Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 4 del libro Perspectivas urbanas; Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.

Brasilia, la capital de Brasil, fue inaugurada a principios de los años 1960 como una “nueva ciudad” que daría comienzo a una era distinta para las metrópolis en América Latina y que demostraría cómo el gobierno hacía un uso eficaz de la tierra en aras de un crecimiento urbano planificado. Tal propósito se servía de dos instrumentos básicos: un control normativo del uso de la tierra basado en un plan general diseñado por Lucio Costa y el gobierno como propietario de las tierras de la capital federal, lo que permitiría que ésta fuera planificada sin los tipos de restricciones y conflictos que normalmente surgen cuando la tierra está en manos privadas. Sin embargo, tres décadas y media más tarde, los problemas asociados con el desarrollo urbano en Brasilia no se diferencian sustancialmente de los que padecen otras ciudades grandes de América Latina.

Falta de visión para la tenencia de la tierra y padrinazgo administrativo

Brasilia se presenta como un ejemplo único de la gestión de tierras urbanas en América Latina porque la responsabilidad de administrar las tierras públicas siempre ha recaído sobre el gobierno local. Sin embargo, la periferia de la ciudad ha sufrido un índice explosivo de crecimiento con un patrón concomitante de ocupación irregular de la tierra, subdivisiones ilegales y carencia de infraestructura. En Brasilia la posibilidad de dirigir el proceso de crecimiento urbano a través de una política explícita de acceso a las tierras públicas se ha visto comprometida de forma lenta e irremediable por la ocupación espontánea (e ilegal) de la tierra. Esta falta de visión en el uso de las tierras públicas suele ser disfuncional tanto para la densidad urbana como para las finanzas públicas, por lo que obstruye los esfuerzos que hace el gobierno local para proveer infraestructura a esos asentamientos irregulares.

Más aún, las influencias políticas que intervienen en el proceso de desarrollo han menoscabado en gran medida las posibilidades de manejar con eficacia la oferta de tierras públicas en Brasilia. A principios de los años 1990 el gobierno distribuyó unas 65.000 parcelas en áreas que carecían de infraestructura básica. Además de reducir las reservas de tierras públicas, este “padrinazgo de la tenencia de la tierra” generó la necesidad de encontrar otras fuentes para financiar nueva infraestructura. Dado que el principal recurso que tiene disponible la entidad de desarrollo urbano del Distrito Federal (Terracap) es la tierra misma, esta política de padrinazgo trajo como resultado la venta de otras tierras públicas para financiar la construcción de infraestructura en los asentamientos irregulares. Este círculo vicioso ha provocado graves distorsiones que la administración local actual pretende resolver usando tierras públicas como “capital” para crear una política efectiva que permita controlar los ingresos provenientes de la tenencia de la tierra y los costos urbanos.

La experiencia de Brasilia parece confirmar los argumentos de Henry George y otros de que la propiedad de tierras públicas no conduce por sí sola a un crecimiento urbano más equilibrado y equitativo socialmente. La estrategia del gobierno local actual de definir maneras de manejar el ingreso proveniente de tierras públicas para así controlar el uso de tierra urbana indica una nueva modalidad de interacción gubernamental con el mercado inmobiliario. En tal sentido, el gobierno cambia su función y deja de ser el propietario principal para convertirse en el administrador de los beneficios de la tierra.

Tierras públicas como capital de tenencia de la tierra

El principio medular de la nueva estrategia de Brasilia para administrar la equidad de la tierra es la definición de tierra pública como “capital de tenencia de la tierra”. El uso de esta tierra se somete a una serie de acciones estratégicas que transforman el capital de las tierras públicas en un factor que propicia la consolidación del complejo tecnológico del Distrito Federal. Se trata de la contraparte pública en el proceso de reconvertir el uso de la tierra en el centro de la ciudad en un instrumento de promoción social en el programa de regulación de la tenencia de la tierra: las tierras públicas se usan como activos mediante ventas, arrendamientos y asociaciones en proyectos urbanos.

La aplicación de estrategias diferenciadas para la tenencia de la tierra confiere mayor flexibilidad al gobierno para coordinar sus acciones. La búsqueda del equilibrio entre las iniciativas de índole social y otras en las que el gobierno intenta maximizar sus ingresos está cobrando la apariencia de una verdadera política de administración de tierras públicas que rompe con las anteriores prácticas de padrinazgo.

En este contexto de exploración de nuevos enfoques para el uso de tierras públicas con la finalidad de controlar el desarrollo urbano en Brasilia, el Instituto Lincoln, el Instituto de Planificación del Distrito Federal y Terracap organizaron un seminario internacional sobre gestión de ingresos provenientes de la tenencia de la tierra y costos urbanos en junio de 1998.

El programa reunió a expertos internacionales, ministros gubernamentales y administradores locales con miras a evaluar las experiencias internacionales en el uso de tierras públicas para financiar el crecimiento urbano en Europa, los Estados Unidos y América Latina. Martim Smolka del Instituto Lincoln describió las relaciones entre las operaciones del mercado inmobiliario, las regulaciones sobre el uso de la tierra y la recuperación pública de plusvalías. Alfredo Garay, arquitecto y exdirector de planificación de la ciudad de Buenos Aires, expuso las experiencias en el desarrollo de terrenos públicos en los alrededores del puerto de esa ciudad.

Bernard Frieden del Instituto de Tecnología de Massachusetts describió cómo se usan las actividades comerciales realizadas en tierras públicas en el oeste de los Estados Unidos para recaudar fondos para la educación y otros fines locales. Henk Verbrugge, director del organismo fiscal de Rotterdam y representante de Holanda ante la Asociación Internacional de Peritos, describió el sistema que tiene el país para la tenencia hereditaria, una regulación legal con la cual la tierra puede tener uso y beneficios completamente privados al tiempo que permanecen bajo control y propiedad económica de la municipalidad.

Los participantes discutieron la medida en que estas experiencias eran comparables a la situación en Brasilia y concluyeron que el éxito de varias estrategias para el uso de tierras públicas depende de la idoneidad de los proyectos específicos para la cultura empresarial del país en cuestión y las prácticas institucionales vigentes en la administración local.

Increasing socio-economic and spatial disparities in Latin American cities have prompted a revival of interest in equity-oriented government policies to reduce those disparities. However, solutions to the major urban problems being faced today must go far beyond the implementation of inconsistent and narrowly defined actions. The solutions must ensure equity for all sectors of society. In too many places, entire neighborhoods are forced to exist under deplorable living conditions while government agencies seek to evict residents in the name of environmental protection. It is evident that urban legislation can no longer ignore the rights of people to have a place in which to live in security and dignity.

The critical impact of land inequity on the urban environment requires that the urban poor gain access to the technical information necessary to better negotiate their concerns with public officials. My research explores the role of environmental education in low-income communities in developing countries. Taking a perspective based on self-help capacity building, my goal is to develop programs to train community leaders at the grassroots level to deal more effectively with local land use conflicts and environmental risks.

Impacts of Land Inequity

Like many Latin American cities, Rio de Janeiro is strongly affected by prevailing poverty and environmental degradation. Complex factors are involved: economic instability, inequitable land ownership, short-sighted development policies, and a lack of a democratic system that provides for human rights and freedoms. In my view, the problems experienced by Rio de Janeiro during the last few decades are mainly a result of existing “apartheid” urban planning assumptions and a lack of political will to incorporate the popular sectors in land use policy making.

In the region of Baixada de Jacarepaguá-at the heart of the core expansion area of Rio de Janeiro-the extraordinary process of urban growth since the 1970s has provoked dramatic changes in the landscape, as well as a variety of environmental problems. Amidst the spectacular natural beauty of lagoon ecosystems, mangrove forests and wetlands, the region remains home to a large population of urban poor who live in favelas-shanty communities resulting from largely uncontrolled urbanization of public land.

During the 1980s and early 1990s, the region enjoyed an unprecedented development boom that has fostered unsustainable patterns of land use. Discrimination against the poor inhabitants and inequalities in landownership allowed landowners and speculators to capitalize on the boom by formally obtaining titles and subdividing the land. In addition, a select group of private builders injected themselves into the local scene with multiple court permits to develop the region for high-income residential condominiums, commercial establishments and industrial enterprises.

Increasing pressures on the land snowballed into a wide range of protests between the popular sectors and the powerful land developers, posing the threat of forced eviction of the poor inhabitants. The accumulated discontent against the government for failing to control land speculation and ensure protective legislation created an extremely dangerous situation. Violence and persecution claimed the lives of 30 community leaders, presidents of local community associations, their family members and relatives. The murders were carried out by what are known in the region as “extermination squads,” and no criminal investigation has taken place.

The Vicious Cycle of Poverty and Environmental Degradation

Since poverty and environmental degradation are interdependent, it is appropriate to think of environmental concerns in terms of social justice. My research revolves around the problems of inequality and the environmental risks faced by the residents of the Via Park village-an informal settlement located in the region of Baixada de Jacarepaguá. A basic question arising from this research is to what extent can improved access to land equity actually contribute to mitigate the factors that encourage environmental degradation. By connecting land use issues to the learning process of environmental education, the research demonstrates that environmental degradation is a recurring phenomenon manifested in the inequitable ways land has been used and distributed in the region.

Via Park village has been caught in a serious land use struggle since the 1970s, when urban development began to impact many traditional fishing communities in the area. Builders were eager to lobby the government to break the fishermen’s land tenure system, which was enforced by law, and thereby turn the land over to market forces. In the 1980s, the area was designated a public reserve for environmental preservation, enshrined in Article 225 of the Brazilian Constitution (1988). Since the village was located on protected land, the city’s planning authorities then argued that the Via Park residents had no legitimate claims of ownership.

Living in an atmosphere of fear and at mercy of the land developers and speculators who continued to flourish, the Via Park residents started illegally subdividing and selling small parcels of land to new settlers. The growth of the poor population and the concentration of land ownership and speculation contributed to the expansion of informal land markets into nearby low-income communities.

Underlying these practices was a more complex system of commercial transactions and civil relations governing the invasion of vacant lands, as well as the division and sale of plots. Throughout Rio de Janeiro, land development through informal channels is the predominant “territorial pact” by which disadvantaged local groups have been able to gain access to land and housing. At the same time, agents from the “formal world” have developed political arrangements to support and take advantage of existing informal land markets.

It was in this context that a program for grassroots environmental improvement was conceived and eventually implemented in Via Park village. However, given the residents’ long history of exclusion-including threats of forced eviction-they remained suspicious. It became clear that successful program implementation would depend on managerial strategies based on an integrated vision of the geographic/ecological and social/cultural environment.

If the dilemma of poverty and environmental degradation is to be overcome, then the task of improving the environment must be shown to be compatible with the struggle for land equity. This innovative approach toward environmental education differs from traditional methodology, which is generally more concerned with simply introducing physical changes to the environment. The key here is to focus on the conditions that are favorable for the development and exercise of a sense of “community belonging”-a tangible expression of shared sentiments, values and identities where land is understood not only as a component of wealth, but as a common settled place invested with symbolic meanings.

Lessons of Via Park Village

While there is no single solution to the social and environmental vulnerability of the urban poor living in the Via Park village, their experience does offer some insights. One alternative suggests creating “urban natural reserves” integrated into the community where those threatened with forced eviction are encouraged to maintain their traditional lifestyles. In exchange, government authorities at all levels would accept the obligation to promote land equity, giving security of tenure and protection to those forced by circumstances to live in informal settlements.

Aspects of the environmental education program initiated in the Via Park village are applicable to other Latin American cities. The fundamental principle is based on insuring respect for the inherent identity of the community. The experience of the Via Park residents demonstrates that local action can contribute to consolidating a socio-political struggle for land equity with protection of the environment. This is in line with current thinking about land use and environmental management, which suggests an integrated approach that acknowledges the leadership role of the local residents.

The Via Park case reveals that a routine excuse being used to justify evictions is “protecting the environment.” In other words, the urban poor most often accused of being the primary protagonists of environmental degradation are in reality the greatest victims. For the 450 residents of the Via Park village, the trauma of being forcibly evicted from their homes will never be overcome. Five people, including two children and one woman, lost their lives in the confrontation. The Via Park village, now destroyed by bulldozers, still reminds us that hope for land equity lies in community solidarity, effective governance and democracy.

Sonia Pereira is a visiting fellow of the Lincoln Institute. She is also completing her Ph.D. thesis from the Institute of Earth Sciences of the Federal University in Rio de Janeiro, with support from a Fulbright scholarship. An environmental lawyer, biologist, social psychologist and activist on behalf of human rights, she has been widely recognized for her work on environmental protection for low-income communities in Brazil. She is a Citizen of the World Laureate (World Peace University, 1992) and a Global 500 Laureate (United Nations Environment Programme-UNEP, 1996).

Driven by an awareness of population expansion and the difficulties that follow growth, Oregon’s Departments of Transportation and of Land Conservation and Development created the “Smart Development” program. The state retained Leland Consulting Group and Livable Oregon to define the goals of Smart Development, to identify obstacles to its execution and to enjoin the development community in discussions about how to implement its goals.

Smart Development is land use that:

• Lowers automobile use;
• Provides nearby services;
• Lowers commuting time;
• Reduces congestion;
• Encourages and makes possible alternate modes of transit;
• Provides better neighborhoods for walking and living;
• Is environmentally sound;
• Maintains Oregon’s historic affordability; and
• Enhances the quality of life and sense of community.

In examining over 60 projects across the country that attempt comprehensive solutions to problems of urban growth, the consultant team looked at examples of “new urbanism,” as well as infill development, subdivisions, affordable housing, adaptive re-use and neighborhood revitalization. While common factors exist among all projects, none of the ones that are successful for their developers satisfy all Smart Development goals at once. The good news is that careful attention to local market conditions and demographics can result in successful projects that do satisfy many of these goals.

Why Smart Development Raises Financing Questions

Projects that satisfy some goals are unlikely to satisfy others because the goals may have different land use solutions which—when built in current markets—are in conflict. Proponents of neotraditional, transit-oriented, small-lot, pedestrian-oriented, mixed-use and grid-platted development have bundled these styles as a single concept. Developers and lenders do not understand the markets, values and risks for these hybrid products.

When we surveyed lenders about the factors that affect their decision to finance Smart Development projects, they explained unequivocally that financing of innovation required clear limits on the risk the lender could accept. While factors such as preleasing and on-site management were considered important, lenders strongly preferred working with a developer who had a track record, financial capacity and experience in the product type.

Lenders also expressed doubts about the willingness of the secondary market to lend on innovative projects. The problem is not innovation in physical design itself, but lenders’ anxieties about FannieMae’s “pass-through” requirement: the bank is financially responsible for the project through foreclosure of the asset. FannieMae support does not insulate the bank from the risk of default. Since banks do not want to own real estate, innovative project types that cannot show strong track records cause anxiety that is not allayed by securitization.

Overcoming the Obstacles

There are three technical obstacles to financing Smart Development:

• appraisal and comparables;
• lack of market and demographic research; and
• lack of clarity in presenting project aims, risks and mitigation to lenders.

A fourth obstacle is financial, relating to the first phase provision of new infrastructure.

Appraisal and Comparables: Standard appraisals usually focus on the housing product without accounting for the economic value produced by higher quality infrastructure, adjacent services, pedestrian amenities, and access to transit. By comparing only housing units, appraisals allot them the value that they would have in adjoining subdivisions that contain none of the amenities. Yet, new projects that we reviewed were often higher in price than the surrounding market. The quality of new designs may justify pricing, but appraisals based on the local area did not support the same percentage of purchase price as for nearby units. Smart Development projects also required proportionately higher cash down-payments, making the units harder to buy (and harder for the developer to sell).

It must be emphasized that Smart Development features are positive attributes that have long-term effects on value. Appraisal is regularly performed involving regression equations to model the economic value of positive externalities and could be applied to this area to produce new standards for evaluation of Smart Development. This process needs research but is well within the professional purview of the appraisal community.

New Market Studies: Smart Development, with its sophisticated land use and concepts such as inclusion of retail into subdivision development, attracts different demographic groups than standard development. Income levels per capita are higher, household sizes are smaller, and the use of transit and other services per person is often greater.

To overcome feasibility and appraisal obstacles, it is useful to consider Smart Development not as a single market concept but as a series of land use solutions that incorporate traditional real estate products in innovative ways. The market for the products can then be assessed in the same way as existing similar land uses that have attracted the demographic groups noted above—older neighborhoods with the sort of land use proposed in these projects. Through this method it is possible to avoid the pitfalls of “trend” studies that are unable to assess the market for new products.

Presentation of Smart Development to Lenders: The business plan for new products describes how products were arrived at in response to market niches and supporting demographics and sales potential. Every aspect of the business is revealed: project principals and roles; financial structure; applied start-up capital; reserves for operational deficits; and projections of revenues, cash flows and profits. The plan illustrates potential risks and suggests mitigations for risk should conditions not meet expectations.

Presentation of real estate development is typically done through market trend studies and architectural drawings. Neither of these modes addresses the issues raised in a business plan. It may be worthwhile for proactive lenders to consider offering assistance with business planning and presentation of innovative projects to alleviate the anxieties of capital investors and loan boards.

First Phase Financial Feasibility: In many western U.S. cities, grid street plans were built by the city and then builders provided the houses. After World War II, American cities stopped creating streets and the developers began providing the local infrastructure. The major public infrastructure dollars were funneled through federal agencies into regional infrastructure improvements (freeways) which sped private development into fringe areas.

It is now understood that highways and major arterials do not eliminate congestion but rather act as a subsidy for congestion-producing development. New requirements for grid streets, pedestrian amenities, sidewalks and parking strips with trees can make development either unaffordable to median buyers or financially infeasible, and there are no local support mechanisms equal to the magnitude of highway funding.

If the goals of Smart Development are serious social goals, then some level of first phase credit enhancement in exchange for fulfillment of social goals is appropriate. Such credit enhancement would serve to produce land use with the long-term benefits of lowered social cost through reduction of congestion and auto use and a better quality of life.

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Edward H. Starkie, principal, and Bonnie Gee Yosick, associate, conduct economic analysis and research on downtown redevelopment for Leland Consulting Group, 325 Northwest 22nd Street, Portland, OR 97210; 503/222-1600.

I am pleased to report that the Lincoln Institute has signed an agreement of understanding with the Ministry of Land and Resources in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to work together on researching and teaching about land and tax policies. Many places in the world face fundamental problems in land allocation and land taxation, but it is difficult to imagine a place and time where the resources of the Lincoln Institute could be more influential and could help more people than in China during the early twenty-first century.

Land and tax policy makers in China are faced with enormous challenges as a result of the extraordinary urbanization of the past two decades. The number of established cities in China grew from 182 in 1982 to 324 in 1985, and reached 666 by 1996, and the average urban population grew by 227 percent between 1957 and 1995. Some cities grew by 200 percent from 1985 to 1995, and the urbanized area of Beijing doubled from 1985 to 1992. However, the extent of urbanization in the future will dwarf that of the recent past. Based on forecasts of population growth and migration, China must provide enough urban land and infrastructure to accommodate more than 450 million persons over the next 20 years. If all of the additional urban population were put in new cities of 10 million persons each, China would need to develop and finance 45 such cities.

China initiated fundamental and revolutionary land use reforms during the mid-1980s. The first reforms established privately held land use rights. The second set of reforms included multiple elements, such as land banking, land trusts, land readjustments, and development of land markets in both urban and rural areas. We believe that the Institute can make a real difference in assisting these reform measures by sponsoring education and training for government officials, supporting research and publications by U.S. and Chinese scholars, and facilitating more in-depth interactions through workshops and conferences.

Over the past two years the Institute has led two training programs in Beijing and participated in meetings between Chinese officials and scholars and Institute board members, faculty and staff. The Institute also sponsored several sessions on land and housing markets in the PRC at the First World Planning Congress in Shanghai in 2001. We anticipate several more training and exchange programs this year, but we believe this is still just the beginning of an expanded effort by the Institute to have a positive impact on land and tax policy in the world’s most populous country. In this issue, Institute faculty associates Chengri Ding and Gerrit Knaap examine some of the recent reforms and current trends in urban land policy in China.

Over the last two decades, and especially in the last few years, land regularization and upgrading programs have been implemented in informal settlements by central, regional and local governments in several Latin American countries. Important lessons must be learned from this incipient practice of urban policy making, not only to contribute toward improving existing experiences, but also to guide those governments that are confronting the phenomenon for the first time, or more likely are confronting the need to design policies to deal with significant increases in informal urban development.

To address this need, the Lincoln Institute sponsored its third offering of the course Informal Markets and Land Regularization Programs in Urban Areas, in November 2003. It was held in Recife, Brazil because of the city’s historic tradition of urban policy making, including its regularization program (PREZEIS), which for the past 20 years has been a pioneering instrument, despite its many shortcomings. The course brought together about 35 people with varied academic backgrounds and institutional positions representing 10 Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.

The 13 intertwined lessons offered here draw on the papers presented in Recife and on experiences discussed in the two previous courses in 2001 and 2002, as well as ideas generated in the meeting of the Institute’s Latin American Network on Land Regularization in Brasília, Brazil, in July 2003. This brief, critical analysis of land regularization programs reflects contributions from many people, but the authors take full responsibility for any misrepresentations that a general synthesis like this one may produce (see Figure 1).

1. The Process of Favelización

The process of informal production of urban space is increasing at a significant pace in Latin America, despite the fact that, unlike Africa and Asia, the region has been solidly urbanized for many decades. Occupied areas are becoming denser, and new settlements are being formed daily. Increasingly, these occupations encroach on environmentally sensitive areas, near protected water reservoirs, on public land, and in other areas not suitable for human occupation or economically feasible in the formal land market. This process has created all sorts of harmful repercussions—socio-environmental, legal, economic, political and cultural—not only for the millions of residents living in informal settlements, but also for city governments and the entire urban population. Despite the many regularization and upgrading programs implemented in the last few decades, the development rate of new informal settlements has been twice and even three times that of urban population growth. Thus, increasing informality is not exclusively the result of demographic change or even the increase in urban poverty, which also has been growing but at a much lower rate.

2. The Vicious Cycle of Informality

Multiple factors are responsible for the establishment of informal settlements. Over and above demographics and macroeconomic factors affecting urban poverty (employment and income policies), local variables contribute to the “unexplained variance” of increasing informality. By acting or failing to act, local authorities have fomented the growth of the phenomenon through exclusionary land use regulation, favoring wealthy neighborhoods in the spatial allocation of public investments, outright complicity with the delinquent practices of land subdividers, and inadequate local fiscal policies.

The corollary of this tolerance of informality is of great importance for land pricing policy. The informal market values and benefits from greater regulatory freedom and from the social values associated with traditional networks among residents within the settlements. Both of these dynamics affect prices in the informal market, which are reaching absurd levels. For example, a 6-square-meter (60-square-foot) wooden shack on a mangrove swamp in Recife has been valued at US$1,300. Such extremes and variations in prices reflect the diversity of informal processes at work in the access to urban land and housing, both among different settlements and within each settlement. Attacking the factors responsible for the vicious cycle of price formation should be an indispensable ingredient of any policy seeking to mitigate the consequences of informality.

3. A World of Diversity

Far from being a homogeneous phenomenon, informality manifests itself in many forms, contexts and places. Enormous differences may be found within and between settlements in the same city, not to mention among cities within a country and among cities in different countries. Each informal area has good and bad neighborhoods; relatively high-valued and low-valued areas; an uneven distribution of whatever services are available; and properties with different types of tenure rights. The income levels of many families in informal areas also are variable and in some cases are well above those of families in formal areas who are typically expected to pay for certain publicly provided services and benefits.

In comparing the archipelago of informal settlements distributed within formal neighborhoods in Latin America, property price gradients have been found to be uncorrelated, revealing altogether different market forces. Although both formal and informal areas are subject to vigorous land markets, the intervening price determinants are of different orders of magnitude. As mentioned above, regulatory freedoms, as well as longstanding informal networks that support the exchange of intangible benefits, affect property values. These realities must be taken into account when designing regularization programs that can offer positive reform of traditional practices.

There is also a need to adjust the programs to the different conditions of newly occupied areas and long-established settlements in consolidated areas. A clearer chain of market transactions can be traced in the newer occupations, whereas there is usually no linear succession of transactions in older areas. Furthermore, established settlements reflect a complex overlay of informally defined rights and transactions, such as rooftops sold to a third party as buildable “land,” which in turn may give rise to an additional living space. It is by no means clear whether regularization programs should start with recent occupations, where the costs of upgrading are lower and degrees of freedom are greater, or with older, consolidated areas that present more pressing social consequences, but where some legal rights may already exist.

4. Tolerance of Informality

Despite all the negative implications, public authorities have tolerated informal urban development processes, whether because of neglect, political convenience, ambiguous actions or even direct promotion of informal occupations. There is, however, little understanding that such tolerance generates rights over time and little information about the extremely high costs, both absolute and relative, of what is involved in upgrading programs. At the same time, tolerance of informal occupations is accompanied by a growing acceptance by both public authorities and public opinion that consolidated settlements should be upgraded with services, equipment and infrastructure. A recent study conducted by Cities Alliance in Brazil shows that the decision to regularize an irregular settlement is often made more quickly than the decision to approve a new regular settlement (six months versus two or three years).

This official tolerance also applies to the acceptance of “second-class solutions” for “second-class citizens” and often results in the early deterioration of upgraded areas. The combination of poor-quality materials and low-cost, unconventional techniques used in upgraded areas, as well as greater pressure on the existing infrastructure because of increased densification, renders the infrastructure obsolete and incurs high maintenance costs. Moreover, upgraded areas usually are not properly integrated into the municipal fiscal system. Throughout the region, the fiscal irresponsibility of municipal administrators is aggravated further by their failure to take responsibility for the broader scope of territorial development, as well as for their negligence or at best paternalistic attitude toward these regularized settlements.

5. Expectations and Land Values

Regularization programs to date have addressed a very small percentage of existing informal settlements, and as a result the vast majority of people living informally have not benefited from any type of public intervention. Furthermore, many regularization programs have been formulated without a proper understanding of the causes of informality, and they often deliver counterproductive results that contribute to the process of increasing socio-spatial segregation.

The mere expectation of upgrading puts a premium value on the land designated for improvements, thus significantly impacting prices in the informal market. The higher the expectation that an area will be regularized in the future, the higher the premium on that land and the higher the market demand for lower-priced subdivisions elsewhere. This suggests two approaches to upgrading: comprehensive programs for everyone in a few places coordinated with policies to change future expectations about cost recovery schemes; or partial upgrading in all informal areas of the city so expectations about market activity will be more balanced and consistent. The importance of integrating upgraded areas into municipal fiscal systems is not yet properly understood.

6. Isolated and Fragmented Policies

Public intervention in informal settlements through regularization programs has been promoted in an isolated, sectoral way without the necessary integration between such programs and the wider context of urban land management policies that have a direct bearing on such settlements. These policies include construction of social housing; rehabilitation of dilapidated urban centers; occupation of vacant areas and buildings; broader spatial allocation of public investments in urban infrastructure and services; modernization of tax collections and cadastres; and public-private partnerships. Moreover, most regularization programs have been limited to residential areas and have rarely been extended to informal industrial and commercial businesses, vacant public buildings and land in central areas, or informal settlements in rural areas.

At all levels of government, regularization programs have been marked by structural fragmentation— within programs, between secretariats and ministries, and among national, state and local levels—and as a result existing resources are often misspent or fail to reach all intended beneficiaries. The programs also have suffered from a lack of administrative continuity due mostly to changes in local political contexts. Rather than supplementing other initiatives, regularization programs often absorb much of the (limited) financial capacity of local municipalities, causing other social housing programs to be sacrificed or neglected. This problem has its origins in both the broad credit lines opened by national and international multilateral agencies and the absence of a requirement that local administrations match the financial burden of the program with efforts to expand their own revenue sources. In general, credit lines for regularization programs have been established without careful consideration of the financial capabilities of municipalities.

7. Lack of Financial Resources

As if the above problems were not enough, regularization programs have not been supported by adequate financial resources. The budgetary provisions are not compatible with the proposed and sometimes ambitious objectives, and often there are no specific funds for the programs. Revenues resulting from urban planning operations (such as earmarking resources from the sale of building rights in formal and high-income areas) have not been properly used to support upgrading. Resources from international agencies have been poorly spent, especially because there has not been a rigorous evaluation of the programs, nor a firm demand that their targets or objectives are fully accomplished. In addition, there are no adequate micro-credit policies in place to support or encourage community organizations.

8. Dissociation Between Upgrading and Legalization

Although it could be argued that illegality is a consequence of the insufficient supply of serviced land at affordable prices, in the vast majority of regularization programs the greater emphasis on upgrading has been dissociated from housing improvement and socioeconomic programs aimed at integrating communities, as well as from specific policies to legalize areas and plots. The components of upgrading and legalization have been conceived as if they were separate processes, or, frequently, as if legalization were an automatic result of the upgrading process. Most upgrading programs seem to fall short of what is required for land occupations to be legalized in the first place. As a result, those few programs that have reached the legalization stage have had to invent legal-political solutions, which often do not reflect the urban conditions actually in force in the area.

Despite the publicity given to regularization programs, the number of titles that actually result in a document issued by the property registration office is disappointingly low. The complexities imposed by law and the resistance and conservative attitudes of notaries and registration offices have been identified as some of the most critical bottlenecks to overcome. It should be added that most families, once they receive a title recognizing their legitimate right to their property, simply do not bother to complete the registration process, often because they do not understand its legal overtones or because it is too expensive or cumbersome. This situation has led to an outcry for the simplification of titling and registration systems and an associated need to disempower the existing bureaucratic entities.

9.The Importance of Titling

Given these problems, few programs have reached the legalization stage, and even fewer have achieved the registration of legalized plots. Perhaps because of that failure, many analysts have come to believe that titles are not important, that the mere perception of security of tenure would suffice. Although it is true that such a perception is indeed the main factor that encourages people to start investing in their houses, titling is important for two reasons: the personal interests of the occupiers (security of tenure, protection against forced eviction, domestic conflicts, marital separation, inheritance, problems with neighbors, access to an address and to forms of credit); and the interest of the city as a whole, since legal titling can contribute to the stabilization of land markets and allow for more rational and better articulated forms of public intervention.

There is still great resistance to land titling programs, especially on the part of the judiciary and the general public. However, it is important to note that individual beneficiaries of titling programs often do not have a full understanding of the protections and limitations of their title—What is it good for? Why does one need to actually register the title? All this suggests that educational programs for both city officials and residents should accompany the introduction of any regularization programs.

In addition, there has been little reflection on the implications of the kinds of instruments used to legalize plots. The emphasis placed on individual freehold titles has ignored the need for collective legal solutions for collective social problems; whenever such legal instruments have been used, they have not been introduced in a way that renders the new legal order compatible with the existing urban order and with the legal implications of the instruments. Most existing legal options have not been fully explored and generally lack creativity. Moreover, a consistent effort has yet to be made to have the new legal instruments fully validated by credit agencies, and by society at large.

10. The Fallacy of Popular Participation

The political quality of regularization programs has varied enormously, but in general the processes of popular participation in formulating and implementing the programs have been of little significance. This situation has been further aggravated by the creation of artificial forms of participation as a result of demands from financing agencies. The designed mechanisms for popular participation are in general a sheer formality, if not a farce from the outset. Very few programs have assimilated solutions proposed by the affected community. The political-institutional and cultural framework within which most regularization programs have been formed, along with the constraints imposed by the way these programs are financed, virtually eliminates any room for a truly effective public role, since public participation normally implies major challenges to the status quo. Regularization programs are more often perceived as solutions from or for the establishment than as a response to the real needs of the majority of the low-income population.

11. Compatible Scale, Patterns and Rights

Perhaps the main problem with regularization programs is the difficulty in making the scale of the interventions compatible with the technical, urban and environmental patterns proposed for the settlements, as well as with the nature of the rights to be recognized for the occupiers. These factors of scale, patterns and rights have to be discussed together to guarantee the sustainability of the programs and their impact on reality.

12. The After-effects of Regularization Programs

After an area is upgraded or a settlement is legalized, the public authorities normally do not maintain their presence in the areas. They should perform many important functions, from monitoring and evaluating the maintenance of installed equipment (notably water and sewage systems) to creating new guidelines or rules governing new occupations. As a result of the absence of official oversight and intervention, many areas rapidly begin to deteriorate. Moreover, the legitimization provided by the regularization program may make neighboring (originally formal) areas more prone to being “contaminated” by new informal land use practices. In general, regularization programs have not led to the promised urban, social and cultural integration of upgraded areas, and the informal areas remain stigmatized as second-rate long after they have been upgraded. The idea that regularized areas are placed in a new, virtuous trajectory rarely survives beyond the original documents setting the justifications for the program.

13. Balancing Individual Freedoms and Public Functions

In spite of their concern with the need to guarantee that the beneficiaries of public intervention are indeed the occupiers of informal settlements, regularization programs have not met a proper balance between respect for individual rights and freedoms and the programs’ public functions (the recognition of the social right to housing and the need to set aside urban areas for that purpose). Frequently the adopted legal solutions embed restrictions intending to freeze the mobility process within the areas (affecting terms of sale, acquisition, rent and so forth), which only helps to generate more informality.

The strategy of focusing on an area or social group seems to ignore the very nature and origins of informality, which is in fact a Catch-22 situation. The lack of sufficient finances in most programs would, on one hand, suggest that beneficiaries should not be able to cash in their benefits and move on to a new informal occupation to be similarly regularized in the future. On the other hand, the cost of monitoring and controlling such practices may be too high, if not unfeasible. Restrictions on transactions would simply generate new kinds of informal arrangements.

Interestingly, very few regularization programs actually accommodate or adjust to the potential upward and downward mobility of the affected occupants. They are formulated with a static community in mind. Intra-urban mobility, particularly among informal settlements and between formal and informal areas, is not well understood and thus is largely ignored. A possible way out of this conundrum would be to establish a cost-recovery scheme or value capture mechanism at the very beginning of planning for a new regularization program.

Conclusion

Regularization programs are typically not formulated with well-defined goals and timetables, and the problem is made worse by the lack of suitable evaluation indicators. In short, the declared objectives of regularization programs in Latin America (promotion of security of tenure and socio-spatial integration) have not been translated into an adequate combination of a comprehensive diagnosis, effective instruments and a clear implementation strategy, not to mention deficiencies in management capacity. As a result, the Latin American experience with regularization so far can not be considered fully successful.

It may be said, however, that regularization programs have shown merit in raising public awareness about the legitimacy of claims for more effective and comprehensive responses to the needs of a significant and growing group of citizens now excluded from the formal socioeconomic system. These programs have enabled some of the urban poor to remain in central, serviced areas of Latin American cities and have improved the livelihood and conditions of those living in regularized settlements, notwithstanding this discussion of their shortcomings. Given the cruel dynamics of socio-spatial segregation in the region, this fact is in itself of great importance.

Edésio Fernandes is a part-time lecturer in the Development Planning Unit of University College London.

Martim O. Smolka is senior fellow and director of the Lincoln Institute’s Program on Latin America and the Caribbean.

Related Land Lines Articles

Angel, Shlomo, and Douglas Keare. 2002. Housing policy reform in global perspective. April: 8–11.

Calderon, Julio. 2002. The mystery of credit. April: 5–8.

Fernandes, Edésio. 2002. The influence of de Soto’s The Mystery of Capital. January: 5–8.

———. 2002. Faculty profile. July: 12–13.

Smolka, Martim O. 2003. Informality, urban poverty and land market prices. January: 4–7.

Smolka, Martim O., and Laura Mullahy. 2003. A decade of changes: A retrospective of the Latin America program. October: 8–12.

Figure 1:

Dos and Don’ts of Regularization Programs

Dos

• Understand and plan the city as a whole before designing a regularization strategy, which should be central to the overall urban policy
• Involve all stakeholders in deciding where and how to insert regularization programs
• Consider regularization programs as part of a broader social policy aimed at promoting social integration
• Maintain a state presence after the regularization program is concluded, by incorporating the regularized areas into the city’s cadastres and taxation system
• Disseminate from the outset the objectives and goals of the program and interventions, and translate them into corresponding legal rights
• Admit from the outset that there may be more than one way of doing things
• Design and provide vigorous preventive programs alongside the regularization programs, which are essentially curative
• Recognize the right to be different
• Recognize that the cost of not accessing a service is often higher than providing it
• Recognize that occupants of informal areas have legitimate rights to the city
• Be sensitive to issues of gender (woman-headed households are more permanent)
• Contemplate the existence of more than one mode of tenure regularization, including collective legal solutions to collective social problems
• Maintain unity across projects, programs and strategies
• Include the cost of not regularizing when evaluating the effectiveness of programs
• Intervene with the support of geo-referenced information monitoring systems

Don’ts

• Treat informality as an exception or formulate regularization programs as isolated or sectoral policies in a single branch of public administration
• Glorify informality as a solution for an allegedly marginal social group
• Provide titles but not services
• Ignore the existence of a vibrant market in pricing all benefits provided
• Create false expectations in the context of unavailable funds and resources
• Restrain the mobility of families
• Fail to prevent and repress new illegal activities
• Ignore irregularities in high-income areas or housing
• Ignore the payment capacity of occupants in informal settlements or the need for public-private partnerships to fund regularization programs
• Make urbanistic norms and regulations too flexible without proper legal support
• Contain market demand or supply pressures artificially
• Fail to recognize that upgrading and legalization programs must be conceived together
• Disseminate the notion that all existing situations can be regularized and fail to make clear that regularization necessarily lives together with removal in some cases
• Consider regularization programs as economically unfeasible
• Start monitoring after most upgrading work is done to magnify positive improvements

Margaret Dewar is the Emil Lorch Professor of Architecture and Urban Planning at the Taubman College of Architecture and Urban Planning at the University of Michigan. She directs the Detroit Community Partnership Center through which University of Michigan faculty and students work with community-based organizations and city agencies on community-identified neighborhood issues. Dewar is also faculty director of the Ginsberg Center for Community Service and Learning, whose mission is to involve faculty, students, staff, and community partners in learning together through community service and civic participation in a diverse democratic society. She and her students have worked on brownfield redevelopment with numerous organizations in Detroit and Flint.

Dewar’s research is concerned with American government effectiveness in intervening in microeconomic systems to deal with economic distress such as troubled industries, declining regions, distressed cities, and poverty. She has written books and articles on industrial policy, rural economic development programs, and urban revitalization. Her current research focuses on ways to address the barriers to equitable redevelopment of older industrial cities. She is writing about systems for moving tax-reverted property to new uses, the role of place-committed coalitions in redevelopment of brownfields, and indicators of early neighborhood decline and revitalization that can facilitate public intervention.

Dewar has a Ph.D. in Urban Studies and Planning from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a Master of City Planning from Harvard University. She received her undergraduate degree from Wellesley College.

Land Lines: How did you become involved in and concerned about brownfield redevelopment?

Margaret Dewar: I had done quite a lot of research on the effects of state and local economic development incentives on business location and expansion decisions. I also had taught courses where students worked on plans for urban redevelopment with nonprofit organizations in Detroit.

The calls for subsidies for brownfield redevelopment grew louder in the mid-1990s as states reformed their laws about cleanup requirements and liability. Given my background in economic development and urban redevelopment, I thought those calls sounded inauthentic. The campaigns for cleanup subsidies were essentially claiming that if the subsidies were provided, redevelopment of contaminated property would occur, implying that the only barrier to land reuse was the dirty dirt.

However, urban redevelopment is a very complex process that involves the assembly of land owned by many people, relocation of residents, demolition of structures, removal and replacement of infrastructure, and adherence to or release from regulatory restrictions and requirements—to name a few of the issues. Contamination could not be the only barrier, and, I thought, it was not even likely to be the most important one.

Further, state and local incentives for economic development rarely change business location and expansion decisions. I suspected that brownfield incentives would have a similar effect. Therefore, I started to do research on the determinants of brownfield redevelopment to place this kind of development in the broader urban redevelopment context.

Land Lines: How has your brownfield research evolved over the last decade?

Margaret Dewar: As I watched community development corporations (CDCs) in Detroit struggle with redevelopment, I became interested in whether place-committed coalitions were more or less effective in brownfield redevelopment than other kinds of developers.

Place-committed coalitions are the alliances of CDCs, nonprofit housing corporations, neighborhood organizations, and determined residents who are going to stay in place, no matter what. Unlike many other developers or businesses, they will not move to the suburbs because development is easier and more profitable there. They are often the only developers interested in the poorest neighborhoods, and any hope for a better physical environment in those places rests with them. Unlike private developers, they are not seeking especially profitable redevelopment projects; if they can break even, much of the return on their investment is seen in the creation of a better neighborhood.

When place-committed coalitions succeed in redevelopment, they may create market conditions that are attractive to private developers and therefore spur further redevelopment, or they may demonstrate market potential through bellwether projects. As a result, nonprofit developers are especially important in making urban redevelopment succeed.

However, I found that these coalitions were rarely successful in brownfield redevelopment, although development on contaminated land did not seem particularly different from other kinds of redevelopment. Now most of my own research projects and quite a few of the student projects I supervise are concerned with factors that lead to positive reuse of abandoned property in cities, especially reuse by nonprofit developers.

Land Lines: How do you involve your students in this work?

Margaret Dewar: I get many research ideas from working with CDCs, nonprofit housing corporations, and public agencies on plans for brownfield reuse, and I am able to bring these ideas into planning practice on specific projects. Twice each year I teach a course where advanced urban planning students develop plans with organizations working on strengthening their city neighborhoods and help advance the organizations’ efforts.

For example, my students and I worked with the Genesee County Brownfield Redevelopment Authority (BRA) and the Genesee County Land Bank to inventory brownfields in Flint, Michigan. We also helped to prioritize sites for attention based the goals of the BRA and the land bank, which are now following up on the recommendations in the plan with a neighborhood nonprofit and a group of diverse property owners.

Another team of students worked with a neighborhood nonprofit organization in southwest Detroit to identify brownfields and determine which sites have the greatest priority for reuse. Although the staff praised the plan, the organization has not been able to act on the recommendations. The contrast in these two experiences, along with the literature on determinants of nonprofit developers’ success, suggests numerous hypotheses about what helps and hinders the reuse of brownfield sites in such situations.

Land Lines: What is your most recent project with the Lincoln Institute?

Margaret Dewar: With Kris Wernstedt at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, I am looking at some of these hypotheses about why CBOs are successful or not in reusing vacant, abandoned, and contaminated property. Kris is looking at the work of CBOs in Baltimore, Portland, and Denver, and I am studying their reuse of such property in Detroit, Cleveland, and Flint. Because the demand for land in my set of three cities is similar, the comparison holds the market constant and promises to reveal institutional, political, and legal factors that are important in CBOs’ results.

The three midwestern cities differ in the strength of their nonprofit development sectors. Cleveland has an active network of nonprofit developers that have constructed thousands of units of housing over the last 15 years. Detroit has a maturing nonprofit development sector that is growing in its capacity to do projects, but Flint has very little such activity.

These differences can help reveal factors that matter and the ways they matter in redevelopment success. For instance, a commonly cited force in the success of Cleveland’s nonprofit developers is the commitment of foundations to provide funding for redevelopment. However, Flint also has foundations with large amounts of resources committed to that city. What are the differences in how the foundations in each city work that might help explain these differences in nonprofit development activity and effectiveness?

Land Lines: How can CBOs be most effective in brownfields redevelopment?

Margaret Dewar: Kris Wernstedt and I pose four groups of hypotheses or framing perspectives in our research on CBOs’ effectiveness in redeveloping brownfields. First, the special features of CBOs—their shortage of funds, small number of professional staff, lack of skills for redevelopment, and other issues—may interfere with implementing successful projects to reuse vacant, abandoned, and/or contaminated sites. CBO staff may especially lack the background to take on projects that involve contaminated sites.

Second, legal and political issues may interfere with the transfer of tax-reverted property to nonprofit developers for redevelopment projects, even though this land is essential for projects to go forward.

Third, weak local institutional settings may leave CBOs without adequate political or financial support for undertaking projects to reuse vacant, abandoned, and/or contaminated properties. Local government, financial institutions, foundations, and intermediaries may not provide sufficient backing to help CBOs over the substantial hurdles.

Fourth, federal and state legal and regulatory structures and financing provisions for contaminated sites in particular may interfere with CDCs’ efforts to reuse such property.

Another factor is that the demand for land in different cities affects the approach and efficacy of CBOs in redeveloping that land. In cities or neighborhoods with strong market demand, CBOs may have little opportunity to obtain such property for redevelopment because they are competing with private developers. On the other hand, in cities with weak demand for land, CBOs may struggle to find tenants or buyers for redeveloped property.

Land Lines: How is your work with the Lincoln Institute helping to broaden the scope of brownfield research?

Margaret Dewar: I continue to believe that contamination is rarely the determining factor in whether land can be reused or not, especially now that cleanup standards and liability risks have changed. By placing contamination in the larger context of the redevelopment of vacant, abandoned, and contaminated property in cities, we gain a better understanding of the complexity of redevelopment in general and of the kinds of changes that would help CBOs be more effective in remaking cities in ways that can improve the quality of life in distressed areas.

Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 7 del CD-ROM Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.

Nuevas evidencias de Brasil indican que la regulación del uso del suelo y las normas de construcción pueden reforzar otros factores que contribuyen a la ocupación informal e irregular del suelo urbano. No es posible explicar del todo la magnitud y la persistencia de la informalidad en las ciudades de América Latina con los índices de pobreza (en descenso), la insuficiente inversión pública en vivienda social o en infraestructura urbana (en aumento), ni siquiera por la tolerancia del gobierno ante determinadas prácticas oportunistas de urbanizadores y pobladores (The Economist 2007). Si bien estos factores son sin duda importantes, el uso inadecuado del suelo y la regulación de la construcción también parecen jugar un papel en la persistencia del problema. Se puede aducir como corolario que un marco regulador alternativo puede ayudar a paliar la informalidad en los mercados del suelo urbano.

La relación entre informalidad y normas de vivienda excesivas no es nueva en la bibliografía (Turner 1972); y la relación económica entre la regulación del uso del suelo y la elasticidad de la oferta de vivienda fue propuesta por Ellickson (1977). La novedad es la aplicación del mismo marco utilizado para entender la dinámica del precio de la vivienda en los Estados Unidos a los países en desarrollo. Los pocos trabajos empíricos en economía que tratan de relacionar la regulación y el uso del suelo no han trazado de manera formal un modelo de la sustitución entre los mercados formales e informales. En consecuencia, no utilizaron las diferencias entre los dos mercados como sus variables principales.

El alcance del problema

La informalidad y la precariedad de la vivienda son grandes preocupaciones en los países en desarrollo. Según estimaciones de las Naciones Unidas, más de mil millones de personas viven en asentamientos informales, que representan un 32 por ciento de la población urbana de todo el mundo (UN Habitat 2006). En América Latina, el porcentaje de vivienda irregular medido por indicadores observables como el régimen de propiedad o la conexión con el sistema de alcantarillado está disminuyendo en algunos países, si bien en proporción desigual. Sin tener en cuenta la disputa continua sobre la forma correcta de medir la informalidad, en la mayoría de las ciudades de América Latina el problema sigue siendo de proporciones considerables, y es necesario comprender mejor su dinámica a fin de recomendar una política de vivienda razonable.

En la práctica, los indicadores conmensurables de informalidad que se basan en la ausencia de títulos de propiedad o el acceso a infraestructura y servicios son más fáciles de obtener que los basados en la falta de cumplimiento de la regulación del uso del suelo o las normas de construcción. La pobreza (en todas sus dimensiones) y la inversión pública insuficiente (en vivienda social, infraestructura y servicios) son las explicaciones más comunes de la persistencia de la informalidad. Pero también aumenta la percepción de que los mercados del suelo urbano en general y las normas y la regulación urbanística en particular son factores relevantes que contribuyen a ella.

El elevado costo de las transacciones en los mercados del suelo urbano se incrementa debido a la burocracia, la falta de información o su poca claridad, y las prácticas discriminatorias, así como por otras discordancias funcionales del mercado derivadas de la estructura de propiedad del suelo, las prácticas especulativas y de monopolio, y la regulación del uso del suelo y de la construcción, que dificultan el cumplimiento de las normas por parte de las familias con bajos ingresos. Estos factores aumentan la ineficacia del mercado y sostienen la informalidad.

En este artículo argumentamos que la regulación del uso del suelo y de la construcción administrada por los planificadores urbanos y por los funcionarios a nivel local puede contribuir efectivamente a la incidencia de la informalidad. Entre el 20 por ciento de municipios brasileños que redujeron la pobreza en mayor medida a lo largo de los últimos nueve años, un 23 por ciento también redujo drásticamente el número de viviendas sin título de propiedad, pero el 24 por ciento aumentó la informalidad en más de un 3,2 por ciento, el ritmo más rápido observado en todo el país (IBGE 1991; 2000). Tales diferencias de rendimiento del mercado de la vivienda en el segmento de bajos ingresos no puede explicarse únicamente por la incidencia de la pobreza, el ritmo de la urbanización y el crecimiento de la población u otros medidores a nivel macro.

Las ventajas e inconvenientes de la regulación urbana

La regulación urbana beneficia a las políticas de vivienda porque soluciona un problema de derechos de propiedad. Regular la distancia entre viviendas, por ejemplo, ayuda a proteger los derechos de privacidad de los demás. La regulación ayuda además a solucionar problemas de externalidad o efectos indirectos. Por ejemplo, no regular las anomalías de vivienda podría dar lugar a problemas de salud pública debido al aumento de humedad, la falta de luz o a problemas graves de seguridad. En este caso, la regulación elimina las efectos indirectos negativos y aumenta el bienestar general de los residentes.

La regulación puede tener también un efecto beneficioso al reducir el vacío de información en el mercado. Si no existen normas de construcción previamente definidas, los urbanizadores pueden aprovecharse de los compradores inexpertos y cobrarles en exceso por una vivienda que es insegura, o podrían venderles un terreno en una nueva urbanización que no proporciona servicios adecuados, como ocurre con frecuencia.

No obstante, la regulación también tiene aspectos potencialmente negativos. Una consecuencia es el inconveniente de procedimientos complicados que pueden conducir a la corrupción. Por ejemplo, no es poco frecuente que se tarde más de cuatro años en emitir una licencia de subdivisión. En su estudio clásico, Mayo y Angel (1993) asocian el complicado marco regulador de Malasia con funcionarios corruptos que intentan capturar rentas de la población a cambio de relajar las normas, agilizar la concesión de licencias o permitir excepciones al reglamento.

En segundo lugar, algunas regulaciones − como por ejemplo las ordenanzas de zonificación − pueden dar lugar a una segregación por ingresos en determinados vecindarios al establecer niveles mínimos que elevan los precios y disuaden efectivamente a las familias con ingresos más bajos de competir en el mercado formal. Los precios elevados de la vivienda pueden deberse a la gran demanda, pero también a la poca elasticidad de la oferta provocada por tales regulaciones y restricciones exclusivas. Malpezzi (1996) ha resaltado el aspecto de exclusión que tiene la regulación del uso del suelo en los Estados Unidos, que limita la integración de residentes con altos y bajos ingresos con la intención específica de evitar las subvenciones para las escuelas y otros servicios públicos locales.

Biderman (2008) ofrece evidencia sobre Brasil para apoyar el argumento propuesto de que las familias pobres a menudo eligen viviendas informales (sin título) por encima de las formales (con título) como respuesta a las regulaciones que exigen costos adicionales o “credenciales” para poder acceder al mercado formal y/o que reducen la flexibilidad del diseño en la construcción de viviendas. Este aspecto exclusivo de la regulación urbana es real en Brasil en cuanto a la infraestructura y los servicios públicos porque en cualquier caso rara vez se facilitan éstos en los asentamientos informales. De hecho, hasta 1988 la ley impedía oficialmente a los municipios facilitar servicios a los terrenos ocupados de forma irregular, aunque en la práctica algunos sí los facilitaron.

La economía política en la que se basan los aspectos de exclusión de la regulación tiene un precedente duradero en la historia de Brasil. El sistema Sesmarias de derechos de propiedad del suelo, instaurado por el rey Fernando I de Portugal en 1375, proporcionaba un régimen de propiedad mediante otorgamiento real (para la élite) o mediante una prueba de uso productivo del suelo (para quienes tenían medios de explotación del mismo). Los municipios de Brasil siguen aplicando las regulaciones urbanísticas en algunas partes de la ciudad, pero no en otras (Rolnik 1997). La retirada en lugar de la mejora de los asentamientos informales en los vecindarios del centro de la ciudad, con alto nivel de ingresos, es un caso oportuno. Este doble estándar permite alojar a los pobres en determinadas zonas sin invertir en infraestructura y provisión de servicios.

Otras razones de la presencia de regulaciones poco razonables en las ciudades de Brasil son la búsqueda de rentas por parte de los funcionarios que provoca la resistencia a la reforma reguladora, y la respuesta del regulador a la presión de los urbanizadores para mantener a las familias con bajos ingresos alejadas de ciertas zonas. Existen muchos ejemplos ilustrativos de esa corrupción y connivencia en Brasil en la bibliografía sobre planificación urbana.

Asimismo, los reguladores tienden a ignorar los efectos no intencionados de las ordenanzas sobre el uso del suelo y la construcción. No es poco frecuente que un municipio adopte simplemente las normas y las regulaciones urbanísticas de otro municipio con el fin de cumplir las órdenes federales sobre planes maestros, por poner un ejemplo. Esta práctica sólo aumenta la probabilidad de que se produzcan efectos negativos en el mercado de la vivienda porque permite que se perpetúen las políticas reguladores inadecuadas.

Un ejemplo del impacto de las regulaciones urbanísticas en el costo de la vivienda y potencialmente en la informalidad en Brasil es el Urbanizador Social, una iniciativa pública ideada para tentar a los urbanizadores informales para que cumplan con las regulaciones sobre el uso del suelo. El primer caso llevado a cabo con éxito en São Leopoldo en 2008, el urbanizador solicitó al municipio la reducción del tamaño mínimo de parcela de 300m2 a 160m2 con el fin de ofrecer opciones de vivienda más asequibles. A cambio, el urbanizador aceptó algunas imposiciones del municipio en forma de inversión directa en infraestructura y servicios urbanos (Damasio et al., próxima publicación).

Efecto de la regulación sobre la informalidad

En la década de 1990 los municipios de Brasil promulgaron diversas regulaciones sobre el uso del suelo y la construcción que pueden agruparse en cuatro tipos principales: normas de parcelación, zonificación, límites del crecimiento urbano y códigos de construcción. Algunos municipios adoptaron algunas de estas regulaciones en la década de los ochenta o incluso antes, otros lo hicieron durante la primera mitad de la década de 2000, y muchos otros aún no han adoptado todas o ni siquiera una de ellas. Estas diferencias temporales en cuanto a su adopción ofrecen una oportunidad analítica única para intentar aislar el papel desempeñado por la regulación de otros eventos que afectan al mercado de la vivienda.

Idealmente, el impacto de la regulación en el mercado de la vivienda debería evaluarse comparando municipios que son idénticos a excepción de que uno de ellos adopta una regulación particular mientras que el otro no. Sin embargo, encontrar municipios idénticos no siempre es factible. Un procedimiento estándar para solventar parcialmente este problema es utilizar los resultados de los municipios que no han adoptado la regulación a fin de estimar lo que habrían experimentado los municipios que sí la adoptaron si no hubieran introducido una regulación. La diferencia entre el resultado de adoptar o no adoptar una regulación sugeriría una estimación superficial del impacto de la regulación en la variación en la proporción de la informalidad.

Nuestro estudio aprovechó las oportunidades que ofrecía el caso de Brasil. En primer lugar, la diferencia cronológica en la adopción de regulaciones entre los municipios permite establecer comparaciones entre ellos. En segundo lugar, la información disponible en el censo y otros estudios a nivel nacional es extensa, e incluye la fecha de promulgación de la regulación, el estado de régimen de propiedad declarado por los propietarios de viviendas, y una cifra generosa de variables de control que incluyen la población, los ingresos y el nivel de pobreza. En tercer lugar, hay datos disponibles sobre más de 2.000 municipios, lo que permite realizar un análisis estadístico significativo. Tener una oportunidad como ésta de investigar los asentamientos informales es poco común, y es una de las principales razones por las que es tan difícil encontrar en la bibliografía pruebas contundentes sobre los factores determinantes de la informalidad.

Dada la naturaleza duradera de una vivienda, tanto las viviendas formales como informales se miden como proporción de todo el conjunto de viviendas, en lugar de como un número designado de viviendas. La medida de la informalidad utilizada en este estudio es la proporción de viviendas sin título de propiedad, que se define como la ocupación del terreno sin ostentar un título de propiedad declarada por propietarios de vivienda que respondieron a una pregunta en un estudio del censo sobre si eran o no propietarios del terreno en el que está ubicada su vivienda.

Según esta definición, la proporción de viviendas sin título de propiedad en las ciudades brasileñas descendió en la década de los noventa, debido en parte a los cambios institucionales asociados a la Constitución de 1988, que redujo de 25 a 5 años el tiempo necesario para legitimizar el derecho de posesión adversa de la ocupación de un terreno urbano no reclamado. Los terratenientes se volvieron menos condescendientes con respecto a tolerar la ocupación del terreno, tal y como se observa en la disminución de las invasiones de terreno y el aumento de las adquisiciones de mercado (aunque por medios informales) como la forma predominante de adquirir terrenos utilizada por los pobres. El descenso en la tendencia a la informalidad también se asocia a la estabilización económica, el fortalecimiento de las finanzas municipales locales, la revitalización del mercado hipotecario y el lento descenso de los índices de pobreza observados durante la década. El impacto de los programas de regularización, aunque su alcance es limitado, es otro factor que influye en la reducción de los asentamientos informales.

La Figura 7.2.5.1 (en anexo) presenta proyecciones utilizando parámetros estimados que comparan la disminución en el porcentaje de viviendas sin título de propiedad, que comienza en un 17,5 por ciento en 1985, con unos límites superior e inferior basados en una desviación estándar. La línea negra (naranja) de la cifra representa la tendencia exponencial en los municipios que no han promulgado regulaciones sobre el uso del suelo o sobre la construcción. Las líneas de color gris (morado o azul verdoso) representan los límites superior (más regulación) e inferior (menos regulación) de los municipios que promulgaron regulaciones en 1991, cuando la proporción de viviendas sin título de propiedad alcanzó el 14 por ciento.

Una forma de interpretar estos resultados es fijar un objetivo deseado en términos de proporción de viviendas sin título de propiedad, y después evaluar cuánto tiempo se necesita para alcanzar este objetivo dados los cambios regulatorios en los municipios. Si el objetivo es reducir la proporción de viviendas sin título de propiedad del 14 al 12 por ciento, entonces una ciudad que no promulgara regulaciones que afectaran al mercado formal de la vivienda habría alcanzado este objetivo en el año 1996, mientras que una ciudad de iguales características que promulgara regulaciones en 1991 habría tardado, en promedio, de dos a diez años más en alcanzar el mismo objetivo. En otras palabras, el plazo de tiempo será mayor en los municipios más regulados.

Los resultados muestran claramente un impacto significativo de la regulación sobre la informalidad y refutan la noción de que los mercados de vivienda formales e informales son independientes. Parece que la informalidad puede ser provocada por las mismas regulaciones que se aplican a los mercados formales, lo que significa que es incorrecto diseñar políticas circunscritas a las zonas informales. Aunque los resultados no siempre se estiman con gran precisión, las medidas de la regulación siempre tienen señales esperadas y sus niveles de confianza están siempre por encima del 81 por ciento. Asimismo, cuando comparamos los municipios que promulgaron regulaciones urbanas más cerca del año 2000, el impacto estimado sobre la informalidad disminuye como se esperaba, lo que demuestra coherencia con los resultados (Biderman 2008).

Perspectivas de futuro

El argumento y la evidencia presentados en este artículo sugieren que la regulación inadecuada en los países en desarrollo puede reducir las alternativas residenciales de las familias, incitándolas o presionándolas para buscar opciones informales. Las subvenciones podrían proporcionar una compensación adecuada a fin de mitigar los efectos de exclusión o las consecuencias imprevistas de determinadas regulaciones necesarias, al hacerlas aplicables a cada ciudadano. Pero en ausencia de tales subvenciones, los niveles de urbanización indebidamente elevados y las restricciones al uso del suelo podrían excluir a un grupo bastante numeroso. Por ejemplo, una norma de parcelación muy elevada (por ejemplo, un tamaño mínimo de parcela de 300m2 cuando los terrenos de 50m2 no son poco comunes) puede dar lugar a que existan grupos que viven en parcelas más grandes y otros en parcelas mucho más pequeñas. En lugar de garantizar niveles mínimos para todos, una norma como esta podría exacerbar las desigualdades.

Evidentemente, no se puede deducir que deberían eliminarse las regulaciones sobre la construcción y el uso del suelo. Las regulaciones desempeñan un papel importante en la creación de un entorno urbano mejor. No obstante, es necesario afrontar las consecuencias no deseadas de la inducción a la informalidad producto de los elevados precios de la vivienda. Una política de vivienda sensata debería tener en cuenta estos efectos indirectos. El desafío actual es cómo conservar los efectos indirectos positivos de las normas urbanísticas estimulando a la vez la construcción de viviendas asequibles. También se debería tener en cuenta el tema de cuántos efectos indirectos positivos pueden extraerse realmente de una regulación determinada.

Por ejemplo, el valor social del efecto indirecto externo generado por una restricción de la densidad podría no ser necesariamente mayor que el valor de la pérdida de bienestar asociada a una restricción en la oferta de suelo urbanizado. En efecto, podríamos argumentar sobre la medida en la que determinadas regulaciones aplicadas actualmente en los municipios de Brasil, proporcionan de hecho más privilegios de exclusión a determinados grupos o una burocracia flagrante y obstáculos de procedimiento que elevan los precios de la vivienda sin crear efectos indirectos positivos para el conjunto del municipio (Henderson 2007).

Ya a finales de la década de los ochenta, los planificadores urbanos de Brasil reconocieron que las normas y las regulaciones urbanísticas estaban aumentando los costos de urbanización y afectando a las viviendas sociales. A pesar de la falta de pruebas estadísticas, los profesionales se dieron cuenta de que los tamaños mínimos de parcela, los terrenos de estacionamiento obligatorios, los impedimentos a los usos mixtos (comerciales y residenciales), y otras regulaciones sobre el uso del suelo urbano no favorecían el aumento de la oferta de vivienda asequible.

Se adoptó un enfoque pragmático a fin de minimizar esas limitaciones a través de la noción ZEIS (Zona Especial de Interés Social), donde se flexibilizaban las regulaciones que incrementaban los costos con el objetivo de promover la oferta de viviendas asequibles. Las ZEIS se definen mayoritariamente de forma que coincidan con los límites de asentamientos ocupados existentes y los municipios las utilizan como herramienta para regularizar ocupaciones de suelo irregulares previas simplemente enunciando que el asentamiento no necesita cumplir las normas aplicables de forma general a las zonas urbanas del municipio. El inconveniente de esta medida paliativa es que el municipio ya no se ve obligado a intervenir en la zona puesto que, por definición, la zona ZEIS ya es conforme a la norma. En otras palabras, el doble estándar abre la vía para que el municipio ignore el problema más allá de la emisión de una ordenanza sobre zonificación.

En resumen, la reforma de la política de vivienda en Brasil exige actualmente un enfoque más amplio que estructure de forma conjunta los elementos de financiación, tecnología y gestión urbanística, y se aleje de la visión paternalista de ofrecer un cobijo o del enfoque limitado sobre los asentamientos informales. Hemos argumentado que el papel de la regulación del suelo urbano y de la construcción es un factor indispensable a tener en cuenta en cualquier intento de afrontar con seriedad el desafío que plantea la informalidad en Brasil y en otras ciudades del tercer mundo.

Referencias

Biderman, C. 2008. Informality in Brazil: Does urban land use and building regulation matter? Documento de trabajo. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Damasio, Claudia, Claudio Gutierrez, Gevaci Perfroni y Jacqueline Menegassi. Próxima publicación. Estudo de caso de urbanizaçao social no municipio de São Leopoldo. Documento de trabajo. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Ellickson, R. 1977. Suburban growth controls: An economic and legal analysis. Yale Law Journal 86 (3).

Henderson, J.V. 2007. The effect of residential land market regulations on urban welfare. Urban Research Symposium 2007. Banco Mundial, 14–16 de mayo.

IBGE (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica/Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics). 1991 y 2000. http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/

Malpezzi, S. 1996. Housing prices, externalities, and regulation in U.S. metropolitan areas. Journal of Housing Research 7(2): 209–241.

Mayo, S. y S. Angel. 1993. Housing: Enabling markets to work. A World Bank Policy Paper.

Rolnik, R. 1997. A cidade e a lei: Legislação, política urbana e territórios na cidade de São Paulo. São Paulo: Studio Nobel: Fapesp.

The Economist. 2007. Adios to poverty, hola to consumption. 16 de agosto. http://www.economist.com/world/la/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9645142&CFID=8338952&CFTOKEN=92529416

Turner, J.F.C. y R. Fichter. 1972. Freedom to build: Dweller control of the housing process. New York: The Macmillan Company.

UN Habitat. 2006. State of the world’s cities 2006. London: Earthscan y UN Habitat.

Sobre los autores

Ciro Biderman es Visiting Fellow del Lincoln Institute of Land Policy e investigador adjunto al Departamento de Planificación y Estudios Urbanísticos del Instituto de Tecnología de Massachusetts. Asimismo es profesor asociado en la Fudación Getulio Vargas e investigador asociado al Centro de Estudio de las Políticas y Economía del Sector Público (CEPESP/FGV) de São Paulo, Brasil (en licencia).

Martim Smolka es Senior Fellow y Director del Programa sobre América Latina y el Caribe del Lincoln Institute.

Anna Sant’Anna es investigadora asociada principal del Programa sobre América Latina y el Caribe del Lincoln Institute.

Ethan Seltzer is a professor in the Nohad A. Toulan School of Urban Studies and Planning at Portland State University. He previously served for six years as the director of the school, and prior to that for eleven years as the founding director of Portland State’s Institute of Portland Metropolitan Studies.

Before joining Portland State in 1992 he served as the land use supervisor for Metro, the regional government in the Portland area; assistant to Portland City Commissioner Mike Lindberg; assistant coordinator for the Southeast Uplift Neighborhood Program in Portland; and coordinator of the Drinking Water Project for the Oregon Environmental Council.

Seltzer received his Ph.D. in City and Regional Planning and Master of Regional Planning from the University of Pennsylvania. His doctoral dissertation examined the role of citizen participation in environmental planning. Current research interests include regional planning, regionalism, regional development, and planning in the Pacific Northwest.

In addition to his current work with the Lincoln Institute, his publications include chapters titled Maintaining the Working Landscape: The Portland Metro Urban Growth Boundary, in Regional Planning for Open Space, edited by Arnold van der Valk and Terry van Dijk (Routledge 2009); and It’s Not an Experiment: Regional Planning at Metro, 1990 to the Present, in The Portland Edge, edited by Connie Ozawa (Island Press 2004).

Land Lines: How did you become associated with the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy?

Ethan Seltzer: Regional planning has been at the center of my career for a long time. I used to be the land use supervisor for Metro, the regional government in the Portland metropolitan region. In the late 1980s we were just starting work on what is now the Region 2040 Growth Concept. Part of that work involved seeking out new ideas about planning, land use, land management, and related topics, and through that search, I started to engage with the Lincoln Institute. A few years later, I was part of a planning project organized through the Regional Plan Association in New York that brought U.S. and Japanese planners together. I met Armando Carbonell (chair of the Institute’s Department of Planning and Urban Form) through that process, and we have remained collaborators on a number of projects since then.

Land Lines: What was the first project you conducted for the Lincoln Institute?

Ethan Seltzer: The first one I recall had to do with re-establishing a dialogue around regional planning and building on the ideas put forth by the old Regional Plan Association of America going back to the 1920s. I was also a part of numerous Lincoln Institute seminars, including one held in Chicago on the relationships and interdependencies between cities and suburbs. The papers were published by the Institute in 2000 in the book Urban-Suburban Interdependencies, edited by Rosalind Greenstein and Wim Wiewel. Since then I have been involved in several Institute-sponsored projects and events, most recently in conjunction with the showing of the film Portland: Quest for the Livable City as part of the Making Sense of Place documentary film series.

Land Lines: How has your association with the Lincoln Institute influenced your research?

Ethan Seltzer: I think the Lincoln Institute is one of the only, maybe the only, institution that has consistently focused on the confluence of issues associated with planning practice, place, regionalism, and land use. There are few other places that address these issues in such a thoughtful, deliberate manner. The support that the Lincoln Institute provides for thinking and writing about these issues is part of what makes it possible for me to find both an audience and like-minded colleagues. There are other networks important to me as well, notably the connections provided by the Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning. Nonetheless, the Lincoln Institute is uniquely a forum for the things that I am most interested in and where I hope to contribute.

Land Lines: What are your current projects for the Lincoln Institute?

Ethan Seltzer: I am working on a book on regional planning in America with an explicit focus on practice. I teach courses in regional planning and, though there is an interesting literature on the reasons why regional planning might make sense and the stark challenges to pulling it off, there is not much information available regarding what regional planners do, and how regional planning is distinguished from other types of planning (i.e., city, urban, transportation).

With support from the Lincoln Institute, and in collaboration with coeditor Armando Carbonell, I was able to recruit a group of talented authors and put together a series of chapters that, we expect, will more completely present what gets done in the name of regional planning in the United States today. We also hope this project will provide a basis for better understanding the unique aspects of regional planning practice.

The working title for the book is American Regional Planning: Practice and Prospect. Coauthors include Tim Beatley, Robert Fishman, Kate Foster, John Fregonese and CJ Gabbe, Frank and Deborah Popper, Manuel Pastor and Chris Benner, Gerrit Knaap and Rebecca Lewis, Fritz Steiner, and Bob Yaro. The manuscript will be completed this fall and the book will be published in the spring of 2011.

Land Lines: Regional planning seems to be a really challenging idea in America. Why are you so interested in it?

Ethan Seltzer: You are absolutely right, but it’s often hard to find a place in the scheme of things for regions and regional planning. The history of America is told with broad, sweeping regions in mind—the South, New England, the West—but the history of planning in America is largely one of local institutions, states, and the federal government.

Regional planning, then, is both present at the outset and a latecomer to the planning game. The institutional turf is quite congested. Although the need for better regional coordination and planning actually predates the “invention” of modern city planning in America (consider that the Burnham Plan for Chicago was a regional plan), regional planning has never been able to mount a convincing challenge to the profoundly local emphasis of planning.

Still, it simply makes too much sense to put aside regional planning for long. One need not be a rocket scientist to recognize that many of the things we care about and depend on are not well managed or defined by local jurisdictions. When I worked as the land use supervisor for Metro in Portland, I was struck by the fact that everyone—rich, poor, and in-between—lived regional lives. That is, households in our region were working, socializing, recreating, worshipping, schooling, and sleeping in territories of their own devising, none of which corresponded to any single local jurisdiction. Consequently, planning by jurisdiction, which is the norm in Oregon and elsewhere, becomes a more complicated proposition. It really makes one wonder for whom the planning is intended. If it is simply about maintaining local property values, then we’ve both made that task overly complicated and are poorly serving a whole host of larger values, goals, and objectives.

However, the other thing that struck me while working for Metro is that if people don’t feel empowered to address the issues right in front of them when they walk out the front of their house or apartment building, then they will never relate to the kinds of things we are talking about at the regional scale. Local empowerment made regional planning and growth management possible. Local and regional, then, go hand in hand, and you cannot have one without the other.

Having worked at the regional level, served as president of my local planning commission, and provided planning assistance to neighborhood associations early in my career, I am familiar with the ongoing tensions between these scales—the scale at which we live in the region, and the scale at which we are empowered at the locality. I think this tension is always going to be present, and I am under no illusions that it will evaporate or that the region will “win” any time in the future.

Still, I, like others, keep coming back to the region because to ignore it is to give up on things that are important to our sense of place and quality of life. The region helps us understand the world and how it works, and makes one look deeply into the causal relationships that link us together and to the natural world. I guess the ecologist in me will never give up on that.

Land Lines: What other kinds of research topics have you been investigating?

Ethan Seltzer: I guess you could summarize my work under several headings. I have written about planning in Portland, particularly regional planning and the way that Metro developed a regional growth management plan. That work has been incorporated in publications and projects in the United States, Japan, and the Netherlands.

More recently, I have been engaged in the work of America 2050 on megaregions. I have provided information about Cascadia, the megaregion of the Pacific Northwest, and participated in several research seminars organized to further our understanding of the nature of megaregions, planning for megaregions, and the utility of that concept for better understanding issues associated with sustainability and competitiveness in the years ahead.

I have also worked with Connie Ozawa, a colleague at Portland State, on the kinds of skills needed by entry-level planners, and therefore the nature of the relationship between graduate planning education and planning practice. I am also working with colleagues at the University of Oregon and Oregon State University to investigate the dynamics underlying and opportunities for bridging the “urban/rural” divide in Oregon. A book on that topic will be published by Oregon State Press in 2011. The fundamental themes that tie all of this together have to do with place and practice—the place being the Portland metropolitan region and the Pacific Northwest, and the practice being what actually gets done by planners.

Land Lines: Any last thoughts?

Ethan Seltzer: In an interesting way, the Lincoln Institute’s association with the ideas of Henry George and their extension into thematic areas of land as property, taxation, and land planning is very contemporary. The challenges we face in the United States and globally due to climate change and instability, the pressure for sustainability, urbanization, and the future of our cities and metropolitan regions all come together around these themes.

Ultimately, the challenges that we talk about in sweeping terms must make sense and be addressed democratically and locally. Pulling that off in a manner that acknowledges the global context for local action is really about infusing what we do as planners and academicians with a new ethical commitment to acknowledging and acting at the true scales at which these issues operate.

La infraestructura, en cuya definición se incluye el transporte, las telecomunicaciones, la energía eléctrica, el agua potable y los servicios de limpieza, es uno de los temas candentes tanto en los países industriales como en los países en vías de desarrollo. En los Estados Unidos, existen motivos de preocupación en cuanto al insuficiente mantenimiento de la infraestructura y la resultante disminución de la calidad de las instalaciones y servicios, en particular del transporte. En las propuestas para estimular la demanda, el empleo y el crecimiento económico también ha tenido un gran peso la cuestión de mayores inversiones en infraestructura. En los países en vías de desarrollo, los desafíos en cuanto a la infraestructura tienen más que ver con aumentar la capacidad de prestar servicios no sólo a los residentes urbanos ya existentes sino también a los dos mil millones de residentes nuevos que se esperan para el año 2050. En la Séptima Conferencia Anual sobre Políticas de Suelo del Instituto Lincoln, celebrada a principios de junio de 2012, se trataron varios aspectos relacionados con la infraestructura, tales como inversiones, mantenimiento y externalidades.

Aspectos económicos.

El trabajo empírico llevado a cabo en los últimos 25 años sobre el rendimiento macroeconómico derivado de las inversiones en infraestructura ha arrojado una amplia variedad de resultados, que van desde rendimientos negativos hasta rendimientos de más del 30 por ciento anual. Según una meticulosa encuesta realizada sobre estudios más recientes, la inversión en infraestructura del transporte, la energía y las telecomunicaciones probablemente obtenga efectos macroeconómicos positivos y aumente la productividad.

Al mismo tiempo, muchos países sólo asignan modestas sumas para el mantenimiento de la infraestructura, aun cuando existe un amplio consenso de opinión y pruebas empíricas que indican que el rendimiento derivado del mantenimiento (especialmente en el área del transporte) es muy alto. Un bajo nivel de mantenimiento puede ser el resultado de las preferencias de los donantes a financiar nuevas capacidades en los países en vías de desarrollo, pero los déficits en mantenimiento son muy comunes en los países desarrollados, lo que sugiere que probablemente también sean importantes otros factores institucionales.

Las redes de infraestructura dependen de las economías de escala, y algunas redes son monopolios naturales que deben sujetarse a las regulaciones económicas para evitar que las empresas monopolicen los precios. Aunque la necesidad de tener regulaciones es más evidente cuando la infraestructura es suministrada por empresas privadas, también resulta necesaria una supervisión regulatoria cuando la suministradora es una empresa pública.

Aspectos espaciales.

La infraestructura ejerce una gran influencia sobre los patrones de desarrollo espacial, por lo que puede utilizarse para dirigir el crecimiento, junto con la zonificación y otros incentivos, para lograr patrones de desarrollo más densos y compactos. No obstante, aunque sólo se dispone de unos pocos estudios, los trabajos empíricos indican que los costos de redesarrollo de lugares contaminados son mayores que los costos en lugares sin desarrollo previo, incluyendo los costos de la nueva infraestructura de servicios.

La desindustrialización de las ciudades sucede desde hace mucho tiempo; sin embargo, algunas ciudades, como San José, en California, ya no apoyan la conversión de espacios industriales o de oficinas en uso residencial o comercial. La intención de estas ciudades es mantener un espacio apropiado para el empleo cuando regrese el crecimiento económico, a fin de poder competir por nuevas empresas y fomentar la creación de nuevos puestos de trabajo.

Externalidades.

Las áreas metropolitanas producen cerca de tres cuartos de las emisiones de gas de invernadero antropogénico de todo el mundo cada año, gran porcentaje de las cuales proviene del transporte y de la energía eléctrica. La sustitución de sistemas antiguos y la instalación de otros nuevos con mejores capacidades brindan una gran oportunidad para recurrir a sistemas más eficientes en energía y emisiones en las áreas urbanas. La gestión de los sistemas también puede mejorarse utilizando peajes, cuotas de estacionamiento y expansión del tráfico; garantizando que las tarifas cubren los costos de provisión de agua potable y energía eléctrica; y promoviendo las edificaciones ecológicas.

La reubicación de las familias que viven en los sectores donde se realizará la expansión de la infraestructura implica el desplazamiento de una gran cantidad de personas para construir nuevas carreteras o ampliar las existentes, la construcción de nuevas instalaciones, como centrales eléctricas, y embalses que inundan amplias áreas detrás de los diques. Según las estimaciones realizadas, entre 10 y 23 millones de personas deben reubicarse de forma involuntaria cada año en los países en vías de desarrollo, y la mayoría de estas reubicaciones se encuentra relacionada con la infraestructura. Algunos de estos reasentamientos involuntarios cumplen con las garantías promulgadas por el Banco Mundial u otros estándares, como los Principios del Ecuador, aunque la mayor parte de los reasentamientos se encuentra sujeta únicamente a políticas nacionales o provinciales.

Estos temas y muchos otros–como el impacto que tienen sobre la infraestructura ciertos megaeventos (como los Juegos Olímpicos), la tributación de servicios públicos, los efectos locales de los peajes, la variación en la calidad de los servicios de infraestructura y el significativo impacto de la telefonía móvil en el África–figurarán en el libro de ponencias que estará disponible en formato impreso en mayo de 2013 y, más adelante, como libro electrónico.

It is an honor to follow Gregory K. Ingram as the fifth president of the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy (see page 28), and to join you for my inaugural issue of Land Lines. It will be a challenge to live up to Greg’s accomplished leadership and remarkably productive years at the helm of the Institute since 2005. I hope that I can combine my skills and experience with Lincoln’s formidable tools and talented staff to continue its singular mission: connecting scholars, public officials, and business leaders to blend theory and practice in land policy in order to address a broad range of social, economic, and environmental challenges.

Tectonic forces—natural, man-made, or both—are reshaping our planet. As we contend with climate change, accelerating urbanization in Asia and Africa, the aging of populations in Europe and North America, the suburbanization of poverty in the United States, and the financial insolvency of American cities, the land use decisions we make today will dictate the quality of life for hundreds of millions of people for the next century. Comprehensive plans and policies that equitably govern land use, political and social systems that ensure sustainability, and sound economic analyses to address these challenges are in critical demand and will remain so for decades to come.

Lincoln Institute affiliates explore these matters in this issue of Land Lines. The 2013 Lincoln/Loeb Fellow Lynn Richards, incoming president of the Congress for the New Urbanism, lays out 10 nifty steps U.S. communities have taken to make their suburbs more pedestrian-friendly, with affordable housing to offset the suburbanization of poverty and with denser mixed-use development and public transit to reduce automobile use and help to slow climate change. Architect and 2014 Lincoln/Loeb Fellow Helen Lochhead discusses the winners of Rebuild by Design, the international competition that fostered design innovations that will integrate resilience, sustainability, and livability in the re-gions affected by Superstorm Sandy. Public Affairs Director Anthony Flint reports on Lincoln’s seventh annual Journalists Forum on Land and the Built Environment, which explored prospects for making smarter, more equitable infrastructure investments in 21st-century cities. Finally, in the Faculty Profile, Lincoln’s senior research analyst Adam Langley discusses the Institute’s Fiscally Standardized Cities (FiSCs) database—a newly developed tool that will provide the foundation for important new analyses that will guide local responses to fiscal challenges in the United States.

And just a little about me. Over the last 14 years, I worked at the Ford Foundation, where I occupied a unique perch within global philanthropy that allowed me to support, demonstrate, and test new approaches to solve vexing social problems. Some of my proudest accomplishments include founding the National Vacant and Abandoned Properties Campaign and helping to build and grow the nation’s field of shared-equity housing through collaborations with the National Community Land Trust Network and other partner organizations. I helped to design and then took leadership of Metropolitan Opportunity, the Foundation’s next generation of community and economic development programming, which seeks to reduce the spatial isolation of disadvantaged populations in metropolitan regions by integrating land use planning, affordable housing development, and infrastructure investment to better serve all residents.

I came to Ford with a research background in housing, economics, and public policy analysis. I enjoyed the opportunity to work with scholars across the globe on issues as diverse as the birth of the environmental movement in Russia, the role of trade imbalances and debt in driving macroeconomic cycles, and the impact of homeownership on the lives of low-income families. I played the role of teacher and mentor to thousands of students and have tracked their successes with great pride. I presented research, advocated for policy change, and enjoyed successful collaborations with researchers, advocates, and public officials on four continents. And now I am delighted and honored to join you in this venture with the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.