The potential for sharp and unpredictable assessment increases is an important source of dissatisfaction with the property tax. Rapid price rises that are accurately and promptly reflected in assessed valuations can leave homeowners responsible for cash payments on paper gains that are unexpected, uncontrollable, and possibly short-lived. Two decades ago, this situation paved the way for adoption of California’s Proposition 13, which rejected fair market value as a basis for assessment.

Increasing valuations do not necessarily produce a corresponding rise in property tax bills, since a higher assessment base could raise equivalent revenue with a smaller tax rate. This solution is not feasible, however, when prices increase disproportionately only in particular neighborhoods or for particular types of property.

What other means are available to address price volatility and its impact on property tax rates? A number of states have recently introduced limitations on annual valuation increases. These measures avoid extreme assessment increases but may still allow assessments to match fair market values at some point in the future. They substitute a non-market value basis for assessment and diminish uniformity by distinguishing between those properties that are assessed on the basis of current values and those that are not.

Assessment Limitations in Washington and Texas

In the November 1997 elections, voters in Washington state approved a referendum generally limiting increases in assessed valuation to 15 percent a year on all classes of taxable property. If a property’s market value rises more than 60 percent, one year’s assessment may reflect no more than one-quarter of that increase. A similar measure strongly supported by business representatives was passed by the Republican legislature but vetoed by Gov. Gary Locke (D), who would have limited it to homeowners.

This case raises an important point concerning uniformity and distribution of the tax burden. Phase-in provisions ease the burden on owners of rapidly appreciating property but correspondingly increase the relative share of the tax borne by owners experiencing slower growth, or no growth, in property value. While tax limitations are generally promoted as protection for homeowners, residential benefits may pale in comparison to commercial gains.

Supporters of the Washington referendum urged passage “to soften a tax blow that could be devastating to a homeowner on a fixed income.” Yet major funding for the campaign came from industrial giants, including Microsoft, Intel, Hewlett Packard, Boeing and Weyerhaeuser. Opponents, including King County assessor Scott Noble, argued that the tax benefits “will go disproportionately to the large corporations that are bankrolling the campaign because of their much higher property values.” On the other hand, restricting such provisions to residential property introduces another level of non-uniformity to the tax.

Texas voters chose this split valuation alternative in November, approving a measure that limits increases in assessed values of residential homestead property, but not business property, to 10 percent a year. The president of the Texas Taxpayers and Research Association said this provision will “keep a terribly hot neighborhood from getting sort of a sticker shock.”

Critics saw the irony of this action. One wrote, “If the Texas Legislature had offered voters a chance to cap appraisal increases on their homes a few years ago, lawmakers would have been lauded as heroes. Angry homeowners were storming the offices of appraisal districts in the early and mid-1990s, demanding relief from double-digit increases in the appraised value of their homes and the prospect of significant property tax hikes. . . Nothing happened. Now that appraisal increases have fallen to three percent or so, the Legislature is offering voters a chance to cap the increases by changing the state Constitution. . . .” Ironically, before the price rises of the 1990s, Texas tax protests centered on whether assessments reflected falling property values quickly enough in the regional recession of the 1980s. For example, Harris County, which includes Houston, saw challenges to one-quarter of all its tax valuations in 1984 and 1985.

A Legislative Approach in Montana

Annual increases of 10 or 15 percent do not necessarily prevent assessed valuations from reaching full market levels. However, Montana lawmakers responded this year to dramatic value increases with an even more drastic measure. After studies reported that residential and commercial property values had increased by an average of 43 percent statewide since the last reassessment, the legislature required this change to be phased in at a rate of only two percent annually-taking 50 years to enter the tax rolls completely. Court challenges to this provision could raise an interesting question as to how long a phase-in period is compatible with state constitutional provisions requiring uniformity in assessment.

Assessment Reform in Ontario

Large valuation increases may be due to assessment lags as well as to price rises. One of the most startling examples of outdated tax valuation is found in Toronto-a surprise to U.S. observers who normally expect a high level of administrative efficiency from their northern neighbor. At the September conference of the International Association of Assessing Officers (IAAO) in Toronto, a panel of speakers brought together by the Lincoln Institute explored this situation. The potential for huge valuation increases stems not so much from extraordinary market activity as from extraordinary assessment inactivity. Metropolitan Toronto has not had a full-scale reassessment since1954-and that was based on 1940 market values.

Attorney Jack Walker described the public as generally supportive of current tax reform efforts, which encompass the entire province of Ontario. By contrast, a 1992 reassessment proposal for Metropolitan Toronto alone sparked such protest from residential and small business taxpayers that the proposal was abandoned. As a result, the 1997 measure explicitly addresses the concerns of many taxpayers groups. Professor David Amborski of Ryerson Polytechnic University explained that it would ensure current value assessments and regular updates. In addition, it will eliminate the business occupancy tax, permit different tax rates for different classes of property, provide special treatment for senior citizens and disabled taxpayers, and reduce taxes on agricultural and open space lands.

Thus, Toronto has also chosen to soften the impact of large assessment increases at the expense of uniformity. In this case, where municipal valuations were so out of date, the net effect may be judged an improvement in assessment equity. It will be important to evaluate the experiences of other jurisdictions struggling with the challenge of balancing uniformity and acceptability to see if they can make the same claim.

Joan Youngman is senior fellow and director of the Institute’s Program in the Taxation of Land and Buildings. An attorney specializing in property tax issues, she also writes a column for State Tax Notes, published by Tax Analysts.

Notes

Joseph Turner, “Ref. 47 Debate: Do Tax Savings Justify Change?” Takoma News-Tribune, October 23, 1997, p. A1 (quoting Rep. Brian Thomas (R-Renton))

2 Tom Brown, “Big Guns Back Property-Tax Lid,” Seattle Times, October 24, 1997, p. B3.

3Clay Robison, “Measure Would Cap Hike in Residential Appraisals,” The Houston Chronicle, November 2, 1997, p.2.

4Michele Kay, “Tax Appraisal Cap on Ballot,” Austin American-Statesman, October 20, 1997, p. A1.

When Jim Brown joined the Lincoln Institute as president and CEO in May 1996, he had served on the faculty of Harvard University for 26 years and headed the Joint Center for Housing Studies at the Kennedy School, considered the most prestigious research center on U.S. housing issues. As he prepares for retirement from the Institute after nearly nine years, he says that the most surprising aspect of his tenure has been his role in expanding the organization’s international programs, especially in Latin America and China.

“The Institute’s programs on U.S. land use and tax policy were well-established and ably directed by senior fellows on the staff,” Brown noted, “but the need and demand for training and research on these topics remain critical in the new market economies that have emerged over the past few decades. Public officials, policy makers, academics and stakeholders in the private sector all have been very receptive to and eager for our educational programs, and we have developed a lively exchange of knowledge and mutual respect.”

Brown expanded and reorganized the Institute’s academic agenda by integrating research and educational programs into three academic departments: Planning and Development; Valuation and Taxation; and International Studies. This structure encouraged each department chair to develop a curriculum, sponsor research, offer educational programs and disseminate information to fit the needs of various constituencies.

“I wanted to empower others to do their work in their own program areas, and I think the results have been very positive,” Brown commented. “The Institute is more widely known today because of our enhanced commitment to curriculum development and special demonstration projects, as well as varied outreach efforts to share the results of our work. We are fortunate to have the financial resources to be able to develop programs and offer them to those who need and can benefit from this information.”

The Institute offers more than 75 courses, conferences and seminars annually at Lincoln House and at locations around the globe to public officials, practitioners and private citizens. In addition, the Institute’s research and graduate student fellowship programs have been greatly expanded over the past five years.

“I’m very pleased with how the staff has developed numerous ways to disseminate our sponsored research and information about our programs,” Brown added. “These include the Land Lines newsletter; books, working papers and other academic publications; our annual catalog; and our Web site. Advances in online communication have challenged us to continue to find ways to reach new audiences.”

As the Institute board, staff and faculty prepare for the next generation of presidential leadership, we offer our sincere thanks to Jim Brown for reinvigorating the organization’s academic mission, the scope of research and educational programs, and approaches to learning and communicating information about the many facets of land policy.

As the U.S. housing market experiences its largest contraction since the Great Depression, the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy and the Urban–Brookings Tax Policy Center took a closer look at the consequences of this crisis for state and local governments in a May 2010 conference. A major theme of the discussion was the fallibility of conventional wisdom. For example, some participants questioned whether easy credit was in fact the cause of the housing bubble and thus to blame for the subsequent loss of state and local tax revenues. Papers presented at the conference document the complexities researchers face in determining the causes and lessons of this crisis.

• While easy credit did motivate homebuyers, its effect was not sufficiently strong to fully account for the housing boom.
• The housing market downturn was largely predictable, but only by looking at state-level rather than national data.
• Although state budgets have been battered by fallout from the recession in the form of lower income and sales tax revenue, these declines have been triggered more by the broader economic downturn than by the collapse in housing markets.
• Local governments seem to have been largely spared the severe budget shortfalls plaguing many states. While housing prices have fallen, property taxes have held up fairly well—supporting city budgets while other revenue sources have shrunk. However, there is great geographic variation in these results.

The Housing Market Boom and Bust

According to Byron Lutz, Raven Molloy, and Hui Shan, house prices at the national level increased by 64 percent from 2002 to 2006, before falling nearly 30 percent over the following four years. From 2006 to 2009, existing home sales dropped 36 percent and the number of newly constructed homes fell 75 percent. Could we have seen it coming? Was the housing market bust predictable? Yes, according to Yolanda K. Kodrzycki and Robert K. Triest, but only by looking at state-level data.

Conventional wisdom held that while house prices could fall in specific markets, national housing prices would not decline. This had been the historical pattern, although some markets, for example the Boston and Los Angeles metropolitan areas, experienced declines in the 1990s after strong increases in housing prices. Other areas, such as Detroit, had been declining or stagnant even when the country as a whole experienced consistent upward movement in house prices.

Much of the modeling and analysis of the housing crisis has used national-level data, which provided insufficient evidence to measure the peak of the housing bubble. Since economic cycles are more apparent at the state level and can act as early warning signs of housing trouble on a national scale, analyzing state data collectively can improve national forecasts.

Nevertheless, even the ability to recognize a housing bubble does not provide an easy prescription for preventing a crisis. Previous episodes of state-level housing price declines show that booms do not necessarily end in busts, Kodrzycki said. Rather, downturns are closely related to economic cycles. In most cases housing prices did not fall until after a recession had begun within a region—a pattern that is different from the current crisis.

The cause of the housing bubble is a crucial and unsettled question. Many economists have argued that easy credit was responsible, but Edward L. Glaeser disputed that view in a paper written with Joshua Gottlieb and Joseph Gyourko. Widely available credit and low interest rates do encourage more people to buy homes, increasing demand and raising housing prices. “This goes along with an older view,” Glaeser said, “that interest rates are very powerful in determining housing prices. There is some truth to that, but I think…those claims are overblown. Certainly the changes in the credit market can’t explain what we went through.”

Between 1996 and 2006, real housing prices rose by 42 percent, according to the Federal Housing Finance Agency price index. Glaeser and his colleagues found that low interest rates can likely explain only one-fifth of that increase. Other factors, including an elastic housing supply and credit-constrained homebuyers, can mute the effect of interest rates on prices. Buyers contemplating future moves or refinancing can take those factors into account when deciding how much to pay for a home. If the link between interest rates and house prices is smaller than expected, that knowledge can inform future federal housing policies and estimates of their effects on the housing market.

Impacts on State Revenues

State revenues plummeted in the recession, leading to record-high budget shortfalls just as demand for public services was growing. Inflation-adjusted state tax revenue fell nearly 15 percent during the downturn—the biggest drop in more than 50 years.

Donald Boyd noted that many of the first states to see their tax revenues decline also had been hit hard and early by the housing downturn. Arizona experienced its revenue peak in 2005, and by 2009 its real per capita tax revenue fell by 23.5 percent. Meanwhile, housing prices in Arizona tumbled 19.7 percent from 2006 to 2008.

States that were spared the worst of the housing crisis did not see revenue losses until the recession was in full swing. Texas had a 7.4 percent increase in housing prices from 2006 to 2008. Its tax revenues did not peak until late in 2008; roughly a year later, however, Texas saw its revenue drop by 17.5 percent.

Steven Craig and Edward Hoang examined how state government expenditures and taxes fluctuate with changes in underlying economic activity. They found that in general state responses initially tend to lag behind changes in gross state product, but in the long run states tended to overadjust to economic shocks.

Boyd found that in response to their budget gaps states cut spending in 2009 and 2010 primarily through furloughs and layoffs, and by stretching out payments of obligations into the future. States also cut grants to local governments, according to Howard Chernick and Andrew Reschovsky, who examined whether state budget crises lead to greater tax competition between states and their large cities. They find that in the long run cities with diversified revenue will be in a stronger fiscal position, but in the short run own-source revenue has declined more in cities with a diversified tax base (due in part to the strength of property tax). They also find that state aid is highly stimulative, but that increases in states sales tax rates will make it more difficult for cities to increase their sales taxes. The authors conclude that the current economic downturn will force significant public service reductions for large central cities.

Rachana Bhatt, Jonathan Rork, and Mary Beth Walker examined how higher education fared during the recession. While there have been highly publicized cuts in funding for higher education from general revenues, the overall level of expenditures for higher education has increased from 1996 to 2008. The authors find that across the business cycle states tend to substitute earmarked support for higher education (whether in the form of federal grants, lottery revenues, or other special accounts) for general fund support.

Federal stimulus spending in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) helped boost state budgets and mitigate cuts in state aid to local governments, but those funds are set to expire in 2011. Boyd examined earlier recessions and found that the declines in state revenues have been more extreme this time. The good news, Boyd said, is that state tax revenue declines are showing signs of slowing and local revenues have not yet declined in aggregate.

“We might be stabilizing,” Boyd said. But, “it’s going to be a long ways before states are likely to have the capacity to finance the kinds of spending programs they have had…which means a lot of budgetary pain ahead still.” Indeed, the stabilization of state revenues on average was due in large part to tax increases in only two states, New York and California. Boyd predicts that it will be some time before other state revenues return to prerecession levels.

But, was this damage caused by the housing crisis? The recession may have been sparked by failing subprime mortgages, but it was fueled by overleveraged financial institutions—turning a housing slump into a global economic downturn. Lutz, Molloy, and Shan sought to separate the effects of the housing downturn on state and local tax revenues from the broader impact of the recession. They identified five main revenue streams that are influenced by the housing market: property tax revenues; transfer tax revenues; personal income tax revenues (related to construction and real estate jobs); direct sales tax revenues (through construction materials); and indirect sales tax revenues (when homeowners adjust their overall spending in response to changes in property value).

Property tax revenues remained high, and even grew in some states. The other four revenue streams declined, but had only a modest effect on overall state and local tax revenues. Lutz, Molloy, and Shan estimated that the combined decreases from these four revenue streams reduced total state and local tax revenues by $15 billion from 2005 to 2009, which is about 2 percent of state and local tax revenues in 2005. They found that in aggregate housing-related declines are responsible for only a fraction of the overall decline. Widespread unemployment and shrinking family incomes are more significant in cutting personal income and sales tax revenue. Thus, while the housing market and the economy are closely intertwined, the severe drop in state tax revenues can largely be attributed to the broader economic downturn, not the housing crisis specifically.

Local Governments and Property Taxes

As state revenues fell, local government revenues as a whole continued to grow because property tax revenue, which stayed strong in the recession, supported municipal budgets. States typically rely on income and sales taxes, which are more volatile than the property taxes that largely fund local governments. From 2007 to 2009, corporate and individual income tax revenue declined rapidly and sales tax revenue fell—but property taxes grew (figure 1).

In most states, housing price declines are not immediately reflected in assessed property values, and that lag makes property taxes a fairly resilient source of revenue. Also, policy makers tend to offset declines by raising tax rates (figure 2). James Alm and David L. Sjoquist backed these findings with their study of national trends in property tax collections. Although experiences varied among cities, they noted that local governments’ reliance on property taxes has been an advantage, allowing them to avoid some of the more severe effects of the recession.

Variable Effects in Selected States

While the conference focused on national trends, a recurrent theme was the dramatically variable experience of specific states and regions. Bruce Wallin and Jeff Zabel examined the effects of an earlier decline in Massachusetts house prices in the aftermath of a tax limit. Proposition 2½, passed in 1980, is a voter initiative that limits property tax levies (to 2½ percent of assessed values) and limits revenue growth to 2½ percent per year. There are exceptions for new growth, and Proposition 2½ does allow local voters to pass overrides to increase the growth percentage. Wallin and Zabel found property tax revenues overall did grow 4.58 percent between fiscal year 1981 and fiscal year 2009, largely due to these exceptions. A maximum of 547 overrides were proposed in 1991, but as few as 51 in 1999. However, poorer towns have been less likely to approve tax increases, relying instead on spending cuts, and leading to a growing gap between poor and wealthy towns over time.

Michigan, already struggling with the loss of manufacturing jobs, provides another striking case study. Poverty and unemployment rates there are higher than the U.S. average. In Detroit, housing prices plummeted—the average home cost $97,850 in 2003, but dropped to a remarkable low of $11,533 by 2009. Mark Skidmore and Eric Scorsone found that in the recession Michigan cut spending on recreation programs and delayed capital projects and infrastructure maintenance. That strategy may be effective in the short run, Skidmore said, but will likely result in higher costs down the road. He suggested that a similar fate might be in store for Las Vegas or cities in Arizona, which also experienced severe housing price declines.

Local governments in Florida and Georgia have remained fairly stable, so far. Florida experienced a tremendous increase in house prices from 1994 to 2006, before the housing market decline caused prices to fall across the state. William M. Doerner and Keith Ihlanfeldt found that city revenues in Florida rose during the housing boom, but not solely as a result of increased property values, and those revenues have stayed fairly strong following the drop in house prices. Alm and Sjoquist reported that property tax revenues in Georgia rose slightly between 2008 and 2009, while property values declined. Local governments, in many cases, maintained collections by increasing the tax rate.

What the Housing Crisis Means for Children

The housing crisis inflicted enormous costs on individuals, communities, and governments. Residents have been hurt by foreclosures and tremendous losses in property values (box 1). Vacant, deteriorating homes have weakened neighborhoods. The children caught up in the housing crisis face uncertain living situations and may have to transfer from school to school. Although researchers know these changes can harm children, they do not yet fully understand how this crisis is affecting students and schools.

David Figlio, Ashlyn Aiko Nelson, and Stephen Ross are studying how foreclosures hurt children’s educational outcomes. Their preliminary analysis indicates that schools serving neighborhoods with high foreclosure rates may experience declines in enrollment or community resources, with spillover effects on students whose families have not lost their homes.

Box 1. Foreclosure Statistics

• Nationwide, 1 in 33 homeowners are facing foreclosure.
• In 2004, before the crisis, the national foreclosure rate was 1.1 percent.
• In 2009, 2.21 percent of all homes in the United States were foreclosed.
• Foreclosure rates hit double digits in some markets: Las Vegas, NV (12.04 percent), Fort Myers, FL (11.87 percent), and Merced, CA (10.10 percent).

Source: Figlio, Nelson, and Ross (2010).

The effects of the housing crisis on children, schools, and neighborhoods are also being examined by Jennifer Comey and her colleagues. The first stage of their work in New York, Baltimore, and the District of Columbia identified areas with high rates of foreclosures. They have found that foreclosures of multifamily and rental units can lead to displacement of renters, causing many families to be harmed by the upheaval in the real estate market. The second phase will track student transfers after foreclosures, comparing their former neighborhoods and schools with their new ones.

Comey and her colleagues will also analyze these students’ school performance through attendance, test scores, and dropout rates. They stressed the importance of coordinating housing and education services. Housing counselors need to know how students are affected by foreclosure and to understand relevant local school policies. A better understanding of these issues can help schools ease the burden on displaced and homeless students.

Looking Abroad . . . and Ahead

Government responses to the global housing crisis also vary around the world, and some countries may offer lessons for the United States. For example, Christian Hilber examined whether central government grants can help maintain housing prices and found that most such grants seemed to translate into increased property values.

Joyce Yanyun Man reported that local governments in China were encouraged to invest in real estate and infrastructure to stimulate economic growth. Rather than using property taxes, they turned to land leasing fees and borrowing to finance urban development. China’s GDP growth rate is rising, but local governments are heavily in debt. Given what we are learning about the stability of property taxes in the United States, China may need to consider a similar policy instead of relying on one-time leasing fees to generate extra revenue.

Although local governments have not suffered the same fate as states, at some point assessed values will catch up to housing price declines. Indeed, recent survey results from the National League of Cities indicate that cities are beginning to see their revenues soften. John E. Anderson warned that local governments are in a precarious position—the property tax base has shrunk and ARRA funding will end, which could create a delayed blow to revenue. If these forces cause local governments to raise rates, this could cause homeowners to push for property tax limits and other initiatives to reduce property tax rates. Anderson investigated the potential adjustments local governments may have to make as they reduce reliance on the property tax in favor of alternative taxes.

Hui Shan stated, “Historical data and case studies suggest that it’s quite unlikely for property tax collections to fall steeply in the next few years.” The delay between the housing downturn and a drop in property taxes may give the national economy time to recover, making up for the loss of stimulus funds and property tax revenue through higher income and sales tax revenue. The forecast is not clear, but state and local governments should be prepared for what the conference participants agreed will be a slow economic recovery ahead.

About the Authors

Kim Rueben is a senior fellow at the Urban Institute and leads the state and local research program at the Urban–Brookings Tax Policy Center.

Serena Lei is a research writer and editor at the Urban Institute.

Acknowledgments

We thank Ritadhi Chakravarti of the Urban Institute, Tracy Gordon of the University of Maryland, and Semida Munteanu and Joan Youngman of the Lincoln Institute for assistance in writing this summary. We also thank the authors and other participants at the conference for engaging in a stimulating discussion. All mistakes and errors are our own.

Conference Authors and Papers

Alm, James, Tulane University; and David Sjoquist, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University: Rethinking Local Government Reliance on the Property Tax

Anderson, John E., University of Nebraska–Lincoln: Shocks to the Tax Base and Implications for Local Public Finance

Bhatt, Rachana, Georgia State University; Jonathan Rork, Reed College; and Mary Beth Walker, Georgia State University: Earmarking and the Business Cycle: The Case of Higher Education Spending

Boyd, Donald J., The Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government, State University of New York at Albany: Recession, Recovery and State and Local Finances

Chernick, Howard A., Hunter College and the City University of New York; and Andrew Reschovsky, University of Wisconsin–Madison: The Impact of State Government Fiscal Crises on Vertical Fiscal Competition Between States and Local Governments

Comey, Jennifer, The Urban Institute; Vicki Been, NYU/School of Law and Furman Center; Ingrid Gould Ellen, NYU/Wagner and Furman Center; Matthew Kachura, The Jacob France Institute, University of Baltimore; Amy Ellen Schwartz, NYU/Wagner-Steinhardt/IESP; and Leanna Stiefel, NYU/Wagner-Steinhardt/IESP: The Foreclosure Crisis in Three Cities: Children, Schools and Neighborhoods

Craig, Steven G., University of Houston; and Edward Hoang, University of Memphis: State Government Response to Income Fluctuations: Consumption, Insurance and Capital Expenses

Doerner, William M., and Keith R. Ihlanfeldt, Florida State University: House Prices and Local Government Revenues

Figlio, David, Northwestern University; Ashlyn Akio Nelson, Indiana University; and Stephen L. Ross, University of Connecticut: Do Children Lose More than a Home? The Effects of Foreclosure on Children’s Education Outcomes

Glaeser, Edward L., and Joshua Gottlieb, Harvard University; and Joseph Gyourko, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania: Can Easy Credit Explain the Housing Bubble?

Hilber, Christian A.L., and Teemu Lyytikainen, London School of Economics and Spatial Economics Research Center (SERC); and Wouter Vermeulen, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, VU University and SERC: Capitalization of Central Government Grants into Local House Prices: Panel Data Evidence from England

Kodrzycki, Yolanda, and Robert K. Triest, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston: Forecasting House Prices at the State and National Level: Was the Housing Bust Predictable?

Lutz, Bryon, Raven Molloy, and Hui Shan, Federal Reserve Board of Governors: The Housing Crisis and State and Local Government Tax Revenue: Five Channels

Man, Joyce Yanyun, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy: Extra-Budget Spending, Infrastructure Investment, and Effects on City Revenue Structure: Evidence from China

Skidmore, Mark, Michigan State University; and Eric Scorsone, Michigan Senate Fiscal Agency: Causes and Consequences of Fiscal Stress in Michigan Municipal Governments

Wallin, Bruce, Northeastern University; and Jeffrey Zabel, Tufts University: Property Tax Limitations and Local Fiscal Conditions: The Impact of Proposition 2½ in Massachusetts

The complete conference papers are available for free downloading on the Lincoln Institute Web site at www.lincolninst.edu/education/education-coursedetail.asp?id=720

Tao Ran es profesor en la Escuela de Economía de la Universidad de Renmin en China, y director del Centro Chino de Economía y Gobierno Público de dicha universidad. También es senior fellow no residente del Instituto Brookings. Su campo de especialización se centra en la urbanización de China y en la economía política de la transición económica, la reforma del sistema de registro de suelo y hogares, y los gobiernos locales y las finanzas públicas en la zona rural de China. Sus varias investigaciones han aparecido en las revistas academicas Journal of Comparative Economics, Journal of Development Studies, Land Economics, Urban Studies, Political Studies, China Quarterly y Land Use Policy.

El Dr. Tao recibió su PhD en economía en la Universidad de Chicago en 2002. Desde hace tiempo es fellow de investigación en el Centro de Desarrollo Urbano y Política del Suelo de la Universidad de Pekín (PKU)-Instituto Lincoln, y fue previamente un fellow Shaw de investigación en economía china del Instituto de Estudios Chinos de la Universidad de Oxford. Con fondos de PKU-Instituto Lincoln y de otras agencias, como la Fundación Nacional de Ciencias de China, lideró un equipo de investigación y comenzó una encuesta amplia sobre los migrantes urbanos y agricultores desposeídos en 12 ciudades de cuatro áreas urbanizadas principales de China: el delta del río Yangtzé (provincias de Jiangsu y Zhejiang), del delta del río Perla (provincia de Guangdong), la región de Chengdu-Chongqing (provincia de Sichuan y municipalidad de Chongqing) y el área de la bahía de Bohai (provincias de Hebei y Shandong). También está trabajando en un proyecto piloto de modelos de revitalización de pueblos urbanos en la municipalidad de Shenzhen y el delta del río Perla.

Land Lines: ¿Por qué es tan importante el estudio de economía política en China y su transición para el futuro del país?

Tao Ran: Como consecuencia de un crecimiento de casi el diez por ciento en las últimas tres décadas, China se ha convertido en la estrella brillante de la economía global del siglo XXI. La gente se maravilla de la transformación exitosa de un país del tercer mundo en la base manufacturera más grande del mundo y la segunda economía global, una evolución que sacó de la pobreza a 450 millones de personas. Sin embargo, a medida que China crece, enfrenta una brecha cada vez mayor de desigualdad de ingresos, corrupción y contaminación graves, e injusticia social que ha dejado a cientos de millones de migrantes temporales sin acceso a servicios públicos aceptables, y decenas de millones de agricultores desposeídos y mal pagados en transición a una economía urbana industrializada.

Mi investigación explora las fuentes institucionales del crecimiento rápido de China en las últimas décadas, así como las implicaciones, tanto negativas como positivas, de China —una autocracia efectiva y orientada al crecimiento, con grandes inversiones en infraestructura e industrias, exportaciones masivas de bienes manufacturados y políticas selectivas de intervención gubernamental e industrial— como un modelo alternativo para el mundo en vías de desarrollo. Creo que es esencial poder predecir lo que va a ocurrir en China en un futuro cercano, porque tendrá consecuencias importantes para el mundo en vías de desarrollo.

Land Lines: ¿Por qué cree que es importante estudiar el registro de suelo y hogares? ¿Qué nos dicen estos estudios sobre el estado actual de la estructura socioeconómica de China?

Tao Ran: China se encuentra inmersa en una revolución urbana, con un volumen masivo de migración del campo a la ciudad cada año de las últimas tres décadas. Alrededor de 200 millones de migrantes rurales están trabajando y viviendo en ciudades chinas. No obstante, bajo el persistente sistema hukou (registro de hogares), una mayoría de migrantes que están registrados en su lugar de origen se consideran “foráneos” o “población temporal” en sus nuevas ciudades de residencia. No tienen acceso a beneficios de asistencia social, viviendas públicas subsidiadas o escuelas públicas urbanas.

Sus dificultades se agravan por los patrones altamente distorsionados del uso del suelo. Normalmente, cuando los países se urbanizan, menos del 20 por ciento de los suelos de utilización nueva se usan para manufactura, dejando la mayoría del territorio para viviendas de la población migrante. Bajo el sistema actual de requisa y arriendo de suelo en China, los gobiernos locales arriendan todos los años alrededor del 40 por ciento de los suelos de utilización nueva para construir parques industriales, dejando sólo entre el 30 y 40 por ciento del área para fines residenciales.

Los sistemas vigentes del uso del suelo y del registro de hogares en China contribuyen asimismo a generar varias estructuras socioeconómicas duales. Además de la dicotomía sobradamente conocida ciudad-campo, también hay una estructura dual de residentes urbanos permanentes versus migrantes. Otra dualidad separa a los propietarios de los inquilinos urbanos, que han acumulado mucha menos riqueza. Como un 90 por ciento de los propietarios son residentes permanentes, y el 95 por ciento de los inquilinos son migrantes, estas estructuras duales crean una sociedad muy dividida.

Land Lines: ¿Qué problemas del uso del suelo enfrentará China en las próximas décadas?

Tao Ran: Muchas ciudades han construido parques industriales, o “fábricas estilo jardín”, que hacen un uso muy ineficiente del suelo. Las empresas industriales arriendan suelo a un precio extremadamente bajo y usan sólo una parte del mismo, dejando otras áreas sin desarrollar o asignadas para proyectos verdes a gran escala. Los gobiernos locales ofrecen poco suelo residencial y comercial, para poder maximizar sus ganancias, lo que produce mercados de suelo comercial/residencial con poca oferta, generando burbujas de precios en el sector inmobiliario. El rápido aumento de los precios de las viviendas urbanas y la formación de burbujas inmobiliarias a lo largo de la última década ha hecho imposible para la vasta mayoría de las poblaciones rurales migrantes poder acceder al inventario de viviendas en las ciudades. De hecho, incluso las personas que ingresan en la fuerza laboral con títulos universitarios descubren que actualmente los precios de las viviendas están fuera de su alcance. Claramente, el acceso económico a la vivienda se ha convertido en el principal desafío que hoy día enfrenta China.

Las consecuencias de la crisis financiera mundial de 2008 tuvieron un enorme impacto en China. El paquete de estímulo fiscal y financiero implementado por el gobierno central benefició principalmente a los gobiernos locales, que continuaron invirtiendo en todavía más parques industriales. Por lo tanto, la economía china ha experimentado un exceso de capacidad en infraestructura industrial y bienes de manufactura, como también burbujas más grandes en los precios de las viviendas en todos los niveles urbanos. Esta trayectoria es menos sustentable aún si se considera que China ya tiene un exceso de capacidad manufacturera y ha sufrido burbujas inmobiliarias antes de 2008. Dada la prác-tica éticamente dudosa de pedir dinero prestado a bancos del estado, y la ilusión fiscal de que la burbuja inmobiliaria continuará para siempre, las deudas de los gobiernos locales han llegado al nivel sin precedentes de 10 billones de RMB, la mitad de los cuales se acumuló después de 2009. Si no se reforman los sistemas de gobierno del suelo, el registro hukou y el financiamiento público local, la economía china se desacelerará de forma muy significativa. En el peor de los casos, la burbuja inmobiliaria explotará, lo que causará una crisis financiera y económica a gran escala.

Land Lines: ¿Cuáles son algunas de las consecuencias políticas de su investigación sobre gobiernos locales y finanzas públicas en las zonas rurales de China?

Tao Ran: China tiene que reformar sus sistemas de registro de suelo y hogares, para que los migrantes puedan acceder a viviendas económicas y servicios aceptables de educación pública en las ciudades. El suelo ha jugado un papel preponderante en el modelo de crecimiento de China en los últimos 15 años, pero también es responsable de los problemas económicos actuales. Desde mi punto de vista, un paquete de reformas centrado en el suelo y la urbanización es la mejor opción para crear un equilibrio entre las tasas de importación y exportación del país, para generar una enorme demanda interna y aliviar al mismo tiempo el problema de exceso de capacidad que aflige a muchas industrias chinas.

Yo propongo una estrategia gradual, que apunte a construir un sistema dual más equitativo. Bajo el sistema de regulación del suelo actual, la propiedad del suelo se divide entre urbana y rural; y mientras que los gobiernos urbanos tienen la autoridad para asignar áreas rurales para desarrollo urbano, los gobiernos rurales no tienen los derechos recíprocos. Esta discriminación ha privado a los residentes rurales de sus derechos de desarrollo inmobiliario, y ha llevado a la economía china por una trayectoria destructiva.

Una liberalización total, sin embargo, puede hacer explotar las burbujas inmobiliarias existentes, al ofrecer al mercado un gran volumen de suelo rural. Para reducir esta preocupación por parte de los gobiernos locales y de los propietarios de viviendas urbanas, es posible que China tenga que crear un mercado de propiedades en alquiler para los 200 millones de migrantes rurales que ya viven y trabajan en las ciudades. La mitad de ellos vive actualmente en dormitorios provistos por sus empleadores, y la otra mitad reside en viviendas construidas ilegalmente en pueblos urbanos sin buena infraestructura o acceso a servicios públicos, como educación para los hijos de los migrantes. Propongo una reforma que permitiría a las comunidades rurales en pueblos suburbanos de las ciudades que reciben a los migrantes que conviertan su suelo no agrícola en un mercado de vivienda urbano, bajo una condición: En los primeros 10 a 15 años, sólo podrían construir propiedades para ofrecer en régimen de alquiler. Después del período de transición, estas viviendas obtendrían derechos plenos y se podrían vender directamente en el mercado inmobiliario.

Land Lines: ¿Cuáles son las ventajas de este diseño?

Tao Ran: Al confinar inicialmente el suelo rural desarrollable al mercado de alquiler, se crea un colchón para el mercado inmobiliario existente y se evitan los pánicos bursátiles y que explote la burbuja inmobiliaria. La fusión posterior de estos dos mercados, sin embargo, enviaría a los especuladores una señal confiable de que los precios de las viviendas residenciales no crecerán más, y el gobierno central podría ir eliminando las regulaciones estrictas sobre el mercado inmobiliario impuestas desde 2010 para controlar la burbuja inmobiliaria. Este paquete de reformas contribuiría a un crecimiento saludable del mercado de vivienda. Más aún, el otorgamiento de derechos de desarrollo inmobiliario a las comunidades rurales –si bien restringidos durante el período de transición– abriría un canal legal para solicitar préstamos para el desarrollo inmobiliario.

Esta oportunidad generaría un auge en la construcción de viviendas en pueblos urbanos y áreas suburbanas, y estimularía la industria de la construcción, que tiene un exceso importante de capacidad. A diferencia de la burbuja de vivienda actual, este tipo de desarrollo inmobiliario es más beneficioso socialmente y económicamente sustentable. Los residentes rurales, particularmente aquellos que viven cerca de los centros urbanos, se beneficiarían directamente. Este crecimiento en el mercado de propiedades de alquiler también proporcionará viviendas asequibles para cientos de millones de trabajadores migrantes, lo que les permitiría que se asentaran en las ciudades de forma permanente. La urbanización tiene el potencial de distanciar la economía china del modelo impulsado por inversión.

Land Lines: ¿Cuál es la clave para el éxito de esta reforma?

Tao Ran: La actitud de los gobiernos locales es fundamental. Su preocupación sobre cómo generar ingresos es perfectamente legítima, y el paquete de reformas tiene que resolverla. Bajo el sistema actual, los gobiernos locales tienen demasiadas gastos, y no cuentan con ingresos adecuadas. Después de la reforma, tendrían un poder limitado de requisa de suelo, y se desharían de la gran cantidad de aranceles por arriendo de suelo y préstamos bancarios asociados con dicho poder. A largo plazo, las municipalidades deberían recaudar impuestos sobre la propiedad para generar una fuente estable de ingresos para el financiamiento público local. Dada la fuerte resistencia de los residentes adinerados y políticamente poderosos de las ciudades que han introducido programas piloto de impuestos sobre la propiedad, no es práctico esperar que este nuevo impuesto entre en vigor en poco tiempo.

Creo que otra fuente no explotada por los gobiernos locales es el suelo industrial subutilizado. De acuerdo con varios informes, el coeficiente de edificabilidad en los parques industriales es sólo de 0,3 a 0,4, aun en áreas desarrolladas de China. Si se negocia una reorganización, es posible duplicar el desarrollo del suelo y convertir parte del suelo industrial para uso residencial y comercial. Nuestras estimaciones muestran que los gobiernos locales saldrían beneficiados al renunciar a la potestad de requisa del suelo, y podrían usar estos ingresos para pagar deudas y evitar una crisis financiera.

En la etapa actual de desarrollo, ninguna reforma de la economía china será fácil. Nadie se debería hacer ilusiones sobre una solución rápida. Pero el paquete de reformas de mercado dual propuesto brinda una esperanza de alentar el consumo interno y aliviar el problema de exceso de capacidad en muchos sectores. Un factor particularmente favorable para esta reforma es el énfasis que ha puesto el nuevo gobierno en la urbanización. El primer ministro Li Keniana ha invertido muchos años en este tema y parece tener un interés genuino en lograr soluciones. Esta propuesta puede proporcionar una hoja de ruta realista para dichas reformas.

Land Lines: ¿Qué lecciones puede darnos China?

Tao Ran: El modelo chino genera crecimiento de forma efectiva. También produce varias consecuencias negativas, como el endeudamiento excesivo por el uso del suelo, los conflictos sociales debido a la requisa de suelo, daños medioambientales y burbujas inmobiliarias que suponen una carga para la población urbana. La lección china es que el gobierno es esencial para que un país crezca, pero ese mismo gobierno puede exagerar las cosas y, a largo plazo, generar distorsiones que dañan en última instancia la sostenibilidad de la economía y la sociedad.