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Land trusts across the United States differ vastly in terms of age, size of protected acreage, mission, strategy, budget, and context. Audrey Rust, an acknowledged conservation leader and the 2012 Kingsbury Browne Fellow at the Lincoln Institute, is in a unique position to parse the differences between two strikingly distinct yet successful preservation efforts in the American West. She served as president and CEO of the Peninsula Open Space Trust (POST) in Palo Alto, California, for 24 years until July 2011, and she is now a board member of the American Prairie Reserve (APR) in Bozeman, Montana.
APR is one of the nation’s most ambitious new conservation efforts, aiming to assemble 3.5 million acres and create the largest wildlife complex in the lower 48 states—in Montana, the nation’s fourth largest state with the seventh smallest population (just one million as of 2012). By contrast, POST encompasses only 2 percent of APR’s projected acreage, yet is considered remarkably successful for amassing 70,000 acres of very expensive open space, farms, and parkland in a densely settled region, from San Francisco to Silicon Valley, with more than seven million inhabitants.
Despite their dissimilar profiles, these organizations share a surprising number of similarities. In this Q&A with the Lincoln Institute, Rust compares POST’s and APR’s particular histories and characteristics, based on her first-hand experience with each organization, and offers some universal lessons for all involved in the difficult and challenging work of preserving open space.
Lincoln institute: How did the Peninsula Open Space Trust begin and what is its mission?
Audrey Rust: POST is a 35-year-old, traditional land trust in a dense metropolitan region, which has grown significantly since POST was founded in 1977. It began as a private conservation partner for the Midpeninsula Regional Open Space District, a public, tax-supported agency on the San Francisco Peninsula (figure 1). Working on the urban fringe, POST would raise private funds on behalf of the District and take on an occasional land donation project. To this day, all the territory it protects lies within a major metropolitan area.
Given POST’s densely populated location, it was essential from the beginning to immediately include opportunities for low-intensity public recreation and provide exposure to the biodiversity of the peninsula, where within a 12-mile transect one can pass through at least nine distinct ecosystems. POST works to assure a system of interconnected open lands in corridors along the San Francisco Bay, the Santa Cruz Mountains, and the Pacific Coast. No specific number of total acres is contemplated, unless a particular campaign is underway, but giving people a place to experience nature is a driving force.
Lincoln institute: How do the genesis and mission of the American Prairie Reserve compare?
Audrey Rust: Since it was founded in 2002, APR has amassed 274,000 acres but seeks to permanently protect some 3.5 million contiguous acres of short-grass prairie as a wildlife reserve in northeastern Montana—one of only four places on earth where such a conservation effort is possible (figure 2). The idea originated from research done by a group of nonprofit conservation organizations working in the northern Rockies, with science assistance from the World Wildlife Fund at the start.
APR is reintroducing plains bison that are free of cattle gene introgression and intends to develop a sustainable herd of 10,000 animals while restoring other native species including prairie dogs, black-footed ferrets, and burrowing owls. APR acquired a lot of land quickly, but it will take decades to reintroduce wildlife and foster significant growth of species populations.
Federal lands form a large part of the wildlife habitat APR is assembling. The Reserve lands are adjacent on the south to the Charles M. Russell National Wildlife Refuge and on the west to the Upper Missouri River Breaks National Monument, which figures prominently in our nation’s history as part of the Lewis and Clark expedition.
Lincoln institute: What are the key challenges for POST and APR?
Audrey Rust: Funding any conservation work is always the biggest challenge. The first hurdle is identifying potential donors and getting their attention. To do that, you need a clearly articulated vision and the ability to make the project relevant to the potential donor. Validation of the mission from a third respected party is key. You also need some means for the donor to experience the relevant work and feel appropriately included, in addition to a well-developed relationship that results in an appropriate request for support made at the right time.
Lincoln institute: What are the particular funding challenges at POST?
Audrey Rust: In the San Francisco Bay Area, millions of people see and appreciate how proximity to nature enhances their quality of life, but most do not know the role POST plays in assuring this; or, if they do know, they don’t necessarily feel moved to support POST’s work financially. Competition for philanthropic dollars within the small geographic area of Silicon Valley is intense. All the major conservation organizations, plus Stanford University’s powerful fundraising machine, operate in the area.
Fundraising takes a traditional course at POST. There is a well-developed annual giving program that moves many donors to the upper capital gift levels. Many of them are willing to lend their networks to the effort, and because of the successes of the organization and the existing donor list, people feel comfortable and supported by their community when making a gift. POST’s model has also depended on finding and creating public funds and then selling land or easements to a public entity, at or below the price paid by POST, allowing the organization to return donor funds to be used again and again.
POST also faces the challenge of success. Often leadership-level donors are ready to move on to new ideas and new environmental issues, seeing that their personal impact is not as visible as it would be in starting their own new organization. Some donors feel they have done their part, and now it’s someone else’s turn. New top leadership-level donors are as difficult as ever to attract.
Lincoln institute: How do APR’s mission and goals affect its fundraising strategy?
Audrey Rust: APR faces what is often called a “pipeline” problem. As a relatively new organization—and one where the potential donor population is both scattered and at a great distance from the Reserve—finding the right people has required many false starts and unproductive gatherings. It has been difficult to expose potential donors to the project in ways that can build a philanthropic relationship. Although board members are willing, only a few have networks that have proven productive for APR. It’s difficult and expensive to assess the real interest of a potential donor, estimate his or her likely gift level, and develop an ongoing relationship with a person who is geographically removed. As yet, status is not associated with being a supporter, and the enormity of the campaign goal ($300 million to $500 million) dwarfs even million-dollar gifts. Any practical campaign would need to attract a gift of $80 million to $100 million at the top of the fundraising pyramid.
Building a productive leadership-level prospect list is only worthwhile if meetings and relationships can happen. Geography creates difficulties when there are not enough people in one area, and efforts can’t be leveraged. Time is a key element in building the needed relationships.
Because of its rare size and scope, however, APR may have singular appeal to extremely wealthy individuals who, like the Rockefellers decades ago, could create this Reserve with their philanthropy alone. This is the unfulfilled dream of every executive director. Chances are slim, but history shows it is possible. APR’s model has never looked to public funding as a way to leverage private dollars, since the leased public lands are in some measure doing just that.
Another key funding challenge for APR is the scale of the project. Impact comes in increments of 50,000 or 100,000 acres in a landscape where conservation biologists have determined that a mixed-grass prairie would need to be approximately 5,000 square miles (roughly 3.2 million acres) to be a healthy, functioning ecosystem that supports the full complement of native prairie biodiversity.
Lincoln institute: How has the leadership at both organizations handled the funding challenges?
Audrey Rust: At both APR and POST, the first president/executive director, who also served as a board member, had a solid business background but no experience fundraising or running a nonprofit organization. The second board chair of both organizations was a successful venture capitalist and was viewed as a founder. All these leaders were charismatic and well-connected. Last but not least, both founding executive directors had to contribute or lend substantial funds to the organization to keep it afloat.
APR’s founding President Sean Gerrity is still at the helm after ten years, and his passion for conservation is undiminished. The time needed for extensive travel and meeting the financial needs of the organization was more than a full-time job, however, and none of the development professionals he hired could relieve his load. On the premise that potential donors want to meet someone with a title, two years ago Gerrity made a major change in how the organization functions by hiring two managing directors who are able to carry a significant fundraising and content load. The strategy requires regular telephone or in-person meetings to stay aligned on all aspects of the organization, but it’s working. Organizing around the managing director model has allowed APR staff to travel more and develop better donor relationships. Current personnel have been in place for fewer than two years, but they are making progress.
Lincoln institute: How did you weather the fundraising challenge at POST?
Audrey Rust: When POST hired me to replace Founding Executive Director Robert Augsburger in 1986, my first mission was to raise $2 million in a few months in order to exercise an option on a key coastal ranch, POST’s first truly independent project.
I understood the local donor community and had a good deal of experience in fundraising and nonprofit management. I was completely absorbed by the work and the need to meet our financial obligations. Although travel usually wasn’t necessary to raise funds, the proximity of potential donors meant that every weekend, every farmer’s market, every local event was an opportunity to connect. We undertook one major project after another, doing good conservation work and building momentum, but I was exhausted.
To solve this problem, I also found really good staff people. My approach, however, was traditional: Get enough money in the bank to hire adequate staff and ensure one of them was a young lawyer with potential to take on additional responsibilities and leadership. I would continue doing large-gift fundraising as well as oversee key land acquisition strategy and negotiation, and others would take over more of the day-to-day work and administration. The ability to grow the staff and delegate some of the work was a major step forward for me and the organization.
Lincoln institute: What has been POST’s basic approach to land acquisition and how has that affected its financial strategy?
Audrey Rust: Both POST and APR want to connect existing public lands through acquisition of adjacent, privately held property, and both have treated local conservation entities as key allies in the task of preserving biodiversity, providing public access, and creating a larger vision of a protected landscape. Their different basic land conservation strategies, however, lead to very different funding patterns and long-term financial impacts.
POST plans to transfer all the land it protects, and most of it will go into public ownership as federal, state, and county parks or to one of the regional open space districts for its management and permanent protection. Agricultural land, protected by strict conservation easements, is sold to local farmers. POST retains the easements along with an easement endowment fund to assure their monitoring and compliance.
The first project POST undertook in the late 1970s resulted in the gift and subsequent sale (at half the appraised value) of a highly visible property adjacent to the town where a high percentage of potential donors lived. The funds resulting from this sale allowed POST to save some additional lands. However, the organization progressed slowly for nearly a decade, with no real financially sustainable land protection strategy in place.
In 1986, driven by an opportunity to purchase a 1,200-acre coastal ranch, POST optioned the property, which required owner-financing, significant fundraising, and later statewide political action. Success led to the creation of a working capital fund that allowed POST to repeat a similar strategy several times, focusing on prominent and ambitious conservation projects. Gaining a reputation for delivering on its promises, POST transitioned to raising funds in a capital campaign for a much larger inventory of property. Having working capital freed POST to focus on what needed to be done, rather than what could be done.
Lincoln institute: What were the key accomplishments and shortfalls of POST’s strategy?
Audrey Rust: POST was able to build working capital and show donors a leveraged return. Success built on success, and today POST operates with a working capital account of more than $125 million. Protected land was never at any risk of being lost due to financial issues. The type of public funds used, coupled with private gifts, provide further assurances.
Each accomplishment has given POST the confidence to move to another level in direct protection, restoration, and collaboration. Sustainable forestry, affirmative easements on farmland, conservation grazing, and exotic species removal are all now a part of its conservation arsenal.
On the other hand, a broad vision of what the future could hold was never well articulated, as POST essentially worked in an incremental fashion. Stirring the imagination of leadership-level entrepreneurial donors, the primary wealth in the Valley, became more difficult as time went on. It was also difficult for the organization to embrace the restoration and management of land being held for later transfer.
As public funds have begun to dry up, public agencies are less likely to take on the obligation of additional land ownership. POST experiences both the expense of holding the property indefinitely and the inability to sell the land to return capital to its account.
Lincoln institute: What has been APR’s basic approach?
Audrey Rust: APR faces a different situation in Montana, where the privately held ranches are far larger than any parcel in the Santa Cruz Mountains, and their owners control additional vast tracks of federally owned leased land. APR intends to hold these private fee lands and leases in perpetuity. Privately raised endowment funds will be required to ensure the management of these lands.
APR wanted to show from the beginning that it could make real progress on its large conservation vision, despite the lack of funds. APR moved quickly to acquire land and the accompanying leases using owner financing. The leadership of the organization felt putting a stake in the ground was the only way to begin to attract the money it would need to acquire the property that would make up the Reserve. Without sufficient fundraising experience or a developed prospect list, the struggle was enormous. Until recently, only minimal funds were held in reserve, making it extremely stressful to meet financial obligations, especially for debt.
Lincoln institute: What are APR’s key accomplishments and ongoing challenges?
Audrey Rust: Persistence and good work are now paying off. Critical advances include the opportunity to acquire fees and associated leases on a 150,000-acre ranch and in 2012 a very important gift from one of the organization’s largest supporters. APR also began building a high-end “safari camp” to open in 2013 that will allow them to bring leadership-level donors to the prairie, build relationships, and deepen their connection to the land.
The organization has a track record, demonstrating its ability to get things done, and can begin management practices to foreshadow future activity. Reintroducing genetically pure bison is a charismatic example. Extraordinary opportunities for acquiring key pieces of land can now be pursued. Without significant working reserves, however, APR staff and leadership are under great stress to meet their financial obligations. This creates a climate of looking for quick delivery on donations rather than developing the kind of leadership gifts the organization needs most for the long haul. As yet, plans are incomplete for assuring the permanent private protection of the acquired lands. Land that carries owner financing or is especially well priced may be purchased, even though its priority for acquisition may not be high. Raising the necessary endowment funds for the ongoing stewardship of the land has been slow.
Lincoln institute: In conclusion, what are key commonalities between these two very different organizations?
Audrey Rust: POST and APR are at different stages in their organizational growth, and their futures are based on their most obvious differences and track records. However, it is possible to identify similar key elements leading to success:
Both organizations continue to face significant challenges in funding their goals. POST has successfully transitioned to new leadership and is pursuing ever larger and more complex conservation initiatives. Its success has dominated the organization for so long that it is difficult for new philanthropists to find something to “invent” and support. It is a very well-run organization, which leaves little room for the new Silicon Valley elite to provide their trademark “we can do it better” involvement. POST needs to do more to identify and attract those very few top-of-the-pyramid donors. This challenge is especially difficult because government participation has virtually ended, and POST’s three largest donors are no longer making grants, in the $20 million to $50 million range, to this type of conservation. Further, it is difficult to point to an endgame, and, without it, the organization will lose urgency and gift support.
APR is new and exciting. The organization has sought a creative partnership with National Geographic, which produced an hour-long video called The American Serengeti, elevating APR’s mission and bringing with it the national prominence APR needs to raise large gifts in the national arena. It is during this time that key leadership donors must become involved. In all nonprofit organizations, funding pyramids are becoming more and more vertical. Campaigns such as this one often depend upon one or two donors to make gifts equal to half or even two-thirds of the total goal. Without these donors, staff members are worn out by raising money, and the cost of fundraising rises rapidly.
I am convinced that the size, scope, and ability to measure the vision held by an organization are key determinants of success. Donors and the public in general are elevated by the idea that we can change our world. Clearly articulating and promoting that vision is instrumental. POST needs to work on its messaging to better articulate its current vision. APR needs to find more venues to effectively communicate its vision and develop a critical mass of supporters.
Conservation leader Audrey Rust, the 2012 Kingsbury Browne Fellow at the Lincoln Institute, will lecture on “The Peninsula and the Prairie: Regional and Large Landscape Conservation,” at Lincoln House on May 1, 2013, at noon (lunch is free).
In the aftermath of the Great Recession, the financing of U.S. public elementary and secondary education has become particularly challenging, given the close link between school finance and property taxation. Across the nation, the sharp drop in housing prices that triggered the recession led to reductions in property tax revenues. Public schools derive more than 80 percent of their local own-source revenue from the property tax (McGuire, Papke, and Reschovsky 2015), and nearly half of total property tax dollars collected in the United States are used to finance public elementary and secondary education (U.S. Census Bureau 2014, U.S. Census Bureau 2013).
As a means of encouraging new research on these issues, the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy organized a conference on “Property Tax and the Financing of K–12 Education” in Cambridge, MA, in October 2013. The Fall 2014 issue of Education Finance and Policy features five of the conference papers along with two additional works submitted as part of the journal’s call for papers for the special issue, which underwent the journal’s peer review process. We served as guest editors, working closely with the journal’s editors, Thomas A. Downes and Dan Goldhaber. Thanks to funding from the Lincoln Institute, the special issue is available for free downloading until January 2016 from the website of the Association of Education Finance and Policy (www.aefpweb.org/journal/free-fall-2014).
Challenges for Funding K-12 Education
Using revenue data from the National Center for Education Statistics (2014), we determined that in real per pupil terms, total revenues devoted to public education fell by 6.2 percent from September 2008 to June 2012. Although comprehensive figures are not yet available for the most recent years, existing evidence points to a continued decline in financial support for public education. Data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Quarterly Summary of State and Local Tax Revenue indicate that per capita real local government property tax revenues (for school and nonschool purposes) were 2.7 percent lower at the end of fiscal year 2014 than they were at the end of fiscal year 2011. And a survey conducted by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities found that, in at least 35 states, real per-student state education aid was lower in fiscal year 2014 than in fiscal year 2008 (Leachman and Mai 2014).
Many school districts around the country responded to reduced revenues by laying off employees. In fact, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2013) reports that between the employment peak in June 2009 and the trough in October 2012, education employment by local governments fell by 357,400—a decline of 4.4 percent. During this same period, public school enrollment grew by 0.9 percent (National Center for Education Statistics 2013).
Current projections signal significant increases in both K–12 enrollment and cost per pupil. The National Center for Education Statistics (NCES 2013) projects that per pupil expenditures will increase from an average of $10,518 in the 2009–10 school year to $12,530 in 2021–22. The NCES also projects substantial increases in public school enrollment, although growth projections for specific states vary and are generally much higher for the southern and western states (8.9 percent and 12.7 percent from 2010 to 2021) than for the Northeast and Midwest (2.2 percent and 2.4 percent). Although public policies and priorities can change, based on current policies and revenue projections, it is unlikely that revenues in support of public education will grow fast enough to match the projected growth in student enrollment and in costs.
National data indicate that in 2011–12, 10 percent of total public education revenue came from the federal government, with the rest split fairly evenly between state and local government sources (U.S. Census Bureau 2014). Federal government programs in support of education are classified as domestic discretionary expenditures. While to date Congress has done little to rein in the growth of spending on entitlement programs, it has mandated strict limits on the growth of domestic discretionary expenditures through the Budget Control Act of 2011 and the fiscal year 2014 Congressional budget agreement. The Congressional Budget Office (2013) predicts that, relative to GDP, domestic discretionary spending will decline through at least 2023. Given these overall spending caps, along with competition from other pressing domestic needs, reductions in real per pupil federal education support appear likely.
School funding systems vary tremendously across states, and future trends in state support for public education will differ greatly across states as well. However, many state governments face several long-run structural problems that are likely to constrain future state funding for public education. On the revenue side, many states have narrow sales tax bases that exclude many services and, as a result, fail to grow proportionally to their economies. The revenue problems are exacerbated by the inability of states to collect sales taxes on many Internet and mail order purchases. In the past few years, a number of states have adopted individual income tax cuts. These tax cuts have generally been enacted with no offsetting revenue increases, or they have been funded using revenue from one-time state budget surpluses.
On the spending side, funding for K–12 education must compete with other priorities. In many states, spending on Medicaid will grow faster than state tax revenues, a trend influenced in part by the aging of the population. Many states are also facing large and growing unfunded pension liabilities. Addressing these unfunded liabilities will undoubtedly require substantial increases in state government pension contributions. Although polls indicate that voters favor increased spending on education over spending in other areas, unless state governments make politically difficult decisions to increase taxes, states’ growing Medicaid and pension obligations may crowd out spending on K–12 education (Pew Research 2011).
With diminished prospects for growth in funding from federal and state governments, local school districts will likely play an increasingly important role in funding public education. Increasing local government funding for public education will require the politically difficult step of increasing property taxes, or, if that proves impossible, the development and widespread adoption of alternative sources of local government revenue. Neither strategy will be easy to implement.
This rather bleak picture of the prospects for public education funding raises a number of research questions. For example, can state governments adopt policies that would make the property tax more publicly acceptable? What role do alternative local sources of revenue play in funding public education? Can their role be increased? Is it possible to design state education aid systems that result in a more steady flow of state aid during economic downturns? Can state policies aimed at providing property tax relief be made more effective? Can state aid systems be reformed in ways that increase the educational opportunities of all students? The Property Tax and the Financing of K–12 Education considers these and other questions.
Conclusion
Three central themes emerge from this special issue. The first is the potential for unintended consequences to arise from state legislation. Eom et al. find that New York’s prominent property tax relief program, STAR, induces voters to increase school spending and raise property taxes, thereby undercutting much of the intended property tax relief. Jeffrey Zabel finds that property tax overrides in Massachusetts have led to increased racial segregation. And Phuong Nguyen-Hoang finds that the use of TIFs in Iowa has led to modest reductions in education spending.
A second theme is the potential for state school finance and property tax policies to provide greater advantages for high-wealth or high-income school districts than for low-wealth or low-income districts. In some cases, this pro-wealthy tilt is an explicit program feature. For example, the sales price differential adjustment factor in STAR channels a disproportionate amount of property tax relief to the wealthiest school districts. Likewise, Michigan’s state aid system sends about 7 percent more state aid per pupil to the wealthiest districts. In other cases, the tilt toward wealthier districts arises in more indirect ways. Chakrabarti et al. find that high-wealth school districts are likelier to increase property tax revenues in response to cuts in state aid. Zabel notes that higher income towns are more likely to pass property tax overrides. Nguyen-Hoang finds that TIFs have a greater negative effect on school spending in low-income or low-wealth districts than in high-income or high-wealth districts. Finally, Nelson and Gazley find that well-off districts are more likely to receive revenue from school-supporting nonprofits, and their per-pupil contributions tend to be higher.
A third theme is the enduring importance of the property tax as a funding source for public education in the United States. Papers by both Nelson and Gazley and by Downes and Killeen demonstrate that non-tax revenue plays a relative minor role in the funding of public schools. And no evidence suggests that the share of revenue from student fees and charges, school-supporting nonprofits, or from miscellaneous non-tax revenues has increased during or after the Great Recession.
These findings suggest that in order to ensure sufficient funding for public education into the future, efforts should be made to make the property tax a more appealing source of revenue. These property tax improvements might include the expansion of well-designed targeted property tax relief programs, such as circuit breakers, the adoption of property tax deferral programs for taxpayers facing high property tax burdens or rapid increases in their property tax bills, and improvements in tax administration that focus on increased transparency.
Given the great diversity in school finance and property tax systems across the U.S. and the fiscal challenges ahead, the papers in this special issue cannot possibly provide insights into the full range of policies needed to assure adequate and equitable funding for public education. However, it is our hope that these papers will be thought-provoking for both policy makers and researchers, and also inspire additional research on property taxation and school funding.
Contents
Introduction to Special Issue on the Property Tax and the Financing of K–12 Education
Daphne A. Kenyon and Andrew Reschovsky
Did Cuts in State Aid During the Great Recession Lead to Changes in Local Property Taxes?
Rajashri Chakrabarti, Max Livingston, and Joydeep Roy
Michigan and Ohio K–12 Educational Finance Systems: Equality and Efficiency
Michael Conlin and Paul Thompson
The Unintended Consequences of Property Tax Relief: New York’s STAR Program
Tae Ho Eom, William Duncombe, Phuong Nguyen-Hoang, and John Yinger
Unintended Consequences: The Impact of Proposition 2½ Overrides on School Segregation in Massachusetts
Jeffrey Zabel
Tax Increment Finance and Education Expenditures: The Case of Iowa
Phuong Nguyen-Hoang
The Rise of School-Supporting Nonprofits
Ashlyn Aiko Nelson and Beth Gazley
So Slow to Change: The Limited Growth of Non-Tax Revenues in Public Education Finance, 1991–2010
Thomas Downes and Kieran M. Killeen
About the Authors
Daphne A. Kenyon, Ph.D., is an economist who is a fellow at the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy and principal of D. A. Kenyon & Associates.
Andrew Reschovsky, Ph.D., is a fellow at the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy and a professor emeritus at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.
References
Congressional Budget Office. 2013. Updated Budget Projections: Fiscal Years 2013 to 2023. Washington, DC (May). www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/44172-Baseline2.pdf.
Leachman, Michael and Chris Mai. 2014. “Most States Funding Schools Less Than Before the Recession,” Washington, DC: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Updated September 12. www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=4011.
McGuire, Therese J., Leslie E. Papke, and Andrew Reschovsky. 2015. “Local Funding of Schools: The Property Tax and Its Alternatives,” chapter 22 in Handbook of Research on Education Finance and Policy, revised edition, edited by Helen F. Ladd and Margaret Goertz, Routledge, 376–391.
National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). 2014. “National Public Education Financial Survey Data,” School Year 2010–11. http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/stfis.asp.
National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). 2013. “Projections of Education Statistics to 2021.” http://nces.ed.gov/programs/projections/projections2021/index.asp.
Pew Research. 2011. “Fewer Want Spending to Grow, But Most Cuts Remain Unpopular.” Center for People and the Press. February 10. www.people-press.org/2011/02/10/fewer-want-spending-to-grow-but-most-cuts-remain-unpopular.
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2013. Table B-1a: Employees on Non-Farm Payrolls by Industry Sector and Selected Industry Detail, Seasonally Adjusted. Current Employment Statistics, Establishment Data. www.bls.gov/web/empsit/ceseeb1a.htm.
U.S. Census Bureau. 2013. 2011 Annual Survey of State and Local Government Finance, State and Local Government Data. www.census.gov/govs/local/.
U.S. Census Bureau. 2014. 2012 Data, Public Elementary-Secondary Education Finance Data. www.census.gov/govs/school/.
