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Since its inception just over a year ago, the Northeast State Planning (NESP) Leadership Retreat has been a valuable professional development tool for state planners from Maine to Maryland. This collaboration between Lincoln Institute and Regional Plan Association (RPA) brings together high-level state officials to discuss current state planning issues. After only two annual meetings the participants from 11 northeast states already have implemented ideas discussed with their peers, and a few states have initiated and built smart growth planning and community development schemes inspired by this interstate exchange.
At the second retreat held in March 2000, the participants shared new ideas and success stories, addressed “the do’s and don’ts” of building state planning programs, and took steps toward establishing an economic development program for the northeast corridor. They compared state growth management initiatives in the Northeast to those occurring in the rest of the country, and traded caveats and suggestions on how to sustain political support in the face of a changing economy, bipartisan politics and conflicting interests.
Smart Growth Across the Nation
According to John M. DeGrove, Eminent Scholar of Growth Management and Development at Florida Atlantic University, a new and bipartisan commitment to smart growth is developing across the United States. No longer is the nation enshrouded in a “no-planning” or “planning in isolation” mindset by state and local governments.
As the keynote speaker at the retreat, DeGrove outlined prerequisite factors crucial to a sustainable smart growth program. A primary realization is that the protection of natural systems and the revitalization of urban systems on a local level should happen concurrently with support and coordination from state agencies. Executive leadership can strengthen state legislative initiatives and is usually crucial to program development and implementation. The involvement of diverse coalitions can also be critical in accelerating a smart growth agenda at the state level.
For a progressive smart growth program to survive, there must be an impetus to place growth management in a state or regional framework bolstered by strong incentives and disincentives. State actions linked to federal programs-TEA 21, the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and the possible renewed funding of the Land and Water Conservation Fund-can enhance the success of strategic, comprehensive planning. Finally, bottom-up coalition building, grassroots efforts, and state agency coordination should be used in place of or in conjunction with top-down approaches. Experiences in Maryland and Pennsylvania have shown that such processes are effective.
Patricia Salkin, associate dean and director of the Government Law Center of Albany Law School in New York, is also at the forefront of growth management research. She has compiled and analyzed information about state planning programs across the country, citing gubernatorial support and legislative reforms as the primary factors driving smart growth programs. She reported that gubernatorial support is generally strong in the Northeast and is growing in such states as Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Minnesota, North Carolina, Utah and Wisconsin.
Salkin mentioned three main categories of legislative reform: 1) recodification and tightening of existing laws, 2) authorization for innovative and flexible controls, and 3) major overhauls. As examples, Oklahoma’s Senate Bill 1151 created a Planning and Land Use Legislative Study Task Force to evaluate the effectiveness of current laws, review model legislation, and identify public information needs; California’s Assembly Bill 1575, encourages innovative land use policies such as unified county plans; and Tennessee is undertaking a study to overhaul its planning and growth management framework and replace it with a smart growth program.
Sustaining Political Support
Sustaining political support for smart growth plans is a challenging task. Bipartisan politics, influential lobbying interests, changes in administration, and home rule are just a few of the most commonly mentioned obstacles to comprehensive, regional programs that address urban, suburban, rural and conservation issues. Arguably, the current strong economy may be facilitating smart growth incentives as many states, especially in the Northeast, offer monetary and capital rewards to municipalities whose policies are consistent with state and regional plans.
A number of common practices on this topic were outlined at the retreat. State agencies such as the office of planning or the department of community affairs may develop coalitions with entities other than fellow state agencies, especially if the “state” is seen as a meddling force in local issues. Some success stories tell of coalition building with elder communities, religious leaders and faith-based communities. Others have tried the silent partner approach in a public/private venture. Most importantly, the political force of local voices can be potent in getting local officials, state congressional representatives and agencies involved.
One key area that requires cautious handling is the presentation and dissemination of information. When plans move from general to specific, care must be taken to allow a broad range of interests to perceive personal and community benefits at the present time and through continued participation in the future. The use of proper terminology is also crucial. For example, in a politically driven world, executives may strive to separate themselves from counterparts with original ideas and phraseology. A state can gain distinction by interchanging the prevalent term “smart growth” with “community preservation,” or “locally designated growth areas” with “urban growth boundaries.”
Political support also can be sustained by creating educational programs to address the planning needs of a community. Training and curricula can be developed for elected public officials and for citizens appointed to planning boards, board of appeals and historic preservation committees. Some efforts have even begun to institutionalize planning studies at the elementary, middle and high school levels. Stamford, Connecticut, for example, is engaged in a program modeled after the recycling movement to encourage school children to bring home planning issues and initiate their family’s involvement in the development and growth of their communities.
Revitalizing the Northeast Corridor
Numerous areas around the globe have adopted the regional corridor concept of economic development. Major capital campaigns are in the process of feasibility analysis or implementation in such diverse locations as California’s San Francisco to San Diego corridor and China’s Beijing to Shanghai corridor. Representatives from several northeast states reported that they are working collaboratively to encourage the economic development of their corridor. Transportation, especially the utilization of rail, is an essential component of the strategy to move goods and people more efficiently throughout the Northeast. Of particular interest is linking the economies of mid-sized cities with the region’s megalopolis anchors-Washington, DC, New York and Boston. The intermediary cities include Providence, RI; Hartford, New Haven, Bridgeport and Stamford, CT; Newark and Trenton, NJ; Philadelphia, PA; Baltimore, MD; and Wilmington, DE.
This planning group, led by the Regional Plan Association, will create a vision and mission statement for the project and then conduct an economic analysis to quantify the benefits. Once a plan is formulated, its cost will be calculated and a timeline will detail the phasing-in of each segment. The participants will then begin an outreach effort to gain backing from various state and local officials, as well as advocacy groups and community representatives. Amtrak, the main source of passenger rail in the corridor, plans to have its high-speed regional train service on-line in late 2000, and a number of partnerships could evolve from the already active advocacy efforts of several groups, such as the National Corridors Initiative/NCI, the I-95 Corridor Coalition, and the Coalition of Northeastern Governors (CONEG). A diverse coalition of business, civic and nonprofit organizations may be instrumental in advancing a regional economic development instrument.
A Southeastern Massachusetts Case Study
The planning retreat culminated with an exercise that looked at the rural southeastern region of Massachusetts where the Commonwealth and the Executive Office of Environmental Affairs (EOEA) are planning to cultivate a bioreserve. Now in its initial stages, this program seeks to preserve vast tracts of valuable land, including forests and wetlands, and curb haphazard and uncoordinated development. The area of concern is the largest high-yield, sole-source aquifer in Massachusetts, with close to 70,000 acres of cranberry bogs, areas of endangered habitat, and a cluster of pine barrens. The Commonwealth is exploring various avenues to preserve these natural resources.
Through a statewide Community Preservation Initiative, the Commonwealth has begun to provide technical assistance to towns in the region by helping them forecast their commercial/industrial buildouts based on current zoning and population estimates. The EOEA hopes this information will help the communities make better decisions regarding future development and put this knowledge to use on a cooperative regional level to create beneficial growth plans for all nearby cities and towns.
The participants emphasized three considerations that specifically addressed the issues raised by the EOEA, and that are transferable to other regional planning initiatives. First, negotiated processes, whether between state government and a municipality, between municipalities, or between a community and a state agency, are effective in consensus building and cutting costs. Investing in consensus building at the beginning of the planning process can preclude litigation costs and the costs of stalled development due to community opposition. Second, technical assistance must be provided in a manner that keeps communities engaged throughout the entire analysis stage. Engagement increases support for the results and demystifies the “technical experience,” thus giving a sense of empowerment and control to those most affected by the final plan. Finally, local government involvement is key to any planning process, since local officials usually have their fingers on the pulse of community vitality and needs, and can use that knowledge to ensure effective programs.
Alternatively, participants mentioned a few pitfalls that need to be avoided in the context of this southeastern Massachusetts case. The original mapping of the bioreserve maximized the layout of open spaces and land in need of protection. However, in the desire to classify maximum acreage for protection, some new boundaries would have cut through municipalities, leaving the potential of an insider/outsider dichotomy. In areas where home rule is a coveted prize, as in Massachusetts towns, government programs are often met with suspicion and resistance. Further, if state government presents an agenda for preservation with lines drawn and boundaries sited without local input, communities will often react adversely to any plans, regardless of the goodwill and intent of the program. The ideal action to preclude these problems is to offer technical assistance to achieve through collaboration the preservation that the state ultimately wants. Preferably, the entire municipality should be represented in any regional framework for southeastern Massachusetts to facilitate inter- and intra-muncipal support for the desired program.
In conclusion, the discussions at the Second Annual NESP Retreat offered a great deal of insight into the experiences of the 11 states represented. Though they share a common geographic location, they have taken many approaches to address future growth and development. The retreat offered instructive lessons on the common theories, practices and principles that are useful in building a diverse array of programs appropriate to each state’s local conditions, and it underscored the value of continuing such meetings.
Robert D. Yaro is executive director and Raymond R. Janairo is senior research associate of the Regional Plan Association, based in New York City.
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Cities in Latin America, Asia, and Central and Eastern Europe are being virtually transformed by inflows of capital in ways that urban land use planners never thought possible. These cities desperately need to develop and implement urban land management systems to maximize the social as well as private benefits of globalization. This article looks at globalization trends, identifies urban land management issues and opportunities, and discusses how Buenos Aires, as a case example, could strengthen its urban land management systems to better accommodate globalization-induced economic growth.
Globalization Trends
Over the past 20 years the world economy has become more and more integrated. International trade and investment have increased and the spatial distribution of industrial activities has become more diffused. Advances in communications, computer technology and logistics have revolutionized how business is conducted and how financial capital is invested. Many cities and regions that were once off the beaten track are now on the world’s main street, and those that once dominated certain markets, such as Glasgow in shipbuilding, Birmingham in textiles and Pittsburgh in steel, have lost ground.
Globalization, that is the international integration of product, service and financial markets, poses enormous opportunities and challenges. In the best of circumstances, globalization can lead to significant increases in non-agricultural employment, increasing wages, improved living conditions and better environmental quality. In other cases it may mean plant closures, unemployment, declining incomes and worsened living conditions
Because globalization requires foreign direct investment in plants and facilities, the internationalization of industrial activities is profoundly altering the world’s urban economic landscape. Over the past two decades, cities benefiting from global structuring have grown rapidly, while less economically competitive cities have stagnated. Given their plentiful supplies of cheap labor and permissive regulatory environments, cities in developing countries have become important actors in global manufacturing.
Multinational manufacturing corporations have been the principal driving force of globalization. These firms have increasingly shifted production from developed to developing countries to exploit the advantages of inexpensive labor. As they restructure their networks of production, they invest in plants and equipment in the host countries and generate significant increases in employment. According to the World Bank, five of the eight million jobs created by multinationals between 1985 and 1992 were generated in developing countries. The total number of jobs created by multinationals in developing countries stands at 12 million, but when subcontracting is included the true total is likely to be 24 million jobs. Multinationals account for more than 20 percent of the total manufacturing employment in such countries as Argentina, Barbados, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, Singapore and Sri Lanka.
Urban Land Management Issues and Opportunities
As cities strive to become centers of global production, trade and development, they are increasingly concerned with improving their attractiveness for foreign direct investment and employment generation. For example, cities must have efficient spatial structures, adequate infrastructure and urban services, affordable housing and healthy environments. Effective urban land management is required to promote urban regeneration and development of new industrial and commercial districts, investments to upgrade and expand critical infrastructure systems, programs to enhance and protect the environment, and initiatives to upgrade social overhead capital (housing, education, healthcare).
To implement these initiatives globalizing cities need to develop urban land management strategies to provide land for industrial and commercial development, to facilitate the formation of public-private partnerships, and to finance the provision of infrastructure and social overhead capital investments. Unfortunately, in many cities around the world such strategies do not exist and foreign investment is either stifled or, if it does take place, causes significant adverse side effects. Several examples highlight the consequences of poor urban land management.
In Ho Chi Minh City, planners have not carefully assessed the land use and transportation impacts of foreign investment. The city administration has approved dozens of high-rise office projects in the Central District but they have not adequately assessed the traffic and infrastructure impacts of these projects. As a result traffic congestion and infrastructure problems with the water supply and sewerage treatment are mounting. To make matters worse, planners have approved the development of Saigon South, a massive 3,000-hectare commercial, industrial and residential project, without assessing its impacts on the city’s transportation system.
Getting access to land for factories and commercial facilities is problematic, particularly in the transition economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Decades of inefficient allocation of land for industrial uses have literally blighted inner-city areas in Warsaw, Moscow and St. Petersburg. Derelict industrial belts that desperately need regeneration surround these cities. Unfortunately, a lack of clarity over land rights, corruption and bureaucratic inertia are impeding redevelopment. To compound matters, land use plans in many transition economy cities have not been adjusted to reflect the new land use requirements necessary to support post-industrial development.
The globalization of economic activity is literally transforming the urban landscapes of developing countries. To effectively exploit the benefits of inward investment flows and to insure that social and environmental goals are met, the public sector needs to take the lead in planning and formulating urban land management strategies to promote sustainable urban economic development.
The Case of Buenos Aires
A recent Lincoln Institute seminar in Buenos Aires offered some ideas on what actions are needed to more effectively manage the challenges of globalization-induced investment and urban economic development in that city. Participants agreed that Buenos Aires needs to strengthen its land management and economic development capabilities. The city should foster the formation of agglomeration economies and define and strengthen its comparative advantage in the global marketplace. The public sector should also foster the formation of social overhead capital and facilitate the development of critical infrastructure, social services and other investments that cannot be provided by the private sector.
Government needs to remove market imperfections and internalize externalities so that the social benefits of urban development are maximized and social costs minimized. This requires having in place sound and appropriate land use and environmental planning controls and regulations. Government should also provide information about the city’s demographic and economic projections and its land and property market so that developers and investors are well informed about urban development trends. This effort includes developing an inventory and assessment of public land holdings that can be used to foster strategic planning objectives.
At the same time, government should work with community and business leaders to improve social equity in real estate market transactions by increasing the supply of affordable housing and seeing that infrastructure and urban services are provided to all neighborhoods regardless of social or economic status. This may include preparing a capital budget for critical infrastructure and real estate development projects, as well as strategies for financing these investments.
The private sector is challenged with developing the city by providing businesses and residents with shops, offices, factories and housing. To the fullest extent possible, the government should enable the private sector to develop real estate to match the changing requirements of households and businesses. In some cases, such activities require partnerships between the public and private sector. For its part, the private sector needs to be more cautious and systematic about the formation and promotion of real estate projects by paying more attention to land market research on occupancy demand and supply for offices, retail, industrial and residential sectors.
To facilitate the implementation of these actions, the seminar participants encouraged Buenos Aires officials to build awareness about the linkages between globalization, urban land management and economic development. One important step would be to form a partnership with the private sector to develop a land market database of real estate transactions in the city. In addition, the participants identified the need for training courses on such topics as strategic planning; public-private partnerships; financing urban development and infrastructure; developing affordable housing; linking urban land management with economic development; and promoting urban revitalization and regeneration.
David E. Dowall is professor of city and regional planning at the University of California at Berkeley.
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The idea of reducing or abolishing capital gains taxes to encourage private investment and general economic growth often comes up in state and national political campaigns. Advocates of cutting these taxes argue that if investors could keep their gains, they would invest them in new enterprises, thereby creating new jobs and strengthening local economies.
The public discussion usually focuses on stock market investments, but most capital gains are generated in the real estate sector where most of the economy’s assets are based. In 1994, the Federal Reserve Board estimated that real estate accounted for 67 percent of the nation’s total economic assets, including land worth about $4.4 trillion, homes worth $5.9 trillion, and other buildings (stores, factories, office buildings) worth an additional $3.1 trillion.
There are no comprehensive national statistics on capital gains from real estate or other assets. But the most recent survey by the Internal Revenue Service, conducted in 1985, estimated that land and buildings accounted for at least 58 and perhaps as much as 70 percent of the total of $208 billion in capital gains that year.
Federal statistics also report that the annual cost of doing business in real estate often exceeds the taxable income generated from land and buildings. It follows that many real estate investors receive a net benefit only when they eventually sell their properties for more than they originally cost. In effect, they are willing to turn over most current income to their mortgage bankers, in the hope of reaping a capital gain at the end of the process.
How Much Total Income Does Real Estate Generate?
There are no adequate national statistics on how much real estate is worth or the total income it generates. It is possible, however, to estimate real estate cash flow by starting from the income reported by the owners of real estate and adding to that some of the major expenses they paid before paying taxes. In 1993, the owners of real estate reported receiving about $209 billion in cash flow (earnings plus depreciation), though the amount depreciated was not taxable. In addition, the real estate industry paid about $515 billion in a combination of mortgage interest and property taxes. Thus real estate generated at least $724 billion in total earnings in 1993 (see chart 1).
The portion of this total paid out as interest to lenders since the end of World War II has grown much faster than any other part of the total. Between 1945 and 1993, the share of real estate earnings paid out as interest grew from about 10 percent to about 50 percent. This reflects the fact that about 70 percent of private sector lending is committed to real estate mortgages. This two-way street—with money flowing from real estate into financial institutions, then back out into real estate loans—is one reason why federal statistics lump real estate and finance together as the “finance, insurance, and real estate” sector, or FIRE for short.
Who Receives Income Generated by Real Estate?
Federal income and tax statistics attribute income from real estate to three categories of owners: persons, corporate real estate and noncorporate real estate. These categories are not self-explanatory. They are based on the motives and behavior of real estate owners, and do not refer simply to individual people, partnerships and companies.
“Persons” receive some income from real estate, though it is not their primary way of earning a living. They may rent out an apartment in a two-family house or a second home during the off-season, for example; or, they may own an apartment building or small commercial property.
“Corporate real estate” is a relatively small category, consisting only of land and buildings that are owned and used for non-real estate business purposes. For example, manufacturing companies typically own their own corporate headquarters and industrial plants. To capture tax advantages, however, these companies may spin off their facilities as “noncorporate” real estate, then lease them back.
The “noncorporate real estate” category is the least obvious. Owners in this category participate either full- or part-time in real estate as a business, mostly through partnerships. The category includes a wide range of people and organizations, from professional developers or property management companies to doctors who own nursing homes.
In 1993, the annual earnings for these three categories were $86 billion for persons, $3 billion for corporate owners, and $120 billion for noncorporate owners (see charts 2-4).
How Is Real Estate Income Taxed?
Since 1970, when the federal government began separating real estate statistics from those for the finance and insurance sectors, real estate has shown little taxable income. Corporate and noncorporate real estate businesses enjoy several tax advantages that help to account for this seeming anomaly of the economy’s major asset generating such low reported earnings:
(a) Like other business owners, they can deduct the cost of maintaining their property (painting, landscaping, replacing a leaky roof, etc.) as an expense before paying taxes on their business income. The purpose of this spending is to preserve the value of their real estate.
(b) They can also claim depreciation (“capital consumption allowances”) for their buildings (technically land does not depreciate). In most businesses, this allowance is a way to compensate for wear-and-tear on machinery, which must be replaced when it becomes obsolete. In practice, real estate owners have often been allowed to depreciate their buildings even though their market value is not declining at all.
(c) When owners sell their properties, any positive difference between the depreciated price received and the price originally paid is taxed as a capital gain. Capital gains are taxed at a lower rate than other income. Thus, over-depreciation turns out to be a way of minimizing tax liability.
The combination of (b) and (c) raises what might seem like an obvious question: how can real estate depreciate, losing value and eventually needing replacement, yet end up selling for more than its purchase price, generating capital gains? Of course a given piece of real estate does not always do both. Some real estate is indeed sold at a loss–for example, if property values in a whole neighborhood or city decline. But land, unlike machinery or even buildings, cannot wear out. Since World War II, urban land in particular and real estate holdings in general have gained in value far more often than they have declined.
How Should Real Estate Income Be Taxed?
In a rising market, federal tax policy allows real estate investors to earn several times more than they could simply by making smart buying and selling decisions. Writing off maintenance expenses and the supposedly declining value of the property before calculating taxable income means that the same property can produce a steady income for realtors and potential investors, but appear to lose money as far as the federal tax collector is concerned.
A tax-smart investor in a rising real estate market will own a piece of property only until it has been fully depreciated. It then has a “book value” of zero—like a piece of machinery so worn out or outdated that it cannot be sold at any price. The owner of such a machine has to junk it and buy a new one. The real estate investor, in contrast, can sell the “zero value” property to new owners, who can depreciate it all over again starting from the new, higher price they paid.
The upshot of these tax policies is that an industry with large total earnings reports little or no taxable income. Charts 3 and 4 show that real estate businesses have reported a negative taxable income frequently since the mid-1980s, despite the fact that real estate values in many places were rising. Since the real estate industry pays hardly any income taxes on its rental income, the major federal tax it does pay is the capital gains tax—for that is where the accumulated rental earnings are taken, when the building is sold for its depreciated value.
Does such favorable tax treatment for real estate benefit the economy as a whole? That question cannot be answered from tax statistics alone. The answer depends in part on whether all real estate projects that are taxed the same way are equally good at generating public benefits, such as jobs in construction and property maintenance, or other needed goods such as housing, shopping, and manufacturing facilities. If the answer to that question is “no,” then the public interest might be better served if funds now invested in real estate for tax advantages alone were invested in new technologies or public infrastructure.
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Michael Hudson is a research associate at the Jerome Levy Economics Institute at Bard College in New York. He is writing a book about how federal income and capital gains taxes on land and buildings affect national taxation and investment patterns, and he spoke on this topic at the Lincoln Institute in October 1995.
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The collapse of communism in the early 1990s launched an era of political and economic reforms in Russia and throughout the former Soviet Union that introduced democracy and the free market economy to countries that previously had no experience with either of these concepts. In Russia privatization of land was one of the first items on the reform agenda, and by the end of 1992 the Russian Parliament had adopted the federal law On the Payment for Land. This law set normative land values differentiated by regions to be used for taxation, as well as a basis for land rent and purchase. At the time the country had no land market, so this was considered a very progressive measure. Lands that were previously held in public ownership were rapidly distributed to individuals, and by 1998 some 129 million hectares of land were privately held by some 43 million landowners. Introduction of private ownership rights in land also meant the introduction of the land tax, since owners or users of land plots became eligible to pay for their real property assets.
Economic reforms in Russia were accompanied by inflation that ran thousands of percent annually. To maintain revenue yields, local and regional authorities adjusted normative land values accordingly. As land market activity started to develop in the mid-1990s, some of these authorities used market price information to make land value adjustments. As a result land taxes became absolutely inconsistent with the economic situation, and tax amounts were not comparable for similar properties located in different jurisdictions.
By the late 1990s the land tax system had developed faults that required tax reform on a nationwide scale. The basic outline of the tax reform included the following features:
Reform of the land tax is seen as part of a wider property tax reform. The current property tax system in Russia includes a number of taxes: individual property tax; enterprise property tax; land tax; and real property tax. While the first three are operational, the fourth tax has been tested as an experiment since 1997 in two cities, Novgorod Veliky and Tver (Malme and Youngman 2001, Chapter 6). It is expected that when Russia is in a position to introduce the real property tax nationally, the first three taxes will be canceled.
In 1999 the Land Cadastre Service of Russia, a land administration authority of the federal government, was delegated the responsibility to develop mass valuation methods and to implement the country’s first mass valuation of all land. The government chose mass valuation, identifying the sales comparison, income and cost approaches as the basic valuation models that needed to be developed. Land is valued at its site value as if it were vacant.
Implementation of a mass valuation system has been constrained by the lack of reliable land market data, however. The housing market is the only developed market in Russia that can be characterized by a large number of sales transactions. These transactions are spread unevenly throughout the country, with large cities characterized by many transactions and high prices for apartments, whereas small towns and settlements have few examples of real estate sales. The national land market recorded some 5.5 million transactions annually, with only about 6 percent of them being actual buying and selling transactions. Official data from land registration authorities could not be used as a data source because transacting parties often conceal the true market price to avoid paying transfer taxes.
This lack of reliable market data has forced the developers of mass valuation models to identify other factors that may influence the land market. The model developed for valuation of urban land included some 90 layers of information that were geo-referenced to digital land cadastre maps of cities and towns. Apart from available market information, these data layers included features of physical infrastructure such as transport, public utilities, schools, stores and other structures. Environmental factors also are taken into consideration.
Mass valuation methods in Russia have identified 14 types of urban land use that can be assigned to each cadastral block. Thus, the model can set the tax base according to the current or highest and best land use. The actual tax base established for each land plot is calculated as the price of a square meter of land in a cadastral block multiplied by the area of the plot.
It took one year of development and model testing and two years of further work to complete the cadastral valuation of urban land throughout Russia. Actual valuation results suggest that the model works accurately with lands occupied by the housing sector. The correlation between actual market data and mass valuation results is between 0.6 and 0.7 on a scale of 0 to 1.0, with greater accuracy in areas where the land market is better developed.
Cadastral valuation of agricultural land is based on the income approach, since availability of agricultural land market information is extremely limited. Legislation allowing the sale of agricultural land became effective in early 2002. The data used to value agricultural land included information on soils and actual farm production figures over the last 30 years. Mass valuation of forested lands was also based on the income approach. Russian land law also identifies a special group of industrial lands located outside the city limits that includes industrial sites, roads, railroads, and energy and transport facilities. These lands proved to be a difficult subject for mass valuation because there are so many unique types of structures and objects on them; individual valuation is often applied to them instead.
Over the past four years, some 95 percent of Russia’s territory has been valued using mass valuation methodology. The Federal Land Cadastre Service continues to refine and improve its methods in preparation for the enactment of relevant legislation authorizing the introduction of a new value-based land tax. During this period, the Cadastre Service organized a Workshop on Mass Valuation Systems of Land (Real Estate) for Taxation Purposes, in Moscow in 2002, under the auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. It also assembled a delegation for the Lincoln Institute’s course Introducing a Market Value-Based Mass Appraisal System for Taxation of Real Property, in Vilnius in 2003 (see related article).
Alexey L. Overchuk is deputy chief of the Federal Land Cadastre Service of Russia and deputy chairman of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Working Party for Land Administration.
Reference
Malme, Jane H. and Joan M. Youngman. 2001. The Development of Property Taxation in Economies in Transition: Case Studies from Central and Eastern Europe. Washington, DC: The World Bank. Available at http://www1.worldbank.org/wbiep/decentralization/library9/malme_propertytax.pdf
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Daphne Kenyon, a visiting fellow at the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, heads D. A. Kenyon & Associates, a public policy consulting firm in Windham, New Hampshire. She also serves on the New Hampshire State Board of Education, to which she was appointed by Governor John Lynch (D) in 2006. Kenyon is writing a policy focus report for the Institute, titled Untying the Property Tax–School Funding Knot, which will be available in the fall of 2007.
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At the end of 2009, the United States faced an economic disaster of major proportions, with trillions of dollars of asset value lost, more than 16 million people unemployed, and four consecutive quarters of rapidly falling GDP. These events were the direct and indirect result of extreme volatility in the value of residential property that had served as collateral for the nation’s huge stock of home mortgages.
Between 2000 and 2005, the value of residential land and buildings increased from about $14 trillion to $24 trillion. About half of this increase reflected new construction, and half was due to rising land values, primarily on the coasts (Case 2007). But in late 2006 prices began to decline, and by mid-2009 they had fallen roughly 30 percent.
Measuring House Price Appreciation and Depreciation
The S&P/Case-Shiller repeat sales home price indexes were developed 25 years ago to track changes in the market value of existing homes. Based on observed values of properties that changed hands more than once, the indexes were proposed as an alternative to the prevailing measure of home price appreciation or depreciation, which was the median price of homes sold in a city or region. A simple median price will move up or down over time with changes in the mix of properties that sell, as well as with changes in the price or value of houses. This can cause the median price to shift even if no appreciation or depreciation occurs, particularly when new, higher-valued properties are part of the sales base.
In the repeat sales methodology we collect all available data on home sales and then determine if the same house has been sold in the past 20 years or so. Each pair of sales provides information on appreciation or depreciation. We then eliminate sales where the property has been changed significantly, or the sale was not arm’s length, such as purchases by a financial institution or sales where the buyer and seller have the same name.
Finally, we reduce the weight assigned to paired sales that are far apart in time, in part because there is a greater chance that those properties have undergone physical changes. We also eliminate paired sales that are less than six months apart, because they may represent purely speculative activity. We publish only results that are supported by strong statistical tests of confidence.
Home Prices: 1990–2010
Between 1975 and 2006 no measure of home prices showed a national decline. The S&P/Case-Shiller and OFHEO (Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight) national house price indexes both show a continuous rise, accelerating around the year 2000 and peaking between 2006 and 2007 (figures 1a and 1b). However, Case and Shiller (2003) found that in 43 states the ratio of house prices to income remained low and constant between 1985 and 2002, even as house prices rose, suggesting that it was changes in per capita income that explained the increase in home values.
Figure 2 shows the ratio of home price to per capita income for 17 of the more volatile metropolitan areas between the first quarters of 1987 and 2009. After 2000, this ratio began to increase in virtually all of these metropolitan areas, with steep acceleration after 2002. The data suggest four distinct submarkets. The first consists of Las Vegas, Miami, and Phoenix, with a virtually constant price/income ratio until 2000, followed by a rapid increase in 2003 and 2004.
The California submarket was even more explosive. San Diego doubled its ratio from below 8 to above 16, with San Francisco and Los Angeles close behind. New York and Boston, in the third group, experienced accelerating ratios, but they were not as dramatic as those in the first two subgroups. In the Midwestern cities of Chicago, Charlotte, Portland, and Minneapolis, the increases were much lower than those observed on the coasts.
Figure 3 shows the volatility of home prices in the same 17 metropolitan areas based on sales in the lower third tier of sales prices. The number of these sales tripled in Miami, Los Angeles, Washington, DC, San Diego, and Las Vegas. In September 2005, Boston saw a price drop that later spread to every metropolitan area in the country.
Table 1 shows the S&P/Case-Shiller Index through September 2009, when prices began to stabilize and then rise. The bottom two lines show composite indexes for two sub-samples of the 20 available metropolitan areas. Both have fallen nearly 30 percent since the summer of 2006.
How Did It Happen?
Needless to say, a credit expansion of this magnitude had a major impact on the housing market. As noted earlier, between 2000 and 2006 prices in the bottom tier of the market increased the most—by 241 percent in Miami, 249 percent in Los Angeles, and 200 percent in Washington, DC, Las Vegas, and San Diego. The S&P/Case-Shiller composite indexes more than doubled, and the national index increased by nearly 90 percent.
At the end of 2005 and into 2006, the housing market began to soften. Interest rates rose, and the 30-year mortgage interest rate was back to 6.6 percent by the last half of 2006. Gluts of speculative building slowed markets in Florida, Arizona, and Nevada. Homes in California and in the Northeast had become very expensive relative to incomes, and the manufacturing base of the Midwest fell into recession. As expectations turned gloomy in 2006, 16 of the 20 S&P/Case-Shiller metropolitan areas showed price declines, and by 2007 all were declining. This had never happened before.
Then inventories of houses for sale began to increase. In the past, when markets rose too quickly, prices were slow to change and adjustment was orderly. With house prices falling nationally, and with the bulk of the newly written mortgage debt carrying high loan-to-value ratios, mortgage default rates rose sharply.
Underwriting standards changed over this period as well. Statistical models of default and foreclosure seemed to “explain” defaults as a function of borrower and loan characteristics. These models were used by all market participants, sometimes even without their knowledge. The most widely known underwriting tools were Loan Prospector and Desktop Underwriter, developed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac respectively. Their low cost and ease of operation made them the industry standard. As these models spread throughout the market, mortgage lenders and insurers that did not accept their results garnered little new business. The rating agencies also fell victim to the same statistical methods, which suggested a very low likelihood of rapidly rising defaults.
The stated goal of the new model of underwriting was to transform a patchwork risk-allocation process into a more efficient and accurate pricing system. But this proved to be not only difficult, but ultimately impossible. Analysts seeking to predict the likelihood of default had little choice but to look to the past: at what rate did mortgages with the same characteristics fail in the past?
But past experience dealt with a 30-year period of rising prices in which the collateral was in most cases sufficient to cover claims. Thus, outside of a few regional downturns, no experience provided data that could accurately measure the impact of falling house prices on delinquency, default, and foreclosure.
The historic housing boom of 2000–2005, together with the change in underwriting standards and credit market operations, made the period of 2000–2008 one of the truly important economic episodes of the last century. Its legacy is a flood of bad mortgages with millions of homes headed for foreclosure.
The Government Has Played a Big Role
One additional factor clearly played a role in all of this: the federal government’s strong efforts to promote home ownership for rich and poor alike. In 1977 Congress passed the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) and the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), designed to increase bank lending to low-income and minority households. Even today, banks have a CRA exam every year to determine whether they are meeting the credit needs of their entire CRA area, which in almost all cases includes low-income neighborhoods that in previous years might have been rejected (“redlined”) for loans or insurance.
These programs reflect a belief that the nation has an interest in promoting home ownership as the American Dream, which is thought by many to lead to meritorious behavior. A homeowner is considered likely to be a better citizen, and more involved in local affairs. Home ownership was also thought to be a way of building wealth for low-income households, part of the social safety net (Case and Marynchenko 2002).
Home ownership was encouraged in a variety of ways. The federal subsidy in the income tax treatment of home ownership (the mortgage interest deduction, the capital gains exclusion, the property tax deduction, and the nontaxation of imputed rent on owner-occupied housing) amounts to about $140 billion annually. The Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) including Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginny Mae), and the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) were all set up to channel capital into home mortgages.
The national housing boom had its roots in unprecedented events that unfolded in U.S. financial markets beginning in 2000. The rapid decline of high tech industries, the stock market collapse in 2000 and 2001, the slow level of technology investment resulting from Y2K, and finally, of course, the events of 9/11 led to a relaxed monetary policy as the Federal Reserve continually reduced interest rates in an attempt to stimulate the economy and prevent recession. In January 2001 the Fed cut the federal funds rate (the interest rate banks charge one another for the use of federal funds) from 6.5 percent to 6 percent, and by the end of 2002 had reduced the rate 11 times, to 1.75 percent.
When the easing of credit began, the 30-year fixed rate for a conventional mortgage was 7.17 percent, down slightly from the 8.3 percent average rate over the first nine months of 2000. By the time the federal funds rate fell to 1.75 percent in the fourth quarter of 2002, the conventional fixed mortgage rate was 6.39 percent. The federal funds rate continued its downward trend until it hit 1 percent in July 2003 and remained there for over a year. By that time, the conventional 30-year fixed-rate mortgage carried an interest rate of 4.6 percent. This easing of credit was the result of a massive injection of liquidity. The dramatic drop in interest rates reduced returns on many investments, placing pressure on yields around the world.
The expansionary monetary policy pursued during this short period reduced the cost of buying a home by almost a third. If its purpose had been to stimulate the mortgage and housing markets, the policy certainly worked, as lower interest rates reduced mortgage costs. Housing production and sales of existing homes boomed. In October 2001 there were about 1.52 million housing starts annually. By the end of 2003 housing starts had increased by a third, to well over 2 million.
Existing home sales were 5.2 million annually at the beginning of 2001 and 6.5 million by the third quarter of 2003. By 2005 they reached 7 million and stayed at about 6 million until 2007. There is little doubt that the housing market kept the economy out of recession through the turbulent early years of the decade.
Figure 4 shows the explosion in home sales and mortgage volume at the end of 2002 and into 2003. Low interest rates stimulated demand for refinancing, and between the fourth quarters of 2002 and 2003, $5.5 trillion in mortgages were originated, and $3.7 trillion were paid off. Over five quarters, the total value of new mortgages was about the same as the entire stock of mortgage debt outstanding in 2001. Seventy-five percent of the new mortgages were written for refinancings rather than purchases of new homes.
By bundling large numbers of mortgages into securities, Wall Street could offer an investment vehicle that combined the implicit government guarantees of the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) with a history of very low default rates. As a result, much of the liquidity that drove the economic expansion was channeled directly into mortgages.
In June 2003, mortgage rates began to rise, moving from 4.60 percent to 5.97 percent by August. The third quarter of 2003 saw the highest volume of refinancings, with originations of $942 billion. The refinancing boom ended with the rise in interest rates, dropping 56 percent in the fourth quarter.
During this expansion of credit, the mortgage industry became highly profitable, collecting fees of about 2.5 percent of the $4 trillion in total originations in 2003 alone—over $100 billion. Greenspan and Kennedy (2008) estimate that fees for refinancings and home equity loans in 2004 reached $200 billion. With default and foreclosure rates low and housing prices high, lenders competed vigorously for the business of homebuyers.
Mortgages for home purchases doubled from $239 billion in 2004 to $478 billion in 2005. Much of this business was directed at low-income neighborhoods and sub-prime borrowers. Between 2002 and 2006, the market originated $14.4 trillion in mortgages, retired $10.3 trillion in debt, and increased the stock of outstanding mortgage debt to $10.3 trillion from $6.2 trillion.
This not-so-subtle pressure from the Congress was clearly accepted by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as the price they needed to pay to maintain the implicit guarantee of their debt, which they enjoyed as a result of their government franchises. There can be no precise division of responsibility between the GSEs and the private sector in expanding the housing bubble.
Several factors played a role in the ultimate collapse: the competitive battle for market share waged by Wall Street investment banks, the private securities markets, and some highly leveraged specialty firms; the high credit ratings that were distributed by the rating agencies; and the fact that default and foreclosure rates remained low. In fact, it took a partnership between public legislation, governmental regulation, private market exuberance, and an extreme increase in liquidity to bring the markets down.
Where Do We Go From Here?
By late 2009, housing markets seemed to be approaching a bottom with prices stabilizing, but many forecasts anticipate declines extending well into 2010. If that were to happen, numerous mortgages written in 2008 and 2009 would not be fully secured and could turn unprofitable.
A prolonged period of falling prices would prevent a significant increase in housing construction. Despite record low interest rates, housing starts have been in uncharted territory for more than a year, having fallen below levels seen in prior downturns. The last four recessions began with large declines in housing starts. At the end of 2008, starts were down from a peak of 2.27 million in 2006 to around 500,000, where they stayed for more than a year, well below the typical bottom of one million starts per year. This represents a decline of approximately $600 billion in aggregate demand.
Two market-clearing processes are currently underway in the housing market, operating side by side, often neighborhood by neighborhood, within metropolitan areas. First, there is the traditional search for a new equilibrium. Inventories remain high as risk-averse sellers seek to avoid sharp price reductions. Sellers without access to liquid capital can actually be among the most reluctant to sell, because they cannot afford to incur high transactions costs. Homeowners do not like to sell at a loss, and may postpone sales in hope of a rising market. This type of market-clearing process is slow and usually results in a long and costly period of quantity adjustment with relatively little change in sale prices.
Second, banks, loan servicers, and other market participants are left holding properties because of defaults and foreclosures. These houses are typically sold at auction, often at very low prices. In every past regional decline these two processes worked together to clear the market. The final result will be the product of a battle between them.
At the end of 2009, homes were selling at a rate of about 6 million per year, 5.5 million existing and 500,000 new homes, including between 1 and 1.5 million sales at foreclosure auctions. The bad news is that new properties are entering the foreclosure process faster than older cases are being resolved, suggesting that the portion of all sales accomplished through the auction process is likely to grow.
But a number of facts suggest that the current bottom could hold and eventually turn upward. First, prices have fallen substantially. In Boston, they have been falling for some time, and in California they are down over 50 percent. Eventually, when prices get low enough, people will start buying again. Furthermore, interest rates are remaining at all-time low levels, with the conventional 30-year fixed-mortgage rate below 5 percent.
In short, all housing market indicators are improving. Pending home sales, existing home sales, new home sales, and housing starts were all up during 2009; and prices actually stopped falling. The OFHEO price index and the S&P/Case-Shiller indexes for 18 of the 20 cities analyzed were up for several months in a row. New home inventories fell to 251,000 (7.4 months of inventory) in September, after having fallen for 13 consecutive prior months.
California represents about 25 percent of all the land value in the United States, and events there have major implications for the rest of the country. The good news is that for the last three months, the indexes for San Francisco, San Diego, and Los Angeles have led the nation in price appreciation. The California Association of Realtors reports substantial increases in home sales volumes except in the Central Valley.
It is important to remember that it takes only a relatively small number of buyers to move the market. Our measures of home values are based on observed sales, but only 5 to 7 percent of the total housing stock changes hands annually. Even with an unemployment rate near 10 percent, homebuyers continue to be very optimistic, and now there may be enough of them to change the market’s direction.
But, we are by no means out of the woods. Unemployment remains very high and jobs are still being lost. In addition, the foreclosure pipeline is moving very slowly, and foreclosures are spreading from the sub-prime market to the presumably more secure A-, Alt A, and prime loans. If the jobs picture does not brighten, and the market does not speed up the process of resolving foreclosures, the housing market could face a long period of stagnation and even a return to falling prices.
References
Case, Karl E. 1986. The Market for Single-family Homes in Boston. New England Economic Review May/June: 38–48.
———. 2007. The Value of Land in the United States: 1975–2005. In Land Policies and Their Outcomes, ed. Gregory K. Ingram and Yu-Hung Hong, 127–147. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
Case, Karl E., and Maryna Marynchenko. 2002. Home Appreciation in Low and Moderate Income Markets. in Low Income Homeownership: Examining the Unexamined Goal, ed. Nicolas Retsinas and Eric Belsky. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Case, Karl E., and Robert J. Shiller. 1987. Prices of Single-family Homes since 1970. New England Economic Review September/October: 45–56.
———. 1989. The Efficiency of the Market for Single-family Homes. The American Economic Review 79(1): 125–137.
———.2003. Is There a Bubble in the Housing Market? Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. September 5.
Greenspan, Alan, and James Kennedy. 2008. Sources and Uses of Equity Extracted from Homes. Federal Reserve Board, Finance and Economics Discussion Working Paper Series 2007-20, October. http://www.federalreserve.gov/PUBS/feds/2007/200720/200720pap.pdf
About the Author
Karl E. “Chip” Case is the Katharine Coman and A. Barton Hepburn Professor of Economics at Wellesley College in Massachusetts. With Robert J. Shiller he developed the S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices. Case is a former member of the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy board of directors.
