How do the perceptions of informal settlement dwellers on tenure security translate into investment in housing improvement? Is a property title necessary to establish security or increase investment? And how are income and credit related to investment? Does the average dweller actually aspire to legalization of tenure, and if so, what is expected? Based on research conducted in two land invasions in Buenos Aires, Argentina, this article addresses these questions, focusing on two issues in particular: the concept of tenure security and the empirical measurement of perceptions of security related to investment in housing improvement (Van Gelder 2009b).
Tenure Security as a Tripartite Concept
In the face of rapidly increasing urban informality in the 1970s, organizations such as the World Bank started experimenting with programs that provided basic services to settlements and granted property titles to dwellers. The assumption was that with secure tenure dwellers would mobilize resources for housing construction more efficiently than they would under public housing programs. Self-help housing, thus, was viewed as a source of economic security and upward social mobility.
In the early 1990s, the economic dimensions of tenure legalization took on new importance in some policy circles (Bromley 1990; World Bank 1993). The mere provision of private property rights was believed to be both a sufficient and necessary condition for settlement development. It was assumed that by providing both the incentive to invest and the possibility to do so by making formal credit accessible, property rights would function as leverage for development.
Critics of this idea argued that, with respect to establishing tenure security and investment, one could better focus on the actual situation on the ground. Factors such as the official recognition of a settlement, introduction of infrastructure and services, and other factors that could strengthen de facto security of tenure were considered more fundamental than holding a legal document for a plot (e.g., Gilbert 2002).
A third point of view on investment in housing claims that security as perceived by the dwellers is the most important factor. Rather than legal security, as embodied by titling, perception is the actual driving mechanism behind investment. It is argued that residents invest in their dwellings regardless of legal status, as long as they think they will not be evicted and will be allowed by the authorities to remain in their homes (Broegaard 2005; Varley 1987).
The concept of tenure security thus can be viewed in three different ways: as a legal construct that often takes the form of title to property; as de facto security based on the actual situation; and as it is perceived by dwellers. However, these views are often confused or simply equated in the research literature and by policy makers, so it is important to distinguish among them in order to answer the questions posed earlier.
Legal tenure security is a formal concept that refers to authoritative documents that identify the owner of an asset recognized by state power, but de facto and perceived tenure security are empirical concepts. To understand the de facto situation, we need to study the facts on the ground and answer such questions as: Have forced evictions been rare or frequent occurrences in a certain city or area? Has the general attitude towards illegal occupation by authorities been lenient or strict? Perceived tenure security, on the other hand, resides in the mind of the dweller, and its measurement requires fine-tuned methods.
The different types of tenure security may overlap. For example, having a title may imply that a dweller also has de facto security and he may perceive his situation to be secure, but there is no necessary connection among these types. Property rights do not always have a bearing on any kind of empirical fact, nor do they have to be recognized as something meaningful in the eyes of dwellers (Van Gelder 2010). Rather, cities with extensive informality are characterized precisely by an absence of such correlations.
One problem with the titling approach is that it equates property rights with tenure security. This makes sense in situations where the facts on the ground reflect the norms of the legal system, but not necessarily when this is not the case. Furthermore, it is important to remember that if tenure security, whether legal or de facto in nature, influences investment, it must operate through psychological pathways.
The Psychological Side of Tenure Security
The literature reveals three critical issues with respect to measuring tenure security. First, whether it is considered legal, de facto, or perceived, tenure security is often seen as a yes–no issue; either you have it or you do not. Second, and related to the first issue, studies only rarely provide an indication of the degree to which tenure security contributes to (more) investment in housing, compared to other factors likely to influence investment, such as income level or the availability of credit. Third, perceived tenure security is nearly always operationalized as a dweller’s perceived probability of eviction.
These three issues expose a number of important limitations related to each point. First, the idea of viewing tenure security as a dichotomy does not fit the reality of developing countries, where tenure security is better conceived as a matter of degree. Most low-income settlements fall somewhere between being completely insecure and entirely secure. Second, to understand the strength of tenure security as a factor influencing investment, this relationship needs to be quantified and examined along with other factors likely to influence investment, such as household income.
With regard to the third point, social psychological research increasingly shows that people’s decisions are often influenced by what they feel about a situation, instead of or in addition to how they think about it (Hsee and Rottenstreich 2004; Kahneman 2003; Van Gelder, De Vries, and Van der Pligt 2009). These insights can be applied to the study of informal housing if we consider a dweller’s investment as a form of decision making under uncertainty. That is, besides operationalizing perceived security only as the perceived probability of eviction, which refers to a cognitive or thinking state, we can also examine the feelings or worry, insecurity, and fear that dwellers experience. We term this component of tenure security fear of eviction.
Does examining feelings add to understanding estimates of the probability of eviction? In the context of informal tenure, it is often suggested that dwellers think that the probability of a forced eviction is very low, in particular when a settlement is relatively consolidated. In these cases, using only perceived probability of eviction as an indicator of tenure security limits its predictive value because it is invariably low. Yet, the possibility of eviction, however small, may still generate intense feelings of worry and stress in dwellers whose decisions are influenced regardless of whether this probability is perceived as likely or not (Van Gelder 2007; 2009a).
To avoid considering (perceptions of) tenure security as a dichotomy, we can operationalize probability and fear of eviction using psychometric scaling techniques. In my research, dwellers were presented various statements about their tenure situation and asked to indicate to what extent they agreed with each statement using five-point scales that ranged from completely disagree to completely agree. For example: “The possibility of an eviction worries me sometimes,” or “The possibility that we could be evicted from this neighborhood is always present.” Both items refer to the possibility of eviction, but the second item, which measures perceived probability of eviction, refers to a chance estimate—a thinking state—whereas the first item inquires about feelings.
Separate composite scales consisting of multiple items measured the perceived probability of eviction and fear of eviction. Respondents, all of whom were heads of household, were also asked about their household income and whether they had taken out a loan in the previous years. To measure investment in housing improvement, surveyors scored participants’ dwellings on three defining elements: the floor, the walls, and the roof. The scores were subsequently combined into a housing improvement or consolidation index, the dependent variable. To isolate the effects of perceived tenure security on investment, the survey included only those heads of household who had lived in the settlement since its origin and were responsible for their home construction.
Case Study Settlements
A land invasion typically involves a few hundred people who gain access to land by collectively invading and immediately building on the site. Residents attempt to comply with land use legislation and other requirements that render the legal and technical subdivision of the land possible at a later stage. This active resident participation makes these settlements different from more irregular slums (e.g., villas miserias).
The study consisted of a structured survey as well as semi-structured interviews and focus groups with dwellers in two different land invasions in the southern cone of Greater Buenos Aires, which is known for its large-scale popular urbanization and high concentrations of poverty (table 1).
The settlements were similar in size, but differed in age and hence degree of consolidation. El Tala was one of the first invasions in the city, while San Cayetano had existed for only two years prior to the survey in 2008. Only half of the dwellers in El Tala had received legal title, creating the conditions for a valid comparison of titled and nontitled households in this settlement.
Results of Analysis
Regression and correlational analysis were employed to examine the strength of both perceived probability of eviction and fear of eviction as predictors of housing improvement. To obtain a better idea of their comparative strength, we also looked at household income. Table 2 shows that both probability and fear were significantly correlated with improvement in both settlements. In other words, both thinking about the probability of an eviction and the feelings evoked by it influence the extent to which people are willing to invest in their dwelling. The higher the perceived probability and fear of an eviction, the less improved their dwelling.
Household income was quite strongly correlated with housing improvement in San Cayetano, but not in El Tala. One likely explanation for these findings is that the most visible investment in housing occurs in the early years of settlement development. Recall that San Cayetano was only two years old at the time of the survey, while El Tala dates to the early 1980s. Another related explanation is that the current income of households, as measured in the survey, does not necessarily reflect income in preceding decades. That income fluctuation makes it more difficult to assess the valid relationship between income and investment for older settlements like El Tala.
The regression analysis in table 3 simultaneously tests probability, fear, and income as predictors of investment by looking at their unique contribution. The strength of the relationship for each separate variable is indicated by the β symbol, which can range from -1 to +1 (indicating a perfect linear negative and positive relationship respectively).
In El Tala the effect of probability of eviction is largely explained by fear of eviction. This appears to confirm the assumption discussed earlier that in cases where eviction is very unlikely, such as in consolidated settlements, fear of eviction is the better predictor of housing improvement. Stated differently, when deciding on whether and how much to invest in their dwellings, individuals are actually more influenced by how they feel about their situation and the risks involved than how they think about it. These results make a strong case for altering our view on perceived tenure security as merely consisting of perceptions of the probability of eviction. If we want to be able to predict behavior, we also need to understand how people feel.
In San Cayetano, however, a different picture emerges. Even though both perceived probability and fear of eviction are negatively correlated with investment in housing improvement, the results of the regression analysis show that household income explains most of the variance. In other words, household income dictated the investment more than perceptions of security, whether perceived probability of eviction or fear of eviction. My (speculative) assumption is that again these results can be attributed to the young age of the settlement, because financial abilities more than anything else dictate to what extent people can invest in their housing in the earliest phase of settlement consolidation.
Virtually all residents surveyed and interviewed in both settlements indicated that having a property title was important to them, and they expressed a strong desire to be legalized. This result presents an intriguing paradox: Even though forced eviction is rarely regarded as likely or even possible by residents, about half of them still gave security of tenure as the most important reason for wanting to have a title to their property. One resident of El Tala commented on different motivations for investment: “I think that there are two moments. One is in the beginning when constructing is a way of ensuring yourself that no one will kick you out. Nowadays, I think the situation is rather reversed. I don’t believe that it is worth putting money in your house if you do not have a title.”
This means that even in situations with very high de facto security of tenure, such as El Tala, property titles are still desired by residents, principally for additional security. This finding corresponds with the point made earlier about the importance of including fear of eviction alongside probability estimates as an indicator of perceived tenure security. The possibility of an eviction, however small, may still elicit strong feelings of worry and fear that can influence residents’ decisions, almost regardless of perceived probability (Van Gelder 2007)
Other frequently mentioned motivations for wanting a property title were expressed as “leaving something to my children” and ”being or feeling that I am the owner of my house.” Surprisingly few dwellers in either settlement mentioned commercial reasons (e.g., increased value of their dwelling or access to credit) for their desire to be an owner. In both settlements, more than 80 percent of the respondents thought that having title would further increase security. More than half of the residents thought they would invest more after having title, and more than half of the residents that had title indicated that they had in fact invested more after their tenure was legalized.
With respect to accessing credit, titled owners did not take out a bank loan more frequently than residents who lacked title. In El Tala only three people with a property title had taken out a mortgage loan in the previous five years versus two people in the untitled part of that settlement. More people—eight in the titled and five in the untitled areas—had taken out loans at lending institutions that charge high interest rates but do not require property as collateral. In other words, the owners did not pledge their dwellings as collateral to obtain the loans.
The majority of the respondents who had taken a loan had done so to improve or repair their dwellings. The small amounts of money borrowed and the very few loans intended for business investments raise doubts about the extent to which increasing access to credit will function as an engine for economic growth, as is sometimes suggested as a rationale for land titling programs.
Conclusions
These results shed some new light on the debate over tenure security and the discussion between advocates and critics of legalization. For example, even though legal title is not a necessary condition for investment in housing improvement, it is likely to be a contributing factor in some situations. Furthermore, nearly without exception, all dwellers aspire to be the legal owner of their home. However, the social and psychological effects seem to be much greater than economic factors in valuing legal tenure.
While policy increasingly has stressed mercantilist arguments in support of titling (e.g., credit and land markets), respondents tend to stress social reasons. Besides tenure security, the ability to leave something “safe” for offspring and the simple feeling that one is the (legal) owner of one’s dwelling were cited as more fundamental motivations for the desire to be a homeowner. Formal ownership is seen by many, realistically or not, as a way of escaping marginality and as a substitute for a largely deficient social security system.
One way to improve policy and more accurately anticipate the consequences of specific interventions, which all too often take straightforward top-down approaches, is to pay more attention to the perspectives of dwellers and to borrow methods and insights from disciplines such as psychology and sociology. These disciplines offer fine-tuned measures of varied constructs that development scholars, policy makers, and land experts should consider in future research and on-the-ground programs for informal developments.
About the Author
Jean-Louis van Gelder is a researcher at the Netherlands Institute for the Study of Crime and Law Enforcement. He studied both organizational psychology and law at the University of Amsterdam and combined them into a Ph.D. on tenure security and informality in Buenos Aires. Other research interests include the role of affect and personality in risky and criminal decision making.
References
Broegaard, R.J. 2005. Land tenure insecurity and inequality in Nicaragua. Development and Change 36: 845–864.
Bromley, D.W. 1990. A new path to development? The significance of Hernando De Soto’s ideas on underdevelopment, production, and reproduction. Economic Geography 66: 328–348.
Gilbert, A.G. 2002. On the mystery of capital and the myths of Hernando De Soto: What difference does legal title make? International Development Planning Review 26: 1–19.
Hsee, C.K. and Y. Rottenstreich. 2004. Music, pandas, and muggers: On the affective psychology of value. Journal of Experimental Psychology 113: 23–30.
Kahneman, D. 2003. Perspectives on judgment and choice: Mapping bounded rationality. American Psychologist 58: 697–720.
Van Gelder, J-L. 2007. Feeling and thinking: quantifying the relationship between perceived tenure security and housing improvement in an informal neighborhood in Buenos Aires. Habitat International 31: 219–231.
———. 2009a. Legal tenure security, perceived tenure security and housing improvement in Buenos Aires: An attempt towards integration. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 33: 126–146.
———. 2009b. Assessing fit: Perceptions of informality and expectations of legality. Working Paper. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
———. 2010. What tenure security? The case for a tripartite view. Land Use Policy 27: 449–456.
Van Gelder, J-L., R.E. de Vries, and J. Van der Pligt. 2009. Evaluating a dual-process model of risk: Affect and cognition as determinants of risky choice. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 22: 45–61.
Varley, A. 1987. The relationship between tenure legalization and housing improvements: Evidence from Mexico City. Development and Change 18: 463–481.
World Bank. 1993. Housing: Enabling markets to work. World Bank Policy Paper. Washington DC: World Bank.
Alan Mallach is a nonresident senior fellow at the Metropolitan Policy Program of the Brookings Institution and a senior fellow at the Center for Community Progress, both in Washington, DC; and a visiting scholar at the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. He has been engaged as a practitioner, advocate, and scholar in the fields of housing, planning, and community development for nearly 40 years, during which time he has made contributions in many areas including affordable and mixed-income housing development, neighborhood revitalization, and urban regeneration. In 2003 he was named a member of the College of Fellows of the American Institute of Certified Planners in recognition of his lifetime achievements as a leader in the city planning profession.
Mallach is also a visiting professor in the graduate city planning program at Pratt Institute, in New York, and has taught at Rutgers University and the New Jersey School of Architecture. He has published numerous books and articles on housing, community development, and land use; his book Bringing Buildings Back: From Abandoned Properties to Community Assets is recognized as the standard work on the subject. His most recent book, Rebuilding America’s Legacy Cities: New Directions for the Industrial Heartland, was published in 2012 by the American Assembly at Columbia University. He is a resident of Roosevelt, New Jersey, and holds a B.A. degree from Yale College.
Land Lines: How did you become involved with the Lincoln Institute?
Alan Mallach: I have known about the Lincoln Institute for many years, and initially became involved in the 1990s through my work on brownfields redevelopment. Since then, I have served as faculty in a number of training sessions sponsored by the Institute and participated in meetings and conferences at Lincoln House. About seven years ago, Nico Calavita, professor emeritus in the Graduate Program in City Planning at San Diego State University, and I undertook research on inclusionary housing. This project led to the Institute’s 2010 publication of our co-edited book, Inclusionary Housing in International Perspective: Affordable Housing, Social Inclusion, and Land Value Recapture. Most recently, I have been working with Lavea Brachman, executive director of the Greater Ohio Policy Center, on a policy focus report that looks at the issues associated with regenerating America’s legacy cities.
Land Lines: What do you mean by legacy cities?
Alan Mallach: “Legacy cities” is a term that has come into use increasingly to replace “shrinking cities” as a way to describe the nation’s older industrial cities that have lost a significant share of their population and jobs over the past 50 or more years. Iconic American cities such as Pittsburgh, Detroit, and Cleveland are typically mentioned in this context, but the category also includes many smaller cities like Flint, Michigan; Utica, New York; and Scranton, Pennsylvania.
Land Lines: How do the issues of legacy cities engage the Lincoln Institute’s central policy concerns?
Alan Mallach: They do so in many different respects, but I think the strongest connection is around the question of how land is to be used in these cities. All of these cities have had a significant oversupply of both residential and nonresidential buildings relative to demand, at least since the 1960s. As a result of extensive demolition over decades, they have accumulated large inventories of vacant or underutilized land. Detroit alone contains over 100,000 separate vacant land parcels and another 40,000 to 50,000 vacant buildings. While this inventory is a burden, it could also become an enormous asset for the city’s future. How to develop effective strategies to use this land in ways that both benefit the public and stimulate economic growth and market demand is one of the central issues facing these legacy cities.
Land Lines: How would you compare this challenge to your work on inclusionary housing?
Alan Mallach: From an economic standpoint, it’s the other side of the coin. Inclusionary housing is a way of using the planning approval process to channel strong market demand in ways that create public benefit in the form of affordable housing—either directly, by incorporating some number of affordable housing units into the development gaining the approval, or indirectly, through off-site development or cash contributions by the developer. As such, it involves explicitly or implicitly recapturing the incremental land value being created by the planning approval process. Inclusionary housing presupposes the presence of strong market demand and cannot happen without it.
Land reuse strategies in legacy cities seek to create demand where it doesn’t currently exist or alternatively find ways to use the land that benefit the public and can be implemented even under conditions where market demand cannot be induced, at least for the foreseeable future. These approaches are often called “green” land uses, such as urban agriculture, open space, wetlands restoration, or stormwater management. It can be difficult to get local officials and citizens to recognize that the traditional forms of redevelopment, including building new houses, shopping centers, and so forth, require the existence of a market for those products. However, the demand simply does not exist in many of these devastated areas. Moreover, the demand cannot be induced artificially by massive public subsidies, even though public funds can, under certain conditions, act as a stimulus to build demand.
Land Lines: Is lack of demand evident everywhere in legacy cities?
Alan Mallach: No, and that’s one of the most interesting things about these cities. Some cities are seeing demand grow far more than others, but in most cases the revitalization is limited to certain parts of the city. One noticeable trend is that downtown and near-downtown areas, particularly those with strong walkable urban character, such as the Washington Avenue corridor in St. Louis or Cleveland’s Warehouse District, are showing great dynamism, even while many other parts of those two cities are continuing to see population loss and housing abandonment.
Part of this dynamism is driven by walkability and strong urban form (see the new Lincoln Institute book by Julie Campoli, Made for Walking: Density and Neighborhood Form (2012), which examines 12 such walkable neighborhoods and the forces behind their recent popularity). A second important factor is that these areas appeal to a particular demographic—young single individuals and couples. This group is not only increasingly urbanoriented, but is growing in terms of its share of the overall American population.
Land Lines: What other issues are you exploring in your work on legacy cities?
Alan Mallach:I am focusing on two research areas, one more quantitative and one more qualitative. In the first area, I am looking at how many of these cities are going through a pronounced spatial and demographic reconfiguration—a process that is exacerbating the economic disparities between different geographic areas and populations within these cities. While many older city downtowns, such as those of St. Louis, Cleveland, Baltimore, and even Detroit, are becoming increasingly attractive, particularly to young adults, and are gaining population and economic activity, many other neighborhoods in these cities are losing ground at an increasing rate. In many places these trends are accentuating already problematic racial divides.
My second area of research revolves around the question of what it takes to foster successful, sustained regeneration. Lavea Brachman and I touch on this challenge in our policy focus report, but I am hoping to delve into it much more deeply, including looking at some European cities that have found themselves in situations similar to those of American legacy cities. I think the experiences of cities in northern England, for example, or Germany’s Ruhr Valley, parallel changes in our own former industrial cities quite closely.
Land Lines: What do you mean by successful regeneration?
Alan Mallach: That’s a very important question. I think there’s often a tendency to see a particular event—the Olympics in Barcelona or a major building like the Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao, Spain, for example—as evidence of regeneration, rather than, at best, a discrete spur to more substantial change. I believe that regeneration has to be a function of change in three fundamental areas: first, the well-being of the population, reflected in such measures as higher educational attainment and income or lower unemployment; second, a stronger housing market and greater neighborhood strength; and third, the creation of new export-oriented economic sectors to replace the lost industrial sector. Population growth alone (that is, reversal of historic population decline) may or may not be evidence of regeneration. It is more likely to follow these three changes rather than lead them.
Land Lines: What do you see as the future of America’s legacy cities?
Alan Mallach: I see a very mixed picture. As shown in the policy focus report, certain cities are doing far better than others. Pittsburgh and Philadelphia are showing strong signs of revival, while Cleveland, Detroit, and Buffalo are still losing ground. I think legacy cities are facing two daunting challenges as they look to the future.
The first issue is what the new economic engines of these cities will be. The cities that have been more successful up to now tend to have the most significant clusters of major national research universities and medical centers. These institutions tend to dominate their cities’ economies. While they have helped cities like Pittsburgh and Baltimore rebuild in the post-industrial era, I think a lot of questions remain about their sustainability as long-term economic engines.
The second question is demographic. Downtowns may be drawing young, single people and couples, but many of these cities’ residential neighborhoods were built around 100 years ago as communities mainly for married couples to raise children. Now they are falling apart, including many neighborhoods that have remained stable until relatively recently. This demographic of married couples with children is shrinking across the country and even more so in our older cities. Today, only 8 percent of the households in Baltimore, for example, fit this description. I believe that the future of these neighborhoods is very important to the future of their cities, and I am very concerned about their prospects.
Land Lines: In spite of these challenges, how do you think your work is making a difference?
Alan Mallach: The fact is, many cities are making progress. Pittsburgh has done an excellent job building on its assets to develop new economic engines, while Baltimore and Philadelphia are making impressive strides in reorganizing many of their governmental functions to better deal with their vacant and problem property challenges. Baltimore, for example, has initiated a program called Vacants to Value, which integrates code enforcement and problem property work with larger market-building strategies. I have been fortunate to be directly involved in this work in some cities, including Philadelphia and Detroit; elsewhere, I’m always gratified when local officials or community leaders tell me that they use my work, or that they have been influenced by my thinking. It makes all the effort very much worthwhile.
David Vetter (Ph.D., University of California) has worked for more than four decades on urban finance and economics issues in Latin America. He taught and conducted urban research in Brazil for 17 years at the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), the Graduate Engineering Program (COPPE), the Institute of Urban and Regional Planning and Studies (IPPUR), and the Fundação Getúlio Vargas. In 1990, he joined the World Bank, where he developed subnational investment and reform programs for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Ecuador. To push for greater private-sector participation in urban financing, he joined Dexia Credit Local in 1998 as vice president and established lending programs in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. Since returning to Brazil in 2004, he has worked as a consultant and researcher for various clients, including the Inter-American Development Bank and the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, where he has been a visiting fellow since July 2014. He recently authored two articles for Land Lines: “Residential Wealth Distribution in Rio de Janeiro” (January 2014) and “Land-Based Financing for Brazil’s Municipalities” (October 2011).
Land Lines: How did you become involved with the Lincoln Institute?
David Vetter: For many years—whether I was doing research, consulting, or working at the World Bank or in the private sector—I quite often found solid information to help me from the Lincoln Institute. More recently, the Institute financed my research on residential wealth and municipal finance in Brazil.
Land Lines: What will you research as a visiting fellow and why?
David Vetter: I will focus on strategies for financing urban infrastructure in Brazil. Like other Latin American countries, Brazil continually needs to make substantial investments to keep pace with the rapidly growing number of new households and to reduce the number of them without access to urban infrastructure. From 2000 to 2010, the number of households grew by more than 12 million—an increase nearly 7 times the 1.8 million households in the Boston-Cambridge Metro Area in 2010. Given this demographic pressure, the absolute number of Brazilian households without access to urban infrastructure remained high in 2010, despite sizeable investments over the previous decade. And the deficits of some types of infrastructure actually increased. From 2000 to 2010, for instance, the number of Brazilian urban households without adequate sewage systems rose by nearly 2 million—more than the total number of housing units in Metropolitan Boston in 2010.
Brazil’s Ministry of Cities estimated that basic sanitation (potable water, waste water, solid waste, and drainage) would cost more than US$80 billion just for 2014 to 2018. Highways, street paving, public security, health, and education demand similarly high investments, and the amounts required often greatly exceed existing sources of financing.
Land Lines: How could value captured by these infrastructure investments help to finance them?
David Vetter: The benefits of infrastructure investments are capitalized into land and building prices. The Lincoln Institute’s 2013 forums on Notable Instruments for Urban Intervention showed that many governments in Latin America are effectively using a wide variety of tools to capture value created by their infrastructure investments, as detailed in Martim O. Smolka’s comprehensive review of the literature (2013): sale of development rights; betterment levies for street paving, drainage, and other improvements; and public-private partnerships (PPPs) involving value capture, as in the financial structure of Rio’s massive port renovation (Porto Maravilha). More efficient collection of the real estate property and transfer taxes help as well.
Value capture can generate positive feedback, creating a virtuous circle that generates additional resources for further investments. For example, the increases in value generated would increase the base for the property tax if real estate assessments were conducted in a timely manner, and the resulting revenue could be used to finance further investment.
Land Lines: To what extent could Brazilian municipalities increase the use of value capture?
David Vetter: According to economic theory, the value generated by infrastructure investments should roughly equal their cost. Because the supply of infrastructure would seem to be inelastic due to public finance constraints, the market value generated can actually exceed the cost of the investments.
For example, Brazilian municipalities invested more than US$82 billion in infrastructure and equipment from 2006 to 2010 (about US$16 billion per year). But in 2010 alone, state and national governments also invested more than US$50 billion. Capture of even a relatively small percentage of the value created could provide significant resources for investment. For example, the Rio de Janeiro Metropolitan Region is receiving massive infrastructure investments from national, state, and municipal governments, as well as from private sector partners, for various projects including the new Arco Metropolitano beltway and a new Metro line. Some are concessions or PPPs with significant financing at below-market interest rates from the public development banks (BNDES and CAIXA).
Land Lines: What role could value capture play in housing policy?
David Vetter: Infrastructure investment creates residential wealth, as its value is capitalized into housing value. Residential structures represent about one third of Brazil’s total net fixed capital in the national wealth accounts, as is typical for other countries around the world. Given this importance, we ask in our own work on the Rio de Janeiro Metropolitan Region: What generates residential wealth? How much residential wealth exists? Who holds it? We found that there are winners and losers. For example, the increase in value generated by infrastructure investment increases the residential wealth of homeowners, but it raises prices for renters in the benefitted area and housing cost for homebuyers wishing to locate there.
Land Lines: Would a housing policy focused on generating residential wealth and the equity of its distribution differ from most low-income housing programs?
David Vetter: It would be quite different. Most low-income housing programs keep unit costs down by building on low-cost land. Land price is low when it lacks access to employment and basic urban services, so affordable units often end up in these poorly serviced areas. A housing policy focused on residential wealth would emphasize access to employment and basic services, as they are among the key determinants of housing value.
Land Lines: But isn’t this utopian? How could value capture help to increase the residential wealth of lower-income families?
David Vetter: The challenge is certainly great. But value capture from higher-income families could allow cross subsidies to lower-income ones, especially renters who wish to locate in the areas benefiting from infrastructure investments.
Let me illustrate. The number of households in the Rio de Janeiro Metropolitan Region increased by more than 600,000 from 2000 to 2010 (that’s twice the number of households in Washington, DC, in 2010). As a result, the region’s urban infrastructure deficits remain high despite high investments. A recent impact study of metropolitan Rio de Janeiro’s new beltway (Pontual et al. 2011) explored the possibility of developing whole new socially integrated and fully serviced neighborhoods to hold the huge expected increase in the number of households along the beltway. This development could be financed in part by capturing value generated by the massive infrastructure investments planned and being implemented. Part of the value captured from higher-income families could be used to finance lower-income ones.
This impact study analyzed where such neighborhoods might best be located. Which value capture instruments might work best in this case? It is interesting that the private sector is already developing what they describe as “green neighborhoods” in the outlying regions of metropolitan Rio. Does it make sense to plan individual housing projects when such large increases in households are involved?
Land Lines: Would lower-income families be able to pay for infrastructure?
David Vetter: In Latin America, the eligibility criteria for value capture programs almost always include a test for capacity to pay. Of course, value capture should only be applied to families who can afford it.
Land Lines: How do you respond to the Brazilian professionals working on urban issues who argue that it is impossible to capture value for legal or cultural reasons?
David Vetter: Although Brazil’s constitution provides broad powers for value capture, only the largest municipalities, such as São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, appear to be using them. Other sub-national and national governments are doing much less to capture the value of considerable public investments.
This failure is probably due in part to resistance by some who think that value capture is legally impossible. Yet while betterment levies meet with similar resistance, Silva and Pereira (2013) estimate that total revenue from them exceeded US$300 million among municipalities in the states of São Paulo, Paraná, and Santa Catarina from 2000 to 2010, even though relatively few municipalities employed them. This amount is not very significant for states of this size, but it does show that betterment levies are feasible.
One reason why betterment levies were successful in Paraná and Santa Catarina was that the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank have required cost recovery in their municipal development projects since the 1980s. This success supports the idea that incentives of a national or state program can encourage use of value capture at the municipal level.
In addition, many cases of value capture seem to go unnoticed. In the City of Rio de Janeiro, for example, the sale of excess land from the existing subway system partly financed the expansion of a whole new line, and developers provide water and sewerage trunk lines as a condition for project approval in a higher-income neighborhood, Barra da Tijuca.
Land Lines: How might national or state government programs encourage greater use of value capture?
David Vetter: One way would be to provide access to financing as an incentive for the municipalities that use value capture. Ecuador’s development bank (Banco del Estado) uses such access to encourage municipalities to employ betterment levies. Access to financing could be used to provide access to a broader range of value capture instruments, such as the sale of development rights and impact fees, as well as betterment levies.
Land Lines: How can the Lincoln Institute encourage infrastructure financing through value capture?
David Vetter: Lincoln has done an excellent job of generating knowledge about value capture through its research, forums, training program, and publications. The Institute could scale up its excellent work on value capture in the region through more forums and publications, and by directly advising policy makers regarding program design and implementation.