “Community Organizing: People Power from the Grassroots.” http://comm-org.wisc.edu/papers97/beckwith.htm
Feldstein, Jill. 2013/14. “Winning a Land Bank We Can Trust.” Shelterforce. Fall/Winter 2013/14. www.shelterforce.org/article/3910/winning_a_land_bank_we_can_trust2/
Horwitz, Staci. 2011. “It’s All About Choice.” Shelterforce. www.shelterforce.org/article/2313/its_all_about_choice/
Joint Center for Housing Studies. 2015. State of the Nation’s Housing 2015. Harvard University. www.jchs.harvard.edu/research/state_nations_housing
Oh, Seunghoon, Josh Silver, Annelise Osterberg, and Jaclyn Tules. 2015. Does Nonprofit Housing Development Preserve Neighborhood Diversity? An Investigation into the Interaction Between Affordable Housing Development and Neighborhood Change. Manna, Inc. www.mannadc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Final_Neighborhood_Impact_Analysis_7_1.pdf
Olick, Diana. 2014. “Housing Still Too Expensive Despite Positive Signs.” CNBC.com, July 10. www.cnbc.com/2014/07/10/housing-still-too-expensive-despite-positive-signs.html
Shelterforce. 2012. “What’s the Point of Shared-Equity Homeownership in Weak Market Areas?” Shelterforce. www.shelterforce.org/images/uploads/theanswer171-2.pdf
Schutz, Aaron and Marie G. Sandy. 2011. “What Isn’t Community Organizing.” In Collective Action for Social Change: An Introduction to Community Organizing, London: Palgrave McMillan. pp. 31–44.
Thaden, Emily and Greg Rosenberg. 2010. “Outperforming the Market: Delinquency and Foreclosure Rates in Community Land Trusts.” Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/dl/1846_1154_LLA10102%20Foreclosure%20Rates.pdf
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Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 5 del libro Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.
¿Es la segregación espacial urbana una consecuencia del funcionamiento normal de los mercados inmobiliarios urbanos, reflejo de las preferencias individuales acumulativas, o es más bien resultado del mal funcionamiento de mercados inmobiliarios urbanos que privatizan los beneficios sociales y socializan los costos privados? ¿Proviene quizás de prejuicios contra ciertas clases o razas? ¿Crean guettos las políticas de viviendas de interés social, o los crean las acciones de agentes y prestamistas inmobiliarios que ponen sus prejuicios personales por encima de toda objetividad, generando y alimentando estereotipos sobre conciudadanos y vecindades? ¿Podrían cambiar los patrones de asentamiento intrametropolitanos si se modifica la política del suelo, o para ello es imperativo que se produzcan transformaciones sociales profundas relacionadas con valores como tolerancia, oportunidad y derechos humanos?
Treinta y siete académicos y asesores de trece países se enfrentaron a éstas y otras preguntas afines en el “Seminario Internacional sobre Segregación en la Ciudad” organizado por el Instituto Lincoln en Cambridge, Massachusetts durante el pasado mes de julio. Los organizadores del seminario, Francisco Sabatini (Universidad Católica de Chile) Martim Smolka y Rosalind Greenstein (Instituto Lincoln) plantearon una amplia gama de aspectos para explorar las dimensiones teóricas, históricas y prácticas de la segregación. Los participantes, procedentes de países tan diversos como Brasil, Israel, Kenya, Países Bajos, Irlanda del Norte y los Estados Unidos, trajeron consigo su formación profesional como juristas, sociólogos, economistas, planificadores urbanos, científicos regionales y geógrafos. A medida que intentaban llegar a un acuerdo sobre el significado de la segregación, las fuerzas diversas que la crean y la refuerzan, y las respuestas políticas posibles, se fue haciendo obvio que no hay respuestas simples y que muchos puntos de vista contribuyen al debate interminable. Este breve informe sobre el seminario ofrece una muestra de esta discusión.
¿Qué es la segregación y por qué es tan importante?
El trabajo de Frederick Boal (Escuela de Geografía, Universidad de Queens, Belfast) es fruto del gran caudal de literatura sociológica sobre segregación y su propia experiencia de vida en medio de los conflictos entre católicos y protestantes en Irlanda del Norte. Boal sugirió que la segregación debe entenderse principalmente como parte de un espectro que abarca desde el movimiento extremista de limpieza étnica hasta el más idealista de asimilación (véase la fig. 1). Tal como pasa con tantos temas vinculados con políticas, para estudiar el problema de la segregación es preciso observarla, más que como una dicotomía, como un continuo de grados o niveles de separación, cada uno con diferentes manifestaciones espaciales.
Para Peter Marcuse (Escuela de Posgrado de Arquitectura, Conservación y Planificación, Universidad de Columbia, Nueva York), la segregación supone la imposibilidad para elegir o la presencia de coerción, o ambas. Marcuse llama “agrupaciones en enclaves” a grupos de diferentes razas o etnias que deciden vivir juntos por voluntad propia. Por otra parte, llama “segregación en guettos” cuando a los grupos se los obliga a vivir aparte, bien sea explícitamente o a través de mecanismos más sutiles. La clave que distingue a estos dos patrones—la imposibilidad para elegir—invita a una respuesta del orden público.
El significado y la importancia de la segregación varía según el contexto histórico. Para William Harris (Departamento de Planificación Urbana y Regional, Universidad Estatal de Jackson, Mississippi), escritor de temas de segregación espacial en el sur de los Estados Unidos, la segregación no puede entenderse ni tampoco enfrentarse sin un conocimiento profundo del papel que ha desempeñado y sigue desempeñando la raza en la historia de los Estados Unidos y del orden público. Flavio Villaça (Escuela de Arquitectura y Urbanismo, Universidad de São Paulo, Brasil) entiende la segregación dentro de un marco conceptual de clases, en donde los factores principales que influyen en los patrones residenciales son el nivel de ingresos y el estatus social, y no la raza. En Brasil y muchos otros países con larga historia de regímenes autoritarios, el estado suele encargarse de prestar los servicios urbanos. En estos países, los patrones residenciales urbanos determinan el acceso a agua y a instalaciones sanitarias (y por tanto, a la salud) así como a medios de transporte, infraestructuras de servicios públicos y otros servicios urbanos.
Según Villaça y otros, en muchos casos la actividad del mercado del suelo y las regulaciones y los códigos urbanos se han aplicado de maneras furtivas o incluso abiertamente para crear vecindades selectas bien dotadas de servicios que separan las clases superiores del resto de la sociedad, al cual prácticamente se le hace caso omiso. Este cuadro tiene paralelismos en los Estados Unidos, en donde el acceso a escuelas de alta calidad y a otras valiosas amenidades lo determinan fundamentalmente patrones residenciales que tienen estrecha relación con la segregación, ya sea por nivel de ingresos, raza u otras características demográficas. Igualmente, los participantes del seminario señalaron la correlación entre las comunidades precarias y la situación de los peligros ambientales. Las zonas de barrios o guettos pobres, habitadas generalmente por personas de raza negra, son el vertedero de los aspectos negativos del mundo urbano moderno, como lo son desechos peligrosos y otros usos indeseados del suelo.
Ariel Espino (Departamento de Antropología, Universidad de Rice, Texas) presentó un análisis del uso de la distancia para reforzar desigualdades sociales, políticas y económicas en la vivienda. Cuando las diferencias sociales y económicas están claramente especificadas y entendidas, las élites dominantes “toleran” la proximidad física. Por ejemplo, los sirvientes pueden vivir cerca de sus patrones, incluso en la misma casa, porque las relaciones económicas y las normas de comportamiento dictan la separación por clases.
¿Por qué persiste la segregación?
Una suposición que prevaleció a lo largo del seminario fue la de que todos los residentes de la ciudad (es decir, los ciudadanos) deberían tener acceso a los servicios urbanos, o al menos a un nivel mínimo de servicios. Sin embargo, Peter Marcuse lanzó al grupo la idea de pensar más allá de un nivel mínimo y de considerar el acceso a amenidades urbanas en el contexto de los derechos. Se cuestionó si la riqueza, la herencia familiar, el color de la piel o la identidad étnica deberían ser los factores determinantes en el acceso a los bienes públicos, no sólo educación, salud y abrigo, sino también a otras amenidades directamente relacionadas con la ubicación física. Expresándose en un lenguaje evocador de las ideas de Henry George sobre la propiedad común a finales del siglo XIX, Marcuse preguntó si era justo o correcto, por ejemplo, que los ricos disfrutaran de las mejores vistas de océanos, ríos u otras bellezas naturales, mientras que los pobres estuvieran relegados a zonas menos atractivas.
Robert Wassmer (Departamento de Orden Público y Administración Pública, Universidad Estatal de California) describió los procesos económicos involucrados en la ubicación residencial, tal como los entienden los economistas de la escuela del “public choice” (decisiones públicas). Según esta perspectiva, los compradores de viviendas eligen no sólo una casa y su terreno, sino también un diverso grupo de ventajas que varían según el sitio. Algunos compradores pueden optar por un paquete de conveniencias que ofrece más sistemas de transporte público y menos vistas panorámicas, mientras que otros pueden preferir mayor acceso a autopistas y a escuelas públicas de mejor calidad. Sin embargo, no todos los ciudadanos tienen las mismas oportunidades para hacer esas selecciones. Varios participantes añadieron que este debate forma parte de una discusión más amplia sobre acceso y selección en la sociedad, dado que casi todas las opciones están restringidas hasta cierto grado, y que muchas restricciones varían sistemáticamente entre los grupos sociales.
Otros participantes señalaron las maneras en que las políticas gubernamentales (p. ej., sistemas tributarios, legislación de vivienda) e instituciones privadas (p. ej., agentes de bienes raíces, instituciones prestamistas) actúan en conjunto para influir en el comportamiento de los mercados inmobiliarios, y por consiguiente, en el efecto de las políticas del suelo en acciones públicas y privadas. Greg Squires (Departamento de Sociología, Universidad de George Washington) informó de un estudio sobre el proceso de búsqueda de vivienda en Washington, DC. Sus hallazgos ponen en evidencia el papel que desempeñan los agentes de bienes raíces al “orientar” a compradores e inquilinos hacia vecindades de las mismas razas. Como resultado fundamental, los negros no disfrutan de las mismas oportunidades que tienen los blancos y sus posibilidades de obtener su solución habitacional preferida son menores, lo cual se contrapone al modelo de “public choice”. Entre los hallazgos de Squires está el hecho de que la selección de la vivienda está determinada por el estatus social o económico. Por ejemplo, en el proceso de búsqueda de vivienda, las amenidades más solicitadas por los clientes negros difirieron de aquéllas preferidas por los blancos, en parte porque aquéllos disponían de menos recursos particulares (tales como automóviles) y requerían viviendas situadas cerca de servicios centralizados tales como transporte público.
John Metzger (Programa de Planificación Urbana y Regional, Universidad del Estado de Michigan) examinó la influencia del mercado privado en la perpetuación de la segregación. Metzger presentó investigaciones sobre perfiles grupales demográficos usados por compañías como Claritas y CACI Marketing Systems para caracterizar los vecindarios. Dichos perfiles se venden a una amplia gama de industrias, entre ellas agencias inmobiliarias y financieras, como también a entidades públicas. La industria inmobiliaria se vale de los perfiles para alimentar el proceso decisorio de comercialización, planificación e inversión, y —señala Metzger— para propiciar enclaves de razas y la persistencia de la segregación. Las instituciones de préstamos hipotecarios se valen de los perfiles para determinar la demanda del consumidor. Los planificadores urbanos, tanto asesores privados y del sector público, usan los perfiles para la determinación de usos futuros del suelo, para la planificación a largo plazo y para guiar las actividades de planificación e inversión de distritos comerciales centrales, mientras que los promotores de bienes raíces los usan para definir sus mercados y demostrar las demandas aceleradas de sus productos. Los perfiles en sí suelen estar basados en estereotipos raciales y étnicos, y a su vez refuerzan la separación de grupos raciales y étnicos dentro de los mercados de bienes raíces regionales.
Xavier de Souza Briggs (Escuela de Gobierno John F. Kennedy, Universidad de Harvard) introdujo la idea de “capital social” en la discusión. El término “capital social”, tal como lo emplean actualmente sociólogos y expertos en teoría sociológica, encarna las redes y relaciones sociales dentro las comunidades, que pueden aprovecharse para el logro de metas individuales y comunes. Briggs argumentó que si bien el capital social es, al mismo tiempo, causa y efecto de la segregación en los Estados Unidos, también puede utilizarse para crear cambios positivos. Otros participantes cuestionaron la eficacia de la teoría y las investigaciones en capital social para resolver el problema de la segregación espacial urbana, señalando que éstas tendían a limitarse a la cuestión de “cómo mejorar la situación de los pobres” en vez de estudiar los mecanismos estructurales e institucionales que contribuyen a la segregación residencial y a la desigualdad de la renta. No obstante, los sociólogos opinan que el capital social es justamente lo que necesitan las comunidades para tener cierto control sobre sus ambientes inmediatos, en vez de ser simples receptoras de las consecuencias previstas e imprevistas de la economía política.
Justicia social y política del suelo
Durante el seminario, participantes de distintas partes del mundo dieron ejemplos de casos de segregación espacial utilizada como estrategia política por los poderes estatales:
Las conexiones entre estas formas extremas de segregación espacial y las fuerzas de mercados y políticas inmobiliarias de la mayoría de las ciudades modernas son complejas y difíciles de articular. Uno de esos vínculos se refleja en las maneras como se continúan aplicando las políticas inmobiliarias y las instituciones que apoyan los mercados inmobiliarios para brindar legitimidad a las prácticas discriminatorias.
Al imaginarse un mundo de ciudades cuyos habitantes tengan verdadera libertad para escoger dónde vivir, los planificadores del seminario se concentraron en políticas y programas gubernamentales que facilitan la integración, tales como el programa “Moving to Opportunity” del Departamento de Vivienda y Desarrollo Urbano de los Estados Unidos. Sin embargo, Stephen Ross (Departamento de Economía, Universidad de Connecticut) cuestionó los supuestos beneficios de las políticas de integración o repoblación lanzando esta pregunta: “¿Qué pasaría si dispersáramos personas de altos ingresos por toda la ciudad? ¿Qué cambiaría? ¿Nos ayuda esto a considerar con más detenimiento la importancia del espacio?”
Otra pregunta de Xavier Briggs obligó a los participantes a pensar en dónde se producen la mayoría de las interacciones sociales significativas. Específicamente, ¿qué debe pasar —y en qué circunstancias— para ir desde el movimiento extremo de limpieza étnica (según el espectro étnico urbano mencionado por Boal) al extremo opuesto de la asimilación? Briggs sugirió que es posible que instituciones como escuelas y lugares de trabajo estén en más capacidad de facilitar la diversidad en las interacciones sociales, que los vecindarios residenciales.
Al fin y al cabo, los planificadores urbanos desearían que se usen sus herramientas para formar ciudades que ofrezcan justicia para todos. Hablando de las condiciones de los ciudadanos árabes en la ciudad mixta de Lod, Haim Yacobi (Departamento de Geografía, Universidad de Ben-Gurion, Israel), tocó los cimientos de los ideales democráticos occidentales al preguntar lo siguiente: “Si una persona no tiene acceso total a la ciudad, si no puede participar de lleno en la vida de la ciudad, ¿está esa persona viviendo en una ciudad verdadera?”
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Value capture instruments are widely considered to be beneficial fiscal planning mechanisms, even though they are difficult to implement. Colombia is notable in Latin America for its unique and long-standing experience with institutionalizing value capture through collecting the Contribución de Valorización, a kind of special assessment, and the Contribución de Desarrollo Municipal (Law 9 of 1989), which preceded the current instrument, Participación en Plusvalías.
Since 1921 when the first such legislation was introduced, Colombia has developed a fiscal culture in which people are aware of and accept value capture instruments as a legitimate revenue-raising mechanism. For example, in 1968, at the height of its use, the Contribución de Valorización accounted for 16 percent of local revenues in Bogotá and about 45 percent in Medellín; in the early 1980s it raised about 30 percent of total revenues in Cali. Nevertheless, because land still plays an important role as a hedge against inflation in places like Colombia, where capital markets are not highly developed, the implementation of such devices still meets with strong political resistance from many constituencies, ranging from powerful landowners and developers to low- and moderate-income families for whom land is an important source of personal savings.
Building on this experience, Law 388 of 1997 creating Participación en Plusvalías decrees that all municipalities must design and approve a ten-year master plan (Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial-POT) and adopt plusvalías as one of the plan’s main sources of income. The revenues raised through plusvalías are to be used primarily for the provision of social housing and infrastructure in under-served neighborhoods, as well as for public works of general interest. The law establishes three administrative conditions for applying the plusvalías instrument as part of the POT:
1. when land changes from one category to another, especially when rural land with low development potential is included within the master plan’s growth boundary and therefore becomes designated as land for urban expansion or as suburban land;
2. when additional development (density) rights are authorized in an area; or
3. when an area changes use, especially from residential to commercial use.
The Participación en Plusvalías is grounded in the legitimate public right to participate in capturing land value increments resulting from administrative actions such as changes in zoning or density that may generate substantial windfalls for the landowner. It is important to note that this instrument is not a tax, a contribution or a fee, but rather a mandated right of the public to ‘participate’ in the value generated by government functions aimed at enhancing urban development. Law 388 and its accompanying decrees define the general parameters for using plusvalías, but the municipalities are required to determine its specific procedures. However, many mayors and other public officials are concerned about the law’s ambiguities and are struggling with the process of applying both the law and the plusvalías instrument.
To address the need for a forum in which public officials and other experts could discuss this problem, the Lincoln Institute and the Bogotá Planning Department held a seminar in December 1999, before the deadline for approval of the legal master plan (POT) on December 31. The seminar convened practitioners actively involved in the implementation process, including planning directors from major cities, representatives of national public agencies and ministries, representatives of institutions in charge of property assessments, lawyers, and scholars involved in the design of the instrument. One immediate outcome of the seminar was a successful lobbying effort to change the deadline to June 30, 2000, to allow more time to review and revise the problematic POT provisions.
Key Implementation Issues
Application of plusvalías to different situations. Most municipal representatives at the seminar agreed that plusvalías should be used only in those situations that result in a clear and substantial windfall, in order to generate greater citizen approval and a simpler administrative process during the first phase of implementation. The general consensus is that Contribución de Valorización has been accepted because the increase in the value of land that benefited from public investment was clearly understood by the owners, so they have been willing to pay the fee. In Bogotá, for example, Contribución de Valorización has been one of the major means for building new streets since 1969.
By comparison, plusvalías are applied only to situations in which a higher land value is specifically associated with a public land use decision defined in the POT, such as changing the land category, its density or its use. Extending the growth boundary to include rural land that can be developed in subsequent years is an explicit situation in which the change in land price is evident. Most representatives of municipalities felt this was the most obvious scenario for application and should be the main focus of the instrument in its first phase.
Accuracy of land value assessments.
Law 388 suggests that the date for the base land price against which the gain is measured is to be July 1997, the date when Congress approved the law. However, it is not clear whether and how the municipalities can determine that land price in subsequent years. The problem is that the initial base value to be compared to the current value may already be influenced by ‘rumors’ circulating about land designations in the master plans. Should the value be calculated before the rumors of urbanistic changes begin to circulate, or just before the actual decision is made? How should cities treat land value increments generated by actions occurring between that base date and the approval of the POT? For how long is the assessment valid? What happens after, say, 15 or 20 years?
These questions are all the more relevant considering that land use norms established recently in some cities have already been capitalized in land prices, thus reducing substantially the current margins for the application of Participación en Plusvalías.
Furthermore, there are different legal implications about which relevant values should be considered (i.e., current use vs. highest and best use). Should the land value increment be based on the potential or the actual value? Should the legally defined formula for assessments apply to the potential buildable area even if the builder is not requesting a license to develop the site to its full allowable density? What happens when a property that has been assessed on a certain date is not completed? Although the law defines the concept of zones with similar geo-economic characteristics, it is not clear whether the landowner may legally request the assessment to be done on a property-by-property basis or on the basis of homogeneous zones.
The short deadlines established by the law for calculating both commercial prices before the master plan and new reference prices after adoption of the plan also cause serious concerns. For example, the law states that the mayor has only five days after the new POT is approved to determine new prices in the affected areas, and that all calculations must be accomplished within the next 60 days. The legal structure for adopting simplified cost procedures to allow assessments for homogeneous areas of the city rather than for individual plots is not clear on this point.
Definition of land categories.
Differences in land categories between Law 9 of 1989 and Law 388 of 1997 have led to questions of applicability. Law 9 included a suburban land category that could be developed at moderate densities on the outskirts of cities. For example, all of the developable land to the north of Bogotá is now in that suburban category, which permits residential densities of 160 inhabitants per hectare. The zoning proposed by the new master plan permits an increase to between 180 and 220 inhabitants per hectare. Law 388 states that the change from rural to urban use may be taxed, but does not address the suburban category, even though suburban land already has strong development rights. Because of these difficulties, many cities prefer to treat suburban land as similar to urban land in order to avoid further implementation problems.
Exemptions and special cases.
Land for low-income housing is exempted from plusvalías, but the law states that the land value increments must be calculated anyway. This may constitute an unnecessary additional cost, considering that 80 percent of all housing to be built in Bogotá within the next ten years will be low-income housing. How does this affect the fairness of this instrument on the remaining 20 percent of housing? How effective will plusvalías be as a planning instrument seeking to decrease speculation on land designated for social housing?
Another issue deals with wipeouts resulting from master plan designation of conservation zones or areas set aside for environmental protection through transfer of development rights (TDRs). Complaints from private agents of ‘takings’ against their full rights of ownership raise important questions of compensation. Areas that already have been designated for high-density development but are not yet fully built also raise questions about the expectation component of land values.
Political and operational obstacles.
A continuing source of confusion and misunderstanding concerns the technical issues associated with the effective calculation of the land value increment. Can it or should it be implemented in cases when, due to general economic recession, all land values are allegedly declining? If landowners are either selling land at a loss or not initiating development on their properties at all, then, quite simply, no plusvalías would be available to the local administration. Theoretically, all that is needed is to distinguish generating effects (administrative actions) from trends in land markets. In practice, however, it is easy to understand that instruments of value capture are more robust, and more palatable politically, during the upswing of land price cycles than the downswing, as is currently the case in Colombia.
The political overtones of this issue become clearer when considering the substantial land portfolios that developers normally hold for strategic planning motives, including for speculation. In effect, urban planners are hard pressed to be more flexible, if not magnanimous, in relaxing urbanistic norms and regulations in order to motivate developers during times of recession. However, this kind of pressure from developers may be simply an attempt to gain compensation for poor investment decisions in the past.
Sometimes developers complain that the municipality is setting the plusvalías fee too high in times of declining prices when recession may create disincentives for future investments in building improvements. However, a counter-argument based on the experience with Contribución de Valorización suggests that if the amount of plusvalías on the changing land use is considered to be overvalued, it follows that the change is probably not cost-effective and should not be proposed. It is also possible that a mistake was made in the feasibility study or the calculations.
Over and above these practical difficulties are certain implementation requirements in the law that affect its operation, such as the need to directly notify the landowner that the property is ‘liable’ for plusvalías. Should the burden reside with the public administration or with the owner? Similarly, there are legal difficulties surrounding the moment when plusvalías should be charged to the property owner, as in the liquidation of properties or in the request for a license to change the use of land. Some grounds for complaints of double taxation could also be raised if an area to be densified (or receive any change in zoning) has received additional infrastructure on which the Contribuición de Valorización provision was charged. The independence of this instrument from plusvalías, as stated by the new law, is important because of the existing option of calculating and charging the plusvalías for public works designated by the POT.
Adjustments Proposed by Municipal Officials
Public officials at the December seminar in Bogotá suggested a few ways to simplify the implementation of Law 388 by sacrificing precision in the calculation of the plusvalías in favor of expediency, transparency and compliance. This perspective is based on the belief that political will may be more important than technical consistency, at least in the early, transitional stages of implementation, in order to improve the chances of long-term success. A very telling and useful example was given by officials from the city of Cartagena (500,000 inhabitants), which has been applying the Contribución de Desarrollo Municipal effectively since 1992. Their experience shows that the effect of density changes to a new lot should be similar with regard to the generation of plusvalías to the rate generated by the same kind of density change already observed in a different but comparable area of the city.
Participants also proposed restricting the application of plusvalías to the more strategic and dynamic areas of the city where the windfall potential is most apparent and expressive, rather than in areas where the land value increments are small. Furthermore, assessment of plusvalías should be based on homogeneous zones, not on individual plots. The plusvalías instrument also needs to be developed and phased in over time as the municipalities gain greater knowledge and sophistication in valuation and assessment techniques. The established nine-year period for the validation of the assessments of land value increments, therefore, should be subject to more frequent periodic review. Some practical transition rules, absent in the original formulation of the law, also will help facilitate the introduction of a new fiscal system.
Other suggestions were made regarding the adoption of master plans (POTs). Municipalities should use these plans, rather than some other valuation mechanism external to the POT, to identify areas where there will be a change in land use in order to determine whether, in fact, it is a higher use and thus subject to an increase in plusvalías. Before adopting the POT, the municipalities should identify such areas so the valuation and assessment techniques could be worked out ahead of time and the sense of uncertainty could be mitigated. Some participants even suggested using the POT to define the relevant ex-ante situation (or prior value) to determine the net land value increment.
In general, the participants agreed that the concept and aims of the master plan and plusvalías instruments are both acceptable and desirable. Many of the problems and issues discussed at the seminar and throughout the country pertain to the implementation of any value capture scheme, or any new fiscal or normative legislation for that matter. In this case there is certainly substantial room for improving the design of the implementation procedures, since changes to operational aspects are always easier to achieve than changes to the law itself. But, over and above the remaining formal difficulties, it has been clearly demonstrated that political will, accumulated technical expertise and the ethical commitment of the participants are all critical to perfecting this land policy instrument and implementing the highly commendable principles that inspire it.
Carolina Barco de Botero is the planning director for the city of Bogotá. She is also a managing consultant with Ciudades, Ltda. in Bogotá and a member of the Lincoln Institute Board of Directors. Martim Smolka is senior fellow and director of the Institute’s Latin America and Caribbean Program.
Fernanda Furtado, a fellow of the Lincoln Institute, also contributed to this article. She recently completed her Ph.D. thesis (in Portuguese) on value capture in Latin America, at the Faculty of Architecture and Urbanism of the University of São Paulo, Brazil. One of her thesis chapters describes the situation in Colombia.
Pros and Cons of Participación en Plusvalías
Pros
Cons
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Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 2 del libro Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.
En el área metropolitana de Lima, el acceso a la tierra urbana por parte de los sectores populares presenta un historial de problemas que son resultado de la combinación de una ocupación irregular y espontánea de la tierra con políticas de corto alcance para regularizar la tenencia de las tierras. Estas políticas diseñadas para resolver o mitigar la ocupación irregular, en vez de contribuir a una solución, han aumentado el problema.
El seminario, “Los gobiernos locales y el manejo de la tierra urbana: Perú y América Latina”, llevado a cabo en Lima en febrero, reunió representantes municipales, expertos de América Latina y líderes de la comunidad para responder a la siguiente pregunta: ¿Asegura el actual marco regulatorio el crecimiento ordenado y equitativo de Lima y de las otras ciudades peruanas?. El programa fue organizado por el Instituto Lincoln; el Instituto de Desarrollo Urbano CENCA, una organización no gubernamental que basa su trabaja con las comunidades; la Asociación de Municipalidades del Perú, y la Red de Políticas de Suelo de la Coalición Internacional del Habitat (HIC).
Políticas de Regularización
Por regularización de la tierra se entiende en general el proceso de intervención pública en zonas ocupadas ilegalmente, a fin de proveer mejoras de infraestructura urbana y reconocer títulos de propiedad u otros derechos de ocupación. En muchos países en desarrollo se necesitan políticas de regularización para contrarrestar los patrones irregulares, y a veces ilegales, de desarrollo de la tierra, en que la ocupación del terreno e incluso la construcción de viviendas precede la instalación de obras de infraestructura y la documentación legal.
Desde 1961, el gobierno central de Perú ha apoyado políticas que permitieron que la población de bajos ingresos ocupara las tierras públicas vacantes, consideradas como un recurso natural de “banco de tierras”. La mayor parte de estos terrenos eran arenosos, casi desérticos, ubicados en los alrededores de Lima y de poco valor comercial. Un 34% de la población de Lima vivía en “barriadas” o asentamientos irregulares para 1993.
Ante la ausencia de políticas efectivas para asegurar el acceso legal y organizado a la tenencia de la tierra, la permisividad que llevó al desarrollo irregular de estas áreas periféricas ha llevado a una crisis que domina actualmente la discusión de las políticas relativas a la tierra urbana (Figura 1). Muchos funcionarios gubernamentales y otros observadores reconocen que el sistema en sí mismo fomenta y permite el crecimiento informal e irregular, y que algunas de las políticas diseñadas para regularizar la tierra han contribuido en la práctica a crear más irregularidades.
Problemas del Manejo de la Tierra Urbana
El manejo de las políticas de la tierra urbana en Perú está siendo reexaminado a causa de tensiones entre el gobierno central y el gobierno local. Entre 1981 y 1995, las municipalidades administraron los procedimientos, autorizaciones y políticas relacionados con la regularización de la tierra. En 1996, el gobierno peruano centralizó la administración de los recursos económicos sobre la vivienda y el desarrollo urbano, retomando los temas de regularización. Esta centralización política, administrativa y fiscal ha creado serias ineficacias e ineficiencias, puesto que aún las agencias de los gobiernos locales tienen que responder a las demandas diarias de la población con respecto a tierra y vivienda, y no tiene ya un control integral de esta problemática.
También existen tensiones a causa de las contradicciones entre el marco legal y el mercado informal de las transacciones cotidianas. Esta falta de relación se refleja en la falta de comprensión y desconfianza que existe entre las autoridades y los agentes privados e individuos que operan fuera del marco de las políticas formales.
A pesar de los intentos por parte de municipalidades y organizaciones no gubernamentales por mejorar la coordinación e implementación de las políticas de la tierra que afectan a los mecanismos formales e informales del mercado formal e informal, los líderes políticos todavía toman la decisión final. Esta situación se ve sujeta a la politización de la administración pública, por ejemplo, a través de políticas creadas para satisfacer a los políticos en vez de la comunidad. Al mismo tiempo, esta situación fomenta las perspectivas a corto plazo, puesto que la autoridad gobernante está más interesada en el trabajo inmediato que en el seguimiento detallado de planes de desarrollo que requieren de un plazo más largo para su ejecución. Como resultado, los problemas graves de crecimiento de Lima no reciben una respuesta adecuada por el marco regulador, legal y político actual.
Problemas Comunes
Un resultado importante de este seminario en Perú fue el intercambio de experiencias con otras ciudades latinoamericanas y asiáticas, en las cuales los gobiernos locales pueden utilizar recursos públicos para promover ciudades urbano más ordenadas. Aún cuando los problemas del manejo de la tierra son amplios y complejos, ciertos problemas comunes fueron identificados para ser discutidos en programas futuros:
Julio Calderón, investigador urbano y consultor en programas de desarrollo social, está afiliado a Red Suelo, la red de políticas de la tierra de la Coalición Internacional para el Habitat.
Figura 1: Políticas de Regularización de la Tenencia de la Tierra en Lima
Febrero 1961-1980: Se estableció la Ley 13517, responsabilizando a varias agencias del gobierno central para regularizar los procedimientos de tenencia de la tierra, pero sólo se emitieron 20.000 títulos.
1981-1995: La función de emisión de títulos fue transferida a la Municipalidad de Lima y la entrega de títulos de propiedad de la tierra aumentó a unos 200.000. En los años noventa la capacidad de entrega de títulos disminuyó gradualmente hasta generar una crisis en el mercado de la tierra.
Abril 1996: La Comisión del Estado de Formalización de la Propiedad Informal (COFROPI) asumió las responsabilidades que estaban asignadas a la municipalidad. A partir de la promesa presidencial de incorporar la población de bajos ingresos al proceso del mercado de la tierra, se entregaron cerca de 170.000 títulos de propiedad entre julio de 1996 y julio de 1997. Se espera que 300.000 títulos más sean emitidos para el año 2000. Sin embargo, COFROPI afirma que el 90% de los títulos entregados antes de 1995 presentan problemas de registro, de manera tal que muchos de los títulos entregados desde 1996 son revisión de otros entregados anteriormente. En consecuencia, es difícil reconstruir la cantidad exacta de títulos emitidos bajo cada administración.
Algunas Definiciones
Ilegal – Ocupación de la tierra que contradice expresamente las normas existentes, el código civil y la autorización pública.
Informal – Actividad económica que no se adhiere a las reglas institucionales y que no está protegida por ellas, en oposición a la actividad formal que opera dentro de los procedimientos establecidos.
Irregular – Subdivisión que está aprobada oficialmente pero que no ha sido ejecutada de acuerdo con la ley.
Clandestina – Subdivisión establecida sin reconocimiento oficial.
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Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 1 del libro Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.
El Programa para América Latina del Instituto Lincoln se dedica a la educación y los proyectos de investigación con universidades y gobiernos locales en toda América Central, Sudamérica y el Caribe. Estas actividades cobran mayor relevancia en la actualidad debido a los numerosos cambios políticos y económicos por los que están atravesando los mercados inmobiliarios de América Latina. Por ejemplo, la (re)democratización del continente permite que un segmento más amplio de la sociedad participe en el diseño de programas viables e innovadores para los gobiernos locales en manos de partidos políticos rivales.
Además, las reformas institucionales, y en muchos casos constitucionales, están afectando el valor de la tierra y los derechos y regulaciones de la propiedad. Los programas de ajustes estructurales diseñados para contener la inflación y superar las crisis económicas de los años 1980 están cambiando las actitudes en cuanto a la tenencia de la tierra, ya sea como inversión o como reserva de valor. En América Latina, los frecuentes cambios especulativos entre la tenencia de la tierra y otros activos financieros, según los caprichos del “ambiente económico” predominante, han sido la pesadilla de los planificadores.
Las fuerzas de la globalización y la urbanización contribuyen igualmente con las presiones significativas y variables que se ejercen sobre el uso de la tierra. Cada vez más, se ven espacios al estilo de Los Ángeles en ciertas zonas residenciales de Sao Paulo, Santiago o Ciudad de México. Aunque la pérdida de la biodiversidad de la región se conoce bien porque está documentada, América Latina también corre el riesgo de perder la diversidad del uso de la tierra.
Pese a que estos temas son comunes, América Latina dista mucho de ser una entidad homogénea. La diversidad surge claramente al analizar la tenencia de la tierra y las estructuras de los mercados inmobiliarios de los distintos países, por ejemplo:
En vista de esta diversidad, el programa para América Latina del Instituto está concentrando sus esfuerzos educativos y de investigación en la creación de una red integrada por estudiosos sumamente capacitados y autoridades responsables de formular políticas públicas.
Dado que representan países diferentes y aportan variados antecedentes académicos y profesionales, estos expertos ayudan a identificar los asuntos de mayor importancia para la región. Estos son algunos ejemplos de los temas actuales que surgen de las necesidades reales y previstas por los funcionarios públicos: La reactivación del debate sobre el funcionamiento de los mercados inmobiliarios urbanos, el estrechamiento de la brecha entre el mercado inmobiliario formal y el informal y la implementación de nuevos instrumentos de políticas de tierras.
El acceso a la tierra por parte de la población urbana de ingresos bajos es el tema que tiene mayor presencia en el ánimo y la mente de muchos investigadores y funcionarios públicos. Hay dos campos de investigación que se relacionan: 1) los mecanismos que generan la segregación residencial o la exclusión a través del mercado por parte de agentes privados o públicos, y 2) las estrategias para que “los excluidos” tengan acceso a la tierra y así puedan formalizar su “inclusión social”. En su mayoría, los programas educativos que el Instituto lleva a cabo en América Latina para abordar la gestión de la tierra y los instrumentos de intervención pública surgen directa o indirectamente de este tema.
Para muchos funcionarios públicos de la región, la reforma de la tierra es un tema delicado y la recuperación de plusvalías de los bienes raíces generados por la actuación del sector público todavía parece una idea subversiva vista con recelo. De tal modo, el Instituto Lincoln se sitúa en una posición privilegiada como facilitador neutral con capacidad para colaborar con académicos y funcionarios públicos de América Latina, y también con expertos de los Estados Unidos, para aportar una perspectiva comparativa internacional de las ideas y experiencias en cuanto a las políticas de la tierra.
Martim Smolka, miembro principal del Instituto desde septiembre de 1995, se encuentra de licencia como profesor asociado en el Instituto de Investigación y Planificación Urbana y Regional de la Universidad Federal de Río de Janeiro, en Brasil.
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Municipalities across the United States face social problems caused by high land prices and a shortage of affordable housing. Dick Netzer, professor emeritus of economics and public administration at the Wagner Graduate School of Public Service at New York University, discusses the role that land taxation might play in addressing these issues. Netzer is a long-time faculty associate of the Institute and is the editor of several Institute publications, including Land Value Taxation: Can It and Will It Work Today (1998).
Land Lines: Could a land tax affect the building portion of the housing supply?
Dick Netzer: Yes. This is a point on which it is useful to distinguish the effect of taxes on land, capital and labor. A change in the tax system that affects the return on an investment in any of these factors will affect the amount that is invested, because a higher rate of return will encourage more investment in that factor and increase its supply. Here, of course, land is an unusual factor of production, because for most purposes we can consider the supply of land as fixed. An increase in demand will not produce an increased supply of land, and reduced demand will not decrease the supply.
On the other hand, lower taxes on capital and labor will cause their supply to increase because of the increased net return to these factors. So a tax shift that reduces taxes on capital and labor and increases taxes on land will increase the supply of capital and labor but not reduce the supply of land. Building construction is a very capital-intensive industry, and an increased supply of capital and labor, reflecting their higher after-tax rewards, will allow more building construction to take place.
LL: How would a land tax affect the price of land?
DN: We can assume that the pre-tax prices reflect “what the market would bear,” and that imposition of a tax will not increase demand or raise the amount that buyers would be willing to pay for land. In that case, the total amount buyers will pay, including the new tax that they will face, will be unchanged. But the division of that payment will change. Less will go to the seller, and that will be balanced by the increased tax that will be paid to the government. We need to distinguish here between short-term and long-term effects. In the long term, the price does not change—it just is divided differently between the seller and the government. But the short-run outlay does change, because the tax is a periodic charge over time, while the price paid to the seller is a lump sum, or requires a mortgage and a down payment. Reducing the lump-sum component and increasing the periodic charge can ease liquidity problems, making land more accessible to purchasers who cannot readily raise large amounts of cash but who can meet their tax obligations.
LL: So the overall effect would be to help make housing more affordable?
DN: Yes. Together these effects on building supply and on land prices should result in lower rents and lower housing prices. Note that this is not a direct effect of increasing land taxes, but an indirect effect as a consequence of untaxing labor and capital.
LL: How do you analyze our current shortage of affordable housing?
DN: Since landowners are currently able to command an outsized return on their landholdings, tenants are paying higher rents than one would expect if the returns to land ownership were more modest. We are fortunate to live at a time when demand for housing is increasing—and so is demand for land on which to build new housing or to renovate existing housing. When demand rises for a product in fixed supply, prices generally rise as well. But this rising demand and these rising prices are not the result of actions by landowners themselves. So there is neither an economic need nor an equitable requirement that this increasing demand produce larger returns to landowners.
LL: What would the economic transition to higher land taxes look like?
DN: In a period when housing demand is rising, one solution would be to increase the tax on land values while reducing taxes on labor, machinery and other productive equipment. First, let’s consider the effect of untaxing labor and capital to some extent. A reduction in taxes on labor and machinery will allow people who offer their labor and savings to earn more after taxes. When these earnings increase, we would expect that more labor and savings will be offered, which in turn will cause some reduction in earnings, but not enough to drive the supply to its previous levels. Because the costs of construction and the cost of equipment will be lower, the prices that consumers pay for new housing will decline.
I don’t want to overstate the scale of this effect. If housing demand is very strong, the effects on prices are likely to be modest, but the supply of housing will increase. The net result will be to dampen increases in housing prices and rents.
LL: What about the effect of the transition on land prices themselves?
DN: That is the other part of the tax shift. Right after such a change in the tax system, the prices of land for new buyers will fall sharply, because along with the land they are buying an obligation to pay the new, higher land taxes. So homebuyers and renters, as well as homebuilders, will face lower immediate prices for land, offset by the higher taxes they will pay over time. Even with this offset, they will be in a better position than they were before the tax shift. There will be a significant lowering in the need for cash when homebuilding begins, when a home is purchased, and when rental property is sold to new investors. These are critical times for homebuyers and for investors in residential property, and a reduction in their cash requirements at these points can be a great benefit. Of course, they will have to pay the higher land taxes each year. But these taxes do not require an advance lump-sum payment, and they require no mortgage or construction loans. These positive liquidity effects can be very important in housing markets—perhaps not to the very largest commercial homebuilders or to the most affluent buyers, who may not require a mortgage at all, but very important to ordinary participants in the housing market.
LL: What about existing landowners who suddenly face higher taxes?
DN: This is a genuine issue, and there may well be negative liquidity effects for them. The sale value of their land will fall immediately and substantially. If so, they may be less willing or able to withhold their land from the market in hopes of gains from increases in market values in the future.
We can expect another impact on land taxes, in a different direction. The lower prices on labor and equipment will cause a greater investment in housing and other construction. That means there will be more demand for land, and this increased demand will raise land prices. However, this rise will be of a different character from the price increase that we considered at the beginning of this discussion, which represented an outsized return to landowners. Unlike speculative price increases that stem from expectations of even higher prices in the future, the rise in land values resulting from increased investment in labor and equipment will not outpace the increase in income generally. The knowledge that a large portion of the future gains will have to be paid to the government in the form of a high land value tax will prevent buyers from bidding up the price of land simply in expectation of those gains. This is a good example of the distinction between two types of price increases. The purely speculative increase produces outsized returns to current landowners but does not benefit society as a whole. A price increase that reflects greater availability of labor and capital can serve the function of allocating land among competing uses, which helps the economy function efficiently.
