Q & A with Mario Coyula
Q. Why is Havana so acclaimed for its beautiful old buildings and neighborhoods?
A. More than two hundred years ago Havana was the preeminent city in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean basin. Established as a service-oriented Spanish colonial settlement, the city spread west and southwest from its initial development next to the port, leaving behind a valuable built heritage representing many different architectural styles over more than four centuries.
The historic character of Havana persists both by accident and by design: By accident, because the 1959 revolution quickly stopped an on-going process of replacing fine old buildings with high-rise condominiums; by design, because one early goal of the new government was to reduce rural poverty and improve living conditions in the countryside and smaller cities and towns. As a result, Havana became more dilapidated, but the population goal was cut short, and the city was spared the fate of traumatic urban renewal and speculative real estate development.
Q. What are the two faces of Havana referred to in the title of your forthcoming book, Havana: Two Faces of the Antillean Metropolis?
A. Every city has at least two faces, depending on the social, cultural and political bias of the observer. Havana had many very wealthy people, but many poor people as well. Some people will tell you that pre-revolutionary Havana was a wonderful, glamorous city, a perfect place to live until communism arrived. Others will recall it as a place ridden with poverty, discrimination and social injustice; they believe that the revolution opened equal opportunities to all.
Some will tell you that present-day Havana is on the verge of collapse because of the lack of maintenance, and dull because of the lack of services and choices. Others will point out that because of that, Havana’s unique architecture was protected from redevelopment. People in the inner districts may be overcrowded, but they have not been expelled by gentrification. In every case, it is both things at the same time. Maybe that is what makes Havana so fascinating.
Q. What is the mission of the Group for the Integrated Development of the Capital?
A. The Group was created in 1987 as an interdisciplinary team of experts to advise the city government on urban policies. Our mission is to place on an equal footing the economic and social development of the city, emphasizing the active participation of the city’s residents. Preserving Havana’s extensive built heritage represents an impossible drain of state funds at a time when the Cuban economy is severely impaired. Yet investment is critical to reassert Havana’s leading role in the region and to create an urban environment that can stimulate economic growth and improve the quality of life of the residents.
New investments should encourage residents to identify and solve their own problems, and progress must be monitored to avoid negative impacts on the natural environment as well as the built and social fabric. Planning for change in Havana demands a pattern of development that would be economically feasible, environmentally sound, socially fair and politically participatory. We want to work with investors who understand and respect the community, to help build a social identity and neighborhood commitment through improving material aspects such as housing, transportation, education and health.
Q. What is the role of the neighborhood transformation workshops started by the Group?
A. These are organizations of neighborhood residents, guided and stimulated by architects, social workers, planners and engineers. We try to find professionals who actually live full-time in the neighborhood for each group. The groups choose and manage revitalization, housing construction, recreation, or other economic and social projects, according to their own vision and priorities for community development in their specific neighborhoods.
Some of the workshops have chosen to focus on the manufacture of building materials, even by recycling rubble (an abundant raw material in Havana!), using these for their own projects but also selling them to other groups. Other neighborhood workshops have chosen to focus on urban gardening or recycling waste. Most importantly, these workshops encourage the self-reliance and commitment of the residents, thus developing a local pride that helps prevent marginality.
Q. What are the respective roles of the central government and the neighborhoods in the revitalization of Havana?
A. The central government has found it increasingly difficult to meet the needs of the neighborhoods, especially since the fall of the Soviet Union. Fuel, food and transportation were once supplied and managed centrally, or even imported. Citizens grew to expect a benevolent government to take care of things from the top down. Now one of our biggest challenges is to energize and empower citizens to provide these things locally, from the bottom up. For example, the government has authorized the creation of tens of thousands of small, community gardens on vacant lots, and the surplus from these gardens is sold in city markets.
Q. What are the pros and cons of tourism development in Havana?
A. On the one hand, tourism can attract new investment and income that will help to improve the living standard of the city’s residents. On the other hand, large-scale construction just for tourists can overwhelm the local built environment, and encourage Cubans to see tourists not as fellow human beings but just as an economic resource—almost the way the hungry man in the old Charlie Chaplin film saw everyone around him as a roast chicken or a delicious dessert.
I would rather attract many small investors than a few large ones and find ways of reusing some of the city’s old mansions as small-scale hotels. That way, we can manage both the benefits and the risks of tourism more effectively, and spread the benefits and costs more thinly across many neighborhoods. This pattern should be more sustainable and less vulnerable in an unfriendly external context, including the American embargo.
Q. The Group has built a huge scale model of Havana. How do you use it?
A. We use the model as an educational tool, to help people see the city as a whole and to place their neighborhood within it. Because the buildings are color-coded by the period when they were constructed, the model also helps people see how the city grew, and how newer buildings replaced or overwhelmed older ones. The model was built at a scale of 1:1000 and now covers 112 square meters. It is exhibited in a custom-made pavilion that serves as an information center for anyone living in or visiting the city.
We also use model to test the visual impact of new projects. By placing proposed buildings on their intended sites, we help people get more information on different options and opportunities. This process has actually stopped some inappropriate, disruptive projects because everyone—planners, developers, neighborhood residents—could see clearly how a new structure would impact the community.
Editor’s Note: Architect and planner Mario Coyula spoke at the Lincoln Institute, the Harvard University Graduate School of Design and the Kennedy School of Government in April about the history and architecture of Havana, his home town. He has been a full professor at the Faculty of Architecture of Havana since 1964 and is vice-director of the Group for the Integrated Development of the Capital (GDIC). Dr. Coyula is also a member of several commissions, scientific councils and advisory councils. He is a co-author of the forthcoming book Havana: Two Faces of the Antillean Metropolis (New York and London: John Wiley and Sons, 1997) with Roberto Segre and Joseph L. Scarpaci, Jr.
As a part of the educational activities of the Lincoln Institute’s Latin America Program, a course on “Large Urban Projects,” held in Cambridge last June, focused on the most important and challenging aspects of this land planning issue. Academics, public officials and representatives from private enterprises in 17 cities participated in the presentations and discussions. This article presents a synthesis of the principal points, questions and challenges raised in carrying out these complex projects.
Large urban redevelopment projects have become an important issue in many Latin American countries recently, due in part to changes motivated by the processes of globalization, deregulation and the introduction of new approaches in urban planning. These projects include varied types of interventions, but they are characterized primarily by their large size and scale, which challenge traditional instruments of urban management and financing.
Urban projects on a grand scale are not considered a novelty in Latin America. The diverse elements of existing developments include the revitalization of historic centers; conversion of abandoned industrial facilities, military areas, airports or train stations; large slum rehabilitation projects; and construction of innovative public transportation models. However, at least four important features characterize this new type of intervention:
The last feature is reinforced by the influence of different planning strategies and the impacts of large urban projects in various cities around the world (Powell 2000). One project that has influenced many city planners and officials in Latin America was the transformation of Barcelona in preparation for the Olympic Games in 1992 (Borja 1995). Several projects in Latin America have been inspired by, if not directly emulated, this approach (Carmona and Burgess 2001), but it also has faced serious criticism (Arantes, Vainer and Maricato 2000). It has been seen as a convenient process through which a group of decision makers or private interest stakeholders manage to bypass official planning and policy channels that are seen to be too dependent on the public (democratic) debate. As a result most such projects tend to be either elitist, because they displace low-income neighborhoods with gentrified and segregated upper-class land uses, or are socially exclusionary, because they develop single-class projects, either low-income settlements or high-income enclaves, in peripheral locations.
Large-scale projects raise new questions, make inherent contradictions more transparent, and challenge those responsible for urban land analysis and policy formulation. Of special importance are the new forms of management, regulation, financing and taxation that are required for or result from the execution of these projects, and in general the consequences for the functioning of land markets.
Size, Scale and Timeframe
The first issue that emerges from a discussion of large-scale projects has to do with the ambiguity of the term and the necessity of defining its validity. Size is a quantitative dimension, but scale suggests complex interrelations involving socioeconomic and political impacts. The wide variety of feelings evoked by large projects shows the limitations in being able to restore a vision of the urban whole and at the same time its global character (Ingallina 2001). This issue has just begun to be discussed in Latin America, and it is framed in the transition to a new approach in urban planning, which is related to the possibility and even the necessity of constructing a typology and indicators for its analysis. Issues such as the emblematic character of these projects, their role in stimulating other urban processes, the involvement of many actors, and the significance of the impacts on the life and development of the city are all part of the discussions. Nevertheless, it is the scale, understood as being more than just simple physical dimensions, that is the central core of this theme.
Since the scale of these projects is associated with complex urban processes that combine continuity and changes over the medium and long terms, the timeframe of their execution must be conceived accordingly. Many of the failures in the implementation of such projects have to do with the lack of a managing authority that would be free or protected from the political volatility of local administrations over time.
The cases of Puerto Madero in Buenos Aires and Fenix in Montevideo, the first completed and the second in process, offer examples of the difficulties in managing the scale and timing of development in the context of economic situations and policies that can change drastically. Twelve years after its construction, Puerto Madero has not yet stimulated other large-scale projects, such as the renovation of nearby Avenida de Mayo, nor appreciable transformations in urban norms.
The scale and timeframe are particularly important for the project in Montevideo, raising doubts about the feasibility of executing a project of this scale in relation to the character of the city, its economy, and other priorities and policies of the country. Its goal was to generate a “work of urban impact,” in this case promotion of public, private and mixed investments in a neighborhood that lost 18.4 percent of its population between 1985 and 1996, and focusing on an emblematic building, the old General Artigas train station. Most of this work has been executed, with a loan of $28 million from the Inter-American Development Bank, however the percentage of public and private investments are minimal and the Fenix project is having to compete with another large-scale corporate-commercial development located east of the city that is already attracting important firms and enterprises.
Land Policy Issues
The issue of scale relates intrinsically to the role of urban land, which makes one ask if land (including its value, uses, ownership and other factors) should be considered a key variable in the design and management of large-scale urban operations, since the feasibility and success of these projects are often associated with the internalization of formidable externalities often reflected in the cost and management of the land.
Projects to restore historic centers offer important lessons to be considered here. We can compare the cases of Old Havana, where land ownership is completely in the hands of the state, which has permitted certain activities to expand, and Lima, where land ownership is divided among many private owners and public sector agencies, adding to the difficulties in completing an ongoing restoration project. Even though Old Havana has received important financial cooperation from Europe and Lima has a $37 million loan from the Inter-American Development Bank, the main challenge is to promote private investment while also maintaining programs of social and economic assistance for the local residents. Both cities have created special units for the management of these projects, which constitutes an interesting commentary on institutional modernization.
The Role of the State
The scale, the time dimension and the role of land in large urban projects lead us to consider the role of the state and public investment. While urban operations on a large scale are not new in Latin American cities, their present conditions have been affected radically by economic changes, political crises and substantial modifications in the role of the state in general. These conditions make the execution of urban projects, as part of the process of long-term urban development, a source of contradictions with the generally short tenure of municipal governments and the limits of their territorial claims. We must also consider the differences in regulatory competencies between central governments and local municipalities, and the differences between public entities and private institutions or local community organizations, which often reflect conflicting interests due the decentralization and privatization processes being promoted simultaneously in many countries.
Two large projects related to transportation infrastructure are examples of local situations that led to very different results. One was the transformation of the old abandoned Cerrillos airport in Santiago, Chile, and the other was a project for a new airport for Mexico City in Texcoco, an area known as ejido land occupied by peasants and their descendants. In the first case, the active participation of interested groups is expanding the recuperation process of a zone of the city that does not have quality urban facilities. A total investment of $36 million from the public sector and $975 million from the private sector is supporting the construction of malls, facilities for education, health and recreation, and housing for the neighborhood. In Mexico serious conflicts between state interests and community rights to the land had caused social unrest and even the kidnapping of public officials. As a result, the federal government has recently withdrawn from the Texcoco project, assuming huge political and economic costs for this decision.
Segregation and Exclusion
Many planners and practitioners have doubts about the feasibility of large projects in poor countries and cities because of the distortions that their execution could cause on future development, in particular the reinforcing tendencies of segregation and social exclusiveness. The diminishing capacity of the state to look for new alternatives for financing socially beneficial projects through private capital, principally from international sources, adds to the doubts about their success. Many large-scale projects are seen as the only alternative or the unavoidable cost that the city or society has to pay to generate an attractive environment in a context of growing competition among cities for a limited number of external investors.
A key matter with respect to the use of public space generated by these projects is to avoid segregation of space and people. Special attention must be given to protect the inhabitants of the zones where the large urban projects are developed from the negative consequences of gentrification. This is without a doubt one of the most difficult aspects of large urban projects. Table 1 shows the most important aspects and the principal challenges that arise from an analysis of the large urban projects. Effectively, the integration of projects of this scope calls for a vision of the city that avoids the creation of islands of modernity isolated in the middle of poor areas, which would contribute to the process called the dualism of the city, or the generation of new exclusive urban centers.
Table 1: Aspects and Challenges of Large Urban Projects
Aspects | Challenges |
---|---|
Urban grid | Integrate the project into the existing city fabric |
Planning process | Design the project to be compatible with the established approach to city planning strategies |
Urbanistic norms and regulations | Avoid the creation of norms giving privileges of exclusiveness to the project |
Stakeholders | Incorporate all participants involved directly, in particular the not so easily identifiable groups indirectly affected by these projects |
Financing | Establish innovative public and private partnerships |
Social, economic and urban impacts | Develop effective ways to measure and assess various types of impacts and ways to mitigate the negative effects |
Two cases in different political-economic contexts help us reflect about this matter. One is the El Recreo project, planned by Metrovivienda, in Bogotá. Although presenting innovative proposals about the use and management of the land in a large project for popular housing, the project has not been able to guarantee the integration of social groups with different income levels. In the Corredor Sur area of Panama City large zones are being planned for the construction of residences, but the result again serves primarily medium- and high-income sectors. Thus in both a decentralized and a centralized country the general norms that provoke residential segregation cannot seem to prevent negative consequences for the poorest sectors of society.
In view of all this, large urban projects should not be seen as an alternative approach to obsolete plans or rigid norms like zoning. They could instead be presented as a kind of intermediate-scale planning, as an integrated approach that addresses the needs of the whole city and avoids physical and social separations and the creation of norms that permit exclusive privileges. Only in this way can large-scale projects take their place as new instruments for urban planning. The positive effects of specific elements such as the quality of architecture and urban design are valuable in these projects if they operate as a benchmark and are distributed with equity throughout the city.
Public Benefits
Large-scale projects are public projects by the nature of their importance and impact, but that does not mean they are the total property of the state. Nevertheless, the complexity of the participant networks involved directly or indirectly, the variety of interests and the innumerable contradictions inherent in large projects require a leading management role by the public sector. The territorial scale of these operations especially depends on the support of the municipal governments, which in Latin America often lack the technical resources to manage such projects. Local support can guarantee a reduction of negative externalities and the involvement of weaker participants, generally local actors, through a more just distribution of the benefits, where the regulation of the use and taxation of the land is a key issue. Such is the intention of the Municipality of Santo Andre in Sao Paulo in the design of the extraordinarily complex Tamanduatehy project. It involves the reuse of an enormous tract of land previously occupied by railroad facilities and neighboring industrial plants that fled this once vigorous industrial belt of Sao Paulo to relocate in the hinterland. The project involves establishing a viable locus of new activities, mostly services and high-tech industries, capable of replacing the economic base of that region.
Beyond creating and marketing the image of the project, it is important to achieve social legitimacy through a combination of public and private partners engaged in joint ventures, the sale or renting of urban land, compensation for direct private investment, regulation, or even public recovery (or recapture) of costs and/or of unearned land value increments. Active public management is also necessary, since the development of the city implies common properties and benefits, not only economic interests. Analysis of economic and financial costs, and opportunity costs, are also important to avoid the failure of these projects.
Conclusions
The basic components in the pre-operational stage of executing large urban projects can be summarized as follows:
An adequate analysis of the trade-offs (economic, political, social, environmental, and others) is indispensable, even if it is clear that the complex problems of the contemporary city cannot be solved with large interventions alone. It is important to reiterate that more importance must be given to the institutionalization and legitimacy of the final plans and agreements than simply the application of legal norms.
The presentations and discussions at the course on “Large Urban Projects” show that the matter of urban land strongly underlies all the aspects and challenges described above. Land in this type of project presents a huge complexity and offers a great opportunity; the challenge is how to navigate between the interests and conflicts when there are many owners and stakeholders of the land. It is necessary to combat the temptation to believe that modern urban planning is the sum of large projects. Nevertheless, these projects can contribute to building a shared image of the city between the inhabitants and the users. This topic clearly has facets that have not been completely explored yet and that need continued collaborative analysis and by academics, policy makers and citizens.
Mario Lungo is executive director of the Office of Planning of the Metropolitan Area of San Salvador (OPAMSS) in El Salvador. He is also a professor and researcher at the Central American University José Simeón Cañas.
References
Borja, Jordi. 1995. Un modelo de transformación urbana. Quito, Peru: Programa de Gestion Urbana.
Carmona, Marisa and Rod Burgess. 2001. Strategic Planning and Urban Projects. Delft: Delft University Press.
Ingallina, Patrizia. 2001. Le Projet Urbain. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Powell, Kenneth. 2000. La transformación de la ciudad. Barcelona: Ediciones Blume.
Arantes, Otilia, Carlos Vainer e Erminia Maricato. 2000. A cidade do pensamento unico. Petrópolis: Editora Vozes.
For the past six years, the Lincoln Institute has been collaborating with the Loeb Fellowship Program at Harvard University’s Graduate School of Design. Established in 1970 through the generosity of alumnus John L. Loeb, the Loeb Fellowship invites about 10 mid-career professionals each year to study independently and develop insights and connections that can advance their work revitalizing the built and natural environments. The 2002–2003 fellows took their class study trip to Cape Town, South Africa, in May, focusing their inquiry on urban renewal efforts in the township of Khayelitsha.
Cape Town is as glistening a first world city as one could ever expect to see. It’s also among the most deceptive. The come-on begins with one’s first view of Table Mountain, rising behind the city’s modernist skyline. It literally peaks when you ride the sleek, blue funicular to the top and behold, along with the wondrous natural landscape, abundant evidence of apparent prosperity and cosmopolitanism. The seaport of this early outpost of globalization continues to bustle with levels of trade befitting an intercontinental crossroads. The gleaming Victoria and Alfred Waterfront is an upscale tourist vortex, and the massive new convention center with its adjoining international hotel help make Cape Town a glorious modern city.
One feels a twinge of betrayal, however, with the first visit to Khayelitsha, 26 kilometers (16 miles) out the N2 highway amid the sandy Cape Flats, a black African township of over a million residents and the sort of place where the majority of Cape Town residents live. Miles before any apparent settlement, one sees dozens of men and women walking along the shoulder of the freeway, making an hours-long commute to work, or in search of it. Closer to Khayelitsha, hordes of children are playing soccer in the road reserve, occasionally streaming across the multilane highway. Soon the shacks come into view, emerging from a smoky-dusty haze. There are thousands of them, amazingly resourceful assemblages of corrugated tin, recovered shipping palettes, found scraps of anything. Some are drab but most are swathed in vibrant hues.
In the township itself there are more shacks, then row after row of cinder block huts. Apart from a gas station there are almost no formal stores or other nonresidential buildings. But informal traders abound at most intersections: hair stylists operating in overturned shipping containers; meat purveyors with raw animal parts lying on dusty tables or sizzling on oil-drum grills fired by salvaged wood; fruit stands; a house store selling cigarettes, drinks and not much else. Even at noon on a workday the streets are teeming with pedestrians.
If it is an overstatement to call this the “real” Cape Town, it is also true that this condition is far more prevalent than the patina of affluence in the white, Euro-centric center. Certainly it is no exaggeration to call townships like this, with their high unemployment and AIDS rates, the greatest challenge to the still young post-apartheid government of South Africa. Recognizing this, the administration of President Thabo Mbeki is pouring resources into a program, dubbed “urban renewal” in an eerie echo of the earlier American episode, aimed at remaking these troubling legacies of apartheid into more livable places. It is this effort that the 2003 class of Loeb fellows has come to study.
Staggering Quality-of-Life Challenges
The urban renewal program was begun in 2001 to combat unemployment and crime and improve quality of life for township residents. Each of the nine provinces has identified several nodes of focus, with more than 30 nodes nationwide. The Western Cape province selected Khayelitsha and the neighboring “colored” township of Mitchell’s Plain because of the huge challenges they present. Both are large—Khayelitsha is second only to Soweto in size—and distant from the urban core and economic opportunities; together they account for one-third of the Cape Town region’s population.
The magnitude of the project is stunning. Not yet 20 years old, Khayelitsha is believed to have over one million residents and an annual growth rate of 5 percent. The township, whose name means “our new home” in the Xhosa language of its dominant population, began life in the early 1980s as a planned dormitory settlement for rural African men who migrated to Cape Town for industrial jobs. Initially, wives and children were not allowed to join the men. When the dying apartheid regime lifted its pass law restrictions in the late 1980s, families came flooding into the township.
Today, unemployment officially stands at around 46 percent, but that apparently counts only those who still are actively looking. The HIV infection rate is thought to be around 25 percent. As much as one-third of township residents are living in informal housing, either in squatter shacks built illegally on city-owned land, in officially sanctioned shacks on plotted and serviced lots, or in backyard shacks behind the cinderblock huts that comprise the lion’s share of formal housing.
Khayelitsha has almost no jobs of its own apart from informal trade, such as unlicensed taverns known as shebeens, hair stylists and house shops, and scant tourism jobs. The commute to Cape Town is a grueling journey by overcrowded trains, and the trip is made longer by the fact that the Khayelitsha line is not direct, but a branch from the line to Mitchell’s Plain. And increasingly the jobs are not in central Cape Town but in the booming edge city of Bellville, which is unreachable for carless commuters except by jitney taxi. As it happens, access to and from Khayelitsha is intentionally poor. Emerging at the height of the anti-apartheid struggle, the township was designed so that its two entrance points could be closed in the event of any disturbance.
Given the paucity of jobs in the township and the difficult commute to existing employment centers, the most appropriate urban renewal strategy might be to relocate residents to new housing near jobs and adequate transportation networks. But that task is so monumental and fraught with thorny considerations that the government has settled for now on trying to make the existing township as livable as possible.
“The question of relocation versus redevelopment of Khayelitsha is a political hot potato,” says Pieter Terblanche, principal planner in Cape Town’s Planning and Environmental Directorate. White residents in Cape Town and its close-in suburbs aren’t eager for new neighbors, and the township residents themselves want to cling to whatever patch of ground they’ve been able to secure for themselves in the (probably legitimate) fear that they’ll never get as much anywhere else.
Addressing the housing needs within Khayelitsha itself then becomes a top priority. About 20,000 households now live in areas with only communal toilets and water taps, though most have electricity. Most of these families need to be relocated to so-called serviced sites, with water, sewer and access to a bona fide street. Several thousand others are doubled up on serviced sites intended for only one house; these too will be relocated. To reduce the risk of the devastating fires that sometimes sweep through the shack lands, the city wants to de-densify informal areas, adding to the relocation challenge.
The rehousing program is complicated by other factors. For the vast majority of residents, the only acceptable housing is a detached hut on a privately owned lot. Multifamily rental housing is seen as a despised relic of apartheid, and mid- or high-rise apartments are anathema to these recently rural denizens. Government rental housing is being phased out as it is converted to private ownership. Most residents are waiting their turn to secure an individual lot where they can use their 17,900 rand (US$2,400) housing subsidy toward building the standard-issue, 36-square meter, cinder block hut. With enough hands, a hut can be erected in a weekend.
Naturally, this land-intensive approach leads to what we in the U.S. would call sprawl, exacerbating transportation problems and dramatically increasing the cost of extending water, sewer and other infrastructure. The effect, taken together with the wide arterial roads that are the primary street network, is a kind of American-style, automobile-oriented design, but without the automobiles.
Other issues are emerging, as well. “Ownership brings financial responsibilities and requirements that people aren’t necessarily prepared for,” said Terblanche. Many residents also were unprepared for the reality of being forced to pay rising water and electricity rates. Most had become accustomed to paying little or nothing during the late apartheid era, when the government could do little to counter the mass civil disobedience. In an echo of that era, angry poor residents today regularly participate in street protests against utility rates and collections.
Remaking the Township into a Town
With residents largely staying put in Khayelitsha, the question for the urban renewal program becomes how to make the township into something more closely resembling a real town. Step one has been to lay the groundwork for a central business district (CBD) that will allow residents to do their shopping and government business closer to home; now they must take a costly cab ride to Mitchell’s Plain to buy anything beyond convenience items.
The CBD is being developed as a joint venture between the city of Cape Town, private interests and the Khayelitsha community. It spans 73 hectares (182.5 acres) adjacent to the commuter rail station. While retailers and developers know Khayelitsha is a huge, untapped market, it is also seen as an enormous risk by financial institutions, who redline African townships. In Khayelitsha, 60 percent equity has been required of any developer or institution seeking financing. In late July, however, a tentative agreement was reached, and the Cape Town council gave approval to what will be one of the largest private-public investments yet undertaken in a South African township. A grocery chain and discount department store have signed on, but planners want to get a mix of tenants that also includes local merchants. That has required an elaborate financing scheme that allows for keeping rents affordable. Some informal traders also will be allowed in an enclosed square that planners consider the focal point of the district.
Several other planned projects aim to formalize and dignify the public realm. While the city’s transport officials are resistant, one of the most urgent needs is to provide safer, cleaner and more attractive pedestrian ways, says Barbara Southworth, manager of urban design in the city’s division of development services.
In addition to building walkways and plazas at key intersections and at taxi-bus nodes, Southworth’s office is working to provide some order to the informal trade areas by introducing rows of concrete, post-and-beam arches that can serve as storefronts for the trading stalls. Most of these are improvised from sideways shipping containers, and tend to lie in haphazard clusters. By leasing the favored storefront positions the city hopes to introduce a modest level of control over an otherwise unregulated environment.
The government’s attention to Khayelitsha has delivered other amenities as well, though not necessarily under the rubric of urban renewal. The magistrate court building that opened in early May is the most expensive government building ever built in a black township, which is taken as an important sign of progress. The national and provincial governments also contributed to the first national tourist site in a township, a cultural center at Lookout Hill. Built at the highest point in the Cape Flats, next to a fragile dune that offers a panoramic view of Khayelitsha and Mitchell’s Plain, the center is expected to be the entry point for the increasingly popular township tours, estimated at 30,000 mostly foreign tourists annually. The center will feature exhibits on the origins of Khayelitsha and on the Sangoma healers of Xhosa culture and a marketplace selling the wares of local cottage industries.
Vexing Consequences
It is unsettling to think that, at the moment, the most promising economic path for Khayelitsha is to offer tourists a glimpse of the provisional landscape necessitated by crushing poverty, mass relocation and government-enforced segregation. It is equally disquieting to realize that urban renewal efforts at normalizing the township’s environment could reduce some of the appeal to those tourists.
While American urban renewal often meant displacing many African-American and immigrant populations by eliminating central city ghettoes, the South African variant aims to improve conditions for millions of residents who will be allowed to remain in far larger ghettoes many miles from the urban core. This immediately raises some vexing questions: Should the government work to preserve these intensely segregated artifacts of an oppressive regime? There are powerful arguments for doing so, not least the extreme difficulty and unpopularity of relocating a population that has had its fill of such government-driven exercises. But by investing in making townships more permanent, are current residents and future generations consigned to economic isolation? These questions linger even as the government proceeds with the program.
David Goldberg was a Loeb Fellow at Harvard in 2002–2003. He is communications director at Smart Growth America, a nationwide coalition based in Washington, DC.
Loeb Fellows, 2002–2003
Gabriel Abraham, Senior Consultant, Research Triangle Institute, Research Triangle Park, North Carolina
Arnd Bruninghaus, Architect, A/haus Group, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Kathleen A. Bullard, Chief of Watershed Planning Division, Mountains Recreation and Conservation Authority, Los Angeles, California
Deborah J. Goddard, Director of Community Development Planning, Urban Edge, Boston, Massachusetts
David A. Goldberg, Communications Director, Smart Growth America, Decatur, Georgia
Linda Haar, Director, Boston Planning Institute, Cambridge, Massachusetts
Susan L. Hamilton, Assistant Director of Industrial Development, Metro Development Authority, Louisville, Kentucky
Robert L. Liberty, Smart Growth Consultant, Portland, Oregon
Josephine Ramirez, Program Officer, Getty Grant Program, J. Paul Getty Trust, Los Angeles, California
Jennifer Siegal, Principal, Office of Mobile Design, Venice, California
Jennifer Yoos, Architect and Partner, Vincent James Associates, Minneapolis, Minnesota
The Lincoln Institute has been cosponsoring research and training programs with public officials in Porto Alegre, Brazil, for several years. The land policy experiment described in this article represents an innovation with much pedagogical potential because it brings attention to the importance of procedural factors (e.g., management, negotiation, transparency, public legitimacy) in the provision of serviced land for the poor, over and above the conventional attention given to funding and other resources.
Approximately one billion people around the world currently live in slums with precarious infrastructure and without basic services or secure land title, and this situation is expected to worsen in the future (UN-HABITAT 2003). From the perspectives of both the urban order and the environment, irregular land occupations often cause irreversible damage and impose high urbanization costs for the local government and the society as a whole.
Irregularity is a multidimensional phenomenon involving tenure issues (e.g., legal rights of occupation, title registration); compliance with urban norms and regulations (e.g., lot sizes, allowance for public spaces, street layouts); the number and quality of services provided; the type of area where settlement occurs (e.g., ecologically risky areas, hillsides, contaminated brownfields); and above all the occupation process itself, which is usually the opposite of formal development, whereby occupation is the culmination of a legal and regulated sequence from titling to planning to servicing.
Basic infrastructure is frequently available in irregular areas, but it is installed either by unregulated subdividers or after occupation by public agencies, often as an emergency measure. For example, sometimes the main trunk networks for water and sewer systems exist close to areas where irregular settlements are forming, so the subdivider or occupants simply improvise clandestine connections to tap into the main line. For small settlements this kind of intervention is not disastrous, yet it implies that services may be extended into areas that are unsuitable for occupation. Private or public utility companies also extend their services to new settlements irrespective of their legal status and often without consulting the local authorities.
Typical Occupation Processes
The most common current practice for creating irregular settlements involves the occupation of a parcel of land through a complex series of commercial transactions involving the landowner, the developer or land subdivider, and often the future occupants. Landowners seek a way to extract profits from the land; subdividers ignore the need to comply with municipal codes and produce a low-cost, high-profit subdivision; and the poor occupants purchase these illegal plots because they have no other option and may be unaware of the legal status. They usually lack a regular income source and savings to apply for credit and meet the stringent building codes and other conditions required for formal purchase and occupation.
Prospective occupants buy the “right to occupy” through a plot acquisition contract and proceed to organize plot boundaries, street layouts and the construction of simple houses. When an official inspection is made it’s already too late; houses have been built and the community is organized to resist. Public authorities cannot keep up with this cycle of complicity, and thus restrict their role to minimal inspection activities that both conceal a management model tolerant of informality and expose the absence of other housing options for that segment of the population.
High-cost curative actions to introduce urban improvements and title regularization programs are being established in many cities, but their effectiveness to date has been limited (Smolka 2003). More seriously and paradoxically, the expectation created by these programs has tended to increase the number of people resorting to irregularity. In sum, the typical process by which the urban poor access serviced land is inefficient and unfair, and ultimately feeds into a vicious cycle of irregularity by contributing to poverty rather than mitigating it. The problem is not so much what services are provided, by whom and at what scale, but how, when and where the process operates to provide those services in the first place.
The Case of Porto Alegre
Porto Alegre (population 1,360,590 in 2000) is the capital of the southernmost state in Brazil and the center of a metropolitan area of 31 municipalities (see Figure 1, page 12). The city’s quality of life improvements have gained worldwide recognition, largely as a result of its poverty reduction and social inclusion programs and its widely acclaimed participatory administration processes (Getúlio Vargas Foundation 2004; Jones Lang Lasalle 2003; UNDP 2003; UN/UMP 2003). For example, the level of infrastructure services is very high: 84 percent of the city’s houses are connected to the sewerage system; 99.5 percent receive treated water; 98 percent receive electricity; and 100 percent of suburbs are serviced by selective waste collection (Municipality of Porto Alegre 2003).
In spite of these impressive figures, 25.5 percent of the population lives in the city’s 727 irregular settlements (Green 2004). It is estimated that the annual population growth in these areas is 4 percent compared to 1.35 percent for the city as a whole. These facts present an apparent paradox and conundrum: How to reconcile widespread provision of basic services with the increase of irregularity in a period of successful, popular and participatory administration?
Since the introduction of decentralized participatory budgeting in 1989, public investment decision making in Porto Alegre has improved, but the process remains economically ineffective, technically inappropriate, environmentally disastrous, fiscally unfair (because land subdividers pocket monies that should benefit the public) and politically unsustainable. Many areas still have serious problems: poor quality streets without drainage or paving; geological instability and susceptibility to flooding; and a lack of legal titling, which means, for example, no address for postal delivery. Nevertheless, the Porto Alegre case is interesting because it vividly demonstrates that the problem of confronting irregularity is less one of providing services than of changing the process by which the services are provided. It’s a procedural process, a change in the rules of the game.
An Innovative Urban Policy Instrument
The Social Urbanizer concept was developed in Porto Alegre as an instrument, and more generally a program, to overcome the existing unsustainable process of providing urban services in spite of a long history of regulatory legislation (see Figure 2). Enacted in July 2003 shortly after approval of Brazil’s innovative City Statute Act, the Social Urbanizer Act was the result of significant dialogue involving the building industry unions, small land subdividers, housing cooperatives, financial agents and the City Council.
A Social Urbanizer is a real estate developer registered with the municipality who is interested in developing in areas identified by the government as suitable for low-income housing, and who agrees to operate according to certain negotiated terms, including the affordability of the serviced plots. The process contemplates a public-private partnership through which the municipality commits to make certain urban norms and regulations more flexible, to speed up the licensing process, reduce the legal requirements, and recognize progressive, step-by-step urbanization. It also anticipates using the transfer of development rights as a stimulating mechanism for private developers. Other incentives may take the form of access to specific lines of credit or certain direct public investments in urban infrastructure so the costs are not passed on to the final buyer. Eligible Social Urbanizer applicants include duly registered real estate developers, contractors already working in the informal market, landowners and self-managed cooperatives.
Porto Alegre’s Social Urbanizer program incorporates lessons learned from both real challenges and untapped opportunities for public action, and it is inspired by several specific ideas. First, land subdividers operating to provide access to urban land by the low-income sector (albeit through illegal activities) have an expertise and familiarity with that sector that public authorities do not have. Thus, rather than demonize or punish these agents, the Social Urbanizer approach takes a new attitude toward attracting them with appropriate incentives (and sanctions) so they can operate legally. Furthermore, while it is common knowledge that a subdivider can usually operate more profitably at the margin of the law, because of lower overhead costs, avoidance of legal approvals, and so forth, it is less well known that, given the option, many of these subdividers would rather operate legally, even if it means a lower profit margin.
Second, the land value increments generated by land transactions could be converted into a source of revenue for the development. In practice this share of value should be distributed both directly by the landowner (as an in-kind contribution of land beyond what is legally required in land subdivisions for low-income occupations) and indirectly by the subdivider through negotiated lower land prices for the low-income buyers. In most cases of irregular development the public is not able to capture and benefit from this increase in land value.
Third, by giving public transparency to the terms of direct negotiations and the resulting win-win agreement among all the interested parties (i.e., landowners, developers, public authorities, prospective buyers), the Social Urbanizer process creates adequate sanctions for compliance with the norms established for the development. Another component of the negotiation process has to do with the agreed investment schedule and its effect in diffusing speculative pricing.
Fourth, to have any chance of success this new mode of urbanization should be able to provide an adequate supply of serviced plots to meet social needs under competitive market conditions (i.e., more affordable than the conditions of otherwise informal subdividers). In effect an essential ingredient of the program’s rationale is that it establishes new rules for social urbanization in general. The signal should be clear to private agents that the Social Urbanizer process is the only way for the government to participate in the development of socially approved and affordable settlements.
The Social Urbanizer as a Third Path
For the public interest, the primary goal of this strategy is to establish the basis for development before occupation takes place, or at least according to a schedule allowing for significant reduction or control of urbanization costs (see Figure 3).
Public administrations in third-world cities typically respond to the inability of the poor to access formal land markets through two models or paradigms. Under the subsidy model the public intervenes to provide serviced land either directly through publicly developed settlements on an emergency basis, or indirectly through below-market interest for developers operating in that segment of the market. At the other extreme, the 100-percent tolerance model recognizes that the government does not have the capacity to provide all the serviced land needed, and thus tolerates irregular and informal arrangements that may eventually be improved with various regularization programs.
Both approaches keep land market conditions untouched and feed into the vicious cycle of informality. In the first case the subsidies are capitalized into higher land prices, and in the second case they allow land subdividers to charge a premium based on the expectation of future regularization: the higher the expectation, the higher the premium.
The Social Urbanizer represents a third path that recognizes both the role and expertise of informal land subdividers who operate in the low-income segment of the market and the indispensable role of public agents in supporting the poor to participate in otherwise inaccessible market conditions. In other words, this program represents an effort to “formalize the informal” and “informalize the formal” by facilitating and providing incentives for developers to operate with more flexibility in the normally unprofitable low-income market. It is an instrument designed to encourage both entrepreneurs operating in the clandestine real estate market and those operating in the formal, higher-income market segment to develop land under the existing regular standards.
The Social Urbanizer Act represents an attempt to change the rules on how low-income housing needs are to be addressed. It gives a clear signal to the private agents operating in the land market and protects the public from arbitrariness in private development actions. The Social Urbanizer has proven to be an indispensable tool for public management. As a break with current practices, however, the program still faces many challenges in implementation.
Early Stages of Implementation
Porto Alegre has five Social Urbanizer pilot projects at different stages of development. They involve different types of developers so they can function as true experiments: small developers, developers already established in the market, and housing cooperatives. One of these pilot areas has demonstrated that 125 square metres (m2) of fully serviced land can be produced at a price ranging from US$25 to US$28 per m2 in contrast with the formal market price of US$42 to US$57 per m2 for the same amount of land. The first price range represents how much a developer is actually willing to contract with the local administration to operate under the Social Urbanizer framework.
The municipality also attempted to gain financial support for social urbanization activities from Caixa Econômica Federal (CEF), the federal organization responsible for financing housing and urban development. The agency is creating a new financial line within its partnership program in which credit is given to the buyer, who will knowingly use it to purchase a plot of land. Until now this financial option was only available for the acquisition of a housing unit before construction. Thus the idea of a credit line to ultimately finance the development of serviced land is a novelty. Another related improvement is the willingness of the local administration to void requirements on developers’ risk analysis, an essential ingredient to open the field to small developers.
The innovation of the Social Urbanizer instrument, as compared to traditional public methods of dealing with urban irregularity, has attracted the attention of many organizations and other municipalities. At a federal level the Social Urbanizer is considered fully integrated with the principles of the City Statute, which has brought support from Brazil’s Ministry for Cities. Another federal law that deals with the subdivision of urban land is now being discussed in the Brazilian National Congress, and the Social Urbanizer is part of that debate as well. If adopted, this subdivision legislation will be an important step toward changing the traditional and perverse process of providing access to land for the urban poor in other Brazilian cities.
Chronology of Urban Policies in Porto Alegre
1979 – Approval of the Federal Subdivision Law (6766/1979) and the First Development Master Plan for Porto Alegre
1990 – Establishment of the Urban Regularization Program
1996 – Creation of the Urban Regularization Center
1998 – Announcement of Land Title Regularization Year
1999 – Approval of the Environmental Development Master Plan
2001 – Implementation of a pilot plan of a differentiated taxation model, based on preventive action, operating in the region of the city that suffers the highest number of irregular settlements
2001 – Enactment of Brazil’s City Statute Act on Urban Development (Law 10.257/2001)
2003 – Enactment of the Social Urbanizer Act (Law 9162/2003)
2005 – Implementation of the Social Urbanizer pilot projects
2005 – Implementation of the Social Urbanizer pilot projects
Martim O. Smolka is senior fellow at the Lincoln Institute, director of the Program on Latin America and the Caribbean, and co-chairman of the Department of International Studies. Cláudia Damasio is an architect and former under-secretary of planning for the Municipality of Porto Alegre. She now serves as coordinator of the Social Urbanizer project. .
References
Getúlio Vargas Foundation. 2004. Revista Você S/A. Editora Abril. August 10. São Paulo, Brazil
Green, Eliane D’Arrigo, ed. 2004. Irregularidade fundiária em Porto Alegre por região de planejamento (Land irregularity in Porto Alegre by planning regions) Municipality of Porto Alegre, Secretary of Municipal Planning, http://www.portoalegre.rs.gov.br/spm/
Jones Lang Lasalle. 2003. World Winning Cities II, http://www.joneslanglasalle.com/research/index.asp
Municipality of Porto Alegre. 2003. Informaçöes a cidade: Títulos e Conquistas (Information about the city: Titles and achievements), http://www.portoalegre.rs.gov.br
Smolka, Martim O. 2003. Informality, urban poverty and land market prices. Land Lines 15(1): 4–7.
UN-HABITAT. 2003. The Challenge Of Slums: Global Report On Human Settlements. Nairobi, Kenya: UN-HABITAT, http://hq.unhabitat.org/register/item.asp?ID=1156
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 2003. Human Development Report 2003. New York: Oxford University Press, http://www.undp.org/
United Nations Urban Management Program (UN/UMP). 2003. Report of the Urban Management Program of UN-HABITAT 2003. Nairobi, Kenya: UN-HABITAT, http://hq.unhabitat.org/programmes/ump/publications.asp
Compulsory purchase, expropriation, eminent domain, or simply “taking” are different names for the legal institution that allows governments to acquire property against the will of its owner in order to fulfill some public purpose. This tool has been used for a long time as a major instrument of land policy, but now it is subject to a number of criticisms and mounting social resistance in many parts of the world. Campaigns for housing rights, movements for the defense of property rights, and legislative and judiciary activism are among the factors changing the conditions under which governments exercise their power of eminent domain.
As the world’s most populous country and its third largest economy, China and its rapid urbanization and development will represent one of the defining trends of the twenty-first century. Over the past 30 years, China has made remarkable economic and social progress, lifting hundreds of millions out of poverty and catapulting China onto the international stage.
This economic transformation has also involved an institutional transformation as China’s centrally planned economy has moved pragmatically to a broad reliance on market mechanisms. This movement has been especially challenging in the case of land, which for decades was owned by the state or peasant collectives. Progress has been made in urban areas, where the leasehold term of land ownership is now normally 70 years, but in rural areas collective land ownership continues.
Despite its noteworthy accomplishments, China is facing critical land policy issues that will determine the direction of its future economic development and urbanization.
With these diverse issues in mind, the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy’s China Program was inaugurated in 2003 and continues to focus on improving the quality of public debate and decisions concerning land policy and urban development in China through sound research and the leveraging of international experience and expertise.
The China Program has grown considerably in capacity, scope, and geographic footprint, highlighted by the establishment of the joint Peking University–Lincoln Institute Center for Urban Development and Land Policy in October 2007. The Center’s mission is to study land, urban, and fiscal policies and to facilitate education, training, policy analysis, and research. Having this joint facility in Beijing provides the China Program with an ongoing domestic presence that expands the Institute’s networks and resources and brings together government officials, practitioners, and foreign and domestic scholars to engage in dialogue and to share experiences to promote a better understanding of land policy, urbanization, and property taxation in China and around the world.
The China Program has identified six key research areas that are highly relevant to China’s future development and also offer the best opportunities to utilize the Lincoln Institute’s expertise and resources.
Adoption of a Property Tax
China’s 11th Five-Year Plan (2006–2010) elevated the issue of a property tax onto the official agenda, and pilot property tax projects are currently under way in more than 10 provinces. However, the issue’s sensitive political nature, lingering technical difficulties concerning data and valuation, and continued debate about the exact form of any proposed property tax have slowed implementation and made it unlikely that a broader property tax and related tax policy reforms will be implemented before the 12th Five-Year Plan begins in 2011.
Through close working relationships with the State Administration of Taxation (SAT), the Ministry of Finance (MOF), and the Development Research Center for the State Council (DRC), the China Program has offered a number of educational programs and provided significant intellectual and capacity building support for China’s adoption of a property tax.
For example, in October 2009 representatives of the British Columbia Assessment Office, the Altus Group, and ESRI Canada led a China Program training workshop on property tax implementation and design of computer-assisted mass appraisal (CAMA) systems. More than 50 SAT officials participated, including representatives from each of the property tax pilot cities.
Delegates from the SAT and the Lincoln Institute attended a three-day conference on valuation and mass appraisal at the University of Pretoria, South Africa, in March 2009, before traveling to Johannesburg’s valuation office to discuss the challenges of implementing a property tax in that country.
In November 2008, training on technical aspects of property valuation was provided in Beijing by property tax experts from Canada, the United States, South Africa, and Hong Kong for more than 40 administrators and assessors from China’s property tax pilot cities.
Local Public Finance
Fiscal policy reform is a key component in addressing many of the social and economic problems China faces. Restructuring the current tax system and promoting balanced tax and expenditure responsibilities at the local government level is one of the main policy objectives of the Chinese government. The underlying efforts are closely related to the future development of any property tax, a necessary and critical solution to local public finance challenges.
The China Program is focused on issues of fiscal decentralization, public service financing, land-related taxes and fees, regional inequity, intergovernmental finance, and the role of property taxation in a modern public sector finance system. Representative activities have included a January 2009 workshop in Beijing on fiscal policy and economic growth in China with leading fiscal policy scholars and experts, including officials from the MOF, DRC, and SAT.
An international conference held at the Lincoln Institute’s headquarters in Cambridge, Massachusetts in May 2008 focused on local public finance and property taxation. Those proceedings will be edited and published in a Lincoln Institute book in 2010, and the volume will be translated and published in China as well.
Land Policy and Land Management
The revision of China’s Land Management Law has been a sensitive issue over the past several years, as the country struggles to define rural land rights, land expropriation, and the public good. With a new land law revision on the horizon, land-related issues remain at the forefront of China’s policy agenda, particularly issues concerning urban and rural property rights, land expropriation, land use efficiency, land use planning, land conservation, and urban expansion and sprawl.
In June 2009 the China Program co-organized a roundtable discussion on the most recent draft revision of China’s Land Management Law with the Land Law Committee of the China Land Science Society in association with the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR). Experts and prominent scholars from across the political spectrum engaged in direct dialogue and discussion with government officials at MLR who are working on the revision.
The China Program is now compiling and translating several land management laws from a dozen developing and developed countries for use by Chinese officials and scholars. The Program also cosponsored a comprehensive survey of land use and farmland conservation issues in a dozen provinces in China, and is building a database for future research on land management issues.
Urban Planning and Development
Rapid urbanization has led to the explosive growth of Chinese cities and their populations, presenting an enormous challenge in terms of city planning, infrastructure, and transportation. New approaches to urban planning are fundamental to the development and management of cities, as well as a prerequisite to ensuring the efficient use of land and integrated development in China. Efforts also must be made to use land sensibly and to coordinate the spatial layout of urban areas, thereby avoiding rampant and uncontrolled urbanization.
The China Program cooperated with the Chinese Society for Urban Studies and the Urban Planning Society of China, affiliated with the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development, in organizing the July 2009 International Forum on Urban Development and Planning, which featured the theme “Harmony and Ecology: Sustainable Cities.”
In cooperation with the Lincoln Institute’s Department of Planning and Urban Form, more than 20 international speakers attended a symposium on megaregions and spatial planning practice worldwide, held in Beijing in October 2008.
Affordable Housing
Housing policy, and in particular affordable housing, is becoming an important focus for China’s policy makers during this period of rapid urbanization. With upwards of 15 million new urban residents expected annually over the next decade, the growth in the supply of affordable housing is an immediate concern. In addition to a one-year joint policy research project with the DRC, the China Program is conducting original research in the field of housing policy and introducing international experience to China’s policy makers and the academic community.
For example, in July 2009 the China Program organized a symposium on low-income housing policy in China to provide a platform for international and domestic scholars and government officials from DRC, the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development, and the People’s Bank of China to engage in dialogue and discussion. Papers from the symposium will be published in an edited volume for distribution in China. The China Program also hosted an international conference entitled Housing Policy and Housing Markets in China in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in May 2009, and is preparing an edited conference volume for publication in both English and Chinese.
Environmental Challenges
With international attention focusing on recent climate negotiations in Copenhagen, there is a pressing need for timely research on low-carbon development and the complex linkages between land, transportation, and urban and environmental policies in China and globally. The China Program is leading research on environmental taxation in China from a global perspective and developing a database of environmental tax statistics.
The Program organized a roundtable on green cities at Peking University in September 2009, which drew strong interest from domestic and international academics and signaled the need for further study of environmental policy issues in the future. And in May 2008, the Program, joined by Loeb Fellows from the Harvard University Graduate School of Design and Chinese policy makers and academics, held a roundtable discussion at Peking University that addressed urban transformation and sustainability.
Building Capacity to Address the Issues
Since its inception the China Program has been committed to enhancing the capacity of both current policy makers and academics and researchers whose analysis and opinions will influence China’s future policies and reforms. This educational emphasis continues with the establishment of the Peking University–Lincoln Institute Center, which has become an important platform for reaching and engaging students and scholars at Peking University and other academic institutions through training programs, fellowships, lecture series, online education, and research publications.
Training the Trainers
This annual program aims to enhance the capacity and awareness of scholars throughout China regarding urban economics, planning, public finance, and related land policy issues. The courses target university faculty and professional researchers, as well as select government officials, with the goal to increase competence through intensive professional seminars on issues related to land policy in China. More than 70 participants on average attend each two-week training program. Leading experts in their fields from around the world offer the participants an invaluable international perspective. The China Program’s recently launched online education platform seeks to build on previous training programs and to move progressively toward more specialized trainings.
Fellowships
The China Program awards several types of fellowships to international and Chinese scholars and graduate students working on Chinese land and urban policy. Two or three international fellowships are awarded annually to leading scholars and professional researchers based at universities around the globe. In addition to producing important research on issues ranging from the spatial structure of megacities to household carbon emissions in Chinese cities, the international fellowship is an invaluable tool to increase scholarly dialogue between China and the world. These fellows are an integral component of the China Program’s other activities, such as teaching at Training the Trainers programs, reviewing other fellowship proposals, and speaking at seminars.
Fellowships for Chinese graduate students and junior researchers are administered through the Peking University–Lincoln Institute Center to bring young scholars into Chinese land and urban policy studies. Approximately 15 dissertation fellowships are awarded to aspiring scholars annually, while an additional 6 or 8 research fellowships help strengthen the capacity of scholars based in China’s leading institutions.
The China Program’s in-country presence at the Peking University–Lincoln Institute Center also facilitates interactions among the fellows, including the provision of constructive feedback on their ongoing research. All fellows are invited to Beijing for a mid-term progress report, where they share their initial research findings with peers and a panel of international experts. This event has proven to be an effective way to help domestic junior scholars and graduate students build research skills and promote studies of urban and land issues in China.
Speaker Series
The China Program also regularly invites distinguished individuals drawn from the Lincoln Institute’s network of leading scholars and policy makers to speak to the Beijing scholarly community on vital topics ranging from planning support systems to fiscal federalism and decentralization in the United States. This speaker series helps meet the demand for knowledge about international development and urbanization experiences and how these cases can be adapted to fit China’s needs.
Online Education
The Lincoln Institute has long history of employing online education as a tool to reach a broader audience and maximize its resources. Given the vast geographic distances in China and its emphasis on training and capacity building, the China Program has similarly been interested in online education for some time. The establishment of the Peking University–Lincoln Institute Center has accelerated the process of making information, analysis, and data available online, and widened the network of collaborators interested in tapping into the Institute’s expertise.
Through the Center, the China Program engaged a local online education company to develop a China-centric platform, which was inaugurated in the summer of 2009 during the China Program’s Training the Trainers session on urban economics and planning. The two-week program was recorded and translated into Chinese, and is accompanied online by Chinese transcripts of lectures and associated PowerPoint presentations and other materials.
The value of the online platform has become apparent almost immediately. During the fall 2009 program and demonstration on property taxation and CAMA, which was also recorded for later conversion to the online platform, attending SAT officials expressed their eagerness to use the platform to demonstrate the concepts to their colleagues and superiors.
Publications and Web-based Resources
As the China Program has increased its research capacity and professional support with the establishment of the Peking University–Lincoln Institute Center, it is producing a steadily increasing series of working papers, books, and training materials that are extending the Lincoln Institute’s and the China Program’s expertise on and influence in China. During 2008 and 2009, nine books were published or made ready for print, and eight other books are at various stages of development. The China Program and the Center’s fellows and visiting fellows have also produced about 40 working papers and a number of focused reports and policy briefs, which will soon be available online.
Complementing all of these activities is the Peking University–Lincoln Institute Center’s revamped Web site. It provides a window into the China Program’s mission and vision, and is an important link between the Lincoln Institute’s and the China Program’s dual educational and research objectives. Drawing together Chinese and English working papers, training and education materials, and conference proceedings from both the Lincoln Institute and the Peking University–Lincoln Institute Center, the Web site is a rich repository of impartial knowledge and an expanding platform for scholarly dialogue concerning the ascendant land, urban, and environmental policy issues in China.
In 2010, the China Program will continue to strengthen its online resources to synthesize and disseminate its recent research to a broader audience of Chinese scholars and policy makers through new publications and focused policy reports, while also striving to advance academic debate through research, demonstration projects, conferences and other activities.
About the Author
Joyce Yanyun Man is senior fellow and director of the Lincoln Institute’s China Program, as well as director of the Peking University–Lincoln Institute Center for Urban Development and Land Policy. She is also professor of economics in the Peking University College of Urban and Environmental Science.
La infraestructura (que comprende energía, telecomunicaciones, transporte, abastecimiento de agua potable y alcantarillado) cumple un papel muy importante en el desarrollo del suelo urbano y ejerce una influencia en la productividad, tanto de las ciudades como del campo. Los datos acerca de la cantidad de obras de infraestructura a nivel nacional (aunque no a nivel metropolitano) se encuentran disponibles en relación con muchos países en vías de desarrollo y de altos ingresos. Dichos datos respaldan varios de los resultados que se resumen en el presente artículo.
La cantidad de obras de infraestructura per cápita en los diferentes países se encuentra estrechamente relacionada con los niveles de ingresos per cápita: en aquellos países en donde los ingresos se duplican, sucede casi lo mismo con las obras de infraestructura. Sin embargo, las obras de infraestructura de un país no se encuentran esencialmente relacionadas con su nivel de urbanización una vez que se han tomado en cuenta los ingresos de dicho país. Y esto resulta sorprendente, ya que las ciudades poseen grandes cantidades de obras de infraestructura. No obstante, las ciudades también presentan una gran densidad de población que utiliza la infraestructura de manera intensiva, por lo que los niveles de obras de infraestructura urbana per cápita son similares a los niveles nacionales.
La composición de las obras de infraestructura también varía sistemáticamente según los ingresos per cápita. Las carreteras representan la mayor proporción de obras de infraestructura en los países con menor cantidad de ingresos, seguidas de los sistemas de agua potable en segundo lugar y los sistemas de energía eléctrica en tercer lugar. A medida que los ingresos de un país se incrementan, la cantidad de obras de infraestructura relacionadas con los sistemas de energía eléctrica aumentan con más rapidez que los niveles de ingresos. La infraestructura correspondiente a los sistemas de agua potable y alcantarillado aumenta a una intensidad menor y, en el caso de las carreteras, el cambio se da en proporción a los ingresos. Como resultado, en los países con altos ingresos, los sistemas de energía eléctrica conforman el mayor componente de las obras de infraestructura, seguidos de las carreteras, mientras que los sistemas de agua potable, alcantarillado y telefonía representan sólo una pequeña proporción de la infraestructura.
Teniendo en cuenta las tasas de crecimiento económico recientes, y utilizando las relaciones existentes entre la infraestructura y los ingresos per cápita, los países en vías de desarrollo probablemente deben invertir alrededor del 5 por ciento de su PIB en infraestructura (3 por ciento en expansión y 2 por ciento en mantenimiento), que en la actualidad se aproxima a los US$750 mil millones anuales, para poder mantener la relación existente entre la infraestructura y el PIB. En los países con altos ingresos, el gasto total sería menor, es decir, un 1,7 por ciento del PIB (dividido equitativamente entre obras de expansión y de mantenimiento), que en la actualidad se aproxima a US$700 mil millones anuales. Aquellos países que crecen con más rapidez que el promedio deben invertir una proporción mayor de su PIB, con el fin de que las obras de infraestructura vayan a la par del crecimiento económico.
En algunos países, una alternativa a las nuevas inversiones consiste en mejorar la eficiencia de la producción de servicios a partir de la infraestructura existente. Por ejemplo, la pérdida promedio de energía eléctrica en los diferentes países llega a alcanzar hasta el 25 por ciento; por otro lado, el agua potable que no se factura y las filtraciones de agua pueden llegar a exceder el 30 por ciento. La reducción de estas pérdidas de gran magnitud puede evitar la necesidad de capacidades adicionales. No deja de ser sorprendente el hecho de que el rendimiento de los diferentes sectores dentro de un mismo país varíe en tan gran medida, pues el rendimiento eficiente que puede tener un país en un determinado sector de infraestructura no se condice con su rendimiento en otros sectores.
¿De dónde provendrán estos fondos de inversión, en particular para los países en vías de desarrollo? La asistencia internacional y el financiamiento brindado por los bancos de desarrollo para obras de infraestructura en los países en vías de desarrollo actualmente llegan a un total de aproximadamente US$40 mil millones anuales. Dicha cifra se ha triplicado (o más) desde el año 1990, en dólares en curso legal. La inversión privada en infraestructura en los países en vías de desarrollo alcanzó recientemente los US$160 mil millones anuales y ha crecido ocho veces más desde el año 1990, también en dólares de curso legal. La asistencia internacional está dirigida principalmente a los sistemas de energía, transporte, agua potable y alcantarillado, mientras que casi no se han destinado fondos a las telecomunicaciones.
Por el contrario, más de la mitad del financiamiento de origen privado se invierte en telecomunicaciones (en particular, telefonía móvil), seguidas por el sector energético. Las telecomunicaciones y la energía atraen más inversiones privadas en los países en vías de desarrollo debido a que los ingresos que obtienen por los aranceles cubren una gran parte de los costos operativos, mientras que los ingresos por aranceles y tarifas de usuarios cubren una menor parte de los costos de transporte, agua potable y alcantarillado. En la década de 1990, las inversiones privadas en infraestructura se concentraron en América Latina y en Asia Oriental; sin embargo, a partir del año 2000, se distribuyeron de forma más uniforme por diferentes regiones del mundo.
A pesar del crecimiento experimentado en cuanto al financiamiento internacional, existen grandes áreas metropolitanas en crecimiento en países en vías de desarrollo que aún deben recaudar importantes sumas de dinero para poder financiar las inversiones en infraestructura. Entre los métodos de recaudación podemos mencionar los siguientes: el aumento de los aranceles que se cobran a los usuarios, el aumento de los impuestos (en particular, los impuestos inmobiliarios) sobre aquellas propiedades cuyo valor se incrementa debido a las inversiones en infraestructura y el establecimiento de mercados municipales de bonos, tales como el que se está desarrollando en África del Sur.
Durante las últimas décadas, la estructura de la economía de los EE.UU. ha cambiado, a medida que experimenta una continua reducción en el empleo fabril en general y un continuo crecimiento en el sector de los servicios, especialmente aquellos relacionados con los trabajadores capacitados. La distribución geográfica de la actividad también ha cambiado debido a que la población continúa moviéndose de las zonas noreste y medio oeste, en donde las estaciones son más marcadas, hacia las zonas sur y oeste, que son más cálidas. Finalmente, en las áreas metropolitanas, las poblaciones y el empleo se movieron de las ciudades a los suburbios, ya que los viajes en autobús y automóvil se han generalizado. Estas tres tendencias han provocado que muchas ciudades del noreste y oeste medio tengan ahora poblaciones mucho menores, economías más débiles, menos empleos fabriles y una incapacidad para compensar las oportunidades de empleo perdidas con las ganancias de sectores que se están expandiendo a nivel nacional. Estas son, hoy en día, las ciudades industriales históricas, que, con frecuencia, poseen una capacidad excesiva de infraestructura, una oferta de viviendas sin utilizar y una tensión fiscal relacionada con obligaciones asumidas en el pasado por sectores públicos que actualmente se encuentran muy disminuidos. En un reciente informe sobre enfoque en políticas de suelo del Instituto Lincoln, Regeneración de las ciudades tradicionales industriales de los Estados Unidos, sus autores, Alan Mallach y Lavea Brachman, analizan el desempeño de una muestra de estas áreas urbanas e identifican las medidas que han tomado las ciudades con más éxito para producir resultados más sólidos.
Aunque la decadencia de las ciudades industriales tradicionales posee causas comunes, el rendimiento económico de las mismas ha sido muy distinto en las últimas décadas, ya que muchas de estas ciudades han logrado resultados económicos, institucionales y fiscales más sólidos que otras. Todas las ciudades industriales antiguas poseen una serie de activos, tales como infraestructura, barrios, instituciones, poblaciones y actividades económicas en desarrollo. Las diferencias en su rendimiento, en forma comparativa, están relacionadas con la manera en que las políticas y el liderazgo municipal han sacado partido de los inventarios existentes de estos activos. En particular, las ciudades históricas tradicionales en vías de recuperación han construido y basado su expansión sobre instituciones preexistentes dedicadas a la investigación, la medicina, la salud y la educación. También han explotado el creciente interés por los barrios urbanos, donde resulta fácil ir caminando a las tiendas y a los restaurantes y donde las densidades residenciales son mayores que las de la mayoría de las comunidades suburbanas. Las ciudades en recuperación también, en general, han mantenido o atraído más residentes con mayores niveles de educación y han experimentado un crecimiento en las actividades relacionadas con el conocimiento.
Las ciudades industriales tradicionales que han visto cómo sus economías comienzan a transformarse y a crecer de nuevo no necesariamente experimentaron aumentos en sus poblaciones. La población de la mayoría de las ciudades tradicionales tuvo su pico de crecimiento a mediados del siglo XX y posteriormente descendió. Por ejemplo, Buffalo y St. Louis presentaron poblaciones más reducidas en el año 2000 que en 1900. A veces, la disminución de la población en estas ciudades se ve compensada por un crecimiento suburbano, por lo que las poblaciones metropolitanas no se reducen. Sin embargo, algunas ciudades tradicionales exitosas, tales como Pittsburgh, han experimentado leves reducciones de población incluso a nivel metropolitano. Cambiar la composición de las poblaciones de las ciudades y de su actividad económica es más importante para lograr el éxito que el crecimiento de la población por sí solo.
La exitosa recuperación de las ciudades industriales tradicionales normalmente no ha sido el resultado de megaproyectos enfocados en el redesarrollo, sino en el aumento de muchas medidas pequeñas que generan un gran impacto por acumulación, un enfoque que Mallach y Brachman han dado en llamar “crecimiento gradual estratégico”. En su investigación, los autores demuestran que las ciudades industriales tradicionales exitosas se han centrado en dicho enfoque de forma continua e incesante. Los elementos clave del crecimiento gradual estratégico requieren de la evolución de nuevas formas de organización física de la ciudad, de componentes económicos, de formas de gobierno y de relacionarse con las regiones circundantes. Desde un punto de vista físico, la práctica implica centrarse en el núcleo de la ciudad, en sus barrios más importantes y en la gestión del suelo vacante. Desde el punto de vista económico, supone restaurar el rol económico de la ciudad según sus ventajas comparativas y sus bienes existentes, compartir los beneficios del crecimiento con la población y reforzar las conexiones con la región en la que se encuentra la ciudad. Las ciudades también deben fortalecer sus formas de gobierno y ocuparse de que la provisión de servicios y de recursos fiscales entre la ciudad y los municipios del área metropolitana sea fluida.
Las ciudades industriales tradicionales han experimentado un deterioro en las últimas décadas, por lo que su recuperación llevará tiempo e implicará una buena dosis de paciencia. Aunque el funcionamiento de algunas de estas ciudades, tales como Camden, Nueva Jersey, continúa disminuyendo, otras ciudades están mostrando signos de progreso. En Pittsburgh, Filadelfia, Milwaukee y otras ciudades industriales tradicionales que se están recuperando, el rendimiento económico ha mejorado y las tasas de desempleo, delincuencia y pobreza se han reducido por debajo de los promedios nacionales, a pesar del hecho de que las poblaciones permanecen bastante por debajo del pico al que habían llegado unos 60 años atrás.
Para obtener información adicional sobre los factores determinantes del éxito de las ciudades tradicionales, ver: http://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/2215_Regenerating-America-s-Legacy-Cities.
Siendo estudiante universitario de diseño y planificación urbana, Matt Tomasulo organizó un ingenioso proyecto de señalización de calles para animar a los residentes de Raleigh, Carolina del Norte, a caminar en lugar de usar el automóvil. Junto con un grupo de cómplices, diseñó y produjo 27 carteles de plástico (Coroplast) de 30 cm2, en los que imprimió mensajes sencillos como “Camine 7 minutos para llegar al cementerio de la ciudad de Raleigh”, con un código de color según la categoría de destino y una flecha que apuntaba en la dirección correspondiente. El grupo fijó estos carteles con sujeciones de plástico en los postes de los semáforos y similares en torno a tres intersecciones de calles en el centro de la ciudad. Les llevó menos de 45 minutos instalar todos los carteles (lo hicieron por la noche, ya que, aunque los carteles parecían señales oficiales, este proyecto se consideraba “no autorizado”, como dijo Tomasulo).
Como era de esperarse, el municipio retiró los carteles. Y esto podría haber sido el fin de la acción: un gesto provocativo y una pieza ingeniosa más en su cartera de diseño. Sin embargo, Walk Raleigh ha experimentado una metamorfosis inesperada desde que apareció por primera vez en el año 2012 al evolucionar hasta lo que hoy se conoce como Walk [Your City] (WalkYourCity.org), un ambicioso intento por extender la idea subyacente de este proyecto por todo el país y trabajar junto con el municipio y los funcionarios encargados de la planificación, en lugar de esquivarlos. Este año, la joven organización de Tomasulo recibió un subsidio de US$182.000 de la Fundación Knight, que ha desencadenado una nueva fase del proyecto, que incluye el despliegue de una serie de carteles con un mensaje particularmente meditado, en coordinación con los funcionarios de San José, California.
Este resultado tan sorprendente se debe en gran medida a la utilización de la tecnología de una forma perspicaz, y quizá, todavía más, a las aportaciones de unos pocos funcionarios de planificación que vieron el potencial que encerraba lo que podría haber sido un divertido pero efímero recurso publicitario.
El objetivo principal de la idea original de Tomasulo era sondear e intentar provocar un cambio en las percepciones existentes sobre caminar: Tomasulo se había topado con una interesante investigación, según la cual la gente a menudo decide no caminar sencillamente porque el lugar de destino “parece” estar más lejos de lo que realmente está.
Los centros más antiguos, como el de Raleigh, por lo general “pueden caminarse más de lo que la gente piensa”, indica Julie Campoli, diseñadora urbana y autora del libro Made for Walking: Density and Neighborhood Form (Hecho para caminar: Densidad y forma del barrio), publicado en 2012 por el Instituto Lincoln. Sin embargo, en muchos casos, décadas de ingeniería de tráfico han socavado la idea de la posibilidad de caminar por los entornos construidos, en donde la señalización está colocada para que la vean los conductores, y cuya información sobre distancias está expresada en un formato dirigido a los automóviles, es decir, en millas. Según Campoli, en su mayoría “las calles están diseñadas para los automóviles”.
Tomasulo realizó una investigación por su cuenta en Raleigh, preguntando a los vecinos y otras personas si, por ejemplo, estarían dispuestos a ir a cierto supermercado caminando en lugar de ir en automóvil si ello les llevara 14 minutos. La gente respondía: “Seguro… o, al menos algunas veces”, y Tomasulo les decía: “Bueno, en realidad el supermercado está a 12 minutos”. Según Tomasulo, “Tuve esta conversación una y otra vez. La gente me decía: ‘Siempre pensé que estaba muy lejos para ir caminando’”.
Por ello, los carteles originales de Tomasulo estaban colocados al nivel de los ojos de los peatones y describían las distancias en minutos hasta un destino en particular que podría interesarles. Tomasulo documentó y promovió el proyecto en Facebook. El entusiasmo que generó en la red social captó la atención de los medios de comunicación, lo que culminó nada menos que con la visita de un equipo de filmación de la BBC.
Fue entonces cuando Tomasulo se comunicó por Twitter con Mitchell Silver, por entonces director de planificación de Raleigh y expresidente de la Asociación Estadounidense de Planificación. Silver no sabía mucho acerca de Walk Raleigh, pero igualmente aceptó hablar con la BBC sobre lo buenas que eran las actividades que fomentaban el caminar, elogiando esta iniciativa como un ejemplo “genial”… que primero debería haber obtenido un permiso. Este documental despertó aún mayor atención. Y cuando, como resultado, se recibieron consultas sobre la legalidad de los carteles, el mismo Silver los retiró y se los devolvió a Tomasulo.
No obstante, Silver también reconoció la gran oportunidad. El plan integral a largo plazo de Raleigh ponía explícitamente énfasis en el fomento de los espacios para caminar (y para andar en bicicleta), una cuestión que tocaba de cerca a la población notablemente joven de este municipio, que crecía rápidamente (en ese entonces, cerca del 70 por ciento de la población tenía menos de 47 años de edad). “Realmente se volvió un tema crucial”, recuerda Silver. “¿Vamos a aceptar la innovación? ¿Walk Raleigh hizo algo incorrecto o nuestros códigos están desactualizados?”, se pregunta Silver, actualmente comisionado del Departamento de Parques y Recreación de la Ciudad de Nueva York. “La innovación pone a prueba las normas. Matt, sin darse cuenta, nos puso a prueba”.
¿Cuál fue la solución a corto plazo? Tomasulo podría donar sus carteles al municipio, que luego los reinstalaría según un “programa educativo piloto”. Para ayudar a Silver a convencer al Concejo Municipal, Tomasulo utilizó la herramienta de firma de peticiones en línea SignOn.org y recolectó 1.255 firmas en tres días. El Concejo aprobó unánimemente el regreso de Walk Raleigh.
Tomasulo fue un poco más allá (por entonces había concluido sus estudios, y tenía una maestría en planificación de ciudades y regiones por la Universidad de Carolina del Norte, sede de Chapel Hill, y otra maestría en arquitectura de paisajes por la Universidad Estatal de Carolina del Norte): recabó fondos por US$11.364 en Kickstarter y, junto con sus socios, construyó WalkYourCity.org, un sitio web en el que se ofrecen plantillas de carteles personalizables para cualquier persona y cualquier lugar. Como resultado, más de cien comunidades de municipios tanto grandes como pequeños de todo el país (y del exterior también) generaron proyectos dirigidos por los ciudadanos.
Esto no debería sorprender, en vista de lo que Campoli describe como un creciente interés, tanto entre los ciudadanos como los planificadores, en el fomento de espacios para caminar. Según Campoli, el movimiento de crecimiento inteligente ha reavivado el interés por formatos de ciudad compactos, “y, en los últimos diez años, se ha producido una convergencia en torno a esta idea del fomento de espacios hechos para caminar”. Particularmente entre grupos demográficos clave (especialmente la generación del milenio y aquellos en la etapa del nido vacío), ha surgido un reconocimiento de que la cultura del automóvil “ya no es tan maravillosa como se pensaba”, observa Campoli.
Y existe además una dimensión económica para las ciudades, según la autora. Una forma de medir esto es el creciente aumento de los valores inmobiliarios asociados con los formatos más compactos y que ofrecen más posibilidades de caminar.
El factor de impacto económico inspiró, hace poco, la oportunidad de cooperar con funcionarios de San José, lo que se destaca como un ejemplo sobre cómo el urbanismo táctico puede llegar a tener una influencia verdadera en la planificación. Sal Alvarez, de la Oficina de Desarrollo Económico de la ciudad, era seguidor de WalkYourCity.org como plataforma abierta en línea, pero destaca que “la ciudad probablemente retirará los carteles. En realidad se necesita un precursor dentro de la organización”. Tanto él como Jessica Zenk, del Departamento de Transporte de la ciudad, asumieron esta función en San José y rápidamente pusieron en marcha tres programas piloto.
Cada programa es concentrado y estratégico. El primero aprovecha la popularidad del Mercado de la Plaza de San Pedro, inaugurado recientemente: una concentración de restaurantes y negocios en el centro de la ciudad de 3 km2. Es un destino muy frecuentado, aunque la gente suele ir y venir en automóvil sin explorar mucho el lugar. Por lo tanto, se colocó una serie de 47 carteles que indican diferentes atracciones en el contiguo distrito de la “Pequeña Italia”, un parque con muchísimos senderos para caminar, el estadio donde juega el equipo de la Liga Nacional de Hockey y un segundo parque que ha sido objeto de medidas de revitalización continuas. El segundo proyecto llevado a cabo en el centro de la ciudad consistió en reclutar a una docena de voluntarios que ayudaran a colocar 74 carteles con el propósito de conectar el distrito artístico SoFA de la ciudad con otros lugares importantes a los que se puede llegar caminando, como el centro de convenciones.
La popularidad de estos dos experimentos inspiró a un concejal a proponer un tercer programa dirigido a un barrio fuera del centro propiamente dicho. El proyecto consiste en convertir una carretera de cuatro carriles en una de dos carriles, con un carril en el medio para girar y otro carril para bicicletas que permita dejar un poco de lado el viaje en automóvil. Tomasulo ha agregado una nueva serie de diseños de señales con códigos de color que indican específicamente otras infraestructuras alternativas al automóvil, tales como sitios de alquiler de bicicletas y paradas del tren de California (CalTrain). El municipio ha estado recabando información sobre el tránsito en relación con este proyecto, a fin de poder medir el impacto de los aproximadamente 50 carteles colocados en 12 intersecciones de calles. Según Alvarez, los carteles son herramientas útiles para fomentar los cambios culturales que ayudan a que los cambios en infraestructura se afiancen.
En términos más generales, los funcionarios de San José están trabajando junto con Tomasulo para “poner algunas herramientas más en la caja” de Walk [Your City], con el fin de motivar y ayudar a los entusiastas a encontrar a sus propios paladines dentro de cada municipio, para que estos proyectos contribuyan al proceso de planificación. “Si no logramos que el municipio acepte la idea en algún momento”, indica Capoli, “no obtendremos el cambio permanente que pretende alcanzar una actuación de corto plazo”.
En cuanto a Raleigh, el proyecto original está evolucionando y transformándose en un aspecto permanente del paisaje, con campañas completamente planificadas y controladas en cuatro barrios y la formación de una sociedad con la empresa Blue Cross & Blue Shield. Y este es un claro ejemplo de lo que Silver proponía: una ciudad que recibe con los brazos abiertos un proyecto de urbanización comunitario, en lugar de limitarse a reglamentar.
Sin embargo, el ejemplo de San José demuestra hasta qué punto el extremo opuesto también es importante: el urbanismo táctico puede recibir beneficios de las estructuras de planificación oficial. A Tomasulo se lo ve realmente satisfecho al observar que este proyecto pasó de ser un experimento “no autorizado” a lograr asociaciones activas con paladines dentro del municipio de San José y otros lugares. Tomasulo acuña un término para referirse a los funcionarios cuyo entusiasmo, creatividad y sabiduría práctica para lograr cosas rompe con todos los estereotipos comunes. “No son burócratas”, señala. “Son herócratas”.
Rob Walker (robwalker.net) colabora con Yahoo Tech, Design Observer y The New York Times.
Few low-income urban settlements in Venezuela are located on land owned by their occupants. As a result, the occupants cannot register the structures they have built and are entitled to only a substitute title (“título supletorio”) granting them limited rights. A legal interpretation handed down by the Supreme Court in the early 1970s has been upheld by repeated court decisions: transactions involving structures on land not owned by the builder cannot be registered without the landowner’s express consent (Pérez Perdomo and Nikken 1979, 38). This is a general legal principle, applicable not only to urban shacks but to all structures.
It could be said, however, that the inhabitants of houses built in the country’s squatter settlements enjoy possession of the land they occupy, though strictly speaking it is what former Venezuelan President Rafael Caldera and others have called a “precarious possession.” These settlements have considerable stability in some cases, less stability in others, and in certain cases there is no stability at all; occupants are evicted and their structures are demolished.
Peaceful occupations of land, and occasionally more aggressive invasions, are by no means a new development in Venezuela; such settlements have been prevalent since the 19th century. As a result, Venezuelan cities are characterized by their physical and social diversity:
Changing Conditions
Many observers wonder, when considering the legal status of the squatter settlements, why it has become “normal,” and to a substantial extent accepted, for Venezuelans to build houses or take up residence on lands assumed to be owned by others. Reactions to this complex situation can vary. It is striking that, in many instances, neither the presumed landowners nor the occupiers of these lands have taken the extreme responses available to each party-demands for eviction or expropriation by the owners or purchase of the land and legalization of its ownership by the occupiers. The presence of a parallel official law has permitted the establishment of settlements and improvement of housing conditions on “invaded” lands (Ontiveros & Bolívar 2000, 128-139). Furthermore, this pattern has become a chronic condition whose end is not demanded by any of the parties involved.
However, this tacit understanding has broken down in recent years, chiefly due to new requirements by banks, which refuse to lend to anyone who does not have registered ownership of the land. The World Bank’s involvement as a co-financier of urban renewal projects has also changed the status of the urban squatter settlements. The national Housing Policy Act (Article 14) now provides for the legalization of land holdings in the squatter settlements, and a team of specialists, mainly lawyers, is drafting a bill that would help make it possible to end the illegal status of Venezuelan urban squatter settlements. Some lower-income neighborhoods with commercially built housing would also be legalized by this action.
Obstacles to Legalization
In spite of these recent developments, procedures and mechanisms relating to urban squatter settlements have been created and modified over many years. The state’s inability to legalize these entrenched settlements can be attributed to a number of interacting factors.
Unclear Land Ownership
Former President Caldera has argued that the main reason for the continuing illegal status of squatter settlements is a lack of clarity as to who actually owns the invaded lands. He argues that, given this prevailing doubt and uncertainty about land ownership, the most important and urgent need is to provide public utilities and other basic public services to the occupiers. Legalization has not been a top priority in the process of consolidating squatter settlements. Nevertheless, there are other causes for the continuing absence of legalization, causes that are deeper and less visible.
Acceptance of the Status Quo
Since the expansion of urban squatter settlements in the 1940s and 1950s, it has been commonly assumed that eventually they would be controlled and demolished, though that has not occurred; they have simply been banished from city maps. The replacement of self-built settlements with standard housing developments has not gone beyond political rhetoric or electoral promises. Proof of this assertion is that half the residents of Venezuelan cities continue to live in these informal settlements.
A kind of official but informal law has emerged for the squatter settlements. Pérez Perdomo & Nikken explain “… how the State itself has contributed to the creation of a kind of informal legal order to meet the squatter settlements’ legal needs in relation to the ownership of housing” (1979, 2). This is a de facto, but not a de jure, acceptance of squatter settlements.
Does this mean that the residents of these settlements do not want legalization of ownership? We know that is not entirely true because they treat the land they possess as if it were their own. When the owner appears and wants to evict them, they fight back until the eviction order is stopped. As long as mere possession poses no risk of eviction, the residents remain satisfied and make no effective distinction between ownership and possession in their settlements. Furthermore, some are afraid of having to pay taxes and accept other obligations that would come with legalization of their status.
Provision of Services and Infrastructure
Further evidence of this acceptance of squatter settlements is the provision of public utilities, services and infrastructure by state agencies, though in most cases the services are considered “precarious” investments. This official attention to the settlements is convincingly illustrated in the work of Josefina Baldó (1996), although it is well known that such attention is provided only to a minimal degree and only in exchange for votes.
Researchers and policy makers from other countries, especially in Latin America, express surprise at the range of public services provided in Venezuelan urban squatter settlements that do not have legal recognition. Even more surprising is the progressive improvement of housing units as they are transformed from shacks into solid houses and even multistory buildings made of appropriate materials (Bolívar et al. 1994). This pattern is not unique to Venezuela, but it reflects the path chosen by the country’s leadership decades ago: a consistent policy of providing “precarious” public services for settlements whose occupation has been accepted, rather than first settling the issue of ownership. This policy has prevented, or at least slowed down, the legalization of the squatter settlements. In addition, improvements built by the residents are paid for by the government if the land is ever expropriated.
Bureaucratic and Legal Procedures
Venezuela is a country characterized by unequal access to the legal and administrative systems. Bureaucratic procedures consume a great deal of energy and are very costly. Accordingly, until a legal deed to property is required of them, most occupants appear content without it, and may even forget that such an option exists. It should also be noted that technical experts are not always available to determine ownership status and that incorrect diagnoses are not unusual.
Furthermore, legalization initiatives run up against the need to identify the true owners. It is necessary to specify the legal tradition of ownership and resolve questions of legally undivided plots (“tierras indivisas”), which traditionally have been dispersed among multiple owners by inheritance. However, there is a prevailing lack of sensitivity and ignorance of the law among court employees and the professionals retained resolve these cases. The laws are very strict, and hence very difficult to apply. The situation is further complicated by unprepared and sometimes corrupt bureaucrats, who may be prejudiced against and resent the “beneficiaries” of land cases, especially when they are illegal occupants of self-built neighborhoods.
Still another obstacle expressed by government officials has to do with the diverse sizes and shapes of land plots in the squatter settlements (Bolívar et al. 1994, 53-100). Some plots may be only 20 m2 in size, while others may cover thousands of square meters, making legalization extremely complicated. A land survey of each settlement would have to be taken, and in many cases their maps would have to be redrawn, implying a highly detailed and difficult challenge to city or state agencies.
Conclusions
Peaceful struggles by settlement residents to occupy land are seldom publicized, although some fights have resulted in the loss of human lives. Most of these battles are not recorded officially, but for those who work in this field they comprise indispensable documentation for the study of the legalization issue.
Given these obstacles and other factors, the political will to launch a legalization process is also lacking in many Venezuelan cities. The politicians who depend on patronage to remain in office have no interest in “resolving” the problem, since that would “kill the goose that lays the golden egg.” To date the occupation of land and subsequent acceptance of possession has been the prevailing pattern, but many observers believe it is imperative to overcome that pattern. To continue relying on the ambiguous position that only possession counts and that ownership is irrelevant is to condemn both the possessors and the owners to a permanent legal vacuum. In time this posture leads to urban chaos and a daily life for the inhabitants characterized by uncertainty, fear and violence.
REFERENCES
Baldó, J. 1996. “Urbanizar los barrios de Caracas.” En: Bolívar, T. y Baldó, J. (comps.), La cuestión de los barrios. Homenaje a Paul-Henry Chombart de Lauwe. Caracas: Monte Ávila Editores Latinoamericana, Fundación Polar y Universidad Central de Venezuela.
Bolívar, T., Guerrero, M., Rosas, I., Ontiveros, T., y De Freitas, J. 1994. Densificación y vivienda en los barrios caraqueños. Contribución a la determinación de problemas y soluciones. Caracas: Ministerio de Desarrollo Urbano/Consejo Nacional de la Vivienda.
Bolívar, T., Ontiveros, T., y De Freitas, J. 2000. Sobre la cuestión de la regularización jurídica de los barrios urbanos. Caracas: SEU/FAU/UCV e Instituto Lincoln (mimeo).
Ontiveros, T., y Bolívar, T. 2000. Vivienda y acceso al suelo urbano. ¿Institucionalización de un derecho oficial paralelo. En: Edesio Fernandes (coordinador), Derecho, espacio urbano y medio ambiente. Madrid: Instituto Internacional de Sociología.
Pérez Perdomo, R., y Nikken, P. 1979. Derecho y propiedad de la vivienda en los barrios de Caracas. Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela y Fondo de Cultura Económica.
Teolinda Bolívar Barreto is an architect and professor in the Department of Architecture, Central University of Venezuela, Caracas. The Lincoln Institute is supporting her research and educational programs on this topic. Translator Richard Melman contributed to this article.