Mark Skidmore is professor of economics at Michigan State University, where he holds the Morris Chair in State and Local Government Finance and Policy, with joint appointments in the department of agricultural, food and resource economics and the department of economics. He received his doctorate in economics from the University of Colorado in 1994, and his bachelor’s degree in economics from the University of Washington in 1987. He serves as coeditor of the Journal of Urban Affairs.

Professor Skidmore’s research has focused on public economics and urban/regional economics. Current research interests include state and local government tax policy, intergovernmental relations, the interrelationship between public sector decisions and economic activity, and the economics of natural disasters. His work has been funded by the Fulbright Program, the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, the National Science Foundation, the Urban Institute, and USAID.

His articles have appeared in journals such as Economic Inquiry, Economics Letters, Journal of Urban Economics, Kyklos, Land Economics, National Tax Journal, Public Choice, Regional Science and Urban Economics, and the Southern Economic Journal. His research also has been cited in prominent news outlets such as the BBC, China Post, The Economist, Europe Intelligence Wire, Forbes, International Herald Tribune, Los Angeles Business Journal, MSNBC, Newsweek, The New Yorker, The New York Times, and PBS News Hour.

Land Lines: This year, you are a Visiting Fellow at the Lincoln Institute. What issues are you working on?

Mark Skidmore: About two years ago, my colleague Gary Sands and I were invited by City of Detroit Councilman Kenneth Cockrel to evaluate Detroit’s ailing property tax environment. Councilman Cockrel wondered what gains might result if Detroit were to shift to a land-based tax. We were given access to detailed data for more than 400,000 property parcels within the city, in order to conduct an evaluation, and we are grateful for the Institute’s support to pursue that project. Our report identified significant erosion of the property tax base and explored options for expanding the base, including a shift to a land-based tax. Our evaluation showed that a land-based tax would serve to broaden the tax base but also would produce substantial shifts in the tax burdens of residential, commercial, and industrial property owners.

In 2013, Detroit’s fiscal challenges came to a head when Governor Rick Snyder appointed an emergency financial manager who subsequently set in motion a filing for bankruptcy. On December 3, 2013, Judge Rhodes ruled that the City of Detroit is eligible for Chapter 9 bankruptcy protection. Despite the near-complete collapse of the real estate market within the city during the Great Recession, the property tax remains an important revenue source, and its administration can help or hinder economic and fiscal recovery. This year, I plan to use the parcel-level data set to examine important issues such as tax delinquency, the over-assessment of property, the value of vacant land, and policies related to transfer of property ownership from the private sector to the public sector due to tax foreclosure, and transfers back to the private sector.

Land Lines: What are some of the underlying factors behind Detroit’s current problems?

Mark Skidmore: About 48 percent of Detroit property owners are delinquent on their tax bills, a fact that reflects the erosion of the social contract between citizens and the city. This extraordinarily high delinquency rate is the result of a confluence of factors. First, the city has failed to enforce tax compliance, particularly for low-valued properties. Second, many citizens perceive the tax to be unfair because of the over-assessment of their property. Finally, anecdotal evidence suggests citizens are not paying taxes because local authorities are failing to provide basic public services such as street lighting, snow plowing, and public safety.

One key cause of the high delinquency rate is the over-assessment of property for tax purposes. The real estate crisis hit Detroit particularly hard. In 2010, the average selling price of a residential parcel with a structure was less than $10,000, yet the average assessed value of such properties for tax purposes was $54,000. According to state guidelines, the ratio of assessed value to sales price should be close to one. In September 2013, city officials announced that over the next three to five years all properties within the city would be reassessed.

Second, Detroit has a history of tearing down dilapidated tax-foreclosed structures. As a result, it is one of the few large cities in the United States with frequent sales of vacant land. The value of vacant land is often difficult to ascertain in highly urbanized areas, but accurate valuations are essential if one wants to impose a land tax or a two-tier tax on land and structures. The large number of sales transactions of vacant land in Detroit provides an opportunity to estimate land value. Interestingly, the average value of an unimproved parcel in 2010 based on sales data was $34,000—much higher than the average price of residential parcels with structures, which, as mentioned, was less than $10,000.

The city government now owns and manages more than 25 percent of the city’s land area, and public ownership continues to grow because tax foreclosures have outpaced the transfer of publicly owned parcels back into private hands. Some of the questions I am investigating are: What are the appropriate policies in a market-oriented society for managing low-valued urban land transactions? Why is the delinquency rate so high, and what can be done to improve property tax compliance in the context of a nearly collapsed urban real estate market? What role does the perception of “unfair” assessments play in tax delinquency?

Land Lines: What is the long-term prognosis for Detroit?

Mark Skidmore: The city’s fiscal challenges are a symptom of deep underlying issues. Whether one considers the redevelopment of a declining urban area or reconstruction in the wake of a major natural disaster, the most important elements in any recovery are human capital and social/cultural attributes. If one accepts the premise that they are essential building blocks for redevelopment, and if these elements are lacking, then a top priority is to consider policies and actions that can develop them. In 2011, the high school graduation rate in Detroit was 62 percent. The percentage of households headed by a single parent was 62 percent. By some measures, the functional literacy rate among adults is just 53 percent. It is difficult to build a dynamic and robust urban economy upon such a weak foundation.

Clearly, policy makers must address the immediate fiscal challenges, but the longer-term prognosis for Detroit will depend on actions aimed at improving the underlying economic base—human and social capital. Without addressing these deep challenges, Detroit will continue to flounder. There is no quick fix. In order for Detroit to have a chance to prosper once again, Michigan needs to make a long-term commitment to improving these underlying conditions.

Land Lines: Is Detroit a harbinger for other U.S. cities?

Mark Skidmore: Yes and no. A number of other local governments face significant fiscal challenges—Chicago, Jacksonville, Los Angeles, Oakland, and Providence, to name a few. Underfunded retiree compensation promises are often cited as a major issue. Yet, many of these cities stand a reasonable chance of re-emerging and potentially prospering in the not-too-distant future because they suffer from acute crises brought on by the recession, but not necessarily from chronic fiscal challenges. However, cities with chronic challenges due to significant deficits in social and human capital can look to Detroit as an indicator of their future. My hope is that state and local policy makers from around the country can learn from the Detroit experience and begin making the necessary long-term investments in their most important asset—people, particularly children— so they can avoid the chronic economic and fiscal challenges seen in Detroit.

Land Lines: How does the Detroit project fit into your larger research agenda?

Mark Skidmore: Much of my research has addressed the interrelationship between public decision making and economic activity. Over the years, I have examined issues such as the effectiveness of tax increment finance, the implications of imposing impact fees to cover the infrastructure costs associated with development, and the effects on development of property taxation, tax abatements, and other subsidies. I have also considered other public finance issues such as state lotteries, sales taxes, and income taxation. I am particularly interested in the spatial-dynamic-competitive relationships between adjacent and overlying taxing jurisdictions.

Land Lines: Much of your research has focused on government policy and finance in the United States. What other work have you done internationally?

Mark Skidmore: In recent years, I have partnered with my MSU colleagues on a USAID-funded grant in Mali. My role has been to consider how Mali’s recently decentralized governmental system can be utilized more effectively in food security and land use management. Climate change is affecting Mali in very tangible ways—as the land in the north has become more arid, there has been significant migration to areas in the south, which has better access to water. This migration is resulting in increased violence due to ineffective land tenure and property rights. Now that democratic rule has been re-established, we are again working with our Malian partners to develop systems that involve local authorities in managing food security, land access, property rights, and land-related conflicts. Interestingly, the issue of what to do with all the publicly owned land in Detroit has informed our work in Mali, and vice versa.

I also have ongoing research in the economics of natural disasters. One of my recently published articles (with coauthor Hideki Toya) used thousands of disaster events from all over the world to show that countries with more decentralized governmental systems have significantly fewer disaster-induced fatalities. Our research provides evidence that decentralized governments provide essential services more effectively than more centralized systems.

A third recently completed project shows that societal trust tends to increase in countries in the years following climatic disasters. The relationship we observe is robust, and we hypothesize that such disasters require and provide opportunities for people to work across social classes to address their challenges, thus building trust and social capital. While natural disasters can have devastating human and economic impacts, a potential spillover benefit of greater disaster exposure may be a more tightly knit society.

Land Lines: How does your research reflect the interests and values of the Lincoln Institute?

Mark Skidmore: The Lincoln Institute is recognized worldwide as a leading organization concerning the use, regulation, and taxation of land—property taxation, tax abatements, economic development policies, decentralized fiscal systems—and all of these are topics of my research. Over the years, the Institute has supported my work on Wisconsin tax increment finance, Michigan local government fiscal stress, and my ongoing evaluation of the Detroit property tax environment. The U.S. system of national and largely autonomous subnational governments provides fertile ground for researchers to study and learn about which policy “experiments” lead to better, or worse, outcomes. I really love doing this work and am thankful to have the Institute as a partner.

Holyoke, una ciudad de alrededor de 40.000 habitantes en el oeste de Massachusetts, fue una de las primeras comunidades industriales planificadas del país. A partir de finales de la década de 1840, inversores de Boston transformaron lo que había sido hasta entonces un área agrícola en un pueblo industrial impulsado por molinos de agua, aprovechando la ventaja de su ubicación geográfica cerca del Río Connecticut. Los inversores querían fabricar textiles de algodón. Pero con el tiempo la ciudad construyó un elaborado sistema de canales para permitir la instalación de más y más molinos, y comenzó a ser conocida también por la producción de seda, lana y papel. En aquel período, Holyoke se convirtió en la “Ciudad del Papel”, por los molinos de agua dedicados a su fabricación.

Con el desarrollo de los molinos, la ciudad prosperó. Con la abundancia de trabajo, la ciudad atrajo olas sucesivas de inmigrantes irlandeses, franco-canadienses, alemanes, polacos, judíos, italianos y puertorriqueños para trabajar en los molinos, quienes crearon pequeñas empresas, formaron familias y construyeron una ciudad que llegó a tener 63.000 habitantes en 1917 (McLaughlin Green 1939).

Después, todo comenzó a desmoronarse… lentamente. Desde su auge en la década de 1920, la industria local se fue reduciendo gradualmente cuando las empresas y los puestos de trabajo se mudaron al extranjero o migraron al Sur y al Oeste para estar más cerca de la materia prima y de mano de obra más barata. En el censo del 2000, la población de Holyoke se había reducido a menos de 40.000 habitantes. Como otras pequeñas ciudades industriales del país, se convirtió en un símbolo en vías de extinción del pasado industrial de los EE.UU., y la otrora próspera Ciudad del Papel luchaba por conservar su nivel económico.

Afortunadamente, a Holyoke le tocó la lotería en 2009, cuando fue seleccionada para albergar lo que hoy se conoce como el Centro Informático Verde de Alta Prestación de Massachusetts (Massachusetts Green High Performance Computing Center, MGHPCC) un complejo de supercomputadoras respetuoso con el medio ambiente para promover —según la denominación que le dieron los funcionarios estatales— la “economía innovadora” de Massachusetts. La energía hidráulica fue, una vez más, la clave del éxito para la ciudad. La ubicación de Holyoke sobre el río Connecticut ofrecía acceso a energía hidroeléctrica de bajo costo, y el río y los múltiples canales de la ciudad ofrecían agua para refrigeración, una ventaja importante para las supercomputadoras. “Holyoke ha tenido problemas para sobrevivir después de haber perdido su base industrial”, dice Kathleen Anderson, presidente de la Cámara de Comercio del Gran Holyoke. “Teníamos una infraestructura envejecida que necesitaba reutilizarse para otros fines, perdimos puestos de empleo y las condiciones demográficas cambiaron. Holyoke ha tenido que pensar creativamente y reconocer los activos que teníamos. Tanto el talento humano como la decisión de construir la represa y su energía hidroéctrica han sido esenciales para nuestro renacimiento”.

Cuando inauguramos el centro informático en 2012, representó un primer paso importante para mejorar el destino de Holyoke, pero ello no fue suficiente para restaurar su vitalidad. La ciudad emprendió un esfuerzo de planificación que dio como resultado un plan de renovación de 20 años para revitalizar y volver a desarrollar el área donde se encuentra el MGHPCC, en el centro de la ciudad. Un paso importante en la ejecución del plan fue la creación del Distrito de Innovación de Holyoke, una inversión del estado por medio de la Asociación Tecnológica de Massachusetts (Massachusetts Technology Collaborative) que reunió a funcionarios locales, líderes empresariales y organizaciones comunitarias para estimular el desarrollo económico local y regional. “La instalación del centro informático en Holyoke desencadenó nuestro proceso de planificación alrededor del Distrito de Innovación de Holyoke. Nosotros decimos que el Distrito de Innovación nació del centro informático”, dijo Marcos Marrero, director de planificación y desarrollo económico de Holyoke y copresidente del Distrito de Innovación de Holyoke, en una entrevista en septiembre (Desmarais 2015) aparecida en el periódico Bay State Banner.

Liderazgo, colaboración, resurgimiento

Fue entonces cuando entró en escena el Banco de la Reserva Federal de Boston. Desde 2008, el personal de investigación del banco había estado estudiando las viejas ciudades industriales similares a Holyoke, como parte del esfuerzo para ayudar a revitalizar otra ciudad de Massachusetts: Springfield. Como Holyoke, Springfield había visto días mejores. El banco realizó un estudio de dos años en colaboración con Springfield para analizar los desafíos que se presentaban para la cuarta ciudad más grande del estado, que seguía decayendo aun cuando el gobierno estatal y las organizaciones sin fines de lucro habían invertido millones de dólares en obras de revitalización.

Una parte del estudio trató de aportar lecciones para Springfield a partir de los destinos de otras 25 pequeñas ciudades industriales del noreste, medio oeste y sur septentrional de los EE.UU. Los economistas de la Reserva Federal de Boston descubrieron que algunas de estas ciudades pudieron mantener o recuperar su estabilidad económica, medida según su nivel de ingreso, tasas de pobreza, cantidad de población y vitalidad económica. Los investigadores las denominaron «ciudades renacientes», y buscaron aspectos comunes que pudieran explicar la razón de su éxito. Encontraron que todas estas ciudades habían enfrentado los mismo desafíos: pobreza, cambio del perfil racial y étnico y pérdida de su base industrial. Pero estaban tratando de superar estos desafíos y compartían un elemento clave del éxito: liderazgo sostenido y colaboración entre empresas, gobierno, organizaciones sin fines de lucro y grupos comunitarios. “Una y otra vez, nuestro análisis de la historia de las ciudades renacientes identificó el elemento de liderazgo por parte de instituciones o individuos clave, junto con la colaboración entre los diversos grupos que compartían su interés en el desarrollo económico”, escribieron los investigadores del banco en un informe de 2009 (Kodrzycki y Muñoz 2009).

Los investigadores también notaron que el origen del liderazgo local variaba de un lugar a otro. En New Haven, Connecticut, las universidades locales trabajaron con funcionarios gubernamentales y la industria privada con el objeto de brindar capacitación laboral y financiamiento para atraer compañías. En Providence, una fundación sin fines de lucro trabajó con ejecutivos empresariales para desarrollar ideas y llegar a un consenso sobre proyectos de desarrollo inmobiliario en el centro. En Evansville, Indiana, un alcalde inició el proceso de recuperación en la década de 1960, proceso que tuvo continuidad gracias a una agresiva campaña de desarrollo económico liderada por la Cámara de Comercio local. A pesar de sus diferencias, todos estos esfuerzos de revitalización económica se prolongaron durante décadas, y precisaron de un liderazgo sólido y continuado.

Todos estos esfuerzos también contaron con la colaboración activa de numerosos grupos e individuos. Según la investigación de la Reserva Federal, “la colaboración fue un elemento necesario porque la transformación económica es compleja y porque los agentes externos, como los gobiernos nacionales y estatales, las fundaciones y las empresas que son una fuente potencial de financiamiento y fuente de trabajo, requieren frecuentemente una evidencia de la colaboración conjunta para contribuir al desarrollo de una ciudad”.

A la altura del desafío

Estas conclusiones llevaron a la Reserva Federal de Boston a preguntarse qué se podría hacer para ayudar a construir la infraestructura cívica sólida que era fundamental para el resurgimiento. Esto llevó a la formación de Working Cities Challenge (Desafíos para Ciudades en Funcionamiento), una organización creada por el banco con la ayuda de Living Cities, una asociación de 22 fundaciones, instituciones financieras y otros miembros, con sede en Nueva York.

El Desafío consistió en una competencia entre las antiguas ciudades industriales pequeñas de Massachusetts. En la primavera de 2013, 20 comunidades solicitaron participar. De estas 20, seis ciudades fueron seleccionadas para recibir un total de US$1,8 millones en subvenciones para financiar proyectos de liderazgo y colaboración. Entre ellas se encontraba Holyoke, junto con Chelsea, Fitchburg, Lawrence, Salem y Somerville. El objetivo era simple: ayudar a salvar estas ciudades de Massachusetts que luchaban por sobrevivir, respaldando el desarrollo de las herramientas necesarias para ayudarse a sí mismas. Este programa fue un hito importante e inusual para un banco de la Reserva Federal. Los bancos son más conocidos por sus investigaciones económicas que por organizar programas concretos. No obstante, la iniciativa fue un reflejo del compromiso del presidente de la Reserva Federal de Boston, Eric Rosengren, para aplicar las investigaciones económicas del banco al mundo real, y para mejorar las comunidades de Nueva Inglaterra. Y el concepto se puede extender, con la posibilidad de impulsar a ciudades y pueblos en todo el país que han tenido problemas con las realidades económicas del siglo XXI.

Tamar Kotelchuck, directora de Working Cities Challenge, dice que las investigaciones del banco sobre las ciudades renacientes le enseñaron que hasta las ciudades con muchos problemas pueden mejorar. “Con base en lo que aprendimos del estudio de ciudades renacientes, nos comunicamos con Living Cities (Ciudades Vivas) y se nos ocurrió la idea de una competencia para otorgar financiamiento multianual con objeto de incentivar el liderazgo y la colaboración”, dijo.

Señala que el banco decidió comenzar con un programa piloto en Massachusetts, concentrándose en ciudades pequeñas y medianas. El objetivo eran ciudades de entre 35.000 y 250.000 habitantes que compartían determinados aspectos económicos y demográficos, como una gran cantidad de familias pobres y una baja mediana de ingresos. “Estas ciudades ya habían formado una coalición para apoyar sus intereses con la ayuda de MassINC, una ONG de expertos”, dice Kotelchuck. “Se hacían llamar Gateway Cities (Ciudades-Portal), y habían estado colaborando para resolver problemas económicos y políticos comunes desde hacía varios años. Aprendieron que el trabajo conjunto les daba cierta cantidad de poder que cada ciudad por separado no tenía”, dice (Forman et. al. 2007).

Working Cities adoptó una metodología original para ayudar a estas ciudades, según Andrew Reschovsky, fellow del Instituto Lincoln. “Lo original de la iniciativa de Working Cities es que, a diferencia de muchas otras estrategias de desarrollo económico urbano, se enfoca en mejorar el bienestar económico de los residentes de bajos ingresos que viven actualmente en cada ciudad”.

Los bancos de la Reserva Federal no pueden usar fondos propios para otorgar subvenciones, pero una serie de socios dispuestos a ayudar se ofrecieron a apoyar a Working Cities. Kotelchuck dice que, como parte de la iniciativa, la Reserva Federal se encargó del diseño e implementación del modelo, en conjunto con un comité directivo, proporcionando asistencia técnica y ayudando a los equipos a capacitarse mediante la asistencia de expertos, redes de contactos y buenas prácticas. Estas subvenciones son financiadas por varios donantes, como el gobierno estatal; Living Cities; Massachusetts Competitive Partnership (Asociación Competitiva de Massachusetts), asociación de los 16 empleadores más grandes del estado que se concentra en el crecimiento económico; y MassDevelopment, la agencia de desarrollo estatal.

Kotelchuck dice que cuando el banco y sus socios organizaron la primera competencia en 2013, dieron libertad a las ciudades para proponer cómo se usarían los fondos de la subvención. “No dijimos a las ciudades en qué tenían que trabajar”, dice. “El Desafío está diseñado para ayudar a construir colaboración sobre temas importantes a nivel local”. Sin embargo, un requisito importante para que un proyecto obtuviera éxito era que generara una colaboración entre el sector privado, el gobierno y otros grupos locales. “Buscamos proyectos que promovieran un cambio sistémico”, dice. “Nuestra meta fue ayudar a los líderes locales a solucionar problemas en sus propias ciudades”.

Un jurado independiente evaluó las propuestas de las ciudades en base a los criterios establecidos por Working Cities Challenge: colaboración, participación de la comunidad y el uso de pruebas concretas para medir el progreso. Los proyectos tenían que concretarse en una contribución duradera para mejorar las vidas de los residentes de bajos ingresos.

En enero de 2014 se anunciaron los premios de las primeras subvenciones. De las seis ciudades seleccionadas, cuatro recibieron subvenciones multianuales y dos recibieron subvenciones en forma de capital semilla. Todas las ciudades estaban combatiendo una alta tasa de desempleo, bajo desempeño estudiantil y un futuro incierto. No obstante, dice Kotelchuck: “Todas las ciudades ganadoras tenían propuestas distintivas. No había dos propuestas iguales. Todas abordaban necesidades locales específicas, tal como esperábamos”, dijo.

Por ejemplo, Fitchburg, situada en la región central del norte de Massachusetts, recibió una subvención de US$400.000 durante tres años para su Iniciativa eCarenomics, un esfuerzo para desarrollar medidas comunes para la salud y bienestar vecinal, con el objetivo de mejorar una parte de la ciudad. Chelsea obtuvo una subvención de tres años para su Iniciativa Shurtleff-Bellingham, diseñada para reducir la pobreza y las tasas de movilidad en un 30 por ciento en su barrio más problemático. Salem recibió una subvención de capital semilla de US$100.000 destinada a su plan para alinear los indicadores económicos de uno de sus barrios de bajos ingresos con el resto de la ciudad, enfocándose en el desarrollo económico, el desarrollo de pequeñas empresas, el desarrollo de la fuerza de trabajo y el desarrollo de liderazgo. Somerville también recibió una subvención de capital semilla de US$100.000 dirigido a un programa de capacitación laboral para jóvenes de 18 a 24 años de edad que no estaban estudiando en la escuela.

El premio más cuantioso, una subvención de US$700.000 durante tres años, fue otorgado a Lawrence, en el noreste del estado, para la Lawrence Working Families Initiative (Iniciativa de Familias Trabajadoras de Lawrence), cuyo objetivo era crear un Centro de Recursos Familiares para aumentar los ingresos de los padres de estudiantes de escuelas locales en un 15 por ciento en un periodo de 10 años. La iniciativa está liderada por la organización Lawrence Community Works y el sistema escolar local, con respaldo de varios empleadores y organizaciones sin fines de lucro de la zona. “El sistema escolar de Lawrence había entrado en quiebra en 2011”, explicó Kotelchuck, así que era lógico concentrarse en las familias y las escuelas.

La ciudad también tenía características económicas que se ajustaban al modelo de Working Cities. La mediana de ingresos de la unidad familiar era la mitad que la mediana estatal, y su tasa de pobreza era casi el triple de la tasa estatal. “El 70 por ciento de la población de la ciudad es ciento hispana, y la tasa de desempleo era alta”, dice Kotelchuck. Muchos de los problemas de la ciudad se trasladaban a las escuelas. “El objetivo del Centro de Recursos Familiares es ayudar a las familias de todas las formas posibles. Brinda capacitación en temas financieros, apoyo en casos de crisis y otros servicios para fortalecer a las familias”, dice.

Además del centro familiar, una gran parte de la iniciativa está enfocado en lo que Kotelchuck llama “participación auténtica de los padres” en las escuelas. La iniciativa creó círculos de educación comunitaria, donde padres, maestros y estudiantes trabajan en problemas escolares específicos. “El objetivo es que los padres se comprometan y participen en el sistema escolar”, dice. Hasta ahora, el programa ha reclutado a 400 padres, ha contratado a un entrenador familiar y ha conseguido trabajo a más de 30 padres, según Kotelchuck.

Holyoke recibió el premio de una subvención de US$250.000 durante tres años que se está usando para implementar el programa de estimulación de potencial y acceso a recursos de conocimientos (Stimulating Potential, Accessing Resource Knowledge, SPARK). Este “centro de iniciativas comerciales y emprendimientos sociales” en el centro de la ciudad se propone aumentar la cantidad de empresas, sobre todo entre los residentes de la ciudad, incluyendo la población latina, que asciende al 60 por ciento del total. El equipo de proyecto que creó el programa se compone de representantes de la ciudad, la cámara de comercio, la biblioteca pública de Holyoke, un centro integral de empleo llamado CareerPoint y la organización local sin fines de lucro Nuestras Raíces.

El programa SPARK se “propone identificar, reclutar y estimular a los residentes y las organizaciones de Holyoke que tienen la ‘chispa’ o el deseo de convertir sus proyectos innovadores o propuestas de negocios de idea en realidad, poniendo énfasis en una metodología comunitaria integral de emprendimiento, aprendizaje individual y capacitación de liderazgo”, de acuerdo con la ciudad. En definitiva, está diseñado para ayudar a empresarios potenciales a elaborar planes de negocios para poner en práctica sus ideas.

Otro objetivo es incorporar a miembros de la comunidad del centro de Holyoke al Distrito de Innovación que la ciudad ha creado alrededor del centro de supercomputadoras. “La ciudad tiene un gran centro de datos “, dice Kotelchuck. “Pero ese hecho por sí mismo no necesariamente va a ayudar a las personas de bajos ingresos de Holyoke. La cuestión que SPARK trata de resolver es cómo aprovechar los recursos de la población inmigrante de Holyoke y conseguir que la gente se beneficie del desarrollo del Distrito de Innovación y sus alrededores.

Los funcionarios municipales están de acuerdo. “El premio de esta subvención es una buena noticia más para el futuro del Distrito de Innovación de la ciudad”, dijo el alcalde Alex Morse cuando se anunció. “Hemos hecho un gran esfuerzo para que Holyoke pueda competir en la economía moderna, para lo cual hace falta estimular proyectos innovadores y emprendimientos comerciales. Con la colaboración de algunas de las mejores organizaciones y líderes comunitarios de Holyoke, este financiamiento nos permitirá ayudar a los residentes locales a poner en práctica sus ideas innovadoras.

Kotelchuck dice que muchas ciudades tratan de atraer a profesionales jóvenes y enfocarse en trabajos de alta tecnología. Ven que otras ciudades han implementado y copiado este modelo con éxito, pero otras no. “Si no ayudamos a los residentes de bajos ingresos”, dice, “simplemente estaremos moviendo la pobreza de un lugar a otro, y eso no ayuda a nadie. La iniciativa Working Cities ayuda a la gente en el lugar donde vive. Ayuda a gente que de otra manera no tendría trabajo”.

“Muchas ciudades persiguen la estrategia de moda más llamativa para revitalizarse, pero al final no es la tendencia más novedosa lo que revitaliza una ciudad”, dice. “Son los efectos de muchas ideas a lo largo del tiempo, y sólo ocurre en aquellas ciudades que cuentan con participación y colaboración comunitaria. Nuestra recomendación es observar lo que uno tiene y construir sistemáticamente a partir de ello”.

Al supervisar el progreso del Desafío, comenta, ha notado diferencias en la manera en que las ciudades piensan sobre su futuro. “Algunas ciudades dicen: Tenemos muchísimos problemas, por favor dennos dinero”, continúa. “Pero otras dicen: Tenemos estos recursos. Tenemos cierta energía. Lo que necesitamos es ayuda para descubrir nuestro potencial”. Dice que las iniciativas de revitalización requerirán una década de esfuerzo o más. El objetivo de la Reserva Federal es proporcionar un adelanto de tres años para este esfuerzo.

También puede generar un interés más amplio en la revitalización de las ciudades. Recientemente, Holyoke SPARK recibió US$56.000 adicionales de Massachusetts Growth Capital Corp, una agencia cuasi pública que da apoyo a pequeñas empresas, para que el programa pueda ofrecer más clases, dar asesoramiento a los emprendedores y respaldar un programa de préstamos para microempresas para aquellos que reúnan las condiciones. También recibió este año financiamiento adicional de subvenciones en bloque para el desarrollo comunitario de la ciudad.

Signos de progreso

La Reserva Federal y sus socios están satisfechos con los resultados del proyecto hasta ahora, dice Kotelchuck. Y el banco anunció recientemente una segunda y tercera tanda de subvenciones para ciudades de Massachusetts y Rhode Island. Con el tiempo, ella cree que esta idea se podría difundir a otros distritos de la Reserva Federal. “Para la Reserva Federal es un modelo nuevo de involucrase en estas comunidades. Otras Reservas Federales están demostrando interés, y nos encantaría que esta idea prendiera en otros distritos”. Rosengren, el presidente del banco, dice que la Reserva Federal de Boston piensa expandir el programa, al menos a otros estados de Nueva Inglaterra.

El programa Working Cities tiene un gran potencial para extenderse más allá de la región. Hay pequeñas ciudades y pueblos en todo el país que han sido golpeados por el cambio de fortuna económica en las décadas recientes. Merecen una oportunidad de convertirse también en ciudades renacientes, y es gratificante ver como una organización como la Reserva Federal de Boston está invirtiendo su inteligencia y su influencia para mejorar el futuro. No hay una sola solución, no hay garantía de éxito, pero Working Cities Challenge demuestra que con tiempo, compromiso, esfuerzo y un poco de dinero se pueden conseguir buenos resultados.

Este es un punto que Reschovsky, del Instituto Lincoln, también subraya: “Aun cuando todas las ciudades involucradas actualmente en Working Cities necesitan más recursos económicos y fiscales, la clave para el éxito de la iniciativa será la combinación de recursos adicionales y el desarrollo y promoción de organizaciones sin fines de lucro, gobiernos, empresas e instituciones sociales.”

Eso parece, efectivamente, lo que está ocurriendo en Holyoke. Últimamente ha generado también algo de reconocimiento a nivel nacional. En el número de febrero de la revista Popular Mechanics, los editores nombraron las 14 mejores ciudades en marcha del país, expresando que querían identificar “la próxima ola de ciudades que están construyendo un ecosistema que convierta a los innovadores en emprendedores”. La lista incluye ciudades pequeñas a lo largo del país. Holyoke apareció en el sexto puesto (Popular Mechanics 2015).

Inevitablemente, la principal ventaja de la ciudad es lo que ya sabemos. “Tenemos energía barata”, escribió el alcalde Morse al describir la innovación aportada por Holyoke para la revista. “En el borde oriental de la ciudad, el río Connecticut tiene una caída de 17 metros en su avance hacia el sur. Cuando se fundó la ciudad en 1850, el río impulsó las ruedas de los molinos de papel; hoy genera energía barata y limpia”. También mencionó las viejas fábricas de ladrillo que se construyeron para la industria papelera, signos del pasado industrial que se han transformado en «atractivos espacios industriales de trabajo”.

“Holyoke ha vuelto a su punto de partida”, dice Anderson, de la Cámara de Comercio. “Nuestros antecesores construyeron un sistema de canales para utilizar la energía del río, y ahora estamos utilizando energía verde para alimentar una economía nueva”.

Billy Hamilton is vicecanciller ejecutivo y director financiero del Sistema Universitario de Texas A&M. Fue contralor adjunto de cuentas públicas del estado de Texas durante 16 años. Desde 2007, escribe una columna semanal para State Tax Notes.

Fotografía: Jeffrey Byrnes

Referencias

Desmarais, Martin. 2015. “The Holyoke Innovation District Finds Creative Solutions to Revitalizing the City.” The Bay State Banner. 10 de septiembre, 2015. baystatebanner.com/news/2015/sep/10/holyoke-innovation-district-finds-creative-solutio/?page=3

Forman, Benjamin, David Warren, Eric McLean-Shinaman, John Schneider, Mark Muro y Rebecca Sohmer. 2007. Reconnecting Massachusetts Gateway Cities: Lessons Learned and an Agenda for Renewal. The Brookings Institution and MassINC. Febrero. www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2007/02/regionsandstates-muro

Kodrzycki, Yolanda y Ana Patricia Muñoz. 2009. “Lessons from Resurgent Cities.” Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. 2009 Annual Report. www.bostonfed.org/about/ar/ar2009/lessons-from-resurgent-cities.pdf

McLaughlin Green, Constance. 1939. Holyoke, Massachusetts: A Case History of the Industrial Revolution in America. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.

Popular Mechanics. 2015. “The 14 Best Startup Cities in America.” Popular Mechanics. Febrero. www.popular mechanics.com/culture/advertorial/g1859/the-14-best-startup-cities-in-america

The study of property taxation in Europe offers special challenges because each country has a different definition of land and property, and a different approach to local property taxation. The term property often includes both land and buildings, but may also include plants and machinery as well as certain possessions, such as automobiles. In Denmark, for example, separate taxes may be levied on the land and property elements of a single holding.

Among the 41 counties in our study, we identified 61 different forms of local taxation. Most are based on annual value, usually assessed on a capital or rental basis, and are payable annually. While most countries tax the sale of property at the state level, the Czech Republic, Italy, Portugal, Slovakia and Spain levy such taxes locally. Yet, amid such diversity, a basic central pattern emerges. Each county, except Malta, operates some form of annual property tax on the use or occupation of land and/or property, usually levied at the local level, and the revenues contribute to the provision of local services.

Tax Reform and the European Union

Over the last 10 years France, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland have either completed or are in the process of completing substantial reforms to their taxation systems. Other countries have undertaken more minor reforms. Even some emerging democracies are reviewing and reforming their relatively new taxation systems in light of changes elsewhere. No individual tax exists in isolation, and all are affected by larger fiscal, economic and political developments. The reform of one tax will often have consequential effects on others, and property taxation in all its forms is no exception.

One impetus to tax reform in Europe is the European Union (EU). Fifteen of the countries in our study are members, and many other countries are in various stages of being considered for membership. Many countries are taking this opportunity to reform and improve their tax administration systems and to make their taxation rates competitive with those of other member states. Tax harmonization is not one of the declared aims of the EU, although it may be a natural consequence of many EU polices.

The main incentive for tax reform in Europe is coming from the states themselves. In one of the first signs of the problems caused by traditional national taxation systems, the Ministry of Finance in the Netherlands noted in the early 1990s that not only were businesses locating in the most tax-favorable areas but they also were buying goods and services from other countries where tax rates and other costs were lower. The close proximity of the Netherlands to Germany, France, Belgium and Luxembourg, as well as the good transport links between the countries, exacerbated the situation.

The introduction of the Single European Market has opened internal markets to foreign competition with the removal of trade barriers and the abolition of customs duties between member states. Business competitiveness now depends primarily on efficiency and the amount of taxation imposed by the national government, rather than on state aid and trade policies.

Approaches to Local Taxation

The Taxpayer

The majority of property taxes are payable by the owner. Of the 51 taxes we studied, 29 identified the owner as the taxpayer and 12 are paid by the occupier; the remaining 10 are sales-based taxes. The occupier figure was distorted because the United Kingdom accounted for 50 percent of this figure, due to differences in the implementation of its local taxes. In the Netherlands both parties can be taxed at different amounts. For sales-related taxes the results were less clear, with the taxpayer being the seller in half the cases and the purchaser in the other half.

Sources of Valuation Information

Many countries have some form of computerized cadastral system to record property-related information, and as part of the assessment process different levels of government usually exchange information. The nature and implementation of such systems vary considerably, from a series of different registers administered at various levels of government to a single register administered nationally.

The rights of the taxpayer to centrally held information also differ among countries. Some provide no rights to any information, while others provide notice whenever a new valuation or alteration is made. In some cases, valuation and comparable evidence may be made available at the request of the taxpayer.

Bases of Valuation

Three alternative approaches for the valuation bases are used most frequently. The Capital Value Approach is normally based on the open market value of the property at a specified baseline date, which may be a current date such as the start of the tax year. Sweden designates a date two years before the tax year. This approach has the advantage of giving valuation authorities more time to consider all the evidence available before arriving at their final valuations. The open market value is usually defined on the basis of a property’s best and/or highest value.

The Rental Value Approach is based on the open market rental value at a specified date. England, Wales, Scotland and the Republic of Ireland specify a baseline date some time before the new values come into effect, as in Sweden. The open market rental value may be restricted by assumptions as to changes of use and alterations. The rationale is that the tax is levied on the occupier and the amount of tax is based on the current use of the property, not its potential value.

Properties not normally bought and sold in the market require alternative approaches to valuation. For example, the use of a revenue (or accounts) approach has been adopted in England and Wales for many types of leisure-related property, and its use is expected to increase. The cost approach, related to the cost of construction, also is widely accepted in England and Wales and in other European countries.

The Overall or Unit Approach relates to a property’s size. The tax is levied at a prescribed rate per square meters or per unit, which may vary depending on the predominant use of the property. These rates may be loosely based on rental or capital values, but are more often an arbitrary rate fixed by the appropriate taxation authority. In 1997 the Netherlands moved away from such a system in favor of a market-related capital value approach. Many new democracies have adopted the unit approach due to a lack of property information, a limited and restricted property market, and insufficient resources to enable the development of alternative systems. It is anticipated that many of these countries will move to a value-based system when resources and circumstances permit.

A number of other approaches are used under special circumstances. One is the capital value banding approach adopted for the valuation of residential property for the Council Tax in England, Wales and Scotland. In this approach property is ascribed to various value bands rather than valuing each individual property precisely. Another example is the local business tax, which includes the value of the property plus in the case of France a percentage of salaries and in the case of Spain and Switzerland the business profits.

Revaluation of the Tax Base

One of the key factors in examining European property tax systems is whether the valuations on which the tax is charged are up-to-date. Our research identified a very mixed picture: some countries have not revalued their tax bases for many years and others undertake revaluations regularly, every four or five years (see Table 1). Many countries have either no provision for regular revaluations or have postponed revaluations so often that their tax base bears little resemblance to current market values.

Indexation

Many countries have attempted to overcome the problems associated with infrequent revaluations by some form of indexation. Those countries performing annual revaluations may implement them through actual annual revaluations, indexation of an earlier revaluation or self-assessment declarations by the taxpayer. While annual indexation between regular revaluations every few years may ensure a relatively accurate tax base, its use becomes more questionable when the base has not been updated for 10 or 20 years. The position is made far worse in countries where the property market is changing rapidly, especially in major cities and towns. Any adopted index needs to be closely related to the property market in that location and to the specific property type. In most cases, however, the index is a single figure applied across the entire country and for all types of property.

Exemptions and Reliefs

Exemptions can be considered from two viewpoints: the nature of the property or the nature of the taxpayer. In addition, some countries have introduced arrangements that place a ceiling on the amount of tax payable. Some common features relating to the types of properties for which some form of relief may be granted are:

• land owned by the state and used for the provision of public services, such as schools, hospitals, cemeteries etc., if usually exempt or excluded from the tax legislation;
• land and property used for religious purposes;
• historic land and buildings;
• agricultural land.

Relief to taxpayers takes many forms and can include:

• relief to persons of retirement age;
• relief to disabled persons;
• relief of a percentage of the tax for certain owner-occupiers or remittance of an initial amount of the tax.

Calculating the Amount of Tax

The simplest systems for calculating tax payments adopt a given tax per square meter occupied. Once the area of the property is agreed, it is a relatively simple matter to apply a given tax rate to that area. In some countries, the assessed value must be multiplied by an index or co-efficient and then by a locally determined rate that can vary depending on the size of the authority levying the charge. In France, the situation is even worse for the business tax, where a series of limitations have to be calculated to ascertain whether a ceiling or cap applies to the taxable amount.

Appeal Systems

Most countries have a system by which the taxpayer may challenge the tax assessment or valuation, although that action generally does not postpone the payment of the tax. In some cases the first step is an informal approach to the authority, which may be able to resolve the dispute without the need for more formal action. Where a formal approach is adopted, the appeal may be dealt with as part of the general tax appeal process through the normal tax tribunals and courts, or it may be handled outside the normal tax system, often in courts and tribunals established for the purpose.

Tax Collection and Payment

In many countries taxes are collected by the national tax authority, often as part of the income tax process. This method has the advantage of being linked with national exemptions and benefits; the resulting tax is usually payable over the whole tax year. Under the second common method, the tax is paid directly to the relevant taxing authority, sometimes in installments.

Conclusion

European countries are constantly reviewing their tax systems and adopting the best features of other systems. This presents special challenges to a survey such as ours, but also enhances its potential impact by allowing comparative analysis to influence new legislation. One very important conclusion at this early stage of the research project is the importance of keeping the tax base up-to-date. This not only simplifies the entire valuation and collection process but also ensures a tax base that is more acceptable and understandable to taxpayers. During this year we propose to widen our research and complete data collection on other European countries. In addition, we will attempt to compare the amounts of revenue raised by each type of taxation and analyze them within the context of each country’s local government and finance system.

Peter K. Brown is professor of property taxation at Liverpool John Moores University, a frequent author and a regular speaker on valuation, rating and taxation matters. Moira Hepworth is head of research at the Institute of Revenues, Rating and Valuation (IRRV), based in London. The authors are joint recipients of a David C. Lincoln Fellowship in Land Value Taxation. This article is based on their first year of research and their recent working paper.

Related Publication

Peter K. Brown and Moira Hepworth. 2000. “A Study of European Land Tax Systems.” Lincoln Institute Working Paper. 156 pages.

The introduction of property taxation in transitional economies offers a unique perspective from which to study fiscal and governmental decentralization, land privatization and market development. These reforms all involve fundamental changes from the centrally controlled and planned societies of the communist period. The Lincoln Institute has a particular interest in the experiences of countries that are adopting property taxation and is underwriting a series of case studies in consultation with research associates in Armenia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, Russia and the Slovak Republic.

These studies demonstrate similarities in the challenges and problems faced by countries in transition and the extraordinary changes that have taken place in less than a decade since the fall of communism. At the same time, each country has followed a somewhat different path, adopting strategies that reflect its unique set of past traditions and current circumstances.

Decentralization and Privatization

Among the challenges facing these countries after nearly 50 years of communist rule are the decentralization of fiscal and political control and the reduction of the role of government in favor of private-sector ownership and activity. Privatization of land ownership has been a particularly sensitive issue. Taxes on real property have been introduced as part of a strategy to provide a revenue source to local governments, to encourage privatization of government-owned real estate assets, and to improve land utilization. Although in most cases the central governments continue to play a dominant role, a degree of local fiscal authority and autonomy has been introduced. Poland and Estonia have assigned these taxes to local self-governments, with authority to determine tax rates within limits established by their national parliaments.

In the other countries, national law sets the rate of taxation, but some local control is achieved by adjusting the coefficients applied to area measures that establish the tax base. The revenues raised from land and building taxes are still a relatively modest source of local revenue, and generally benefit rural communities more than urban areas. Although property taxes raise a minor portion of these countries’ total taxes at present, central governments envision a larger role for them in improving inter-governmental finance systems.

Privatization of state assets and ownership rights to real property is an essential yet complicated process that is still underway in each of the countries studied. In Estonia, for example, the desire to restitute land to pre-Soviet-period owners or their heirs initially complicated the determination of property rights. The adoption of a land tax in 1993, within two years of independence, was an essential element of Estonia’s land reform program, which also included privatization and market development. Limiting the tax base to land alone was intended to encourage its productive use, stimulating owners of restitution rights “to develop the property or sell it.”

In the former Soviet satellites, considerable private ownership remained under communism, but the formal cadastral systems were not maintained and the recording of property rights is still far from complete. During the Soviet period, land was treated separately from buildings, and this practice has continued in some countries, making real estate units more difficult to assemble for investment purposes. Property (buildings and structures) is treated separately from land for taxation purposes in Armenia, the Czech and Slovak Republics, and Russia.

While housing and business privatization has progressed to a degree in all countries, the release of land to private ownership and especially to ownership by foreigners has been a contentious issue. In Russia, although the Constitution and Civil Code provide for private property, the government and the Duma have failed to agree on a Land Code to provide a legal basis for land ownership. Most countries have placed some restrictions on foreign ownership, but permit long-term leases. Land taxation offers a potentially broad and expanding revenue base as privatization continues.

Market-based Reforms

In the absence of secure property rights and developed property markets, most countries have taken an incremental approach to incorporating market-based elements into their property tax bases. With the exception of Estonia, the countries in this study levy taxes on the basis of land or building area, adjusted by coefficients related to location, population, usage or other factors not derived directly from market indicators. As a logical step in their transitional reforms, Armenia and the Czech Republic are each exploring the addition of ad valorem elements to their area-based property tax, and Poland is considering proposals to shift to a market-based system. Plans for an ad valorem tax in the Slovak Republic await further fiscal, governmental and market reforms.

Estonia’s strong ideological commitment to a market economy led its Parliament to take the bold step in 1992 to base its land tax on market value. The first valuation assigned price zones to each assessment area, with the expectation that the methodology could be refined as understanding of real estate markets improved and as the markets matured. The collection of land tax information has strengthened real estate market activity and has been a catalyst for the development of land records, sales registries and cadastral maps. A revaluation in 1996 incorporated the expanded market databases.

Recent efforts to develop a pilot project for market value-based real property taxation in two Russian cities illustrate both the potential and the frustration of tax reform in the current Russian fiscal climate. The program began with funding from USAID in 1995, and federal legislation authorized the “experiment” in 1997. Before the current fiscal crises, the city of Novgorod anticipated implementation of the new tax in 1999 to replace the three existing non-value-based taxes on land, property of individuals and assets of enterprises. Whether the local officials will consider it possible to risk implementation under current conditions is now unclear.

Other Challenges

The reorganization of administrative functions and the cost of integrating and collecting property tax information are other challenges to the development of modern market-based property tax systems. Each country is struggling with structural reforms of Soviet-based administration and are seeking to improve inter-agency cooperation and efficiency in planning for property tax reforms.

The case studies illustrate the complex transitions that are underway in each of these countries. At the same time, the studies point out the important role that property taxation can play in providing a stable source of independent revenue to local governments, developing democratic and accountable public institutions, and maintaining a public claim on property entering the private market.

The potential benefits of market value-based taxation in stimulating real estate markets and promoting urban revitalization and efficient land use are just beginning to be recognized. The financial hardships still experienced by many people in these countries may keep property taxes at very modest levels for some time, making the design of a broad-based system with limited exemptions particularly important to the viability of property taxation in these new economies.

Note:

1. “Unlikely Icon,” Economist (February 28, 1998): 78.

Jane H. Malme is a fellow of the Lincoln Institute specializing in the development and implementation of property taxation in diverse international contexts.

She is coordinating the preparation of case studies with colleagues for the following transition countries:

Armenia: Richard R. Almy, consultant, Almy, Gloudemans, Jacobs & Denne, Chicago, Illinois, with Varduhi Abrahamian, International City/County Management Association, Yerevan, Armenia

Czech Republic: Gary Cornia and Phillip Bryson, Romney Institute of Public Management, Marriott School of Management, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah, with Dr. Alena Rohlícková, Ministry of Finance, Czech Republic

Estonia: Jane H. Malme with Tambet Tiits, director, AS Kinnisvaraekspert, Tallinn, Estonia

Poland: Jane H. Malme with W. Jan Brzeski, president, Cracow Real Estate Institute, Cracow, Poland

Russia: Jane H. Malme with Dr. Natalia Kalinina, Center for Real Estate Analysis, Moscow, Russia

Slovak Republic: Gary Cornia and Phillip Bryson with Ing. Sona Capová, Univerzita Mateja Bela, Banská Bystrica, and Milos Koncek, Ministry of Finance, Slovak Republic

Sources: These figures are based on official country data sources and were provided by the research associates. No data was available from Russia.

William Vickrey died on October 11, three days after the announcement of his being awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics, while on his way to the Lincoln Institute for the annual research conference of the Committee on Taxation, Resources and Economic Development (TRED).

TRED meetings have been sponsored by the Institute for 20 years, and Bill Vickrey was at every one of those meetings. Indeed, his connection with TRED goes back even further, for he was one of the committee’s founding members more than 35 years ago. TRED began in discussions among academic economists who were interested in contemporary applications of the ideas of Henry George and were also concerned with land and natural resources. Over the years, TRED’s membership expanded to include public finance and urban economists interested in the use of land and economic phenomena related to how things are arranged over space.

Bill Vickrey was the ultimate intellectual sparkplug of TRED from the beginning. His wonderful inventiveness and irreverence came out in inspired, seemingly off-the-cuff interventions in the discussion, some of which have changed thinking about economics and economic policy forever. For example, in one sally he imagined a linear city in which all structures were truly mobile. This image made it possible to think clearly about location, the effects of the durability and immobility of structures, and appropriate land policies, without being trapped by peripheral issues. No one could cut to the quick like Vickrey.

TRED member Ed Mills of Northwestern University spoke to our assembled group at the Institute shortly after hearing the news of Bill’s untimely death. “Bill Vickrey lived his life exactly as he wished, right to the end,” Mills said. “He died with his boots on.” Those of us who have been honored to know Bill for some time have been shaped by our contact with him, and we will miss him.

Dick Netzer

TRED member and visiting senior fellow of the Lincoln Institute

In the past quarter century, the People’s Republic of China has achieved remarkable progress in economic growth, social advancement, and political and administrative reforms. These achievements are largely attributed to the commitment of the Chinese government to improve its people’s welfare through adherence to a free market economy. The interrelated forces of economic growth and policy reform are stimulating rapid and fundamental transformation, especially in Chinese cities, where infrastructure projects, urban renewal, housing development and reform of state-owned enterprises are taking place at an unprecedented pace and scale.

The catalyst for this surge in urban development has been the widespread adoption of the Land Use Rights System (LURs) in which land ownership and use rights have been separated. Its impacts are two-fold. First, it promotes the development of markets for land use rights in which land prices and market mechanisms begin to affect land use and land allocation decisions. Second and more important, it creates an institutional capacity for local governments to raise much-needed revenues to finance urban redevelopment and economic reforms. This revenue-raising ability is rooted in the land ownership structure and power of Chinese government, since the state owns virtually all land in cities and towns. Users are required to pay upfront leasing fees for 40- to 70-year periods, depending on the type of use.

Along with its fiscal impacts, the LURs has created several problems that have drawn increasing attention. First, revenues from leasing state-owned land are not sustainable from a long-term perspective; leasing of existing urban land has been the primary revenue source for financing urban projects, and sooner or later cities will run out of urbanized land available for leasing. For example, Hanzhou City will collect 6 billion RMB (US$732 million) in 2003 from the sales of land use rights, most of them on existing urban land, but land sale revenues have already reached their peak and have started to decline.

Second, Chinese governments lack instruments to capture their share of the increases in land value that are driven up by the combined forces of urbanization, public investment in infrastructure and private efforts. Based on the proposition that one should be rewarded only for one’s own effort, government should capture the increased land value resulting from public investment, rather than having it accrue to the private landowner.

Third, laws do not specify concrete measures for implementing lease renewals. It will be more difficult to collect leasing fees in the renewal period since local governments will have to deal with thousands of households compared to a small number of developers in the first round of leases. Finally, some local government officials have been politically motivated to create an oversupply of land and overheated real estate activity, thus diminishing the central government’s efforts to institutionalize land management and urban planning.

Compulsory Land Acquisition

The other major source of land revenues for local governments is the leasing of former farmland. Both the Chinese Constitution and the 1999 Land Administration Law (LAL) specify that the state, in the public interest, may lawfully requisition land owned by collectives, thus setting the stage for compulsory land acquisition. The local government is thereby able to acquire land cheaply from farmers and sell it to developers at much higher prices. This is a complicated process because it requires first acquiring the land, then converting it to state ownership, resettling the displaced farmers and providing urban infrastructure before finally leasing the land to developers. The law requires that peasants’ lives should not be adversely affected by land acquisition. However, this requirement is difficult to implement, in part because measures of life changes for peasants are multifaceted; financial compensation is only one of the considerations.

Since there is no market data for farmland prices, the government pays collectives and peasants a compensation package that includes three components: compensation for the land itself; resettlement subsidies; and compensation for improvements to the land and for crops growing on the requisitioned land. The law stipulates that compensation for cultivated land shall be six to ten times the average annual output value of the acquired land for the three years preceding the requisition.

The amount of the resettlement subsidies depends on the number of people living on the land, but each person’s subsidy shall not exceed six to ten times that of the annual yield from the occupied land. Recognizing diversity of local conditions in terms of socioeconomic development status, productivity, and per capita income, the local government is permitted to raise the sum of the resettlement subsidies and land compensation up to 30 times the previous three years’ average output value on the acquired land.

Emerging Issues

Several significant issues are emerging from this land acquisition process. The first relates to the ill-defined concept of property rights and development rights: who is entitled or empowered to acquire land from peasants for urban development? Currently any entity can acquire land from peasants as long as it can justify public interest or purpose. This public interest requirement was easy to fulfill in the 1990s, since there were many state-owned enterprises that provided services and/or goods to the public. They could acquire land to launch profitable commercial, housing, entertainment and industrial development projects. Individual developers also can acquire land if they have strong political connections. However, these profit-making and political motivations for land acquisition are responsible for increasing corruption in real estate and housing developments and creating chaotic and uncoordinated urban development patterns. Recent economic reforms and privatization have begun to diminish the roles of state-owned enterprises, so it is time to reexamine the concept and definition of public interest and public projects.

The interactions of multiple players in land acquisition (including individuals, corporations and governments) create several problems in land management and planning: (1) it becomes extremely difficult, if not impossible, to coordinate land development so that infrastructure and transportation facilities are used efficiently; (2) it voids many urban planning efforts; and (3) it is blamed for “villages in the city” (cheng zhong chun), a phenomenon in which villages and farmland are surrounded by developed land, making the city unattractive, disrupting the continuity of economic, social and cultural functions, and significantly increasing transportation costs.

The second issue is who is entitled to compensation and at what level. The village collective is the basic socioeconomic organization in rural areas, and its largest asset is the land collectively owned by the members. Even though laws recognize that both the collective and its members should be entitled to sharing compensation, there are no specific policy guidelines or regulations on how to divide the shares in different situations. The collective’s share is supposed to enhance its capacity in farmland productivity and social welfare, thus benefiting all its members. However, the role of the collective is diminishing, in part because its membership is decreasing as some farmers leave to become urban residents following acquisition of communal land, and in part because of socioeconomic changes due to advancing urbanization. The revenue sharing scheme reflects this transformation.

To make matters worse, different levels of governments take a cut out of the monetary compensation that is supposed to go to the farmers. For example, the Chinese government built a pipeline that transfers natural gas from the western to the eastern part of the country. This was a national project, so compensation to peasants was paid by the state, but the amount of compensation varied from province to province. The state gave 20,000 RMB (US$2,500) per mu (one mu=666.67 square meters) to peasants in Henan province for their land. Given the fiscal structures between governments, these funds were allocated downward to lower levels of government (from state to province to city to county to township, respectively). At each transfer point, a portion of funds was retained for that level of government to finance their own public goods and services. The peasants received only 5,000 RMB in the end.

The situation here is similar to the concept of value capture in which governments are entitled to retain a portion of land value increases in exchange for their efforts in urban development and infrastructure provision. In a case like Henan it is legitimate to ask if the state’s compensation reflected the true market value of the land. If it did, then local governments should be entitled to their shares. Alternatively, if the state captures the entire land value increase, then the state should reimburse at least the costs of infrastructure provisions supplied by the local government.

The third issue is the equity of compensation, which involves both the level of compensation as well as variations in payments in different situations. Since there are no market data that can truly reflect the price of farmland, compensation hardly reflects market conditions and it varies dramatically from case to case, mainly depending on who plans to develop the land. For instance, profitable projects such as commercial housing and business developments can afford to pay higher prices for land than public transportation and infrastructure projects such as highways, railroads, airports and canals. If these different types of projects, private and public, occur in one village at different times or in neighboring villages at the same time, peasants who are less well compensated feel unequally treated by the government. Many complaints have something to do with this inconsistency in compensation. Such inequity contributes to rising tensions and distrust between peasants and the government and adversely affects subsequent planning and implementation of land management policies.

Finally, it is becoming increasingly difficult and costly to resettle peasants. The LAL requires that the quality of life of farmers shall not be adversely affected by compulsory land acquisition, but does not specify concrete measures to achieve this goal. As a result, many peasants end up living under worse conditions several years after their land was taken than they did before. This situation is not difficult to imagine. Farming does not make peasants rich, but it generates sufficient income to support a minimum level of livelihood and security. Without appropriate training and skills in managing their lump sum payment and without appropriate investment channels (if their compensation is sufficient to make any investment at all), it is common for peasants to end up with no land to farm, no income stream to support themselves, and no job skills to compete in the tight urban job markets.

Land Policy Challenges

China is facing many challenges in its efforts to supply land for new development as rapid urbanization continues. First, it is becoming more difficult for local governments to acquire land for true public works and transportation projects, since they cannot offer peasants as much compensation as developers of more profitable commercial projects.

A second challenge is to fairly compensate peasants when their farmland is acquired. As governments capture a greater proportion of the land value increases, the low level of compensation to peasants imposes a serious long-term threat to sustainable development in China. The number of people who live in poverty after land acquisition continues to rise. For instance, Zhijiang province alone has more than 2 million farmers who have lost their farmland. In 2002, more than 80 percent of legal cases filed by peasants against governments in the province were related to land acquisition.

This situation is a potential source of instability and is likely to escalate in the future as increasing urbanization puts even more pressure on the need for new land for development. According to the General National Land Use Comprehensive Plan, China needs 18.5 million mu of land for nonagricultural uses in the first decade of the twenty-first century, and 90 percent of that land will be acquired from farmers. It is estimated that 12 million farmers will lose their land through this type of acquisition. Without fair compensation or other efforts to assure their social security over the long term, these farmers will impose enormous socioeconomic problems on China for years to come.

The third challenge is associated with the rate of urbanization. According to the report of the 16th Communist Party Convention in 2003, the total population of China is estimated to be 1.6 billion to1.8 billion by 2020, with more than 55 percent living in cities, compared to the current population of 1.3 billion with 38 percent in urban areas. Migration from rural areas to cities is expected to be around 15 million annually, after taking into account the rate of natural urban population growth. Sustainable and affordable urban economic development is urgently needed to absorb these large numbers of rural immigrants.

A final dilemma is how to achieve a balance between farmland preservation and urban spatial expansion. Farmland preservation will inevitably increase land costs, which in turn will slow down urban development. At the same time, it is necessary to promote urban economic growth to provide sufficient job opportunities. This in turn leads to urban encroachment into rural areas to take advantage of less expensive land.

To address these challenges, Chinese officials need to ask some fundamental questions:

• What are the impacts of urbanization and infrastructure provision on the value of farmland, and how do the values change over space and time?
• Who is entitled to the value increases in land, and what is the peasants’ fair share?
• What constitutional rights do peasants possess? Will the Chinese Constitution be amended soon? If so, what will be the impacts?
• What are some other mechanisms of capturing land value? What are the merits and drawbacks of these mechanisms, and will they work in China? If so, how can the government make them work?

Land Acquisition Reform

It is hard to anticipate how Chinese officials will address these questions, but rapid urbanization and massive infrastructure provision will inevitably increase land values over the next two decades. Recognizing the enormous problems associated with land acquisition, several cities have adopted different approaches to protect farmers’ rights and interests so their lives will not be adversely affected. These approaches include:

• Joint ventures (Shanghai). Collectives share stock in the land they transfer for projects. In return, they receive annual cash payments equivalent to average profits from farming.
• Extra allowance for construction on land in villages (Shuzhou). Local governments strictly control the amount of nonagricultural construction on land owned by a collective. By providing an extra allowance for nonagricultural land, villages are able to pursue economic activities other than agriculture and are able to generate income simply by renting out their land for nonagricultural purposes.
• Combination of cash resettlement and provision of social security funds (Zhuzhou and Jiaxing). The population in a village where land will be acquired is divided into three age groups: youth, adults and elders. The younger residents are paid a cash compensation. The cash compensation for adults is double the youth amount and half of it is earmarked for job training. Those two groups are compensated upfront in a lump sum payment. The local government establishes a social security fund for the elderly so they are paid on a monthly basis rather than in a lump sum fashion. The amount of their pay is equivalent to the minimum standard set by governments for urban laid-off workers.
• Compensation based on location, not previous land use (Nanjing City). This example is closer to compensation based on farmland markets.

The Chinese government is taking other measures, such as attempting to make the land acquisition process more transparent so farmers know where and when their land will be acquired and how much they will be compensated for it. This transparency will also help to reduce corruption and improve land management. There is also an urgent need to establish legal channels for farmers to file appeals and protests against governments in compulsory land acquisition cases. The development of farmland markets may challenge land acquisition and also may have substantial impacts on fiscal policy and government financing.

All of these efforts will change both the way land will be taken from farmers and how the issues and challenges of land acquisition will be addressed. Although it is too early to predict how and to what extent these measures and reforms may affect urban and rural development, China is certain to be one of the most fascinating and dynamic places for continuing research and study of land policy reform and societal transformation.

Chengri Ding is associate professor in the Department of Urban Studies and Planning at the University of Maryland, in College Park. He specializes in urban economics, housing and land studies, GIS and spatial analysis. He is also special assistant to the president of the Lincoln Institute for the Program on the People’s Republic of China.

Note: RMB is the Chinese currency; US$1=8.20RMB.

A well-functioning property tax system could offer many benefits to the nations of sub-Saharan Africa. At a time of decentralization, when local governments are being asked to assume new responsibilities for services and infrastructure in such countries as Sierra Leone, South Africa, and Uganda, a dependable and locally administered source of revenue would greatly benefit local democracy and economic development. It could improve the standard of living in local communities on a continent still grappling with abject poverty and poor governance.

Faculty Profile, John H. Bowman

Cities are both contributors to and victims of global climate change. Delta cities, in particular, have long been recognized as being extremely vulnerable because they are located where the stresses on natural systems coincide with intense human activity.

A number of climate change impacts may affect delta cities, including rising sea levels, infrastructure damage from extreme weather events, the public health implications of higher average temperatures, altered energy consumption patterns, stress on water resources, impacts on tourism and cultural heritage, decreased urban biodiversity, and ancillary effects on air pollution (IPCC 2007). Climate change also may affect physical assets used for economic production and services, as well as the costs of raw materials and inputs, which in turn will affect competitiveness, economic performance, and employment patterns.

China’s remarkable economic growth since the beginning of the country’s reform period in 1978 has concentrated a large share of population and wealth along the coast, especially in three megacity regions: Pearl River Delta, Yangtze River Delta, and Capital Region. While the potential implications of climate change pose a challenge for coastal communities around the world, this geographic concentration of population and economic activity seems disproportionate in China.

Among China’s coastal and delta regions, the Pearl River Delta (PRD) in Guangdong province is an important economic center that includes the cities of Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and seven prefecture-level municipalities. Together with Hong Kong and Macao, the greater PRD area is one of the key megacity regions in the world, but its geography makes it highly vulnerable to sea level rise. Unprecedented economic and urban development, along with the major changes in land use and land cover accompanying that development over the past three decades, has released large emissions of CO₂, leading to higher temperatures and more intensive and extreme weather events (Tracy, Trumbull, and Loh 2006). Given the importance of this region to both China and the broader global economy, we take a closer look at the PRD’s contribution to and risks from climate change.

Industrialization and Urbanization

With the establishment of the Shenzhen and Zhuhai Special Economic Zone in 1980, the PRD was among the earliest regions in China to begin to liberalize its economy. Its institutional advantages, combined with its proximity to Hong Kong and Macao, made the PRD the fastest growing region in the world during the past three decades. From 1979 to 2008, the PRD’s GDP grew at 15.6 percent annually in constant prices, outpacing both the national rate of 9.77 percent and the provincial rate of 13.8 percent.

As a result, the delta’s contribution to the share of GDP in China soared from 2.8 percent in 1979 to 9.5 percent in 2008. In terms of total fixed investment, foreign direct investment, exports, and energy consumption, the PRD was one of the most important and dynamic economic regions in China during this period (figure 1).

This rapid development resulted from the dual process of industrialization and urbanization. The region’s secondary and tertiary industries have grown rapidly as primary industry has gradually decreased in relative economic importance, with its contribution to GDP declining from 26.9 percent in 1979 to 2.4 percent in 2008, while the tertiary service sector grew from 27.9 percent to 47.3 percent.

Over the same time, the population increased from 17.97 to 47.71 million residents, reaching an urbanization rate of 82.2 percent in 2008. In terms of land use, areas designated for manufacturing, residential, and commercial uses grew by 8.47 percent annually, increasing from 1,068.7 square kilometers (k2) in 1979 to 4,617.16 k2 in 2008 (figure 2).

Climate Changes

Given these dramatic land use changes and the region’s increased emissions of greenhouse gases, it is not surprising that the PRD has experienced noticeable regional climate changes. The Guangdong Meteorological Administration (2007) reported that the average temperature increase in Guangdong province over the past five decades has been 0.21 °C every 10 years, which is similar to the rate of warming seen nationally in China. Guangdong’s coastal region, especially the highly urbanized PRD, witnessed even greater temperature increases, averaging 0.3 °C every 10 years. The cities of Shenzhen, Dongguan, Zhongshan, and Foshan warmed more than 0.4 °C every 10 years.

After compiling data from 21 meteorological stations in the PRD region, we calculated the average annual and seasonal temperatures during the 1971–2008 period and compared them with the annual temperatures in Guangdong. Our research showed the PRD has experienced significant warming and has been hotter than the entire Guangdong province during the observed period. Since the 1970s, the PRD has seen its average temperature rise by approximately 1.19 °C to 22.89 °C in the most recent decade, with annual average temperatures remaining above the region’s 30-year average temperature of 22.1 °C since 1994 (figure 3).

The winter and autumn seasons saw the most considerable temperature increases, with averages of 24.1 °C in the autumn and 15.2 °C in the winter between 1994 and 2007. These temperatures are significantly higher than their respective 40-year averages of 23.5 °C and 14.6 °C. While not as significant, average spring and summer temperatures in the PRD during the 1997–2007 period were also greater than their 40-year average temperatures of 22 °C and 28.2 °C. This regional warming phenomenon is also seen to a lesser degree in Guangzhou, a populous and characteristic metropolis in the PRD, where average temperatures have risen like those in the greater delta region.

As the PRD’s climate has warmed more quickly than that in the rest of the province, the rapid industrialization and urbanization has generated enormous energy demand from manufacturing industries, transportation, and residential consumers, resulting in greater emissions of CO₂ and other greenhouse gases that are contributing to global climate change. The increased concentration of greenhouse gases, both regionally and globally, represents a large latent source of future warming and additional changes.

Impacts of Climate Change

Given its coastal geography and population density, Guangdong is among the most vulnerable of China’s coastal provinces to the sort of meteorological disasters that are expected to increase with global warming. In 2008, Guangdong experienced direct economic losses of 15.43 billion yuan and 73 deaths, accounting for 75 percent and 48 percent of national totals, respectively, as well as the loss of 602 kilometers (km) of land to coastal erosion (table 1). With sea levels in the province having risen by 75 millimeters (mm) during the 1975–1993 period, the China Meteorological Administration’s (2009b) prediction that sea levels will rise a further 78–150 mm between 2008 and 2038 represents a serious threat to coastal infrastructure and communities in the PRD.

Guangdong has long been impacted by marine hazards such as rainstorms, cyclones, and storm surges that have killed hundreds of people, caused serious damage to housing and transportation infrastructure, and impacted farming in the province. In the 1950s, the annual average farming area affected by marine hazards was about 200,000 hectares (ha), which grew to 440,000 ha in the 1960s and 500,000 ha in the 1970s, before jumping to 1,411,000 ha in the 1990s.

In addition to more frequent extreme storm events, instances of drought also have been increasing in the PRD. In the 1950s, the average farming area affected by droughts in Guangdong was 104,000 ha, which grew steadily to reach 201,500 ha in the 1980s, 282,500 ha in the 1990s, and 426,400 ha in the 2000s. Given the expected increases in the frequency of extreme weather events, as well as rising temperatures and sea levels, agricultural and mariculture activities in the PRD will be increasingly vulnerable to future climate change.

Cities in the PRD are particularly susceptible to natural disasters and climate change as they concentrate infrastructure, nonagricultural activities, and population, severely impacting economic activities and daily life. Rainstorms and typhoons occur frequently in the region and typically entail serious damage and huge economic losses. During the 2000–2007 period, for instance, rainstorms and typhoons in Shenzhen caused cumulative direct economic losses of 525 and 277 million yuan respectively, accounting for approximately for 63 and 33 percent of total direct economic losses associated with all meteorological hazards in the city (figure 4).

Meteorological hazards also lead to disruptive impacts on facilities, infrastructure, and transportation. Rainstorms and typhoons impose challenges on urban sewage systems and flood control facilities, while prolonged periods of high or low temperatures exert pressure on urban power supply infrastructure.

In May 2009, Shenzhen experienced an unprecedented rainstorm, with some parts of the city receiving daily precipitation in excess of 208 mm. The storm flooded 40 areas of the city and left 11 areas under at least one meter of water. Two years before, in April 2007, rainstorms flooded the Qinghuhe River in Shenzhen, damaging embankments and toppling power lines. On the other end of the spectrum, in July 2004 Guangzhou suffered a prolonged heat wave that created tremendous demand for electricity. Usage eventually peaked at 8.45 million kilowatts and forced many enterprises to stop production to help conserve power.

Transportation is the lifeline of urban activity and economic production. As two of China’s major population and economic centers, Shenzhen and Guangzhou are particularly important national transportation hubs, and any disruptions from extreme weather events such as rainstorms, typhoons, and flooding have far-reaching effects across the country.

When tropical storm Fengshen landed in Shenzhen on June 24, 2008, the city’s Yantian seaport was forced to close and hundreds of vessels were stuck in port, resulting in huge economic losses. During 2008, four tropical storms and one rainstorm resulted in the cancellation of 249 flights and the delay of 386 other flights at the Shenzhen International Airport, stranding more than 20,000 passengers. In 2009, three major weather events caused the cancellation of 176 flights and the delay of 326 flights, while 4,151 ships were forced to take shelter in Yantian port. As Chinese travelers become more affluent and air travel grows more rapidly, the vulnerability of these cities to disruption by severe weather events is set to increase.

Disruptive Effects of Sea Level Rise

The China Meteorological Administration (2009b) has identified the PRD as one of the country’s areas most at risk from rising sea levels due to its low mean sea level. Previous studies concur that sea levels in the PRD are rising and will continue to do so in the foreseeable future. Figure 5 illustrates the changes in sea level recorded at three tidal gauges (Hong Kong, Zha Po, and Shan Tou) during the 1958–2001 period. Hong Kong recorded a sea level rise of 0.24 centimeters per year (cm/year) during the period, while Zha Po and Shan Tou saw sea levels rise by 0.21cm/year and 0.13cm/year, respectively. Tidal records from six different gauges in the Pearl River estuary show that sea levels have risen at an accelerating rate over the last 40 years.

With the melting of glaciers globally due to climate change, these recent rises in sea level are expected to continue and potentially even accelerate. Li and Zeng (1998) offered three forecasts for sea level rise in the PRD, with 100 cm (high), 65 cm (middle), and 35 cm (low) forecasts by 2100. These predictions have been echoed by similar projections from the Chinese Academy of Sciences (1994), which indicate that sea levels in the PRD would rise by 40 to 60 cm by 2050.

The physical geography and urban development of the delta render it extremely vulnerable to the effects of sea level rise, and many lowland areas are likely to be inundated (Yang 1996). According to calculations by China’s National Marine Data and Information Service, a sea level rise of 30 cm could inundate an area of 1,154 k2 of coast and islands at high tide, with Guangzhou, Doumen County, and Foshan at particular risk (Guangdong Meteorological Administration 2007).

Coastal and river flooding in the PRD is influenced by several factors: rainfall, high tides, high winds, and typhoons and storm surges. The combination of weather and tidal factors that causes water levels to rise by upwards of three meters during tidal cycles is already well known in parts of the Pearl River Estuary (Tracy, Trumbull, and Loh 2006). According to Huang, Zong, and Zhang (2004), the current maximum tidal range increases as one travels up the estuary, from a low of 2.34 meters near Hong Kong to 3.31 meters at Zhewan, before reaching 3.35 meters at Nansha.

Rising sea levels would magnify the effect of storm surges, which already can be dramatic when weather and tidal factors coincide. Analyzing records from 54 tidal gauges across the PRD, Huang, Zong, and Zhang (2004) created predictions for water level rises in different parts of the delta under a number of different flood scenarios. According to the lowest freshwater discharge scenario (2000 m2/s), their simulations show that a 30 cm sea level rise will affect the northwest part of the region most severely and the majority of the area significantly. These researchers also simulated the impacts of a 30 cm sea level rise on the distribution of flood damage based on four freshwater discharge scenarios, showing that as floods increase in severity the size of the areas affected also increases.

Summary and Discussion

Delta cities enjoy locational advantages that make them attractive to both residents and businesses, and thereby lead many delta regions to develop into vital economic cores in many countries. Delta cities, however, are particularly vulnerable to meteorological hazards and are more at risk than inland cities to the existing and anticipated effects of climate change. The Pearl River Delta has witnessed substantial increases in both sea levels and temperatures, greater variation in rainfall, more frequent extreme weather events, and increasing losses from marine hazards.

More frequent meteorological hazards such as flooding from tropical storms and rainfalls have indeed caused disruptive impacts in the PRD: disrupting agricultural and mariculture production, damaging coastal defenses and embankments, destroying houses and facilities, shutting down transportation, and causing the loss of life. Sea level rise resulting from global warming represents a further threat and challenge in many parts of the region. The cumulative impact of these interrelated weather and climate phenomena have increased the costs of development in the PRD substantially. Fortunately, provincial and municipal governments have realized the importance of climate mitigation and adaptation, and are looking to the experiences of other delta cities around the world for valuable lessons about how best to strengthen urban sustainability and resiliency.

References

China Meteorological Administration. 2009a. China marine hazards report 2008. Beijing.

———. 2009b. China sea level report 2008. Beijing.

Chinese Academy of Sciences. 1994. The impact of sea level rise on economic development of the Pearl River Delta. In The impacts of sea level rise on China’s delta regions. Beijing: Science Press.

Du, Yao-dong, Li-li Song, Hui-qing Mao, Hai-yan Tang, and An-gao Xu. 2004. Climate warming in Guangdong province and its influences on agriculture and counter measures. Journal of Tropical Meteorology 10(2): 150–159.

Guangdong Meteorological Administration. 2007. Assessment report on climate change in Guangdong. www.gdemo.gov.cn

He, Canfei, Lei Yang, and Guicai Li. 2010. Urban development and climate change in the Pearl River Delta. Working Paper. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Huang, Z., Y. Zong, and W. Zhang. 2004. Coastal inundation due to sea level rise in the Pearl River Delta, China. Natural Hazards 33: 247–264.

IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). 2007. Climate change 2007: Impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Li, P., and Z. Zeng. 1998. On the climatic and environmental changes in the Pearl River Delta during the last 500 years. Quaternary Sciences 1: 65–70.

Tracy, A., K. Trumbull, and C. Loh. 2006. The impacts of climate change in Hong Kong and the Pearl River Delta. Hong Kong: Civic Exchange.

Wu, Y. and Li, H. 2009. Meteorological disasters and hazard evaluations in Shenzhen since 2000. Guangdong Meteorology. 31(3): 43-45 (in Chinese).

Yang, H. 1996. Potential effects of sea-level rise in the Pearl River Delta area: Preliminary study results and a comprehensive adaptation strategy. In Adapting to climate change: An international perspective, J. N. Smith, et al., eds. New York: Springer-Verlag.

About the Authors

Canfei Heis professor in the College of Urban and Environmental Sciences, Peking University, and associate director of the Peking University–Lincoln Institute Center for Urban Development and Land Policy. He is also the associate director of the Economic Geography Specialty Group of the China Geographical Society. His research interests include multinational corporations, industrial location and spatial clustering of firms, and energy and the environment in China, and his publications appear in many international journals.

Lei Yang is a Ph.D. student in Shenzhen Graduate School of Peking University.

For planning processes to resolve the pressing issues of our day—such as climate change, traffic congestion, and social justice—plans must be made at the appropriate scale, must promulgate appropriate implementation tools, and must be enforced with legitimate authority. That is, our ability to meet critical challenges depends on the legal and institutional foundations of planning.

In the United States, responsibility for establishing these foundations for planning rests with the states, which in turn have delegated most land use authority to local governments. In Europe, the foundations of planning are established by each country, whose planning systems often feature national and regional plans as well as a mosaic of local plans. For better and for worse, these institutional foundations have framed the planning process on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean for most of the post-war period. But as the scope of our planning challenges continues to broaden, and discontent with the status quo continues to spread, several states and European nations have begun to experiment with new and innovative approaches to planning.

The opportunity to explore and discuss these issues brought scholars, practitioners, students, and others to Dublin, Ireland, in October 2012 for a two-day seminar sponsored by the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy and organized by the School of Geography, Planning, and Environmental Policy at University College Dublin and the National Center for Smart Growth at the University of Maryland. Held in the historic Newman House on St. Stephen’s Green, the meetings featured overview papers on planning in the United States and Europe and case studies of five U.S. states and five European nations. Each presentation was followed by commentary from a high-level official from the corresponding state or nation (see box 1).

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Box 1: Papers Presented at the Dublin Seminar on Planning for States and Nation/States, October 2012

Bierbaum, Marty
The New Jersey State Development Plan

Faludi, Andreas
The Europeanisation of Planning and the Role of ESPON

Fulton, Bill
Planning for Climate Change in California

Galland, Daniel
The Danish National Spatial Planning Framework

Geppert, Anna
Spatial Planning in France

Grist, Berna
The Irish National Spatial Strategy

Knaap, Gerrit
PlanMaryland: A Work in Progress

Lewis, Rebecca
The Delaware State Development Plan

Needham, Barrie
The National Spatial Strategy for The Netherlands

Salkin, Patricia
Planning Frameworks in the United States and the Role of the Federal Government

Seltzer, Ethan
Land Use Planning in Oregon: The Quilt and the Struggle for Scale

Tewdwer-Jones, Mark
National Planning for the United Kingdom

For more information about the seminar, see the program website: http://www.ucd.ie/gpep/events/seminarsworkshopsconferences/natplansymp2012

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A Framework for Spatial Planning in Europe

Planning in Europe is governed by a variety of traditions and governance structures (Faludi 2012). Some European nations have “unitary” governance structures, in which all land use authority ultimately rests with the national government. Italy and Spain have “regional” governance structures, in which land use authority is constitutionally shared between the national government and regional governments. Austria, Belgium, and Germany have “federalist” governance structures, in which particular land use functions are distributed among the national, regional, and local governments. Within these frameworks a variety of planning cultures and traditions have evolved: “amenagement duterritoire” in France; “town and country planning” in the UK; “Raumordnung” in Germany; and “ruimtelijke ordening” in The Netherlands. While these terms generally connote what “urban planning” means in the United States, there are important, nuanced, and fiercely defended differences.

The expression for urban planning used by the European Union is “spatial planning” (European Commission 1997, 24).

“Spatial planning refers to the methods used largely by the public sector to influence the future distribution of activities in space. It is undertaken with the aims of creating a more rational territorial organization of land uses and the linkages between them, to balance demands for development with the need to protect the environment, and to achieve social and economic objectives.

“Spatial planning embraces measures to co-ordinate the spatial impact of other sectoral policies, to achieve a more even distribution of economic development between regions than would otherwise be created by market forces, and to regulate the conversion of land and property uses.”

The European Union has no authority to engage in spatial planning, but directly influences spatial planning outcomes through regional development initiatives, environmental directives, and structural and cohesion funding. This goal is articulated in the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP) signed in 1998 by the ministers responsible for spatial planning in the member states and the members of the European Commission responsible for regional policy (Faludi 2002).

Modern spatial planning in the European context is broadly understood to include national, regional, and local planning, where national plans provide broad national development strategies and guidelines for plans at lower levels of government; regional plans integrate physical development with social, economic, and environmental policies but without site-level specificity; and local plans are site-specific and address the physical and urban design elements of the built environment. While none of the planning frameworks for the member nations matches this neat hierarchical ideal exactly, the ESDP has influenced planning activity in every nation.

The ESDP itself is based on longstanding European planning traditions dating to World War II, when national development or reconstruction plans were indisputably necessary for post-war reparations. Many European nations still have national development plans and complementary national spatial strategies. But the influence and importance of those plans has diminished steadily since reconstruction. In the last decade in particular, nations once known for their ambitious and extensive commitment to planning—France, Denmark, and the United Kingdom among them—have failed to adopt new national plans and expressly placed greater emphasis on regional and local plans.

National European Spatial Strategies and Frameworks

France

Although France is a unitary, centralized nationstate, the national government has never played a leading role in spatial planning. Rather, responsibility for spatial planning was officially transferred to regional and local governments in devolutionary reforms adopted in 1982 and 2003 (Geppert 2012). Although coordination between governments at different levels continues, this process results more often in joint investment strategies rather than in shared spatial visions or common objectives. Before most other nations, the French national government began focusing less on spatial planning and more on sectoral policies, leaving spatial issues for lower levels of government.

Denmark

Planning in Denmark historically began with a comprehensive national planning framework (Galland 2012). Over the last two decades, however, as a result of interrelated political and economic factors, the land use roles of national, local, and regional governments within the national territory have significantly transformed the scope, structure, and understanding of Danish spatial planning (figure 1).

Among the implications of this reform, several spatial planning responsibilities have been decentralized to the local level while regional planning for Greater Copenhagen and other sectoral functions have been transferred to the national level. Moreover, the recent abolition of the county level of government has increased the risk of uncoordinated spatial planning and decreased coherence across diverse policy institutions and instruments.

The Netherlands

The Netherlands has perhaps the longest and best-known tradition of national spatial planning, and its plans include industrial as well as detailed spatial policies (Needham 2012). For several decades, Dutch national plans influenced the distribution of people and activities throughout the country. In the first decades after World War II, all levels of government—national, provincial, and municipal—tended to work together in their spatial planning. In the 1990s, however, they started to move apart. In response, the national government strengthened its own powers over the local governments (a form of centralization), and at the same time reduced its own ambitions to pursue a national spatial strategy (a form of decentralization). The latest national spatial strategy expressly withdraws from some planning tasks previously carried out by the national government.

United Kingdom

In the early 1900s, the UK Parliament divested its direct powers to plan; instead, the powers of intervention, new state housing development, and regulation of private housing development were handed over to local governments (Tewdwr-Jones 2012). In the following decades, the central government did acquire new planning powers of its own as a consequence of World War II and the need to rebuild cities, infrastructure, and the economy in the national interest. Since 1945, central government has retained these powers, while also permitting the monitoring of local authorities in their operation of the planning system.

These powers have changed dramatically over the last 70 years. After 1999, devolution in Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland further fragmented the meaning of “national” in policy and planning terms. During the 2000s, the push toward regional spatial planning in England also rebalanced national planning matters toward sub-national interests. As a result of this trend in devolution, decentralization, regionalism, and localism over the last 20 years, it is increasingly questionable whether the UK now possesses anything that could be regarded as a national planning system, since so much has changed spatially and within policy-making institutions and processes across different parts of the country.

Ireland

Ireland is one of few European nations not following the trend toward decentralization of planning authority, partly due to the fact that its planning system has been fully decentralized (Grist 2012). Largely following EU guidelines, Ireland adopted a series of national development plans, the latest one being the National Development Plan 2007–2013. Based on recommendations in the previous national plan, the Department of Environment, Community and Local Government in 2002 developed the Ireland National Spatial Strategy. This strategy identified critical gateways and hubs and articulated plans to decentralize economic activity from Dublin and throughout the island.

Following a turbulent period that saw the rise and fall of the Celtic Tiger, blamed in part on lax local planning policies allied with extensive incentivizing of property development and political corruption, the country is now revisiting that strategy, strengthening regional development guidelines, and imposing new consistency requirements on local governments.

Under the new evidence-based planning regime, local plans must conform more closely with regional planning guidelines, and local plans will have quantitative limits on how much development can be allowed. The future role of the National Spatial Strategy is currently in the review process as the new government, elected following the property crash in Ireland, examines the planning and development issues that prevailed during the property bubble.

The Federal Government and Land Use in the United States

The U.S. federal government, like the European Union, has no authority to plan and manage land use, but probably has a greater influence on the location and nature of development patterns (Salkin 2012). Besides the billions of dollars it allocates for transportation infrastructure, social services, development, and redevelopment, the federal government is a major landowner of more than 630 million acres across the country. Federal regulations are also highly influential. The Clean Air and Water Acts, for example, impose no restrictions on land use per se, but in establishing targets for ambient air quality and nutrient loadings to rivers, lakes, and streams, both acts profoundly influence local land use plans, regulations, and development patterns.

More recently, President Barack Obama’s administration has established a new channel of federal influence on land use planning and regulation. While the federal government continues to refrain from direct intervention in local land use governance, the secretaries of the Departments of Transportation and Housing and Urban Development and of the Environmental Protection Agency signed a memorandum of understanding establishing the Sustainable Communities Partnership. To promote six principles of sustainable communities, these agencies launched a number of new grants programs, including the Regional Sustainable Communities Planning Grants. To be eligible for such a grant, local governments must form inter-organizational consortia that include the metropolitan planning organization (MPO), the central city, the majority of local governments, and a representation of civic and advocacy groups.

While the stated purposes of these path-breaking grants include urban revitalization, environmental protection, social justice, and sustainable development, an equally important purpose is to establish new inter-institutional relationships by promoting greater inclusion and participation. Regional Sustainable Communities Planning is now underway in 74 metropolitan areas across the country. It remains to be seen, however, whether the incentives offered to local governments to engage in regional planning are sufficient to get them to participate in regional plan implementation without additional state-level intervention.

State Plans and State Planning Frameworks

Every state established a framework for local planning and regulation in the 1920s and 1930s based on the standard planning and zoning enabling acts prepared by the U.S. Department of Commerce. Despite expectations of extensive institutional change, characterized in the “Quiet Revolution” more than 40 years ago, most states merely authorize local governments to plan (Salkin 2012).

Others, like Oregon, mandate, review, and approve local plans (Seltzer 2012). If local governments do not submit plans that meet the state’s land use goals and guidelines, the state can withhold funds or the authority to issue building permits. Several unique land use institutions also support the Oregon planning system, including a state planning commission, a land use court of appeals, and a directly elected regional government. Though simple in structure, and frequently challenged in the courts and at the ballot box, the Oregon system has a reputation as one of the most, if not the most, effective land use systems in the United States (Ingram et al. 2009).

California is among the states that delegated substantial land use authority to local governments. Although major development projects have to pass a complex mini-National Environment Policy Act process, and the California Coastal Commission was an innovative new statewide institution in its day, local planning remains dominant. But in 2008, the state adopted a bold new initiative to address climate change—Senate Bill 375, which required MPOs to develop transportation and land use plans that meet state greenhouse gas targets. The difficulty is that local governments, not MPOs, retain land use authority in California. MPOs and the state governments are providing incentives for local governments to adopt plans that conform with metropolitan plans, but it remains uncertain whether the combination of financial and other incentives are sufficient to nudge local governments to follow the MPO plans (Fulton 2012).

At the other extreme, plans for entire states are not common in the United States. In response to federal requirements, most states do have transportation plans, and some have economic development plans, workforce development plans, or climate action plans, but only five have state development plans—Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, and Rhode Island.

New Jersey and Delaware have perhaps the best- and least-known state plans, respectively. New Jersey adopted its State Planning Act in 1985, requiring the state planning commission to develop, adopt, and implement the New Jersey State Development and Redevelopment Plan (Bierbaum 2012). The planning process included a complex cross-acceptance procedure for identifying and resolving differences between the state and local governments. Since its adoption, the influence of and attention received by the plan has ebbed and flowed over successive gubernatorial administrations. Most recently, Governor Chris Christie’s administration developed an entirely new state plan, focused primarily on economic development without the cross-acceptance process. The state plan commission, however, has not yet adopted the plan.

The Delaware plan is much less well-known and far less controversial than the New Jersey plan, and both the content and process are less complex (Lewis 2012). The Delaware plan includes five general land designations (figure 2). It depends on state-local coordination and relies on the threat of withholding infrastructure funding (of which the state pays a significant share) to incentivize compliance by local governments. Because the state did not begin tracking data on development patterns until 2008, and does not maintain spatial data on state expenditures, it is difficult to discern the impact of the approach on development and the consistency of state spending with the state plan map.

Maryland is the only state that rivals California and Oregon in its adoption of bold new approaches to planning, based on its long tradition of leadership in land use and environmental policy (Knaap 2012). Maryland established the first state plan commission in 1933, and broke into the national spotlight in 1997, when it adopted the path-breaking Smart Growth and Neighborhood Conservation Act. Since 1997 the use of state expenditures to provide incentives for smart growth has been the signature feature of the Maryland approach. Long before anyone in Maryland spoke the words “smart growth,” however, the state had passed legislation in 1959 that required the Maryland Department of Planning to develop and adopt a state development plan. More than 50 years later, the administration of Governor Martin O’Malley finally met that requirement.

On December 19, 2011, Governor O’Malley signed PlanMaryland, establishing the first new state development plan in the United States in many years (figure 3). But unlike state plans in New Jersey or Delaware, the Maryland plan is more procedural than substantive. Specifically, it established six plan designation categories and, following a longstanding Maryland tradition, enabled local governments to allocate land for any or all designated uses. State agencies would then target programmatic funds to each of these areas. Since the plan was signed, state agencies have been developing and refining implementation plans, and local governments have just recently begun submitting plans for state certification.

Concluding Comments

The frameworks for land use and spatial planning vary extensively across Europe and the United States. On both sides of the Atlantic, local governments carry much of the load, especially with respect to community, neighborhood, and site-specific details. But the role of regions, states, and nations remains important.

Contrary to its reputation in the United States, planning in many European nations has decentralized extensively. Few European nations are engaged in full-scale national plans that guide national investments and land use regulations. In fact, planning in Europe, while still far more comprehensive in sectoral details than in the United States, shares many policy features with its North American counterpart. An interesting exception is Ireland, which continues to expand the role of national and regional governments partly as a response to the recent period of extremely decentralized planning that failed to take into account and implement the national strategy. Ireland is also one of the few countries adhering to the broad principles of spatial planning formally adopted by the European Union.

In the United States, neither state development planning nor state approval of local plans is a rapidly growing practice. Indeed, despite the demonstrated success of the Oregon program and the growing recognition of the need for horizontal and vertical policy integration, land use planning in the United States remains a fiercely local affair. Although both the state of California and the federal government are providing financial incentives for intergovernmental coordination and planning at the metropolitan scale, it remains far from certain that incentives alone will secure the changes in local plans and regulations required to institute meaningful adjustments in land consumption, travel behavior, and access to opportunities.

New approaches are needed to make cites and metropolitan areas more productive, equitable, and environmentally sustainable in light of anticipated challenges in the future. If these issues cannot be addressed adequately, other kinds of experiments in institutional planning reforms may become more common in many countries.

About the Authors

Gerrit Knaap is professor of urban studies and planning, director of the National Center for Smart Growth, and associate dean of the School of Architecture, Planning, and Preservation at the University of Maryland.

Zorica Nedovic-Budic is professor of spatial planning and geographic information systems (GIS) in the School of Geography, Planning and Environmental Policy at University College Dublin.

References

Denmark Ministry of the Environment. 2006. The 2006 national planning report–In brief. Copenhagen. http://www.sns.dk/udgivelser/2006/87-7279-728-2/html/default_eng.htm

European Commission. 1997. The EU compendium of spatial planning systems and policies. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.

Faludi, Andreas. 2002. European spatial planning. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Ingram, Gregory K., Armando Carbonell, Yu-Hung Hong, and Anthony Flint. 2009. Smart growth policies: An evaluation of programs and outcomes. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.