The collapse of communism in the early 1990s launched an era of political and economic reforms in Russia and throughout the former Soviet Union that introduced democracy and the free market economy to countries that previously had no experience with either of these concepts. In Russia privatization of land was one of the first items on the reform agenda, and by the end of 1992 the Russian Parliament had adopted the federal law On the Payment for Land. This law set normative land values differentiated by regions to be used for taxation, as well as a basis for land rent and purchase. At the time the country had no land market, so this was considered a very progressive measure. Lands that were previously held in public ownership were rapidly distributed to individuals, and by 1998 some 129 million hectares of land were privately held by some 43 million landowners. Introduction of private ownership rights in land also meant the introduction of the land tax, since owners or users of land plots became eligible to pay for their real property assets.

Economic reforms in Russia were accompanied by inflation that ran thousands of percent annually. To maintain revenue yields, local and regional authorities adjusted normative land values accordingly. As land market activity started to develop in the mid-1990s, some of these authorities used market price information to make land value adjustments. As a result land taxes became absolutely inconsistent with the economic situation, and tax amounts were not comparable for similar properties located in different jurisdictions.

By the late 1990s the land tax system had developed faults that required tax reform on a nationwide scale. The basic outline of the tax reform included the following features:

• The land tax will become a local tax.
• While floating tax rates will be established by local governments, the maximum possible tax rates will be fixed by federal legislation.
• The federal government will develop rules and procedures for mass valuation of land plots.
• The tax base will be the cadastral value of land plots.
• Land cadastre authorities will provide information on taxable objects and their taxable land values to tax and revenue authorities.

Reform of the land tax is seen as part of a wider property tax reform. The current property tax system in Russia includes a number of taxes: individual property tax; enterprise property tax; land tax; and real property tax. While the first three are operational, the fourth tax has been tested as an experiment since 1997 in two cities, Novgorod Veliky and Tver (Malme and Youngman 2001, Chapter 6). It is expected that when Russia is in a position to introduce the real property tax nationally, the first three taxes will be canceled.

In 1999 the Land Cadastre Service of Russia, a land administration authority of the federal government, was delegated the responsibility to develop mass valuation methods and to implement the country’s first mass valuation of all land. The government chose mass valuation, identifying the sales comparison, income and cost approaches as the basic valuation models that needed to be developed. Land is valued at its site value as if it were vacant.

Implementation of a mass valuation system has been constrained by the lack of reliable land market data, however. The housing market is the only developed market in Russia that can be characterized by a large number of sales transactions. These transactions are spread unevenly throughout the country, with large cities characterized by many transactions and high prices for apartments, whereas small towns and settlements have few examples of real estate sales. The national land market recorded some 5.5 million transactions annually, with only about 6 percent of them being actual buying and selling transactions. Official data from land registration authorities could not be used as a data source because transacting parties often conceal the true market price to avoid paying transfer taxes.

This lack of reliable market data has forced the developers of mass valuation models to identify other factors that may influence the land market. The model developed for valuation of urban land included some 90 layers of information that were geo-referenced to digital land cadastre maps of cities and towns. Apart from available market information, these data layers included features of physical infrastructure such as transport, public utilities, schools, stores and other structures. Environmental factors also are taken into consideration.

Mass valuation methods in Russia have identified 14 types of urban land use that can be assigned to each cadastral block. Thus, the model can set the tax base according to the current or highest and best land use. The actual tax base established for each land plot is calculated as the price of a square meter of land in a cadastral block multiplied by the area of the plot.

It took one year of development and model testing and two years of further work to complete the cadastral valuation of urban land throughout Russia. Actual valuation results suggest that the model works accurately with lands occupied by the housing sector. The correlation between actual market data and mass valuation results is between 0.6 and 0.7 on a scale of 0 to 1.0, with greater accuracy in areas where the land market is better developed.

Cadastral valuation of agricultural land is based on the income approach, since availability of agricultural land market information is extremely limited. Legislation allowing the sale of agricultural land became effective in early 2002. The data used to value agricultural land included information on soils and actual farm production figures over the last 30 years. Mass valuation of forested lands was also based on the income approach. Russian land law also identifies a special group of industrial lands located outside the city limits that includes industrial sites, roads, railroads, and energy and transport facilities. These lands proved to be a difficult subject for mass valuation because there are so many unique types of structures and objects on them; individual valuation is often applied to them instead.

Over the past four years, some 95 percent of Russia’s territory has been valued using mass valuation methodology. The Federal Land Cadastre Service continues to refine and improve its methods in preparation for the enactment of relevant legislation authorizing the introduction of a new value-based land tax. During this period, the Cadastre Service organized a Workshop on Mass Valuation Systems of Land (Real Estate) for Taxation Purposes, in Moscow in 2002, under the auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. It also assembled a delegation for the Lincoln Institute’s course Introducing a Market Value-Based Mass Appraisal System for Taxation of Real Property, in Vilnius in 2003 (see related article).

Alexey L. Overchuk is deputy chief of the Federal Land Cadastre Service of Russia and deputy chairman of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Working Party for Land Administration.

Reference

Malme, Jane H. and Joan M. Youngman. 2001. The Development of Property Taxation in Economies in Transition: Case Studies from Central and Eastern Europe. Washington, DC: The World Bank. Available at http://www1.worldbank.org/wbiep/decentralization/library9/malme_propertytax.pdf

Daphne Kenyon, a visiting fellow at the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, heads D. A. Kenyon & Associates, a public policy consulting firm in Windham, New Hampshire. She also serves on the New Hampshire State Board of Education, to which she was appointed by Governor John Lynch (D) in 2006. Kenyon is writing a policy focus report for the Institute, titled Untying the Property Tax–School Funding Knot, which will be available in the fall of 2007.

At the end of 2009, the United States faced an economic disaster of major proportions, with trillions of dollars of asset value lost, more than 16 million people unemployed, and four consecutive quarters of rapidly falling GDP. These events were the direct and indirect result of extreme volatility in the value of residential property that had served as collateral for the nation’s huge stock of home mortgages.

Between 2000 and 2005, the value of residential land and buildings increased from about $14 trillion to $24 trillion. About half of this increase reflected new construction, and half was due to rising land values, primarily on the coasts (Case 2007). But in late 2006 prices began to decline, and by mid-2009 they had fallen roughly 30 percent.

Measuring House Price Appreciation and Depreciation

The S&P/Case-Shiller repeat sales home price indexes were developed 25 years ago to track changes in the market value of existing homes. Based on observed values of properties that changed hands more than once, the indexes were proposed as an alternative to the prevailing measure of home price appreciation or depreciation, which was the median price of homes sold in a city or region. A simple median price will move up or down over time with changes in the mix of properties that sell, as well as with changes in the price or value of houses. This can cause the median price to shift even if no appreciation or depreciation occurs, particularly when new, higher-valued properties are part of the sales base.

In the repeat sales methodology we collect all available data on home sales and then determine if the same house has been sold in the past 20 years or so. Each pair of sales provides information on appreciation or depreciation. We then eliminate sales where the property has been changed significantly, or the sale was not arm’s length, such as purchases by a financial institution or sales where the buyer and seller have the same name.

Finally, we reduce the weight assigned to paired sales that are far apart in time, in part because there is a greater chance that those properties have undergone physical changes. We also eliminate paired sales that are less than six months apart, because they may represent purely speculative activity. We publish only results that are supported by strong statistical tests of confidence.

Home Prices: 1990–2010

Between 1975 and 2006 no measure of home prices showed a national decline. The S&P/Case-Shiller and OFHEO (Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight) national house price indexes both show a continuous rise, accelerating around the year 2000 and peaking between 2006 and 2007 (figures 1a and 1b). However, Case and Shiller (2003) found that in 43 states the ratio of house prices to income remained low and constant between 1985 and 2002, even as house prices rose, suggesting that it was changes in per capita income that explained the increase in home values.

Figure 2 shows the ratio of home price to per capita income for 17 of the more volatile metropolitan areas between the first quarters of 1987 and 2009. After 2000, this ratio began to increase in virtually all of these metropolitan areas, with steep acceleration after 2002. The data suggest four distinct submarkets. The first consists of Las Vegas, Miami, and Phoenix, with a virtually constant price/income ratio until 2000, followed by a rapid increase in 2003 and 2004.

The California submarket was even more explosive. San Diego doubled its ratio from below 8 to above 16, with San Francisco and Los Angeles close behind. New York and Boston, in the third group, experienced accelerating ratios, but they were not as dramatic as those in the first two subgroups. In the Midwestern cities of Chicago, Charlotte, Portland, and Minneapolis, the increases were much lower than those observed on the coasts.

Figure 3 shows the volatility of home prices in the same 17 metropolitan areas based on sales in the lower third tier of sales prices. The number of these sales tripled in Miami, Los Angeles, Washington, DC, San Diego, and Las Vegas. In September 2005, Boston saw a price drop that later spread to every metropolitan area in the country.

Table 1 shows the S&P/Case-Shiller Index through September 2009, when prices began to stabilize and then rise. The bottom two lines show composite indexes for two sub-samples of the 20 available metropolitan areas. Both have fallen nearly 30 percent since the summer of 2006.

How Did It Happen?

Needless to say, a credit expansion of this magnitude had a major impact on the housing market. As noted earlier, between 2000 and 2006 prices in the bottom tier of the market increased the most—by 241 percent in Miami, 249 percent in Los Angeles, and 200 percent in Washington, DC, Las Vegas, and San Diego. The S&P/Case-Shiller composite indexes more than doubled, and the national index increased by nearly 90 percent.

At the end of 2005 and into 2006, the housing market began to soften. Interest rates rose, and the 30-year mortgage interest rate was back to 6.6 percent by the last half of 2006. Gluts of speculative building slowed markets in Florida, Arizona, and Nevada. Homes in California and in the Northeast had become very expensive relative to incomes, and the manufacturing base of the Midwest fell into recession. As expectations turned gloomy in 2006, 16 of the 20 S&P/Case-Shiller metropolitan areas showed price declines, and by 2007 all were declining. This had never happened before.

Then inventories of houses for sale began to increase. In the past, when markets rose too quickly, prices were slow to change and adjustment was orderly. With house prices falling nationally, and with the bulk of the newly written mortgage debt carrying high loan-to-value ratios, mortgage default rates rose sharply.

Underwriting standards changed over this period as well. Statistical models of default and foreclosure seemed to “explain” defaults as a function of borrower and loan characteristics. These models were used by all market participants, sometimes even without their knowledge. The most widely known underwriting tools were Loan Prospector and Desktop Underwriter, developed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac respectively. Their low cost and ease of operation made them the industry standard. As these models spread throughout the market, mortgage lenders and insurers that did not accept their results garnered little new business. The rating agencies also fell victim to the same statistical methods, which suggested a very low likelihood of rapidly rising defaults.

The stated goal of the new model of underwriting was to transform a patchwork risk-allocation process into a more efficient and accurate pricing system. But this proved to be not only difficult, but ultimately impossible. Analysts seeking to predict the likelihood of default had little choice but to look to the past: at what rate did mortgages with the same characteristics fail in the past?

But past experience dealt with a 30-year period of rising prices in which the collateral was in most cases sufficient to cover claims. Thus, outside of a few regional downturns, no experience provided data that could accurately measure the impact of falling house prices on delinquency, default, and foreclosure.

The historic housing boom of 2000–2005, together with the change in underwriting standards and credit market operations, made the period of 2000–2008 one of the truly important economic episodes of the last century. Its legacy is a flood of bad mortgages with millions of homes headed for foreclosure.

The Government Has Played a Big Role

One additional factor clearly played a role in all of this: the federal government’s strong efforts to promote home ownership for rich and poor alike. In 1977 Congress passed the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) and the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), designed to increase bank lending to low-income and minority households. Even today, banks have a CRA exam every year to determine whether they are meeting the credit needs of their entire CRA area, which in almost all cases includes low-income neighborhoods that in previous years might have been rejected (“redlined”) for loans or insurance.

These programs reflect a belief that the nation has an interest in promoting home ownership as the American Dream, which is thought by many to lead to meritorious behavior. A homeowner is considered likely to be a better citizen, and more involved in local affairs. Home ownership was also thought to be a way of building wealth for low-income households, part of the social safety net (Case and Marynchenko 2002).

Home ownership was encouraged in a variety of ways. The federal subsidy in the income tax treatment of home ownership (the mortgage interest deduction, the capital gains exclusion, the property tax deduction, and the nontaxation of imputed rent on owner-occupied housing) amounts to about $140 billion annually. The Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) including Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginny Mae), and the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) were all set up to channel capital into home mortgages.

The national housing boom had its roots in unprecedented events that unfolded in U.S. financial markets beginning in 2000. The rapid decline of high tech industries, the stock market collapse in 2000 and 2001, the slow level of technology investment resulting from Y2K, and finally, of course, the events of 9/11 led to a relaxed monetary policy as the Federal Reserve continually reduced interest rates in an attempt to stimulate the economy and prevent recession. In January 2001 the Fed cut the federal funds rate (the interest rate banks charge one another for the use of federal funds) from 6.5 percent to 6 percent, and by the end of 2002 had reduced the rate 11 times, to 1.75 percent.

When the easing of credit began, the 30-year fixed rate for a conventional mortgage was 7.17 percent, down slightly from the 8.3 percent average rate over the first nine months of 2000. By the time the federal funds rate fell to 1.75 percent in the fourth quarter of 2002, the conventional fixed mortgage rate was 6.39 percent. The federal funds rate continued its downward trend until it hit 1 percent in July 2003 and remained there for over a year. By that time, the conventional 30-year fixed-rate mortgage carried an interest rate of 4.6 percent. This easing of credit was the result of a massive injection of liquidity. The dramatic drop in interest rates reduced returns on many investments, placing pressure on yields around the world.

The expansionary monetary policy pursued during this short period reduced the cost of buying a home by almost a third. If its purpose had been to stimulate the mortgage and housing markets, the policy certainly worked, as lower interest rates reduced mortgage costs. Housing production and sales of existing homes boomed. In October 2001 there were about 1.52 million housing starts annually. By the end of 2003 housing starts had increased by a third, to well over 2 million.

Existing home sales were 5.2 million annually at the beginning of 2001 and 6.5 million by the third quarter of 2003. By 2005 they reached 7 million and stayed at about 6 million until 2007. There is little doubt that the housing market kept the economy out of recession through the turbulent early years of the decade.

Figure 4 shows the explosion in home sales and mortgage volume at the end of 2002 and into 2003. Low interest rates stimulated demand for refinancing, and between the fourth quarters of 2002 and 2003, $5.5 trillion in mortgages were originated, and $3.7 trillion were paid off. Over five quarters, the total value of new mortgages was about the same as the entire stock of mortgage debt outstanding in 2001. Seventy-five percent of the new mortgages were written for refinancings rather than purchases of new homes.

By bundling large numbers of mortgages into securities, Wall Street could offer an investment vehicle that combined the implicit government guarantees of the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) with a history of very low default rates. As a result, much of the liquidity that drove the economic expansion was channeled directly into mortgages.

In June 2003, mortgage rates began to rise, moving from 4.60 percent to 5.97 percent by August. The third quarter of 2003 saw the highest volume of refinancings, with originations of $942 billion. The refinancing boom ended with the rise in interest rates, dropping 56 percent in the fourth quarter.

During this expansion of credit, the mortgage industry became highly profitable, collecting fees of about 2.5 percent of the $4 trillion in total originations in 2003 alone—over $100 billion. Greenspan and Kennedy (2008) estimate that fees for refinancings and home equity loans in 2004 reached $200 billion. With default and foreclosure rates low and housing prices high, lenders competed vigorously for the business of homebuyers.

Mortgages for home purchases doubled from $239 billion in 2004 to $478 billion in 2005. Much of this business was directed at low-income neighborhoods and sub-prime borrowers. Between 2002 and 2006, the market originated $14.4 trillion in mortgages, retired $10.3 trillion in debt, and increased the stock of outstanding mortgage debt to $10.3 trillion from $6.2 trillion.

This not-so-subtle pressure from the Congress was clearly accepted by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as the price they needed to pay to maintain the implicit guarantee of their debt, which they enjoyed as a result of their government franchises. There can be no precise division of responsibility between the GSEs and the private sector in expanding the housing bubble.

Several factors played a role in the ultimate collapse: the competitive battle for market share waged by Wall Street investment banks, the private securities markets, and some highly leveraged specialty firms; the high credit ratings that were distributed by the rating agencies; and the fact that default and foreclosure rates remained low. In fact, it took a partnership between public legislation, governmental regulation, private market exuberance, and an extreme increase in liquidity to bring the markets down.

Where Do We Go From Here?

By late 2009, housing markets seemed to be approaching a bottom with prices stabilizing, but many forecasts anticipate declines extending well into 2010. If that were to happen, numerous mortgages written in 2008 and 2009 would not be fully secured and could turn unprofitable.

A prolonged period of falling prices would prevent a significant increase in housing construction. Despite record low interest rates, housing starts have been in uncharted territory for more than a year, having fallen below levels seen in prior downturns. The last four recessions began with large declines in housing starts. At the end of 2008, starts were down from a peak of 2.27 million in 2006 to around 500,000, where they stayed for more than a year, well below the typical bottom of one million starts per year. This represents a decline of approximately $600 billion in aggregate demand.

Two market-clearing processes are currently underway in the housing market, operating side by side, often neighborhood by neighborhood, within metropolitan areas. First, there is the traditional search for a new equilibrium. Inventories remain high as risk-averse sellers seek to avoid sharp price reductions. Sellers without access to liquid capital can actually be among the most reluctant to sell, because they cannot afford to incur high transactions costs. Homeowners do not like to sell at a loss, and may postpone sales in hope of a rising market. This type of market-clearing process is slow and usually results in a long and costly period of quantity adjustment with relatively little change in sale prices.

Second, banks, loan servicers, and other market participants are left holding properties because of defaults and foreclosures. These houses are typically sold at auction, often at very low prices. In every past regional decline these two processes worked together to clear the market. The final result will be the product of a battle between them.

At the end of 2009, homes were selling at a rate of about 6 million per year, 5.5 million existing and 500,000 new homes, including between 1 and 1.5 million sales at foreclosure auctions. The bad news is that new properties are entering the foreclosure process faster than older cases are being resolved, suggesting that the portion of all sales accomplished through the auction process is likely to grow.

But a number of facts suggest that the current bottom could hold and eventually turn upward. First, prices have fallen substantially. In Boston, they have been falling for some time, and in California they are down over 50 percent. Eventually, when prices get low enough, people will start buying again. Furthermore, interest rates are remaining at all-time low levels, with the conventional 30-year fixed-mortgage rate below 5 percent.

In short, all housing market indicators are improving. Pending home sales, existing home sales, new home sales, and housing starts were all up during 2009; and prices actually stopped falling. The OFHEO price index and the S&P/Case-Shiller indexes for 18 of the 20 cities analyzed were up for several months in a row. New home inventories fell to 251,000 (7.4 months of inventory) in September, after having fallen for 13 consecutive prior months.

California represents about 25 percent of all the land value in the United States, and events there have major implications for the rest of the country. The good news is that for the last three months, the indexes for San Francisco, San Diego, and Los Angeles have led the nation in price appreciation. The California Association of Realtors reports substantial increases in home sales volumes except in the Central Valley.

It is important to remember that it takes only a relatively small number of buyers to move the market. Our measures of home values are based on observed sales, but only 5 to 7 percent of the total housing stock changes hands annually. Even with an unemployment rate near 10 percent, homebuyers continue to be very optimistic, and now there may be enough of them to change the market’s direction.

But, we are by no means out of the woods. Unemployment remains very high and jobs are still being lost. In addition, the foreclosure pipeline is moving very slowly, and foreclosures are spreading from the sub-prime market to the presumably more secure A-, Alt A, and prime loans. If the jobs picture does not brighten, and the market does not speed up the process of resolving foreclosures, the housing market could face a long period of stagnation and even a return to falling prices.

References

Case, Karl E. 1986. The Market for Single-family Homes in Boston. New England Economic Review May/June: 38–48.

———. 2007. The Value of Land in the United States: 1975–2005. In Land Policies and Their Outcomes, ed. Gregory K. Ingram and Yu-Hung Hong, 127–147. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Case, Karl E., and Maryna Marynchenko. 2002. Home Appreciation in Low and Moderate Income Markets. in Low Income Homeownership: Examining the Unexamined Goal, ed. Nicolas Retsinas and Eric Belsky. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Case, Karl E., and Robert J. Shiller. 1987. Prices of Single-family Homes since 1970. New England Economic Review September/October: 45–56.

———. 1989. The Efficiency of the Market for Single-family Homes. The American Economic Review 79(1): 125–137.

———.2003. Is There a Bubble in the Housing Market? Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. September 5.

Greenspan, Alan, and James Kennedy. 2008. Sources and Uses of Equity Extracted from Homes. Federal Reserve Board, Finance and Economics Discussion Working Paper Series 2007-20, October. http://www.federalreserve.gov/PUBS/feds/2007/200720/200720pap.pdf

About the Author

Karl E. “Chip” Case is the Katharine Coman and A. Barton Hepburn Professor of Economics at Wellesley College in Massachusetts. With Robert J. Shiller he developed the S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices. Case is a former member of the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy board of directors.

American cities have promising long-term prospects as hubs of innovation and growth, with expansion in technology and health sciences beginning to offset the decades-long erosion of manufacturing. Cities also remain places of vitality, offering urban design, density, and trans-port options that attract residents of all ages and backgrounds. In fact, nine of the ten most populous U.S. cities gained population over the last decade, according to the 2010 U.S. Census.

Yet the short-term prospects for cities are fraught with challenges. The recent sharp decline in tax revenues, caused by the 2008 housing market collapse and related financial crisis and economic slowdown, has made it extraordinarily difficult for state and local governments to maintain basic services, let alone plan for investments in infrastructure. Federal funds from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) helped local governments offset revenue declines in the past three years, but ARRA funds are no longer available for the coming fiscal year (a transition now termed “the cliff”), leaving local officials to confront the full force of revenue shortfalls.

The 2011 Journalists Forum on Land and the Built Environment: The Next City brought scholars, practitioners, and political leaders together with print and broadcast journalists to explore the theme of infrastructure for cities in the context of the ongoing economic recovery. This program is an annual partnership of the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, the Nieman Foundation for Journalism at Harvard University, and Harvard Graduate School of Design.

Two roles for infrastructure investments and related services permeated discussions at the Forum. First was the near-term role of investment in infrastructure as a fiscal stimulus aimed at turning around the economy and increasing employment. Second was the longer-term role that infrastructure plays in sustaining the transformation of municipal economies and increasing their competitiveness and livability in a globalized world.

Infrastructure and the Local Government Fiscal Crisis

The country’s need for fiscal stimulus to jump-start the economy in 2009 raised the prospect of massive infrastructure investments to help meet that need. However, the kinds of projects that could be launched quickly at the local level tended to be smaller-scale efforts, such as roadway repairs and facilities maintenance. More ambitious initiatives, such as intercity high-speed rail, failed to materialize due to spending and debt concerns and because much more design was needed before implementation could proceed.

Lawrence H. Summers, who recently returned to his professorship at Harvard after being director of the White House National Economic Council, defended the Obama administration’s stimulus plans, which he said were necessary to restore confidence in the financial system and keep the recession “out of the history books.” However, he said, “while local governments were able to use stimulus funds to cover revenue shortfalls, there were very few large shovel-ready projects.”

Moreover, the grim reality of fiscal stress is that cities cannot focus on large-scale, long-range infrastructure projects because they are struggling to cut spending and reform the delivery of local public services, noted Michael Cooper, reporter for The New York Times. Some examples of lost services include the Hawaii program that furloughs public school teachers every Friday through this school year; the San Diego boy who died choking on a gumball because a nearby fire station had been shuttered on a rotating basis; Colorado Springs’ decision to turn off a third of its streetlights each night and to auction off the police helicopter; and the California town that recalled its mayor because he revamped the city’s failing wooden pipes in its water system, but increased water fees to pay for it.

Many jurisdictions also have ongoing fiscal problems with the underfunding of pension funds and benefits. Some are worsening the problems simply by not making the required annual payments, a stopgap applied by Governor Chris Christie in New Jersey, among others. The municipal bond market faces tumult and some cities, like Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, are on the brink of bankruptcy. Fiscal deficits are growing because local governments have now expended the last of their

ARRA funds.

Adrian Fenty, former mayor of Washington, DC, said cities need to be run on a more business-like basis, moving to the politics of performance and away from the politics of patronage. Improvements are needed in both the efficiency of basic service delivery and the management of city finances. Because education is so important to the economic growth of cities, his administration gave priority to education reform—human infrastructure as well as physical infrastructure. During his term as mayor, his administration closed 20 percent of the schools and reduced administrative personnel by 50 percent. He also revamped teacher contracts, offering a merit pay system without tenure that 60 percent of the teachers opted to join.

Infrastructure Challenges: The Case of High-Speed Rail

President Barack Obama’s $53 billion high-speed rail initiative has brought the challenges of the local government fiscal crisis into sharp relief. Governors in Florida, Ohio, and Wisconsin returned the federal funding allocated to those states for intercity rail, claiming that their state and local governments could not possibly afford the resulting maintenance and operating costs, and questioning ridership projections. The high-speed rail project in California, though financed by a voter-approved bond issue, faces similar opposition because of financial burdens and local land use disputes.

Bruce Babbitt, former governor of Arizona and secretary of the U.S. Department of Interior, and a member of the Lincoln Institute board of directors, said the Obama administration’s campaign for high-speed intercity rail was a “political disaster,” and that the underlying vision needed a reassessment. He suggested that the Northeast Corridor should be the model, and that a revised plan should include a well-defined system of reliable financing—similar to the approach used to build the interstate highway system.

Paying for high-speed rail infrastructure will require a dedicated funding stream, perhaps from an increase in the gasoline tax in the states where the new rail lines would be located, and a system of value capture to engage private landowners who benefit from increases in property value as a result of such public works projects. “We don’t have the political courage to define our priorities,” Babbitt said. It will take a “national hammer” to address the nation’s infrastructure deficit without abdicating control to governors and states.

High-speed rail may live or die based on economic considerations. Petra Todorovich, executive director of America 2050, which has issued numerous analyses of high-speed rail’s potential, proposed a framework of 12 U.S. megaregions that represent collections of metropolitan areas where enhanced rail service offers the greatest potential for replacing automobile and short-haul airline travel. High-speed rail can deepen labor markets, increase agglomeration economies, and boost productivity by linking urban centers. Japan, France, and China are among the countries that have demonstrated how rail lines between major cities can foster economic synergies through the strategic location of high-speed rail stations and their connections to commuter rail and transit.

This economic payoff argument was seconded by Edward Rendell, former governor of Pennsylvania and mayor of Philadelphia, who is part of Building America’s Future, a campaign for investments in crumbling infrastructure nationwide. Rendell argued that the United States has been resting on its past investments, and that shoring up the nation’s decaying physical foundations is now an urgent priority. Without world-class infrastructure, the country will not be competitive in attracting private investment, sustaining rapid technological innovation and productivity growth, or maintaining the growth of good jobs domestically.

Infrastructure and the Future of Cities

As the recovery continues and economic growth returns, investments in new communication technology, green energy, smart urban systems, transport such as high-speed rail and mass transit, and other infrastructure will be needed to help cities fulfill their roles as the centers of innovation, culture, and productivity.

The vision of infrastructure combined with long-range planning is also a central theme in how cities can adapt to the inevitable impacts of climate change, including a possible one-meter sea level rise and associated storm surges, flooding, and increasing numbers of extreme weather events. Infrastructure in most coastal cities is so old that even a moderate storm event can do extensive damage, said Ed Blakely, public policy professor at the University of Sydney and former hurricane recovery czar in New Orleans.

Cities have been able to base their current plans on the relatively calm meteorological record of the last 200 years, but that calm is likely to erode with climate change, making much of the existing infrastructure inadequate or obsolete. Attention should not be focused on rebuilding after disasters like Hurricane Katrina, Blakely said, but on relocating, repositioning, and “future-proofing” for more resilient cities.

Infrastructure as an amenity that improves city livability is seen in New York’s High Line project, the conversion of an elevated freight line through the Meatpacking District and Greenwich Village. One of the architects on that project, Liz Diller, principal in Diller, Scofidio + Renfro, suggested that such retrofits can transform urban areas, provide a focal point for social and cultural events, and promote economic activity—though she cautioned that “architecture can’t really fix big problems.”

In spite of the current fiscal crisis, cities are expected to experience other changes that may aid their economic recovery. Among these are the fallout from the current housing crisis that is likely to spur demand for rental units and the demographic shift as the baby boom generation enters retirement age and begins to downsize housing choices.

Professor Arthur C. (Chris) Nelson, professor at the University of Utah, noted that both changes may generate more demand for urban lifestyles. For example, the current reduction in demand for owner-occupied, single-family houses at the metropolitan periphery is evident in the Intermountain West, Southwest, and South, where entire subdivisions are virtually empty. The percent of households owning homes has declined from a high of 69.2 percent in 2004 to 66.4 percent in 2011, fostering more demand for rental units that typically are located in more urbanized areas.

Demographic shifts are also related to changes in household composition. By 2030 single-person households will constitute one-third of the population, and only about one out of four households will include children, a decline from 45 percent with children in 1970 and 33 percent in 2000. These changes are likely to foster a significant adjustment in housing markets and values as aging baby boomers offer their suburban houses for sale and move to more urbanized locations with access to transit and walkable neighborhoods. At the same time, upcoming changes in mortgage markets and the reform of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac may make mortgage financing (and homeownership) more costly and cause younger families to choose renting over owning.

Cities as Engines of Growth

Investing in infrastructure to support metropolitan regions might have an additional rationale grounded in the surprising resilience of cities themselves. The ongoing urban resurgence is visible in the income growth of highly skilled professionals, the relatively modest housing price declines and even recent increases in several prospering cities, and a concentration of innovation in urban areas, said Harvard economics professor Edward Glaeser. “We could move anywhere that suits our biophilia,” he said. “Yet we keep flocking to cities.”

Urban population growth is highly correlated with average urban incomes, education levels, and the share of employment in small firms as cities continue to draw entrepreneurs and foster productivity. If incomes everywhere were like those in New York City, the national GDP would rise 43 percent, Glaeser said. Cities will also continue to be prized for their environmental value as places of density and transit, reflecting relatively lower per capita energy use and carbon emissions than suburban and rural areas. Glaeser argued against restrictive zoning and regulations that discourage greater density and leave older, low-rise urban neighborhoods “frozen in amber.” He also stressed that public education remains the most important investment that cities can and should make to enhance their continued economic growth and quality of life.

As both the national economy and local government revenues recover, a key priority will be to balance expenditures between current services and longer-term investments. Economic growth will make it easier to finance investments in infrastructure, but investments in infrastructure are needed to increase economic growth. The challenge is to find a politically feasible way of breaking into this virtuous circle.

About the Authors

Gregory K. Ingram is president and CEO of the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Anthony Flint is fellow and director of public affairs at the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Alan Mallach is a nonresident senior fellow at the Metropolitan Policy Program of the Brookings Institution and a senior fellow at the Center for Community Progress, both in Washington, DC; and a visiting scholar at the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. He has been engaged as a practitioner, advocate, and scholar in the fields of housing, planning, and community development for nearly 40 years, during which time he has made contributions in many areas including affordable and mixed-income housing development, neighborhood revitalization, and urban regeneration. In 2003 he was named a member of the College of Fellows of the American Institute of Certified Planners in recognition of his lifetime achievements as a leader in the city planning profession.

Mallach is also a visiting professor in the graduate city planning program at Pratt Institute, in New York, and has taught at Rutgers University and the New Jersey School of Architecture. He has published numerous books and articles on housing, community development, and land use; his book Bringing Buildings Back: From Abandoned Properties to Community Assets is recognized as the standard work on the subject. His most recent book, Rebuilding America’s Legacy Cities: New Directions for the Industrial Heartland, was published in 2012 by the American Assembly at Columbia University. He is a resident of Roosevelt, New Jersey, and holds a B.A. degree from Yale College.

Land Lines: How did you become involved with the Lincoln Institute?

Alan Mallach: I have known about the Lincoln Institute for many years, and initially became involved in the 1990s through my work on brownfields redevelopment. Since then, I have served as faculty in a number of training sessions sponsored by the Institute and participated in meetings and conferences at Lincoln House. About seven years ago, Nico Calavita, professor emeritus in the Graduate Program in City Planning at San Diego State University, and I undertook research on inclusionary housing. This project led to the Institute’s 2010 publication of our co-edited book, Inclusionary Housing in International Perspective: Affordable Housing, Social Inclusion, and Land Value Recapture. Most recently, I have been working with Lavea Brachman, executive director of the Greater Ohio Policy Center, on a policy focus report that looks at the issues associated with regenerating America’s legacy cities.

Land Lines: What do you mean by legacy cities?

Alan Mallach: “Legacy cities” is a term that has come into use increasingly to replace “shrinking cities” as a way to describe the nation’s older industrial cities that have lost a significant share of their population and jobs over the past 50 or more years. Iconic American cities such as Pittsburgh, Detroit, and Cleveland are typically mentioned in this context, but the category also includes many smaller cities like Flint, Michigan; Utica, New York; and Scranton, Pennsylvania.

Land Lines: How do the issues of legacy cities engage the Lincoln Institute’s central policy concerns?

Alan Mallach: They do so in many different respects, but I think the strongest connection is around the question of how land is to be used in these cities. All of these cities have had a significant oversupply of both residential and nonresidential buildings relative to demand, at least since the 1960s. As a result of extensive demolition over decades, they have accumulated large inventories of vacant or underutilized land. Detroit alone contains over 100,000 separate vacant land parcels and another 40,000 to 50,000 vacant buildings. While this inventory is a burden, it could also become an enormous asset for the city’s future. How to develop effective strategies to use this land in ways that both benefit the public and stimulate economic growth and market demand is one of the central issues facing these legacy cities.

Land Lines: How would you compare this challenge to your work on inclusionary housing?

Alan Mallach: From an economic standpoint, it’s the other side of the coin. Inclusionary housing is a way of using the planning approval process to channel strong market demand in ways that create public benefit in the form of affordable housing—either directly, by incorporating some number of affordable housing units into the development gaining the approval, or indirectly, through off-site development or cash contributions by the developer. As such, it involves explicitly or implicitly recapturing the incremental land value being created by the planning approval process. Inclusionary housing presupposes the presence of strong market demand and cannot happen without it.

Land reuse strategies in legacy cities seek to create demand where it doesn’t currently exist or alternatively find ways to use the land that benefit the public and can be implemented even under conditions where market demand cannot be induced, at least for the foreseeable future. These approaches are often called “green” land uses, such as urban agriculture, open space, wetlands restoration, or stormwater management. It can be difficult to get local officials and citizens to recognize that the traditional forms of redevelopment, including building new houses, shopping centers, and so forth, require the existence of a market for those products. However, the demand simply does not exist in many of these devastated areas. Moreover, the demand cannot be induced artificially by massive public subsidies, even though public funds can, under certain conditions, act as a stimulus to build demand.

Land Lines: Is lack of demand evident everywhere in legacy cities?

Alan Mallach: No, and that’s one of the most interesting things about these cities. Some cities are seeing demand grow far more than others, but in most cases the revitalization is limited to certain parts of the city. One noticeable trend is that downtown and near-downtown areas, particularly those with strong walkable urban character, such as the Washington Avenue corridor in St. Louis or Cleveland’s Warehouse District, are showing great dynamism, even while many other parts of those two cities are continuing to see population loss and housing abandonment.

Part of this dynamism is driven by walkability and strong urban form (see the new Lincoln Institute book by Julie Campoli, Made for Walking: Density and Neighborhood Form (2012), which examines 12 such walkable neighborhoods and the forces behind their recent popularity). A second important factor is that these areas appeal to a particular demographic—young single individuals and couples. This group is not only increasingly urbanoriented, but is growing in terms of its share of the overall American population.

Land Lines: What other issues are you exploring in your work on legacy cities?

Alan Mallach:I am focusing on two research areas, one more quantitative and one more qualitative. In the first area, I am looking at how many of these cities are going through a pronounced spatial and demographic reconfiguration—a process that is exacerbating the economic disparities between different geographic areas and populations within these cities. While many older city downtowns, such as those of St. Louis, Cleveland, Baltimore, and even Detroit, are becoming increasingly attractive, particularly to young adults, and are gaining population and economic activity, many other neighborhoods in these cities are losing ground at an increasing rate. In many places these trends are accentuating already problematic racial divides.

My second area of research revolves around the question of what it takes to foster successful, sustained regeneration. Lavea Brachman and I touch on this challenge in our policy focus report, but I am hoping to delve into it much more deeply, including looking at some European cities that have found themselves in situations similar to those of American legacy cities. I think the experiences of cities in northern England, for example, or Germany’s Ruhr Valley, parallel changes in our own former industrial cities quite closely.

Land Lines: What do you mean by successful regeneration?

Alan Mallach: That’s a very important question. I think there’s often a tendency to see a particular event—the Olympics in Barcelona or a major building like the Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao, Spain, for example—as evidence of regeneration, rather than, at best, a discrete spur to more substantial change. I believe that regeneration has to be a function of change in three fundamental areas: first, the well-being of the population, reflected in such measures as higher educational attainment and income or lower unemployment; second, a stronger housing market and greater neighborhood strength; and third, the creation of new export-oriented economic sectors to replace the lost industrial sector. Population growth alone (that is, reversal of historic population decline) may or may not be evidence of regeneration. It is more likely to follow these three changes rather than lead them.

Land Lines: What do you see as the future of America’s legacy cities?

Alan Mallach: I see a very mixed picture. As shown in the policy focus report, certain cities are doing far better than others. Pittsburgh and Philadelphia are showing strong signs of revival, while Cleveland, Detroit, and Buffalo are still losing ground. I think legacy cities are facing two daunting challenges as they look to the future.

The first issue is what the new economic engines of these cities will be. The cities that have been more successful up to now tend to have the most significant clusters of major national research universities and medical centers. These institutions tend to dominate their cities’ economies. While they have helped cities like Pittsburgh and Baltimore rebuild in the post-industrial era, I think a lot of questions remain about their sustainability as long-term economic engines.

The second question is demographic. Downtowns may be drawing young, single people and couples, but many of these cities’ residential neighborhoods were built around 100 years ago as communities mainly for married couples to raise children. Now they are falling apart, including many neighborhoods that have remained stable until relatively recently. This demographic of married couples with children is shrinking across the country and even more so in our older cities. Today, only 8 percent of the households in Baltimore, for example, fit this description. I believe that the future of these neighborhoods is very important to the future of their cities, and I am very concerned about their prospects.

Land Lines: In spite of these challenges, how do you think your work is making a difference?

Alan Mallach: The fact is, many cities are making progress. Pittsburgh has done an excellent job building on its assets to develop new economic engines, while Baltimore and Philadelphia are making impressive strides in reorganizing many of their governmental functions to better deal with their vacant and problem property challenges. Baltimore, for example, has initiated a program called Vacants to Value, which integrates code enforcement and problem property work with larger market-building strategies. I have been fortunate to be directly involved in this work in some cities, including Philadelphia and Detroit; elsewhere, I’m always gratified when local officials or community leaders tell me that they use my work, or that they have been influenced by my thinking. It makes all the effort very much worthwhile.

Adam H. Langley es analista senior de investigación en el Departamento de Valuación e Impuestos del Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. Previamente, Langley trabajó para la Asamblea del Estado de Nueva York. Obtuvo su licenciatura en Estudios políticos en el Bard College y una maestría en Economía en Boston University.

Las investigaciones de Langley han cubierto una serie de temas relacionados con las finanzas públicas estatales y locales, centrándose específicamente en el impuesto sobre la propiedad. Ha sido coautor de tres informes sobre enfoque en políticas de suelo del Instituto Lincoln: Property Tax Circuit Breakers: Fair and Cost-Effective Relief for Taxpayers (Fusibles para el impuesto sobre la propiedad: Alivio equitativo y económicamente efectivo para los contribuyentes) (2009), Payments in Lieu of Taxes: Balancing Municipal and Nonprofit Interests (Pagos en lugar de impuestos: Equilibrando los intereses de las municipalidades y organizaciones sin fines de lucro) (2010), y Rethinking Property Tax Incentives for Business (Repensando los incentivos del impuesto sobre la propiedad para las empresas) (2012). También ha liderado varios proyectos para proporcionar datos en el sitio web del Instituto Lincoln, como la creación de la base de datos de Ciudades Fiscalmente Estandarizadas (Fiscally Standardized Cities o FiSCs) y un juego de datos con amplia información sobre organizaciones sin fines de lucro que efectúan pagos en lugar de impuestos, y las localidades que los reciben.

Sus artículos han aparecido en publicaciones como Regional Science and Urban Economics, Public Finance and Management, y Publius: The Journal of Federalism. Su investigación también ha sido cubierta por más de cien medios periodísticos, incluyendo The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Economist, Governing, y The Boston Globe.

Land Lines: ¿En qué proyectos ha estado trabajando recientemente como analista de investigación senior del Instituto Lincoln?

Adam Langley: He estado trabajando en varios proyectos relacionados con las finanzas de los gobiernos locales. Un proyecto importante ha sido la creación de la base de datos de “Ciudades fiscalmente estandarizadas” (Fiscally Standardized Cities o FiSCs). Este subcentro del sitio web del Instituto Lincoln permite a los usuarios realizar comparaciones significativas de las finanzas de los gobiernos locales a nivel ciudad para 112 de las ciudades más grandes de los EE.UU. en los últimos 35 años. Utilicé estos datos en un artículo reciente sobre las finanzas municipales durante la Gran Recesión, que presenté en la 9.a Conferencia Anual sobre Política de Suelo el 2 de junio de 2014. También estoy creando una tabla resumida para describir los programas estatales de exención y créditos al impuesto sobre la propiedad, con información del subcentro “Características significativas del impuesto sobre la propiedad” del Instituto Lincoln. Pienso usar dicha tabla para estimar los gastos tributarios para estos programas en cada uno de los 50 estados.

Land Lines: Usted trabajó en varios proyectos para proporcionar datos en el sitio web del Instituto Lincoln. ¿Qué lo motiva a enfocarse en los datos?

Adam Langley: Estos proyectos de datos forman parte central de la misión del Instituto Lincoln de facilitar la toma de decisiones informadas sobre temas relacionados con el uso, la regulación y la tributación del suelo. Las bases de datos del Instituto han sido utilizadas por gestores de políticas, para ayudarles a guiar sus decisiones; por periodistas, para ampliar el contexto de sus notas; y por investigadores, para sus propios proyectos. El aprovisionamiento de datos accesibles sin cargo y fáciles de usar aumenta enormemente el alcance potencial del trabajo del Instituto en temas de políticas de suelo, porque permite a otros analistas realizar nuevas investigaciones sobre el tema.

También es esencial para el prestigio del Instituto Lincoln que nuestras recomendaciones de políticas se cimienten en un análisis de alta calidad y datos fidedignos. Para poder influir en las decisiones políticas, es fundamental que nuestras investigaciones sean ampliamente consideradas como objetivas, no partidistas y basadas en evidencias.

Land Lines: Usted dijo que la base de datos de “Ciudades fiscalmente estandarizadas” permite realizar comparaciones significativas de las finanzas de los gobiernos locales a nivel ciudad. ¿Qué tiene de malo la simple comparación de gobiernos municipales?

Adam Langley: Las responsabilidades de servicio de los gobiernos municipales varían mucho a lo largo del país. Mientras que algunas municipalidades brindan una oferta completa de servicios públicos a sus residentes, otras comparten estas responsabilidades con una serie de gobiernos independientes superpuestos. Debido a estas diferencias en la estructura de los gobiernos locales, la comparación simple de gobiernos municipales puede ser engañosa.

Por ejemplo, consideremos una comparación entre Baltimore y Tampa. El gobierno municipal de Baltimore gasta tres veces más per cápita que el gobierno municipal de Tampa (US$5.594 vs. US$1.829 en 2011). No obstante, la diferencia se debe casi por completo al hecho de que la ciudad de Tampa comparte el aprovisionamiento de servicios locales con un distrito escolar independiente y con el condado de Hillsborough al que pertenece, mientras que Baltimore no cuenta con ningún condado superpuesto, y las escuelas forman parte del gobierno municipal propiamente dicho. Cuando se tienen en cuenta todos los gobiernos superpuestos en la base de datos de FiSC, los gastos per cápita para los residentes de las dos ciudades son casi idénticos: US$6.083 en Baltimore vs. US$6.067 en Tampa.

Land Lines: ¿Puede explicar la metodología utilizada para crear las “Ciudades fiscalmente estandarizadas”?

Adam Langley: Las FiSC se construyen sumando los ingresos de cada gobierno municipal con la proporción pertinente de los condados superpuestos, distritos escolares independientes y distritos especiales. Los ingresos del condado se asignan a la base de datos FiSC según la proporción de la población del condado que vive en dicha ciudad; los ingresos escolares se asignan en base al porcentaje de estudiantes del distrito que vive en la ciudad central, y los ingresos de los distritos especiales se asignan en base a la proporción de los residentes del área de servicio del distrito que vive en la ciudad. Por lo tanto, la base de datos FiSC proporciona una representación plena de los ingresos recaudados de los residentes y comercios de la ciudad, ya sea por el gobierno municipal o por un gobierno separado superpuesto. Estas asignaciones se hacen para más de 120 categorías de ingresos, gastos, deudas y activos. La metodología de la base de datos FiSC fue desarrollada junto con Andrew Reschovsky, fellow del Instituto Lincoln, y Howard Chernick, profesor de Hunter College de la Universidad de la Ciudad de Nueva York. Calculamos las estimaciones usando datos fiscales de cada gobierno individual proporcionados por la Oficina del Censo de los EE.UU. y actualizamos la base de datos de FiSC con los datos de años posteriores, en la medida que se encuentren disponibles.

Land Lines: ¿Por qué es importante comparar las finanzas de los gobiernos locales a nivel de ciudad?

Adam Langley: Mucha gente quiere saber cómo se compara su ciudad con otras ciudades, pero al hacer estas comparaciones es fundamental contabilizar las diferencias en las estructuras de los gobiernos locales. La base de datos FiSC precisamente hace eso. Por lo tanto, se puede usar para comparar los ingresos del impuesto sobre la propiedad en dos ciudades, clasificar a todas las ciudades por su nivel de gasto escolar, investigar cambios en los salarios del sector público a lo largo del tiempo, o ver qué ciudades dependen más de la ayuda estatal para financiar sus presupuestos.

En otro proyecto, junto con Andrew Reschovsky y Richard Dye, estamos usando la metodología de FiSC para estimar los costos de las pensiones y otras obligaciones de los gobiernos locales de cada ciudad. La cobertura en los medios de comunicación a veces da la impresión de que todos los planes públicos de pensiones tienen dificultades, pero en realidad hay mucha variación en el país. Para poder investigar estas diferencias, es fundamental contar con datos comparables de costos de pensiones de todos los gobiernos locales de cada ciudad. Por ejemplo, las estimaciones iniciales muestran que en promedio la contribución requerida anual (annual required contribution o ARC) de los planes de pensiones locales en 2010 ascendía al 4,9 por ciento de los ingresos generales en las 112 FiSC de la base de datos. No obstante, la ARC era más del 10 por ciento de los ingresos tanto en Chicago (11,7 por ciento) como en Portland, Oregón (10,9 por ciento).

Land Lines: ¿La disminución de los ingresos durante la Gran Recesión varió mucho en las distintas ciudades?

Adam Langley: Sí, la disminución de ingresos varió significativamente en las 112 FiSC durante y después de la recesión. Cuando se tiene en cuenta la inflación y el crecimiento de la población, sólo los ingresos de ocho FiSC evitaron una disminución neta a finales de 2011. Calculé los cambios en los ingresos reales per cápita con respecto al máximo de cada FiSC hasta finales de 2011. Alrededor de un tercio de ellas tuvo una disminución del 5 por ciento o menos (41 FiSC), otro tercio sufrió disminuciones de entre el 5 y 10 por ciento (34 FiSC), y alrededor de un cuarto sufrió disminuciones superiores al10 por ciento (29 FiSC). Las FiSC con las mayores disminuciones de ingresos fueron Las Vegas (20,2 por ciento), Riverside (18,0 por ciento) y Sacramento (18,0 por ciento).

Land Lines: ¿Se han recuperado mucho los ingresos de los gobiernos locales desde el fin de la recesión?

Adam Langley: Todavía no, porque los cambios en el nivel de ingresos se retrasaron varios años con respecto a los cambios en la economía durante y después de la recesión. Los ingresos gubernamentales reales per cápita fueron estables a lo largo de 2009, disminuyeron un poco en 2010, y cayeron de forma importante en 2011. El último año con datos completos es 2011, así que combiné distintas fuentes de datos para estimar los ingresos a lo largo de 2013. Estos datos sugieren que los ingresos tocaron fondo en 2012, cuando fueron entre un 5 y 6 por ciento inferiores a los de 2007. Esto quiere decir que los ingresos no llegaron a su valor mínimo hasta tres años después de que la recesión terminó oficialmente. Los ingresos comenzaron a recuperarse en 2013, pero siguieron siendo más del 4 por ciento inferiores a los niveles previos a la recesión.

Este retraso se debe a cambios en la ayuda intergubernamental y los impuestos sobre la propiedad, que en su conjunto financian casi dos tercios del presupuesto de los gobiernos locales. La Ley de Recuperación y Reinversión Americana proporcionó a los estados alrededor de 150.000 millones de dólares en estímulos federales entre 2009 y 2011, con fondos de estímulo adicionales proporcionados directamente a los gobiernos locales. Sin embargo, la mayoría de los fondos de estímulo desaparecieron el año 2012, lo cual condujo a los mayores recortes de gasto estatales de los últimos 25 años. Más aún, los cambios en los impuestos sobre la propiedad normalmente se retrasan con respecto a los cambios en los precios de las viviendas entre dos y tres años, debido a que el monto se basa en la tasación de años anteriores, hay retrasos en la actualización de dichas tasaciones y otros factores. Este retraso hizo que los impuestos sobre la propiedad crecieran a lo largo de 2009, no disminuyeran hasta 2011, y cayeran a su punto mínimo en 2012.

Land Lines: ¿Puede darnos más detalles sobre su trabajo acerca de la exención de impuestos sobre la propiedad y los programas de crédito?

Adam Langley: Ya casi he terminado con la primera etapa de este proyecto, que consiste en crear una tabla con el resumen de los programas de exención y créditos estatales. La tabla contiene datos de 167 programas, con 18 variables que describen las características principales de cada programa. Hay información sobre el valor de las exenciones expresadas en términos de valor de mercado; criterios relacionados con la edad, discapacidad, nivel de ingresos y si el beneficiario es un veterano de guerra; el tipo de impuesto afectado; si la pérdida de ingresos tributarios la sufre el estado o el gobierno local; opciones locales; etc. Una vez que haya completado la tabla, escribiré un resumen de política para describir las características principales de estos programas. Toda esta información se deriva de la tabla “Programas de alivio tributario para propiedades residenciales” del subcentro “Características significativas del impuesto sobre la propiedad” del sitio web del Instituto. La tabla original de “Alivio residencial” brinda descripciones detalladas de cada programa, mientras que la tabla resumida será más útil para aquellos usuarios que quieran hacer una comparación rápida entre estados, o para investigadores que quieran realizar análisis cuantitativos.

En la segunda etapa de este proyecto, calcularé los gastos tributarios de mantener estos programas de alivio tributario del impuesto sobre la propiedad. A pesar de la preponderancia de estos programas y su a menudo considerable impacto en la carga tributaria sobre la propiedad, no existen estimaciones completas sobre su costo. Usando datos de la tabla resumida y microdatos de la Encuesta de Comunidades Americanas, calcularé para cada estado el porcentaje de residentes que pueden beneficiarse de los programas de alivio tributario sobre la propiedad, el costo total de dichos programas, el beneficio promedio para los beneficiarios y el porcentaje de residentes elegibles y el beneficio promedio por quin-til de ingresos. Estos cálculos proporcionarán nueva y valiosa información sobre el impacto de los programas de alivio del impuesto sobre la propiedad en los Estados Unidos.

Smart growth has moved from the domain of policy analysts into more general acceptance. It is championed by national leaders such as Vice President Al Gore, governors (Parris Glendening of Maryland), urban mayors (William A. Johnson of Rochester, New York), non-governmental organizations (National Trust for Historic Preservation), and the private sector (Urban Land Institute). Voters in many California cities, including Sacramento, Santa Barbara, Irvine and Davis, and in numerous suburbs around San Francisco have approved urban growth boundaries (UGB) as one type of intervention to contain sprawl development.

Urban containment policies are not limited to environmentally active communities in California, Oregon or Colorado, or booming economies in states such as Florida, however. Lexington, Kentucky, observed the 40th anniversary of its urban growth boundary last year, and Sioux Falls, South Dakota, has had a containment boundary for many years. This kind of broad-based popular support for smart growth policies is more than simply a growth management fad and is likely to increase, particularly as long as the national economic expansion continues. Indeed, urban containment appears to be building a kind of momentum as a land use policy that has not been seen since the Supreme Court’s sanctioning of zoning in Ambler Realty Co. vs. Euclid, Ohio.

Urban containment planning has two basic purposes: (1) to promote compact, contiguous, and accessible development provided with efficient public services; and (2) to preserve open space, agricultural land and environmentally sensitive areas that are not currently suitable for development. Urban containment consists of drawing a line around an urban area within which development is encouraged, often with density bonuses or minimum density requirements, to accommodate projected growth over a specified future time period, typically ten to twenty years. Land outside the boundary is generally restricted to resource uses and to very low-density residential development by limiting the extension of utilities, wastewater services and other infrastructure.

Intuitively, however, this sort of land regulation appears to be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, measures aimed at reducing traffic congestion or infrastructure costs, or improving the aesthetic quality of urban areas, are appealing. On the other hand, measures that are seen to limit land supply and potentially cause housing prices to increase are unappealing, particularly to those seeking to expand the stock of affordable housing.

To explore the implications of these two faces of urban containment as smart growth policy, the Lincoln Institute and the Fannie Mae Foundation convened a group of scholars and practitioners for a symposium in Cambridge last February. The economists, planners and other researchers in attendance discussed the existing literature on urban containment and identified questions for future research that could inform policy making in this dynamic area of land regulation.

Housing Price Effects

Housing costs reflect the price of land, the price of the house and the value of amenities. Urban containment policies change housing costs for two reasons. First, land prices change when land supply is altered. Second, if urban containment increases the value of the amenity package associated with a house, then that, too, will cause a change in house prices. Much of the discussion at the symposium centered around these two theoretically distinct aspects of the housing price problem.

Most economic literature assessing urban containment argues that it raises land and housing prices principally by constraining the supply of land and/or by failing to accommodate new demand for serviced land. But, others argue that urban containment systems, when coupled with increased densities within the growth boundary, should not adversely affect supply and, indeed, should generate benefits to residents. This latter view shifts the focus away from the microeconomic theory of price determination to housing economics, which introduces the concept that house prices capitalize the value of neighborhood amenities.

For example, the increased densities within an urban growth boundary can make it practical to extend or enhance existing public transit, thus yielding greater accessibility. In addition, increases in densities can result in lower costs to provide urban services by the public sector. Similarly, higher neighborhood densities can lead to more interactions with neighbors and more “eyes on the streets,” which, in turn, can translate into lower crime rates. Finally, if urban containment is successful in preserving open spaces, house values in neighborhoods near the preserved open space should also rise.

All of these benefits can be counted among the amenities that give value to a house and are ultimately capitalized in its value, even while the land supply restriction can also put pressure on house prices. In truth, both factors may be at work, and we still have much to learn about their impacts. Furthermore, some of these internalized benefits may have different values for households at different income levels.

A comparison of Atlanta, Georgia, and Portland, Oregon, both suggests of these sorts of benefits and points to areas for future research to answer these questions more comprehensively (see Table 1). During the first half of the 1990s, Portland experienced a large increase in housing prices (approximately 60 percent compared to almost 20 percent in Atlanta, in nominal terms). Between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s, homeownership rates in Portland increased by nearly 5 percent while Atlanta’s rate remained virtually unchanged. Finally, perceptions of improved house quality were greater among Portland residents than those in Atlanta. In both metropolitan areas and in both time periods, the proportion of household income spent on housing was virtually the same, suggesting that income growth in Portland exceeded that in Atlanta. However, it is difficult to conclude definitively that increases in house quality in Portland were due to enhanced amenities conferred on households by changes in land regulation, rather than to rising incomes.

Although urban containment policies may stabilize the supply of land, they usually increase the supply of development opportunities. Such policies are typically accompanied by “upzoning” whereby land zoned formerly at one level of development intensity is changed to allow for a higher density. One strategy to increase densities is to infill and redevelop (or “refill”) urban areas at higher than extant levels through the adoption of “minimum intensity” zoning. We do not know the subsequent effect of such policies on house prices, and we know even less about their effect on household budgets and disposable income. For example, higher housing prices may simply reflect capitalization of more efficient development patterns that reduce expenditures in other parts of the household budget.

It is possible, however, that current and future homeowners will benefit directly from these sorts of capitalized savings. For example, location-efficient mortgages, a lending instrument being tested in a few markets, allow lenders to extend mortgages to households based on a higher mortgage-to-income ratio. The rationale for altering the income eligibility is that, in comparison to suburban households, urban households can substitute walking and public transit for automobile payments, including both capital costs and operating expenses. Thus, disposable income is effectively increased as non-housing expenditures decline. Current experiments with the location-efficient mortgage are underway in Chicago’s northside neighborhoods and in central Seattle. If default rates for these loans are similar to those for traditional mortgages, we may see greater adoption of this instrument in appropriate submarkets.

Other savings that may accrue to urban homeowners as a result of containment policies are lower taxes due to lower capital costs or increases in supplemental income if higher densities are achieved through the addition of accessory apartments in existing houses.

Landowner Behavior Implications

The imposition of urban containment policies and changes in density are also likely to result in changed expectations of landowners. Therefore, an additional consideration for researchers, which the symposium participants confronted, is the role of containment in affecting the nature of landowner behavior with respect to land acquisition and land development.

In an environment of a relatively inexhaustible supply of land, speculation can be reasonably efficient while the competition to sell land keeps prices low. The end result may be that housing prices will not be affected materially. However, when supply is constrained, even if upzoning increases development capacity, the number of players in the land market can fall and cartels may form. Furthermore, an assumption of urban containment policies is that undeveloped land inside the boundary will come on-line in sufficient amounts and at appropriate times to sustain development. There is no research into this, however. Will owners of land, knowing they hold an oligopolistic position in the land market, delay its sale to get a higher price?

Until now, in our studies of urban land markets, we have lived with the assumption of relatively inexhaustible (i.e., elastic) land supply. Urban containment policies can change that premise by making land an exhaustible commodity, resulting in the problem of dual predictability. On one hand, developers are given more certainty in whether and how they develop land; on the other hand, landowners know that land supply will become exhaustible and therefore they may be enticed to become speculators, in their own right. Will local governments reward those willing to develop vacant or underused parcels with higher densities to offset others who delay sale? Certainly, a land tax is expected to limit this sort of behavior. Can other changes in the tax regime encourage development within the UGB? For all of these reasons, we have much to learn about the effect of urban containment on landowner and speculative behavior.

Summary Observations

The symposium participants spent more time on the economic issues related to urban containment than on environmental concerns. However, some material was presented that suggested significant environmental benefits as a result of urban containment. Table 2 presents additional comparisons of Portland and Atlanta between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s. While vehicle miles traveled increased in both places, Portland experienced little change (2 percent) whereas Atlanta experienced a significant increase (17 percent). At the same time, Portland’s average commute times fell, air quality improved, and per capita energy consumption declined.

All of these indicators suggest that Portland is different from Atlanta in meaningful ways. Furthermore, typical behavior by individuals in each of these metropolitan areas is presumed to be different. We should attempt to find out the degree to which growth containment policies account for these behavioral differences and whether there are other policies that may also play important roles in affecting the economic and environmental dynamics of metropolitan regions. For example, the problem of housing affordability remains a serious concern in most cities, whether with or without urban containment boundaries.

Urban containment creates an entirely new regime in urban planning and development decision making, offering research challenges because of the difficulties in developing methodologies that can tease out complex interactions and frame the results in a manner that can advance both public and private interests. The Lincoln Institute, the Fannie Mae Foundation and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development are among a growing number of research entities interested in pursuing these challenges.

Arthur C. Nelson is professor of city planning, urban design and public policy at the Georgia Institute of Technology in Atlanta. He organized the seminar referenced in this article and has researched and written extensively on this topic.

Cuba es un país sorprendente. La ciudad de La Habana, su capital histórica, ostenta 400 años de herencia arquitectónica. Muchas de sus áreas se encuentran en un estado de triste deterioro, pero otras, representan formas muy creativas de abordar la conservación y el desarrollo económico. Debido al enfoque en el desarrollo rural luego de la revolución de 1959, Cuba no experimentó el mismo tipo de inmigración popular del campo a las ciudades que ocurrió en otras partes de América Latina. Los desarrollos modernos se dieron en gran parte fuera del núcleo histórico de La Habana. En este sentido, las buena noticia es que la herencia arquitectónica de la ciudad todavía está en pie, pero la mala es que apenas está en pie.

Los arquitectos y urbanistas de Cuba enfrentan grandes dificultades para realizar las tareas básicas de mejorar la infraestructura y la vivienda al mismo tiempo que fomentan un desarrollo económico apropiado a su visión socialista. Están desarrollando modelos de transformación comunitaria a través de la organización local y los programas de autoayuda, y están creando modelos de “recuperación de plusvalías” en el proceso de conservación histórica y desarrollo turístico.

A través de las conexiones con el Grupo de Desarrollo integral de la Capital (GDIC), nueve profesionales del diseño ambiental viajaron a Cuba en junio para explorar los problemas de deterioro e innovación del medio ambiente construido y natural. El equipo contó con la asistencia de nueve de los once becarios de investigación Loeb de la Escuela de Posgrado en Diseño de la Universidad de Harvard en 1997-98.

Las becas de investigación Loeb para estudios ambientales avanzados se establecieron en 1970 gracias a la generosidad del exalumno de Harvard John L. Loeb. La beca anualmente otorga financiamiento de un año de estudios independientes en la Universidad de Harvard a entre diez y doce líderes en las profesiones de diseño y ambientalismo. Una tradición reciente del programa de becas de investigación es que los becarios hacen un viaje en conjunto al final del año académico, para dar solidez a las relaciones que desarrollaron durante el año, explorar juntos un ambiente nuevo y compartir sus conocimientos y experticia con otros.

Los becarios de investigación Loeb que viajaron a Cuba tienen una variedad de intereses que en conjunto conforman una muestra representativa de las profesiones de diseño ambiental:

• Charles Birnbaum, arquitecto especializado en paisajismo que aboga por la conservación de paisajes importantes.
• Toni Griffin, arquitecto preocupado por el desarrollo económico y comunitario de vecindarios urbanos.
• Pamela Hawkes, arquitecto especializada en la conservación histórica.
• Daniel Hernández, arquitecto creador de viviendas asequibles.
• Leonard McGee, líder comunitario que trabaja por la transformación y mejoramiento de las comunidades centro-urbanas de escasos recursos.
• Julio Peterson, promotor comunitario interesado en el desarrollo económico de centros urbanos de bajos recursos y países en vías de desarrollo.
• Peter Pollock, planificador urbano especializado en problemas de administración del crecimiento.
• Anne Raver, periodista interesada en la relación de la gente con su medio ambiente natural.
• Jean Rogers, ingeniero ambientalista y urbanista que se enfoca en mejorar los impactos de la industrialización en el medio ambiente.

Los becarios fueron recibidos en La Habana por el GDIC, que fue creado en 1987 como un equipo pequeño de expertos que aconsejaba al gobierno de la ciudad sobre políticas urbanas. Según Mario Coyula: “El grupo quiso desde el primer momento promover un nuevo modelo para el medio ambiente construido que sería menos imponente, más descentralizador y participativo, sensato ecológicamente y económicamente posible, en definitiva, holísticamente sustentable”.

Mario Coyula es arquitecto, urbanista y vicepresidente del GDIC. Entre él y sus colegas del GDIC han ensamblado una serie de seminarios informativos, así como recorridos de los becarios por La Habana. Además, han organizado visitas de los becarios a urbanistas y diseñadores en las ciudades de Las Terrazas, Matanzas y Trinidad.

Varias fundaciones y grupos han brindado su apoyo al proyecto: la Fundación Arca, la Fundación William Reynolds, el Instituto Lincoln de Políticas de Suelo, la Asociación de Exalumnos Becarios Loeb, y el Programa de becas de investigación Loeb de la Escuela de Posgrado en Diseño de la Universidad de Harvard. Cada becario Loeb escribirá un ensayo sobre un área de investigación relevante y su relación con las condiciones de Cuba. Éstos ensayos serán compilados y puestos a la disposición del GDIC, de la Universidad de Harvard y potencialmente de otros a través de la publicación de una revista o reporte especial.

Peter Pollock es el director de planeación comunitaria de la ciudad de Boulder, Colorado. En 1997-98 fue becario Loeb en la Universidad de Harvard y miembro visitante del Instituto Lincoln.

A proud outpost of America’s Industrial Revolution, Johnstown, Pennsylvania, survived the Great Flood of 1889, when a 40-mph wave swept the city into the Conemaugh River. Johnstown rebuilt itself into a dynamic city teeming with factories and steel mills. Yet what the flood couldn’t kill, a changing economy nearly has.

In the space of a generation, Johnstown has hemorrhaged 40 percent of its population and seen its job base disintegrate–joining the growing ranks of U.S. industrial cities teetering on the brink of terminal illness. They are becoming places without purpose, experts say, ill-prepared for a new economic era except as recipients of transfer payments and warehouses for the poor, the aged, the infirm and, in big cities, the violently deviant. “Johnstown is a place where wealth has moved out, where there is no middle class and where the town frantically searches for a magic solution to stay alive,” said anthropologist Bruce Williams of the University of Pittsburgh at Johnstown.

As the Information Age unfolds, urban scholars see a disturbing new set of forces converging viselike on Johnstown and many U.S. cities. While the problems of a New York City or a Detroit command popular attention, smaller cities such as Johnstown–those with populations of 25,000 to 100,000–might be suffering most from wrenching economic changes. No longer are place and distance such vital factors. The new economy is driven by technological changes that allow those with means to live and work largely where they want. New suburbs are still the number one choice for both business and residential developers seeking large plots of cheap land.

Struggling for Relevance

Many old industrial cities, meanwhile, struggle for relevance. Their residents lack the training for–and access to–the modern work force. New offices and industries require less labor. Isolation and segregation of the urban poor feed a cycle of despair. Advantages such as a coast, river or rail line matter less. With dwindling public investment and little or no market for their services or products, scores of these older cities can’t nurse themselves back to health.

“If a city lacks the basics for economic viability, what does it have left except some type of massive support by the federal government?” said Dr. Irving Baker, a retired political scientist at Southern Methodist University. “Those cities . . . are expendable,” he said.

This phenomenon links aging central cities, decaying inner-ring suburbs and exploding Mexican border cities. One of every five U.S. cities larger than 25,000 people has a poverty rate greater than 20 percent–a prime symptom of urban decay, an analysis of U.S. Census Bureau data indicates. Dallas and other Sun Belt cities are repeating the trajectory of distressed Northern cities, where poverty rates soared and the concentration of poor worsened.

As the debate continues over Washington’s shifting budget role, some experts wonder whether one result might be disposable cities, like the 19th-century ghost towns that predated federal bailouts. Solutions seem elusive, the experts agree, because neither government-run urban renewal nor private enterprise alone appears equal to the task.

“I think we are in a struggle for America’s heart right now,” said Peter C. Goldmark, president of the Rockefeller Foundation, whose programs support efforts to revitalize communities. “Because I don’t think America can live if its cities are dying.” Neal Peirce, an urban affairs commentator and writer, noted: “As I see it, we have a civilization to defend. If we really come to the point of writing places off as cities and neighborhoods of no return, we have reached the point of giving up what made this country the civilization I think many of us really have much pride being in.”

Disturbing Trends in Distressed Cities

Analysis by The Dallas Morning News–based on more than 125 interviews, a review of hundreds of reports and creation of a computer-generated index of 148 distressed communities–documented a number of alarming urban trends:

The United States remains an urban nation. But of all urban dwellers, 60 percent now live in suburbs — not in the nation’s 522 central cities.

Concentrations of the poor are increasing in all cities, including Sun Belt cities. In 1968, 30 percent of the nation’s poor lived in cities. Now the figure is 42 percent.

Jobs are leaving cities in massive numbers and are not being replaced. About 70 percent of new jobs, most requiring extensive technical training, are being created outside cities. Although the number of poor Americans dropped in 1994 for the first time in four years, the gap between rich and poor continued to widen as low-skill, low-wage jobs disappeared, according to the U.S. Census Bureau.

Many older cities are burdened with foul physical sites created for a smokestack economy that no longer exists. Mayor Freeman Bosley said St. Louis’ dramatic population decline–a 50 percent loss since 1950–relates directly to his city’s inability to reclaim contaminated properties, known as brownfields. “Right now, there is no way the city of St. Louis can attract business to abandoned industrial sites,” he told a congressional panel recently. “The existing cleanup standards and related costs exceed the property’s value, and there are no compensating incentives.”

The revival of rural America comes at the expense of many cities. Following a decade of decline, three in four rural counties gained population between 1990 and 1994. Most of the gain was caused by migration from cities, not urban encroachment.

Few places have been able to reverse these trends once decline sets in. Said Brian Berry, an internationally recognized professor of urban geography at the University of Texas at Dallas: “To be blunt and brutal about it, there’s very little that policymakers can do [about these cities] short of bringing in the aspirins and making people feel a little better.”

The success stories of recent years have enjoyed some attractive geographic asset or been the target of a sustained intentional effort. Hoboken, New Jersey, once a rundown manufacturing hub, capitalized on its waterfront view of the Manhattan skyline. It is now a trendy suburb for young couples with children. Cleveland, Pittsburgh and St. Louis have stabilized after shedding population for decades. Yet even though each has poured tens of millions into successful downtown revitalization efforts, many neighborhoods remain deeply troubled.

Smaller cities such as Johnstown dominated The News’ list of distressed communities. “Small and medium-sized cities don’t have the great urban assets to draw on,” said David Rusk, former mayor of Albuquerque, New Mexico, and now an urban consultant in Washington, D.C. “They don’t have the legacy of parks, museums and recreational facilities that big cities have. And, most of all, they don’t have the old downtown core.”

What can be done to assist these communities? Gary Orfield, a professor of education and social policy at Harvard University, said, “If I were a mayor, my number one effort would be to try to help people to understand how serious these problems are and to convince the people in the rest of the society that if they don’t share in the solution, they are going to be sharing in a much, much more radical problem in the future.”

______________

Chris Kelley is urban affairs writer at The Dallas Morning News. This article is excerpted from a four-part series titled “Whither the Cities?” which ran December 3-6, 1995. A series reprint is available by calling The News at 1-800-431-0010, ext. 8472, or on the Internet at http://www.pic.net/tdmn/tdmn.html. Kelley participated in the Lincoln Institute’s 1995 Land Policy Forum for Journalists.

The twenty-first century will witness record growth in the number and distribution of private residential communities. Collectively referred to as common interest communities (CICs) or common interest developments (CIDs), these communities rely on covenants, conditions and restrictions to privately govern and control land use, design decisions, services and social conduct. The communities own, operate and manage the residential property within their boundaries, including open space, parking, recreational facilities and streets. Although CICs historically have been the domain of the affluent, they are now becoming a viable choice for both suburban and urban residential development. Taking the form of condominiums, cooperatives, and single- and multifamily homes, both gated and nongated private communities are spreading among diverse economic and social classes.

A Worldwide Phenomenon

The proliferation of private communities in the United States is causing an unprecedented transition from traditional individual ownership to collective governance of property, signaling a remarkable shift in the American political and economic landscape. This trend establishes a new micro-scale level of governance beneath existing municipal structures, and highlights other tensions between the public and private sectors.

Indeed, the numbers provide a clear indication of this movement’s strength. At the end of the twentieth century, about 47 million Americans lived in condominiums, cooperatives and homeowner associations (HOAs). Growing from only 500 in the 1960s to an estimated 231,000 in 1999, HOAs now comprise almost 15 percent of the national housing stock, with an estimated addition of 8,000 to 10,000 private developments each year. In the 50 largest metropolitan areas, more than half of all new housing is now built under the governance of neighborhood associations. In California—particularly in the Los Angeles and San Diego metropolitan areas—this figure exceeds 60 percent (Treese 1999).

Recent press coverage and research from Europe, Africa, South America and Asia suggest that CICs are rapidly being popularized in other parts of the world as well. Although gated communities are still rare in Britain, former prime minister Margaret Thatcher reportedly moved into such a community in South London. In South Africa, where secure communities were an unavoidable consequence of racism, post-apartheid gated developments are inhabited by all races, and not only by the wealthy. In Saudi Arabia private compounds of linked houses provide extended families with privacy and identity. Those compounds seem to be a reaction to the single residential typology imported from abroad during the country’s modernization period.

Since the economic reforms of the early 1980s, many residential areas in Chinese cities have walls to improve security and define social status. Often these developments are designed by U.S. companies and based on U.S. planning and design standards. Private communities in Southeast Asia, such as in Indonesia, are marketed as places that allow the differentiation of lifestyle and give prestige and security to their inhabitants. In Latin America sprawling gated communities at the metropolitan edges of Santiago, Chile, Bogotá, Colombia, and other cities have become the norm for a growing professional class in need of a secure lifestyle in an environment dominated by social and economic poverty. The deteriorating political and economic state of affairs in Buenos Aires, Argentina, has resulted in situations where developers and private companies provide privatized “public” services that attract large sectors of the population to private developments housing up to half a million people (Environment and Planning B 2002).

Dual Governance, Rules and Outcomes

The spread of CICs in the U.S. is driven by the mutual interests of developers and local governments, including planning officials. Developers benefit because they can maintain profits—despite the high costs of land and infrastructure—by introducing efficient land design schemes and, often, higher densities. Local governments prefer CICs because they privatize infrastructure and reduce public costs. At the same time, consumers see a way to protect their property values through the ability to control their neighborhood character by using compliance and enforcement mechanisms. CICs also provide consumers greater infrastructure options, recreational amenities and community services.

The growing fiscal crisis experienced by many local governments means they are often unable to respond to such traditional community demands as building and maintaining streets, collecting garbage, snowplowing and other services. The establishment of a separate legal mechanism within a private neighborhood association allows collective control over a neighborhood’s common environment and the private provision of common services. Perhaps more important, this trend creates a de facto deregulation of municipal subdivision standards and zoning, because cities and towns allow for a different, more flexible set of standards to be implemented in private developments. Often, the results are innovative spatial and architectural layouts and, sometimes, unusually sensitive environmental design. This shift in neighborhood governance enables a resultant shift in the design of residential developments that heretofore has not been fully appreciated.

A recent nationwide survey of public officials and developers gauges the impacts of subdivision regulations on the design of residential developments and the practices of developers in rapidly growing regions of the country (Ben-Joseph 2003). It assesses attitudes and perceptions and identifies the issues regarding subdivision regulations that members of the housing industry and the regulatory agencies feel are affecting housing development.

Excessive Regulations

As early as 1916 Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr., commented on subdivision standards and regulations.

While such regulations are intended only to guard against the evil results of ignorance and greed on the part of landowners and builders, they also limit and control the operations of those who are neither ignorant nor greedy; and it is clear that the purpose in framing and enforcing them should be to leave open the maximum scope for individual enterprise, initiative and ingenuity that is compatible with adequate protection of the public interests. Such regulations are, and always should be, in a state of flux and adjustment—on the one hand with a view to preventing newly discovered abuses, and on the other hand with a view to opening a wider opportunity of individual discretion at points where the law is found to be unwisely restrictive. (Olmsted 1916, 3)

Indeed, developers in the 2003 survey clearly expressed their frustration with the excessive and often unwarranted nature of physical improvements and standards associated with subdivision development. When asked to indicate which types of requirements present the greatest expense in conforming to regulations, an overwhelming majority (80 percent) pointed to requirements associated with site design. When asked to indicate which specific requirements they perceived as excessive, 52 percent of the respondents indicated those relating to street design and construction, with almost 45 percent indicating land dedication and 43 percent storm sewer systems (underground piping for storm water mitigation). When asked about which physical standards within each category were seen as excessive, those most frequently cited were street widths (75 percent of the respondents), street rights-of-way (73 percent) and requirements of land for open space (73 percent). Most developers also mentioned water and sewer hook-up fees (85–90 percent) and payments in lieu of land dedication (79 percent) as being excessive monetary requirements associated with physical improvements (see Table 1).

While one might expect that developers would criticize regulations as interfering in their business, it is important to note that most respondents were selective in their answers to the survey. Out of 29 requirements listed in Table 1, only 13 were considered excessive by the majority of developers, while 16 others were deemed reasonable. Such results indicate that many developers are tuned in to construction and design performance, and their attitude toward regulation cannot always be assumed to be negative.

Furthermore, the surveyed public officials (town planners and town engineers) often concurred with the developers’ observations. Generally these officials agreed that the regulatory process, such as the enforcement of subdivision regulations, has become more demanding and complex. Over the past five years, for example, 70 percent of the jurisdictions where these public officials work have introduced new requirements, and 57 percent have increased specifications, such as those for setbacks and lot sizes. Only 16 percent of these jurisdictions have decreased their specifications, mostly by reducing street widths.

Relief from Subdivision Regulations

Two-thirds of residential developers consider government regulations, particularly those pertaining to the design and control of subdivisions, the main culprit in prohibiting design innovation and increasing the cost of housing. More specifically, they see these regulations as an impediment to increasing densities, changing housing types, and reconfiguring streets and lots.

One way developers try to relax these regulations is through requests for relief in the form or zoning or design variances. More than half of the surveyed developers (52 percent) had to apply for some sort of relief in at least half of their projects, while 37 percent had to apply in at least three-fourths of their projects. When asked to point to the type of changes they requested, many indicated higher-density single-family projects, more multifamily units, and more varied site and structural plans. The majority of the developers in the survey responded that they sought to increase the density of housing units on their sites, but 72 percent noted that because of existing regulations they had to design lower-density developments than they wanted. Some developers reported that regulations forced them to build in greenfield locations away from major urban areas, where restrictions and abutters’ objections were less onerous.

Although almost all of the public officials (83 percent) reported that their jurisdictions require private developments to follow established subdivision regulations, the enforcement of these standards through the approval process is malleable. In some cases, when such a development is classified as a condominium, which may include attached and/or detached dwelling units, no formal review of street standards is required. In fact, the majority of public officials surveyed (61 percent) indicated that their jurisdictions allow for narrower streets to be constructed within private developments. One respondent stated, “Variances are more easily granted within private road systems since the county will not have any maintenance responsibility or liability.”

The practice of building narrower roadways and offering smaller building setbacks within private subdivisions has become widely accepted over the last decade. A street standards survey completed in 1995 showed that 84 percent of the cities responding allowed for different street standards in such developments, and that they more readily accepted the introduction of different paving materials, changes in street configurations, and the employment of traffic calming devices (Ben-Joseph 1995).

Design Benefits

Both public officials and developers acknowledge the design benefits associated with private subdivisions (see Table 2). Fifty-seven percent of officials indicated that private developments are introducing innovative design in the form of building arrangements and unit clustering. Forty-one percent felt that such developments permit the introduction of housing types not found elsewhere in their communities, and 61 percent indicated that they allow for narrower street standards to be incorporated.

While public officials see the benefits of pushing the design envelope within the confines of the development itself, many are also concerned about the social implications and impacts of these private developments on their surrounding communities. “As a matter of policy,” a survey respondent wrote, “gated private communities are discouraged as they are not in keeping with the urban form, which calls for an interconnecting network of vehicular and pedestrian movement. In addition, the walling of neighborhoods from arterial roadways should be avoided by alternatives such as the placement of other compatible uses along the periphery.”

Both developers and public officials believe that common subdivision regulations restrict alternative solutions, and they see privatizing subdivisions as a vehicle for simplifying the approval process and introducing design innovation. As one of the developers remarked, “Regular subdivision codes don’t allow flexibility. Lots are too standardized and streets use too much area. If I could build narrow streets and small lots, developments controlled by covenants and HOAs will not be necessary.” The ability to provide design choices and efficient layouts and to avoid a lengthy approval process drives both public and private sectors to offer CICs rather than typical subdivisions. Indeed, it seems that in the last decade most innovation in subdivision design has sprung from within the private domain and under the governance of community associations rather than within the public realm through traditional means.

Toward Better Subdivisions

The proliferation of CICs, with their ability to plan, design and govern outside of public boundaries, can be seen as an indicator of a failed public system. When developers and public officials resort to privatization to achieve a more responsive design outcome, and when local jurisdictions acknowledge that privatized communities provide a straightforward way to grant variations and innovation, then something is wrong with the existing parameters of subdivision codes and regulations.

For the last 25 years the subdivision approval process has increased in complexity, in the number of agencies involved, in the number of delays, and in the regular addition of new requirements (Seidel 1978). Both developers and public officials acknowledge that the application for variances and changes in subdivision regulations are lengthy and cumbersome. Therefore, it is not surprising that developers see private projects governed by HOAs as not only responding to market demands and trends, but also introducing planning and design concepts that are often not allowed or are difficult to get authorized under the typical approval process.

CICs are enabling developers to maintain profits and keep the design process relatively open-ended and flexible. The ability to operate outside the regular, common set of subdivision regulations allows developers to offer various design solutions that fit the local setting, the targeted site and the prospective consumers. In some cases these can be attractive, high-density yet affordable single-family developments, and in others low-density, high-end yet ecologically sensitive construction (McKenzie 2003).

The concept of private communities as environmentally sensitive developments may seem a contradiction in terms. However, some of these developments provide examples of responsible construction that minimizes environmental impact while maximizing economic value. In Dewees Island, South Carolina, there are few impervious road surfaces, allowing full restoration of the underground aquifer. Only vegetation indigenous to the local coastal plains is allowed. This xeriscaping approach removes the need for irrigation, fertilizers and pesticides. In addition, homes are required to use water conservation fixtures, reducing water consumption by 60 percent.

Paradoxically, while CICs are often controlled and managed by strict covenants and regulations, their initial design is very much outside the mainstream regulatory apparatus. It is precisely for this reason that they prove to be more flexible in their design solutions and more agreeable to developers, consumers and local governments.

How can such flexibility be integrated in the regular planning process? Can subdivision regulations be made more accommodating and less prescriptive? Will such an approach level the playing field and allow for more housing choices and greater design variety in the public domain? Will such changes promote developers to plan subdivisions endowed with CICs’ design qualities without their restrictive covenants and privatized shared spaces? And conversely, can CICs, while exhibiting great variation in architecture and site design features, be made less controlling in their management policies?

There are many issues raised by the spread of CICs, but none is more important than the realization that public policy and subdivision regulations must allow and promote more variety in housing styles and development options. Consumers should not be forced into CICs because they are the only type of development that offers a lively choice of features. CICs should be seen as a catalyst to change subdivision standards and regulations and as a vehicle to create a bridge between public officials and developers. Through the use of CICs developers are not only able to circumvent existing regulations, lower development costs and in some cases produce quite innovative community design solution, but also enable jurisdictions to secure new taxpayers with less public expenditure.

Not all CICs are created equal, and many are far from perfect. But, in terms of design efficiency, utilization of space, and integration of social and environmental amenities, private communities illustrate the shortcomings of many standards applied to typical subdivisions.

References

Ben-Joseph, Eran. 1995. Residential street standards and neighborhood traffic control: A survey of cities’ practices and public officials’ attitudes. Berkeley: Institute of Transportation Studies, University of California at Berkeley.

———. 2003. Subdivision regulations—Practices and attitudes: A survey of public officials and developers in the nation’s fastest growing single-family housing markets. Working paper. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design. 2002. Theme issue: The global spread of gated communities 29(3).

McKenzie, Evan. 2003. Common-interest housing in the communities of tomorrow. Housing Policy Debate 14(1/2):203–234.

Olmsted, Frederick L., Jr. 1916. Basic principles of city planning. In City planning: A series of papers presenting the essential elements of a city plan, John Nolen, ed., 1–18. New York: D. Appleton and Company.

Seidel, S. 1978. Housing costs and government regulations: Confronting the regulatory maze. New Brunswick: Center for Urban Policy Research, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey.

Treese, Clifford. 1999. Community associations factbook. Alexandria, VA: Community Associations Institute.

Eran Ben-Joseph is associate professor of landscape architecture and planning in the Department of Urban Studies and Planning at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA. This article is based in part on his survey and research that were supported by the Lincoln Institute.