The land market allocates land and access to urban amenities, and it does so with impressive efficiency. Yet, economists and planners continue to debate the extent to which the market fails to achieve broader social goals, how far regulation can offset for that failure, and even whether regulation results in land market outcomes being even farther from the socially desired outcome than would be the case without any regulation. To examine this debate and the underlying issues, more than 30 economists and planners met at the Lincoln Institute in July 2002 to encourage new policy-relevant analysis on land markets and their regulation, and to foster more fruitful communication between the disciplines.

At the center of the substantive debate was the basic question of regulation within a market economy and the unintended consequences that can result. The discussions touched upon many themes including gentrification, the use of public resources for private consumption, distributional issues, urban form and its regulation. If perspectives regarding market regulation differed between the two disciplines, so too did views regarding the strengths and limitations of the analytic tools that academics from different disciplines bring to such thorny problems. Among the challenges are the basic questions of how to define the problem, how to measure the current conditions in light of limited data, and how to interpret findings. Throughout the conference, the differences in the perspectives, assumptions, tools and references between planners and economists were ever present, in particular with regard to the role of politics in planning and policy making.

Unintended Consequences of Land Market Regulations

Despite their differences, concern for land markets and their centrality to social, political and economic life was the common focus of both economists and planners at the conference. They agreed that land markets are about far more than land. These markets have an important role in delivering life experiences and conditioning the welfare of the majority of people in developed and developing countries alike who live and work in cities. In addition, their regulation has both direct and indirect economic effects that extend into many areas of economic life and public policy. For example, the urban poor are likely to have worse schools and to experience higher levels of neighborhood crime because land markets capitalize the values of neighborhood amenities, such as better school quality and lower crime, thereby pricing poorer households into less desirable neighborhoods.

This power of land markets to reflect and capitalize factors that affect a household’s welfare was revealed in a study of impact fees levied on new development in Florida. Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy found that impact fees appear to be fully capitalized into house prices for owners of new and existing houses by redistributing the costs of new infrastructure provision from existing taxpayers to a reduced value of development land. In fast-growing Miami the cost of impact fees was borne by developers, yet offset by the increases they received in higher prices for new housing, “while buyers of new homes are compensated for a higher price by the property tax savings they experience. In contrast to the neutral effects that fees have on developers, landowners, and purchasers of new housing, impact fees provide existing homeowners a capital gain” (Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy, 26).

One complement to their story of Florida’s impact fees was illustrated in several other papers concerned with the unintended outcomes of regulation. British participants reported that Britain’s containment policy has generated higher densities within urbanized areas, but cities leapfrog out across their Greenbelts (or growth boundaries) to smaller satellite settlements; the consequence is that development becomes less contiguous and travel times increase. Villages become high-density suburbs surrounded by a sea of wheat: London in functional terms extends to cover most of southeastern England.

In a U.S. example based on an econometric simulation, Elena Irwin and Nancy Bockstael found that a clustering policy intended to preserve open space could instead backfire. Using Maryland data, they simulated the effects of a policy that was intended to preserve rural open space and found that it would instead accelerate development if “small to moderate amounts of open space are required to be preserved (specifically, 20 acres or less) and would slow the timing of development if larger amounts of open space are required to be preserved” (Irwin and Bockstael, 26). Their simulation results yield an interpretation that is highly nuanced and requires careful thought. That is, under certain conditions the cluster policy can backfire, while under other specific conditions the policy can yield an intended policy outcome.

These hypothetical clusters in Maryland may be echos of a real situation that Jean Cavailhès and his colleagues observed in the French countryside, where some urban dwellers moved to farm regions to create a mixed-use area that is neither entirely urban nor entirely rural. These former urbanites appear to value their proximity to a functioning rural landscape in exchange for longer commutes and (surprisingly) smaller residential lots. The authors hypothesize that these peri-urban dwellers benefit in different ways from living among the farmers.

In another example of the unintended consequences of regulations, Donald Shoup analyzed curbside parking. Many U.S. municipalities require developers to provide minimal parking per square foot of new commercial or, in some communities, residential space. The requirement for off-street parking, coupled with a systematic underpricing of curbside parking, has a double impact, according to Shoup. It imposes a substantial tax on affected developments (equivalent to up to 88 percent of construction costs), increases land taking, and means that public revenues annually lost an amount equal to the median property tax.

In these cases of unintended consequences of policy or regulatory interventions in the market, the authors argued for more careful design of both policies and regulations so state and local governments could reasonably achieve their policy goals. Despite the fact that the conference debate tended to pit regulation against the market, there was probably a tendency—if not full-fledged consensus—to favor market incentives and disincentives to achieve policy goals, rather than to rely strictly, or even largely, on regulation. Roger Bolton’s comments on Shoup’s paper cogently reflected this viewpoint. He said that Shoup’s work was valuable because it urges us to pay attention to a whole package of “important and related phenomena: inefficient pricing of an important good, curb parking; inefficient regulation of another good, privately owned off-street parking; and missed opportunities for local government revenue.”

Data and Measurement Challenges

Growth management and urban form were referenced extensively throughout the conference. The paper presented by Henry Overman, and written with three colleagues (Burchfield et al.) provided useful grounding to that conversation. They attempted to measure the extent of sprawl for the entire continental U.S. Using remote sensing data they calculated and mapped urban development and the change in urban land cover between 1976 and 1992. They defined sprawl as either the extension of the urban area, or leapfrog development, or lower-density development beyond the urban fringe. They concluded that only 1.9 percent of the continental U.S. was in urban use and only 0.58 percent had been taken for urban development in the 16-year period covered by the study. Furthermore, during this period, urban densities were mostly on the increase.

This study found development to be a feature of the “nearby urban landscape,” whether that was defined as close to existing development, or near highways or the coasts, and thus was perceived as encroaching on where people lived or traveled. The authors use this last observation to reconcile the apparent contradiction between their finding that less than 2 percent of the continental U.S. has been developed and the fact that containing and managing sprawl is at the center of policy agendas in many states and regions across the U.S. While relatively little land might have been consumed by new development in aggregate during the study period, many people see and experience this development on a daily basis and perceive it to represent significant change, often the kind of change they do not like.

The conference discussion touched upon some of the data questions raised by this work. The paper’s discussant, John Landis, noted some challenges he has faced in working with these and similar data to measure growth patterns in California. The estimates by Burchfield et al. are extremely low, possibly for technical reasons, according to Landis. Among the reasons is the difficulty in interpreting satellite images and the different outcomes that can occur when different thresholds are used for counting density, for example. That is, an area can be classified as more or less dense depending on what threshold the analysts establishes. “Ground-truthing” is required to remove some of the arbitrariness from the analysis, but this is an enormously costly undertaking.

Policy analysts are always faced with data limitations. Sometimes the problem is missing data, while other times it is data with questionable reliability. Yet, all too often researchers spend very little time paying attention to how serious that deficiency is for the policy problem at hand. When the available data is a very long time series with frequent intervals that relies on a well-structured and well-understood data collection method, and where few transformations occur between data collection and data use, most researchers and policy analysts would feel extremely comfortable interpolating one or two or even a handful of missing data points. Econometricians relying on data collected at regular intervals from government surveys frequently face this situation and are quite adept at filling in such “holes in the data.” In the world of limited data, that might be considered the best-case scenario.

At the other extreme we might have data that are collected using relatively new methods and that require significant transformation between collection and use. Data reliability likely decreases under these circumstances. Given the imperfect world in which we live, the answer is probably not to insist on using only the “best data.” However, researchers and policy analysts do have the obligation to use care in interpreting results based on weak data and to convey that weakness to their audience.

Another side of the limited data problem is the translation from concept to measure, and it explains why the conference participants spent so much time discussing “What is sprawl?” For researchers this question becomes “How does one define sprawl in such a way that one can measure it?” Burchfield et al. define sprawl as leapfrog or discontiguous urban development. Landis argues for “a more multi-faceted definition of sprawl, one that also incorporates issues of density, land use mix, and built-form homogeneity.”

Definitions are not trivial in policy analysis. If we cannot define the problem or the outcome, and we cannot measure it, how can we know if it is getting better or worse, and if our policies are having an impact? On the other hand, a very precise definition of a different but perhaps related concept may lead to unnecessary intervention. The new policy may improve the score on the measure but have little or no effect on the problem. For a variety of reasons (perhaps in part the customs and cultures within different disciplines) the economists at the conference tended to favor concepts that are simple and for which the data exist. On the other hand, the planners tended to favor concepts that are messy. In the end, one is left with weaknesses on both sides. The uni-dimensional definition, and therefore the uni-dimensional measure, may provide many of the desirable properties that allow statistical analyses. Multi-dimensional concepts are difficult to translate into measures. Which is better for policy making?

The Political Nature of Land Policy

Planning as a political activity was emphasized by several authors, notably Chris Riley (discussant of papers by Edwin Mills and Alan Evans), to emphasize the importance for economists to recognize this role and the constraints it imposes on significant change (particularly given the capacity of land markets to capitalize into asset values the amenities generated by planning policies themselves). Richard Feiock added there was also evidence that the forms of planning policies that communities selected (both the severity of such policies and the degree to which they relied on regulation in contrast to market instruments) could be largely accounted for by the political structure and socioeconomic and ethnic composition of those communities.

Participants reacted differently to the political nature of land policy and planning. For some this was problematic: it meant that the market was not being allowed to work. For others, it meant that the political process in a democracy was being allowed to work: the people had spoken and the policy reflected the expressed will of the body politic.

Reflections on Debate

The differences between economists and planners will continue, and differences among practitioners in different countries and even different parts of the same country (notably the large United States) can either stimulate or thwart future debates over the study of land market policies and implementation. Perhaps, though, the word debate itself thwarts our efforts. In debates, the debaters rarely change their minds. They enter the debate with their point of view firmly fixed and do not get “points” for admitting that their debating opponent taught them something or that they have consequently changed their own mind. However, one purpose of a professional conference is, indeed, for thoughtful people to consider their own assumptions and to be informed and changed by the points of view of others. In the future, perhaps debates will be supplanted with reflective conversation.

Paul Cheshire is professor of economic geography at the London School of Economics, England; Rosalind Greenstein is senior fellow and cochair of the Department of Planning and Development at the Lincoln Institute; and Stephen C. Sheppard is professor in the Department of Economics at Williams College, Massachusetts. They jointly organized the Lincoln Institute conference, “Analysis of Urban Land Markets and the Impact of Land Market Regulation,” on which this article is based.

Conference Papers

The conference participants whose papers are cited in this article are noted below. All conference papers and discussants’ comments are posted on the Lincoln Institute website (www.lincolninst.edu) where they can be downloaded for free

Burchfield, Marcy, Henry Overman, Diego Puga and Matthew A. Turner. “Sprawl?”

Cavailhès, Jean, Dominique Peeters, Evangelos Sékeris, and Jacques-François Thisse. “The Periurban City.”

Feiock, Richard E. and Antonio Taveras. “County Government Institutions and Local Land Use Regulation.”

Ihlanfeldt, Keith R. and Timothy Shaughnessy. “An Empirical Investigation of the Effects of Impact Fees on Housing and Land Markets.”

Irwin, Elena G. and Bockstael, Nancy E. “Urban Sprawl as a Spatial Economic Process.”

Shoup, Donald. “Curb Parking: The Ideal Source of Public Revenue.”

C. Lowell Harriss is Professor Emeritus at Columbia University, where he taught economics from 1938 until his retirement in 1981. He then served as executive director of the Academy of Political Science until 1987. He has been a consultant to and a member of numerous government commissions and boards of professional organizations. He has written and edited many books and hundreds of articles, and is the recipient of countless honors and awards. Dr. Harriss has been a valued associate of the Lincoln Institute since its founding in 1974, as a faculty member, research scholar, and board member. Joan Youngman, senior fellow and chairman of the Institute’s Department of Valuation and Taxation, spoke with him about his lifelong commitment to education, public service, and property taxation.

Joan Youngman: How does land value differ from improvement value as a property tax base?

Lowell Harriss: The significant factor with land is location, the unimproved condition of nature in the most fundamental economic sense. Whatever results from private or public investment and labor, such as streets, buildings, and so forth, is not part of land in this definition. Land differs from other productive resources because it is immobile and its quantity is fixed.

Land exists not because people produce it, but because it’s there by nature. The price one pays for land, as contrasted with other resources, has no role in creating supply. Land is also unique in that no two pieces are the same, so the kind of analysis appropriate for labor and capital with fungible aspects is not applicable to land.

Another important element is the ability to control land use–for example, to receive rent as payment for access, rather than because the owner created anything. The person who controls land use can serve a constructive function by directing it into better instead of poorer uses, and I think there should be the prospect of rewards for doing so. Market forces will indicate demand, and one interested in public policy hopes that the land will be used in the best possible ways. The owner of desirable land will get higher returns, but not because of anything he or she did to create it.

Almost any urban use illustrates this. Some thirty or forty years ago, I was walking down Park Avenue and I saw a very fine building in a key location, 64th Street, I think, housing some offices of the New York City Board of Education—much too valuable a location to be used for administrative purposes. I raised this point with someone in the school system, and he said that they were moving out. They had come to the same economic realization.

Any use of land prevents another use. Holding land idle or partially idle affects not only the owner but neighbors and society at large. Others will have to travel further to get to work or to the grocery store or to school. Land is so crucial, so important to life, that society will be better off if there are forces, market forces or governmental forces, inducing better rather than poorer uses.

JY: How can the tax system encourage better land use?

LH: A tax system that imposes higher taxes on land creates pressure on owners to make more productive use of their land. I don’t like the term “land value tax,” because it emphasizes the tax aspect. My focus over the years has been on reducing the tax rates on structures to induce more investment in improvements. I have not emphasized increasing the tax rates on land to increase pressure for better land use, but these can go together. If the tax system can create a built-in inducement, year in and year out, for better use of land, that will be a plus. I don’t want to be unduly skeptical about more direct land use regulation, but government is politics and the political pressures that affect government regulation do not always represent mankind at its best.

JY: How would you deal with past improvements to land, before the implementation of a land-based tax?

LH: I would just establish the tax on the current condition of the land. The past is past. We’re not talking about a tax on capital gains but a recurring tax on an immobile resource. Some of its current value does reflect prior capital investment, the same as for structures, but I don’t see how to make any differentiation for an annual tax on land value. As a practical matter we have no market for land the way it was hundreds of years ago.

Going forward, it would be desirable to distinguish the value of unimproved land from the value of capital improvements to the land, such as infrastructure and grading, that aren’t viewed commonly as “buildings” but that represent investment and effort. The tax system should not create obstacles to investment. I would certainly be open to learning more about what might be administratively feasible in that regard.

JY: What about the taxation of farms, forests, and open space?

LH: Well, this raises complicated concerns. On one hand, I think it would be good to have additional pressure on some owners of agricultural land to speed up nonagricultural development, especially in the urban fringe. On the other hand, decisions about land use are often irreversible. Covering more acres in Westchester County, where I live, with asphalt and buildings will affect drainage for years to come. I think if anything there should be bias against decisions that are costly in the long run and difficult to reverse if conditions change. But it’s also pretty clear that interests vary, and what is in the interest of farmers is not always in the interest of the public as a whole.

Land is a large part of farm investment, and anticipated future income is reflected in land prices. The market value of land does not necessarily reflect current cash flow, so if taxes are high they may constitute a substantial portion of farm income. I’m sometimes considered not very sympathetic to farmers, because I think they have undue political influence.

The effect of many state and federal programs to benefit farms will be capitalized into higher land values. The consumer will pay forever, and the benefits will go to the person who owned the land when the policy was established. This is not a new conclusion. It’s been in the literature since farm programs began in the 1930s, but it has not affected the political decision-making process. Congressman Barney Frank of Massachusetts asked why the family farm deserves more consideration than the family shoe store, and I agree with the implication of his question.

JY: What about two people who own identical parcels of land, side by side, but one has a small, older house and the other has a new commercial building or shopping center? Many people think it’s unfair to impose the same tax on both.

LH: There are real problems here, too, partly because of imperfections in the capital markets. The person with unimproved land, let’s say it’s a widow, might ideally get a reverse mortgage to realize cash income from her property. The logical thing at that stage of life is to consume capital, for example, by drawing down retirement accounts. We have a systematic market that enables us to live off of our capital when it’s in the form of financial investments, but it’s not that well developed for the real estate market.

I always want to be sympathetic with the person who is having trouble, but wise public policy cannot be made well by concentrating on the extreme cases. Society needs to deal both with the cases of human need and with other problems such as the pressures on land use. Those whose land has become valuable, not because of what they did, but because of their neighborhood, are lucky, even though they may not recognize it. We need separate instruments to deal with separate problems, such as the person whose tax bill goes up even when his cash income does not.

Another aspect of the question is that the property tax is not a personal tax and cannot be evaluated on the same grounds as, say, an income tax. To attempt to do so can mislead. A rich person may own no land and a person with very little cash may own a good deal of land. There are ways to deal with the cash-flow problem, such as circuit breakers that limit property taxes to a certain percentage of income or deferral of tax payments until the property is sold.

JY: Is speculation a special concern? Is everyone who holds property with the hope that it will rise in value a speculator?

LH: I’ve always been reluctant to use the term “speculation,” and I certainly would not say that public policy should penalize the speculator. But, to the extent that government plays a role, I would say its bias should be toward use rather than idleness, and tax policy also supports this view. There is a whole range of speculation, from an owner deciding not to sell a house this week because of hopes for a better price next week, to holding a plot of ground idle in downtown Manhattan, knowing that someone is going to offer a very high price for it eventually.

The developer is presumably a constructive element in the total process. I don’t think anyone really wants equilibrium, but something better than what would be equilibrium. More people live better by reasonable standards now than was the case 20 or 100 years ago, and the real estate developer has played a part in that process. Sometimes it’s fashionable to be disparaging of developers, but we owe a lot to them. Maybe we’ve overpaid some of them, but plenty of them have lost their shirts. It can be a very risky business.

JY: How should the tax system treat government-financed improvements to land?

LH: In New York City, for example, I don’t know how much of the cost of building and extending subways could be borne by taxing the increments of the land value in the neighborhood, but probably a good deal. It’s not going to slow down progress to use those land value increases to help finance the expansion of the subway system.

We need to distinguish, however, between year-in, year-out financing of government by taxes on land and more or less one-time charges. That is, if the subway system is extended, there will be immediate capital gains as well as a long-term increase in the property tax base. Each of these effects deserves consideration in public policy.

JY: What is the difference between someone who invests in a piece of land and then watches as the price of land rises and someone who invests in a stock and then watches the stock market rise?

LH: Well, as far as income taxation is concerned I would think they are the same, but for financing local government they’re very different. The land stays in place, yet the stockholder can move. The ability of the landowner and stockholder to pay may be the same, but that isn’t the only relevant consideration. In thinking about how to tax gains you need to take into account whether the taxpayer can move from the jurisdiction.

I think that taxing people annually to finance local government, based on their ownership of land, is good public policy. The effort to apply that same principle to intangibles was a complete failure in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, because you can’t tax people locally on the basis of resources that are so mobile.

The distinction here is not between earned and unearned income. For income tax purposes the tax is applied after a sale when the owners have realized their gain. But, to finance schools and other services you don’t want to rely on residents’ decisions about whether or not to sell their land. You want a permanent and steady source of tax revenue.

This is quite different from the question of unearned income, that is, whether or not the owner grew rich in his sleep. If the Astors became rich from owning land in Manhattan, but paid their property taxes year in and year out, well, so be it. I think that the property tax can take only a very limited account of differences in wealth. The administrative difficulties of a net wealth tax could be enormous. And the identification of a property tax with a tax on wealth or net worth is, I think, diverting and dangerous. It shifts attention from the goal of financing government to issues of personal status and relative position.

JY: Could you say more about the problem of jurisdictions competing for business by offering tax reductions?

LH: It seems to me there is no need for property tax exemptions on land. Special concessions may be appropriate for buildings, as an acceptable means of competition, but I’m dubious and favor broad reduction of taxes on structures. In any case, the land is not going to move. If you give concessions for land, they will tend to be capitalized into capital gains for the present owners. Under a two-rate land and buildings tax system, any concessions should be made on the basis of the variable resource, which is the building value. Inducements are not going to create more land, but they might create more structures. In this way, economic development incentives might be more effective under a land tax.

For many years, researchers have puzzled over the causes and consequences of voter-approved tax and expenditure limits (TELs), a fiscal rule that weakens the ability of elected officials to raise revenues or make expenditures.

Municipalities around the country face a daunting fiscal crisis. Federal stimulus assistance has expired, and many states have made significant cuts in aid to municipalities. Meanwhile property values have declined 31 percent since their 2006 peak according to the S&P/Case-Shiller national home price index.

It will take several years to know how this historic decline will affect property tax revenues, because changes in property tax bills significantly lag changes in market values. However, cities faced declines in general fund revenues of 2.5 percent in 2009, and approximately 3.2 percent declines in 2010 (Hoene 2009; Hoene and Pagano 2010). Municipal responses to revenue shortfalls have included making cuts to personnel (71 percent of cities), delaying or cancelling capital projects (68 percent), and making across the board cuts (35 percent) (McFarland 2010).

To avoid further cuts, municipalities will need to raise additional revenues. But with anti-tax sentiment running high, many cities and towns may try to avoid raising tax rates and look instead to increased reliance on fees and other alternative revenue sources. One alternative that has attracted the attention of many local officials recently is payments in lieu of taxes (PILOTs) by nonprofit organizations.

PILOTs are voluntary payments made by tax-exempt nonprofits as a substitute for property taxes. These payments typically result from negotiations between local government officials and individual nonprofits, but the exact arrangements vary widely. PILOTs can be formal, long-term contracts, routine annual payments, or irregular one-time payments. The payments can go into a municipality’s general fund, or be directed to a specific project or program. PILOTs are most frequently made by hospitals, colleges, and universities, but also by nonprofit retirement homes, low-income housing facilities, cultural institutions, fitness centers, and churches. Some such payments are not even called PILOTs, but are know as “voluntary contributions” or “service fees.”

Since 2000, PILOTs have been used in at least 117 municipalities in at least 18 states (Kenyon and Langley 2010). These payments are concentrated in the Northeast, and especially in Massachusetts where they have been made in 82 out of 351 municipalities (figure 1). It is hard to make definitive statements about trends in the use of PILOTs, because there is no comprehensive source that tracks them, but press accounts suggest growing interest in PILOTs since the early 1990s, with a noticeable uptick in recent years. Major multiyear agreements have recently been reached in Pittsburgh and Baltimore; commissions have studied PILOTs in Boston, New Orleans, and Providence; and many smaller municipalities have reached new agreements with local charities.

The Revenue Potential of PILOTs

The revenue potential of PILOTs varies across municipalities because of large differences in the impact of the charitable property tax exemption on their tax bases. Figure 2 shows that in 23 large U.S. cities the value of tax-exempt nonprofit property as a share of total property value ranged from 10.8 percent in Philadelphia to 1.9 percent in Memphis and El Paso. Similarly, a fiscal year 2003 study of 351 municipalities in Massachusetts found that if the tax exemption for charitable and educational nonprofits were removed, these organizations would account for more than 10 percent of the property tax levy in 18 municipalities and between 2.5 and 10 percent in another 68, but less than 1 percent of the tax levy in 179 municipalities (McArdle and Demirai 2004).

Since nonprofit property tends to be highly concentrated in a relatively small number of municipalities, especially central cities and college towns, PILOTs have the potential to be a very important revenue source for some municipalities, even if they are unlikely to play a significant role in financing local government in the majority of cities and towns. Table 1 looks at PILOTs in ten municipalities where they rarely account for more than 1 percent of total revenues, but the dollar figures are often significant.

The impact of the charitable property tax exemption on municipal budgets also depends on the degree of reliance on property taxes as a revenue source. Local governments with a heavier reliance on sales and excise taxes, user fees, or state aid are in a better position to deal with forgone property tax revenues through those other sources.

Collaboration on PILOT Agreements

In seeking PILOT agreements, local officials sometimes resort to adversarial pressure tactics, which can backfire and jeopardize important relationships between municipalities and nonprofits. A more collaborative approach is usually more successful when local officials work to build genuine support among nonprofits for a PILOT program that is rooted in shared interests and mutual dependence for each other’s long-term success.

Many large nonprofits like hospitals and universities are quite immobile, and other smaller nonprofits may be committed to serving their local communities even if they could relocate with relative ease. The long-term success of these organizations depends on the municipality’s success. Because population loss, crime, and crumbling infrastructure can imperil a nonprofit’s future, having a local government with the capacity to provide quality public services is in its own self-interest.

Similarly, nonprofits are often major employers and provide services and activities that attract people to a city and improve the quality of life for local residents. Thus, the success of these organizations is also crucial for a municipality’s future. Even if the nonprofits are tax-exempt, their presence can significantly expand the local tax base by attracting businesses and homeowners.

Recognition of these shared interests by both sides is crucial to reaching sustainable PILOT agreements. Private conversations between high-ranking municipal and nonprofit officials can help break down barriers that sometimes block PILOTs. To make the case for PILOTs, municipalities often appeal to the nonprofits’ sense of fairness and community responsibility—arguing that it is fair for nonprofits to pay for the cost of public services they consume, and that a contribution will directly benefit the community.

These conversations should also touch on what the nonprofits need for their future success. In practice, municipalities are often most successful in obtaining PILOTs when nonprofits need something from the local government, such as building permits or zoning changes. The quid pro quo nature of these agreements is often viewed negatively—as a form of extortion or special treatment. However, accommodating these requests is often in a municipality’s own interest.

For major nonprofit development projects, a shortened approval process with less red tape can cut overall costs significantly, and such discussions can result in more creative arrangements. For example, as part of a 20-year PILOT agreement with Clark University, the City of Worcester, Massachusetts agreed to work with the university to convert a short section of a street into a pedestrian area.

When local officials use more aggressive tactics to obtain PILOTs, such as trying to shame nonprofits into making payments or threatening to challenge their tax-exempt status in court, the organizations may become defensive and less willing to cooperate. Charitable nonprofits have a strong record of defending their property tax exemptions, so such divisive tactics are likely to leave a municipality with no PILOT, potentially significant legal fees, and a damaged reputation.

Problems with PILOTs

PILOTs have the potential to provide crucial revenue for municipalities with large nonprofit sectors, but there are many problems with these payments compared to more conventional taxes and fees.

First, at the same time that municipalities face a fiscal crisis caused by the recession, nonprofits face their own fiscal crisis due to declining endowment values and donations. In addition, government contracts—a major funding source for health and human service nonprofits—were cut, and some government entities are delaying contracts or payments. A 2009 survey found that 80 percent of nonprofit organizations were experiencing fiscal stress in the wake of the recession (Center for Civil Society Studies 2009). To nonprofits facing uncertain financial futures, it appears unfair for local governments to begin requesting PILOTs at this time (National Council of Nonprofits 2010).

Second, some degree of horizontal and vertical inequity in PILOT programs is almost inevitable, because their voluntary nature means there is no way to ensure that nonprofits with similar property values make comparable PILOTs. For example, even with Boston’s long-standing PILOT program, the four largest universities in the city made very different contributions in fiscal year 2009. Boston University paid $4,892,138 (8.53 percent of what it would pay in property taxes if taxable); Harvard University paid $1,996,977 (4.99 percent); Boston College paid $293,251 (1.92 percent); and Northeastern University paid only $30,571 (0.08 percent).

Third, PILOTs are a limited and frequently unreliable revenue source, rarely accounting for more than 1 percent of total revenues. This limited revenue potential must be weighed against some potentially significant costs associated with reaching PILOT agreements, such as upfront administrative costs, time spent by high-ranking officials negotiating agreements, or costs to obtain accurate assessments of exempt properties. PILOTs can also be an unreliable revenue source from one year to the next if they rely on short-term agreements.

Finally, the process used to reach PILOT agreements is often contentious and secretive, with contributions determined in an ad hoc manner lacking objective criteria. A collaborative approach can make PILOT requests less controversial, but reliance on private conversations also makes the process less transparent.

Systematic Programs to Mitigate Problems

Many of these problems with PILOTs can be mitigated if municipalities set up a systematic program that does not rely solely on case-by-case negotiation, especially for municipalities with a large number of nonprofits. A framework that applies to all organizations can provide guidance and bring consistency to the negotiations with individual nonprofits. The recommendations of Boston’s PILOT Task Force provide a concrete example (box 1).

Baltimore, Maryland: The city reached a $20 million six-year PILOT agreement with hospitals and universities in June 2010, with $5.4 million to be paid in each of the first two years. In return, the city dropped a proposed $350 fee per dorm and hospital bed, and protected hospitals and universities from increases in telecommunications and energy tax rates over the next six years (Walker and Scharper 2010).

Boston, Massachusetts: Beginning in January 2009, a task force of representatives from nonprofits, city government, business, labor, and the community met with a goal of making the city’s existing PILOT program more consistent. The final report has recommendations on key features of a systematic PILOT program: only nonprofits with property values exceeding a $15 million threshold are included in the program; the target PILOT for each institution is equal to 25 percent of what it would pay in property taxes, because roughly one-quarter of the city’s budget is devoted to core public services that benefit nonprofits; assessed value is used as a basis for the payments; and guidelines determine which types of services will count for community benefit offsets (City of Boston 2010).

New Orleans, Louisiana: A Tax Fairness Commission has been tasked with recommending changes to make the city’s tax system fairer and to broaden the tax base. While the commission may consider PILOTs, it is particularly interested in narrowing the nonprofit property tax exemption (Nolan 2011). Louisiana has a very broad charitable exemption compared to most states, with all properties owned by eligible institutions exempt from taxation regardless of use, including those not typically tax-exempt such as fraternal organizations, labor unions, and trade associations (Bureau of Government Research 1999).

Providence, Rhode Island: The mayor and city council members sought to increase the amount of PILOTs from the city’s four colleges and universities, but the Commission to Study Tax-Exempt Institutions (2010) recommended against renegotiating the 20-year $48 million PILOT agreement reached in 2003. Instead the commission recommended that the city should focus on forming partnerships with local nonprofits to foster economic growth, and the state should provide full funding of its PILOT program and provide Providence with a share of new income and sales tax revenues that result from nonprofit expansion.

Municipalities interested in establishing a systematic PILOT program should consider the following features.

Use a threshold level of property value or annual revenues to determine which nonprofits to include in the PILOT program. Excluding from PILOT requests certain types of nonprofits, such as religious organizations or small social service providers, may be a popular notion, but it can result in arbitrarily targeting some nonprofits while ignoring others. A more systematic policy with a threshold approach is easy to administer and will exclude only those nonprofits that do not meet the financial threshold to make significant contributions, rather than favor some organizations based on the nature of their activities.

Set a target for contributions that is justified. Instead of reaching an arbitrary dollar figure in negotiations, a target that applies to all nonprofits in the program can reduce horizontal inequities and may raise more revenue by creating the expectation for a certain contribution. For example, the target can be justified by estimating the cost of local public services that directly benefit nonprofits, such as police and fire protection and street maintenance.

Use a basis to calculate suggested payments. Using a basis with the rate set to reach the target contribution will also promote consistency. The fairest basis is the assessed value of exempt property, because the PILOT request will be proportional to the tax savings each organization receives from the property tax exemption. However, municipalities that want to avoid having to accurately assess tax-exempt properties can use another basis, such as the square footage of property or the organization’s annual revenues.

Include community benefit offsets, so nonprofits can reduce their target cash PILOTs in return for providing certain public services for local residents. Charitable nonprofits are typically more willing to provide in-kind services than to make PILOTs, and are well positioned to leverage their existing expertise and resources to provide needed services. For example, nonprofit hospitals can set up free health clinics, and universities can establish after-school tutoring programs. Local officials should be clear and consistent about which services are most needed by local residents and will count for community benefit offsets, and should rely on nonprofits to estimate the cash value of these donated in-kind services.

Reach long-term PILOT agreements. Both municipalities and nonprofits are better off with a long-term approach that allows them to build predictable payments into their respective budgets. Additionally, because PILOT requests can require considerable time to negotiate, both parties will benefit from reaching an agreement and then moving on to focus on their primary missions and perhaps other partnerships to serve the community. Several municipalities have 20- or 30-year PILOT agreements in place.

Alternatives to PILOTs

Given some of the common problems with PILOTs, municipalities with large nonprofit sectors that face revenue shortfalls may want to consider alternative revenue-raising measures.

Increase reliance on traditional user fees or special assessments. This alternative may be the most palatable in the current anti-tax climate. One consideration favoring this option is that nonprofits are typically not exempt from these charges, so increasing reliance on such sources will obtain revenue from a broad group of entities, including tax-exempt nonprofits. For example, a municipality could finance garbage collection through a fee instead of the property tax, or use special assessments to pay for sewer hookups in new subdivisions.

Establish municipal service fees. Some municipalities have carved out specific services that are normally funded through property taxes and instead charged nonprofits a fee for the service. These fees may or may not be assessed solely against tax-exempt nonprofits, and they often use a basis for the payments related to the size of the property rather than the assessed value. For example, Rochester, New York, has a local works charge to fund snowplowing and street repair. It is applied to both taxable and tax-exempt organizations using the property’s street frontage as the basis. Minneapolis, Minnesota, has a street maintenance fee that also uses square footage as the basis, but is only charged to nongovernmental tax-exempt properties.

Develop agreements for needed services. Local officials can decide not to pursue cash PILOTs, but instead develop formal partnerships with nonprofits to provide specific services for local residents or work together to foster economic development. Direct provision of needed services, sometimes known as services in lieu of taxes or SILOTs, will help the fiscal situation of the municipality in the short run, while joint efforts to foster economic development can have significant long-run benefits.

Expand the tax options for municipalities. This final alternative would require a change in state law in many instances. Some municipalities across the country have the ability to levy sales taxes, special excise taxes such as hotel taxes, income taxes, or payroll taxes. But most cities in the Northeast do not have these alternative tax sources, and are especially reliant on the property tax, which can be problematic if the tax-exempt sector is large or growing rapidly.

Conclusion

PILOTs have the potential to provide crucial revenue for municipalities that have a significant share of total property value owned by tax-exempt nonprofits, both as a stop-gap in the current municipal fiscal crisis and in the future. However, PILOTs rarely account for more than 1 or 2 percent of municipal revenues, so expecting these payments to eliminate local government deficits is unrealistic. Furthermore, singling out nonprofits to help address a municipal fiscal crisis is unfair since they face their own challenges due to the recent recession.

Local officials who do want to pursue PILOT agreements must tread carefully if they want to avoid some common pitfalls. First, PILOT requests can be highly contentious when local officials resort to heavy-handed pressure tactics to reach agreements. It is preferable for local officials to work collaboratively with nonprofit leaders to craft PILOT agreements that serve their mutual interests. Second, the voluntary nature of PILOTs limits the revenue potential of these agreements, results in inconsistent treatment of nonprofits, and leads to other problems. Municipalities with a large number of nonprofits can mitigate these problems by establishing a systematic PILOT program to provide guidance and bring consistency to their negotiations with individual nonprofits.

About the Authors

Daphne A. Kenyon is a visiting fellow in the Lincoln Institute’s Department of Valuation and Taxation and principal of D. A. Kenyon & Associates, Windham, New Hampshire.

Adam H. Langley is a research analyst in the Lincoln Institute’s Department of Valuation and Taxation and a master’s student in economics at Boston University.

References

Bureau of Government Research. 1999. Property tax exemption and assessment administration in Orleans parish. New Orleans, LA.

Center for Civil Society Studies. 2009. Impact of the 2007-09 Economic Recession on Nonprofit Organizations. Communique No. 14. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University for Policy Studies. June 29.

City of Boston. 2010. Mayor’s PILOT task force: Final report and recommendations. December.

Commission to Study Tax-Exempt Institutions. 2010. A call to build the capital city partnership for economic growth: Report to the Providence City Council from the Commission to Study Tax-Exempt Institutions. Providence, RI. November.

Hoene, Christopher W. 2009. City budget shortfalls and responses: projections for 2010-2012. Washington, DC: National League of Cities.

Hoene, Christopher W. and Michael A. Pagano. 2010. Research brief: City fiscal conditions in 2010. Washington, DC: National League of Cities.

Kenyon, Daphne A. and Adam H. Langley. 2010. Payments in lieu of taxes: Balancing municipal and nonprofit interests. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Lipman, Harvy. 2006. The value of a tax break. The Chronicle of Philanthropy 19(4): 13.

McArdle, Regina, and Donna Demirai. 2004. A study of charitable and educational property tax exemptions. City and Town, January. Boston: Massachusetts Department of Revenue, Division of Local Services.

McFarland, Christiana. 2010. State of America’s cities survey on jobs and the economy. Washington, DC: National League of Cities.

National Council of Nonprofits. 2010. State budget crises: Ripping the safety net held by nonprofits. Washington DC. March 16.

Nolan, Bruce. 2011. N.O. Tax Fairness Commission begins rethinking property taxes. The Times-Picayune. February 3.

Walker, Andrea K., and Julie Scharper. 2010. Baltimore City Council committee backs $15 million in new taxes; deal with hospitals and universities announced for $20 million more. Baltimore Sun. June 10.

La conversión del suelo de producción agrícola a desarrollo urbano e industrial es uno de los procesos de cambio críticos en las economías en vías de desarrollo que experimentan la industrialización, urbanización y globalización. Los cambios en el uso del suelo urbano que están ocurriendo en China han atraído la atención de muchos académicos, especialmente en vista de las grandes reformas económicas, el significativo crecimiento económico y los profundos cambios estructurales que han tenido lugar en las últimas tres décadas. La transición de una economía planificada a una economía de mercado, y de un gobierno provincial y municipal autoritario a un tipo de gobierno más descentralizado ha generado un nuevo marco institucional para los cambios del uso del suelo (Lin y Ho 2005).

La opinión general es la de calificar el cambio del uso del suelo como resultado del crecimiento económico y de los cambios estructurales. Este punto de vista está alineado con el modelo de crecimiento neoclásico en el que el suelo cumple un papel cada vez menor en el crecimiento económico. No obstante, estos cambios en el uso del suelo pueden ser tanto la consecuencia del crecimiento económico como los factores impulsores de dicho crecimiento (Bai, Chen y Shi 2011; Ding y Lichtenberg 2011).

Pero la realidad resulta mucho más compleja. En lugar de estar impulsada por una población en crecimiento, la expansión del suelo urbano en China está motivada por el financiamiento de suelo, en virtud del cual los gobiernos municipales recaudan ingresos y atraen inversiones mediante el arrendamiento y desarrollo de terrenos. Como resultado, la política urbana centrada en el suelo se ha identificado con una de las fuerzas impulsoras más importantes de la espectacular expansión de las ciudades desde mediados de la década de 1990 (Lin 2007). La oferta de suelos agrícolas para fines no relacionados con la agricultura permite de hecho al gobierno municipal “matar varios pájaros de un tiro” (Ping 2011). En consecuencia, el desarrollo del suelo fomenta el crecimiento económico, especialmente en áreas urbanizadas.

Los cambios en el uso del suelo en China también se ven afectados en gran manera por las políticas de oferta de terrenos, que se han visto ajustadas en forma regular a fin de suplir la demanda del desarrollo económico. La oferta ilegal de terrenos es una de las causas principales de una inversión excesiva y descontrolada, que se produce cuando el gobierno municipal no ofrece terrenos a las personas que utilizan el suelo de acuerdo con los planes de uso del suelo en curso o después del permiso definitivo del gobierno central. Como resultado, el gobierno central comenzó a utilizar las políticas de suelo como herramienta fundamental del control macroeconómico nacional a fines del año 2003.

Entre otras medidas, la transferencia de terrenos se ha llevado a cabo mediante subastas o licitaciones desde 2004, y la política sobre oferta de terrenos dio un giro desde el control de la cantidad al control estructural desde 2006. Los índices sobre el uso del suelo distribuidos por el gobierno central a los gobiernos municipales sólo hacían hincapié en la cantidad de terrenos antes de 2006; sin embargo, en la actualidad, la distribución de los usos del suelo en categorías la realiza el gobierno central, que define, incluso, hasta la intensidad del uso del suelo.

Este legado puede observarse en la decisión del Consejo de Estado de establecer el sistema altamente centralizado de Supervisión Estatal del Suelo (SES) en 2006. Se crearon nueve oficinas regionales nuevas, encargadas de investigar la oferta ilegal de terrenos en todo el país (Tao y otros 2010). La nueva política de suelo ha representado un papel activo en la mejora del uso del suelo, mediante la prohibición de arrendamiento de suelo para proyectos que no se encuentren en línea con la política industrial nacional, los planes de desarrollo y las normas de ingreso. Con posterioridad a la introducción de estas reformas y gracias a un estricto control, se ha reducido significativamente la cantidad de suelo ofrecido de manera ilegal, mientras que el PIB generado por unidad de suelo desarrollable ha aumentado sustancialmente (Centro de Derecho sobre Recursos de Suelo y Mineros de China 2007). Se espera que esta estricta política de suelo tenga un impacto significativo en el patrón espacial del uso del suelo y tenga efectos sobre la relación existente entre los cambios en el uso del suelo y el crecimiento económico en China.

Cambios en los patrones de uso del suelo en China

La política de suelo en China ha sufrido cambios drásticos desde 2004, por lo que podría también esperarse un patrón diferente del uso del suelo desde entonces. En base a los datos oficiales a nivel de condado de 2004 a 2008, examinamos los cambios en el uso del suelo de las ciudades a nivel de prefectura y analizamos la relación espacial entre los cambios en el uso del suelo y el crecimiento económico. Los datos oficiales sobre cambios en el uso del suelo se dividen en varias categorías de uso del suelo dentro de tres niveles todos los años. El primer nivel incluye el suelo agrícola, el suelo para construcción y el suelo sin utilizar. El segundo nivel incluye diez categorías de utilización del suelo. El tercer nivel incluye 52 subcategorías.

La tabla 1 muestra los cambios en el uso del suelo a nivel nacional de 2004 a 2008, período durante el cual se reconvirtió una mayor cantidad de suelo para usos de construcción, mientras que la cantidad de suelo agrícola y suelo sin utilizar disminuyó. Entre las categorías de suelo agrícola, el suelo para pastoreo y el suelo cultivado se redujeron en 12,69 millones de mu (0,85 millones de hectáreas) y 11,27 millones de mu (0,75 millones de hectáreas), respectivamente. El suelo sin utilizar se redujo en 17,91 millones de mu (1,19 millones de hectáreas).

Debido a las recientes y rápidas industrialización y urbanización, no es de sorprender que las reconversiones de suelo que se llevaron a cabo a mayor velocidad en China hayan sido las destinadas para uso de construcción, que sumaron 18,83 millones de mu (1,26 millones de hectáreas). En la categoría de asentamientos y emplazamientos industriales y mineros, las ciudades, las ciudades designadas y los emplazamientos industriales y mineros fueron los que experimentaron una expansión del suelo más rápida, llegando a tasas de crecimiento del 19,61 por ciento, 13,33 por ciento y 12,42 por ciento, respectivamente, mientras que la superficie de suelo destinada a asentamientos rurales disminuyó. Asimismo, grandes cantidades de suelo se reconvirtieron para su utilización en el transporte, particularmente para la construcción de autopistas.

El presente análisis a nivel nacional oculta diferentes variaciones espaciales en los cambios en el uso del suelo en provincias y regiones concretas (figura 1). Así, analizamos los cambios en el uso del suelo a nivel provincial, centrándonos en los cambios acaecidos en el suelo cultivado, el suelo urbano (que incluye ciudades y pueblos designados), los emplazamientos industriales y mineros autónomos, los asentamientos rurales y el suelo para transporte destinado a autopistas.

La figura 2 muestra que la pérdida de suelo cultivado se dio principalmente en la región este y central de China. El crecimiento económico, la urbanización y la industrialización se han acelerado en las provincias de Hebei, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Guangdong y Guangxi, donde la mayor parte del suelo cultivado se reconvirtió con fines urbanos, industriales y de transporte. Las provincias de Shanxi, Shaanxi, Chongqing y Sichuan también experimentaron una rápida reconversión de su suelo cultivado para fines de actividades no relacionadas con la agricultura. Dichas provincias se encuentran en el cinturón geográfico de transición en China, donde el suelo cultivado es la mejor opción a la hora de realizar proyectos de construcción y desarrollo. Por el contrario, las provincias del interior, tales como Tíbet, Qinghai, Xinjiang, Mongolia interior y Heilongjiang, experimentaron ciertos incrementos en el suelo cultivado.

El suelo destinado a asentamientos rurales se ve influenciado tanto por las nuevas políticas sobre el campo y el crecimiento de los ingresos rurales. El aumento en los ingresos ha tenido un impacto sobre la reconversión del suelo para asentamientos rurales en las provincias del este, como Guangdong, Fujian, Zhejiang, Guangxi, Hebei y Tianjin, y en ciertas provincias del interior, como Heilongjiang, Mongolia interior, Xinjiang, Qinghai, Tíbet, Yunnan, Guizhou, Hubei y Shanxi. Sin embargo, algunas provincias experimentaron descensos significativos en la cantidad de terrenos utilizados para asentamientos rurales, particularmente en Jiangsu, Jiangxi y Anhui. Este descenso puede tener relación con las nuevas políticas sobre el campo, que literalmente han obligado a los campesinos a mudarse a las ciudades.

La urbanización y la industrialización son los principales motores de la expansión del suelo no destinado a usos agrícolas en China. La tasa de urbanización creció del 40,50 por ciento al 45,68 por ciento entre 2004 y 2008, período en el que todas las provincias experimentaron una expansión del suelo urbano e industrial (figura 3). No obstante, la mayor parte de la expansión del suelo urbano se dio al sur del río Yangtze. En el norte, sólo Shandong, Anhui y Jiangsu experimentaron cambios importantes en el suelo urbano e industrial.

El rápido crecimiento de la cantidad de suelo utilizado para emplazamientos industriales y mineros se observa principalmente en las provincias del este, tanto en términos de cambios absolutos como relativos, en concreto en Fujian, Jiangsu, Zhejiang y Hebei (figura 4). Con tasas de crecimiento relativamente menores, Guangdong, Shandong y Liaoning experimentaron también la reconversión de una gran cantidad de suelo para emplazamientos industriales y mineros. Las provincias de Mongolia interior, Qinghai y Tíbet en el oeste del país experimentaron un rápido crecimiento de terrenos para emplazamientos industriales y mineros, aunque se observó un bajo crecimiento absoluto.

De 2004 a 2008, China dio un gran impulso al desarrollo de redes de transporte mediante la construcción de nuevos ferrocarriles y autopistas para sostener el crecimiento económico. A nivel nacional, el suelo destinado al transporte creció cerca de 10 por ciento durante dicho período. En muchas provincias se observó un crecimiento más rápido en la cantidad de suelo utilizado para el transporte que en el país en su conjunto, incluyendo Mongolia interior, Hebei, Qinghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Chongqing, Hubei, Anhui, Jiangxi y Guangxi. La confiscación de terrenos para construir autopistas se concentró principalmente en las provincias del este, y los mayores aumentos absolutos se dieron en las provincias de Zhejiang, Jiangsu y Hebei.

En general, China ha experimentado cambios muy importantes en el uso del suelo, en concreto en las provincias del este y en algunas de la región central. El patrón espacial de cambios en el uso del suelo es coherente con el cambio espacial del crecimiento económico, ya que las provincias del este gozan de ventajas institucionales y de ubicación y economías de aglomeración. Estas provincias han atraído la mayor parte de las inversiones extranjeras, particularmente aquellas relacionadas con las industrias que utilizan el capital y la tecnología de forma intensiva, y son las exportadoras líderes de los productos chinos.

La aceptación dentro de la Organización Mundial de Comercio ha redundado en aún mayores beneficios para las industrias ubicadas en la región este de China, ya que tienen mayor acceso a los mercados internacionales. Por otro lado, a medida que las industrias continúan aglomerándose, la región este ha experimentado un aumento en los costos del suelo, de la mano de obra y del medio ambiente, obligando a algunas industrias tradicionales a mudarse a las provincias centrales. Algunas de estas áreas recientemente han atraído inversiones y han experimentado un crecimiento económico más rápido, lo que elevó su nivel de importancia entre las economías regionales de China.

Correlaciones entre los cambios en el uso del suelo y el crecimiento económico

A fin de investigar la relación existente entre los cambios en el uso del suelo y el crecimiento económico de forma sistemática en todas las ciudades y provincias, calculamos los coeficientes de correlación entre la tasa de crecimiento del PIB de 2005 a 2009 y la tasa de cambios en diferentes categorías de suelo. La extensión de dicha correlación puede depender de diferentes factores económicos, de ubicación e institucionales. Analizamos el impacto que tiene el tamaño de la ciudad, la ubicación, la estructura industrial, la cantidad de inversiones extranjeras directas (IED) y las limitaciones en la oferta de terrenos sobre la relación existente entre los cambios en el uso del suelo y el crecimiento económico. Los coeficientes de correlación se calculan además utilizando submuestras de las ciudades clasificadas según dichos factores.

Los resultados inesperados muestran que sólo existen unos pocos, y pequeños, coeficientes de correlación significativos entre la tasa de cambios en el uso del suelo y la tasa de crecimiento económico (He, Huang y Wang 2012). Los cambios en el suelo destinado a otros tipos de transporte (tales como aeropuertos, puertos y ductos) poseen un coeficiente significativamente positivo. Los coeficientes de correlación para suelo urbano, emplazamientos industriales y mineros, ferrocarriles y autopistas resultaron apenas significativos.

Algunas evidencias muestran que el tamaño de la ciudad, la ubicación geográfica, la situación fiscal, la oferta de terrenos y las IED realizadas pueden moderar la correlación existente entre los cambios en el uso del suelo y el crecimiento económico. Por ejemplo, la expansión del suelo urbano se relaciona con el crecimiento económico de manera positiva en la región central de China, pero de manera negativa en las regiones del este y el oeste. Los emplazamientos industriales y mineros autónomos aumentan significativamente junto con el crecimiento económico en el oeste de la China. Sin embargo, en general, la correlación entre la tasa de cambios en el uso del suelo y el crecimiento económico es algo débil.

Dado que el suelo puede tomarse como un factor en la función productora, la cantidad de suelo puede contribuir en forma directa al crecimiento del PIB. Calculamos los coeficientes de correlación entre el crecimiento absoluto del PIB de 2005 a 2009 y los cambios absolutos en el uso del suelo de 2004 a 2008 a fin de analizar esta relación y descubrir si presentan una estrecha correlación. A nivel nacional, la reconversión de una mayor cantidad de suelo cultivado para fines no relacionados con la agricultura contribuye significativamente al crecimiento absoluto del PIB, con un coeficiente de correlación de -0,26. Una mayor cantidad de suelo para uso urbano y para fines industriales y mineros se relaciona en forma significativa y positiva con los aumentos en el PIB.

La existencia de coeficientes de correlación significativos entre los cambios en el uso del suelo y el crecimiento económico sugiere que el suelo ha sido un importante factor impulsor del crecimiento económico, aunque dicho aporte positivo se ve moderado por diferentes factores, tales como el tamaño de la ciudad, la ubicación, la estructura industrial, la situación fiscal y la utilización de IED. Se observa que la reconversión de suelo cultivado para fines no relacionados con la agricultura contribuye al crecimiento económico, especialmente en ciudades de más de 5 millones de habitantes, que realizaron IED por más de US$200 millones, y que poseen mayores limitaciones en el suelo para fines agrícolas, un dominio de la industria secundaria y una ubicación en la región central de China.

Claramente, el suelo no agrícola es más productivo que el suelo cultivado en las ciudades grandes e industriales. En los últimos años, a medida que la implementación de políticas del gobierno central se centró en el desarrollo de la región central de China, las provincias del interior han atraído mayores inversiones, tanto nacionales como extranjeras, y han experimentado un rápido crecimiento económico a medida que el suelo cultivado se ha ido reconvirtiendo para usos urbano e industrial.

En términos comparativos, la expansión del suelo urbano posee una mayor correlación con el crecimiento del PIB en las ciudades más pequeñas y en aquellas ubicadas en el interior. Estos tipos de ciudades tienen más probabilidades de depender del arrendamiento de suelos a fin de generar ingresos municipales, ya que enfrentan mayores limitaciones fiscales. En dichas áreas, la acumulación de capital derivada del arrendamiento de suelos es una típica estrategia de desarrollo municipal. Además, la expansión del suelo urbano cumple una importante función para estimular el crecimiento económico cuando las limitaciones fiscales son mayores, la oferta de terrenos se encuentra estrictamente controlada, dominan las industrias terciarias y se utilizan más inversiones extranjeras. La expansión del suelo industrial también contribuye de manera significativa al crecimiento económico, especialmente en las ciudades que tienen más limitaciones fiscales y más actividades industriales.

La reciente explosión experimentada en el desarrollo de infraestructura del transporte también ha contribuido al crecimiento económico. El aumento del suelo para construir autopistas ha estimulado el crecimiento económico sin ningún tipo de límites. Las ciudades ubicadas en las regiones del oeste y aquellas que presenten un bajo nivel de recaudación fiscal son las que más se benefician de las nuevas autopistas, mientras que la expansión del ferrocarril se relaciona en menor medida con el crecimiento económico. La construcción de otros tipos de infraestructura de transporte (aeropuertos, puertos, ductos) ha representado un papel fundamental para facilitar el crecimiento económico en ciudades más pequeñas y ubicadas hacia el este, así como también en aquellas ciudades cuyas economías se encuentran dominadas por las industrias de servicios.

El análisis de correlación ofrece pruebas claras que demuestran que el aumento de suelo urbano, industrial y para fines de transporte se relaciona de forma significativa y positiva con el crecimiento económico. La reconversión de suelo cultivado ha contribuido a la expansión económica en varias regiones de China; no obstante, la importancia de la ampliación del suelo no destinado a actividades agrícolas en función del crecimiento económico se encuentra moderada por condiciones sociales, económicas y geográficas.

Conclusión y debate

Desde la implementación de su reforma económica, China ha perseguido un modelo de crecimiento basado en el uso intensivo de recursos que ha obligado al suelo a cumplir un papel fundamental en el sostenimiento de su rápido crecimiento económico. Esto ha dado como resultado una gran oferta de suelo desarrollable y una rápida reconversión de suelos agrícolas en suelos no relacionados con la agricultura. En China, el suelo no es sólo el resultado del crecimiento económico sino también su motor.

La conversión del suelo cultivado para fines no agrícolas se ha concentrado en las regiones del este y del centro del país. Con la implementación de nuevas estrategias de desarrollo del campo y la imposición de limitaciones más estrictas en cuanto a la oferta de terrenos, China ha experimentado una reducción de los asentamientos rurales en la mayor parte de la región central y noreste. La expansión del suelo urbano e industrial ha dominado los cambios del uso del suelo en todo el país. El desarrollo del transporte, incluyendo nuevas autopistas, ferrocarriles, aeropuertos, puertos y ductos, también ha sido una de las principales causas de consumo de terrenos en los últimos años, particularmente en las regiones este y central.

El análisis de componentes principales en base a los datos sobre cambios en el uso del suelo de las ciudades a nivel de prefectura indicó una significativa variación espacial en los cambios en el uso del suelo entre las ciudades chinas y demuestra que tienen una autocorrelación espacial. El análisis de correlación también demostró una débil relación entre la tasa de crecimiento del PIB y la tasa de cambios en el uso del suelo. Sin embargo, en términos absolutos los cambios en el uso del suelo y el crecimiento del PIB presentan una fuerte correlación, lo que indica que la cantidad de terrenos constituye un factor fundamental en el crecimiento económico.

Por lo general, las teorías occidentales sobre crecimiento económico consideran que el suelo cumple una función marginal en el crecimiento económico. Nuestro análisis exploratorio sugiere que, en China, se da la situación contraria. A medida que China se urbaniza, se industrializa y se globaliza, va experimentando cambios significativos en el uso del suelo que presentan una correlación con el crecimiento económico. Esta relación significativa se asocia a los particulares sistemas de propiedad estatal del suelo y de derechos de uso del suelo en China. Como tal, el suelo puede utilizarse como una poderosa herramienta de intervención macroeconómica. El arrendamiento a largo plazo de derechos de utilización del suelo incentiva a los gobiernos locales a vender terrenos para generar ingresos totales que posteriormente se utilizan para financiar el desarrollo urbano e industrial y la provisión de infraestructura.

En consecuencia, el suelo ha cumplido una función fundamental en el rápido crecimiento económico de China. Sin embargo, este tipo de urbanización e industrialización basada en el suelo ya ha causado graves tensiones sociales, una degradación del medioambiente y fluctuaciones económicas. Los ingresos totales generados por el arrendamiento de suelo no son sustentables, si se tiene en cuenta que, aún siendo tan extensa, China posee una limitada oferta de suelo. Puede esperarse que el papel del suelo como factor impulsor del crecimiento económico se reduzca a medida que China experimente gradualmente un avance industrial.

Sobre los autores

Canfei He es profesor asociado en la Facultad de Ciencias Urbanas y Ambientales de la Universidad de Pekín, además de director asociado del Centro de Desarrollo Urbano y Políticas de Suelo de la Universidad de Pekín y el Instituto Lincoln en Beijing.

Zhiji Huang es estudiante de doctorado en la Facultad de Ciencias Urbanas y Ambientales de la Universidad de Pekín y del Centro de Desarrollo Urbano y Políticas de Suelo de la Universidad de Pekín y el Instituto Lincoln en Beijing.

Weikai Wang es estudiante de posgrado en la Facultad de Ciencias Urbanas y Ambientales de la Universidad de Pekín y del Centro de Desarrollo Urbano y Políticas de Suelo de la Universidad de Pekín y el Instituto Lincoln en Beijing.

Referencias

Bai, X., J. Chen y P. Shi. 2011. Landscape urbanization and economic growth in China: Positive feedbacks and sustainability dilemmas. Environmental Science and Technology 46: 132–139.

Centro de Derecho sobre Recursos de Suelo y Mineros de China. 2007. The evolution of land policy’s involvement in macro-control policies of China. China Land 6, 53–56 (en chino).

Ding, C. y E. Lichtenberg. 2011. Land and urban economic growth in China. Journal of Regional Science 51(2): 299–317.

He, Canfei, Zhiji Huang y Weikai Wang. 2012. Land use changes and urban economic growth in China: An exploratory analysis. Documento de trabajo. Beijing: Centro de Desarrollo Urbano y Políticas de Suelo de la Universidad de Pekín y el Instituto Lincoln.

Lin, G. C. S. 2007. Reproducing spaces of Chinese urbanization: New city-based and land-centered urban transformation. Urban Studies 44 (9): 1827–1855.

Lin, G. C. S. y S. P. S. Ho. 2005. The state, land system, and land development processes in contemporary China. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 95(2): 411–436.

Ministerio de Suelo y Recursos. 2008. Land use change survey data. República Popular China.

Ping, Y. C. 2011. Explaining land use change in a Guangdong county: the supply side of the story. The China Quarterly 2107: 626–648.

Tao, R., F. Su, M. Liu y G. Cao. 2010. Land leasing and local public finance in China’s regional development: Evidence from prefecture level cities. Urban Studies 47(10): 2217–2236.

Como consecuencia del colapso en el mercado inmobiliario y la Gran Recesión –que provocaron un aumento sustancial de ejecuciones hipotecarias residenciales y a menudo abruptas caídas de los precios de las viviendas, lo cual probablemente dio lugar a ejecuciones hipotecarias adicionales– muchos observadores especularon sobre si los gobiernos locales iban a sufrir consecuentemente pérdidas significativas en la recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad. Si bien las pruebas anecdóticas sugieren que las ejecuciones hipotecarias, en especial en los lugares donde estaban espacialmente concentradas, redujeron los precios de las viviendas y los ingresos del impuesto sobre la propiedad, las investigaciones existentes no proporcionan ninguna prueba empírica que justifique esta conclusión (recuadro 1). Con datos de ejecuciones hipotecarias de la empresa RealtyTrac, que proporciona información sobre las ejecuciones hipotecarias anualespor código postal para el período de 2006 a 2011 (período que tanto precede como sucede a la Gran Recesión), este informe es el primero en examinar el impacto de las ejecuciones hipotecarias sobre los valores y la recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad por parte de los gobiernos locales. Después de presentar información sobre la correlación entre ejecuciones hipotecarias y los precios de viviendas en todo el país, nos concentramos en Georgia, para explorar cómo las ejecuciones hipotecarias afectaron a los valores de la propiedad y la recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad en los distritos escolares a lo largo del estado. Nuestro análisis empírico indica que, en efecto, las ejecuciones hipotecarias probablemente redujeron los valores de la propiedad y la recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad. Si bien aún preliminares, estas conclusiones sugieren que las ejecuciones hipotecarias han tenido una serie de efectos sobre los sistemas fiscales de los gobiernos locales.

————————

Recuadro 1: Investigaciones existentes sobre el impacto de factores económicos en la recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad

Si bien existen investigaciones que examinan los diversos impactos de factores económicos sobre la recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad, dichos estudios usan datos que reflejan sólo una recesión previa (por ejemplo, la recesión de 2001) o cubren solamente el inicio de la crisis inmobiliaria de la Gran Recesión. Doerner e Ihlanfeldt (2010), por ejemplo, han estudiado directamente los efectos de los precios de las casas sobre los ingresos de los gobiernos locales usando datos del panel de precios detallados de las viviendas en Florida durante la década del año 2000. Concluyen que los cambios en el precio real de las viviendas unifamiliares de Florida tuvieron un efecto asimétrico sobre los ingresos gubernamentales. Los aumentos de precio no aumentan la recaudación real per cápita, pero los descensos de precio tienden a reducirla. Doerner e Ihlanfeldt también concluyen que las respuestas asimétricas se deben en gran parte a los límites impuestos sobre los aumentos y el monto del gravamen, las demoras positivas o negativas entre los cambios en los precios de mercado y la valuación tributaria, y la reducción de las tasas tributarias en respuesta a un aumento de los precios de las viviendas. Alm, Buschman y Sjoquist (2011) documentan las tendencias generales en la recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad en los Estados Unidos entre 1998 y 2009 inclusive, cuando los gobiernos locales, en promedio, pudieron evitar en gran medida los impactos significativos y negativos sobre el presupuesto sufridos por el gobierno federal y los gobiernos estatales, por lo menos hasta 2009, si bien se produjeron variaciones regionales sustanciales en dichos efectos. Alm, Buschman y Sjoquist (2009) también examinan la relación entre los gastos en educación y la recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad para el período entre 1990 y 2006. En un estudio relacionado, Alm y Sjoquist (2009) examinan el impacto de otros factores económicos sobre las finanzas de los distritos escolares de Georgia, como las respuestas estatales a las condiciones de los distritos escolares locales. Finalmente, Jaconetty (2011) examinó temas legales relacionados con las ejecuciones hipotecarias, y la Fundación MacArthur ha financiado un proyecto sobre ejecuciones hipotecarias en el condado de Cook, Illinois.

————————

Vínculos potenciales entre los precios de las viviendas, las ejecuciones hipotecarias y los valores inmobiliarios

Los gobiernos locales en los Estados Unidos dependen de varias fuentes de ingresos propios, tales como impuestos locales sobre los ingresos, sobre la propiedad y generales sobre las ventas, e impuestos específicos sobre el consumo, aranceles y cargos sobre el usuario. De éstos, la fuente de ingresos dominante es, con mucho, el impuesto sobre la propiedad. En 2011, los impuestos locales sobre la propiedad generaron aproximadamente tres cuartos de los ingresos tributarios totales de los gobiernos locales y casi la mitad de los ingresos locales totales propios (incluyendo aranceles y cargos).

Algunos impuestos locales, como los impuestos sobre el ingreso y las ventas, tienen bases tributarias que varían de acuerdo a los niveles de actividad económica, y la Gran Recesión deprimió seriamente los ingresos derivados de dichos impuestos. La base tributaria del impuesto sobre la propiedad es el valor de tasación, que no cambia automáticamente en respuesta a las condiciones económicas; a falta de un cambio formal y deliberado en la tasación, una reducción en el valor de mercado no se traduce necesariamente en una reducción del valor de tasación. Los límites de tasación, las demoras en las revaluaciones y la posibilidad de efectuar cambios deliberados en el tributo unitario o la tasa del impuesto sobre la propiedad se combinan para que las fluctuaciones económicas que influyen en los valores de las viviendas no afecten a la base tributaria del impuesto sobre la propiedad o los ingresos debido a este impuesto de manera inmediata u obvia. Con el tiempo, sin embargo, los valores de tasación tienden a reflejar los valores de mercado, y la recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad puede verse afectada.

Un mercado inmobiliario debilitado –con valores de la vivienda más bajos y mayor cantidad de ejecuciones hipotecarias– puede reducir los ingresos tributarios de los gobiernos locales procedentes de distintas fuentes (Anderson, 2010; Boyd, 2010; Lutz, Molloy y Shan, 2010), como los impuestos a la transferencia inmobiliaria, los impuestos sobre las ventas de materiales de construcción de viviendas, y los impuestos sobre la renta de los trabajadores de las industrias de la construcción de viviendas y de mobiliario para el hogar. Los ingresos del impuesto sobre la propiedad suponen una proporción importante de la recaudación tributaria local, sin embargo, los cambios en la recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad frecuentemente son mayores que los cambios debidos a dichos otros impuestos relacionados con las viviendas.

Actividad de ejecución hipotecaria en todo el país durante y después de la Gran Recesión

La figura 1 (pág. 26) presenta la cantidad total de ejecuciones hipotecarias a nivel de código postal de 5 dígitos como porcentaje de la cantidad de viviendas ocupadas por sus dueños en 2010. Esta figura demuestra la clara concentración geográfica de las ejecuciones hipotecarias. Arizona, California y Florida fueron afectadas especialmente por el colapso de la burbuja inmobiliaria. No obstante, otras áreas también experimentaron una actividad significativa de ejecuciones hipotecarias.

La Agencia Federal de Financiamiento de Viviendas (FHFA) produce un índice de precios de viviendas para cada área estadística metropolitana (MSA). Cotejamos los datos de ejecuciones hipotecarias de RealtyTrac con el índice de precios de viviendas de la FHFA en 352 áreas estadísticas metropolitanas. La figura 2 (pág. 26) presenta un simple diagrama de dispersión que relaciona las ejecuciones hipotecarias totales entre 2006 y 2011 como porcentaje de la cantidad de unidades de vivienda ocupadas por sus dueños en 2010, con el cambio del índice de precios de las viviendas en el período de 2007 a 2012 en las 352 áreas metropolitanas. El simple coeficiente de correlación entre las ejecuciones hipotecarias por unidades de viviendas ocupadas por sus dueños y el cambio del índice de precios de viviendas es de -0,556; si consideramos solamente aquellas MSA con ejecuciones hipotecarias no nulas a lo largo del período, el coeficiente de correlación es de -0,739. Este simple análisis sugiere que las ejecuciones hipotecarias tienen una correlación negativa significativa con los valores de la vivienda. El próximo paso es explorar el efecto de las ejecuciones hipotecarias sobre la base tributaria del impuesto sobre la propiedad y sobre la recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad propiamente dicho. En la próxima sección examinaremos este tema para el estado de Georgia.

Análisis más detallado: Ejecuciones hipotecarias, valores de la propiedad e ingresos del impuesto sobre la propiedad en Georgia

Al examinar el efecto de las ejecuciones hipotecarias sobre los valores de la propiedad y la recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad en un solo estado, eliminamos la necesidad de controlar las muchas maneras en que los factores institucionales pueden diferir entre estados. Georgia es un lugar adecuado para concentrarse porque de alguna manera es un estado “promedio”. Por ejemplo, los gobiernos locales de Georgia dependen del impuesto sobre la propiedad sólo un poco menos que el promedio nacional; en 2008, los ingresos del impuesto sobre la propiedad como porcentaje de los impuestos totales de los gobiernos locales fue del 65,1 por ciento en Georgia, en comparación con el 72,3 por ciento en los Estados Unidos en general. (Bourdeaux y Jun 2011).

Medimos la actividad de ejecución hipotecaria con datos de RealtyTrac, agregando las observaciones por código postal en los condados correspondientes. El Departamento de Ingresos de Georgia suministró la base tributaria anual del impuesto sobre la propiedad (que en Georgia se denomina “resumen neto”) y las tasas del impuesto sobre la propiedad. Los ingresos del impuesto sobre la propiedad y los ingresos locales totales de los distritos escolares fueron suministrados por el Departamento de Educación de Georgia. La base tributaria corresponde al 1 de enero del año respectivo. La tasa del impuesto sobre la propiedad se determina en la primavera, las facturas del impuesto se pagan en el otoño, y su recaudación se reporta en el siguiente año fiscal. Los distritos escolares tienen un año fiscal que va del 1 de julio al 30 de junio, de manera que la base tributaria y las tasas unitarias de 2009, por ejemplo, aparecerían en los ingresos del año fiscal 2010. También usamos varios datos demográficos y económicos (ingresos, empleo y población) medidos a nivel de condado para ayudar a explicar los cambios en la base tributaria. Debido a que estas variables se reportan a nivel de condado, para el análisis siguiente agregamos las variables de base tributaria del impuesto sobre la propiedad y su recaudación en los distritos escolares urbanos a los sistemas escolares de condado correspondientes a dichas ciudades para obtener los totales para los 159 condados. Para condados que incluyen todo o parte de un sistema escolar urbano, la tasa tributaria es el promedio de las tasas tributarias escolares del condado y la ciudad, ponderadas por sus bases tributarias respectivas.

En Georgia, las tasaciones de las propiedades con fines tributarios son responsabilidad exclusiva de los gobiernos de condado, pero el estado evalúa todas las bases tributarias del impuesto sobre la propiedad anualmente, comparando ventas reales de parcelas mejoradas durante el año con los valores de tasación, y determina si el nivel de tasación es apropiado con relación al valor justo de mercado, que se fija legalmente en el 40 por ciento. Los “estudios de razón de ventas” resultantes reportan una cifra de base tributaria del impuesto sobre la propiedad ajustada al 100 por cien para cada distrito escolar del estado, junto con una razón calculada. Podemos usar estas bases tributarias ajustadas del impuesto sobre la propiedad, cubriendo los períodos de 2000 a 2011 inclusive, para medir el valor de mercado de la propiedad residencial.

Georgia tiene muy pocas limitaciones institucionales al impuesto sobre la propiedad. Las juntas de distritos escolares pueden fijar generalmente sus tasas del impuesto sobre la propiedad sin aprobación de los votantes, la cual solamente es necesaria si la tasa del impuesto sobre la propiedad en un distrito escolar de condado excede de 20 milésimas del valor de tasación. En la actualidad, solamente cinco sistemas escolares han alcanzado este límite. Además, no hay un límite general en el valor de tasación, si bien un condado ha congelado las tasaciones sobre bienes de familia. En 2009, el estado de Georgia impuso una congelación temporal sobre las tasaciones en todo el estado, que potencialmente afectaba a los ingresos del impuesto sobre la propiedad sólo en el año académico/año fiscal 2010; sin embargo, al disminuir las bases netas y ajustadas del impuesto sobre la propiedad per cápita en la mayoría de los condados de 2009 a 2011 inclusive, es poco probable que esta congelación haya recortado las tasaciones.

Ejecuciones hipotecarias

La tabla 1 muestra la media y mediana de ejecuciones hipotecarias en todo el estado por código postal entre 2006 y 2011 inclusive. La cantidad total de ejecuciones hipotecarias casi se duplicó de 2006 a 2010, disminuyendo en 2011. La media de ejecuciones hipotecarias es mucho mayor que la mediana, lo cual es señal de que la distribución es extremadamente asimétrica.

La tabla 2 muestra la distribución de los códigos postales de Georgia por la cantidad de años que el código postal tuvo alguna ejecución hipotecaria. Más del 65 por ciento de los códigos postales tuvieron ejecuciones hipotecarias en cada uno de los seis años, mientras que sólo el 7 por ciento no tuvo ninguna ejecución hipotecaria en ninguno de los seis años. Esta distribución sugiere que sólo una porción muy pequeña del estado quedó inmune a la crisis de ejecuciones hipotecarias.

La figura 3 (pág. 27) muestra la distribución de ejecuciones hipotecarias en el estado durante el período de 2006 a 2011 inclusive. Como los códigos postales difieren en tamaño y densidad de viviendas, también se muestra un mapa de las ejecuciones hipotecarias por unidades de vivienda ocupadas por sus dueños en 2010 en la figura 4 (pág. 28). Nótese que los códigos postales marcados en blanco no tienen ninguna ejecución hipotecaria o no se tienen datos de ejecuciones hipotecarias. Como era de esperar, los condados urbanos y suburbanos (particularmente en el área metropolitana de Atlanta) sufrieron la mayor cantidad de ejecuciones hipotecarias. No obstante, hay también una gran cantidad de ejecuciones hipotecarias en muchos de los códigos postales menos urbanos.

La figura 5 muestra la distribución anual de ejecuciones hipotecarias por cada cien unidades de vivienda en cada uno de los 159 condados de Georgia. Nótese que la barra del recuadro representa el valor medio, el recuadro captura las observaciones en el segundo y tercer cuartil, los “bigotes” representan 1,5 veces la diferencia entre los porcentiles veinticinco y setenta y cinco, y los puntos son los valores extremos. La mediana de ejecuciones hipotecarias por condado aumentó de 0,17 por 100 unidades de vivienda en 2006 a 1,18 por 100 unidades en 2010, un aumento en la mediana de más de seis veces. Hay una alta correlación positiva entre la actividad de ejecuciones hipotecarias en 2006 y 2011 en todos los condados. Esta correlación es de 0,78 cuando se mide en relación a las unidades de vivienda y 0,74 cuando se mide per cápita, lo que indica que los condados con actividad de ejecución hipotecaria mayor (menor) que el promedio antes de la crisis inmobiliaria siguiron estando por arriba (abajo) del promedio en su pico.

Valores de la propiedad,/b>

En cuanto a los cambios en los valores de la propiedad, las figuras 6 y 7 muestran la distribución de cambios anuales, respectivamente, en la base tributaria neta del impuesto sobre la propiedad per cápita y en la base tributaria 100 por ciento ajustada del impuesto sobre la propiedad per cápita en los 159 condados entre 2001 y 2011 inclusive. Los estudios sugieren que las ejecuciones hipotecarias pueden tener un efecto de contagio sobre los valores de mercado de otras propiedades en la jurisdicción (Frame, 2010). Intentamos estimar el efecto de las ejecuciones hipotecarias sobre los valores de mercado en función de la base tributaria 100 por ciento ajustada del impuesto sobre la propiedad.

Nuestros resultados son preliminares, porque el análisis solamente incluye datos de Georgia. Aun así, sugieren significativos efectos negativos de las ejecuciones hipotecarias sobre los valores de la propiedad, controlando por los cambios porcentuales de año a año en ingresos, empleo y población. Las estimaciones de coeficientes de la variable ‘ejecuciones hipotecarias’ sugieren que un aumento marginal de una ejecución hipotecaria por cada 100 viviendas (o aproximadamente el aumento en la mediana de ejecuciones hipotecarias de 2006 a 2011) está asociado con aproximadamente una disminución del 3 por ciento en la base tributaria 100 por ciento ajustada del impuesto sobre la propiedad en cada uno de los dos años subsiguientes. De igual manera, un aumento de una ejecución hipotecaria por cada 1.000 habitantes está asociado con casi el 1 por ciento de disminución en la base tributaria 100 por ciento ajustada del impuesto sobre la propiedad después de un año, y una disminución porcentual ligeramente menor en el año subsiguiente.

Ingresos del impuesto sobre la propiedad

También exploramos el efecto de las ejecuciones hipotecarias sobre la recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad. La figura 8 representa la distribución de cambios nominales por condado de los ingresos totales de mantenimiento y operaciones del impuesto sobre la propiedad desde 2001, que muestra una variación considerable de un sistema escolar a otro en los cambios anuales de recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad. Aun en los últimos tres años de disminución de los valores de la propiedad, por lo menos la mitad de los condados tuvo un crecimiento nominal positivo anual en la recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad. Para comprender el efecto de la actividad de ejecución hipotecaria sobre los ingresos del gobierno local por impuestos sobre la propiedad, estimamos las regresiones que relacionan las ejecuciones hipotecarias con los gravámenes del impuesto sobre la propiedad y la recaudación de dicho impuesto.

Encontramos que un aumento en las ejecuciones hipotecarias está asociado a una reducción en el monto del gravamen, después de controlar por los cambios en la base tributaria del impuesto sobre la propiedad como también en las fluctuaciones de ingresos, empleo y población. Un aumento de una ejecución hipotecaria por cada 100 unidades de vivienda se asocia con alrededor del 1,5 por ciento de disminución subsiguiente en el gravamen, manteniendo constante el resto de las variables. También encontramos que las ejecuciones hipotecarias tienen un impacto negativo sobre la recaudación, manteniendo constante el resto de las variables. Como en nuestras estimaciones anteriores, estos resultados son para Georgia solamente, pero identifican una relación negativa significativa entre las ejecuciones hipotecarias y los gravámenes y la recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad por parte de los gobiernos locales. Puede ser que una mayor actividad de ejecución hipotecaria haga vacilar a las autoridades locales sobre la posibilidad de aumentar las tasas tributarias para compensar el efecto de las ejecuciones hipotecarias sobre la base tributaria.

Conclusiones

¿Las ejecuciones hipotecarias causadas por la Gran Recesión afectaron a los valores de la propiedad y la recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad por parte de los gobiernos locales? Nuestros resultados sugieren que las ejecuciones hipotecarias han tenido un impacto negativo significativo sobre los valores de la propiedad y, por esta vía, un efecto similar sobre la recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad, por lo menos en el estado de Georgia. Nuestros resultados también sugieren la presencia de efectos adicionales sobre los gravámenes y la recaudación de dicho impuesto, después de controlar por los cambios en la base tributaria. Hacen falta más investigaciones para saber si estos resultados se extienden a otros estados.

Sobre los autores

James Alm es profesor y director del Departamento de Economía de Tulane University.

Robert D. Buschman es asociado de investigación senior en el Centro de Investigaciones Fiscales de la Escuela Andrew Young de Estudios Políticos de la Universidad Estatal de Georgia.

David L. Sjoquist es profesor y titular de la cátedra Dan E. Sweat en Política Educativa y Comunitaria en la Escuela Andrew Young de Estudios Políticos.

Recursos

Alm, James y David L. Sjoquist. 2009. The Response of Local School Systems in Georgia to Fiscal and Economic Conditions. Journal of Education Finance 35(1): 60–84.

Alm, James, Robert D. Buschman, y David L. Sjoquist. 2009. Economic Conditions and State and Local Education Revenue. Public Budgeting & Finance 29(3): 28–51.

Alm, James, Robert D. Buschman, y David L. Sjoquist. 2011. Rethinking Local Government Reliance on the Property Tax. Regional Science and Urban Economics 41(4): 320–331.

Anderson, John E. 2010. Shocks to the Property Tax Base and Implications for Local Public Finance. Paper presented at the Urban Institute-Brookings Institution Tax Policy Center and the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy Conference, “Effects of the Housing Crisis on State and Local Governments,” Washington, D.C. (Mayo).

Bourdeaux, Carolyn y Sungman Jun. 2011. Comparing Georgia’s Revenue Portfolio to Regional and National Peers. Report No. 222. Atlanta, GA: Fiscal Research Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.

Boyd, Donald J. 2010. Recession, Recovery, and State and Local Finances. Paper presented at the Urban Institute-Brookings Institution Tax Policy Center and the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy Conference, “Effects of the Housing Crisis on State and Local Governments,” Washington, D.C. (Mayo).

Doerner, William M. y Keith R. Ihlanfeldt. 2010. House Prices and Local Government Revenues. Paper presented at the Urban Institute-Brookings Institution Tax Policy Center and the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy Conference, “Effects of the Housing Crisis on State and Local Governments,” Washington, D.C. (Mayo).

Frame, W. Scott. 2010. Estimating the Effect of Mortgage Foreclosures on Nearby Property Values: A Critical Review of the Literature. Economic Review 95(3): 1–9.

Jaconetty, Thomas A. 2011. How Do Foreclosures Affect Real Property Tax Valuation? And What Can We Do About It? Working paper presented at National Conference of State Tax Judges, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Cambridge, MA (Septiembre).

Lutz, Byron, Raven Molloy, y Hui Shan. 2010. The Housing Crisis and State and Local Government Tax Revenue: Five Channels. Paper presented at the Urban Institute-Brookings Institution Tax Policy Center and the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy Conference, “Effects of the Housing Crisis on State and Local Governments,” Washington, DC (Mayo).

Strengthening Municipal Fiscal Health in China

Since 2013, Zhi Liu has been a senior research fellow and director of the China Program at the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, and director of the Peking University–Lincoln Institute Center for Urban Development and Land Policy (PLC). Prior, Zhi was lead infrastructure specialist at the World Bank, where he worked for 18 years, with operational experiences in a number of developing countries.

Zhi received a B.S. in economic geography from Dr. Sun Yat-Sen University (China), a M.S. in city and regional planning from Nanjing University (China), and a Ph.D. in urban planning from Harvard University.

LAND LINES: The Lincoln Institute recently initiated a global research agenda on municipal fiscal health. This effort arises from the recognition that a number of cities in the United States and in many other countries including China suffer financial hardship. What is the nature of municipal fiscal distress in China?

ZHI LIU: It’s very different from the financial troubles faced by cities in the United States. The two countries are at very different stages of urbanization. While the U.S. is highly urbanized, with more than 80 percent of citizens living in urban areas, according to the 2010 census, China is only halfway through the urbanization process. Today, 750 million Chinese citizens live in cities, accounting for 55 percent of the total population. By 2050, the urban population is expected to reach 1.1 billion, or 75 percent of the total population. Over the last two decades, with the exception of a few mining cities, almost all municipalities have seen rapid population growth and spatial expansion, generating a significant demand for public investment in urban infrastructure.

In China, the main sources of funding for urban infrastructure investment are revenues from land concessions and local borrowing from commercial banks, often using land as collateral. Urban land is owned by the state, and rural land is collectively owned by villages. The Land Administration Law stipulates that only the state has the power to convert rural land into urban use. This sets the stage for the municipal governments to take rural land for urban development through the land concession process. As it goes, municipal governments expropriate rural land, service it with infrastructure, and sell the land use rights to real estate developers. The compensation to farmers for the farmland taken is low, based on the land’s agricultural production value instead of market value for urban use. When the demand for real estate development is high, the land concession fees are bid high, and the municipal governments stand to collect a huge amount of revenues. For the last 10 years, revenues from land concessions have accounted for more than one-third of total local fiscal revenues.

Moreover, municipal governments further expand their financing capacity by using land assets as collateral to secure commercial loans from commercial banks. Before a recent amendment, the Chinese Budget Law did not permit local governments to borrow. However, most municipal governments bypassed the law by creating their own local financing vehicles—known as urban development investment corporations (UDICs)—that borrowed commercial loans or issued corporate bonds for the governments. The size of outstanding local debts has grown rapidly over the last few years, reaching at least one-third of the GDP now.

The land-based financing mechanism has helped municipal governments in China raise a significant amount of funds for capital investment. However, the success has also created incentive for municipal governments to rely on land concessions and UDICs too heavily. Today, China’s economy is growing more slowly than before, and the mechanism is running out of steam in many localities where conversion of rural land for urban use exceeds the real demand. Some cities have borrowed much more than they can repay, leaving them heavily indebted.

Many empirical studies, including some funded by the Lincoln Institute, find that China’s land-based financing mechanism is one of the main causes of other urban issues that we face today. Skyrocketing housing prices, growing local debts, excessive land-taking, growing tension between the farmers and municipal governments over land-taking, and widening gaps of income and wealth distribution between urban and rural populations are among the major issues.

LL: The international mass media has been reporting on these issues. How will China address them?

ZL: There is a high level of consensus on the root causes of the problems. In November 2013, the central government announced a set of reforms, and a few are directly related to urbanization policy and municipal finance. For example, the scope of land expropriation will be narrowed to the confine of public purposes, and villages are allowed to develop their land for urban use under the premise that it conforms to planning. The reforms also call for acceleration of property tax legislation; reform of hukou, the household residential registration system, to help farmers become urban residents; and government efforts to make basic urban public services available to all permanent residents in cities, including all rural-to-urban migrants.

LL: What are the implications of hukou reform on municipal finance?

ZL: The government is phasing out China’s longstanding hukou system, and the implications for municipal finance will be significant. Hukou was designed to identify a citizen as a resident of a certain locality, but for several decades the government used the system to control rural-to-urban migration. A rural hukou holder could not become an urban hukou holder without the government’s approval. Without urban hukou, a rural migrant worker is not eligible for public services provided by the urban governments.

Since the economic reform, the expanding urban economy has absorbed a large number of rural-to-urban migrant workers. Earlier, I mentioned China’s urbanization rate of 55 percent and urban population of 750 million. These numbers include the 232 million rural migrants who stay in cities for more than half a year. If they were excluded from the calculation, the level of urbanization would be just 38 percent. Due to their rural hukou status, however, migrant workers don’t have access to many services enjoyed by urban hukou holders, despite the fact that many have labored and lived in cities for years. Municipal governments determine the extent of many urban public services—such as public schools and affordable housing—according to the number of urban hukou holders inside the municipal jurisdiction. Phasing out hukou would significantly increase the fiscal burden to the municipal governments for public service provision. Some scholars in China estimate that the cost of providing full urban public services to each rural migrant would be at least RMB 100,000 (roughly $16,000 U.S.). The total outlays for all current rural migrants would be at least RMB 23 trillion (about $3.8 trillion U.S.).

LL: China is introducing the residential property tax. What is the status of that initiative?

ZL: The government is drafting the first national property tax law as part of the ongoing reform of public finance. China is one of only a handful of countries without a local property tax. The current taxation system relies heavily upon taxes on businesses and transactions, and very little upon taxes on household income and wealth. In a more urbanized China with a wealthier population who own residential properties, the property tax would be a more viable source of municipal revenues. Today, 89 percent of urban households own one or more residential units, and the value of those properties has much to do with urban public services. Property tax will allow cities to tax urban residential properties whose value would benefit from the improved public services made possible by property tax revenues. It should also fill part of the fiscal gap left by the expected reduction of revenues from land concessions. However, property tax will not be a major source of municipal revenues any time soon. It may take one or two more years for the National People’s Congress to pass the new law. It would also take perhaps two to three years for cities to establish the property database and assessment and administration system.

LL: It must be tough for cities to deal with declining revenues from land concessions without an immediate alternative—especially as they are coping with growing local debt, which has been widely reported. How will Chinese cities get out of this situation?

ZL: The situation is indeed tough. China’s economy is slowing down. The real estate sector is no longer as hot as it was in the last 10 years, resulting in lower demand for land and thus lower revenues from land concessions for municipal governments. Cities are now facing a fiscal gap. One possible way to fill the gap would be local government borrowing. However, as I mentioned earlier, many cities are indebted and have little capacity to borrow further. In fact, most cities in China do not have adequate capacity for debt management. The newly amended budget law permits provincial-level governments to issue bonds within the limit set by the State Council, but also closes the door on other forms of local government borrowing. Currently, the central government actively promotes infrastructure financing through public-private partnerships (PPP). While this is a good move, it won’t be sufficient to fill the infrastructure financing gap, as PPP is suitable mainly for infrastructure projects with a strong revenue flow. There are many other urban infrastructure projects that generate little or no revenues. In the long term, I believe that China should actively establish a municipal government bond market to channel funds from institutional investors to municipal infrastructure investment and enable local governments to access commercial loans based on creditworthiness. To do so, municipal governments need to develop institutional capacity on several fronts, such as local debt management, capital improvement planning, multiyear financial planning, and municipal infrastructure asset management.

LL: Is PLC’s work relevant to the current reform?

ZL: The PLC was jointly established by the Lincoln Institute and Peking University in 2007. By the time I arrived, in 2013, the center had developed its reputation as one of China’s premier research and training institutions on urban development and land policy issues. The center supports a number of activities, including research, training, academic exchange, policy dialogue, research fellowship, demonstration projects, and publication. We focus on five core themes—property taxation and municipal finance, land policy, urban housing, urban development and planning, and urban environment and conservation. Over the last few years, our research projects have touched upon land-based finance, local debts, housing prices, infrastructure capital investment and finance, and other topics relevant to municipal fiscal health. We have also provided training to Chinese government agencies on the international experiences of property tax assessment and administration. I would say that our work is highly relevant to the current reform.

Implementation of the new comprehensive policy reforms is generating considerable demand for international knowledge and policy advice in the China Program’s focus areas, especially property taxation and municipal finance. We plan to initiate a pilot demonstration project with one or two selected cities in China, to support the institutional capacity required for the development of long-term municipal fiscal health. Our team has started a study to develop a set of indicators to measure municipal fiscal health for Chinese cities. It is the right time for us to initiate this agenda in China.