Infrastructure upgrades and facilities are desperately needed around the world, but governments often struggle to pay for the high costs of developing and maintaining them. The newly published Lincoln Institute book Infrastructure Economics and Policy: International Perspectives includes two chapters that address issues related to infrastructure finance, including the development of innovative and replicable financing models.
Basics of Infrastructure Finance
In Chapter 9, economist Akash Deep of the Harvard Kennedy School explains why financing is a key challenge in infrastructure development. Governments must typically pay the costs of infrastructure up front, while the benefits are spread out over many years. This difference between the timing of costs and benefits is generally bridged through borrowing.
It is important to note that financing differs from funding. The funder is the entity that ultimately bears the cost of the infrastructure, either the general public (in the form of taxes) or the direct users (in the form of user charges). Those who finance the project are the borrowers and lenders who reconcile the timing of the benefits and costs. Those borrowers and lenders can be public or private. The capital structure can be determined to reflect the riskiness, and the cost of financing, and thereby the financial value of infrastructure. Proper structuring and risk allocation can make infrastructure finance more efficient and less risky.
Because infrastructure investments often have a long payback period, investors are typically less interested in infrastructure than other assets. Deep illustrates the potential for innovation in financing infrastructure, including efforts to tap the huge and growing savings in insurance and pension funds. Managers of such funds prefer the combination of modest but stable long-term returns that infrastructure offers, but they are often required to maintain their debt portfolio at investment grade or higher. One solution developed by the European Investment Bank is to provide direct financing (in the form of subordinated debts) or financial guarantees to make the investment less risky for insurance and pension funds.
A more widely imitated innovation is infrastructure funds modeled after those pioneered by Australia’s Macquarie Group in 1996. The Macquarie Group introduced features such as pooling equity from multiple projects, active asset management, financial engineering, and listing on capital markets–reforms that made infrastructure equity funds more liquid and especially attractive for pension funds. Infrastructure funds have attracted both institutional and retail investors, thereby significantly expanding the pool of equity available for infrastructure investment.
Infrastructure Finance through Land Value Capture (LVC)
The benefits and costs of infrastructure are typically specific to the location where the project will occur. In urban locations, where the supply of land is limited and the infrastructure on it is often immobile, the benefits created by infrastructure often result in an increase in the value of land. In such cases, the public sector can fund infrastructure improvements by imposing property taxes, selling development permissions, or utilizing similar measures to capture all or part of the uplift in land value that the improvements create. Such measures ensure that the parties who benefit from the improvements pay to support them.
Chapter 10, written with Yu-Hung Hong, former director of the Samuel Tak Lee Real Estate Entrepreneurship Lab at MIT, and Du Huynh of Fulbright University Vietnam, examines the record of land value capture around the world. Value capture is especially promising in developing countries, which have enormous infrastructure needs but fewer alternative funding sources. Chapter 10 focuses on the experiences of Brazil and Vietnam with one of the most important types of value capture—the sale of development rights.
The case of São Paulo, Brazil, is internationally known and widely praised; the city developed a market-oriented value capture program, auctioning Certificates of Additional Construction Potential, or CEPACs, to developers in exchange for the right to build at greater density in designated areas. The city has used the proceeds to pay for affordable housing, transportation upgrades, and other public goods.
The case of Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, is more controversial: through ad hoc procedures, the city sold the development rights to convert rural land for urban development. Both cases confirm that sales of development rights can generate substantial proceeds, often more than enough to pay for the extra infrastructure needed for the associated development. But the examples also show that successful implementation requires a clear and widely accepted delineation of property rights. Also important are a system of registries and impartial courts to record and protect those rights, a realistic and reasonably detailed land use master plan, and politically skilled sponsors.
As both chapters illustrate, governments around the world are finding innovative ways to finance infrastructure. Given the urgent need for global infrastructure investments and upgrades, these methods should be more widely implemented and embraced.
Several major sources of radical uncertainty are currently affecting the performance of infrastructure and will likely shape infrastructure in the future: climate change, automation, the sharing economy, and the COVID-19 pandemic. Our book, Infrastructure Economics and Policy: International Perspectives, recently published by the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, attempts to determine how the infrastructure sector should cope with these radical uncertainties.
Three chapters of the book assess the impacts of climate change, automation, and the sharing economy, respectively, and discuss how public policies should respond to these challenges. The COVID-19 pandemic erupted while we were preparing the book, and little evidence was available on which to assess its impacts on infrastructure. These impacts are becoming increasingly clear now as data and empirical studies are emerging, and we have included our thoughts on them below.
Climate Change
Severe weather conditions and natural disasters due to climate change can seriously disrupt infrastructure services and damage or destroy infrastructure facilities, from transit lines to power lines. These impacts typically vary from one locality to another. For example, forest fires are a major concern in California, while rising sea levels are more important to Miami. As a result, Henry Lee, the author of chapter 18 of the book and a faculty member at the Harvard Kennedy School, argues that effective adaptation policies will mainly emerge at lower levels of government, in a bottom-up process.
Lee predicts that the magnitude of investments in climate-resilient infrastructure over the next few decades will be unprecedented. He discusses the characteristics of these investments and the scope of the transitions that will be required in the transportation, electricity, and water sectors. After identifying the governance challenges that underlie all climate mitigation and adaptation options, Lee proposes changes in governance to enable more effective planning, delivery, and management of infrastructure. His main messages are as follows:
Honoring the commitments made by many nations to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050 will require unprecedented investments in infrastructure.
Local governments are likely to lead in developing adaptive policies, since the nature and extent of climate damages vary so much by location.
The electricity sector will be by far the most affected by efforts to mitigate emissions as electricity replaces direct burning of fossil fuels for mobility, heating, cooling, and manufacturing and as countries shift to solar, wind, and other renewable sources that require more sophisticated and extensive grids and standby capacity to remain reliable.
In the water sector, changes in precipitation will require some areas to import water, increase desalinization, or encourage conservation by raising prices.
Transportation infrastructure will be the least affected, although many vehicles are likely to be powered by electricity or hydrogen.
For these investments to succeed, four changes in the governance of infrastructure are needed: (1) reduce the number of agencies and levels of government with overlapping responsibilities; (2) streamline the process for siting facilities; (3) address stranded financial and human assets; and (4) reduce the bias for spending on disaster relief rather than disaster prevention.
Autonomous Vehicles
The second radical uncertainty examined in the book is automation and other new technologies that have emerged rapidly in recent years, thanks to advancements in information technologies such as cloud computing, the internet of things, and artificial intelligence. Whether these new technologies will revolutionize the infrastructure sector is the central question examined in chapter 19 by Shashi Verma, director of strategy and chief technology officer at Transport for London (TfL). Verma reminds us that fundamental infrastructure change typically comes only very slowly. Then, using autonomous vehicles (AV) as a case study, he discusses the economics of AVs, the likely impacts of automation on other modes and consumer behavior, and the institutional challenges it faces before its widespread acceptance. He offers the following advice:
AVs may prove to be among the rare fundamental changes in infrastructure technology, on par with the invention of the internal combustion engine, and especially disruptive to our cities.
Policy makers should take actions to prepare for the arrival of the technology, including licensing, allocation of road space, economic support to public transportation, and control over pricing structure.
Between one-half and three-quarters of the cost of a taxi ride covers hiring the driver. If AVs could save on driver cost, this would stimulate an increase in travel and pose an existential threat to public transportation. The latter would be competitive with AVs only during peak hours and even then, only where it is protected from traffic congestion.
Road congestion would likely increase greatly with the rising use of AVs unless there is a large increase in ride-sharing. The only unmitigated benefit would be a large reduction in the land required for parking.
The Sharing Economy
The third radical uncertainty examined in the book is the sharing economy. Sharing is an economic model of acquiring, providing, or sharing access to goods and services using online platforms. What impacts might the sharing economy have on infrastructure services and assets? In chapter 20, authors Andrew Salzberg and O.P. Agarwal explore this question using a case study of urban transportation. Salzberg is responsible for public policy at Transit, a leading public transportation app in North America, and before that worked as an executive at Uber. Agarwal served in the Indian Administrative Service and the World Bank and is currently chief executive officer of World Resources Institute India.
Over the last decade, new methods of sharing motor vehicles (Zipcar, Car2Go, Uber, Lyft, DiDi, Ola, and others) and smaller motorized electric vehicles like e-bikes and scooters (Bird, Lime, Gojek, etc.) have grown rapidly around the globe. Salzberg and Agarwal discuss the potential benefits, costs, and risks of shared vehicles, and argue that the sharing economy model has the potential to improve the use of fixed assets and thereby allow wider access to services. However, the current experience of shared vehicles in the U.S. indicates that the market penetration remains tiny, as most people still prefer individualized mobility services. Therefore, whether the service will grow to a significant size remains uncertain. The authors predict that new regulations will emerge to address the disruptive impact of this model on traditional businesses. More important, public policies related to road and parking pricing and congestion charges will be crucial to the future of the sharing economy in the urban transportation sector. Their chapter also delivers the following specific messages:
The sharing economy is not an altruistic neighbor-to-neighbor exchange, but a digital transaction connecting asset owners with users by taking advantage of improvements in technology.
In theory, car sharing could greatly increase asset utilization, since personal cars are used only about five percent of the time. Simulations have shown that a ubiquitous shared vehicle network—using right-sized vehicles, potentially including AVs, and moving 100 percent of motorized travel—could dramatically reduce peak-hour congestion, the number of vehicles on the road, and the roadway and parking infrastructure needed to accommodate a given quantity of passenger travel. These model results are optimistic, however, in that they assume that travelers will shift to a sharing mode that is highly efficient from a systemic perspective. In reality, the long-term decline in carpooling suggests how difficult it is to convince two or more people to ride together in the back of a car.
Infrastructure managers could encourage sharing by imposing per-vehicle congestion charges or by designating priority lanes for carpools.
The future of micromobility services, such as electric scooters and bikes, seems especially dependent on designating street space where the vehicles could be safely operated by people with different levels of skill.
The COVID-19 Pandemic
During the production of the book, researchers were actively studying both the effects of infrastructure on pandemic severity as well as the effects of the pandemic on infrastructure. One of the first studies of the former appears in chapter 3, in which the World Bank’s Sameh Wahba, Somik Lall, and Hyunji Lee argue that infrastructure shortages and affordability challenges have exacerbated exposure and community contagion risk from COVID-19 across poor neighborhoods in developing cities around the world. Many other cities, including some of the major cities in China and Europe, adopted the opposite policy of attempting to reduce contagion by deliberately limiting access to infrastructure through lockdowns, quarantines, and other similar measures. How successful these measures have been in reducing the spread of disease and whether those reductions are worth their often-substantial economic costs is a matter of continuing and intense debate. Other emerging takeaways include:
Public transit systems around the world lost much of their ridership and passenger revenues. Moreover, these systems seem unlikely to be able to fully bounce back even after the pandemic is over. Former riders are now more used to working at home and meeting online, and are more inclined to view riding on crowded public transportation as a health hazard.
The consequences of a long-term shift from public transit to driving would be a financial disaster for public transit operators and traffic gridlock in our largest and most congested cities. It is important to consider what public policies are required to revitalize public transit systems, and to enable them to cope with future pandemics.
A likely increase in public infrastructure spending is an important part of post-pandemic economic recovery programs. The primary objectives of these programs are to increase employment and revitalize the economy, and this funding can speed up the delayed construction of public infrastructure works, clear maintenance backlogs, and perhaps finance some “shovel-ready” projects. The key question is whether this is the right time for increased public investment for new mega-infrastructure projects.
Policy makers often assume that infrastructure investment would have significant multiplier effects on other parts of the economy. However, a review of empirical analyses of economic stimulus programs, presented in chapter 2—authored by Gregory Ingram (former president of the Lincoln Institute) and Zhi Liu—suggests that in developed economies, infrastructure spending has little stimulus effect in the first several years, after which the economy is likely to have begun growing again anyway. These analyses find little to no short-term economic impacts, even when the long-term economic impacts are clearly positive. The small short-term impacts are due in part to the substantial time required to prepare and construct a project and in part to the crowding out of private investment by public investment. Therefore, it is important to select and include the most valuable and shovel-ready projects in the stimulus programs.
José A. Gómez-Ibáñez is the Derek C. Bok Professor Emeritus of Urban Planning and Public Policy at Harvard University. Zhi Liu is senior fellow and director of the China Program at the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
Image: A woman in the back seat of a rideshare. Credit: halbergman via GettyImages.
Lincoln Institute Sessions at the 2022 IAAO Annual Conference
The annual conference of the International Association of Assessing Officers (IAAO) offers state and local assessing officials the opportunity to hear varied perspectives on property tax issues from practitioners and valuation experts. This year, the Lincoln Institute will present two sessions for conference participants on current issues in valuation and property tax policy:
The Property Tax in Focus: Are Assessments and Property Taxes Equitable?
A number of recent studies have found lower-value residences assessed at higher proportions of sale price than higher-value properties. This plenary session will review these findings, consider the complexities of measuring vertical equity in assessment, and explore potential improvements and policy tools that can make the property tax more equitable.
Policies that Promote Equity: Lincoln Institute Report on Residential Property Tax Relief
Fair and effective residential relief is essential for a successful property tax system. This session discusses policy options to address concerns with affordability, volatility, fiscal disparities, and other challenges. It considers the experiences of specific jurisdictions and offers recommendations that strengthen the equity and efficiency of the tax.
Detalles
Fecha(s)
Agosto 30, 2022
Time
11:00 a.m. - 2:30 p.m.
Location
Hynes Convention Center 900 Boylston Street Boston, MA United States
avalúo, desarrollo económico, valor del suelo, impuesto a base de suelo, temas legales, gobierno local, salud fiscal municipal, tributación inmobilaria, finanzas públicas, tributación, valuación, impuesto a base de valores
Public Schools and the Property Tax: A Comparison of Education Funding Models in Three U.S. States
The massive shutdown of K–12 schools sparked by the COVID-19 pandemic has no precedent in U.S. history. By the end of the 2019–2020 school year, at least 50.8 million public school students had been affected by school closures (Education Week 2020). Although schools closed during the 1918 influenza pandemic, fewer children attended school then and schools were not as integral to daily life (Sawchuk 2020). This time, almost overnight, the national education system shifted dramatically. Teachers were required to adapt lessons to virtual meeting platforms. The forced rapid transition to online methods led to learning loss or unfinished learning for many students. The pandemic exacerbated existing disparities and created new challenges for students of color, English language learners, and students with disabilities.
The pandemic also sparked a temporary shift in national education funding as the country experienced one of the deepest economic downturns in its history. Vigorous federal fiscal policy helped make it the shortest recession in the country’s history as well, and as part of this economic rescue effort, Congress funneled hundreds of billions of dollars to education. These funds came via the March 2020 CARES Act; a second infusion sent to state and local governments in December 2020; and the American Rescue Plan Act of March 2021, which contained another $350 billion for state and local governments plus about $130 billion specifically for K–12 education. Altogether in the first year of the pandemic, the federal government provided an unprecedented amount of aid for public K–12 education, equivalent to about $4,000 per student (Griffith 2021).
Although this lessened the fiscal impact of the pandemic in the near term, it did not permanently alter the federal government’s traditionally modest role in funding K–12 education. Public schools are typically supported by a combination of state aid and local funding. The property tax has been the single largest source of local revenue for schools in the United States, reflecting a strong culture of local control and a preference for local provision.
An Ideal Local Funding Source
Property taxation and school funding are closely linked in the United States. In 2018–2019, public education revenue totaled $771 billion. Nearly half (47 percent) came from state governments, slightly less than half (45 percent) from local government sources, and a modest share (8 percent) from the federal government. Of the local revenue, about 36 percent came from property taxes. The remaining 8.9 percent was generated from other taxes; fees and charges for things like school lunches and athletic events; and contributions from individuals, organizations, or businesses.
In many ways, the property tax is an ideal local tax for funding public education. In a well-structured property tax system, without complex or confusing property tax limitations, the tax is both visible and transparent. Voters considering a local expenditure, such as for a new elementary school, will have clear information on benefits and costs. The property tax base is immobile; by contrast, shoppers can easily avoid a local sales tax by driving a few miles and businesses can avoid liability for local income taxes by relocating office headquarters.
The property tax is also a stable tax, as evidenced by its performance relative to the sales tax and income tax each time the economy falls into a recession. Since state governments rely predominantly on sales and income taxes, states often cut aid to schools in recessions in order to balance their budgets. This means that in most recessions public schools increase their reliance on property tax revenues to make up for declining state school aid (see figure 1).
But the property tax as a source of school funding has not been without controversy. In the 1970s, public recognition that disparities in the relative size of local tax bases can lead to differences in the level and quality of public services ignited a national debate about the importance of equal access to educational opportunity. As the single largest source of local revenue, the property tax became the main target in this debate, giving rise to proposals that sought to reduce schools’ reliance on local property taxes and increase the state share of education spending to mitigate educational disparities. Between 1976 and 1981, the local property tax share of national education revenues declined from approximately 40 percent to 35 percent (McGuire, Papke, and Reschovsky 2015). But in the three decades since, the role of the local property tax in school funding has remained remarkably stable, never deviating much from that 35 percent.
In recent years, increased public concern about rising inequality has amplified the debate about ensuring equal access to educational opportunities and adequate funding to address the needs of all students, especially those in traditionally disadvantaged groups. Some suggest that an increase in state aid would accomplish this goal, but there are conflicting results in the literature as to whether centralizing school funding by substituting state aid for local property tax increases or decreases per-pupil spending and equity. With the pandemic forcing a reconsideration of school funding formulas, including those based on enrollment (see sidebar), the following excerpted case studies of Michigan, California, and Massachusetts offer examples that may be helpful to places considering the best way to provide an adequate and equitable education for all. Massachusetts relies heavily on the property tax to fund schools, while California and Michigan rely heavily on state aid (see table 1).
SCHOOL ENROLLMENT AND FUNDING FORMULAS
When the pandemic thrust students across the country into remote and hybrid learning, many public schools lost enrollment. For the 2020–2021 school year, enrollment was down 3 percent nationwide compared to 2019–2020. Declines were uneven across states and student groups, with the largest drops among pre-K and kindergarten students and among low-income students and students of color (NCES 2021). Since state aid for public schools is linked to the number of students attending or enrolled, a slump in attendance or enrollment can reduce that revenue. In response to these enrollment declines, many states adopted short-term policies to hold school districts harmless. Delaware and Minnesota, for example, provided extra state funding for declining districts. Many states, including New Hampshire and California, used prepandemic enrollment to calculate state aid (Dewitt 2021; Fensterwald 2021). Texas announced hold-harmless funding to districts that lost attendance if they maintained or increased in-person enrollment, in an effort to bolster in-person learning. All of these provisions are temporary, and states are waiting to see if enrollment will recover in 2022–2023. If it doesn’t, the data suggest that reduced funding for schools with the highest enrollment declines will disproportionately affect Black and low-income households (Musaddiq et al. 2021). These fiscal and equity concerns are causing educators to rethink the measurement of attendance and enrollment, and its link to funding.
Michigan: A Tax Swap
Michigan voters passed a proposal in 1994 that reduced reliance on the local property tax, shifting much of the state’s school funding to the sales tax and other taxes while restructuring state aid to schools. Research suggests this shift led to increased spending in the short term that improved some educational outcomes, but also resulted in a distribution of funds that did not reach the students who most need support.
Michigan voters had considered and defeated a series of proposals to restructure property taxes and school funding before approving Proposal A in 1994, which reduced reliance on the property tax and raised the sales tax to pay for that property tax relief. This “tax swap” greatly increased state education aid in the year of implementation and for some years after, changed the basic state aid formula, and changed the way state education aid is targeted.
The state raised the sales tax from 4 to 6 percent, depositing the revenue into the School Aid Fund. It obtained additional revenue from the income tax, real estate transfer tax, tobacco taxes, liquor taxes, the lottery, and a new state government property tax known as the State Education Tax. Local property taxes levied for school operating costs, which had averaged a rate of 3.4 percent before Proposal A, were eliminated; the state mandated a 1.8 percent local property tax rate on nonhomestead property, and all property became subject to the 0.6 percent State Education Property Tax.
State aid under Proposal A explicitly targeted low-spending districts. Increases in state funding were phased in over time, with substantial increases for low-spending districts, without reducing the funding of initially high-spending districts. In addition, school districts were allowed only limited options for supplementing education spending (Courant and Loeb 1997).
Because Michigan’s tax swap was enacted so long ago, we can observe the impacts of three recessions on state aid and local property tax funding. During the 1990–1991 and 2000–2001 recessions, reliance on state aid decreased while reliance on the local property tax increased. In the Great Recession, reliance on state aid decreased and reliance on the local property tax decreased slightly. The fact that the property tax was less effective as a backstop in the Great Recession is likely due to uniquely restrictive property tax limits in the state.
Michigan’s property tax is subject to all three main types of property tax limits: rate, levy, and assessment. In addition, one provision of the levy limit is particularly restrictive: not only does it require reductions in tax rates when the property tax base grows rapidly (“Headlee rollbacks”), but unlike most state levy limits, it prohibits increased tax rates without an override vote when the property tax base grows slowly or declines. This had a very constraining effect on property tax revenues during the Great Recession, when property values declined (Lincoln Institute 2020).
Although real per-pupil education revenue increased at a faster rate just after passage of Proposal A, beginning with the recession of 2000–2001, real state aid declined for many years, leading to slower growth or declines in total real per-pupil revenue and in educational expenditures per pupil (see figure 2). An empirical study to analyze the impacts of Proposal A on revenue and spending in K–12 education concludes that “the reform increases the level of school revenue and spending at the state level only in the first two years of the reform; the reform eventually decreases it two years after and onwards” (Choi 2017, 4).
Importantly, a tax swap may not create a more equitable school finance system. The school finance restructuring in Proposal A did reduce the disparities in school spending per pupil among school districts (Wassmer and Fisher 1996). This equalization was primarily accomplished by using state aid to raise per-pupil spending of the lowest-spending districts and placing some restrictions on spending on the highest-spending districts. But Michigan’s Proposal A was not designed to target aid to the children or the school districts most in need. It targeted additional school aid to previously low-spending school districts, which tended to be middle-income and rural.
An evaluation of the equity and adequacy of school funding systems across the United States concluded that resources in Michigan’s highest poverty districts are severely inadequate (Baker et al. 2021). Thirty-seven percent of students attend districts with spending below the amount required to achieve U.S. average test scores.
The recovery from the COVID recession, along with the massive influx of federal funds for education, may yet enable a turnaround in Michigan’s K–12 education system. In her 2022 State of the State address, Governor Gretchen Whitmer said her next budget would include the largest state education funding increase in more than 20 years (Egan 2022).
California: Shifting Control
California’s school finance narrative illustrates the tension between school funding equity goals and property tax reduction goals, providing a cautionary tale of the danger of diminishing local funding and the unintended consequences of assessment limits. In its pursuit of educational equity, California shifted funding away from local governments at the cost of local control. In taxpayers’ quest to control property tax increases, they traded horizontal equity for predictability.
Prior to 1979, California school districts raised over half of their revenue locally and school districts exercised control over their budgets and property tax rates. School finance litigation that began in the early 1970s drove legislation that began to erode this local control, shifting authority for property tax revenue distribution to the state in an attempt to equalize school district revenues. This series of cases, known as Serrano v. Priest, was motivated by concerns that the disparities in wealth among school districts created by dependence on local property taxes discriminated against the poor and violated California’s equal protection clause.
During the same period, dramatic growth in property tax values without an offsetting decrease in property tax rates incited a tax revolt that culminated in the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978. This citizen-initiated constitutional amendment fundamentally changed the nature of property tax assessments and imposed strict limits on growth in assessed values and property tax rates. Among other things, Proposition 13 limited growth in assessed values to 2 percent per year and capped cumulative property tax rates at 1 percent of assessed value.
Combined with the assessment limit, the rate limit provided certainty to taxpayers about how much property taxes could increase in the future—but stripped local governments and school districts of their ability to control spending levels and budgets.
Proposition 13 also instituted acquisition value assessment, under which properties are reassessed only when sold. This provides a strong incentive for taxpayers to remain in their homes and contributes to the state’s housing affordability crisis. Proposition 13 also prevented local governments and school districts from exceeding the limits in order to raise funds for local priorities, except for voter-approved bond measures. It required a two-thirds majority vote by both houses of the California legislature to increase any state tax and required a two-thirds majority vote of the electorate for local governments to impose special taxes.
In 1978, school district tax collections accounted for 50 percent of school district revenue; in 1979, they made up only a quarter of total revenue. The state aid share of school district revenue, supported mostly by state income taxes, climbed from 36 percent in 1978 to 58 percent in 1979.
In 1986, the California Court of Appeal held that the state’s centralized school finance system complied with the state constitution. The court found 93 percent of California students were in districts with wealth-related spending differences of less than $100 per pupil as prescribed by the courts in 1976. While the reforms satisfied the court, making per-pupil spending more consistent among school districts has not definitively improved or equalized educational outcomes.
Together, the court rulings and Proposition 13 altered the school finance landscape in California and inspired a wave of property tax revolts and school finance litigation across the United States. The school finance reforms in California successfully constrained revenues, but at the cost of local control and to the detriment of education quality. School districts lost control over their primary revenue source, per-pupil spending fell below the national average (see figure 2), and academic achievement and public school enrollment declined (Brunner and Sonstelie 2006; Downes and Schoeman 1998).
California’s test scores continue to suffer. National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) scores for California show that its students continue to perform below the national average, although the gaps have narrowed since 2013, when California enacted the Local Control Funding Formula (LCFF) school finance reforms (see figure 3). Among other reforms, the LCFF targets aid to high-need districts through concentration grants and gives districts more discretion over how they spend state funds.
One analysis suggests that California’s reforms played a major role in the rapid decline in public school enrollment in the 1970s and a partial role in the rapid growth in private school enrollment during the same period (Downes and Schoeman 1998).
Persistent efforts to amend the state constitution to eliminate acquisition value assessment for nonresidential property provide evidence of long-term dissatisfaction with Proposition 13 among some Californians. Referred to as a “split roll,” such proposals are often debated but rarely make it to the ballot. Voters narrowly defeated one such proposal, Proposition 15, in November 2020. Proposition 15 would have returned certain commercial and industrial real property to market-value assessment while preserving acquisition value assessment for residential properties and most small businesses.
Massachusetts: Targeted Aid
Massachusetts’ case indicates that targeting state aid to the school districts that need it most and linking accountability standards to increased school aid can produce strong academic results. The state was also able to reduce reliance on the property tax while improving its property tax system. However, recent years show that even strong school finance systems can backtrack and should be reevaluated periodically.
In 1980, Massachusetts enacted a property tax limit known as Proposition 2½. The two most important components of Proposition 2½ limit the level and growth of property taxes: they may not exceed 2.5 percent of the value of all assessed value in a municipality, and tax revenues may not increase more than 2.5 percent per year. Because K–12 schools are part of city and town governments in the state and not independent governments, as in some states, Proposition 2½ directly affects schools.
One might expect that reducing reliance on the property tax in a state that does not allow local governments to levy either sales or income taxes might heavily constrain local government revenues. But local governments were lucky in the timing of the enactment of Proposition 2½. The tax limitation came into force at the beginning of a period of significant economic growth in the state popularly termed the “Massachusetts Miracle.” This enabled the state to increase aid to localities, which cushioned the tax limitation’s impact.
Also important is the fact that Proposition 2½ was not a constitutional amendment, but a piece of legislation that could be modified by the legislature—and was. Altogether, Proposition 2½ had “a smaller impact than either its supporters had hoped or its detractors had feared” (Cutler, Elmendorf, and Zeckhauser 1997). Although not perfect, Proposition 2½ is less restrictive and less distortionary than many property tax limits in other states (Wen et al. 2018).
During the 1980s, the state also reformed its property tax system by moving to assessing properties at full market value. Before this reform, most properties, especially residential ones, were assessed at far less than market value, with high-income properties receiving preferential treatment. Proposition 2½ created an incentive to move to the full value because of the 2.5 percent cap on the property tax levy.
As the state was coming out of a deep recession in the early 1990s, the quality of its public schools had caused broad dissatisfaction. The Massachusetts Business Alliance for Education published Every Child a Winner in 1991, calling for “high standards, accountability for performance, and equitable distribution of resources among school districts” (MBAE 1991). The highest court was considering an equity lawsuit that had been filed in 1978, and the state Board of Education published a report highlighting some schools’ shortcomings (Chester 2014).
In 1993, a pivotal year, the state legislature passed the Massachusetts Education Reform Act (MERA) and the state’s highest court ruled in McDuffy that the state was not meeting its constitutional duty to provide an adequate education for all students. MERA had a number of important components, including a large increase in state aid for education (from $1.6 billion in 1993 to $4 billion in 2002), and a new school funding formula targeted to districts that needed it most. Another component of MERA was curriculum standards and accountability. In 1998, the MCAS (Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System) was administered for the first time to measure student achievement.
In a second school funding lawsuit, Hancock v. Driscoll, settled in 2005, the Supreme Judicial Court concluded that “a system mired in failure has given way to one that, although far from perfect, shows a steady trajectory of progress” (Costrell 2005, 23). One measure of Massachusetts’ achievement is the improvement of state scores on NAEP tests (see figure 3). Although the original intention was to reevaluate and, if need be, revise the state’s school funding formula periodically, that did not happen. Furthermore, after several years of growth in state school aid, cuts came in 2004, then again in 2009 after the onset of the Great Recession.
In 2015, a Foundation Budget Review Commission was established to review the state’s school aid system (Ouellette 2018). The commission concluded that local governments were bearing a disproportionate share of the cost of educating children and that several elements of the foundation aid program, such as the way health insurance costs were taken into account, were outdated.
In 2019, the legislature passed and Governor Charlie Baker signed the Student Opportunity Act (SOA), which provides $1.5 billion in additional school aid better targeted to low-income students. This revised school aid system was designed to be phased in over seven years. In 2020, the state delayed the funding increases because of pandemic-related economic uncertainty. However, in 2021, the legislature fully funded the act for the first time (Martin 2021).
Finding the Right Combination
Neither state aid nor the property tax on its own can provide adequate, stable, and equitable school funding. But the right combination can provide all three. Just as weaving requires lengthwise and crosswise threads (the warp and woof), so a sound school finance system requires a well-designed property tax and well-designed state school aid.
The system of state and local funding should provide sufficient funding so that all children, no matter their race, ethnicity, or income, can receive an adequate education. When designed properly, state aid can ensure that all school districts can provide an adequate education and weaken the link between per-pupil property tax wealth and per-pupil education funding—without sacrificing the benefits that come from a stable property tax base and local control of public schools.
Daphne Kenyon is a resident fellow in tax policy at the Lincoln Institute. Bethany Paquin is a senior research analyst at the Lincoln Institute. Semida Munteanu is associate director, valuation and land markets at the Lincoln Institute.
Lead image by skynesher via Getty Images.
REFERENCES
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New Report: Taxing Land More Than Buildings Would Help Detroit Homeowners and Spur Development
Reforming Detroit’s property tax system by taxing land at a higher rate than buildings would help to revive the local economy and reduce tax bills for nearly every homeowner, according to a new study from the nonprofit Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
With the lowest property values of any large U.S. city and some of the highest property tax rates, Detroit is caught in a decades-long cycle of rising tax rates that still fail to generate enough revenue. In the absence of strong public services, high property taxes increase owner costs, reduce property values, and increase the costs of repair and redevelopment, creating a drag on economic recovery.
Like many economically distressed cities, Detroit copes with this challenge by offering generous tax abatements for new development and for some homeowners. Abatements relieve excess costs and temporarily raise property values, but only a small set of residents and new businesses qualify. This leaves high—sometimes destabilizing—tax bills in place for long-term owners. While high taxes remain on most homes and businesses, inclusive and lasting incentives for reinvestment are absent.
A higher tax rate for land than for structures—known as “split-rate” because there are two different tax rates—would address the problem more effectively and distribute the benefits more equitably.
The new study, Split-Rate Property Taxation in Detroit: Findings and Recommendations, finds that taxing land at five times the rate for buildings would result in lower tax bills for 96 percent of homeowners, with an average savings of about 18 percent. Under a revenue-neutral reform, tax savings would be fully offset by tax increases on vacant and underutilized property.
“By adopting a split-rate property tax, Detroit can make its tax system both more efficient and more equitable,” said John Anderson, an economist at the University of Nebraska, Lincoln, and lead author of the study. “Efficiency is enhanced by removing the tax-related barriers to capital improvements and development. Equity is enhanced by a reduction in taxes for the vast majority of residential homeowners.”
“Splitting the property tax provides long-time Detroiters with the tax relief that new businesses and residents already receive,” said co-author Nick Allen, former manager of strategy and policy for the Detroit Economic Growth Corporation and now a doctoral candidate at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. “Our study shows that it is an effective, immediate way to permanently reduce burdens on overtaxed households and restore property wealth. It’s not enough, but it is a required step towards racially equitable recovery.”
In addition, a split-rate tax increases the cost of holding vacant land and reduces the cost of developing it, or of renovating deteriorated buildings. Reduced tax burdens and accelerated investment lead to an average 12 percent increase in residential property value and a 20 percent increase for commercial property. In a supporting technical paper, the project team also found that the proposed 18 percent reduction in residential taxes would reduce residential tax foreclosures by at least 9 percent.
“Implementation of a split-rate tax in Detroit offers an opportunity to strengthen the property tax system by increasing efficiency, and reducing property tax inequities and tax foreclosure,” said Michigan State University economist Mark Skidmore, a co-author of the study.
Commissioned by Invest Detroit with support from The Kresge Foundation, the study analyzes data from municipalities in Pennsylvania that have implemented split-rate taxes, as well as real estate and property tax data from Detroit. In addition to Anderson, Allen, and Skidmore, the study’s co-authors include Fernanda Alfaro of Michigan State University, Andrew Hanson of the University of Illinois at Chicago, Zackary Hawley of Texas Christian University, Dusan Paredes of Northern Catholic University in Chile, and Zhou Yang of Robert Morris University.
“If we are to continue the momentum of Detroit’s positive, equitable growth, we must transform our property tax structure to alleviate the burden on majority Black homeowners and local developers,” said Dave Blaszkiewicz, president and CEO of Invest Detroit. “This report provides a solution that accomplishes that while also disincentivizing blighted and underutilized properties that hinder Detroit’s growth.”
“With this analysis, Invest Detroit has elevated an equitable approach to taxation that can bring much-needed relief to tax-burdened Detroiters while encouraging investment and growth. This is a timely idea that addresses an urgent concern, and the highly regarded Lincoln Institute of Land Policy has now provided a solid framework for community discussions,” said Wendy Lewis Jackson, managing director of Kresge’s Detroit Program.