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Imagine two communities in the Rocky Mountain region in the late 1860s. One is located along the transcontinental railroad, the other is 100 miles to the south. Which community would come to dominate the region by the turn of the century? Counterintuitively, the latter community did. There, aggressive entrepreneurs and community leaders orchestrated the completion of a spur linking the town to the railroad and then commenced a promotional campaign on the community’s behalf. Over time, that town, Denver, flourished, while the other, Cheyenne, did not. Denver leaders did not rely on chance. Instead they mobilized public resources to pursue their vision of Denver as a major city.
As product cycles ebb and flow, populations and firms migrate, natural resources peter out and consumer tastes change, cities either adapt to their changing environments or succumb to the invisible hand of the marketplace. Local elected and appointed officials can shape their cities by deciding whether or not to implement nonmarket, city-sponsored development.
Politics is important because these city officials either respond to a tax-services imbalance or they pursue an image or vision of their city’s future, its cityscape. Although city-sponsored development might lower business costs and spur economic growth, such development is not an automatic response to changing economic circumstances. Rather, public economic development is the result of a purposive political decision and is undertaken selectively.
Mobilizing Public Capital
City governments search for an equilibrium in their relations with the external environment. Governments operate within fixed territorial jurisdictions, but capital is not similarly constrained. To avoid driving business elsewhere, officials must try to maximize services while minimizing taxes. Two factors are important to our argument: (1) efforts to restore the tax-services equilibrium are rooted in a city’s development function, and (2) the decision to mobilize a development tool has to do with the tax-services disequilibrium and is unrelated to employment and income issues.
Threats to a city’s revenue stream disrupt the tax-services balance and most assuredly trigger the search for an appropriate development policy to redress the imbalance. But for some city officials, a perceptual concern motivates their actions. They may want their city to move into a higher orbit or plane within its “system of cities,” the spatial and market area within which cities compete to provide goods and services. These city leaders hope to expand their city’s influence beyond the immediate region rather than cast its fate to the workings of the marketplace. They actively intervene in hopes their city will catapult to a higher level or regain lost status within its relevant system.
City Types
A city government’s orientation reflects both its leaders’ aspirations and its tax-services balance. We have defined four city types based on levels of economic stress and political activism to promote development. In “survivalist cities” development decisions are triggered by a tax-services imbalance. These cities experience economic and fiscal stress and employ a greater-than-average number of development tools. In “market cities” that also suffer economic and fiscal stress, officials do not implement many economic development tools but instead leave the city’s economic fortunes to the private marketplace. “Expansionist cities” are in fairly healthy economic shape, but they mobilize more economic development tools than the average city out of the desire to become a higher order city. “Maintenance cities” also enjoy economic and fiscal health, but city officials refrain from mobilizing many economic development tools because they want to control or manage growth.
Duluth, Minnesota, is an example of a “survivalist city.” It was mired in economic and social malaise after the mid-1970s shutdown of U.S. Steel and many subsequent plant closings. Unemployment was well above the national average, emigration decreased the population by nearly 16 percent in a decade’s time (1970-1982), and general fund revenues declined in constant dollars. By the early 1980s, insufficient revenues and the prospect of lower services triggered Duluth’s response to become exceptionally active in promoting itself as a business location. Development projects ranged from sprucing up the downtown business district through a storefront renovation program to involvement in constructing a several hundred million dollar paper mill.
Since the 1970s, declining manufacturing employment in the industrial belt hit Springfield, Ohio, a “market city,” particularly hard. However, city officials there have been hesitant to invest in public development because of fiscal realities and the dominant political culture, which favors limited government involvement. They clearly understand that by not risking city resources in the development process, it is possible that Springfield will “ratchet down” the hierarchy in its relevant system of cities.
In Huntsville, Alabama, an “expansionist city,” there are no reservations about using the public sector to prime the economic development pump. But unlike in Duluth, Huntsville officials are not responding to economic decline. Instead, their motivation is a vision of Huntsville as the major high-tech, regional city of the new South. To pursue that vision, the city has constructed an economic development program around extant defense installations and the aerospace industry. Huntsville markets itself as a limitless place, as a community reaching for the stars.
Santa Barbara, California, is a “maintenance city” guided by its vision as a Refuge from the Commonplace. It does not offer money or underwrite programs for commercial rehabilitations. It provides no low-interest subsidies for business. It offers no tax abatements. It has no marketing program for economic development. It conducts no industrial recruitment. There is no program in Santa Barbara to leverage private investment, nor is there a public/private partnership. City assistance or involvement in development often is nothing more than approval of a proposed project. The city’s dominant policy instrument is the comprehensive plan. Zoning variances, manipulation of the parking supply, and the imposition of fees are additional tools. The city does not promote development the way other cities do; instead, Santa Barbara molds it.
Politics Matters
The envisioned city of tomorrow is not static; it evolves in response to shifting economies and political coalitions. A city’s underlying economic base, its governing coalition, and the vision of its leaders are in constant tension with other conflicting opportunities, possibilities and visions. A change in city leadership and the governing elite, the closing or downsizing of a large firm, or a substantial change in state aid or in unfunded mandates will, among other factors, influence the vision of the city’s leaders and affect the underlying economy. These changes in vision and market adjustments, then, profoundly affect a city’s approach to economic development. The mobilization of public capital as a mechanism for achieving the vision may change as well.
When voters replaced the leadership of Boise, Idaho, with more proactive officials in the mid-1980s, for example, a new vision was one of the most obvious results. The new mayoral-led coalition talked about regional prominence, and boldly marshaled public capital in support of development projects. The city used development tools and sponsored projects that were vastly different from those of the previous regime. In effect, Boise was transformed from a “maintenance city” to an “expansionist city.”
Thus, politics plays an important role in explaining the path and direction a city chooses. Local officials may perceive a relevant orbit and then try to mobilize public capital in order to keep their city in (or move it to) that orbit. Or, they may choose to allow the workings of the marketplace to determine the city’s orbit. In either case, market forces, a city’s comparative advantage, the relative factor prices of land, labor, and capital—in short, the underlying local economy—influence these perceptions and the city’s approach to development policy.
Political leaders’ images of the good society and their perceptions of their city’s relevant orbit are the foundations for a city’s economic development functions and for the political decision to mobilize public capital. City investment in, and regulation of, development projects is the most effective means by which a city controls and molds its growth in pursuit of its future cityscape.
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Ann O’M. Bowman is professor in the Department of Government and International Affairs at the University of South Carolina, Columbia. Michael A. Pagano is professor of political science at Miami University in Oxford, Ohio. This article is excerpted in part from their book Cityscapes and Capital: The Politics of Urban Development (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995).
Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 4 del libro Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.
Las políticas públicas y acciones urbanísticas relacionadas con la vivienda de interés social en Colombia, como en otros países latinoamericanos, se han concentrado en los programas de regularización y mejoras, que en muchos casos están vinculados a la necesidad de fondos para infraestructura. Estos programas también se consideran como el único instrumento paliativo para abordar un problema que parece no tener solución –el desarrollo urbano ilegal (pirata)–, aunque han resultado ser bastante limitados y hasta contraproducentes. En este trabajo presentamos una política alternativa: la aplicación de principios e instrumentos para la gestión del suelo y la participación en plusvalías (participación pública en los incrementos del valor del suelo derivados de las acciones administrativas). Esta política fue establecida en la constitución colombiana y en la Ley 388 de 1997, que estipula que los ingresos provenientes de los incrementos del valor del suelo deben usarse en inversiones sociales.
Operación Urbanística Nuevo Usme es uno de los proyectos estratégicos promovidos por el alcalde de Bogotá Antanas Mockus para resolver el problema de los desarrollos urbanos ilegales. Ubicada en el sureste de la ciudad, la localidad de Usme es una de las áreas más vulnerables a las presiones de la urbanización ilegal; poderosos urbanizadores piratas han dispuesto más de la mitad de las 1.000 hectáreas ya designadas para uso urbano. El mecanismo predominante para este tipo de desarrollo informal, además de las invasiones y los asentamientos humanos ilegales, ha sido la venta de lotes por parte de urbanizadores que compran grandes extensiones de tierra a precio rural y las venden sin redes de servicios públicos ni infraestructura y sin aprobación de la administración pública. Entre las consecuencias negativas de este tipo de desarrollo encontramos precios del suelo relativamente altos y patrones desiguales de ocupación territorial.
Se espera que Usme se extienda e incorpore otras 600 hectáreas de cerros y terrenos ecológicamente frágiles –considerados en gran parte suelo rural–, según el plan maestro de la ciudad (Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial o POT) que fue aprobado en junio de 2000. El gobierno de Bogotá ya ha invertido en sistemas de acueducto y alcantarillado para el área y está ejecutando otros proyectos, entre ellos la ampliación del sistema de transporte público TransMilenio y la construcción de 6.200 viviendas para el sector de bajos ingresos. Además, por iniciativa de organizaciones de ciudadanos, dos grandes áreas –el Parque entre Nubes y el Agroparque Los Soches– han sido designadas en el POT como hitos urbanos locales de gran significado y simbolismo. La primera es un parque grande que marca la transición entre el territorio urbano y el rural, amenazado constantemente por el desarrollo ilegal y la explotación. La segunda, un tipo de zona de amortiguación agrícola, fue creada por una organización campesina que aceptó a sabiendas una reducción en el precio del suelo al cambiar la clasificación del mismo de suburbano a rural, a fin de preservar su carácter agrario. Actualmente esta organización aplica medios alternativos novedosos de gestión de suelo mediante proyectos de conservación ecológica para beneficiar a la ciudad en su conjunto y obstaculizar la amenaza del crecimiento urbano ilegal.
¿Cómo puede la diversidad de elementos, desde la vivienda social hasta el transporte público y la conservación de tierras agrícolas, crear una oportunidad para condiciones de vida sostenible para los habitantes más pobres de la ciudad? ¿Cómo reconciliamos los objetivos de la política urbana y la justicia social? ¿Cómo puede la ciudad impedir que los urbanizadores piratas se aprovechen inmerecidamente de la nueva área de desarrollo de Usme? Este es el desafío que enfrentan el gobierno municipal, las organizaciones de vivienda popular y los residentes del sur de la ciudad.
Mecanismos alternativos para la recuperación de plusvalías
Uno de los temas de debate con respecto a la Ley 388 es el precedente de recuperación de plusvalías en áreas destinadas para viviendas sociales. Las organizaciones de vivienda han buscado exonerar esos suelos de la participación en plusvalías, debido a una frecuente interpretación errónea de la naturaleza del instrumento, según la cual el valor recuperado se transfiere al precio final de la vivienda (véase Smolka y Furtado, página 12). Desde un enfoque diferente, el proyecto Usme está estructurado a partir de varios mecanismos alternativos para la recuperación de plusvalías que van más allá de la función restringida y malinterpretada de un impuesto.
El primer mecanismo consiste simplemente en anunciar el proyecto Usme, puesto que la Ley 388 establece que en caso de adquisición pública de suelo, el valor comercial del mismo (para fines de indemnización) no puede incluir el monto correspondiente a las plusvalías derivadas del proyecto. Esta disposición congela el precio del suelo en su nivel anterior al anuncio del proyecto, por lo que es un instrumento oportuno para reducir el costo del suelo que de otra manera tendría que pagar la administración local para sus propios proyectos de desarrollo urbano.
El segundo mecanismo es el Plan Parcial, un plan para parcelas de desarrollo local que se basa en el principio de reparto equitativo de cargas y beneficios y que la legislación colombiana ha adoptado de la legislación de España. Esta modalidad de reparcelación (o reajuste equitativo del suelo) abarca la distribución de los costos de infraestructura, así como los derechos de desarrollo, y permite que la administración pública obtenga una porción del suelo urbanizado como retribución por su inversión en las obras de desarrollo. Mediante este mecanismo el Municipio de Bogotá obtiene suelo de forma gratuita o por un costo bajo que luego puede destinar para infraestructura o servicios públicos, o para viviendas de interés social.
Un tercer mecanismo es la recuperación de plusvalías, tal como la establece la Ley 388, para la cual se requiere que la Alcaldía Mayor apruebe un acuerdo específico. Si se aprueba el plan de recuperación, el municipio puede recobrar entre el 30% y el 50% del incremento del precio del suelo derivado del cambio en su clasificación de rural a urbano, la autorización para usos más rentables o el incremento de los derechos de desarrollo. Las plusvalías podrían pagarse con suelo, como un porcentaje de participación en el proyecto, en infraestructura o en dinero efectivo. Una vez más, el efecto que se busca es reducir el precio del suelo obtenido por la administración local por el cumplimiento de sus objetivos sociales.
Una alternativa más innovadora consiste en que la administración local o el municipio asigna los derechos de desarrollo del suelo directamente a beneficiarios de pocos ingresos del programa de viviendas. Este ingenioso mecanismo, basado en la separación de los derechos de construcción de los derechos de propiedad, en efecto traslada el equilibrio de fuerzas desde los urbanizadores hacia las familias de pocos ingresos que se residencian en el área y por consecuencia comparten el incremento del valor del suelo generado por el desarrollo. Estos nuevos residentes ahora tienen los derechos sobre la tierra que de otra manera habrían tenido que comprar a urbanizadores piratas que ya no tienen un mercado cautivo para la venta de lotes irregulares a precios altos en anticipación de futuros programas de mejoras.
Al adoptar una actitud activa en la regulación de la ocupación del área mediante la distribución de tales derechos de construcción, el municipio se encuentra en una posición más ventajosa para negociar directamente con los urbanizadores piratas y para emular de alguna manera sus acciones mediante la dotación de suelo urbanizado (“terrenos y servicios”) a precios asequibles. Con este enfoque jurídico el municipio garantiza la dotación de carreteras, redes de servicios públicos, zonas verdes y espacios públicos y recreativos que por lo general los urbanizadores piratas no ofrecen o que los propietarios de tierras rurales no pueden mantener. En síntesis, el procedimiento asigna los derechos de construcción a los habitantes de pocos ingresos que con el tiempo construirán viviendas gracias a sus propios esfuerzos. Al reducir los derechos de construcción del propietario original a través del Plan Parcial, también se reduce el precio del suelo.
Ampliación de la participación en plusvalías
La política de plusvalías que busca recuperar los incrementos del valor del suelo para beneficio público ha sido aceptada en áreas de ingresos altos, donde las rentas públicas se utilizan para subsidiar inversiones sociales en otras localidades. Sin embargo, los urbanizadores piratas suelen encontrar maneras de expropiar estas inversiones en áreas de ingresos bajos mediante las actividades ilegales y clandestinas prevalecientes utilizadas para el acceso y ocupación del suelo. El proyecto Usme representa un intento por trasladar el poder de negociación de la población con respecto a los urbanizadores piratas mediante el diseño de procesos de urbanización alternativos.
La Alcaldía Mayor ya ha hecho un compromiso de facto para aplicar los instrumentos de recuperación de plusvalías, aunque éstos siguen siendo objeto de explicaciones y discusiones dentro del debate general sobre la política de participación en plusvalías. Como ya hemos visto, el principio práctico en que se basa esta política es la separación de los derechos de propiedad de los derechos de construcción. No obstante, esta política afronta una enorme resistencia debido a la tradición jurídica civil de que los derechos unitarios y absolutos están asociados con la tenencia privada de la tierra.
La novedad del programa radica en su potencial para abordar directamente los retos de la urbanización de bajos ingresos. Las expectativas han hecho aumentar el precio de las tierras parceladas ilegalmente en Usme y han propiciado que los urbanizadores piratas “produzcan suelo comercial” mediante la destrucción de comunidades campesinas, la degradación de áreas de importancia ecológica y la ocupación de zonas de riesgo. La tolerancia de tales prácticas llegó a un extremo tal que los precios elevados prevalecientes en las transacciones de estos mercados inmobiliarios –ilegales, en su mayoría– han sido utilizados por la administración local como precio de referencia para determinar la indemnización justa por la adquisición de tierras.
A falta de mecanismos públicos para intervenir en el mercado del suelo, tales como la participación en plusvalías, los propietarios –particularmente los urbanizadores piratas– no sólo han recuperado todos los incrementos del precio derivado del desarrollo urbano, sino que además han tomado bajo control el proceso. La urbanización ilegal resultante es costosa para los ocupantes individuales de dichos asentamientos y para la sociedad como un todo, ya que eleva el costo de los futuros programas de mejoras entre tres y cinco veces, en comparación con el costo de urbanizar suelo no ocupado.
Mediante los mecanismos alternativos mencionados anteriormente, se espera que otras conversiones del uso del suelo, como en el caso de la urbanización de Usme, se hagan más en un entorno político-económico alternativo, en el cual el municipio participe como un regulador activo y socialmente responsable del proceso. Estos proyectos forjarán nexos estrechos entre las políticas de regulación del suelo y las reglas que se aplican para la compra o subasta pública de tierras, para la distribución de los costos de dotación de infraestructura y servicios públicos y para el ejercicio de los derechos de desarrollo. La devolución a la comunidad de las plusvalías derivadas de estos cambios en las regulaciones del desarrollo urbano y las inversiones públicas constituye la manera más eficaz de construir relaciones más democráticas basadas en el ejercicio de una demanda renovada de reforma urbana y el derecho de acceso al suelo.
María Mercedes Maldonado Copello es profesora e investigadora del Centro Interdisciplinario de Estudios Regionales (CIDER) de la Universidad de Los Andes en Bogotá, Colombia. Martim O. Smolka es miembro principal y director del Programa para América Latina y el Caribe del Instituto Lincoln.
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Urban land management policies and land market operations have taken on greater status in the debate on urban public policy in Latin America, and they are given increased attention in academic research and the development agendas of many countries in the region. Over the past 10 years the Lincoln Institute’s Program on Latin America and the Caribbean has supported a network of Latin American scholars and practitioners who have developed seminars, promoted research, organized public debates, consulted with decision makers and published their findings on these timely issues. Members of this network met at a conference in Buenos Aires in April 2004 to assess their activities and prepare this summary declaration of core land policy issues crucial to the search for more sustainable urban development programs in the future.
Urban land policy in Latin America and the ways that land markets operate tend to produce cities that are economically unequal, politically and socially exclusionary, spatially segregated and environmentally unsustainable. The consequences of these policies can be seen in the high and often irrational prices for land, due in part to the absence of effective urban land management practices.
The Current Situation
Land markets are structurally imperfect. However, the functioning of urban land markets depends on social relations, just as the outcomes of land market operations affect those relations, making it both possible and necessary to influence the markets. Instead of removing the imperfections, many instruments and policies have in fact helped to distort urban land market operations even further. Moreover, many established policies have kept the “rules of the game” in urban real estate unchanged, and apparently untouchable.
A more comprehensive reading of the problem reveals that, rather than being the result of inconsistent rationalization, the current dysfunctional land market is the result of missed opportunities for socially sustainable development in Latin American cities. Yet there are promising and innovative alternatives that can overcome the existing bottlenecks evident in inadequate and destructive national government policies, the enduring difficulties in financing urban development, and poor management practices.
One of the most glaring negative outcomes of the current situation is the relative persistence, weight and importance of informal urban land markets dominated by many exclusionary practices, illegal titling, lack of urban services, and other problems. Deregulation in places that should be regulated (poor outlying areas on the urban fringe), overregulation of wealthy regulated areas, and privatization policies that disregard social criteria are factors that help to drive these negative processes, particularly the spatial concentration of the urban poor. Although the majority of regularization programs are well-intended, they instead cause perverse effects, including increased land costs for the poorest sectors.
Traditional urban planning processes and urban standards have lost importance and effectiveness as instruments for guiding urban development, especially the existing mechanisms for land management. Yet this situation offers opportunities to think about innovative ways to deal with land management and urban planning strategies. This opportunity has already been seized in some places, where new experiments and proposals are causing intense debates by questioning the predominant traditional approaches.
Creating new practices within this framework requires making one unavoidable step: rethinking urban land taxation by incorporating new methods and keeping an open mind regarding alternative fiscal instruments that must be intended as tools to redirect current urban development and discipline the operation of the urban land market. These new tools should not only collect funds in order to build infrastructure and provide urban services, but also contribute to a more equitable distribution of benefits and costs, especially those associated with the urbanization process and the return of recovered land value increments to the community.
Proposals for Action
Recognize the indispensable role of the government. It is critical that the government (from local to national levels) maintains an active role in promoting urban development. The local level should be more committed to structural changes in land management, while the national level should actively foster such local initiatives. Government must not ignore its responsibility to adopt urban land market policies that recognize the strategic value of land and the specific characteristics of how land markets operate, in order to promote the sustainable use of the land by incorporating both social and environmental objectives and benefiting the most vulnerable segments of the urban population.
Break the compartmentalization of fiscal, regulatory and legal authorities. Lack of cooperation among local authorities is responsible for major inefficiencies, ineffective policies, waste of scarce resources and inadequate public accountability. Furthermore, incongruent actions by different public authorities send misleading signals to private agents and create uncertainties if not opportunities for special interests to subvert government plans. The complexity and scale of the challenges posed by the urban social reality of Latin American cities require multilateral actions by numerous stakeholders to influence the operation of urban land markets (both formal and informal), thus insuring the achievement of joint objectives: promoting sustainable and fair use of land resources; reducing land prices; producing serviced land; recognizing the rights to land by the urban poor; and sharing the costs and benefits of urban investment more evenly.
These authorities must also coordinate urban development policies with land taxation policies. They should promote a new urban vision with legislation that recognizes the separation of building rights from land ownership rights, with the understanding that land value increments generated from building rights do not belong exclusively to landowners. Urban managers must also devise creative mechanisms whereby these land value increments may be mobilized or used to produce serviced land for low-income social sectors, thereby offsetting urban inequalities.
Recognize the limits of what is possible. Transforming the current regulatory framework that governs the use of urban land requires new legal and urbanistic thinking that recognizes that inequalities and socio-spatial exclusion are intrinsic to the predominant urban development model. Even within the current model there is substantial room for more socially responsible policies and government accountability. Urban regulations should consider the complexity of land appreciation processes and enforce effective traditional principles such as those that restrain the capacity of government agencies to dispose of public resources or proscribe the “unjustified enrichment” of private landowners.
Break vicious cycles. Alternatives to existing regularization programs are needed to break the vicious cycle of poverty that current programs help to perpetuate. It is important to recognize that these programs are only a stopgap measure and that urbanization, housing and land taxation policies must also be integrated into the process. Reliance on housing subsidy policies, although inevitable, can be nullified if there are no mechanisms to prevent these subsidies from being translated into an increase in land prices. City officials should give priority to the creation of more serviced land rather than new regularization programs, since the right to a home is a social right to occupy a viable “habitat” with dignity. It is also important to understand that the low production of serviced land per se contributes to withholding the supply and, therefore, to higher prices affecting all aspects of urban development.
Furthermore, individual solutions (such as plot-by-plot titling processes or case-by-case direct subsidies to individual families) ultimately result in more costs for society as a whole than broader, collective solutions that incorporate other aggregate values such as public spaces, infrastructure investment and other mechanisms to strengthen social integration. Many Latin American countries have witnessed subsidized housing programs, often supported by multilateral agencies, where the land component is overlooked or dismissed. Such programs seek readily available public land or simply occupy land in intersticial areas of the city. This disregard of a broader land policy compromises the replicability, expansion and sustainability of these housing programs on a larger scale.
Rethink the roles of public and private institutions. Land management within a wide range of urban actions, from large-scale production of serviced land for the poor to urban redevelopment through large projects, including facelift-type actions or environmental recovery projects, requires new thinking about how public institutions responsible for urban development can intervene through different types of public-private associations. Redeveloping vacant land and introducing more flexibility in the uses and levels of occupancy can play a crucial role here, provided such projects fall under the strategic guidelines of public institutions, are subject to monitoring by citizens, and incorporate a broadly shared and participatory vision of urban development.
Showcase projects such as El Urbanizador Social (The Social Urbanizer) in Porto Alegre, Brazil, the Nuevo Usme housing project in Bogotá, Colombia, and that country’s value capture legislation are examples of sensible and creative efforts that recognize the importance of adequate urban land management and new thinking on the role of land, particularly the potential of land value as an instrument for promoting more sustainable and equitable development for the poor in our cities. Creative and balanced new thinking is also exemplified by the joint ventures of public land and private capital in Havana, Cuba, with value increments captured for upgrading densely populated historic areas.
Empower the role of land taxation in public finance to promote urban development. National, state or provincial and local governments must share responsibility for promoting property taxation as an adequate and socially meaningful method of financing and fostering urban development. The property tax should be sensitive and responsive to Latin American cities that have a strong legacy of marked economic and socio-spatial differences. There may be good reasons to tax land at a higher rate than buildings, in a rational and differentiated manner, especially in outlying areas subject to urban speculation and lands offered ex ante to low-income sectors of society (making certain that paying the tax also helps to build citizenship in these sectors). As already noted, it is also critical to create innovative fiscal instruments appropriate to special situations and other methods for capturing the value generated.
Educate stakeholders in the promotion of new policies. All actors involved in these processes, from judges to journalists, from academics to public officials and their international mentors, need in-depth training and education in the operation of land markets and urban land management in order to achieve the above objectives. We must identify the “fields of mental resistance,” particularly in urban and economic thinking and in the legal doctrines that represent the obstacles to be overcome. We must recognize, for example, that an “informal right” exists and operates in many areas to legitimize land transactions socially, if not legally, and to create networks and spaces of solidarity and integration. It is urgent that we take steps to introduce these themes and proposals into political agendas at the various government levels, in political parties, social organizations, academia and the mass media.
Latin American Network
Pedro Abramo, Rio de Janeiro, Brasil
Oscar Borrero, Bogotá, Colombia
Gonzalo Cáceres, Santiago, Chile
Julio Calderón, Lima, Perú
Nora Clichevsky, Buenos Aires, Argentina
Claudia De Cesare, Porto Alegre, Brasil
Matilde de los Santos, Montevideo, Uruguay
Diego Erba, São Leopoldo, Brasil
Edésio Fernandes, London, England
Ana Raquel Flores, Asunción, Paraguay
Fernanda Furtado, Rio de Janeiro, Brasil
Alfredo Garay, Buenos Aires, Argentina
Silvia García Vettorazzi, Guatemala City, Guatemala
Ana Maria González del Valle, Lima, Perú
Samuel Jaramillo, Bogotá, ColombiaCarmen Ledo, Cochabamba, Bolivia
Mario Lungo, San Salvador, El Salvador
María Mercedes Maldonado, Bogotá, Colombia
Carlos Morales Schechinger, Mexico City, Mexico
Laura Mullahy, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USARicardo Núñez, Havana, Cuba
Sonia Rabello de Castro, Rio de Janeiro, Brasil
Eduardo Reese, Buenos Aires, Argentina
Francisco Sabatini, Santiago, Chile
Martim Smolka, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA
Alvaro Uribe, Panama City, Panama
Ricardo Vanella, Córdoba, Argentina
Maria Clara Vejarano, Bogotá, Colombia
Isabel Viana, Montevideo, Uruguay
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Population density has been identified by many analysts as a key indicator of the efficiency and sustainability of human development patterns.
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Many historic centers in Latin America have been the focus of government and private initiatives seeking to rehabilitate the building stock and position the areas to serve the tourism industry. In most cases these efforts have led to the displacement of lowincome residents or of residential activities altogether, due to gentrification and commercialization of the district (Scarpaci 2005). More recently, the rehabilitation of these historic cores has been framed as part of broader debates and efforts that pursue the recovery of the city centers (historical or otherwise) because of their key role as collective symbols or spaces of social interaction, or because of their potential efficiency as dense, well-serviced urban districts (Pérez, Pujol, and Polèse 2003; Rojas 2004).
This article seeks to advance this discussion based on the experience in Panama City’s historic center, “Casco Antiguo.” It describes some recent, innovative policies that have explored the intersections of tourism, affordable housing, employment, and culture in a historical context, and draws some general insights and lessons.
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Weidong Qu is a research fellow at the Peking University–Lincoln Institute Center for Urban Development and Land Policy in Beijing, and an associate professor in the Department of Land and Real Estate Management at Renmin University of China. Dr. Qu’s research interests include real estate appraisal, land and cadastral management, fuzzy cluster analysis, GIS programming and analysis for real estate valuation, and real estate investment analysis and finance.
Since 2003, he has focused much of his research on property tax reform in China. Dr. Qu has authored five academic books and published over twenty papers for both international and domestic Chinese journals and conferences. He earned his Ph.D. in real estate appraisal at the Geodetic Institute of the University of Hannover, Germany, in 2000.
Dr. Qu also serves as director of the China Association of Real Estate Academicians and executive secretary general of the Global Chinese Real Estate Congress. He is also conducting research in Munich on real estate mortgage valuation and risk analysis as a Humboldtianer fellow of Germany’s Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, and taking part in a research project on property tax reform in Germany.
Land Lines: How did you become associated with the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy?
Weidong Qu: After returning to China in 2002 following my studies Germany, I took part in a training seminar on urbanization and smart growth that was cohosted by the Lincoln Institute and Renmin University. Then, in December 2003, I was invited by officials in the City of Shenzhen to participate in an international symposium on property taxation organized by China’s State Administration of Taxation and the Lincoln Institute. At a later conference on property taxation in Beijing in 2007, I met Joyce Yanyun Man, the director of the Institute’s China Program and the Peking University–Lincoln Institute Center for Urban Development and Land Policy, and she invited me to join the Center’s research group to lead the property tax team.
Land Lines: Why is research on property taxation in China so important?
Weidong Qu: China’s real estate market has developed rapidly over the past 30 years as economic reforms have been introduced. At the same time, real estate–related taxes remain relatively complicated, with a lack of distinction between taxes and fees, and widespread use of administrative fees in place of taxes that may not otherwise have been approved by central regulatory authorities. The steady increase in the use of taxes and fees has begun to influence development costs in the residential housing sector, with the combined charges estimated to account for 40 percent of total costs for new housing stock. This situation is a growing source of criticism from both property developers and residents, who see this increase in charges as one of the factors pushing China’s urban housing prices ever higher.
Another tax-related issue confronting the sustainable growth of China’s real estate sector is the preference for levying taxes and fees on the developer rather than the ultimate owner. To date, China has not established a property tax system, and taxes and fees levied on property owners remain comparatively low, which has contributed to overinvestment and speculation in the property market.
In addition, due to China’s centralized tax system and the lack of a stable local revenue source such as a property tax, local governments have become heavily dependent on revenues from land transfer fees to fund public expenditures and infrastructure investments. According to China’s Ministry of Land and Resources, during the 11th Five-year Plan (2006–2010), more than 33 million mu (more than 200 million acres) of land was transferred by local governments for development, generating revenues of 7 trillion renminbi (approximately US$1.1 trillion). This land-based approach to public finance undermines economic stability and puts pressure on land prices, with the potential to contribute to a real estate bubble.
Land Lines: What challenges differentiate property tax issues in China from the experience in the United States, Europe, or other developed economies?
Weidong Qu: Property tax levies in developed countries are generally based on an assessed value, and most jurisdictions utilize computer-assisted mass appraisal (CAMA) systems to administer their property taxes. At this time, however, none of the taxes or fees levied on China’s real estate sector are based on an assessed value and, consequently, there is a critical shortage of experienced assessors and officials. Most current assessors focus primarily on individual properties, and they lack experience with mass appraisal techniques.
Administering a modern property tax also requires an integrated geographic and property database. My research indicates that more than 90 percent of China’s cities do not yet have such a property database, and many local governments cannot document the number of parcels within their jurisdictions, or even the ownership of each parcel.
Land Lines:How does property taxation in China relate to the country’s rapid urban development and growth?
Weidong Qu: According to a projection from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, China’s rate of urbanization will be 52.28 percent in 2015, 57.67 percent in 2020, and 67.81 percent in 2030, after which the rate is expected to stabilize. This trend will produce a rapid increase in the urban population and the need for significant expansion of basic infrastructure, such as schools and hospitals, as well as more residential housing. Supplying land for this new infrastructure will be an ongoing challenge and will eventually render China’s current land-based public financing approach unsustainable.
Land Lines: How do you approach property taxation in China through your own research?
Weidong Qu: The first official mention of property tax reform came in a report from the third plenary session of the 16th Central Committee of the Chinese Community Party in 2003. That report directed the government to “reform city and village construction taxes and fees, and levy a property tax on fixed assets when the conditions are ready, including the concomitant cancelation of overlapping taxes.” This statement was one of the major impetuses for the Lincoln Institute to become involved with property tax research in China and to collaborate with the State Administration of Taxation in Shenzhen, as well as the beginning of my own work in the area.
With the central government’s support, policy makers selected six Chinese cities to serve as initial property tax reform pilot cities for internal sample valuations and research. The study was later expanded to ten cities, including Beijing. These pilots have built upon China’s ongoing stamp tax reform, which refers to a value-based tax paid during the sale of a property and has been invaluable in pushing jurisdictions to formulate their own assessment standards. According to the Ministry of Finance, China will transition to an assessed-value standard for the stamp tax by 2012, which will require each jurisdiction to develop its own computer-assisted mass appraisal system.
In my opinion, four key issues merit research attention. First, it is important to define what we mean in China by a property tax, because considerable disagreement exists among policy makers and scholars about what such a tax should include. Second, property databases remain incomplete or inaccurate, so it is vital to conduct a national-scale survey of housing stock and ownership. Without this data, government agencies are unable to assess property values for all parcels within their jurisdictions or ensure that property tax bills are mailed to the correct property owner.
Third, further research into mass appraisal theories and techniques is still needed. Although China’s tax officials have made progress in their knowledge of the basic principles of mass appraisal, they generally lack specialized real estate training, and their limited understanding threatens to lead to ill-informed policy making. Fourth, before any progress can be made, it is necessary to overcome opposition from China’s political and economic elites, who often own multiple properties and have emerged as one of the biggest obstacles to property tax reforms. Given the uncertainty as to the final direction of property tax reform in China, these interest groups have seen delaying the imposition of a property tax as their best strategy.
Land Lines: What challenges has the PKU-Lincoln Center’s property tax demonstration project sought to address?
Weidong Qu: Since property tax reform in China was first mentioned in 2003, the Lincoln Institute has contributed to this important issue by hosting training seminars and international conferences on property tax assessment and theory, along with lessons from other international experiences. The property tax demonstration project represents the logical next step in the Institute’s work, with a goal of identifying and addressing the practical challenges of such reform. Many of these challenges, such as the importance of cross-ministerial information sharing and CAMA valuation codes, are not the high-profile issues focused on by officials, but they are equally important in ensuring the success of any property tax reform.
Specifically, the demonstration project has focused on 18 properties on Financial Street in western Beijing, the location of the People’s Bank of China and the headquarters of a number of other major domestic and international financial companies. We chose Financial Street because it is one of the most developed districts in Beijing; however, even in such a modern area it took us several months to collect all of the geographic, property, and tenant information needed. This underscores the importance of constructing standards for data gathering and information sharing among government agencies.
Land Lines: What are the biggest remaining obstacles to implementing an effective residential or commercial property tax in China?
Weidong Qu: Assessing a property tax on residential housing stock and on commercial real estate are two separate issues in China. As mentioned, many factors hinder the implementation of a property tax on residential housing stock, including the opposition of powerful interest groups and the current lack of reliable property transaction and ownership data. As in most countries, citizens’ historic opposition to paying taxes on owner-occupied property is also a challenge.
In terms of a property tax on commercial real estate, the current consensus is to leave the existing tax burden unchanged by eliminating the present land use fee and the rental-income and original-value-based real estate taxes levied on commercial property and then establishing a single assessed-value property tax. This approach should not generate the same opposition as that seen against a residential property tax.
In my view, there are two key challenges remaining. The first is to revise China’s existing laws related to taxes on property and then to draft new legislation. The second challenge is the current variety of commercial real estate and the lack of consensus on what valuation method should be used for each type. The demonstration project conducted by the PKU-Lincoln Center in 2009 focused exclusively on top-grade commercial real estate, such as office space, hotels, and apartments. There remains a need for further research on the best valuation methods for property such as gas stations, hospitals, shopping centers, and informal shops in China.
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Siqi Zheng is an associate professor at the Hang Lung Center for Real Estate and the deputy head of the Department of Construction Management, both at Tsinghua University in Beijing, China. She specializes in urban economics and China’s housing market, particularly urban spatial structure, green cities, housing supply and demand, housing price dynamics, and low-income housing policies.
Her innovative and diverse research projects have been supported by international research institutions including the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the International Growth Center at London School of Economics, and various departments of the Chinese government including the National Science Foundation of China, the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development, and the National Statistics Bureau of China.
Dr. Zheng received her Ph.D. in urban economics and real estate economics from Tsinghua University, and she pursued post-doctoral research in urban economics at the Graduate School of Design at Harvard University. She is a research fellow at both the Peking University-Lincoln Institute Center for Urban Development and Land Policy and the Center for Industrial Development and Environmental Governance at Tsinghua University.
Dr. Zheng is also the vice secretary-general of the Global Chinese Real Estate Congress. She has won awards such as the Homer Hoyt Post-Doctoral Honoree (2010) and the Best Paper Award from the American Real Estate Society (2005). She is also on the editorial boards of Journal of Housing Economics and International Real Estate Review.
Land Lines: How did you become associated with the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy and its programs in China?
Siqi Zheng: I first learned about the Lincoln Institute when I did my postdoctoral research at Harvard University in 2005-2006. I joined the Peking University-Lincoln Institute Center for Urban Development and Land Policy (PLC) as a research fellow soon after it was established in 2007. From that time I became fully involved in PLC’s research activities, such as conducting research projects, reviewing research proposals, and participating in conferences. I was awarded an international research fellowship by the Lincoln Institute in 2008-2009, with my colleagues Yuming Fu and Hongyu Liu, to study urban housing opportunities in various Chinese cities. I now lead the housing team at PLC in conducting policy-relevant research in the areas of housing market analysis and low-income housing policies.
Land Lines: Why is the study of the urban economics and the housing market so important to China’s future?
Siqi Zheng: China is experiencing rapid urbanization at a rate of about 50 percent in 2011, but it is expected to reach 70 percent over the next 10 to 20 years. Up to 1.5 million new migrants already move to Chinese cities per year. Such rapid urban growth offers potentially large economic benefits, as cities offer much better opportunities to trade, to learn, and to specialize in an occupation that offers an individual the greatest opportunity to achieve life goals.
However, rapid urbanization also imposes potentially large social costs, such as pollution and congestion, and urban quality of life suffers from a fundamental tragedy of the commons problem. Urban economics research addresses these issues and tries to figure out a way to maximize agglomeration economies and at the same time minimize congestion diseconomies. This is crucial for China’s future, because urbanization is the engine for China’s growth.
The housing sector is a key determinant of both the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of urban growth. Along the quantitative dimension, everyone in the city needs some place to live. Housing supply has important influences on a city’s overall size and its living cost, and thus the labor cost. Along the qualitative dimension, intensive social interactions happen in vibrant urban communities and neighborhoods. The spillover effect arising from such activities reduces the cost of learning and contributes to human capital improvement.
Low-income housing is a major policy issue in China. Income inequality is rising and housing prices are very high in major Chinese cities, so low-income households face severe affordability problems. For years the Chinese government had overlooked the supply of affordable housing, but it has recently began to understand that well-designed policies for low-income housing are crucial for achieving more inclusive urban growth opportunities for all residents.
Land Lines: How do you approach the study of urban economics and China’s housing market?
Siqi Zheng: I am doing cross-city and within-city studies on the intersection of urban and environmental economics. With increasing labor mobility across cities, China is moving toward a system of open cities. Under the compensating differentials framework, I use city-level real estate prices to recover households’ willingness-to-pay for urban amenities, such as better air quality, more green space, and educational opportunities. My basic finding is that Chinese urban households do value quality of life. As China’s urbanites grow richer over time, their desire to live in clean, low-risk cities is rising.
Within a city, I examine the jobs-housing spatial interactions–where people live, where they work, and how they choose their commuting mode. I use household survey data and real estate transaction data to model these behaviors, since individual choices determine the basic pattern of urban form. Those individual behaviors (“snowballs”) also have important implications for the interrelationships among land use, transportation, and the urban environment, because car ownership is rising and the increase in vehicle miles traveled has become a major contributor to pollution in Chinese cities.
I also focus on housing market dynamics and low-income housing policies. Our Tsinghua team constructed the first quality-controlled hedonic price index based on transaction data in 40 Chinese cities. My coauthors and I estimate the income elasticity of housing demand and the price elasticity of housing supply, and examine the determinants of such elasticities. Using microdata, I investigate how land and housing supply and public investments affect price and quantity dynamics in the urban housing market. I pay close attention to the housing choices of low-income households and rural migrants. Based on my behavior-based empirical study using microdata, I explore the kinds of urban and housing policies that can improve the position of these disadvantaged groups in both housing and labor markets.
Land Lines: What challenges do you think China will face in this field in the coming decade?
Siqi Zheng: The major challenge is how to achieve a successful transition toward sustainability. China’s rapid economic growth in recent years was largely export-based and benefited from low labor, land, and regulatory costs. The environmental disasters and social unrest that have occurred in many places in China indicate that the current approach is not sustainable for the long term.
Policy makers should reshape urban policies in a variety of ways. Remaining institutional barriers on labor mobility should be removed. Negative externalities of urban production and consumption activities (such as pollution and congestion) should be priced correctly so that individuals’ behaviors are consistent with the socially optimal solution. Income inequality and spatial inequality issues should be addressed. More investment in human capital is needed. Housing plays a pivot role because it is the largest asset a household owns, and it also affects accessibility to urban opportunities and the quality of social interactions.
Land Lines: What are some potential policy implications of this research on the housing market?
Siqi Zheng: Most of my work is empirical analysis with microdata, so I can focus on the incentives and choices made by individuals, firms, and governments. I also look at how these choices determine urban form, local quality of life, the labor market, and housing market outcomes. In this way I can provide key parameters for policy makers to support their policy design. For instance, I identify the cities with different housing supply and demand conditions, and suggest that officials should offer different low-income housing policy choices. Cities with an abundant housing stock can use demand-side instruments such as housing vouchers, but those without enough housing should use supply-side instruments such as building more public housing.
Land Lines: Is China’s experience with housing market development useful to share with other developing countries?
Siqi Zheng: Yes, because many countries also face difficult situations in their housing sectors. Some of the common challenges are how to house the vast numbers of rural migrants in cities; how to provide more affordable housing for increasing numbers of low-income people; where and by what means to provide such housing; and, as cities expand spatially, what are the appropriate urban planning policies and infrastructure investment strategies that can achieve efficient and inclusive urban growth? Through the research conferences and publications produced by the Peking University-Lincoln Institute Center, China’s experiences are already providing lessons for other developing countries.
Land Lines: Can you describe some examples of housing supply in the informal housing sector?
Siqi Zheng: Nations such as Brazil, India, and China have many poor migrants living in squatter and informal areas. Local governments have little incentive to provide public services to such areas because the improvements, including clean water and sewerage facilities, will simply stimulate more urban migration.
Chengzhongcun (urban village) is a typical type of informal housing in large Chinese cities. It represents a match between migrants’ demand for low-cost housing and the supply of housing available in the villages being encroached upon by urban expansion. High crime rates, inadequate infrastructure and services, and poor living conditions are just some of the problems in urban villages that threaten public security and management. My research on Chengzhongcun shows that local governments at first liked this kind of low-cost informal housing because it can lower labor costs and thus contribute to higher GDP growth in their cities. However, the low quality of social interaction and the shortage of basic public services do not provide a sustainable way of life for the poor rural migrants.
As the industrial sector moves toward a more skill-intensive economy, local governments should consider how to improve the quality of human capital rather than focus on the quantity of cheap labor. This may provide the incentive to upgrade informal housing and transform it to formal housing, or provide public housing to those migrants so they can access more urban opportunities and improve their skills. This transitional process is now occurring in China, and will soon happen in other developing countries that can benefit from China’s experience.
Another example is the role of housing supply in urban growth. Many studies already show that housing supply can support or constrain urban growth because the size and price of housing stock influence labor supply and living costs. In developing countries land and housing supply are influenced by government regulations and behaviors to a greater extent than in developed countries. The design of housing supply policies needs to accommodate future urban growth for all sectors of society.
I have written many working papers on these topics and contributed to the 2011 Lincoln Institute book, China’s Housing Reform and Outcomes, edited by Joyce Yanyun Man, director of the Peking-Lincoln Center at Peking University.
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When I was a scholar at Cambridge University in the 1990s, my now-departed colleague and friend Wynne Godley would drop by on Sundays to take me to visit one of the ubiquitous medieval churches in the villages of East Anglia. Wynne frequently noted that “a church is more a process than a building. It unfolds over centuries and involves generations of families in its construction and maintenance.” He had a keen eye for architectural detail and would point out a buttress or belfry that illustrated distinct technical practices, unusual materials, or both. A single church offered a living, layered record of how successive generations of a community solved the challenge of making and keeping large, enclosed, open spaces for worship feasible and beautiful.
In this way, cities are much like medieval churches. Over time, they illustrate the collaboration of generations of residents, as well as the evolution of economic, technical, and even social tools used to build and maintain them. Rome’s marble relics stand testament to ancient values, aesthetics, and building ingenuity, while a modern city thrives around them. Manhattan’s iconic skyline, seemingly fixed, is ever in flux, and is now evolving dramatically to respond to 21st-century demands for sustainability, resilience, mixed-use development, and other concerns.
The boundaries of cities evolve, too, and tell another critically important story. The future of the planet may depend on our capacity to understand that story and to develop the tools and collective will to manage the pattern and progression of urban growth. Shlomo (Solly) Angel documents this trajectory in the Atlas of Urban Expansion (Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2012), which uses satellite images collected over decades to track the spatial evolution of 120 cities around the world, from Bamako and Guadalajara to Shanghai and Milan. The last half-century of urban growth has provided a cautionary tale about the seduction of sprawl—a path of least resistance that generates quick profits but unsustainable development. Our ability to manage our ecological footprint and minimize our global impact will be tied inextricably to our ability to plan and construct more dense and efficient human settlements. Given the United Nations’ prediction that the global urban population will nearly double to 6 billion by 2050, the fortunes of the planet will depend on whether we, as a species, adopt a more appropriate development paradigm over this half-century.
As we endeavor to reinvent our urban settlements, we will confront an old foe—land that is already improved and developed, but needs to be adapted to new uses. While we are not unfamiliar with this highly contentious process, it is safe to say that we have not yet cracked the code on how to manage it. This issue of Land Lines considers some of the driving needs that will require creative approaches to redevelopment in different cities and contexts: satisfying the unmet demand for housing that leads millions of workers in Beijing to subterranean habitationfinancing infrastructure to manage population pressure in Rio and other Brazilian citiesrepurposing land in the throes of a complete industrial, demographic, and fiscal overhaul in Detroit. These places are quite distinct, but all will face similar challenges as they evolve in the coming decades.
At the Lincoln Institute, we are keenly aware of the need for new ideas and new practices to facilitate sustainable redevelopment of land that is already developed or occupied. Over the next year, we will begin to build an intellectual enterprise around addressing the manifold challenges of urban regeneration—extracting the lessons learned from earlier efforts in the United States and other developed countries since World War II, finding new and creative ways to finance infrastructure that improves the land under the informal settlements that choke cities in developing countries, or rekindling the fiscal health of legacy cities like Detroit by unpacking the causes of insolvency and testing remedies for it.
The medieval churches that I visited during the 1990s offered lessons in stone. These included innovative techniques and materials that permitted medieval architects to defy gravity. Perhaps more importantly, they were monuments to the communal efforts and long-term commitment of the congregations that built and sustained them over centuries. In the end, human survival might hinge on our ability to override similarly the centripetal forces that undermine collective action, and to build and maintain the social structures and policy frameworks to develop and redevelop our cities for mutual and long-term posterity.
Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 4 del libro Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.
En los últimos cinco años el Instituto Lincoln ha respaldado el estudio de las políticas e instrumentos de recuperación de plusvalías en muchos países latinoamericanos. Pese a la diversidad de enfoques y la variedad de casos específicos, hemos podido identificar siete lecciones preponderantes que pueden ayudar a aclarar parte de la confusión y los conceptos errados que se asocian con la implementación de los principios de recuperación de plusvalías. Cada lección resumida más adelante presenta uno o dos ejemplos tomados de libro Recuperación de Plusvalías en América Latina: Alternativas para el Desarrollo Urbano.
La recuperación de plusvalías se refiere al proceso por el cual el sector público recupera la totalidad o una porción de los incrementos en el valor del suelo atribuibles a los “esfuerzos comunitarios” más que a las acciones de los propietarios. La recuperación de estos “incrementos inmerecidos” puede hacerse indirectamente mediante su conversión en ingresos públicos en forma de impuestos, contribuciones, exacciones y otros mecanismos fiscales, o directamente mediante mejoras locales para beneficio de la comunidad por entero.
1. El concepto de recuperación de plusvalías no es nuevo en América Latina. La experiencia latinoamericana en este campo tiene largos años de precedentes históricos. En varios países los debates públicos sobre el uso de la recuperación de plusvalías e instrumentos asociados comenzaron a principios del siglo XX. En los años de 1920, el debate surgió por acontecimientos concretos, como el problema de la pavimentación de las calles en São Paulo, Brasil y la falta de financiamiento externo para obras públicas necesarias en Colombia. En otros casos, los factores políticos e ideológicos han motivado discusiones de alcance nacional. Los representantes del Partido Radical en Chile intentaron introducir la idea en varias ocasiones y en los años 1930 el Presidente Aguirre Cerda propuso una ley para crear un impuesto nacional sobre las plusvalías (incrementos en el valor del suelo) con fundamento en las ideas de Henry George.
2. No obstante, sigue siendo limitada su aplicación en los planes de política urbana. A pesar de los numerosos informes sobre experiencias pertinentes que integran los principios de la recuperación de plusvalías, el tema no están bien representado ni ha ganado suficiente reconocimiento dentro de la esfera de las políticas urbanas. En algunos casos, han surgido valiosas iniciativas para la recuperación de plusvalías que han cobrado notoriedad en su momento, sólo para quedar olvidadas más tarde. Un ejemplo destacado es el conocido Informe Lander en Venezuela durante los años 1960, en el cual se proponía que el suelo y los incrementos de su valor debían ser la fuente principal de financiamiento para los proyectos de desarrollo urbano. Sentaba las bases para recomendaciones sobre las finanzas del desarrollo urbano incluidas en las deliberaciones de la cumbre Habitat I (1976).
En otros casos, se están perdiendo o desestimando oportunidades interesantes para usar la recuperación de plusvalías como una herramienta de las políticas urbanas. Actualmente algunos países de América Latina no están aprovechando los posibles incrementos del valor del suelo generados por grandes proyectos de renovación en los cascos urbanos. Aunque está generalmente aceptada la noción de recuperación de plusvalías, en realidad es poco lo que efectivamente se ha recuperado y redistribuido de los incrementos del valor del suelo derivados de las acciones urbanísticas.
3. A menudo existe la legislación, sólo que no se aplica. Como en muchos otros países de la región, la variedad de los instrumentos de recuperación de plusvalías existentes en México –desde la contribución por mejoras (una tasación especial o gravamen por mejora dirigido a recuperar los costos de las obras públicas), hasta los impuestos sobre las plusvalías– ilustra la discrepancia entre lo que es legalmente posible y lo que verdaderamente se implementa. Contrario a lo que suele aducirse, el problema general no radica en que los planificadores o funcionarios públicos carezcan de acceso legal o práctico a estos instrumentos, sino que tienden a prevalecer las siguientes condiciones:
4. La resistencia obedece más a la ideología que a la lógica. Incluso cuando se entienden la legislación y los instrumentos para la recuperación de plusvalías –o en algunos casos justamente porque se entienden–, es posible que no puedan implementarse a cabalidad debido a la manifiesta “falta de voluntad política”. Esta resistencia puede tomar la forma de interpretaciones engañosas, racionalizaciones estereotipadas y hasta “prédicas” puramente ideológicas.
Resulta sencillo encontrar justificación pública de que la aplicación de tales instrumentos es inoportuna o inapropiada, especialmente si la justificación se basa en interpretaciones engañosas. Algunos de estos argumentos sostienen que las imposiciones sobre el valor del suelo son inflacionarias y alteran el buen funcionamiento de los mercados, o que provocan una doble tributación inaceptable de la misma base. Estos conceptos erróneos parecen hallarse detrás de la renuencia que muestra el Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo de Chile para promover la revisión y reintroducción ante el Congreso de algunas disposiciones sobre la recuperación de plusvalías en el nuevo marco legal de urbanismo del país.
Las objeciones basadas en racionalizaciones estereotipadas pueden recurrir a los siguientes argumentos:
No obstante, en oposición a estos argumentos, están los programas participativos de mejoras que se han llevado a cabo con éxito en áreas pobres de muchas ciudades (por ejemplo, en Chile, Brasil y Perú). Estos programas han sido eficaces técnica y económicamente y por lo general han contado con un apoyo sólido de la población de bajos ingresos afectada.
Finalmente, algunas objeciones son de índole netamente ideológica. Por ejemplo, la resistencia a la implementación de la participación en plusvalías en Colombia se basa en la aseveración de que este mecanismo, si bien se reconoce que tiene una buena formulación técnica, representa una forma más de “interferencia” pública indeseable en el negocio inmobiliario urbano, como lo son una mayor carga fiscal, limitaciones de los derechos de propiedad o más regulación (Barco de Botero y Smolka, 2000). Esta posición ha quedado sustituida recientemente por un amplio consenso entre los políticos, líderes empresariales y el público general de que la aceptación de este instrumento es una mejor opción que la exigencia de otros impuestos a la propiedad.
5. La recuperación de plusvalías se va haciendo cada vez más popular. A pesar de los obstáculos y la resistencia política, la experiencia reciente en América Latina con la recuperación de plusvalías muestra un creciente interés en el tema y en las condiciones que justificarían su utilización. Atrae la atención de planificadores municipales en toda la región y comienza a percibirse como una iniciativa importante de las políticas urbanas. Esta popularidad creciente está vinculada a varios factores que se presentan en la región.
En primer lugar, una mayor descentralización administrativa y fiscal exige más autonomía para redefinir y obtener fuentes alternativas de fondos públicos para financiar el proceso de urbanización. La necesidad de más recursos locales se ha visto acentuada por las demandas sociales y las presiones políticas asociadas con los actuales procesos de redemocratización y el mayor grado de participación popular. La generación de fondos no presupuestados requeridos para financiar programas sociales especiales está vinculada a casi todas las nuevas iniciativas de recuperación de plusvalías y ha sido una de las razones más poderosas para implementar dichas políticas.
En segundo lugar, la redefinición de las funciones del estado (incluida la privatización), en conjunto con la disminución de la planificación integral, ha dado pie a la materialización de intervenciones públicas más flexibles y negociaciones directas sobre la regulación del uso del suelo y las alianzas entre los sectores público y privado. También cobra significación la apertura de áreas públicas al mercado inmobiliario privado, así como una mejor coordinación entre los intereses de los propietarios privados y el sector público con miras a fomentar nuevas áreas en las ciudades. Cabe destacar que incluso en Cuba encontramos un programa pujante mediante el cual la Oficina del Historiador de la Ciudad de La Habana, que funciona como una suerte de compañía inmobiliaria, refinancia las operaciones del estado con los incrementos del valor del suelo provenientes de proyectos de rehabilitación urbana en forma de impuestos cobrados a los “socios” privados en las obras de desarrollo (Núñez, Brown y Smolka, 2000).
Otros factores favorables incluyen las condiciones estipuladas por los planes de los organismos multilaterales, que claramente promueven la universalización de los gravámenes al usuario y la recuperación de los costos de las inversiones públicas. La creciente popularidad de los nuevos instrumentos de recuperación de plusvalías también puede atribuirse a cierta frustración causada por los resultados mediocres que se obtuvieron en décadas anteriores con la aplicación de impuestos y otras contribuciones tradicionales relacionadas con el suelo urbano, en cuanto a los ingresos y los objetivos de las políticas urbanas.
6. El pragmatismo prevalece sobre las justificaciones éticas o teóricas. Como corolario al punto anterior tenemos que la creciente popularidad de la recuperación de plusvalías parece inspirarse más en razones fundamentalmente pragmáticas que en criterios éticos, nociones de igualdad o justificaciones teóricas o políticas. Algunas reformas tal vez se han introducido sin plena conciencia política del proceso, o de su importancia teórica, como se ilustró anteriormente en el caso de Mexicali. Los indicios históricos muestran que en su mayoría las iniciativas de recuperación de plusvalías han respondido más que todo a la necesidad de enfrentar las crisis fiscales y otros problemas locales en el financiamiento del desarrollo urbano. Es el mismo caso que ocurre en Argentina, donde la necesidad de ingresos predominó sobre los principios establecidos que se oponían a nuevos impuestos cuando se recurrió a un aumento provisional del 5% en el impuesto a la propiedad como una de las iniciativas para financiar las inversiones en el nuevo sistema de subterráneo de Buenos Aires.
No obstante, no debería darse por sentado a partir de los ejemplos anteriores que la acumulación de experiencia no es importante para el perfeccionamiento de instrumentos y la evolución de las políticas de recuperación de plusvalías. Un caso pertinente es la experiencia colombiana con la contribución de valorización desde los años 1920 y los innumerables intentos para resolver algunas de sus limitaciones, especialmente en los últimos 40 años. La participación en plusvalías promulgada recientemente es una versión de mayor logro técnico y políticamente aceptable de un instrumento dirigido a recuperar los incrementos –en ocasiones enormes– del valor del suelo asociados con las decisiones administrativas con respecto a la zonificación, niveles de densidad y otras normas y regulaciones urbanísticas.
7. La recuperación de plusvalías no es necesariamente progresiva o redistributiva. Es necesario señalar que de ninguna manera la referencia a las plusvalías es un monopolio de la izquierda política. Las experiencias recientes de Argentina y Chile indican claramente la disposición hacia el tema en contextos neoliberales. Además, las operacões interligadas (operaciones interligadas), desarrolladas en São Paulo y aplicadas con efectividad por administradores con tendencias políticas e ideológicas opuestas, fungieron como argumento convincente de la imposibilidad de etiquetar estos instrumentos a priori.
Los gobiernos locales progresistas, por otra parte, a veces son renuentes a utilizar estos instrumentos, y hasta pueden rechazar de un todo la noción, por tres razones: Primero, es posible que crean que tales contribuciones serían un mero mecanismo para imponer nuevos gravámenes fiscales sin ningún efecto redistributivo. Segundo, incluso cuando los ingresos generados se destinen a la población de bajos ingresos, pueden resultar insuficientes para reducir las diferencias entre ricos y pobres en lo concerniente al acceso al suelo urbanizado (Furtado 2000). Tercero, el argumento intergeneracional de que tales gravámenes se imponen a los residentes más nuevos –generalmente pobres– que necesitan servicios, mientras que las generaciones anteriores no pagaron por servicios de infraestructura o instalaciones recreativas.
De tal modo, la naturaleza progresista de dichas políticas no se resuelve “creando impuestos” sobre los incrementos del valor del suelo ni tampoco apuntando hacia los contribuyentes de altos ingresos. La imagen de Robin Hood de tales políticas se diluye en cuanto queda claro que la parte del valor realmente recuperada de esta manera tiende a ser sólo una fracción –a menudo pequeña– de lo que el propietario recibe en realidad en beneficios. Este punto parece haber sido bien entendido por muchas poblaciones de bajos ingresos, como las de Lima, donde un programa exitoso que comprendía unos 30 proyectos se valió de la contribución de mejoras para financiar obras públicas a principios de la década de 1990.
Este ejemplo y otros indicios fuertes confirman la necesidad de reconsiderar las nociones convencionales sobre la tensión que existe entre los principios de beneficio y la capacidad de pago. En la práctica, la estrategia de atraer cierta intervención pública hacia nuestro vecindario (incluso si ello implica pagar su costo) es más ventajosa que la alternativa de quedar relegado. Sin embargo, este punto debería tratarse con cautela, a la luz de ciertas experiencias en las que se ha aplicado la contribución de mejoras en áreas de bajos ingresos con fines distintos al beneficio de los ocupantes; por ejemplo, para justificar el desalojo o provocar la partida de aquellos residentes que no pueden pagar las mejoras (Everett 1999).
Consideraciones finales
A pesar de las dificultades de interpretación y resistencia a la implementación descrita más arriba, las políticas de recuperación de plusvalías sin duda están despertando nuevo interés y logrando mayor aceptación. Los esfuerzos para utilizar la recuperación de plusvalías se han multiplicado en número y creatividad y sus virtudes, aparte de ser una fuente alternativa de financiamiento público, se entienden cada vez más. Los funcionarios de la administración pública se están dando cuenta del “valor de mercado” de su competencia privativa para controlar los derechos de uso del suelo, así como para definir la ubicación y fecha adecuada de las obras públicas. Asimismo ven que la negociación transparente del uso del suelo y las relaciones de densidad reducen el margen de transacciones que solían realizarse “por debajo de la mesa”. Como el vínculo entre la intervención pública y el incremento del valor del suelo se hace cada vez más notorio, las actitudes están cambiando para hacerse más favorables a la creación de una cultura fiscal que fortalezca los impuestos a la propiedad y los ingresos locales en general.
Sin embargo, todavía queda mucho por hacer en ambas esferas: investigar la naturaleza compleja de las políticas de recuperación de plusvalías y promover un mayor entendimiento por parte de los funcionarios públicos de la manera en que pueden usarse para beneficiar a sus respectivas comunidades. Es indispensable conocer mejor ciertas idiosincrasias latinoamericanas, como cuando los incrementos significativos del valor del suelo se generan bajo regímenes alternativos de tenencia de la tierra que no gozan de la protección del estado, y en casos en que el suelo representa un importante mecanismo de capitalización para los pobres.
Más allá de las limitaciones tradicionales estructurales de patrimonialismo, corrupción, intereses velados, insensibilidad ideológica y demás, una parte considerable de la “variación inexplicable” en las diferentes experiencias con la recuperación de plusvalías en América Latina puede atribuirse a la falta de información. Con el fin de mejorar la comprensión de los principios e implementación de la recuperación de plusvalías, quedan muchas oportunidades para documentar y analizar las experiencias actuales con valoración alternativa del suelo y los instrumentos impositivos.
Martim Smolka es miembro principal y director del Programa para América Latina y el Caribe del Instituto Lincoln, y Fernanda Furtado es miembro del Instituto y profesora del Programa de Posgrado en Urbanismo de la Universidad Federal de Río de Janeiro.
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Although many governments in Latin America have improved the process of legalizing peripheral settlements, recognized the rights of housing, and acknowledged the United Nations’ position on evictions as violations of fundamental human rights, urban displacement continues. Forced evictions bring devastation to families and neighborhoods and hamper efforts to improve large areas of the city. By perpetuating a climate of fear and uncertainty, the threat of eviction makes people reluctant to invest labor and resources in their homes and barrios.
Evictions arise from the prevalence of illegal housing in Latin America, which is caused by rapid growth, the limited financial resources of the poor and municipal governments alike, and unclear or contested titles. Given this situation, the urban poor employ a number of survival mechanisms, including illegal subdivisions, invasions, and do-it-yourself housing, in order to meet their needs for shelter and community.
In the northeastern section of Bogotá, Colombia, known as Chapinero Alto, residents have faced 30 years of displacement and eviction attempts. Many of the families living in this mountainous urban periphery are related to the workers on the great estates that covered the sabana (high plain). As the estates were broken up and sold to make way for urban expansion, the workers were left to live in the hills, which at mid-century were considered worthless to developers.
In the early 1970s, a planned highway project through the area brought a wave of speculation and several eviction attempts. Residents and their allies at universities and religious institutions formed a massive social movement that blocked several evictions but could not halt speculation. When the highway was finally built in the 1980s, only a few families had to move to make way for the road, but another wave of eviction attempts threatened the barrios.
In the early 1990s, residents faced a new threat: sustainable development and claims by both government and private groups that the poor barrios were a threat to the fragile environment. Since then, continued pressure to remove squatters has tested the abilities of residents to defend against eviction. The uncertainty has also discouraged investment by both residents and the city government.
Development Refugees
The causes of evictions are varied, but typically displacement relates directly or indirectly to development. As the availability of serviceable land shrinks, competition and evictions force the residents of such informal housing settlements further into the periphery. In Bogotá, the expansion of the city has made Chapinero Alto one of the most coveted pieces of real estate in the city. The victims of evictions, so-called development refugees, are often accused of standing in the way of progress when they protest. They are rarely offered compensation or allowed to participate in resettlement. In cases of speculation, residents typically have little warning prior to eviction and experience the trauma of forced displacement.
Local governments play a central role in evictions, along with landowners, developers, police and armed forces. Clearing the poor residents from desirable lands not only makes way for luxury development and infrastructure projects but also frees the wealthy from daily contact with them. Governments and developers often cite the beautification and improvement of the city as justification, or claim that social problems proliferate in slums. Governments also increasingly cite environmental protection and sustainable development as justifications for eviction. Government officials and private title-holders hoping to evict squatters have used all of these justifications in their efforts to clear Chapinero Alto of poor barrios.
When families are forced to move, they lose not only their land and houses, but neighborhoods, communities and social networks. The psychological stress caused by months of uncertainty and the health effects alone can be devastating. Children often lose months of school and their parents often travel long distances to get to work. Anthropologists have demonstrated that relationships of mutual aid and social networks are dismantled as populations disperse. These social networks are a critical survival tool for the urban poor who must constantly weather economic fluctuations and uncertainty. Even when families receive compensation for lost homes, these social relations are virtually irreplaceable. Finally, displacement carries a very high risk of impoverishment. This is especially true for those who lack legal title to their land because they generally do not receive compensation.
In 1992, the Bogotá city government evicted a group of 30 families following a violent dispute with the title-holder. The city moved the families to an abandoned school where they lived for several months awaiting public housing promised to them by the mayor. As the months wore on and the promised housing solution evaporated, stress, health problems and lost income and education took their toll on the families. Several of the men left, rumors of domestic violence grew, and social relationships disintegrated. By 1997, the families were scattered around the city in whatever housing they could find.
One of the most distressing consequences of urban displacement is the effect that insecurity of tenure has on all irregular settlements. Whether or not residents are ever evicted, the threat of eviction affects huge areas of developing cities and prevents investment in housing and services that is necessary to solve the problem of slums in the first place. This is one of the reasons why the problem of evictions must be addressed within the framework of human rights; until security of tenure and adequate shelter are fully acknowledged and protected as human rights, the problem of urban displacement will continue.
Evictions and Human Rights
Given the far-reaching social consequences of displacement, it is not surprising that forced evictions entail the violation of a number of human rights. Evictions obviously compromise the right to housing. The right to adequate housing has been made increasing explicit in international law. Article 25 of the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights established the right to housing for the first time in 1948. The Declaration on Social Progress and Development, the Declaration on the Rights of the Child, the Vancouver Declaration on Human Settlement and other conventions all affirm the right to housing. More than 50 constitutions recognize housing as a human right, including the Colombian Constitution of 1991.
In addition to the right to housing, the right to freedom of movement is commonly violated with eviction. When community leaders and protestors are killed or subjected to violence, the right to life and security of the person are denied, as are the right of freedom of expression and association. When children are taken from school, the right to education is affected. When police or military enter homes by force, families lose their rights of privacy. The right to work is one of the most common violations associated with evictions. Finally, the psychological and physical toll wrought by eviction compromises the right to health.
Even where governments have ratified UN conventions on housing rights, evictions often occur. The United Nations, like many other observers, clearly places the responsibility for preventing evictions on the states. The United Nations has declared that when governments fail to ensure the availability of adequate housing, they must not claim that the removal of illegal settlements is consistent with international law. Since virtually all evictions are planned, and since there are a set of internationally recognized conventions in place condemning eviction, such displacements should be guided by social policies and a human rights framework.
Policy Considerations
Based on a review of several studies on eviction and my own research in Bogotá, I suggest a number of ways in which better enforcement of human rights can improve housing policies and prevent violence. The following points should be the focus of policies aimed at eliminating forced evictions.
Only when effective mechanisms for extending tenure rights to the urban poor have been created can the problems associated with forced displacement-violence, impoverishment, stagnated urban development-be adequately addressed. One major way that current human rights guidelines can be improved is to extend the rights to protection from forced eviction and the rights to adequate resettlement. Current guidelines are most effectively enforced in cases of internationally financed development projects, but similar guidelines could be used by states to govern all forms of displacement. By extending human rights guidelines and improving the mechanisms for implementation and enforcement, national and international agencies can better meet the needs of the urban poor.
Margaret Everett is assistant professor of Anthropology and International Studies at Portland State University in Portland, Oregon. Her research for this article was funded in part by the Lincoln Institute. The complete report, “Evictions and Human Rights: An Ethnographic Study of Development and Land Disputes in Bogotá, Colombia,” is posted on the Lincoln Institute website.
