Tao Ran is a professor in the School of Economics at Renmin University of China and director of the university’s China Center for Public Economics and Governance. He is also a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institute. His field of specialization centers on China’s urbanization and the political economy of the economic transition, land and household registration reform, and local governance and public finance in rural China. His diverse research has appeared in the Journal of Comparative Economics, Journal of Development Studies, Land Economics, Urban Studies, Political Studies, China Quarterly, and Land Use Policy.
Dr. Tao received his PhD in economics from the University of Chicago in 2002. He is a long-time research fellow at the Peking University-Lincoln Institute Center for Urban Development and Land Policy and was previously a Shaw Research Fellow of Chinese Economy at the University of Oxford’s Institute of Chinese Studies. With funding from PKU–Lincoln Institute and from other agencies, such as the National Science Foundation of China, he led a research team and started a large survey on urban migrants and dispossessed farmers in 12 cities across China’s four major urbanizing areas: the Yangtze River Delta (Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces), the Pearl River Delta (Guangdong province), Chengdu–Chongqing region (Sichuan province and Chongqing municipality), and Bohai Bay Area (Hebei and Shandong provinces). He is also working on a project to pilot new urban village redevelopment models in Shenzhen municipality and the Pearl River Delta.
Land Lines: Why is the study of China’s political economy and its transition so important to the country’s future?
Tao Ran: After enjoying nearly double-digit growth in the past three decades, China has become the shining star of the 21st-century global economy. People marvel at its successful transformation from a third-world country into the world’s largest manufacturing base and second largest economy—an evolution that lifted 450 million people out of poverty. As China grows, however, it faces widening income inequality, serious corruption and pollution, and social injustice that has left hundreds of millions of temporary migrants without access to decent urban public services and tens of millions of undercompensated, dispossessed farmers transitioning into industrialized urban economies.
My research explores the institutional sources of China’s fast growth in the past decades as well as the implications, positive and negative, of China as an alternative model for the developing world—as an effective, growth-oriented autocracy with heavy investments in infrastructure and industries, massive exports of manufacturing goods, and selective government intervention and industrial policies. I believe it’s essential to predict what will happen to China in the near future, because it will have important implications for the whole developing world.
Land Lines: Why do you think it is important to study land and household registration? What do these studies say about the current state of China’s socioeconomic structure?
Tao Ran:China is in the midst of an urban revolution, sustaining a massive volume of rural-to-urban migration every year in the last three decades. About 200 million rural migrants are working and living in Chinese cities. Yet, under the persistent hukou (household registration) system, a majority of migrants with hukou registration in their homelands exist as “outsiders” or “temporary population” in their new cities of residence. They are denied access to welfare benefits, subsidized public housing, and urban public schools.
Their difficulties are compounded by highly distorted land use patterns. Typically, when countries urbanize, less than 20 percent of newly utilized land supports manufacturing, leaving a majority of that territory to accommodate migrant housing. Under the current Chinese land requisition-leasing system, local governments lease around 40 percent of newly utilized land to build industrial parks, leaving only 30 to 40 percent of the area every year for residential purposes.
China’s current land use and household registration systems help to generate several dual socioeconomic structures as well. Besides the widely acknowledged urban-rural dichotomy, there is also a dual structure of urban permanent residents versus migrants. Another duality separates homeowners from urban rentees who lag far behind in terms of wealth accumulation. As 90 percent of homeowners are permanent residents, and 95 percent of renters are migrants, these dual structures lead to a highly divided society.
Land Lines: What land use challenges will China face in the coming decade?
Tao Ran:Many cities have constructed industrial parks, or “garden-style factories,” that make very inefficient use of land. Industrial companies lease land at an extremely low price and use only a part of it, leaving other areas undeveloped or allocated for large-scale greenification projects. Local governments undersupply residential and commercial land in order to maximize profits, leading to undersupplied commercial/residential land markets, followed by serious bubbles in the real estate sector. The rapid rise in urban housing prices and the formation of a real estate bubble over the past decade has made it impossible for the vast majority of rural migrant populations to afford commodity housing in cities. In fact, even new labor force entrants with university degrees find that today’s housing prices are far higher than they can afford. Clearly, housing affordability has become the main challenge to China today.
The aftermath of the 2008 world financial crisis had a huge impact on China. The fiscal and financial stimulus package implemented by the central government mainly benefitted local governments, which have continued to invest in even more industrial parks. Consequently, the Chinese economy has experienced more overcapacity in industrial infrastructure and manufacturing goods as well as more serious housing bubbles across all tiers of cities. This path is all the more unsustainable considering that China already suffered from overcapacity in manufacturing and real estate bubbles before 2008. Given the moral hazards of borrowing from state-owned banks and the fiscal illusion that the housing bubble will continue, local government debts have reached an unprecedented level of 10 trillion RMB, half of which was accumulated after 2009. I f there is no real reform in the systems governing land, hukou registration, and local public finance, the Chinese economy will slow down quite significantly. In the worst-case scenario, the housing bubble will burst, leading to a full-scale financial and economic crisis.
Land Lines: What are some potential policy implications of your research on local governance and public finance in rural China?
Tao Ran: China needs to reform its land and household registration systems so that migrants can access affordable housing and decent public schooling services in cities. Land has played an essential role in the making of China’s growth model in the past 15 years—but it is also responsible for current economic woes. In my view, a reform package that centers on land and urbanization provides the best chance of creating a better balance between the country’s import and export rates by unleashing huge domestic demand and relieving the overcapacity problem in many Chinese industries.
I propose a gradualist approach that aims to build a more equitable dual-track system. Under the current land regulatory regime, land ownership is separated into urban and rural; while urban governments have the authority to allocate rural areas for urban development, rural governments do not have the same rights in reciprocity. This bias deprives rural residents of their development rights and leads the Chinese economy down a destructive path.
Total liberalization, however, may result in a crash of the existing housing bubbles when a large volume of rural land is made available to the market. To alleviate this concern on the part of local governments and urban homeowners, China may need to set up a rental property market track targeting the 200 million rural migrants who already live and work in cities. Half of them currently live in dormitories provided by their employers, and the other half reside in illegally built housing in urban villages without good infrastructure or access to urban public services such as education for migrating children. I propose a reform that would allow rural communities in suburban villages of migrant-receiving cities to take their nonagricultural land onto the urban housing market under one condition: for the first 10 to 15 years, they could build properties used only for rental purposes. After the transitional period, those houses would gain full rights, and they could be sold directly on the housing market.
Land Lines: What are the advantages of this design?
Tao Ran: Insulating developable rural land in the rental market initially provides a cushion for the existing real estate market and prevents market panics and a bursting of the housing bubble. Merging the two tracks, however, would send speculators a credible signal that residential building prices will not rise further, and so the central government could phase out its strict regulations on real estate markets installed since 2010 to curb the housing bubble. Such a reform package would contribute to a healthy growth of the housing market. Moreover, granting rural communities development rights—even if those rights were restricted during the transition period—would open the legal channel for them to apply for development loans.
This opportunity would unleash a housing construction boom in urban villages and suburban areas and provide a lift for construction-related industries with significant overcapacity. Unlike the current housing bubble, this kind of real estate development is more socially beneficial and economically sustainable. Rural residents, particularly those living close to urban centers, would benefit directly. The growth in the rental property track also makes housing affordable for hundreds of millions of migrant workers, enabling them to settle in cities permanently. Urbanization has the potential to turn the Chinese economy away from the investment-driven model.
Land Lines: What is the key to the success of this reform?
Tao Ran: The attitude of local governments is critical. Their concern over revenues is perfectly legitimate and needs to be addressed in the reform package. Under the current system, local governments are burdened with too many spending responsibilities, and they lack adequate revenues. After the reform, they would have limited power of land requisition and lose the sizeable land lease fees and bank loans associated with that power. In the long run, municipalities should levy property taxes to generate a stable source of income for local public finance. Considering the strong resistance from wealthy and politically powerful residents of the cities introducing the property tax on a trial basis, however, it is unrealistic to expect this new tax to take effect soon.
I believe that another untapped source for local governments is underutilized industrial land. According to various reports, the floor-area ratio is only about 0.3 to 0.4 for industrial parks even in China’s developed areas. Through reorganization by negotiation, it is possible to double land development intensity and convert some industrial land for residential and commercial construction. Our estimates show that local governments would be more than compensated for giving up the power of land requisition, and they could also use these revenues to pay back the debts and avert a financial crisis.
At the current stage of development, no reform in the Chinese economy is going to be easy. One certainly should not have any illusions about a quick fix. But the proposed dual-track reform package offers some real hope of boosting domestic consumption and alleviating the overcapacity problem in many sectors. One particularly favorable factor for this reform is the new leadership’s emphasis on urbanization. Premier Li Keqiang has spent years on this issue and seems to have a genuine interest in achieving breakthroughs. This proposal may provide a realistic roadmap for such reforms.
Land Lines: What lessons can China teach?
Tao Ran: The Chinese model successfully effects growth. It also generates several negative consequences, such as the over-leveraging of land, social unrest resulting from land grabbing, environmental damages, and housing bubbles, which burden the urban population. The Chinese lesson is that for a country to grow, the government is essential; but that same government may overdo things and, in the long run, generate distortions that finally damage the sustainability of the economy and society.
Una caricatura de Jack Ziegler en la revista New Yorker refleja la ironía esencial de participar en condominios, cooperativas y otros tipos de asociaciones de propietarios. Un automóvil está ingresando en un camino que conduce hasta un grupo de casas adosadas a lo lejos, con un cartel en la entrada que proclama “Bienvenido a Condoville y la ilusión de ser propietario de su propia vivienda” (Ziegler 1984).
A pesar de esta ambigüedad, aproximadamente un cuarto de la población estadounidense vive ahora en viviendas gestionadas por asociaciones, conocidas en su conjunto como comunidades de interés común (CIC). La figura 1 muestra el impresionante aumento de las CIC en las últimas décadas. Entre 1970 y 2013, la cantidad de unidades de vivienda en este tipo de comunidades pasó de alrededor de 700.000 a 26,3 millones, mientras que la cantidad de residentes se multiplicó por más de 30, de 2,1 millones a 65,7 millones.
Con su creciente popularidad, las comunidades de interés común han generado desafíos políticos y problemas legales que exigen constante resolución. Estos conflictos en general tienen que ver con preocupaciones externas de que las CIC segregan a los ricos del resto de la sociedad, o desacuerdos internos entre los propietarios individuales y los órganos de gobierno de sus asociaciones. Este artículo examina algunas de las controversias asociadas al modelo de CIC y su sistema de gobierno, y sugiere medidas para aumentar los beneficios de las comunidades de interés común, tanto para los propietarios como para la sociedad en general.
El aumento de las comunidades de interés común
La creciente industrialización que se produjo en el siglo XIX, causó contaminación, tráfico, ruido y enfermedades, lo que llevó a muchos planificadores y ciudadanos a favorecer la separación de usos residenciales, comerciales e industriales. (La zonificación como herramienta de planificación no había surgido todavía, y no sería legitimada por la Corte Suprema de Justicia de los Estados Unidos hasta 1926). Algunos emprendedores residenciales impusieron por lo tanto “servidumbres” (convenios, restricciones y derechos de acceso en predios ajenos) sobre sus proyectos de subdivisión. Las servidumbres generalmente restringían las propiedades a usos residenciales y frecuentemente creaban derechos compartidos para el uso de instalaciones y servicios comunales, a cambio de aranceles. Los compradores de lotes aceptaban estas servidumbres y, una vez que las restricciones se habían registrado, los compradores subsiguientes estaban legalmente obligados a respetarlas. El derecho consuetudinario resultó ser un vehículo efectivo para crear áreas residenciales de alto nivel, como Gramercy Park en Nueva York (1831) y Louisburg Square en Boston (1844).
Después de una desaceleración durante la Gran Depresión y la Segunda Guerra Mundial, la construcción de CIC comenzó a crecer a fines de la década de 1960, y la Administración Federal de Viviendas (FHA) reconoció el condominio como un vehículo de propiedad asegurable, seguido de leyes legislativas estatales en el mismo sentido. Los seguros hipotecarios de la FHA animaron a los emprendedores a construir condominios para la clase media, que ganaron aceptación en el mercado como consecuencia del movimiento llamado “new town” (nuevos pueblos), ejemplificado por las primeras comunidades planificadas, como Reston, Virginia (1964) y Columbia, Maryland (1967). La aprobación de la Propuesta 13 en California, una iniciativa que limitó la tributación a la propiedad en 1978, y de medidas similares en otros estados, también impulsó el crecimiento de las CIC, ya que los gobiernos locales, necesitados de fondos y bajo creciente presión para suministrar más servicios, ya no estaban dispuestos a absorber los costos de infraestructura y servicios de nuevos emprendimientos. Por esta razón, tendieron a aprobar solamente nuevos emprendimientos en forma de CIC, donde los costos estaban cubiertos por el emprendedor (y en última instancia por los propietarios).
Hoy en día, los propietarios de CIC están sujetos generalmente a una variedad de restricciones sobre sus unidades privadas, desde limitaciones sobre la diagramación y el diseño de los edificios y el tipo de materiales de construcción utilizados, hasta restricciones en las decoraciones visibles, estructuras auxiliares y el paisajismo. Frecuentemente existen controles sobre la conducta de los propietarios y el uso de la propiedad, que está normalmente limitado a ocupación residencial. También se pueden imponer reglamentos sobre ruido, estacionamiento y tráfico, junto con restricciones vehiculares. En algunos casos también se prohíben carteles políticos, distribución de volantes y actividades asociadas.
A cambio de las cuotas de asociación, los propietarios tienen acceso a infraestructura común, como calles y áreas recreativas, y a servicios privados, como seguridad, recolección de basura, limpieza de calles y remoción de nieve. En general, la CIC es administrada por un gobierno residencial privado y varios comités, que son elegidos por los propietarios y están sujetos a las leyes que rigen contratos civiles, no al derecho público administrativo y constitucional (ver recuadro 1).
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Recuadro 1: Modelos de comunidades de interés común
Las CIC normalmente tienen un gobierno privado elegido por los propietarios para administrar y hacer cumplir los contratos, y para promulgar reglas que beneficien los intereses de la comunidad. Aunque la forma exacta de la estructura de gobierno puede variar, los conceptos básicos son similares.
Asociaciones de propietarios
Los propietarios de cada unidad –en general una vivienda unifamiliar o adosada– poseen el título de propiedad de la misma. La asociación posee el título de las áreas comunes y otorga a los propietarios derechos de servidumbre para poder usarlas. Éstas se pueden crear por derecho común o, en algunos estados, bajo derecho legislado. Las asociaciones de propietarios constituyen más de la mitad de las asociaciones comunitarias del país.
Condominios
Los propietarios de cada unidad poseen el título de propiedad de la misma, más un porcentaje de las áreas comunes. La asociación administra las áreas comunes, pero no posee el título de las mismas. Los condominios pueden ser verticales (edificios de apartamentos) u horizontales (viviendas unifamiliares o adosadas) y se crean exclusivamente bajo leyes estatales. Los condominios representan entre el 45 y 48 por ciento de las asociaciones comunitarias.
Cooperativas
Una corporación cooperativa es dueña del edificio, y los propietarios reciben acciones en la corporación y un contrato de alquiler de largo plazo, automáticamente renovable, sobre sus unidades individuales. A diferencia de los condominios y las asociaciones de propietarios, la corporación puede transferir el control de los contratos de alquiler y las acciones de los propietarios de la cooperativa. Sólo entre el 3 y 4 por ciento de las asociaciones comunitarias está organizado en cooperativas.
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Beneficios económicos de las CIC
Las CIC aportan beneficios económicos sustanciales a sus propietarios y a la sociedad en general. Los residentes que compran propiedades en estas comunidades han llegado a la conclusión de que las instalaciones compartidas, como las áreas recreativas, son, un mejor valor que, por ejemplo, las piscinas personales y otras instalaciones privadas. De manera similar, aquellos que se han unido a las CIC han llegado a la conclusión de que ciertas restricciones (como la prohibición de estacionar casas rodantes en las entradas de vehículos) aumentan el valor de su propiedad.
Estas comunidades también ayudan a lograr un uso eficiente del suelo. Los costos de organizar y administrar una comunidad residencial privada son menores que los de un sistema público (Nelson 2009). Los costos de transacción y captación de rentas por medio del sistema político también se reducen. Finalmente, como está libre de restricciones legislativas y constitucionales, una comunidad privada tiene mayor flexibilidad para crear sus propias reglas y operaciones, liberándola de la necesidad de cumplir con pautas públicas cuando firma contratos con proveedores de servicios y abastecedores.
Los tribunales estadounidenses han validado estos beneficios en eficiencia al reconocer los contratos de CIC y la participación de sus propietarios en los mismos. En opinión de un tribunal: “Es un hecho reconocido que [los convenios] aumentan el valor de la propiedad subdividida y crean un incentivo para que los compradores adquieran lotes dentro de la subdivisión” (Gunnels vs. No. Woodland Community Ass’n, Tex. Ct. App, 17013 [1978]).
Preocupaciones externas: Secesión de la comunidad general
A pesar de estos beneficios, varios comentaristas han argumentado a que los servicios e instalaciones privadas de las CIC están solamente disponibles para aquellos que tienen el dinero suficiente, y que sirven para separar a los ricos del resto de la sociedad. El resto de la municipalidad donde se encuentra la CIC se ve obligado a vivir sin estos privilegios, creando un sistema permanente de dos niveles de vivienda. Los críticos también argumentan que la privatización de infraestructura y servicios aísla a los residentes de las CIC y reduce su interés en temas comunales generales.
De acuerdo a esta lógica, los residentes de las CIC están menos dispuestos a participar con el gobierno público en asuntos cívicos, y son mucho más propensos a oponerse a los aumentos de impuestos, ya que los servicios son proporcionados por la CIC y no por el gobierno municipal. Cuando las asociaciones comunitarias forman parte de los emprendimientos suburbanos, el aislamiento del centro urbano puede agudizarse. Estas preocupaciones se centran frecuentemente en el miedo a sufrir segregación económica y de clase. El ex Secretario de Trabajo Robert Reich escribió en un artículo para el New York Times, titulado “Secesión de los exitosos”: En muchas ciudades y pueblos, los ricos han retirado de hecho su dinero del mantenimiento de los espacios e instituciones públicas compartidas por todos y han dedicado sus ahorros a sus propios servicios privados… Los condominios y las omnipresentes comunidades residenciales presionan a sus miembros a realizar trabajos que los gobiernos locales con fondos escasos ya no están en condiciones de hacer bien (Reich 1991).
Libertad de elección
Esta caracterización de las asociaciones comunitarias, sin embargo, contradice los valores estadounidenses fundamentales de libertad de contrato y libertad de asociación. Es un valor compartido por todos que la gente puede gastar su dinero y firmar contratos de la manera que quiera, siempre que sus fines sean lícitos. La ley sólo interfiere con la libertad de contrato ocasionalmente, cuando se ponen en juego consideraciones políticas importantes. Los tribunales han reconocido que la libertad de contrato es un elemento importante para sostener los acuerdos de servidumbre privados: Comenzamos con el supuesto de que las personas privadas, en el ejercicio de su derecho constitucional de libertad de contrato, pueden imponer las restricciones que quieran sobre el uso del suelo transferido a otro (Grubel vs. McLaughlin, D. Va. [1968]).
Las CIC también son un reflejo de la creencia estadounidense en la libertad de asociación, ejemplificada por una larga tradición de comunidades utópicas y otras redes basadas en creencias. Los residentes de las CIC modernas podrían compartir intereses comunes, como los propietarios que viven en comunidades ecuestres o de clubes de golf. Otros residentes pueden simplemente compartir el deseo de vivir con tranquilidad o de gozar del carácter del barrio. En Behind the Gates (Detrás de las puertas), Setha Low sugiere que las CIC permiten a las “familias de clase media establecer sus paisajes residenciales con “amabilidad”, de manera que puedan reflejar su propia estética de orden, constancia y control” (Low 2004). Cualquiera que sea la razón, las asociaciones comunitarias son congruentes con la observación de Tocqueville sobre las interacciones entre estadounidenses: Los estadounidenses de toda edad, condición y disposición están constantemente formando asociaciones.No sólo tienen compañías comerciales y de manufactura, de las cuales todos forman parte, sino también asociaciones de miles de otros tipos: religiosas, morales, serias, fútiles, amplias o restringidas, enormes o diminutas (de Tocqueville 1835).
Más aún, las pruebas disponibles demuestran que los residentes de CIC están generalmente contentos con su elección. En 2014, en una encuesta realizada por Public Opinion Strategies para el Instituto de Asociaciones Comunitarias, el 64 por ciento de los propietarios dieron una opinión positiva sobre su experiencia general, y el 26 por ciento dieron una opinión neutra. Si bien el 86 por ciento de los encuestados indicaron que preferiría menor regulación gubernamental o, por lo menos, que no quería ninguna regulación adicional, el 70 por ciento opinó que las reglas y restricciones de la asociación protegen y aumentan el valor de su propiedad.
El problema de doble tributación
Si bien el auge de las CIC se debe a una variedad de factores, uno especialmente clave fue la constricción financiera de las municipalidades después de las revueltas tributarias de la década de 1970. De hecho, una narrativa distinta sobre el tema de “la secesión” es que algunos de los propietarios en comunidades de interés común creen que el gobierno municipal los abandonó a ellos.
Los propietarios de CIC pagan impuestos sobre la propiedad a la misma tasa que otros ciudadanos, aunque a título privado servicios como recolección de basura, limpieza de calles y seguridad, como parte de las cuotas de asociación comunitaria. Esto equivale a una doble tributación, porque los propietarios de asociaciones pagan por un servicio que no reciben.
Si hubiera una política de no proveer de servicios efectivamente antes de que el propietario comprara una unidad en una CIC, teóricamente el comprador podría ofrecer un precio de compra más bajo que reflejase la falta de servicios municipales y el efecto de la doble tributación. El propietario de la unidad estaría protegido, y el emprendedor absorbería la pérdida. Pero si una municipalidad reduce los servicios pero no los impuestos después de la compra de la unidad, el propietario sufre una pérdida no compensada. Este resultado sería una mala política, pues supondría posibilitar la captación de rentas al permitir que una mayoría los ciudadanos de un pueblo seleccionara a un grupo de residentes para que soporte una carga tributaria adicional sin crear costos adicionales. Esto pervierte la noción de ecuanimidad y eficiencia, y es antitética a la construcción de comunidad y confianza cívica.
Es especialmente importante que las legislaturas eviten el uso de la doble tributación como política, dado que las acciones judiciales al respecto tienen poca probabilidad de tener éxito. Los pocos tribunales que han examinado ataques contra la doble tributación han sido indiferentes a los argumentos de que viola el proceso de derecho debido, viola la cláusula de protección igualitaria de la Constitución, o que equivale a la toma de una propiedad sin compensación. Si bien la doble tributación puede ser una mala política, no es inconstitucional. Los tribunales no deberían revocar estas decisiones legislativas, porque son esencialmente decisiones políticas que el público debería rechazar en las urnas.
La cuestión de desigualdad
El argumento de “secesión de los ricos” parece estar basado en la noción de que sólo los propietarios de mayores ingresos con viviendas de mayor valor son los que viven en comunidades de interés común. Los datos disponibles, sin embargo, no apoyan este supuesto con claridad. Como se indica en la figura 2, los precios de condominios y cooperativas –que suman la mitad de las unidades en CIC del país– son inferiores a los de todas las viviendas existentes (que incluyen condominios, cooperativas y viviendas unifamiliares dentro y fuera de asociaciones comunitarias). Si bien estas estimaciones no están segmentadas en profundidad (por ejemplo, no desglosan las viviendas unifamiliares dentro y fuera de las CIC), demuestran que los valores de condominios y cooperativas concuerdan con los valores de las viviendas en general.
El acceso a viviendas a un precio asequible es un desafío importante en los Estados Unidos, pero las asociaciones comunitarias no son necesariamente la causa de estos problemas arraigados y complejos. Antes de que las CIC se hicieran populares, los gobiernos locales ya habían impuesto la zonificación en forma de requerimientos de lotes de una gran superficie mínima, lo que frenaba a los emprendedores a construir viviendas de interés social. De hecho, se ha demostrado que las CIC han reducido los costos de la compra de vivienda. Las viviendas multifamiliares, como los condominios y las casas adosadas, son más económicas que las viviendas unifamiliares, porque recortan el costo del suelo, la infraestructura y la construcción (Ellickson & Been 2005). Las cooperativas de viviendas de interés social permiten restricciones a los precios de reventa y el nivel de ingresos del propietario, asegurando que las familias de bajos ingresos tengan la oportunidad de acceder a la vivienda. Con este propósito, los emprendedores que operan bajo requisitos o incentivos municipales frecuentemente designan como de interés social ciertas unidades de condominio dentro del proyecto.
Por lo tanto, es simplista y contraproducente considerar que las asociaciones comunitarias son un campo de batalla entre ricos y pobres.También el uso peyorativo del término “comunidades enrejadas” para describir las CIC con acceso público limitado no contribuye a comprender el problema. De hecho, una cooperativa de ingresos moderados con su puerta principal bajo llave por razones básicas de seguridad caería en la definición de “comunidad enrejada”.
Principios rectores
¿De qué manera debería la crítica de la “secesión de los exitosos” afectar nuestra comprensión, aceptación y autorización de las comunidades de interés común? El tema es complejo y no se presta a elecciones binarias. Por el contrario, es cuestión de acomodar intereses contrapuestos de acuerdo a los siguientes principios:
Conflictos internos: Propietarios individuales vs. la comunidad
En su libro pionero Privatopia: Las asociaciones de propietarios y el ascenso de los gobiernos residenciales privados (1996), Evan McKenzie advirtió: Las CIC tienen una forma de gobierno privado que expresa una preferencia norteamericana por la propiedad de viviendas privadas y, con demasiada frecuencia, se convierte en una ideología de privativismo hostil. El objetivo social más importante es la preservación de los valores de la propiedad, y todos los demás aspectos de la vida comunitaria están subordinados a él. El cumplimiento rígido, intrusivo y frecuentemente mezquino de las reglas es una caricatura de… la gestión benigna, y la creencia en la planificación racional se distorsiona al poner el énfasis en la conformidad por la conformidad misma.
Los conflictos entre los residentes y las asociaciones o juntas de las CIC frecuentemente se centran en torno a dos temas: el sentido de las restricciones y los procedimientos para hacerlas cumplir (ver el recuadro 2). La disputa puede enfocarse en una gama de temas que va desde restricciones de paisajismo a la cobranza de cuotas. En efecto, el 24 por ciento de los residentes de CIC que respondió a la encuesta de Public Opinion Strategies de 2014 había experimentado un problema o desacuerdo personal importante con su asociación. De este grupo, el 52 por ciento quedó satisfecho con las resoluciones y el 36 por ciento no; en el 12 por ciento de los casos, el problema todavía no se había resuelto.
Existe sin duda el riesgo de que las asociaciones comunitarias se excedan en el contenido y cumplimiento de las restricciones, pero estas preocupaciones políticas sustanciales y de procedimiento se pueden resolver por medio de legislación y supervisión judicial.
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Recuadro 2: Los conflictos son buenos para los medios
Mientras que los siguientes titulares omiten las múltiples interacciones positivas entre los propietarios individuales y las asociaciones, sí señalan algunas de las interacciones difíciles que se pueden producir.
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Libertad de elección
Como se dijo anteriormente, los individuos ejercen su libertad de elección al comprar viviendas en CIC y aceptar sus reglas. La vida en una asociación puede no ser para todos, pero en general se deben respetar las expectativas de la gente que elige vivir en una CIC, y no deben verse frustradas por alguien que después trata de violar el contrato. Los tribunales generalmente coinciden con esta opinión, como indica esta sentencia de 1981:
Las restricciones [originales] están revestidas de una presunción muy fuerte de validez, que deriva del hecho de que cada propietario individual de una unidad la compra sabiendo y aceptando las restricciones que se imponen sobre las mismas… [Una] restricción de uso en una declaración de condominio puede tener un cierto grado de irracionalidad, pero a pesar de ello resistir un ataque en los tribunales. De no ser así, el propietario de una unidad no podría confiar en las restricciones estipuladas en la declaración… ya que dichas restricciones podrían estar potencialmente en un estado de cambio continuo (Hidden Harbour Estates vs. Basso, Fla. Ct. App. [1981]).
Hay varias situaciones, sin embargo, en las que los propietarios no tendrían ninguna libertad de elección. Primero, es posible que las únicas viviendas nuevas disponibles para los compradores estuvieran en CIC, es decir, que los emprendedores ya no construyan viviendas fuera de asociaciones. Efectivamente, un informe reciente concluyó que en 2003 el 80 por ciento de todas las viviendas en construcción en ese momento eran en asociación (Fundación para la Investigación de Asociaciones Comunitarias, 2014). Además, un gobierno municipal podría requerir que los emprendedores crearan asociaciones como condición para la aprobación de una subdivisión. (La reciente legislación promulgada en Arizona que prohíbe esta práctica es señal de que todavía ocurre.) Finalmente, algunos tribunales han sugerido que, si bien las reglas en vigor al momento de la compra se deben hacer cumplir, una regla promulgada posteriormente por la asociación o junta bajo una competencia reservada no se tiene que hacer cumplir si un propietario puede demostrar que “no es razonable”. Otros tribunales no están de acuerdo: No se debe considerar la reclamación de un propietario cuando la asociación de propietarios enmienda la declaración conforme a una cláusula registrada en la declaración de convenio inicial. Cuando un comprador adquiere una unidad en dicha comunidad, la compra se efectúa no sólo sujeta a los convenios expresos en la declaración, sino también sujeta a las disposiciones de enmienda… Y, por supuesto, un comprador potencial que esté preocupado por el gobierno de la asociación comunitaria tiene la opción de comprar una vivienda que no esté sujeta al gobierno de una asociación… Por esta razón, declinamos someter dichas enmiendas… a la prueba de “racionalidad” (Hughes vs. New Life Development Corp., Tenn.Sup.Ct. [2012]).
Directrices para la protección de la autonomía personal
Las restricciones impuestas por las asociaciones de propietarios generan una preocupación cuando amenazan la autonomía personal y los derechos individuales fundamentales de sus miembros. Las restricciones de este tipo podrían incluir la prohibición de carteles o mensajes políticos, y la restricción de ocupación a familias “tradicionales”.
Los tribunales deberían hacer cumplir las restricciones si limitan los efectos colaterales (también llamados “secuelas” o “externalidades”) de un propietario hacia el resto de la comunidad. Sin embargo, no deberían dejar cumplir las restricciones que limitan la naturaleza o el estado de los ocupantes o el comportamiento dentro de una unidad que no cree externalidades. Esta metodología se basa en la teoría de que el propósito fundamental de los regímenes de las CIC es aumentar el valor económico y fomentar los intercambios eficientes. Por lo tanto, si el propietario no genera externalidades, los tribunales no deberían hacer cumplir prohibiciones de ciertos comportamientos. Más aún, algunos valores de autonomía personal son demasiado importantes y tienen prioridad sobre las reglas usuales de contrato. Por ejemplo, no permitimos contratos de esclavitud o la venta de órganos humanos.
Según este norma, una regla que limite el ruido o prohíba fumar (debido a la propagación de olores) en unidades multifamiliares sería legítima, pero las restricciones basadas en el estado civil de los residentes no. Algunas situaciones son más complicadas: por ejemplo, las restricciones sobre mascotas. Según las directrices sugeridas, en general sería legítimo prohibir las mascotas debido al ruido potencial y la renuencia de algunos residentes a compartir áreas comunes con ellas. No obstante, en el caso de animales de servicio, la salud del propietario de la unidad puede tener prioridad sobre las preocupaciones comunitarias.
Los temas relacionados con la Primera Enmienda presentan desafíos especiales. La libre expresión –por ejemplo, los carteles políticos o sobre un tema conflictivo, la distribución de volantes, demostraciones u otro tipo de manifestación– puede causar efectos colaterales, como ruido, interferencia estética y perturbación del ambiente general de la comunidad. Al mismo tiempo, sin embargo, la libre expresión es fundamental para nuestra forma republicana de gobierno, ya sea en el ámbito mayor del gobierno público o del gobierno privado. En casos de expresión, los tribunales podrían tener en cuenta la doctrina de larga tradición que prohíbe convenios que violen políticas públicas, y rechazar las prohibiciones totales de libertad de expresión a favor de restricciones razonables de horario, lugar y modo. De esa manera, se podría permitir la expresión pero limitar, pero no eliminar, sus efectos colaterales sobre la comunidad.
Otro valor fundamental para los estadounidenses es la libertad de culto. Las restricciones a la colocación de una mezuzá en el marco de la puerta o la exposición de pesebres, figuras de santos y luces de Navidad limitan la libre expresión del culto. Ponerse a hacer equilibrios para determinar la importancia religiosa de las luces de Navidad de colores frente a las blancas, en contra de las normas de la CIC, abriría una caja de Pandora, y sería apropiado que los tribunales impusieran una norma general de adecuación razonable sobre los reglamentos de la CIC que afecten a prácticas religiosas.
Finalmente, en el desarrollo y cumplimiento de los reglamentos de asociaciones, los propietarios de las CIC tienen el derecho a esperar cierto comportamiento por parte de las asociaciones y juntas. Esta expectativa deriva de la obligación de que todas las partes de un contrato actúen de buena fe y de forma ecuánime. Por lo tanto, un propietario debería tener el derecho a procedimientos imparciales, con las notificaciones pertinentes y la oportunidad de ser escuchado; de ser tratado de la misma manera que otros propietarios en circunstancias similares; y a no sufrir prejuicios, animadversión y decisiones de mala fe por parte de la junta y sus miembros.
Conclusión
Las comunidades de interés común cubren una gran parte de la superficie residencial de los Estados Unidos, y actualmente alojan a un cuarto de la población del país. Aunque las CIC ofrecen grandes ventajas económicas a sus residentes y a la sociedad en general, estos tipos de modalidad de vivienda requieren interacciones cuidadosas entre la asociación comunitaria y el gobierno municipal, y el reglamento de la asociación puede afectar la autonomía personal de sus miembros. No obstante, hay estrategias disponibles para mitigar, si no superar, estos problemas. Estas estrategias pueden hacer que la propiedad de una vivienda en una CIC sea menos ilusoria y más real.
Sobre el autor
Gerald Korngold es profesor de derecho en la Facultad de Derecho de Nueva York y visiting fellow del Instituto Lincoln de Políticas de Suelo. Enseña y escribe sobre temas de propiedad y derecho inmobiliario.
Referencias
De Tocqueville, Alexis. 1835. Democracy in America. London: Saunders and Otley.
Ellickson, Robert C. y Vicki L. Been. 2005. Land Use Controls. New York, NY: Aspen Publishers, 3rd edition.
Foundation for Community Association Research. 2014. “Best Practices. Report #7: Transition.” www.cairf.org/research/bptransition.pdf.
Foundation for Community Association Research. 2013. “National and State Statistical Review for 2013.” www.cairf.org/research/factbook/2013_statistical_review.pdf.
Grubel v. McLaughlin Gunnels v. No. Woodland Community Ass’n, 17013, Texas Court of Appeals (1978).
Hidden Harbour Estates v. Basso, Florida Court of Appeals (1981).
Hughes v. New Life Development Corp., Tennessee Superior Court (2012).
Low, Setha. 2004. Behind the Gates: Life, Security, and the Pursuit of Happiness in Fortress America. London: Routledge.
McKenzie, E. 1996. Privatopia: Homeowner Associations and the Rise of Private Residential Governments. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.
Nelson, R. H. 2009. “The Puzzle of Local Double Taxation: Why Do Private Communities Exist?” The Independent Review. 13 (3) (Invierno) 345–365.
Public Opinion Strategies. 2014. “Verdict: Americans Grade Their Associations, Board Members and Community Managers.” Falls Church, Virginia: Community Associations Institute.
Reich, Robert. 1991. “Secession of the Successful.” The New York Times Magazine. 20 de enero.
Treese, C. J. 2013. Association Information Services, Inc., compiled from National Association of Realtors data. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1I_2LgTIYSqR4nLPRxN-HtCV-oOFK_QqN1AcO5JJTw-g/edit.
Ziegler, J. 1984. The New Yorker. 3 de septiembre.
Land and housing markets, and any other market for that matter, can be approached as arenas in which persons exchange rights to assets subject to constitutional rules, statutory and common law rules, and administrative rules and procedures. The value of land is often believed to be determined by expectations about what land uses will be legally permitted over time and the return from such uses. However, there is substantial evidence, international as well as U.S.-based, that markets and prices are also shaped by expectations about what is legally prohibited yet is nonetheless achievable through extra-legal or illegal means.
Scholars since Jeremy Bentham have linked markets and their viability to a legal regime of property rights which clearly defines, safeguards and facilitates the transfer of such rights through legal means. How then do we explain illegal or extra-legal property transactions: the buying and selling of stolen goods; subdivision of single-family houses into one-room rentals; and squatter settlements.
In all these contexts, assets are being acquired and used, hence there is property. There are also markets, frequently thriving, to exchange such assets. What is absent from these markets are legally defined rights. Their absence, however, does not prevent these markets from emerging and affecting supply and demand in the legal market. It is crucial, therefore, that such markets be understood, not just as an exotic feature of the developing world, but as alternatives to which actors in the market turn under certain conditions.
What happens if property rights are not clear, are contested or are not well enforced? Policy advisors rarely address this question, not because they fail to see that property regimes are frequently lacking in stability and security, but rather because they see their function as one of putting in place the ideal set of laws, regulations, and administrative and enforcement mechanisms that would guarantee stable expectations, secure rights and efficient markets (see Figure 1).
The only problem is that putting in place such laws and regulations rarely happens in a vacuum. Rather, it happens in a landscape of existing interests, entitlements, conventions and practices. It is the interaction between these new interventions and existing norms and practices that determines who is able to do what with which assets in society. Three examples illustrate my point.
Farm Restructuring in Eastern Europe
Until the late 1980s, farmland in Eastern Europe was organized within state farms, collective farms, or, in some cases, small private farms owned by farmers who had the right to cultivate but not sell or develop the land. The absence of competitive agricultural and land markets prevented many necessary adjustments from taking place: labor mobility, adjustment in farm sizes, incentives to invest or increase labor productivity, and moving land to better uses.
Some policy advisers have argued that unless the New Independent States establish family-based farms with legally, well-defined and well-protected private property rights that can be transferred easily, little can be done to promote necessary adjustments. How do farmers adjust to the new realities of the transition while constitutions are amended, laws are promulgated, cadasters are compiled and land registers are established?
The answer lies in short-term informal leasing, which is the most common land transaction in Eastern Europe for several reasons. First, informal leases occur mostly between neighboring farmers who know each other and the quality of the land being traded. Second, most leases are short-term, allowing farmers to reduce the uncertainty associated with long-term commitments in inflationary and politically unstable environments. Finally, short-term leases allow farmers to adjust their farming units, which speeds up the economic restructuring of the farming sector. Farmers conduct these short-term transactions not because they are legally permitted but because of norms, conventions and local networks.
Squatter Housing in Developing Countries
Conventional wisdom on squatter housing in developing countries has been that lack of tenure security is responsible for the poor quality of housing in these settlements. Granting legal titles, the argument goes, would provide the necessary security and unleash household savings into investment in better housing. Recent empirical work, however, suggests that legal title is neither necessary nor sufficient for tenure security to exist.
Furthermore, absence of land title does not prevent squatters from renting or selling their houses. Indeed, except when an eminent threat of eviction exists, informal markets evolve to reduce the uncertainty associated with illegal transactions. Rules and arrangements evolve over time to provide information about who owns what, enforce contracts and resolve property disputes. For example, neighborhood associations in Brazilian favelas maintain an informal register of residents and issue documents as proof of ownership. Middlemen and land subdividers in Jordan play a crucial role in finding buyers and even financing them. These roles substitute for, duplicate or manipulate the legal system that functions in formal markets.
Illegal Housing Conversions in the U.S.
A recent series of articles in the New York Times documents the surge of illegal apartments throughout the City of New York in response to continuing poverty and the dwindling supply of affordable housing. In Queens, for example, one- and two-family units are being converted into multiple apartments, turning even attics and basements into makeshift flats.
These apartments are not registered with the city and are, therefore, not regulated. Firefighters estimate that as many as 80 percent of the homes in Queens are illegally subdivided. Needless to say, landlords, tenants, developers, brokers and contractors operate in these markets. They rely on evading, manipulating, and breaking laws and regulations to allow these markets to function. By necessity, they also have to rely on extra-legal means to enforce some of their contractual arrangements or resolve their disputes.
An Alternative Model
To understand how land markets operate, we need a “lens” that captures a wider array of rules and market arrangements. We need to examine not only what constitutional, statutory and common laws permit, but also what social norms and conventions permit. We need to go beyond property rights to include the range of property interests that are not necessarily based in law. We also need to go beyond the formal means of contracting and enforcement to include informal means based on ethnic, territorial and associational networks. This approach amounts to an alternative framework (see Figure 2) for understanding market actors’ expectations about the ability to use, develop, transfer and derive income from land.
The wider lens approach to market institutions also allows us to shift emphasis from institutional forms to institutional substance. The important question is not whether a particular institution (such as a land registry) exists, but rather how information about land and housing markets is provided, how risk is reduced, and how enforcement is made effective.
Omar Razzaz is Ford International Assistant Professor in the Department of Urban Studies and Planning at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He previously worked at the World Bank on property rights under transition in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Africa.
References
Bruni, Frank, with Deborah Sontag. “Behind a Suburban Facade in Queens, A Teeming, Angry Arithmetic,” The New York Times, October 8, 1996, p. A1.
Razzaz, Omar. “Contestation and Mutual Adjustment: The Process of Controlling Land in Yajouz, Jordan,” Law and Society Review 28, no. 1. 1994.
“Examining Property Rights and Investment in Informal Settlements: The Case of Jordan,” Land Economics, November 1993.
World Bank, “Regional Study: Farm Restructuring and Land Tenure in Reforming Socialist Economies: A Comparative Analysis of Eastern and Central Europe,” 1994. Prepared by Euroconsult/Center for World Food Studies, Washington, DC.
As a visiting fellow at the Lincoln Institute and a Loeb Fellow at Harvard University Graduate School of Design during the 2004–2005 academic year, Mario Navarro has undertaken a critical analysis of the innovative housing finance policy developed in Chile over the last 30 years. The objective of the study, summarized here, is to help housing policy designers in developing countries understand the Chilean model as an alternative to provide housing to people from low- and moderate-income sectors.
Until the beginning of the 1970s, housing programs in developing countries consisted of government-sponsored initiatives to design, build and sell houses using loans with subsidized interest rates. These policies were generally limited in scale, not affordable by or clearly focused on poor families, and often inefficient (Mayo 1999). Cognizant of these problems, international development organizations in the mid-1970s started to direct their loans and advice to developing countries based on the new “basic needs” strategy, which consisted of providing sites and services, slum upgrading and core housing (Kimm 1986).
At the same time and independently from these development organizations, Chile started several reforms in the financial sector and in social housing programs, among which was the creation of the first program in the world to subsidize the demand to buy housing (Gilbert 2004). This Chilean model was established ten years before the “enabling markets housing approach” promoted by international organizations such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (Kimm 1986), the Inter-American Development Bank (Rojas, Jacobs and Savedoff 1999) and the World Bank (World Bank 1993). Under this enabling policy governments generate incentives and act as a facilitator so the private sector will produce and finance the housing that the country needs.
The Chilean model has influenced housing policy in many countries of Latin American, and even those of other continents (Gilbert 2004; Gonzáles Arrieta 1997). Nevertheless, it has not been widely recognized as the first program in which the government plays the role of enabling the market. Gilbert (2002), an important scholar of the Chilean model and its influence on other countries, mentions that Chile “fits into” the enabling model, but my study shows that, more than only fitting in, the Chilean housing model was the precursor of the policy. The main characteristics of this program (one-time cash payments of a fixed amount) correspond “unquestionably to the type of subsidy [for housing] that is less problematic than others” (Angel 2000).
The Chilean government, through the Ministry of Housing and Planning (in Spanish, Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo, MINVU), was the key actor in the success of the Chilean model. During the first 27 years of implementing this policy (until 2001), MINVU not only funded and managed the subsidy programs, but it also was the largest real estate firm and the second largest mortgage bank in the country, in terms of the number of houses built and the number of mortgage loans issued.
Three Periods of Housing Policy
What have been the instruments and the amounts of public and private resources that were allocated to the construction and improvement of social housing in the Chile? My study is divided into six parts; the first three review distinct periods of housing policy over the past 30 years, and the next three parts describe the most relevant events in the evolution of this policy.
The first period, from 1974 to 1984, established the foundations of the enabling markets housing policy. During those 11 years, profound reforms were made in the banking system. The programs to subsidize housing were created and then significantly adjusted over time. However, few resources were devoted to housing programs, and the private sector participated only in providing housing for the upper-middle class. The public resources did not reach the poorest groups, so the housing deficit continued to growth.
The second period extended over 17 years, from 1985 to 2001, during which time the policy was consolidated with significant state intervention. The earthquake that shook the central zone of Chile in March 1985 marked the historic peak of the housing deficit, reaching more than one million units. This event precipitated increased attention to the design of housing and subsidy programs, as well as an increase in the level of resources allocated to these programs. These two factors were decisive in attracting the private sector to the social housing market. The continuity of housing policies implemented by democratic governments that started in 1990 was a strategic effort to consolidate the trust and knowledge required by the private sector to increase its participation in the market. The government continued its role in the construction and funding of housing for broad sectors of the population, and the focus of the resources improved with respect to the previous period. Although the commitment was still inadequate, the great accomplishment of this period was the reduction of the housing deficit to half of what it had been in the mid-1980s.
The third period, from 2002 to 2004, corresponds to the implementation of the enabling markets housing policy. Although Chile’s housing policy received international recognition before 2001, only 25 percent of its resources were allocated to families below the poverty line. At that rate of performance, it would have taken 24 years to close the housing deficit (Focus 2001). MINVU was spending more than half of its resources on direct housing construction programs and was still working as a bank, providing mortgage loans, although more than 70 percent of payments were in arrears (División Técnica 2001).
Current Housing Policy
To improve the focus of its resource allocation, MINVU in 2002 started the most important transformation of its housing policy since 1974. At the same time, MINVU stopped giving mortgage loans and gave up the direct construction of houses. In 2004, 96 percent of resources were targeted to subsidy programs and only 4 percent to building programs. The most important housing programs for urban families under this new housing policy are described here.
For the poorest residents, MINVU created a subsidy program called Fondo Solidario de Vivienda (Funding for Cooperative Housing) with an up-front subsidy of US$8,400 per household. Applicants need US$300 of savings and have to present a specific housing proposal. The subsidy covers the cost of land, infrastructure and a 350-square-foot unit containing a bathroom, kitchen, multipurpose space and bedroom. This is considered to be the first stage of a house to be built progressively over time. The municipal building permit is pre-approved assuming the unit’s expansion to a minimum of 550 square feet.
Families must apply in organized groups of at least 10 households and with the support of a managing organization, which can be a municipality, a nongovernmental organization or a consulting firm registered with MINVU. The ministry no longer decides where and what to construct, since the family groups present their projects and MINVU selects the best ones from a social, design and urban development point of view. The managing organization receives the funds to develop the project, implement a social action plan, and assist the families with technical support to expand their units.
Families do not receive another subsidy for the expansion, but since they do not have to pay a mortgage they can save to finance the materials and labor required. The new program is flexible and also accepts projects that involve the purchase of existing houses or construction on existing open space within a lot to increase housing density.
The selection mechanism benefits people who buy used houses over those who build new houses. The goal was to open a new market for the very low-income sector by making it possible for them to purchase the houses that had been constructed by the government over the previous 30 years. This policy is also viewed as a solution to the traditional problems associated with moving families to new housing projects on the periphery of cities, far from social and employment networks and more expensive for commuting to work. This program is focused on people living below the poverty line (approximately 632,000 households in Chile, equivalent to 19 percent of the population). Nearly 30,000 such subsidies have been given each year since 2002.
The second subsidy program was designed for low-income people above the poverty line who were the main consumers of the former housing projects developed by MINVU until 2001. The subsidies can be used to buy new or existing housing or to construct a house on one’s own land. The subsidy is US$4,500 for houses that cost US$9,000 or less and it decreases linearly to US$2,700 for houses up a price limit of US$18,000. Nearly 40,000 units have been granted annually under this program.
Because of credit enhancements offered by MINVU, six private banks signed agreements to deliver mortgage loans for housing valued under US$18,000. This policy was able to reduce the rent requirements and allow informal workers to qualify for mortgage loans. To reduce delinquency rates, the loans needed to be insured against fire and unemployment or the death of the principal. Three credit enhancements are included in MINVU’s agreements with the banks.
Some constituencies were afraid that the subsidies would go only to the upper limit of the price allowed and that the market would provide neither housing nor credit for houses of less than US$15,000. The results showed that the progressiveness of the subsidies was sufficient to promote the market at all of the price levels targeted by the subsidy.
The third type of subsidy is for houses between US$18,000 and US$30,000, to promote mixed-income units in private housing projects. Only 6,500 of these subsidies have been given each year. The subsidy offers up-front capital of US$2,700, but the credit enhancements were eliminated because many private banks were already originating mortgage loans in this price range.
The last three parts of the study analyze (1) key issues to generate an enabling markets housing policy, including transaction costs, access to bank financing, savings for housing, and support to families so they can take advantage of the subsidies; (2) the impact of the housing programs on family income and the distribution of national income; and (3) lessons on housing finance learned from the Chile’s experience over the last 30 years.
Conclusion
My study analyzes the Chilean housing policy since 1974, to better understand how it became possible to incorporate the participation of the private sector and improve the focus in allocating resources to the poorest sector. The study explores both good and bad decisions that were made over the past 30 years, and particularly in the past three years, and it identifies the roles of different social and economic actors in the process. The early results are encouraging. Using the same budget for subsidies in each of the last four years, MINVU increased by 57 percent the number of families from the poorest three income deciles who have benefited from government housing subsidies.
Despite the great breakthrough in social housing in Chile, many tasks remain. A report by MINVU estimates a housing deficit of 543,000 units in 2000 and suggests that 96,000 new units of housing are needed each year just to accommodate new family demand (Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo de Chile 2004).
The effects in terms of land use are also remarkable. Until 2001 all the housing units built for low-income families in the Greater Santiago area were developed by MINVU in new infill projects on the periphery of the city. The Funding for Cooperative Housing program established in 2003 encouraged acquisition of existing houses and increased density of housing within already urbanized areas. As a result, the percentage of these types of housing began to shift dramatically, from zero in 2001 to 23 percent in 2003 and up to 63 percent in 2004, with a corresponding decrease in the percentage of new infill units being developed on the periphery.
It took Chile more than 28 years to fully implement the enabling markets housing policy. I hope this study can help other countries to formulate their housing policies so that all citizens, without regard to their socioeconomic condition, can have access to opportunities to own a decent home.
References
Angel, S. 2000. Housing policy matters: A global analysis. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
División Técnica de Estudio y Fomento Habitacional. 2001. Informe de gestión: Diciembre de 2000. Santiago, Chile: Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo.
Gilbert, A. 2002. Power, ideology and the Washington consensus: The development and spread of the Chilean housing policy. Housing Studies 17(2): 305–324.
———. 2004. Helping the poor through housing subsidies: Lessons from Chile, Colombia and South Africa. Habitat International 28(1): 13.
Gonzáles Arrieta, G. 1997. Acceso a la vivienda y subsidios directos a la demanda: Análisis y lecciones de las experiencias latinoamericanas. Serie Financiamiento del Desarrollo (63).
Kimm, P. 1986. Evolving shelter policies for developing countries. Second International Shelter Conference, Vienna, Austria.
Mayo, S. 1999. Subsidies in housing. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.
Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo de Chile. 2004. El déficit habitacional en Chile: Medición de los requerimientos de vivienda y su distribución espacial. Santiago, Chile: Política Habitacional y Planificación (321).
Rojas, E., Jacobs, M., and Savedoff, W. 1999. Operational guidelines for housing: Urban development and housing policy. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.
World Bank. 1993. Housing: Enabling markets to work. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Mario Navarro was director of housing policy in Chile’s Ministry of Housing and Planning (MINVU) from 2000 to 2004, when he was named Loeb Fellow at Harvard and visiting fellow at the Lincoln Institute.
Many historic centers in Latin America have been the focus of government and private initiatives seeking to rehabilitate the building stock and position the areas to serve the tourism industry. In most cases these efforts have led to the displacement of lowincome residents or of residential activities altogether, due to gentrification and commercialization of the district (Scarpaci 2005). More recently, the rehabilitation of these historic cores has been framed as part of broader debates and efforts that pursue the recovery of the city centers (historical or otherwise) because of their key role as collective symbols or spaces of social interaction, or because of their potential efficiency as dense, well-serviced urban districts (Pérez, Pujol, and Polèse 2003; Rojas 2004).
This article seeks to advance this discussion based on the experience in Panama City’s historic center, “Casco Antiguo.” It describes some recent, innovative policies that have explored the intersections of tourism, affordable housing, employment, and culture in a historical context, and draws some general insights and lessons.
Ciro Biderman is an associate professor in the graduate and undergraduate programs in public administration and in economics at Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) in São Paulo; associate researcher at the Center for the Study of the Politics and Economics of the Public Sector (CEPESP/FGV); and associate researcher at the Metropolis Laboratory of Urbanism at São Paulo State University (LUME/FAUUSP). He received his Ph.D. in economics at the FGV and his postdoctoral degree in urban economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 2007.
Biderman was a visiting fellow at the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy from 2006 to 2009, and he continues to teach courses and conduct research with Martim Smolka and others affiliated with the Program on Latin America and the Caribbean. He also consults on the economics and politics of local development for the World Bank and other organizations. His research interests include urban and regional economics focused on public policies at the subnational level, with particular emphasis on land policy interactions with real estate markets and transport costs.
He has published articles in academic journals, and coauthored or coedited three books, including the 2005 volume Economia do Setor Público no Brasil (Public Sector Economics in Brazil). At the Lincoln Institute he has written several Land Lines articles and working papers, all of which are available on the Institute Web site.
Land Lines: As a Latin American scholar specializing in land economics issues, how do you compare the state of the art of research in the region to other countries?
Ciro Biderman: In Brazil, as in most of Latin America, there is a lack of research in urban economics in general and in land issues in particular. The same is true to some extent in the United States and Europe, although the research interests are quite different, and urban economics is more in the mainstream in those countries.
Some relevant characteristics of cities in Latin America are similar to those in other developing countries, and all would benefit from additional research. For instance, despite the large informal market in Latin America, most economists have neglected that sector. Ironically, most urban economics analysis of informality has been conducted by U.S. and other international scholars.
Second, Latin American cities are usually not as sprawling as cities elsewhere, yet their historic downtowns are often deteriorated and we know little about why this is happening. Third, most countries in the region have recently adopted decentralization policies that shifted the responsibility for the provision of public goods to local governments. However, the revenues of local governments are low and most rely heavily on federal transfers.
Land Lines: How did you become associated with the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy?
Ciro Biderman: My first contact was in 1998, when I was awarded a dissertation fellowship to finish my Ph.D. Working with Paulo Sandroni at FGV, I studied the impact on land prices of a zoning change in São Paulo. At the time, the central business district was expanding toward the southwest, but the expansion was blocked by Jardim Europa, then a low-density, high-end residential neighborhood. New office development bypassed the area, moving towards the new Luiz Carlos Berrini Avenue. To reverse this pattern, in 1996 the city changed the zoning in part of Jardim Europa, increasing density and auctioning building rights to encourage new development.
I compared the part of the neighborhood where zoning did not change with that which experienced exogenous changes from being a low-rise residential area to a high-rise, mixed-use area of high-end residential and office space. In an article written with Sandroni and Smolka (2006) we showed that the change in density increased land prices as expected.
The most interesting finding, however, was the local government’s capture of the land price increment through a fiscal mechanism called CEPAC (Certificate of Additional Potential of Construction). These certificates are auctioned as part of the process by which developers obtain building licenses in specified areas. In the adjacent neighborhood where business development had leapfrogged without CEPACs, the incremental land rent generated by the zoning change was instead captured by the developers.
Land Lines: What other research have you pursued at the Institute?
Ciro Biderman: Since becoming a visiting fellow in 2006, I have focused on the economics of informal housing, particularly on the extent to which urban regulation was statistically associated with different measures of informality, including the role of regulation on prices in formal and informal housing markets (Biderman 2008).
In a related study in 2009, Martim Smolka and I discussed the policy implications of how and why different international agencies define informality to reflect one or more housing attributes. The consequence is that different definitions produce different estimates of the incidence of informality. Thus, when governments improve only one informal housing attribute but not the others, they may report a reduction in informality when in fact there is none.
In a new line of research I am looking at the causes and consequences of sprawl in Latin America, focusing on ten large Brazilian cities. Preliminary findings show that these cities are less sprawled than their North American and European counterparts, but more than comparable Asian cities. Transport systems are based on the automobile, as in the United States, except that less than 10 percent of the population owns a car. Yet the socioeconomic spatial pattern is more similar to Europe, with the rich living in the center and the poor on the periphery.
Land Lines: You help the Latin America Program evaluate research proposals submitted for Institute funding. What have you learned from that experience?
Ciro Biderman: I have been involved in evaluating these proposals since 2006, and the number of high-quality scholarly applications has grown steadily. I have noticed that the research questions from Latin Americans scholars are often better presented than the techniques to address them, in contrast to what occurs in the United States.
I think this is a problem faced in many aspects of social science research, and not only in Latin America. Although the origins of urban economics were grounded in the connections among urban equilibrium, transport costs, and land prices, each of these fields has developed almost independently and there is a general need for more integrated analysis.
Land Lines: What do you see as the main strengths of Latin American researchers?
Ciro Biderman: Highly qualified professionals in Brazil and other countries often move between public office and academia. As a result, they are aware of the respective issues and needs in the public sector and academia, and may have a more direct impact on the implementation of urban policies.
Furthermore, researchers can bring to focus what is specific to Latin American cities compared to cities elsewhere, thus expanding the scope of applied research. For example, to the best of my knowledge, there is no economic model for housing demand that allows the quality of the housing to change in order to adjust housing consumption to budget constraints. This is quite a relevant question in Latin America, but not to researchers in the United States or Europe.
Land Lines: Can you elaborate on the kinds of issues facing scholars in different world regions?
Ciro Biderman: As with most social phenomena, patterns of land use have evolved historically. For instance, sprawl in the United States is closely related to the movement of high-income groups to the periphery of metropolitan areas. In Latin America the movement of income groups is usually in the opposite direction, with poor people seeking affordable land on the periphery.
Although fundamental principles of urban economic theory might apply, the consequences are quite different. Studying different patterns using the same theoretical framework would advance our understanding of urban economics.
Land Lines: What topics or issues are especially lacking in strong empirical work?
Ciro Biderman: In terms of land policy, in my opinion, we need more research on property taxation; the interactions of fiscal and regulatory policies with land use planning issues; socioeconomic patterns of sprawl; and the connections between land use and transport. The lack of research on the economics of the informal housing market is surprising since informal settlements represent more than one-third of the total urban housing stock in some countries. Although this problem could eventually be solved with subsidies, the amount of resources needed is probably prohibitive for most countries.
Currently there is a branch of the literature studying the impact of tenure security on general welfare, suggesting that titling programs may be improving welfare, but there are few similar studies on the impacts of slum upgrading programs. While some evidence suggests that inappropriate regulation may induce more informality, we do not yet fully understand the economic nexus between formal and informal housing markets. We also lack systematic cross-country studies.
Land Lines: Do you think there a trade-off between policy experience and technical research capability?
Ciro Biderman: As an economist, I know the virtues of the division of labor and gains from trade, so it is important that academics and public officials complement each other. Thus, researchers need to be as rigorous as possible and able to expose the unintended consequences of public policies, and policy makers must ensure that their policies are designed so they can be implemented effectively and efficiently to reach the intended goals.
For example, a major policy issue is how to increase the supply of affordable, high-quality housing for the poor in developing countries, which requires understanding the opportunity costs between affordability and quality. The trade-offs may be technical, but the alternatives are clearly political. How can this housing imbalance be fixed? Who has to pay the cost (the residents or the society)? What are the consequences of different policy options? These are practical questions. Empirical evidence that helps to evaluate current policies might be a major resource for a policy maker.
Land Lines: How do you think the Lincoln Institute can contribute to narrowing the gap between rigorous empirical research and policy relevance?
Ciro Biderman: I believe that the Institute is already doing that by working with both scholars and policy makers in a variety of programs and fellowship opportunities. Classroom and online courses offer training to policy makers to help improve their dialogue with researchers, and to young scholars to expand the pool of policy-sensitive researchers. The intensive courses in methods for land policy analysis also inform researchers about advances in urban economics theory and strengthen both their methodological skills and their knowledge of new analytical techniques.
References
Biderman, Ciro. 2008. Informality in Brazil. Does urban land use and building regulation matter? Working Paper. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
Biderman, Ciro, Paulo Sandroni, and Martim Smolka. 2006. Large-scale urban interventions: The case of Faria Lima in São Paulo. Land Lines 18(2).
Smolka, Martim, and Ciro Biderman. 2009. Measuring informality in housing settlements: Why bother? Land Lines 21(2).
Los Estados Unidos están emergiendo de una gran recesión, cuya característica principal ha sido el colapso de los precios inmobiliarios nacionales, los cuales aumentaron en un 59 por ciento de 2000 a 2006 y luego descendieron un 41 por ciento para el año 2011 (siempre en dólares constantes). A nivel nacional, los verdaderos precios inmobiliarios en 2011 se encontraban un 6 por ciento por debajo de los niveles del año 2000. El colapso de los precios inmobiliarios tuvo efectos contagiosos inesperados que contribuyeron a la crisis financiera resultante y al deterioro económico más grave desde la Gran Depresión. La proporción de hipotecas de los EE.UU. en mora por 90 días o más aumentó de cerca del 1 por ciento en 2006 a más del 8 por ciento en 2010. Los costos económicos y sociales derivados de esta burbuja de precios inmobiliarios y su consecuente colapso han sido enormes.
La prevención de futuras burbujas de precios inmobiliarios evidentemente conlleva grandes beneficios, aunque lograr dichos beneficios requerirá que los legisladores aprendan a detectar las burbujas de precios a medida que éstas se van formando y luego implementen las políticas necesarias que logren atenuar o mitigarlas. En un reciente informe sobre enfoque en políticas de suelo del Instituto Lincoln, titulado Cómo prevenir las burbujas de precios inmobiliarios: Lecciones de la explosión de 2006–2012, sus autores, James Follain y Seth Giertz, abordan los desafíos a la hora de diagnosticar y tratar las burbujas de precios en el mercado inmobiliario. Este informe representa un aporte al amplio análisis estadístico que se encuentra disponible en varios documentos de trabajo del Instituto Lincoln.
Aunque es muy común resumir la reciente explosión del mercado inmobiliario en términos de indicadores nacionales (tal como se indica en el párrafo anterior), dichos indicadores no toman en cuenta las grandes variaciones tanto en los niveles como en los cambios en precios inmobiliarios entre diferentes áreas metropolitanas. Por ejemplo, de 1978 a 2011, los precios inmobiliarios en dólares constantes en Dallas, Texas y en Omaha, Nebraska experimentaron una variación menor al 20 por ciento comparados con los niveles de 1978; los precios en Stockton (California) casi se triplicaron de 1978 a 2006, aunque para el año 2011 volvieron a los niveles de 1978. Los mercados inmobiliarios locales se encuentran influenciados por las políticas y condiciones económicas y financieras a nivel nacional, pero estas grandes diferencias entre los mercados metropolitanos indican que las condiciones locales también juegan un papel muy importante en este sentido.
Un elemento clave en el trabajo estadístico llevado a cabo por Follain y Giertz es utilizar mercados inmobiliarios metropolitanos como unidad de observación para sus análisis, que están basados en datos anuales (desde 1980 hasta 2010) y en datos trimestrales (desde 1990 hasta 2010) de hasta 380 áreas metropolitanas. Según el trabajo econométrico realizado por los autores, las burbujas de precios inmobiliarios pueden detectarse comparando las diferentes áreas metropolitanas, y los precios y el riesgo crediticio resultante varía en gran medida. Las pruebas de estrés, tales como aquellas utilizadas para evaluar el riesgo de crédito hipotecario, pueden llegar a ser indicadores útiles de posibles burbujas de precios a nivel metropolitano.
Debido a que los niveles y cambios en los precios inmobiliarios varían en gran medida entre las diferentes áreas metropolitanas —algunas de las cuales presentan aumentos de precios del tipo burbuja, y otras experimentan precios básicamente estables— Follain y Giertz concluyen que las políticas destinadas a mitigar las burbujas de precios inmobiliarios deberían ser formuladas a medida para las áreas o regiones metropolitanas, en lugar de ser aplicadas uniformemente en todas las áreas metropolitanas a nivel nacional. De esta manera, la política monetaria representaría una intervención poco atractiva para hacer frente a los aumentos de precios inmobiliarios en algunas áreas metropolitanas, ya que afectaría los términos financieros tanto en los mercados inmobiliarios efervescentes como en aquellos que son estables. En cambio, Follain y Giertz son partidarios de las intervenciones consistentes en políticas dirigidas a aquellas áreas metropolitanas que presentan grandes aumentos de precios. La política por la que abogan los autores aumentaría el coeficiente de reserva de capital que deben poseer los bancos en relación con las hipotecas que financian en dichas áreas. Estas políticas anticíclicas respecto del capital desalentarían los aumentos de precios inmobiliarios a la vez que fortalecerían las reservas de los bancos emisores, lo que mejoraría la capacidad de estos últimos de soportar cualquier conmoción financiera inesperada.
La aplicación de políticas prudentes en cuanto a los mercados inmobiliarios a nivel metropolitano parecería ser algo obvio… entonces, ¿por qué no se han implementado antes? Gran parte de la respuesta tiene que ver con que el análisis del mercado inmobiliario está siendo beneficiado por una revolución en la disponibilidad de datos desglosados espacialmente a nivel metropolitano, del condado e incluso por zona de código postal. Los datos necesarios para informar acerca de las intervenciones mediante políticas a nivel metropolitano que se encuentran ampliamente disponibles desde hace muy poco tiempo, y dichos datos sustentan el trabajo empírico llevado a cabo por Follain y Giertz. Para más información sobre el análisis realizado por los autores, ver http://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/2245_Preventing-House-Price-Bubbles.
A New Yorker cartoon by Jack Ziegler captures the essential irony of buying into condominiums, cooperatives, and other homeowner associations. A car is entering a driveway that leads to a group of townhouses in the distance, and a sign by the entrance proclaims, “Welcome to Condoville and the Illusion of Owning Your Own Property” (Ziegler 1984).
Despite this ambiguity, about a quarter of the American population now lives in association housing situations, collectively known as common interest communities (CICs). Figure 1 shows the tremendous increase in CICs over the past several decades. From 1970 to 2013, the number of housing units in such communities spiked from about 700,000 to 26.3 million, while the number of residents multiplied more than 30-fold from 2.1 million to 65.7 million.
With their growing popularity, common interest communities have raised policy challenges and legal issues that require ongoing resolution. These conflicts generally reflect either external concerns that CICs segregate the wealthy from the rest of society or internal disagreements between individual owners and their associations’ governing bodies. This article examines some of the controversies associated with the CIC model and its governance, and suggests approaches for enhancing the benefits of common interest communities for both property owners and society at large.
The Rise of Common Interest Communities
With increasing industrialization during the 19th century, the intrusion of pollution, traffic, noise, and disease led many planners and citizens to favor the separation of residential, commercial, and industrial uses. (Zoning had not yet emerged as a planning tool and would not be validated by the Supreme Court of the United States until 1926.) Some residential developers thus imposed “servitudes”—covenants, restrictions, and easements—on their subdivision projects. Servitudes generally restricted the properties to residential uses and often created shared rights to communal facilities and services in exchange for fees. Lot purchasers agreed to the servitudes, and once the restrictions were recorded, subsequent purchasers were also legally bound. The common law proved to be an effective vehicle for creating high-end residential areas, including New York City’s Gramercy Park (1831) and Boston’s Louisburg Square (1844).
After a slowdown during the Great Depression and World War II, construction of CICs began to boom in the late 1960s, after the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) recognized the condominium as an insurable ownership vehicle, and state statutory authorization followed. FHA mortgage insurance encouraged developers to build middle-class condominiums, which gained market acceptance as a result of the “new town” movement—exemplified by early planned communities such as Reston, Virginia (1964), and Columbia, Maryland (1967). The passage of California’s Proposition 13, the initiative that limited property taxation in 1978, and similar measures in other states also spurred an increase in CICs, as cash-strapped local governments, under increased pressure to provide more services, were unwilling to absorb the infrastructure and service costs from new development. As a result, they tended to approve new developments only in CIC form, where the developer (and ultimately the owners) covered the costs.
Today, CIC owners are generally subject to a variety of constraints related to their private units, from limitations on the layout and design of buildings and the type of construction materials used, to restrictions on visible home decorations, ancillary structures, and landscaping. There are often controls on the owner’s behavior and use of the property, which is typically limited to residential occupancy. Noise, parking, and traffic rules may also be imposed, along with vehicle restrictions. In some cases, political signs, leafleting, and related activities are also prohibited.
In exchange for their association dues, owners have access to common facilities, such as roads and recreational areas, and to private services, such as security, trash collection, street cleaning, and snow plowing. The CIC is usually administered by a private residential government and various committees, elected by the owners and subject to the law of contract rather than public administrative and Constitutional law (see Box 1).
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Box 1: Common Interest Community Models
CICs typically create a private government elected by the owners to administer and enforce contracts, and to promulgate rules to advance community interests. While the exact form of the arrangement may vary, the basic concepts are similar.
Homeowner Associations
Unit owners hold fee title to their individual properties, which are usually single-family or townhouse homes. The association holds title to common areas and grants the owners easement rights for their use. These can be created by common law or under statutes in some states. Homeowner associations make up more than half of community associations nationally.
Condominiums
Unit owners receive fee title to their units plus a percentage ownership in the common areas. The association administers the common areas but does not hold title to them. Condominiums may be vertical (high-rise) or horizontal (single-family or townhouse homes), and they are created exclusively pursuant to state statute. Condominiums represent 45 to 48 percent of community associations.
Cooperatives
A cooperative corporation owns the building, and the owners receive shares in the corporation and automatically renewable, long-term leases on their individual units. Unlike condominium and homeowner associations, the corporation can control transfer of leases and shares by cooperative owners. Only 3 to 4 percent of community associations are organized as cooperatives.
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Economic Benefits of CICs
CICs bring substantial economic benefits to owners and to society at large. Residents who buy into these communities have determined that shared facilities, such as recreational areas, are a better value than, say, personal swimming pools and other private facilities. Similarly, those joining CICs have determined that certain restrictions—such as a prohibition on parking mobile homes in driveways—increase property values.
These communities help to achieve efficient use of land as well. The costs of organizing and administering a private residential community are lower than in a public system (Nelson 2009). Transaction costs and rent-seeking through the political system are also reduced. Finally, because it is free from statutory and constitutional restraints, a private community has greater flexibility in the substance of its rules and operations, freeing it from adherence to public guidelines when entering into contracts with service providers and suppliers.
American courts have recognized these efficiency benefits when enforcing CIC arrangements and the owners’ reliance on them. As one court noted, “It is a well-known fact that [covenants] enhance the value of the subdivision property and form an inducement for purchasers to buy lots within the subdivision” (Gunnels v. No. Woodland Community Ass’n, Tex. Ct. App, 17013 [1978]).
External Concerns: Secession from the General Community
Despite these benefits, various commentators have argued that the services and private facilities of CICs are available only to those who can afford them and facilitate the separation of the wealthy from the rest of society. The rest of a CIC’s municipality is forced to do without, creating a permanent, two-tier system of housing. Critics also claim that privatization of infrastructure and services isolates CIC residents and reduces their stake in broad communal issues.
By this logic, CIC dwellers are less willing to engage with public government on civic matters and more likely to resist tax increases, given that the CIC rather than the municipal government provides many services. Where community associations are part of suburban developments, isolation from the urban core may be acute. These concerns often center on a fear of class and economic segregation. As former Secretary of Labor Robert Reich wrote in a New York Times article called “Secession of the Successful”: In many cities and towns, the wealthy have in effect withdrawn their dollars from the support of public spaces and institutions shared by all and dedicated the savings to their own private services. . . . Condominiums and the omnipresent residential communities dun their members to undertake work that financially strapped local governments can no longer afford to do well (Reich 1991).
Freedom of Choice
This characterization of community associations, however, is at odds with the fundamental American values of freedom of contract and freedom of association. It is a shared value that people may spend their money for lawful purposes as they wish and enter into contracts as they please. The law intrudes on freedom of contract only in rare instances when major policy considerations are at stake. Courts have recognized freedom of contract as an important consideration for upholding private servitude arrangements: We start with the proposition that private persons, in the exercise of their constitutional right of freedom of contract, may impose whatever restrictions upon the use of land which they convey to another that they desire to impose (Grubel v. McLaughlin, D. Va. [1968]).
CICs also reflect the American belief in freedom of association, exemplified in a long tradition of utopian communities and other belief-centered networks. Residents in modern CICs might share common interests, such as the homeowners living in golf or equestrian communities. Other residents may simply share a desire for neighborhood tranquility or character. In Behind the Gates, Setha Low suggests that CICs allow “middle-class families [to] imprint their residential landscapes with ‘niceness,’ reflecting their own aesthetic of orderliness, consistency, and control” (Low 2004). Whatever the reason, community associations are consistent with de Tocqueville’s observation about American interactions: Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions, constantly form associations. They have not only commercial and manufacturing companies, in which all take part, but associations of a thousand other kinds—religious, moral, serious, futile, extensive or restricted, enormous or diminutive (de Tocqueville 1835).
Moreover, the available evidence indicates that CIC residents are generally happy with their choice. In a 2014 survey conducted by Public Opinion Strategies for the Community Associations Institute, 64 percent of owners were positive about their overall experience, and 26 percent were neutral. While 86 percent of respondents indicated that they wanted either less or no additional governmental regulation, 70 percent maintained that association rules and restrictions protect and enhance property values.
The Issue of Double Taxation
While the rise of CICs reflects a variety of factors, the constrained finances of municipalities following the property tax revolts in the 1970s were key. In fact, a different take on the “secession” narrative is that some owners in common interest communities believe that municipal government abandoned them.
CIC owners pay property taxes at the same rates as other citizens, even though they privately purchase services such as trash collection, street cleaning, and security with their community association dues. This amounts to double taxation, charging association owners for a service they are not receiving.
If a no-service policy were in effect before an owner purchased a unit in a CIC, theoretically the buyer could lower the offer price to reflect the lack of municipal services and the double-taxation-effect. The unit owner would be protected, and the developer would absorb the loss. But if a municipality reduces services but not taxes after the unit purchase, the owner suffers an uncompensated loss. This outcome would be bad policy in that it permits rent seeking, allowing the majority of citizens in the town to select one group of residents to bear an extra tax burden even though they do not create extra costs. This offends notions of both fairness and efficiency, and it’s antithetical to community building and civic trust.
It is especially important for legislatures to avoid the use of double taxation as a matter of policy, given that judicial challenges are unlikely to succeed. The few courts that have entertained attacks on double taxation have been unsympathetic to claims that it violates due process of law, offends the equal protection clause of the Constitution, or works a taking of property without compensation. While double taxation may be bad policy, it is not unconstitutional. The courts should not overturn such legislative decisions, because these are essentially political outcomes that the public should challenge at the ballot box.
The Question of Inequality
The “secession of the wealthy” argument appears to be based on the notion that only higher-income owners with higher-value homes live in common interest communities. The available data, however, do not clearly support this assumption. As Figure 2 indicates, prices for condominiums and cooperatives—half of the units in CICs nationally—are below those for all existing homes (including condominiums, cooperatives, and single-family homes inside and outside of community associations). While these estimates are not deeply segmented (for example, they do not break out single-family homes inside and outside CICs), they do show that the values of condominiums and cooperatives are consistent with those of homes generally.
Housing affordability and access are significant challenges in the United States, but community associations are not necessarily the cause of these deep-seated, complex problems. Employed before CICs became popular, exclusionary zoning imposed by local governments in the form of large lot requirements has prevented developers from building affordable housing. CICs have in fact been found to lower the costs of home purchases. Multi-unit housing, such as condominiums and townhouses, is more affordable than single-family homes because it cuts the cost of land, infrastructure, and building (Ellickson & Been 2005). Affordable housing cooperatives permit restrictions on resale prices and owner income, thus ensuring that housing opportunities remain available for lower-income families. For these purposes, developers operating under city requirements or incentives often designate condominium units within a project as affordable units.
It is therefore simplistic and counterproductive to see community associations as a battleground between rich and poor. Similarly, pejorative use of the term “gated” communities to describe those CICs with limited public access does not advance understanding. Indeed, a moderate-income cooperative with a front door locked for basic security reasons falls within the definition of a “gated” community.
Guiding Principles
In what ways should the “secession of the successful” critique affect our understanding, acceptance, and authorization of common interest communities? The issue is complex and does not lend itself to binary choices. Instead, it is a matter of accommodating competing interests according to the following principles:
Internal Conflicts: Individual Owners vs. the Community
In his groundbreaking book Privatopia: Homeowner Associations and the Rise of Private Residential Governments (1996), Evan McKenzie warned that: CICs feature a form of private government that takes an American preference for private home ownership and, too often, turns it into an ideology of hostile privatism. Preservation of property values is the highest social goal, to which other aspects of community life are subordinated. Rigid, intrusive, and often petty rule enforcement makes a caricature of . . . benign management, and the belief in rational planning is distorted into an emphasis on conformity for its own sake.
Conflicts between residents and CIC associations or boards often revolve around two general issues: the substance of the restrictions and the procedures for enforcement (see Box 2). As Figure 3 shows, disputes may focus on a range of topics, from landscaping restrictions to assessment collection. Indeed, 24 percent of CIC residents responding to the 2014 Public Opinion Strategies survey had experienced a significant personal issue or disagreement with their associations. Of this group, 52 percent were satisfied with the outcome and 36 percent were dissatisfied; in 12 percent of cases, the issue was still unresolved.
There are indeed certain risks that community associations can overstep with respect to the substance and enforcement of restrictions, but legislation and judicial supervision can address these substantive and procedural policy concerns.
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Box 2: Conflicts Make Good Copy
While the following headlines fail to represent the myriad positive interactions between individual owners and associations, they do suggest some of the difficult interactions that can occur.
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Freedom of Choice
As discussed earlier, individuals exercise their freedom of choice by purchasing homes in CICs and agreeing to be subject to their rules. Association living may not be for everyone, but the expectation of people who choose the CIC life should generally be respected and not be frustrated by someone who subsequently seeks to violate the compact. The courts generally reflect this view, as suggested by this 1981 ruling: [The original] restrictions are clothed with a very strong presumption of validity which arises from the fact that each individual unit owner purchases his unit knowing and accepting the restrictions to be imposed. . . . [A] use restriction in a declaration of condominium may have a certain degree of unreasonableness to it, and yet withstand attack in the courts. If it were otherwise, a unit owner could not rely on the restrictions found in the declaration . . . since such restrictions would be in a potential condition of continuous flux (Hidden Harbour Estates v. Basso, Fla. Ct. App. [1981]).
There are several scenarios, though, where homeowners may have no freedom of choice. First, it is possible that the only new housing available to buyers would be in CICs—i.e., developers are no longer building new homes outside of associations. Indeed, a recent report found that in 2003, 80 percent of all homes being built at that time were in associations (Foundation for Community Association Research 2014). In addition, municipal government may require developers to create associations as a condition for subdivision approval. (Recent legislation in Arizona prohibiting this practice indicates that it still occurs.) Finally, some courts have suggested that while rules in place at the time of purchase should be enforced, a rule subsequently enacted by the association or board under a reserved power should not be enforced if an owner can show that it is “unreasonable.” Other courts disagree: Homeowner should not be heard to complain when, as anticipated by the recorded declaration of covenants, the homeowners’ association amends the declaration. When a purchaser buys into such a community, the purchaser buys not only subject to the express covenants in the declaration, but also subject to the amendment provisions. . . . And, of course, a potential homeowner concerned about community association governance has the option to purchase a home not subject to association governance. . . . For this reason, we decline to subject the amendments . . . to the “reasonableness” test (Hughes v. New Life Development Corp., Tenn. Sup. Ct. [2012]).
Guidelines for Protecting Personal Autonomy
Association restrictions raise concerns when they threaten the personal autonomy and fundamental individual rights of owners. Constraints of this type might include prohibitions of political signs or messaging, and restriction of occupancy to “traditional” families.
Courts should enforce restrictions if they limit spillovers (also known as fallout or externalities) from one owner to the rest of the community. They should not, however, enforce restrictions that limit the nature or status of the occupants or the behavior within a unit that does not create externalities. This approach is based on the theory that the primary purpose of CIC regimes is to enhance economic value and encourage efficient exchanges. Thus, if the owner creates no externalities, the courts should not enforce bans on the particular behavior. Moreover, some values of personal autonomy are too important and trump the usual rules of contract. We do not, for example, permit contracts of indentured servitude or the sale of human organs.
By this standard, limiting noise and banning smoking (because of seepage of odors) in multi-family units would be legitimate, but restrictions based on the marital status of residents would not. Some situations are trickier—for example, restrictions on pets. Under the suggested guidelines, it would usually be legitimate to bar pets because of the potential noise and the reluctance of some residents to share common areas with them. In the case of service animals, however, the unit owner’s health needs may trump community concerns.
First Amendment–type issues present special challenges. Free expression—such as political or issue-related signage, leafleting, demonstrations, or other manifestations—can cause spillovers that may include noise, aesthetic interference, and disruption of the community’s general ambience. At the same time, however, free speech is fundamental to our republican form of government, arguably whether it is addressed to the larger public government or the private government. In expression cases, courts might apply the longstanding doctrine that prohibits covenants that violate public policy, rejecting total bans on speech in favor of reasonable restrictions on time, place, and manner. This would allow expression but limit, if not eliminate, spillover on the community.
Religious freedom is another fundamental American value. Restrictions on the placement of a mezuzah on doorposts and the display of crèches, statues of saints, and Christmas lights limit free exercise of religion. While it would open a Pandora’s box to engage in balancing the religious importance of colored versus white Christmas lights against CIC standards, it would nevertheless be appropriate for the courts to impose a general standard of reasonable accommodation on CIC regulations that affect religious practices.
Finally, in the development and enforcement of association rules, CIC property owners have a right to expect certain behavior from associations and boards. This expectation traces from the obligation of good faith and fair dealing that is incumbent on all parties to a contract. Thus, an owner should have a right to fair procedures, including notice and an opportunity to be heard; to be treated equally to other similarly situated owners; and to be free from bias, personal animus, and bad-faith decision making by the board and its members.
Conclusion
Common interest communities are a large part of the American residential landscape, currently providing homes for a quarter of the U.S. population. While CICs bring great economic advantages to residents and society in general, these types of housing arrangements do require nuanced interactions between the community association and the municipal government, and association rules can impinge on the personal autonomy of members. However, strategies are available to mitigate if not overcome these problems. Indeed, these approaches can make ownership of a home in a CIC less of an illusion and more of a reality.
About the Author
Gerald Korngold is Professor of Law at New York Law School and a visiting fellow at the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. He teaches and writes in the fields of property and real estate law.
References
De Tocqueville, Alexis. 1835. Democracy in America. London: Saunders and Otley.
Ellickson, Robert C. & Vicki L. Been. 2005. Land Use Controls. New York, NY: Aspen Publishers, 3rd edition.
Foundation for Community Association Research. 2014. “Best Practices. Report #7: Transition.” www.cairf.org/research/bptransition.pdf.
Foundation for Community Association Research. 2013. “National and State Statistical Review for 2013.” www.cairf.org/research/factbook/2013_statistical_review.pdf.
Grubel v. McLaughlin Gunnels v. No. Woodland Community Ass’n, 17013, Texas Court of Appeals (1978).
Hidden Harbour Estates v. Basso, Florida Court of Appeals (1981).
Hughes v. New Life Development Corp., Tennessee Superior Court (2012).
Low, Setha. 2004. Behind the Gates: Life, Security, and the Pursuit of Happiness in Fortress America. London: Routledge.
McKenzie, E. 1996. Privatopia: Homeowner Associations and the Rise of Private Residential Governments. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.
Nelson, R. H. 2009. “The Puzzle of Local Double Taxation: Why Do Private Communities Exist?” The Independent Review. 13 (3) (Winter) 345–365.
Public Opinion Strategies. 2014. “Verdict: Americans Grade Their Associations, Board Members and Community Managers.” Falls Church, Virginia: Community Associations Institute.
Reich, Robert. 1991. “Secession of the Successful.” The New York Times Magazine. January 20.
Treese, C. J. 2013. Association Information Services, Inc., compiled from National Association of Realtors data. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1I_2LgTIYSqR4nLPRxN-HtCV-oOFK_QqN1AcO5JJTw-g/edit.
Ziegler, J. 1984. The New Yorker. September 3.
In a report titled A Rise in Downtown Living, the Brookings Institution and the Fannie Mae Foundation (1998) highlighted an emerging land use movement in 24 U.S. cities. The release of the 2000 U.S. Census data verified the progress in those cities in another brief, Downtown Rebound (Sohmer and Lang 2001). While these publications alerted the nation to a possible trend, they did have some limitations, which inspired Eugenie Birch’s follow-up study, A Rise in Downtown Living: A Deeper Look, funded by Lincoln Institute, the University of Pennsylvania and the Fannie Mae Foundation.
This study, initiated in summer 1999, employs census data analysis, survey research, personal interviews and field visits to the sample cities. Birch draws on a larger and more representative sample of 45 cities, including 37 percent of the nation’s 100 most populous cities selected for balanced regional distribution, and of these 100 percent of the top 10 and 62 percent of the top 50. The sample includes 19 percent of the 243 cities having a population of 100,000 or more. Birch defined each city’s downtown by census tracts to create a baseline for mapping and collected data on nine population and housing factors for the downtowns and their cities and Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) over three decades. Birch administered two mail surveys, in 1999 and 2001, of city officials and business improvement district leaders to identify their respective roles in encouraging downtown housing, and she is currently making site visits to all 45 cities to verify the census data and survey results.
In this article, Birch summarizes seven key findings of her research, which were also presented at a Lincoln Institute lecture in March 2002 and reported in the APA Journal (Birch 2002).
The Definition of Downtown
Although most people think they understand what downtown is, there is no single socioeconomic meaning or geographical definition for the term. While U.S. downtowns share several common characteristics (a central business district at the core, access to substantial transportation networks, a supply of high-density buildings, expensive land), they differ dramatically in their age, size, functions, contents and character. Furthermore, downtowns are in a state of flux as their boundaries and contents are changing. Tracking downtown boundaries over time reveals that in almost all the cities in the sample, the downtowns of today are remarkably different in size (measured in the number of census tracts included) than they were 20 years ago. Downtowns that are incorporating residences are also attracting more community-serving facilities, such as supermarkets or cineplexes that used to be in neighborhoods. Maps of the several downtowns, created as part of this study, illustrate the size variations.
Residential Populations by the Numbers
The rates of increase in downtown residential populations vary enormously among cities. While downtown growth rates are impressive, numerical counts for MSAs still overshadow those of downtowns. Measuring the growth against basic benchmarks (1970 population levels for the defined downtowns and comparative growth rates with city and MSA) reveals just how fragile this movement is. For example, only 38 percent of the sample cities had more downtown residents in 2000 than in 1970. Only one-third had a downtown population growth rate between 1970 and 2000 that was greater than that of their cities. For the same period, 42 percent of the sample showed a negative downtown growth rate even when their cities had positive numbers. Finally, only seven cities (Chicago, Cleveland, Los Angeles, New York, Norfolk, San Francisco and Seattle) had downtown growth rates that exceeded those of their MSAs in the entire 30-year period.
Looking at the data decade-by-decade tells a different story. Not surprisingly, downtown population declined most severely in the 1970s, when 89 percent of the sample showed losses that ranged from 2.4 percent (Des Moines) to 60 percent (Orlando). In contrast, by the 1990s more than three-quarters (78 percent) of the sample posted increases. However, only four cities (Los Angeles, New York, San Diego and Seattle) had gains in all three decades. Comparing city and MSA data shows similar nuances.
Downtowns also vary in the amount and level of residential development. In 2000 for example, 24 percent of the sample cities had 20,000 or more downtown residents, while 20 percent had fewer than 5,000, and a great deal of diversity exists within the categories. Denver’s downtowners number just over 4,200, but most observers perceive the city’s record in attracting residents as a stand-out success, while Cincinnati, with about 3,200 downtown residents, is struggling to maintain a critical mass. At the other end of the scale, Chicago’s 73,000 and Philadelphia’s 78,000 downtowners are integrated into their larger metropolises.
Differences in the proportion of a city’s population that lives downtown are also striking. For example, Boston and Philadelphia have roughly equal downtown populations, but Boston’s comprises 14 percent of the total while Philadelphia’s is only 5 percent. Finally, a simple numerical listing of the sample downtowns is misleading. Downtown population growth has occurred at varying rates with some cities experiencing the phenomenon for a longer time than others. This may account for the greater success of some cities. Also, given the varying geographical size of the different downtowns, density measures as well as demographic analysis should be added to any assessment in order to gauge the potential impact (economic, political, social) of new residents.
Approaches to Creating Downtown Housing
Over the past decade, policy makers and investors have relied on six types of approaches to create downtown housing, and they often blend more than one of these:
To accomplish these ends, cities have engaged in creative financing, leveraging public funds, tax credits, gap financing pools and other tools at their disposal. Philadelphia, Boston and Lower Manhattan present examples of the office conversion trend, while Atlanta, Minneapolis, Cincinnati and Cleveland have employed warehouse store adaptive reuse. Charlotte represents a combination of HOPE VI, new construction and historic preservation. The found-land approach is seen in Milwaukee with its riverfront redevelopment (including brownfields remediation), Cincinnati with its expressway diversion/riverfront development, Des Moines with its construction of a new downtown neighborhood, and New York at Battery Park City. Chicago is the king of mixed-use new construction. Columbus (Georgia), Lexington and Chattanooga have fostered historic districting as a means to protect older, downtown residential neighborhoods.
Deep Roots of Success
Today’s growth in downtown living is the fruit of more than five decades of sustained attention to downtown revitalization. It has come about because cities have steadily improved their environments through downtown planning and additions of new elements to reinvent their old central business districts. In so doing, they have transformed their downtowns into new, hip places, thus making them competitive and attractive for housing. Although specific municipal policies such as favorable tax treatment, zoning amendments and infrastructure investments have, without doubt, flamed the private market activities in downtown housing, public investment in large-scale projects dating from the mid-1950s to the present have helped create a sympathetic climate for this investment. Preliminary evidence shows a strong relationship between investor choices and the presence of new downtown amenities. For example, developers in Los Angeles, Denver, Baltimore, Detroit and Memphis cite the presence of stadiums or sports arenas as important factors in their location decisions.
Demographic Characteristics of Downtowners
Downtowners are more affluent, more highly educated and more white than the city dwellers overall, but more diverse than those in the MSA. Singles, empty-nesters, gays, and childless or small households are more highly represented in downtowns than in MSAs. Families with children are present but not dominant. Other submarkets are students and the elderly. In some cities where the housing market is tight, notably Boston, New York, Chicago and San Francisco, low- and moderate-income groups are reporting difficulty in finding space for affordable housing. In other cities like Charlotte that have an excess of downtown land, much of it devoted to parking lots, the issue is not space but cost. In these contexts, questions arise as to what resources should be devoted to high-rent downtown units.
Private Development Efforts
Promoting downtown housing has emerged as a central strategy of private downtown groups, mainly business improvement district (BIDs), working with municipal government, often city planning and/or economic development departments. In 59 percent of the sample, BIDS or other privately sponsored organizations have engaged in pro-housing campaigns. As membership organizations their internal needs drive the agenda, so the amount and nature of their efforts vary widely.
Contribution to Citywide Growth
Downtown growth has contributed to the numeric changes in citywide populations in many cities. While the percentage contribution to overall municipal growth is often quite small, in 53 percent of the sample cities the downtown numerical contribution is a significant portion of the total, and in another 22 percent of the sample cities the downtown portion has offset losses in other parts of the city. In other words, without the downtown population growth, 60 percent of the sample would be worse off. In Boston, for example, downtowners constituted 25 percent of the increased number of people living in the city, while in Pittsburgh the additional downtowners reduced the city’s population loss by only one percentage point.
Conclusions
Reviewing these seven findings reveals a few themes. Downtowns are ever-changing places. Their functions, their boundaries and their very characters have been evolving in the postwar period. They are like complicated jigsaw puzzles with players (urban leaders) fitting the pieces together slowly. Just as assemblers first frame a puzzle and then fill in the center, city leaders have provided infrastructure outlines—streets or street improvements, schools, redeveloped river edges, improved open space—and now are adding other parts. Downtown living is one of these. In many places it has fit very well, especially in the past ten years. In a few cases, new downtown residents contribute significantly to the numerical growth of their city’s population. Just as certainly, many downtowns have not really kept up with their MSAs, and a majority of cities have yet to recover their 1970 populations. Nonetheless, having formerly vacant and/or abandoned buildings occupied (and eventually paying taxes) and having more (and more diverse) people on the streets night and day, weekday and weekend, are positive factors for urban life.
Making sense of this housing phenomenon requires not only placing it in the context of contemporary metropolitan development but also making it part of an evaluation of past urban redevelopment programs. Downtown living is not a silver bullet for curing urban ills but one element of an ongoing planning and investment effort for a part of the city.
Public/private partnerships have been essential in achieving changes in downtown living. The existence of productive interplay between focused interest groups, especially the growing number of business improvement district leaders, and public planning and economic development units has resulted in bold, imaginative, creative and thoughtful approaches to creating housing opportunities.
The findings and themes in this research give rise to other questions related to individual downtowns. These include an evaluation of the costs and benefits of attracting different types of downtowners and an assessment of the reasons why some places have been more successful than others in gaining the populations. This information that would be useful, for example, for policy makers in cities having less developed downtowns who first must decide whether a downtown living approach is appropriate for their cities and, second, must determine whether supportive incentives or complementary activities are needed. Other questions revolve around how to spread downtown progress to nearby neighborhoods without provoking displacement or unwanted gentrification and how to resolve the inevitable political disputes that will arise with the newcomers.
All in all, the rise in downtown living is as complex and layered as any urban issue. While widely reported in the popular press, it deserves a balanced, scholarly appraisal. This study raises important planning and development issues that still need attention: for example, information on the critical mass of residents required to make a difference in downtown life, the relationship between downtown housing units and employment, and the number of households needed to support community-serving functions. All of these issues lead to questions of balancing appropriate density for new development and quantity for adaptive reuse with other downtown functions like office, parking, retail and entertainment. No one really knows the proper composition of a balanced downtown.
Eugenie Ladner Birch is professor and chair of the Department of City and Regional Planning at the University of Pennsylvania.
References
Birch, Eugenie Ladner. 2002. Having a Longer View on Downtown Living. Journal of the American Planning Association 68 (1):5-21.
Brookings Institution Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy and Fannie Mae Foundation. 1998. A Rise in Downtown Living. Washington, DC.
Sohmer, R.R., and Lang, R.E. 2001. Downtown Rebound (FMF Census Note 03, May). Washington, DC: Fannie Mae Foundation and Brookings Institution Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy.
Gated communities are residential areas with restricted access designed to privatize normally public spaces. These developments occur in both new suburban developments and older inner city areas retrofitted to provide security. We estimate that at least three or four million and potentially many more Americans are seeking this new form of refuge from the problems of urbanization.
This rapidly growing phenomenon has become ubiquitous in many areas of the country since the late 1980s. While early gated communities were restricted to retirement villages and the compounds of the super rich, the majority found today are middle to upper-middle class. Along with the trend toward “forting up” in new developments, existing neighborhoods of both rich and poor are using barricades and gates with increasing frequency to isolate themselves.
Gated communities can be classified in three main categories based on the primary motivation of their residents. Two types of “lifestyle” communities provide security and separation for the leisure activities and amenities within. These include retirement communities and golf or country club leisure developments as one subgroup and suburban new towns as another.
In “elite” communities the gates symbolize distinction and prestige. Through both creating and protecting a secure place on the social ladder, these communities become enclaves of the rich and famous, developments for the very affluent, and executive home developments for the middle class.
The third type is the “security zone,” where fear of crime and outsiders is the key motivation for defensive fortifications. This category includes middle-class areas where residents attempt to protect property and property values; working-class neighborhoods, often in deteriorating sections of the city; and low-income areas, including public housing complexes, where crime is acute.
Urban Problems Stimulate Trend to Gating
High levels of foreign immigration, a growing underclass and a restructured economy are changing the face of many metropolitan areas and fueling the drive for separation, distinction, exclusion and protection. Gated communities are themselves a microcosm of America’s larger spatial pattern of segmentation and separation by income, race and economic opportunity. Suburbanization has not meant a lessening of segregation, but only a redistribution of the old urban patterns. Minority and immigrant suburbanization is concentrated in the inner ring and old manufacturing suburbs. At the same time, poverty is no longer concentrated in the central city, but is suburbanizing rapidly.
Gated communities are not yet the normal pattern in the nation. They are primarily a metropolitan and coastal phenomenon, with the largest aggregations being in California, Texas and Florida. However, gates are being erected in almost every state. Real estate developers suggest that the demand for homes in gated communities is increasing, and there is evidence that housing appreciation in such developments is higher than outside the gates.
Fear of crime is the strongest rationale for this new form of community. According to recent reports in Miami and other areas where gates and barricades have become the norm, some forms of crime, such as car theft, are reduced. On the other hand, some data indicate that the crime rate inside the gates is only marginally altered by barricades. Nevertheless, residents report less fear of crime in such settings. This reduction in fear is important in itself, since it can lead to increased neighborly contact, which can reduce crime in the long run.
Policy Issues for Community Life
The development of gated areas is related to the uncoupling of industry from cities and of professionals from the industrial core. Geography compounds current trends toward fragmentation and privatization by undercutting the old foundation of community and providing a new rationale for the lifestyle enclave or gated community based on shared socioeconomic status. This narrowing of social contact is likewise narrowing the social contract.
Privatization- the replacement of public government and its functions by private organizations which purchase services from the market- is promoted as a “benefit” of gated communities, but it may have serious impacts on the broader community. Private communities provide their own security, street maintenance, parks, recreation, garbage collection and other services, thus relieving taxpayers of additional burdens. However, they may also have the unintended consequence of reducing voter interest in participating in tax programs or voluntary efforts to deal with community problems or additional public services such as schools, streets, police or other city and county government programs.
The resulting loss of connection between citizens in privatized and traditional communities loosens social contact and weakens the bonds of mutual responsibility that are a normal part of community living. As a result, there is less and less talk of citizenship. The new lexicon of civic responsibility is that of the taxpayers who take no active role in governance but merely exchange money for services. Residents of privatized gated communities say they are taking care of themselves and lessening the public burden, but this perspective has the potential for redistributing public costs and benefits.
Walled and gated communities are a dramatic manifestation of the fortress mentality growing in America. As citizens divide themselves into homogenous, independent cells, their place in the greater polity and society becomes attenuated, increasing resistance to efforts to resolve municipal, let alone regional, problems.
The forting-up phenomenon has enormous policy consequences.What is the measure of nationhood when neighborhoods require armed patrols and electric fencing to keep out other citizens? When public services and even local governments are privatized and when the community of responsibility stops at the subdivision gates, what happens to the function and the very idea of democracy? In short, can this nation fulfill its social contract in the absence of social contact?
Edward J. Blakely, a visiting fellow of the Lincoln Institute, is dean and Lusk Professor of Planning and Development for the School of Urban and Regional Planning at the University of Southern California. Mary Gail Snyder is a doctoral student in the Department of City and Regional Planning at the University of California at Berkeley.
Additional information in printed newsletter:
1. Map of the United States showing concentrations of Gated Communities.
2. Table showing Social Dimensions of Gated Communities.