As part of a series of educational programs on brownfields redevelopment for community-based organizations (CBOs), the Lincoln Institute will offer its third course, “Reuse of Brownfields and Other Underutilized Properties: Identifying Successful Roles for Community-based Nonprofit Organizations,” in Detroit in late March 2004.

The impetus for the series arose from a number of issues in the CBO community. First, CBOs are often left out of brownfield redevelopment training programs, which are generally designed for the private sector, including developers, environmental engineering firms and financial institutions, or for local governments. While these sectors must gain a better understanding of brownfields, particularly where the fear of liability looms large and remains a chief obstacle to entering into any development process, CBOs are also essential redevelopment partners. Learning how to partner with other sectors and when to bring these partners into a brownfields project is an important aspect of successful brownfields redevelopment for CBOs, and has been an integral part of the Lincoln Institute course curriculum.

Second, CBOs are often viewed as underfunded and lacking sufficient capacity to take on brownfield redevelopment. This is sometimes true, but as a result of this perception the importance of CBOs can be underestimated by both the public and private sectors, and this phenomenon becomes a self-fulfilling cycle. A wider range of state and federal funding sources are now available to CBOs, but they need to know how to access them. Some examples are special funds to conduct site assessments or do neighborhood planning, banks seeking to make loans in low-income areas where they can get special federally recognized credit, and other resources available only for nonprofit organizations.

Moreover, CBOs can play many unique roles that draw upon their strengths and capacities as community-oriented institutions. CBOs—particularly large, long-standing and well-funded CBOs—may act as the developer and/or the property owner, or they can serve as a broker or community champion, which does not require the more complex skills normally characteristic of a commercial developer. In addition to learning how to partner and play different roles, many CBOs are beginning to expand their traditional focus beyond housing or community services to encompass a broader range of economic development activities, such as property redevelopment. As a result, CBOs are interested in building their organizational capacity to take on brownfields redevelopment and other related activities.

The neighborhoods in which CBOs often work exhibit many signs of disinvestment, including as much as 30 percent vacant property, high unemployment rates, absentee land ownership and few commercial businesses. Therefore, with an inherently weak market, the brownfield sites in these neighborhoods are routinely ignored by both the public and private sectors, specifically because they may be the hardest sites to redevelop. These redevelopment difficulties may arise from the level of on-site contamination—real or perceived—as well as from the challenges of the market. There is a need for both the public and private sectors to establish partnerships, but often a lack of will to bring the two entities together. The leadership of the nonprofit sector is frequently pivotal in attracting public attention and stimulating private sector interest in the neighborhood, and thus improving the likelihood that properties in these neighborhoods will be redeveloped. CBOs with a strong presence in a neighborhood can often take this leadership role in redeveloping these sites.

Case Studies

One of the most popular aspects of the Lincoln Institute series has been the opportunity for smaller, less experienced CBOs to interact with larger ones that have a track record in doing redevelopment work. Through both formal and informal exchanges of ideas and information, the CBOs are exposed to the best brownfield redevelopment practices. This opportunity to learn from peers is enhanced with the use of case studies. In direct response to participant demand, these case studies were developed and integrated into the curriculum to allow the participants to learn directly from the practical experience of their colleagues and from other CBO staff attending the courses.

The case studies were developed through interviews with the CBOs involved in the projects and have been published as a Lincoln Institute working paper, “Three Case Studies on the Roles of Community-based Organizations in Brownfields and Other Vacant Property Redevelopment: Barriers, Strategies and Key Success Factors” (Brachman 2003). The cases are:

• Brokering Redevelopment on a “Silver Shovel” Property, involving the Greater Southwest Development Corporation in Chicago, Illinois;
• Maximizing Community Benefits Through a Community Garden Strategy, with the New Kensington Community Development Corporation in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and
• Connecting Comprehensive Economic Planning with Brownfield Projects, featuring the Racine County Economic Development Corporation in Racine, Wisconsin.

Common successful redevelopment strategies emerged in these cases, despite the variations in CBO role, organizational structure and external conditions. These strategies included partnering with city officials on property acquisition and use of city services; linking redevelopment with other visible physical improvements; communicating regularly with city officials and community groups; undertaking redevelopment primarily as part of a comprehensive plan, instead of on a site-by-site basis; and utilizing tax increment financing.

Breaking Barriers to Redevelopment

The need for extensive predevelopment work constitutes one of the major barriers to brownfields redevelopment. This work includes assessing environmental conditions on the site; figuring out a pathway to site control or property ownership; finding ways to protect owners from liability; locating funding sources; determining the beneficial property reuse for the community; and eliciting community support for the project. Discovering the true status and location of on-site contaminants is a key step toward assessing and limiting liability as well as targeting an appropriate end use.

Since these activities often inhibit private sector interest, CBOs can offer particular economic value to the redevelopment process and improve a project’s chances for success. The cases and other experiences demonstrate that CBO involvement with the predevelopment work reduces the costs and effort of the private sector, thus improving a project’s economics in comparison with greenfields developments.

If redevelopment is viewed as a linear process (which is not entirely accurate, but for the sake of discussion we will assume so here), then CBOs can invest time and money in upfront activities that traditionally have made brownfield properties incrementally more costly than development of other properties. One of the most important activities is conducting an inventory of brownfield sites throughout a neighborhood or community. This function may be performed by a local government or by a CBO, but it can lead to engineering a broader strategy or master plan that leverages the redevelopment of multiple properties. These types of tactics can help address broader market imperfections that usually plague those areas adversely affected by brownfield sites where these CBOs operate.

Another major barrier is obtaining property ownership or site control. The case studies and other examples discussed throughout the course reveal that this barrier can be overcome with city involvement or even temporary municipal ownership. Site control is a difficult problem since ownership is often obscure. Some properties have been abandoned or “orphaned;” the owner is bankrupt; or the properties are burdened with back property taxes. Again these are time-consuming issues that extend the development timeline, but they are not insurmountable when the CBO can gain knowledge about state statutes and tax practices.

Site contamination has receded somewhat as a major barrier to property redevelopment in and of itself (except for the implications for unknown and thus economically unquantified liability), but market conditions and location remain frequent and intractable barriers. The solutions to such conditions vary from location to location, but they include some of the tools discussed in the course: a redevelopment master plan for multiple properties (including uncontaminated vacant properties); a city land bank; and state statutory authority that eases the property disposition process for properties burdened by back taxes.

Learning from Experience

CBOs are in a unique position to ensure that the community is involved in the process and then benefits from the site redevelopment. However, due to minimal funding and staffing, CBOs have a particularly steep learning curve with respect to brownfields redevelopment, as do community residents. Because of their inexperience with the unique characteristics of these properties and the complications these characteristics pose for the real estate development process, residents and some CBOs can be intimidated by brownfields—the potential environmental conditions on these properties, the industrial owners, the cleanup process and the liability. Education about the process for assessing environmental conditions, the laws governing the cleanup, and issues of property ownership and liability can go a long way toward reducing the mystery surrounding these sites and alleviating the stigma often attached to them.

Brownfields redevelopment is complicated on two additional fronts. First, it requires the involvement of multiple stakeholders to be successful. Thus, included among the Institute’s course faculty have been representatives from the federal Environmental Protection Agency and the state environmental agencies overseeing the brownfield programs that approve cleanup activities and standards for properties; and funders such as financial institutions, private foundations and government agencies. Second, it is inherently interdisciplinary. The course also includes experts in legal liability, real estate development, property assessment and environmental health impacts; environmental engineers; and CBO and community development corporation staff and directors who have successfully completed brownfield deals.

This year’s course will be held in Detroit and will target primarily CBOs in Michigan and other midwestern states, allowing for a sharper focus on the common challenges faced by CBOs in that region and helping CBOs understand the importance of specific state policies and laws. Furthermore, CBOs and their statewide umbrella organizations may be able to play an advocacy role in bringing improved property disposition and tax laws to their states to increase their chances of success in future projects.

The city of Detroit and its environs, as well as other Michigan cities, are afflicted with hundreds of undeveloped brownfields, primarily the remains of former automobile factories and related service industries, so it can serve as an example of the redevelopment challenges that remain. Held in conjunction with local partners, the course will focus on how CBOs can get started with their projects; the roles they can assume—as developer, property owner, broker or facilitator, predeveloper, intermediary or advocate; possible funding sources and other resources; the relationship of the CBO to local government; the need for effective state policies to help CBOs do their job; and “green” reuses.

Another outcome of this experience working with CBOs will be the preparation of a guidebook on brownfield redevelopment to assist CBOs in addressing the challenges identified here and in deriving community benefits from underutilized property. The guidebook will address the need for structured guidance on brownfields redevelopment, similar to guidebooks that exist for the private sector but tailored for the needs of the nonprofit sector. The guidebook is still being formulated, but it is expected to cover such topics as why and when CBOs should be involved in redevelopment; what roles they can play; identifying and assessing properties for redevelopment viability; investigating the environmental conditions and cleaning up the property; obtaining liability protection; finding funding; working with other partners; building their own organizational capacity for these projects; as well as other topics.

Lavea Brachman is director of the Ohio office of the Delta Institute and a Lincoln Institute faculty associate who develops the curriculum and helps teach the course series on urban redevelopment. She also serves as a gubernatorial appointee to Ohio’s statutory body charged with reviewing and awarding state bond funds for brownfield redevelopment projects throughout the state.

Reference

Brachman, Lavea. 2003. Three Case Studies on the Roles of Community-based Organizations in Brownfields and Other Vacant Property Redevelopment: Barriers, Strategies and Key Success Factors. Lincoln Institute Working Paper.

Photograph Caption: H. James Brown, president of the Lincoln Institute, with Lu Xinshe, vice-minister of China’s Ministry of Land and Resources, signed an agreement in September 2002 at Lincoln House. Observing the occasion are (left to right) Yang Yixin, deputy director general of the Ministry, Chengri Ding, and Wang Guanghua, director general of the Ministry’s Information Center.

Driving around a bustling Chinese city, one can almost feel the pace of change. Just a few decades ago, China was a sleeping giant whose prominence in world affairs seemed forever relegated to its ancient past. Today China boasts one of the world’s fastest growing economies and some of the most vibrant cities, and it is among the most active and interesting real estate markets.

From 1978 to 1997, gross domestic product in China grew at a remarkable 17 percent annual rate. Over the last several years, while most Western nations languished in recession, the economy of China grew at a steady 7 to 8 percent. China’s population continues to grow as well. In November 2000, China’s population was approximately 1.3 billion; by the year 2050 it is expected to reach 1.6 billion. Following familiar international patterns, the combination of population growth and economic expansion is manifest most prominently in Chinese cities. From 1957 to 1995, China’s urban population grew from 106 to 347 million. In 1982 there were 182 Chinese cities; by 1996 there were 666.

While urbanization has led to significant improvements in the welfare of the Chinese people, it has also placed enormous pressure on China’s land resources. China is the world’s third largest country in land area (after Russia and Canada). But, with more than 21 percent of the world’s population living on about 7 percent of the world’s cultivated land, China’s farmland resources are relatively scarce. Between 1978 and 1995 China’s cultivated land fell from 99.4 million to 94.9 million hectares while its population rose from 962 million to 1.2 billion. Simply because of its scale, the widening gap between China’s growing population and a shrinking supply of farmland has implications not only for China’s ability to feed itself, but also for global food security.

To manage its land base and rapid urban expansion, the Chinese government in the early 1980s launched sweeping reforms of the structure of institutions that govern land and housing allocation. While maintaining the fundamental features of a socialist society (state or collective ownership of land), China has moved toward a system in which market forces shape the process of urbanization and individuals have greater choice over where to work and live. Among the most influential of these changes are the establishment of land use rights, the commercialization of housing, and a restructuring of the urban development process.

Land Use Rights

Before the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded in 1949, land could be privately owned and legally transferred through mutual agreement, and property taxes were a key source of local public finance. Soon after the Communist Revolution, however, property use rights were radically transformed. In rural areas the Communist Party confiscated all privately held land and turned it over to the poor. Later, peasants joined communes (“production co-operations”) by donating their assets, including their land. Today, nearly all land in rural areas remains owned by farmer collectives. In urban areas, the Communist Party took a more gradual approach. While confiscating property owned by foreign capitalists and anti-revolutionaries, it allowed private ownership and land transactions to continue. Over the next two decades, however, through land confiscation, strict controls on rent and major investments in public housing, state dominance in urban land and housing markets grew. By the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, nearly all land was owned by collectives or by the state. Private property rights virtually disappeared and land transactions were banned.

Modern land reforms began in the mid-1980s. Following a successful experiment in Shenzhen (a Special Economic Development Zone on the border with Hong Kong), in which state-owned land was leased to foreign corporations, the Constitution was amended in 1988 so that “land use can be transacted according to the law.” In 1990, China officially adopted land leasing as the basis for assigning land use rights to urban land users.

In the current property rights regime, use rights for specified periods (e.g., 40 to 70 years) can be obtained from the state through the up-front payment of land use fees. The fees are determined by the location, type and density of the proposed development. This separation of land ownership and use rights allows the trading of land use rights while maintaining state ownership of land. For the Chinese government, this separation offered three advantages: first, market mechanisms could help guide the allocation of land resources; second, land use fees would provide local government with a new source of revenues; and third, by retaining state ownership, social and political conflict would be minimized.

In the short period following its adoption, the new system of land use rights has had profound symbolic and measurable impacts. By embracing the concept of property rights, the system provided Chinese residents and firms with greater economic freedom and signaled to the world that China welcomes foreign investment on Chinese soil. By establishing legal rights of use, China has promoted the development of land markets, enhanced the fiscal capacity of local governments, and accelerated the advancement of market socialism. The system also created a fast-growing real estate market that is now transforming China’s urban landscape.

Despite its advantages, the system created many new challenges. First, state-owned enterprises can still acquire land through administrative channels, causing price distortions and large losses of local government revenues. Second, government officials are tempted to lease as much land as possible for their own short-term gain. Since revenues from the sale of land use rights account for 25 to 75 percent of some local government budgets, future losses of revenue are inevitable as land becomes increasingly scarce. Third, there is great uncertainty about what happens when existing leases expire. Most leases stipulate, for example, that without payments for renewal, rights of use return to the state. However, it will be extremely difficult to collect such payments when hundreds or thousands of tenants share rights previously purchased by a single developer. Finally, the government lacks the ability to capture its share of rents as they increase over time. As capital investments and location premiums rise, these losses could be substantial.

Whether land use rights and the markets they create will soon dominate the process of urban development or alter the structure of Chinese cities also remains uncertain. There is evidence that land use fees vary spatially in Chinese cities, much like prices and rents in Western cities. But it may be several decades before skylines and capital-land ratios in Chinese cities mirror those in the West. Further, fees remain set by administrative rather than competitive processes. Thus, the extent to which they will improve the allocation of land resources remains to be seen.

The Commercialization of Housing

The socialization of housing was an important element of the communist transformation. But because the communist party took a more gradual approach in urban areas, private ownership remained the dominant form of housing tenure in Chinese cities through the mid-1950s. Over the next two decades little private housing was constructed because the state owned all the land, imposed strict ceilings on rents, and generally discouraged speculative building. By the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, privately owned housing had virtually disappeared.

In the absence of private housing markets, shelter became part of the social wage provided by the state. Housing was not provided directly by the government but through the work unit or danwei, a state-owned enterprise that serves as a vehicle for structuring economic activity and social organization. The main defining feature of a danwei is its multi-functionality as a place of employment, residence, education and commerce. A danwei worker acquires housing “according to his work,” a fundamental socialist allocation principle. In this system the allocation of housing is determined by social status and length of employment, not prices and incomes.

Danwei housing was an integral element of a centrally planned economy in which financial resources were planned by entire sectors (industrial, educational, health care, and others). Housing was merely one element of these larger development projects and was constructed only if the project needed workers and those workers needed housing. Investments in housing and other services such as schools (if the project was large), canteens and daily-use grocery stores were made in conjunction with the overall project; entire communities were thus built all at once enabling workers to live close to their work. The distinctive role of the danwei has had a profound impact on the morphology of Chinese cities and has complicated housing policy reforms ever since.

While serving to promote socialist ideology and minimizing popular unrest, the danwei system had serious limitations. The combination of negligible rents and excessive housing demand placed heavy financial and production burdens on the state. Housing allocations were based on criteria such as occupation, administrative rank, job performance, loyalty and political connections. Gross inequities were common. Finally, inadequate revenue generation from rents diminished the quality of housing management and maintenance and discouraged the construction of private rental housing or owner-occupied housing by private developers.

When Deng XiaoPing came into power in 1978, he attacked the state-controlled public housing system and introduced market forces into the housing policy arena. Subsequently, the government initiated a reform program with privatization as a major component. The privatization of the state-controlled housing sector included several elements: (1) increases in rents to market levels; (2) sales of public housing to private individuals; (3) encouragement of private and foreign investments in housing; (4) less construction of new public housing; (5) encouragement and protection of private home ownership; (6) construction of commercial housing by profit-making developers; and (7) promotion of self-build housing in cities.

The dismantling of the danwei housing system and the commodification of housing, though far from complete, has produced rapid growth in the housing industry and a substantial expansion of the housing stock. By 1992, the government share of investments in housing had fallen to 10 percent—less than the share of investment from foreign sources. In the wake of an extended housing boom, per capita living space rose from 4.2 square meters in 1978 to 7.9 in 1995.

Growing pains persist, however. Many Chinese still live in housing deemed inadequate by Western standards, and critical financial institutions remain underdeveloped. Housing for the wealthy is overabundant while housing for the poor remains scarce. Further, as space per Chinese resident rises, maintaining jobs-housing balance becomes increasingly difficult. The replacement of danwei housing with a Western-style housing market gives Chinese residents greater freedom of location, but it may lead to the deconstruction of communities in which work, leisure and commerce are closely integrated. Rising automobile ownership also may create Western-style gridlock. Furthermore, the rapid rise of commercial housing undermines the longstanding tradition in which access to affordable housing is an integral part of the social contract. As a result, the commercialization of housing, far more than a mere change in ownership structure, represents a fundamental change in the core institutions of Chinese society.

Restructuring Urban Development

Unlike many other rapidly developing nations, China is still relatively nonurbanized. In 2000, approximately 36 percent of China’s population lived in urban areas, and no single metropolitan area dominated the urban hierarchy. Among the many reasons for this pattern is the government’s regulation of rural-urban migration through a household registration system, or hukou. Every Chinese resident has a hukou designation as an urban or rural resident. Hukou is an important indicator of social status, and urban (chengshi) status is necessary for access to urban welfare benefits, such as schools, health care or subsidized agricultural goods. Without urban hukou status it is very difficult to live in cities. By limiting access to the benefits of urbanization, the hukou system ostensibly served as the world’s most influential urban growth management instrument.

As land and housing markets have emerged, the hukou system has weakened. Rural peasants now account for a significant portion of the urban population. As a result, China has been forced to manage urban growth, like other nations, through the conversion of land from rural to urban uses. Today, this can occur in one of two ways: (1) work units and municipalities develop land acquired from rural collectives through an administrative process; and (2) municipalities acquire land from rural collectives and lease it to developers. While providing local governments with new sources of revenues and introducing market rationality, this dual land market has introduced other complexities in the urban development process. Black markets have been created, for example, by the difference in price between land obtained virtually free through an administrative process and land leased to the private sector upon payment of fees. Work units have undertaken developments incompatible with municipal plans. And, urban sprawl has arisen in the special development zones that have proliferated in the rush to attract foreign investment.

To address these problems, the 1999 New Land Administration Law (which amended the 1988 Land Administration Law) was adopted to protect farmland, manage urban growth, promote market development, and encourage citizen involvement in the legislative process. Besides strengthening property rights, the law mandates no net loss of cultivated land. It stipulates that “overall plans and annual plans for land utilization take measures to ensure that the total amount of cultivated land within their administrative areas remains unreduced.” This means that land development cannot take place on farmland unless the same amount of agricultural land is reclaimed elsewhere. As reclaimable land is depleted, urban land supplies will diminish, the cost of land reclamation will rise and ultimately that cost will be passed on to consumers. Since its implementation, the law has drawn widespread criticism for stressing farmland protection over urban development. Due to rising incomes and larger populations, the demand for urban land will continue to increase. Given the fixed amount of land, development costs will certainly rise and gradually slow the pace of urban development.

Challenges and Opportunities

For those interested in land and housing policy, China is difficult to ignore. Through perhaps the most sweeping and nonviolent land and housing reforms the world has ever seen, China is moving from a system tightly controlled by the state to one strongly influenced by market forces. The pace at which this transformation is taking place offers rare challenges and opportunities. For land policy researchers, China offers opportunities to explore questions central to international urban policy debates: (1) how do market forces shape the internal structure of cities? (2) can markets provide safe and affordable housing for all segments of the population? and (3) are markets the primary cause of urban sprawl? For academics and practitioners involved in education and training, China offers the challenge of sharing the lessons of Western experience without encouraging the Chinese to make the same mistakes. In the process, both researchers and trainers have the opportunity to improve the process of development in the world’s most rapidly urbanizing nation.

Chengri Ding is assistant professor in the Department of Landscape Architecture and Urban Planning at Texas A&M University in College Station, Texas. He also serves as special assistant to the president of the Lincoln Institute for the China Program.

Gerrit Knaap is professor and director of the National Center for Smart Growth at the University of Maryland. The authors are editing a Lincoln Institute book on land and housing markets in China, including papers presented at the First World Planning Schools Congress held in Shanghai in July 2001.

The New Urbanism has captured the imagination of the American public like no urban planning movement in decades. Amid great fanfare, New Urbanists are seeking to redefine the nature of the American metropolis by reintroducing traditional notions of neighborhood design and fitting those ideas into a variety of urban and suburban settings.

The New Urbanism began as a reaction to conventional suburban planning as it has been practiced in the United States since the 1940s. New Urbanists view the decentralized, auto-oriented suburb as a recipe for disaster. They blame these suburbs for ever-increasing congestion on arterial roads, a lack of meaningful civic life, the loss of open space, limited opportunities for children and others without cars, and a general discontent among suburbanites.

As the latest in a long line of reform movements that have sought to establish new planning and design principles that may be applied to metropolitan areas and, especially, to new suburban neighborhoods, the New Urbanism owes much to the City Beautiful and Garden City movements of the early twentieth century. The “neotraditional” view of urban planning that began in the early 1980s with the widely publicized new town of Seaside, Florida, has since matured into the New Urbanism movement of the 1990s.

Many different sets of planning and design principles are circulating around the New Urbanism banner, but most definitions include the following ideas:

• walkable neighborhoods oriented around the five-minute walk;
• primary orientation around public transit systems;
• greater integration of different types of land uses at the neighborhood level.

In addition, most New Urbanists claim to be committed to the concepts of strong citizen participation, affordable housing, and social and economic diversity, though these ideas do not fit so neatly onto a list of neighborhood design characteristics. In its rhetoric, the New Urbanism strives for a kind of utopian social ideal, although most New Urbanists focus on a community’s physical infrastructure in the belief that community design can create or influence particular social patterns.

Promises and Problems

The New Urbanism is still in its infancy, and there remains a great deal of skepticism about what its proponents seek to achieve. Although millions of Americans live in “old urban” neighborhoods, fewer than 2,000 live in new neighborhoods built strictly according to New Urbanist principles. Many critics believe that, while the New Urbanism contains many attractive ideas, it may have difficulty dealing with a wide range of contemporary issues that generally fall into five broad categories: scale, transportation, planning and codes, regionalism, and marketing.

Scale: The traditional neighborhoods that the New Urbanists hope to replicate are characterized by compactness, small scale and diversity of building types. But, increasingly, the economic and lifestyle demands of urban and even suburban life seem to require facilities on a massive scale, such as big-box retailers and their industrial equivalents. Many New Urbanists concede that large-scale operations will inevitably be auto-oriented, but they still claim their ideas can work for smaller-scale retailers.

Transportation: Transportation is perhaps the most contentious single aspect of the New Urbanism, which is often “sold” to public officials based on its supposed transportation benefits. Assertions such as reduced dependence on the automobile, increased transit use, shorter trips, and a more flexible hierarchy of streets make common sense, but they are not yet backed up by much empirical evidence. Perhaps the best that can be said is that New Urbanist ideas may be a necessary but not sufficient pre-condition to change the way people travel.

Planning and Codes: New Urbanists often criticize American development codes as perpetuating suburbia’s auto-oriented nature. Codes regarding segregated land uses, street widths, setbacks and other requirements are often the province of local officials, such as fire chiefs and traffic engineers, who are loathe to change them. Some New Urbanists have worked successfully with code enforcers to find common ground in order to permit unconventional projects to proceed, yet, many aspects of planning and codes remain incompatible and contentious.

Regionalism: New Urbanists have struggled to move the public perception of their movement beyond the simple idea of designing suburban neighborhoods toward focusing on metropolitan areas. Proponents and critics alike fear that widespread application of the movement’s design principles apart from a regional context may simply cause suburban sprawl to be replaced by “New Urban” sprawl. Many New Urbanists advocate urban and suburban redevelopment and infill projects, and some have expressed support for such regulatory tools as urban growth boundaries.

Marketing: Many previous reform movements in urban planning have failed because their ideas did not enjoy widespread acceptance in the marketplace, and New Urbanism is facing a similar challenge. Real estate marketing experts say that many New Urbanist projects proceeded with little market research because the developers (who were New Urbanist devotees themselves) simply believed the idea would sell itself. Now they see that selling New Urbanism requires at least as much marketing effort as selling a conventional subdivision. New Urbanists have also learned the hard way that the promise of a diversified community, with many types and prices of homes, retail stores within walking distance, and other community amenities, requires a highly sophisticated effort to bring all the components “on line” in the right sequence.

A Powerful Idea

Although it is often advertised as a panacea, the New Urbanism is only one alternative to suburban sprawl. It will probably function most successfully in a broader planning context that may include significant investments in transit, incentives to reinvest in the inner city, and disincentives to build at the metropolitan fringe.

At the same time, it is important to appreciate the power of the New Urbanism as an idea. Perhaps the most refreshing aspect of this movement is that it promotes a positive image of “town life” that includes the public as well as the private realm. In a world where a “lack of community” is often blamed for many social ills, this is no small achievement.

William Fulton is editor of California Planning and Development Report, contributing editor of Planning magazine, and a member of the Lincoln Institute Editorial Advisory Committee. This article is excerpted in part from the Lincoln Institute Policy Focus Report, The New Urbanism.

The conversion of land from agricultural production to urban and industrial development is one of the critical processes of change in developing economies undergoing industrialization, urbanization, and globalization. Urban land use changes taking place in China have attracted much scholarly attention, especially in light of the extensive economic reforms, remarkable economic growth, and profound structural changes over the last three decades. The transition from a planned to a market economy and from authoritarian to more decentralized provincial and local government has generated a new institutional setting for changes in land use (Lin and Ho 2005).

The prevailing view is to characterize land use change as the outcome of economic growth and structural change. This argument aligns itself with the neoclassical growth model in which land plays a decreasing role in economic growth. However, these changes in land use can be both the consequence of economic growth and the drivers of such growth (Bai, Chen, and Shi 2011; Ding and Lichtenberg 2011).

The reality is much more complicated. Instead of being driven by growing population, urban land expansion in China is motivated by land finance, whereby local governments raise revenue and attract investment by leasing and developing land. As a result, land-centered urban policy has been identified as one of the most important driving forces operating behind the spectacular expansion of cities since the mid-1990s (Lin 2007). Supplying agricultural land for nonagricultural purposes effectively allows the local government to “kill many birds with one stone” (Ping 2011). As a result, land development fuels economic growth, especially in urbanized areas.

Land use changes in China are also affected in significant ways by land supply policies, which have been adjusted regularly to meet the demands of economic development. Illegal land supply is a leading cause of excessive and uncontrolled investment, which occurs when local governments do not supply land to land users according to current land use plans or following the final permission of the central government. As a result, the central government started to use land policy as a major aspect of national macro-economic control in late 2003.

Among other measures, land transfers have been conducted through auction or tender since 2004, and land supply policy has shifted from quantity control to structural control since 2006. Land use indexes distributed by the central government to the local governments emphasized only the quantity of land before 2006, but currently the distribution of land uses among categories is set by the central government and even the intensity of land use is defined.

This legacy can be seen in the State Council’s establishment of the highly centralized State Land Supervision (SLS) system in 2006. Nine new regional offices were charged with investigating illegal land supply across the country (Tao et al. 2010). The new land policy has played an active role in improving land use by forbidding land to be leased to projects inconsistent with national industrial policy, development plans, and entry standards. Following the introduction of these reforms, the amount of land supplied illegally has decreased greatly due to stringent control, while GDP generated per unit of developable land has increased substantially (China Land and Mine Resources Law Center 2007). It is expected that this stringent land policy will have a significant impact on the spatial pattern of land use and may affect the association between land use changes and economic growth in China.

Changes in Land Use Patterns Across China

Land policy in China has changed dramatically since 2004, and one would also expect a different pattern of land use since then. Based on official county-level data from 2004 and 2008, we examine land use change at the provincial prefecture city level and explore the spatial relationship between land use change and economic growth. Official land use change data are divided into several land use categories at three levels every year. The first level includes agricultural land, construction land, and unused land; the second level contains ten categories of land uses; and the third level contains 52 subcategories.

Table 1 shows land use changes nationally from 2004 to 2008, during which time more land was converted into uses for construction while the amount of agricultural land and unused land declined. Among agricultural land categories, pasture land and cultivated land shrank by 12.69 million mu (0.85 million hectares) and 11.27 million mu (0.75 million hectares) respectively. Unused land fell by 17.91 million mu (1.19 million hectares).

Given recent rapid industrialization and urbanization, it is not surprising that the fastest land conversions in China have been to construction uses, which added 18.83 million mu (1.26 million hectares). In the category of settlements and industrial/mining sites, cities, designated towns, and industrial/mining sites witnessed the fastest land expansion, with growth rates of 19.61, 13.33, and 12.42 percent respectively, while the land area of rural settlements decreased. Significant amounts of land were also converted for the use of transportation, particularly the construction of highways.

This national-level analysis hides many spatial variations in land use changes in particular provinces and regions (figure 1). Thus we explore land use changes at the provincial level, focusing on the changes to cultivated land, urban land (including cities and designated towns), stand-alone industrial/mining sites, rural settlements, and transportation land for highways.

Figure 2 shows that losses of cultivated land occurred mainly in eastern and central China. Economic growth, urbanization, and industrialization have accelerated in Hebei, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Guangdong, and Guangxi provinces, where the most cultivated land was converted to urban, industrial, and transportation purposes. Shanxi, Shaanxi, Chongqing, and Sichuan provinces also saw rapid conversion of cultivated land to nonagricultural activities. Those provinces are located in China’s transitional geographic belt, where cultivated land is the best choice for construction and development. In contrast, inland provinces including Tibet, Qinghai, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, and Heilongjiang saw some increases in cultivated land.

Land for rural settlements is influenced by both new countryside policies and rural income growth. Increases in income have influenced the conversion of land to rural settlements in the eastern provinces such as Guangdong, Fujian, Zhejiang, Guangxi, Hebei, and Tianjin, and in some inland provinces including Heilongjiang, Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Qinghai, Tibet, Yunnan, Guizhou, Hubei, and Shanxi. However, some provinces experienced significant decreases in land used for rural settlements, particularly in Jiangsu, Jiangxi, and Anhui. This decline may be associated with new countryside policies, which have actually forced farmers into towns.

Urbanization and industrialization are the major drivers of nonagricultural land expansion in China. The urbanization rate grew from 40.50 to 45.68 percent between 2004 and 2008, when all provinces experienced urban and industrial land expansion (figure 3). However, most urban land expansion occurred south of the Yangtze River. In the north, only Shandong, Anhui, and Jiangsu experienced substantial urban and industrial land changes.

The rapid growth in the amount of land used for industrial/mining sites is seen largely in the eastern provinces, both in terms of absolute and relative changes, especially in Fujian, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Hebei (figure 4). With relatively smaller growth rates, Guangdong, Shandong, and Liaoning also saw a large amount of land converted to industrial/mining sites. The western provinces of Inner Mongolia, Qinghai, and Tibet witnessed rapid growth of land for industrial/mining sites but small absolute growth.

From 2004 to 2008, China launched a major drive to develop transportation networks by building more railways and highways to support economic growth. Nationally, land used for transportation grew at about 10 percent during this period. Many provinces witnessed faster growth in land used for transportation than the nation as a whole, including Inner Mongolia, Hebei, Qinghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Chongqing, Hubei, Anhui, Jiangxi, and Guangxi. Land requisition for highways was largely concentrated in the eastern provinces, with the largest absolute increases in Zhejiang, Jiangsu, and Hebei provinces.

Overall, China has witnessed remarkable land use changes, particularly in the eastern provinces and some central provinces. The spatial pattern of land use change is consistent with the spatial shift of economic growth, because eastern provinces enjoy institutional and locational advantages and agglomeration economies. They have attracted the majority of foreign investments, particularly those in capital- and technology-intensive industries, and are the dominant exporters of Chinese products.

Acceptance into the World Trade Organization has further benefited industrial firms located in eastern China with greater access to international markets. On the other hand, as industries continue to agglomerate, the eastern region has experienced rising land, workforce, and environmental costs, forcing some traditional industries to move to the central provinces. Some of these areas have attracted more recent investment and experienced faster economic growth, thus raising their importance among China’s regional economies.

Correlations Between Land Use Change and Economic Growth

To investigate the relationship between land use changes and economic growth systematically across cities and provinces, we calculate the correlation coefficients between the GDP growth rate from 2005 to 2009 and the rate of change of different land categories. The extent of the correlation may depend on a variety of economic, locational, and institutional conditions. We examine the impact of city size, location, and industrial structure, the amount of foreign direct investment (FDI), and land supply constraints on the relationship between land use changes and economic growth. The correlation coefficients are further computed using city subsamples classified by those factors.

The unexpected results showed that only a few significant but small correlation coefficients exist between the rate of change in land use and the economic growth rate (He, Huang, and Wang 2012). The change in other transportation land (including airports, ports, and pipelines) holds a significant positive coefficient. Correlation coefficients for urban land, industrial/mining sites, railways, and highways are barely significant.

Some evidence shows that city size, geographical location, fiscal situation, land supply, and realized FDI may moderate the correlation between land use change and economic growth. For instance, urban land expansion is associated with economic growth positively in central China but negatively in eastern and western regions. Stand-alone industrial/mining sites increase significantly with economic growth in western China. But overall, the correlation between the rate of land use change and economic growth is rather weak.

Since land can be treated as an input in the production function, the quantity of land may contribute directly to GDP growth. We compute the correlation coefficients between absolute GDP growth from 2005 to 2009 and absolute land use change from 2004 to 2008 to explore this relationship and find they are strongly correlated. Nationally, more cultivated land converted to nonagricultural uses contributes significantly to absolute GDP growth, with a correlation coefficient of -0.26. More land for urban uses and industrial/mining uses, are significantly and positively associated with GDP increases.

Significant correlation coefficients between land use change and economic growth suggest that land has been a significant driver of economic growth, but this positive contribution is moderated by a variety of factors including a city’s size, location, industrial structure, fiscal condition, and utilization of FDI. Conversion of cultivated land to nonagricultural uses is shown to contribute to economic growth, particularly in cities with more than 5 million people, realized FDI greater than US$200 million, strong agricultural land constraints, secondary industrial domiance, and location in central China.

Clearly, nonagricultural land is more productive than cultivated land in large and industrial cities. In recent years, as the implementation of central government policies targeted development in central China, the inland provinces have attracted more domestic and foreign investment and seen rapid economic growth as cultivated land has been converted to urban and industrial uses.

Comparatively, urban land expansion holds a stronger correlation with GDP growth in smaller cities and those located further inland. These types of cities are more likely to depend on land leasing to generate local revenues since they face more stringent fiscal constraints. In these areas, capital accumulation from land leasing is a typical local development strategy. In addition, urban land expansion plays a larger role in stimulating economic growth when fiscal limitations are steeper, land supply is strictly controlled, tertiary industries dominate, and more foreign investment is utilized. Industrial land expansion also contributes significantly to economic growth, especially in cities with stringent fiscal constraints and more industrial activities.

The recent transportation infrastructure development boom has contributed to economic growth as well. Land expansion for highways has stimulated economic growth with no constraints. Cities located in the western regions and those with poor fiscal revenues particularly benefit from new highways while expansion of railways is less associated with economic growth. The building of other transportation infrastructure (airports, ports, and pipelines) has played a critical role in facilitating economic growth in smaller and more eastern cities as well as in those whose economies are dominated by service industries.

The correlation analysis provides clear evidence to show that urban, industrial, and transportation land expansion is positively and significantly associated with economic growth. Converting cultivated land has contributed to economic expansion in many regions of China, but the importance of nonagricultural land expansion in economic growth is moderated by social, economic, and geographical conditions.

Conclusion and Discussion

Since the implementation of its economic reform, China has pursued a resource-intensive growth model that has forced land to play a critical role in sustaining its rapid economic growth. This has resulted in a large supply of developable land and rapid conversion from agricultural to nonagricultural purposes. Land in China is not only the outcome of economic growth but is also its driver.

The conversion of cultivated land to nonagricultural uses has been concentrated in the eastern and central parts of the country. With the implementation of new countryside development strategies and the enforcement of stricter land supply constraints, China witnessed a reduction in rural settlements across most of the central and northeastern regions. Urban and industrial land expansion has dominated land use changes throughout the nation. Transportation development, including new highways, railways, airports, seaports, and pipelines, has also been a major cause of land consumption in recent years, particularly in the eastern and central regions.

The principle component analysis based on land use change data from prefecture level cities indicated substantial spatial variation in land use changes among Chinese cities and showed that they are auto-correlated spatially. Correlation analysis further showed a weak relationship between the growth rate of GDP and the rate of land use change. But absolute land use change and absolute GDP growth are strongly correlated, indicating that land quantity is a critical input in economic growth.

Land is usually regarded as playing a marginal role in economic growth in Western economic growth theories. Our exploratory analysis suggests the opposite in China. As China urbanizes, industrializes, and globalizes, it is experiencing substantial land use changes that are correlated with economic growth. This significant relationship is associated with China’s particular state-owned land ownership and land use rights systems. As such, land can be used as a powerful macroeconomic intervention tool. The long-term lease of land use rights grants incentives for local governments to sell land to generate lump-sum revenues, which are then used to finance urban and industrial development and infrastructure provision.

Consequently, land has played a critical role in China’s rapid economic growth. However, this form of land-centered urbanization and industrialization has already caused serious social tensions, environmental degradation, and economic fluctuation. The lump-sum revenues generated by land leases are not sustainable considering that, even as large as it is, China has a limited land supply. The role of land as a driver of economic growth can be expected to decline as China gradually undergoes industrial advancement.

About the Authors

Canfei He is associate professor at the College of Urban and Environmental Science, Peking University, and associate director of the Peking University-Lincoln Institute Center for Urban Development and Land Policy in Beijing.

Zhiji Huang is a Ph.D. student at the College of Urban and Environmental Science, Peking University, and the Peking University-Lincoln Institute Center for Urban Development and Land Policy in Beijing.

Weikai Wang is a postgraduate student at the College of Urban and Environmental Science, Peking University, and the Peking University-Lincoln Institute Center for Urban Development and Land Policy in Beijing.

References

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Ding, C., and E. Lichtenberg. 2011. Land and urban economic growth in China. Journal of Regional Science 51(2): 299-317.

He, Canfei, Zhiji Huang, and Weikai Wang. 2012. Land use changes and urban economic growth in China: An exploratory analysis. Working Paper. Beijing: Peking University-Lincoln Institute Center for Urban Development and Land Policy.

Lin, G. C. S. 2007. Reproducing spaces of Chinese urbanisation: New city-based and land-centred urban transformation. Urban Studies 44 (9): 1827-1855.

Lin, G. C. S., and S. P. S. Ho. 2005. The state, land system, and land development processes in contemporary China. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 95(2): 411-436.

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Tao, R., F. Su, M. Liu, and G. Cao. 2010. Land leasing and local public finance in China’s regional development: Evidence from prefecture level cities. Urban Studies 47(10): 2217-2236.

Las ciudades de América Latina han liderado la implementación de Sistemas de Transporte Público Masivo de Autobuses tipo BRT (llamados así por sus siglas en inglés por Bus Rapid Transit), un modo de transporte que generalmente se caracteriza por el desarrollo de infraestructura que dan prioridad al transporte público en relación con el transporte en otros tipos de vehículos, ofrece la posibilidad de pagar la tarifa antes de tomar el autobús y permite un rápido acceso al mismo. Más de 45 ciudades de América Latina han realizado inversiones en sistemas tipo BRT, lo que representa el 63,6 por ciento del número de pasajeros en sistemas tipo BRT a nivel mundial.

En Curitiba, Brasil, el sistema tipo BRT ha sido implementado como una herramienta para fomentar un proceso de desarrollo urbano que se caracteriza en apoyar y fortalecer el sistema de transporte público en general. En el año 1972, la ciudad incorporó una red de vías exclusivas para autobuses y estimuló a lo largo de los cinco ejes principales del sistema tipo desarrollos del suelo de alta densidad y usos mixtos, estos ejes estructurales han guiado el proceso de crecimiento urbano de Curitiba por décadas y convergen en el centro de la ciudad. La nueva línea verde de Curitiba se fundamenta en principios similares: fomentar el desarrollo urbano que mejora y facilita el uso del sistema de transporte público masivo. El caso de Curitiba sugiere que el éxito del sistema tipo BRT puede ser mayor a través de la concentración del desarrollo del suelo a lo largo del eje del sistema de transporte público masivo. En otros estudios, se ha investigado si el sistema tipo BRT puede realmente estimular el desarrollo del suelo.

El término “desarrollo orientado al tránsito” (DOT) –en inglés, Transit Oriented Development o TOD– se utiliza para describir el desarrollo urbano que se caracteriza por ser compacto con mezcla de usos del suelo, entre los cuales generalmente se encuentran los de tipo residencial, comercial y de oficinas, así como un entorno urbano de alta calidad para los peatones que efectivamente tienen acceso al transporte público. Se considera que dicho desarrollo urbano facilita o respalda el transporte público, ya que puede concentrar la demanda a lo largo de las troncales y/o corredores de transporte, equilibrar los flujos de pasajeros y generar oportunidades para garantizar viajes de carácter multimodal. La evidencia de la experiencia en los Estados Unidos en este tema sugiere que las personas que residen en áreas servidas por DOT utilizan más el transporte público en comparación con otros viajeros frecuentes. Aunque la mayoría de los DOT se han construido alrededor de los sistemas de transporte público sobre rieles, el concepto del desarrollo urbano orientado hacia el transporte público también puede constituirse en una estrategia para complementar y mejorar los sistemas tipo BRT.

Tipologías de DOT

Tanto investigadores como profesionales han desarrollado una variedad de tipologías de desarrollo urbano orientado al transporte público DOT, aunque ninguna de ellas se ha enfocado específicamente en los sistemas tipo BRT. El tipo de desarrollo urbano que podría darse en torno a las estaciones de los sistemas tipo BRT es un factor fundamental para la planificación del desarrollo alrededor de las estaciones o terminales, comprender de qué manera el DOT es adecuado dentro de una estrategia de crecimiento regional, crear conciencia y fomentar la participación del público en general en el desarrollo urbano y, finalmente, aumentar las posibilidades de éxito del sistema.

La literatura acerca de los DOT sugiere la existencia de diferencias importantes en relación con las características y los tipos de este desarrollo urbano. Una aproximación se sustenta en la experiencia de los planificadores, arquitectos y urbanistas. Peter Calthorpe (1993) utilizó el concepto de urbanización para identificar los DOT de carácter urbano y de escala barrial con características tales como la calidad del servicio de transporte público, los usos del suelo, la intensidad del desarrollo y el carácter del diseño urbano. La localización geográfica de estos DOT varía desde áreas de desarrollo con terrenos aún no urbanizados hasta áreas de redesarrollo y renovación urbana. Una tipología similar desarrollada en el estado de Florida (Estados Unidos) en el año 2011 no sólo se enfocó en la escala y tamaño del centro de actividades (regional, comunitario o barrial), sino también incluyó otra dimensión relacionada con los modo de transporte (Renaissance Planning Group, 2011).

Dittmar y Poticha (2004) combinaron los conceptos de localización geográfica y urbanización en la definición de tipologías DOT, las cuales están denominadas como centro urbano, barrio urbano, centro suburbano, barrio suburbano, zona de tránsito a escala barrial y ciudad dormitorio. Se ha establecido el mismo enfoque en aplicaciones más recientes de tipologías de DOT. Por ejemplo, la ciudad de Sacramento, California definió las tipologías de DOT como núcleo o centro urbano, centro de empleo, centro residencial, centro dormitorio y troncal de autobuses con mejoras (Steer Davies Gleave, 2009). La organización Reconnecting America desarrolló las siguientes tipologías para el área de la Bahía de San Francisco, California: centro regional, centro urbano, centro suburbano, centro de ciudad de tránsito, barrio urbano, barrio de tránsito y corredor de uso mixto (Comisión Metropolitana de Planificación 2007). En Denver, Colorado, el Centro para el Desarrollo Urbano Orientado hacia el Transporte Público (Center for Transit Oriented Development – CTOD por sus siglas en inglés, 2008) desarrolló una guía para la planificación de áreas alrededor de estaciones de transporte público que incorporó una tipología adicional definida como usos especiales y/o distrito de empleo.

Una aproximación alternativa para identificar tipologías a priori consiste en utilizar técnicas de agrupación de datos con el fin de examinar los mismos y la evidencia recolectada de un entorno urbano determinado. Por ejemplo, las tipologías de desarrollo urbano del entorno de 25 estaciones de metro que tuvieron un desarrollo integrado en Hong Kong se componen de cinco tipos: edificios de oficinas de gran altura, edificios residenciales de gran altura, desarrollos residenciales a gran escala, desarrollos de uso mixto a gran escala y edificios residenciales de mediana altura (Cervero y Murakami, 2009). En otro estudio se utilizó el análisis de conglomerados con el objetivo de desarrollar una definición espacio-funcional de tipologías de las áreas del entorno urbano de las estaciones del tren ligero de Phoenix, Arizona (Atkinson-Palombo y Kuby, 2011). Las tipologías identificadas en el estudio fueron las siguientes: centros de empleo, áreas de uso mixto de medianos ingresos, nodos de estacionamiento para pasajeros frecuentes, áreas de alta densidad poblacional o alta presencia de zonas de alquiler, y áreas que presentan concentración de pobreza urbana.

Un último conjunto de tipologías emergentes elaborado por el CTOD representa el entorno urbano construido introduciendo una dimensión de implementación o desempeño. Por lo general, estas tipologías se convierten en una matriz de dos dimensiones, donde los tipos del entorno urbano construido se encuentran en un eje y las medidas de implementación y disponibilidad en el otro. Estas tipologías, que se desarrollaron para Portland, Oregón y Baltimore, Maryland, en los Estados Unidos, se utilizan con el fin de guiar inversiones de capital y promover cambios de política; además, resultan particularmente útiles para generar conciencia en el público en general con respecto a los beneficios en términos de viajes y desplazamientos que ofrece el desarrollo urbano orientado hacia el transporte público – DOT (Deng y Nelson, 2012).

Ciudades estudiadas y recolección de datos

Con el objetivo de discernir la condición del desarrollo urbano orientado a los sistemas tipo BRT en América Latina, el estudio que llevamos a cabo investigó el entorno urbano construido que caracteriza las estaciones y terminales de sistemas tipo BRT en siete ciudades (tabla 1). Para ello, identificamos grandes ciudades en la región donde sistemas tipo BRT han estado en operación durante por lo menos cinco años: Bogotá (Colombia); Curitiba (Brasil); Goiânia (Brasil); Ciudad de Guatemala (Guatemala); Guayaquil (Ecuador); Quito (Ecuador); y el área metropolitana de São Paulo (Brasil), específicamente la troncal “ABD”. En conjunto, estas ciudades representan el 16 por ciento del número de pasajeros en sistemas tipo BRT a nivel mundial, y el 31 por ciento del número de pasajeros en sistemas tipo BRT en América Latina. El estudio incluyó dos tipos de paradas: estaciones, es decir, las paradas comunes del sistema BRT, y terminales, es decir, las paradas que se encuentran al final de una troncal o aquellas en donde se realizan transbordos importantes de una troncal del sistema BRT a otra. Con el apoyo de planificadores urbanos en las ciudades seleccionadas, identificamos un grupo de estaciones y terminales específicas representativas del sistema BRT al interior de cada ciudad, independientemente de que el desarrollo urbano estuviera orientado al sistema tipo BRT o no. En definitiva, 51 estaciones y 31 terminales fueron identificadas para adelantar la investigación.

Debido a la falta de datos en común con una alta definición espacial entre las ciudades, fue necesario recolectar datos in situ utilizando un formato de recolección diseñado para obtener información de las características del entorno urbano en dos niveles: calles (segmentos compuestos por una manzana o cuadra) y manzanas o cuadras urbanas. El término “segmento” se definió como el tramo de una calle entre dos intersecciones. El formato de recolección se estructura en los siguientes campos acerca del entorno urbano:

• Peatones y bicicletas (calles peatonales, puentes peatonales, ciclovías).
• Usos del suelo (industrial, comercial, residencial unifamiliar, residencial multifamiliar, comercialindustrial, comercial-residencial, institucional).
• Densidad del desarrollo urbano (baja, media, alta).
• Presencia de espacios públicos o semipúblicos (áreas de uso público junto a centro comerciales, escuelas o colegios, hospitales o centros de salud, iglesias, bibliotecas, mercados, centros deportivos y/o de recreación).
• Presencia de espacios abiertos (áreas verdes, parques, plazas, plazoletas).
• Mezcla de tipologías de vivienda.
• Nivel de desarrollo en el área de estudio.
• Estado de las construcciones y los espacios verdes (bajo, medio, alto).

Con respecto a las estaciones, estudiamos segmentos de calles al interior de un radio de 250 metros, tomando como centro la estación del sistema tipo BRT. Para las terminales, estudiamos el área comprendida en un radio de 500 metros tomando como centro la terminal del BRT. En siete casos en la Ciudad de Guatemala y un caso en Goiânia, estudiamos dos estaciones (en lugar de sólo una) debido a que el sistema de autobuses se dividió en dos calles paralelas, cada una de sentido único, lo cual implica la localización de estaciones paralelas o “hermanas” que se complementan al brindar acceso al sistema en ambos sentidos. En estos casos, el área que se analizó es un poco mayor al radio de 250 metros. Además de los datos recolectados en campo, utilizamos datos secundarios suministrados por parte de las autoridades municipales, tales como la población censada dentro del área de estudio y la distancia de las estaciones y terminales a los principales centros de actividades en cada ciudad.

Estudiamos en total 10.632 segmentos y 2.963 manzanas alrededor de 82 estaciones y terminales de los sistemas tipo BRT en las siete ciudades. Debido a que la superficie de las estaciones estudiadas era similar, la comparación entre segmentos y manzanas por estación/terminal ofrece información acerca de qué tan compactas son dichas áreas en cada ciudad y su nivel de conectividad. Una estación en Guayaquil presentó la mayor cantidad de segmentos (102,1), mientras que las estaciones en São Paulo (Corredor ABD) presentaron la menor cantidad de segmentos (43,1). Detectamos un patrón similar al examinar los segmentos por manzana.

Todos los datos fueron agregados al nivel de estación/terminal. Los datos recolectados a nivel de segmento se agregaron con el fin de medir en porcentajes la presencia o ausencia de una o varias características del entorno urbano de cada estación/terminal. Los datos recolectados al nivel de manzana se agregaron con el fin de medir con respecto al área bruta la densidad de las características en el entorno urbano de la estación/terminal. Finalmente, calculamos 38 variables que caracterizan el entorno urbano construido alrededor de cada estación/terminal.

Tipologías de estaciones identificadas en los sistemas tipo BRT

Debido a la gran cantidad de variables (38) y el número relativamente bajo de observaciones (82), llevamos a cabo un análisis de factores a nivel exploratorio con el fin de generar un subconjunto de variables y estimar sus puntajes factoriales. El análisis de factores se basa en la correlación de los datos para identificar grupos de variables que son más similares entre sí. Las 38 variables se redujeron a 9 factores para su posterior análisis:

• Apto para peatones, con espacios públicos y áreas verdes conectados.
• Usos residenciales de viviendas unifamiliares adosadas localizadas en áreas no centrales.
• Residencial multifamiliar de alta densidad.
• Suelo sin desarrollar.
• Áreas de uso mixto con buen estado y mantenimiento.
• Espacios verdes con buen estado y mantenimiento.
• Equipamientos de carácter público para usos institucionales orientados al sistema de BRT.
• Desarrollos comerciales a gran escala.
• Área urbana consolidada sin usos del suelo industrial.

Al examinar los factores y sus estadísticas descriptivas, surgieron varias observaciones. En primer lugar, la intensidad del desarrollo alrededor de las estaciones y terminales tiende a ser relativamente baja. Por ejemplo, sólo el 8 por ciento de los segmentos posee desarrollos de alta densidad, mientras que el 31 por ciento de los segmentos presenta un desarrollo de baja densidad. En segundo lugar, el redesarrollo como estrategia para fomentar el desarrollo urbano orientado al sistema tipo BRT parece ser fundamental en las ciudades estudiadas. Solamente el 8 por ciento de los segmentos muestran bajos niveles de consolidación, mientras que el 11 por ciento de los mismos presentan lotes vacantes. En contraste, casi la mitad de los segmentos muestran desarrollos con un alto nivel de consolidación. Este resultado sugiere que existen pocas oportunidades para que los desarrollos orientados hacia el sistema tipo BRT se lleven a cabo en suelos vacantes o por desarrollar. En tercer lugar, en relación con el estacionamiento de vehículos, cabe destacar que en el 26 por ciento de los segmentos encontramos estacionamiento de vehículos sobre la calle, mientras que el 30 por ciento de segmentos muestran algún tipo de actividad comercial y de venta minorista con estacionamiento para vehículos particulares (fuera de la vía pública). Este hecho pone de manifiesto el desafío de administrar la oferta (y la demanda) de espacios de estacionamiento y, asimismo, podría indicar que el entorno urbano alrededor de las estaciones de los sistemas tipo BRT por lo general no resulta tan apto para los peatones y usuarios del sistema como debería.

El funcionamiento de cada estación en relación con los nueve factores se combinó con la densidad poblacional y con tres variables adicionales que no presentaron correlación alguna de las demás variables en el análisis de factores. Con estos nueve factores y las cuatro variables adicionales llevamos a cabo un análisis de conglomerados con el fin de determinar cuáles eran las estaciones y terminales que podrían agruparse. El análisis de conglomerados se utilizó como base para definir la tipología, análisis a través del cual se identificaron 10 tipos de desarrollo urbano en torno a las paradas de los sistemas tipo BRT (tabla 2).

Al examinar la tipología por ciudad, descubrimos que dos tipos de paradas capturan factores específicos de dos ciudades: el centro histórico de Quito y varias estaciones características de Ciudad de Guatemala (ciudad que posee el sistema tipo BRT más reciente entre los sistemas estudiados). El hecho de que sea nuevo y de que funciona en partes de la ciudad bastante consolidadas podría explicar por qué las estaciones se agrupan en el análisis de conglomerados. Los ocho tipos de estaciones restantes representan un amplio rango de estaciones entre varias ciudades.

Cinco atributos parecen diferenciar las distintas estaciones: (1) desarrollos multifamiliares con y sin orientación hacia el sistema tipo BRT ; (2) viviendas unifamiliares adosadas que, en algunos casos, se construyen de manera informal y tienen acceso a algunas actividades comerciales, generalmente lejos de los centros de mayor actividad de la ciudad; (3) alta densidad poblacional, infraestructura para peatones y acceso a parques y espacios verdes, generalmente lejos de los centros de mayor actividad de la ciudad; (4) estaciones con la presencia de equipamientos de uso institucional y espacios verdes, no necesariamente abiertos al público; y (5) estaciones con barreras físicas por la convergencia de varias calles y avenidas con un gran volumen de tráfico.

Las tipologías de desarrollo urbano identificadas comprenden una amplia gama de posibles entornos urbanos construidos alrededor de las estaciones de los sistemas tipo BRT. La tipología de desarrollo denominado centro satélite orientado hacia el sistema tipo BRT, que ilustramos con el caso de Bogotá, presenta un nivel importante de actividades comerciales, instalaciones públicas, parques e infraestructura para peatones, y a su vez presenta una mezcla de viviendas residenciales multifamiliares y viviendas unifamiliares adosadas (figura 1). Tomadas en conjunto, estas características se acercan mucho al ideal de un desarrollo urbano orientado al transporte público – DOT. De manera similar, la tipología representada por la estación del centro histórico de la ciudad de Quito posee también muchos atributos de un desarrollo urbano orientado al transporte público – DOT. La cuestión sobre si la presencia de estas tipologías se traduce en una mayor cantidad de pasajeros en el sistema tipo BRT continúa siendo una pregunta de investigación empírica por examinar.

Las estaciones dentro de las tipologías centro comunitario y centro barrial parecen ajustarse apropiadamente con la definición de Calthorpe (1993) acerca de DOT comunitarios y barriales. Entre los casos analizados, las estaciones en la tipología centro comunitario presentan algunas viviendas unifamiliares adosadas y usos mixtos, tales como usos institucionales que, por lo general, están destinados a funcionar en áreas próximas a la ciudad. Las estaciones en la tipología centro barrial presentan una mayor intensidad de desarrollos residenciales, específicamente viviendas unifamiliares adosadas. Las estaciones que se encuentran dentro de las tipologías definidas como corredores parecen coincidir con el concepto de mejoramiento urbano de los corredores de autobús desarrollado en Sacramento y San Francisco, California, aunque en nuestros datos podemos distinguir claramente entre corredores dominados por usos institucionales y corredores que simplemente presentan una amplia gama de usos mixtos.

A través de las tipologías también identificamos desafíos y oportunidades para mejorar la capacidad de un desarrollo urbano orientado al sistema tipo BRT. Sólo las estaciones dentro de las tipologías centro de ciudad y centro satélite orientados al BRT presentaron una integración adecuada entre el entorno peatonal y el transporte público. La tipología centro urbano, como por ejemplo el de Curitiba, está listo para el mejoramiento en su integración con el sistema tipo BRT, ya que posee las densidades y los usos mixtos apropiados para promoverlo (figura 2). La tipología conformada por las estaciones Nexo, tal como se presenta en Goiânia, representa un desafío frecuente para los planificadores urbanos municipales (figura 3). Estas estaciones y terminales deberían ubicarse de manera que faciliten los transbordos intermodales, aunque esto por lo general implica sacrificar el acceso de los usuarios a cada lugar y la orientación del desarrollo hacia el transporte público en la estación y/o terminal.

En comparación con otras tipologías, no encontramos evidencia sólida de estaciones relacionadas con centros de empleo o pasajeros frecuentes. Esto puede ser resultado del precario papel que juegan los usos mixtos del suelo entre las estaciones y terminales, ya que los usos del suelo cumplen un papel importante en otras tipologías. Una explicación por este fenómeno podría ser el alto nivel de usos mixtos que habitualmente se encuentran en las ciudades de América Latina, lo que contribuye a un bajo nivel de variación entre las diferentes áreas de las estaciones y terminales estudiadas.

En cuanto a las políticas de vivienda, las tipologías correspondientes al centro barrial y áreas verdes presentan una combinación interesante de distancia a los centros de mayor actividad en la ciudad y presencia de viviendas para hogares de bajos recursos. Dado que las paradas se encuentran lejos de los centros de mayor actividad, es mucho más probable que presenten espacios verdes, viviendas de interés social y, en algunos casos, viviendas informales. Las ciudades de América Latina suelen exhibir un gradiente de precios del suelo bastante pronunciado, donde las áreas con acceso privilegiado a los centros de mayor actividad tienen precios más altos que las áreas periféricas. Estas dos tipologías de estación del sistema tipo BRT plantean preguntas sobre las posibles consecuencias que pueda tener el sistema tipo BRT en cuanto a incrementar la segregación de viviendas y la carga financiera en términos de movilidad para las personas de bajos recursos.

Análisis de las tipologías de estación y prospectiva de la planificación

Nuestro análisis de 82 paradas de los sistemas tipo BRT en siete ciudades de América Latina reveló una variedad de patrones de desarrollo urbano. Algunas tipologías poseen atributos que son coherentes con los principios del desarrollo urbano orientado hacia el transporte público – DOT. Otras tipologías presentan una gran cantidad de usos del suelo, vías e infraestructura, así como características de desarrollo que no promueven un desarrollo urbano orientado hacia el sistema tipo BRT. No obstante, otras tipologías muestran un proceso de desarrollo aún en curso, con una cantidad importante de terrenos vacantes y desarrollos todavía en proceso de consolidación. Finalmente, algunas estaciones parecen captar las condiciones urbanas que surgen en muchas ciudades latinoamericanas: presencia de viviendas informales que se encuentran lejos de los centros de mayor actividad; desarrollos comerciales a gran escala, generalmente del tipo centro comercial o grandes superficies, los cuales generan espacios privados para el comercio y, en algunos casos, espacios de uso público; y una relativa carencia de espacios públicos al aire libre. Esta información es útil para facilitar procesos de planificación de un desarrollo urbano orientados hacia los sistemas tipo BRT, dado el rápido crecimiento de sistemas tipo BRT en las últimas dos décadas. Unas 146 ciudades en todo el mundo presentan en la actualidad algún tipo de sistema tipo con prioridad para autobuses.

Comprender el tipo de desarrollo urbano que podría generarse en el entorno de las estaciones de sistemas tipo BRT es fundamental para planificar las áreas de las estaciones e identificar de qué manera el desarrollo urbano orientado hacia el transporte público – DOT encaja dentro de una estrategia de crecimiento regional. Robert Cervero (1998) sostiene que toda inversión en transporte debe estar precedida y dirigida por una visión de desarrollo urbano exitosa, y esta planificación es necesaria si se van a generar subcentros alrededor de las estaciones de los sistemas de transporte. Cervero refuerza su argumento con la notable experiencia y hallazgos obtenidos en Copenhague, Estocolmo y Singapur, y sugiere que es fundamental tomar medidas para desarrollar visiones tanto a escala regional como de las estaciones de los sistemas de transporte (entorno urbano alrededor de las estaciones) para garantizar el éxito hacia futuro del desarrollo urbano orientado a los sistemas de transporte público – DOT. De hecho, las tipologías de DOT en vías de expansión en los Estados Unidos están basadas en parte en su capacidad de sostener una planificación del DOT a largo plazo. Por ejemplo, la tipología de Denver, Colorado resultó de vital importancia a la hora de crear una visión del uso y la planificación del suelo para las áreas de las estaciones del tren ligero, tanto las existentes como las futuras.

Las visiones acerca de qué tipos de desarrollo urbano pueden darse en el futuro y dónde tendrían lugar son fundamentales en el proceso de planificación y, con frecuencia, hacen parte de los escenarios definidos en ejercicios de prospectiva, en los cuales estas tipologías deben ser tenidas en cuenta por parte de los tomadores de decisiones, los planificadores y el público en general. La visión en prospectiva en el proceso de planificación es, por lo general, una condición previa para que cualquier ejercicio de planificación de las áreas de las estaciones de sistemas tipo definidas como DOT pueda ser efectivo. El Centro para el Desarrollo Urbano Orientado hacia el Transporte Público (Center for Transit Oriented Development – CTOD por sus siglas en inglés) sugiere la elaboración de un plan que incluya la participación ciudadana, la comercialización del proyecto y la creación de una estrategia regional de DOT. Para poder lograr todos estos aspectos, se necesita una visión acerca del tipo de desarrollo urbano que puede generarse en el área que es objeto del proceso de planificación. Las visiones son particularmente predominantes a la hora de involucrar al público en general, ya que pueden presentar de manera tangible los posibles resultados del proceso de planificación, lo cual permite tener una mayor comprensión del impacto de las decisiones acerca de la densidad, la mezcla de usos del suelo y las áreas de acceso a las estaciones.

El próximo paso en nuestra investigación será determinar las causas de los diferentes patrones de desarrollo urbano que hemos identificado. En algunos casos, el entorno urbano ha cambiado de forma radical con las inversiones de los sistemas tipo BRT, mientras que en otros casos no se han producido mayores cambios. Aquí entran en juego tanto las fuerzas de mercado como la regulación del desarrollo urbano, los cuales determinan en gran medida el resultado del desarrollo y la revitalización. Algunas de las medidas para liberar el potencial de desarrollo de los predios y áreas cercanas a las estaciones de los sistemas tipo BRT consisten en cambiar la regulación de los usos del suelo, flexibilizar los límites de densidad o reducir los requisitos de estacionamiento de vehículos. Esta estrategia coordinada entre la planificación del uso del suelo y el sector transporte es la piedra angular del desarrollo urbano orientado hacia el transporte público – DOT.

Sobre los autores

Daniel A. Rodríguez es profesor de Planificación Urbana y Regional, profesor asociado adjunto de Epidemiología y director del Programa de Transporte Carolina de la Universidad de Carolina del Norte en Chapel Hill. Su área de investigación se enfoca en la relación recíproca entre el medio ambiente construido (que incluye los sistemas tipo BRT) y el comportamiento de los pasajeros.

Erik Vergel tovar es becario Fulbright y estudiante de doctorado en Planificación Urbana y Regional en la Universidad de Carolina del Norte en Chapel Hill. Arquitecto con estudios de maestría en Gestión, Planificación y Desarrollo Urbano (grado con honores) en el Instituto de Estudios de Vivienda y Desarrollo Urbano (IHS) de la Universidad Erasmus de Rotterdam, Países Bajos. Su área de investigación se enfoca en las relaciones entre el transporte urbano (en particular, los sistemas tipo BRT), las políticas de suelo, desarrollo urbano y vivienda para grupos de bajos ingresos.

Referencias

Atkinson-Palombo, C. y M. J. Kuby. 2011. “The geography of advance transit-oriented development in metropolitan Phoenix, Arizona, 2000–2007”. En Journal of Transport Geography 19(2): 189–199.

Calthorpe, P. 1993. The new American metropolis: Ecology, community, and the American dream. Nueva York: Princeton Architectural Press.

Cervero, R., 1998. The transit metropolis: A global inquiry. Washington, DC: Island Press.

Cervero, R. y J. Murakami. 2009. “Rail and property development in Hong Kong: Experiences and extensions”. En Urban Studies 46(10): 2019–2043.

CTOD. 2008. Station area planning: How to make great transit-oriented places. Washington, DC: Reconnecting America.

Deng, T. y J. D. Nelson. 2013. “Bus rapid transit implementation in Beijing: An evaluation of performance and impacts”. En Research in Transportation Economics 39(1): 108–113.

Dittmar, H. y S. Poticha. 2004. “Defining transit-oriented development: The new regional building block”. En The new transit town: Best practices in transit-oriented development. Editores: H. Dittmar y G. Ohland, xiii y 253. Washington, DC: Island Press.

Comisión Metropolitana de Planificación. 2007. “Station area planning manual. Oakland, CA”. http://ctod.org/pdfs/2007MTCStationAreaPlanningManual.pdf

Grupo de Planificación Renacimiento. 2011. “A framework for transit oriented development in Florida”. Orlando, FL. http://www.fltod.com/renaissance/docs/Products/FrameworkTOD_0715.pdf

Steer Davies Gleave. 2009. “Sacramento regional transit: A transit action plan”. Sacramento, CA: Sacramento Regional Transit.

Han transcurrido más de 20 años desde que un megaproyecto impulsado por el gobierno comenzó a transformar a Puerto Madero, el sector más antiguo del distrito portuario que se encuentra en la desembocadura del Río de la Plata en Buenos Aires, Argentina. Habiendo sido anteriormente un centro de decadencia que fomentaba el deterioro del centro adyacente, Puerto Madero es, hoy en día, un ícono turístico y un centro de progreso, ya que atrae tanto a la población local como a los visitantes hacia sus parques y actividades culturales. En Puerto Madero viven aproximadamente 5.000 habitantes nuevos y ha generado 45.000 puestos de trabajo en el área de servicios. Alberga numerosos referentes arquitectónicos nuevos, incluyendo el Puente de la Mujer, de Santiago Calatrava, y la casa matriz de YPF, obra de César Pelli. Además, el redesarrollo al que se sometió el puerto ha contribuido a la reactivación del centro de la ciudad, influyendo en las tendencias de desarrollo en toda la capital argentina.

Puerto Madero abarca 170 hectáreas en la zona cercana a la casa de gobierno (la Casa Rosada) en el centro y fue uno de los primeros proyectos urbanos de reacondicionamiento en América Latina a esta escala y nivel de complejidad. Fue un proyecto concebido como parte de una estrategia de desarrollo más amplia en todo el centro de la ciudad, que también incluía cambios en las normas sobre el uso del suelo, el reacondicionamiento de edificios y la construcción de viviendas de interés social en áreas tradicionales. En el presente artículo se analizan dos décadas de evidencias y experiencias respecto de este proyecto a fin de examinar hasta qué punto Puerto Madero ha logrado sus objetivos principales: contribuir a la reducción de patrones de desarrollo no deseados en la ciudad, afirmar a esta zona como el principal centro de la ciudad de Buenos Aires, estimular la economía de la ciudad y mejorar las condiciones de vida de todos los porteños.

El puerto en crisis

Puerto Madero fue abandonado como puerto a principios del siglo XX cuando todas las operaciones se transfirieron al Puerto Nuevo. Hacia fines de la década de 1980, Puerto Madero había sufrido varias décadas de abandono y desuso. Los terrenos eran propiedad de la Administración General de Puertos federal, pero tanto el gobierno de la ciudad como el gobierno nacional tenían jurisdicción sobre la planificación de esta zona. De manera similar, el Gran Buenos Aires, que aloja al 35 por ciento de la población argentina y produce el 46 por ciento del PIB, se encuentra gobernado por una superposición de instituciones que, con frecuencia, enfrentan problemas para trabajar en forma coordinada. Con el fin de simplificar este gobierno interjurisdiccional, se constituyó una empresa pública para gestionar el proyecto, cuyas acciones se dividen equitativamente entre el gobierno nacional y el gobierno de la ciudad. En 1989, el gobierno federal transfirió la propiedad de este sector del puerto a la nueva sociedad, la Corporación Antiguo Puerto Madero (CAPM).

Una vez recibida la transferencia de los terrenos del gobierno federal, el rol de la CAPM consistió en desarrollar el plan para este sector, definir un modelo financiero autofinanciado, encargarse de las mejoras por realizar en el sector asociadas con el proyecto, comercializar los terrenos y supervisar el proceso de desarrollo de acuerdo con los plazos y las pautas establecidas en el plan maestro. A diferencia de lo que ocurre con otras empresas similares en otras partes del mundo, que generalmente cuentan con un sustancial financiamiento público o acceso al crédito, la CAPM, por decreto, no recibiría recurso público alguno aparte de la transferencia de los terrenos y generaría sus propios ingresos para cubrir los costos operativos. El redesarrollo del puerto no podría haberse llevado a cabo de otra manera, ya que el gobierno federal estaba abocado a la recuperación fiscal y la creación de puestos de trabajo en medio de una crisis económica nacional.

Contexto y cronología del megaproyecto

Tal como ocurre en la mayoría de las ciudades latinoamericanas, el desplazamiento de actividades del centro tradicional de la ciudad de Buenos Aires había reducido el uso del sistema de transporte público y había dado como resultado un lento deterioro de los edificios del patrimonio histórico, muchos de los cuales se habían convertido en edificios de viviendas subestándar. La propuesta de redesarrollo de Puerto Madero fue parte de una estrategia más amplia concebida por la ciudad para proteger el patrimonio, promover el desarrollo en el centro, estimular la economía de la zona y contribuir a la reducción de estos patrones de asentamiento no deseados.

El desarrollo tuvo lugar en cuatro etapas. Durante la primera etapa (1989–1992), la CAPM vendió las antiguas propiedades que se encontraban en el extremo oeste del puerto, con lo que se inició así el proceso de redesarrollo y se cubrieron los costos iniciales del proyecto. En 1991, el gobierno de la ciudad y la Sociedad de Arquitectos firmaron un convenio para facilitar el Concurso Nacional de Ideas para Puerto Madero.

En el año 1992, los tres equipos ganadores trabajaron en colaboración para desarrollar el Proyecto Urbano Preliminar de Puerto Madero. El redesarrollo requirió una nueva geometría de subdivisión que permitiera llevar a cabo la con-strucción sin la necesidad de demoler las valiosas estructuras históricas. Muchos de los edificios históricos del puerto, tales como los depósitos, se restaurarían para darles nuevas funciones, con lo que se combinaría el valioso patrimonio histórico con el nuevo desarrollo.

Durante la segunda etapa (1993–1995), se otorgó el contrato del plan maestro a los ganadores del Concurso de Ideas. La propuesta original consistía en el desarrollo de 1,5 millones de metros cuadrados de superficie construida, concentrados en una ubicación central, con el fin de reactivar el centro de la ciudad. El plan, que contemplaba un horizonte de 20 años, comprendía actividades comerciales, establecimientos culturales y recreativos, cafés, restaurantes, servicios, estudios profesionales y actividades comerciales de mediana envergadura (tales como imprentas y empresas dedicadas a embalaje y depósito), que podrían ubicarse adecuadamente en los 16 antiguos depósitos portuarios renovados. A fin de compensar una evidente falta de espacios verdes en los alrededores del centro de la ciudad, se propusieron espacios verdes, tales como un parque central metropolitano, una reserva ecológica y la rehabilitación de la Costanera Sur. Dado el supuesto original de que predominarían los edificios de oficinas, la cantidad de unidades habitacionales prevista fue de menos de 3.000 (sin embargo, el uso residencial experimentó una mayor demanda, por lo que, en la actualidad, existen aproximadamente 11.000 unidades habitacionales).

Durante la tercera etapa (1996–2000), se realizó la mayor parte de las obras públicas y los gastos del proyecto aumentaron en gran manera junto con las ventas de terrenos. A lo largo de esta etapa, el costo por metro cuadrado de construcción no varió en forma significativa, ya que osciló entre 150 y 300 dólares por metro cuadrado hasta finales de la década (todos los precios mencionados se refieren a dólares estadounidenses). En esta tercera etapa, el perfil de los inversores había evolucionado de un grupo pionero inicial formado por pequeñas y medianas empresas que enfrentaban altos niveles de riesgo (1989–1993) a grandes firmas que invertían en productos de eficacia comprobada. Para el año 2001, quedaban pocos terrenos públicos para vender y la empresa pública poseía suficientes activos líquidos para finalizar las obras públicas necesarias para el proyecto. La cuarta etapa del desarrollo incluye dos fases: de 2001 a 2003, y de 2004 a la actualidad. Al principio, el proyecto sufrió las turbulencias económicas, financieras y políticas asociadas con la crisis fiscal de 2001, impulsada por la falta de pago del gobierno respecto de su deuda externa. Durante todo este período, la CAPM enfrentó altos niveles de incertidumbre gubernamental, por lo que las ventas de terrenos se detuvieron. No obstante, con posterioridad a las elecciones presidenciales del año 2003, el país retomó las negociaciones internacionales, reestructuró su deuda externa y mejoró significativamente sus condiciones económicas.

Al mismo tiempo, la CAPM pudo resolver ciertos litigios que existían sobre algunos terrenos, que posteriormente vendió y con cuyos ingresos pudo completar las obras públicas necesarias en el lugar.

A medida que los terrenos disponibles en Puerto Madero se volvían escasos, los desarrolladores recurrieron a las áreas que rodeaban el centro de la ciudad a modo de sitios alternativos para la inversión. La escala y complejidad del redesarrollo del puerto atrajo inversores que poseían conexiones más estrechas con los mercados financieros, tanto nacionales como internacionales. Muchos desarrolladores decidieron invertir en el centro en lugar de los suburbios. De esta manera, el proyecto tuvo éxito al redireccionar las tendencias del mercado para alinearlas con las prioridades de las políticas urbanas, un cambio que no hubiera existido sin la intervención del estado.

Logros del proyecto

En la actualidad, el proyecto se encuentra casi completo, con aproximadamente 1,5 millones de metros cuadrados de superficie construida, según lo planificado. Desde el comienzo hasta su finalización, los fondos para el proyecto provinieron completamente de la venta de terrenos y concesiones.

Para el año 2011, la CAPM había vendido aproximadamente 257,7 millones de dólares en propiedades, invertido 113 millones de dólares en obras públicas, e incurrido en unos gastos generales de cerca de 92 millones de dólares, entre honorarios de gestión y otros gastos operativos. Los precios inmobiliarios aumentaron de 150 dólares el metro cuadrado a principios de la década de 1990 a 1.200 dólares el metro cuadrado en la actualidad. El proyecto atrajo una cantidad considerable de inversiones del sector privado, además de la transferencia de terrenos del estado.

El proyecto agregó cuatro masas de agua de grandes dimensiones (por un total de 39 hectáreas) y 28 hectáreas de espacios verdes al sistema de parques de la ciudad. También se facilitó la apertura de la reserva ecológica y se renovó el acceso a la explanada sur, conocida como la Costanera Sur, diseñada a principios del siglo XX por Jean-Claude Nicolas Forestier, quien también diseñó el Paseo del Prado en La Habana, Cuba. El centro adyacente representa nuevamente el punto de referencia indiscutido de la actividad pública, administrativa, financiera y comercial de alto nivel.

Puerto Madero fomentó además el crecimiento económico de la zona que, en última instancia, se tradujo en una mayor recaudación impositiva. Como iniciativa estatal, desencadenó más de 2,5 mil millones de dólares en inversiones privadas, con un valor actual de más de 6 mil millones de dólares. Aunque no tenemos a disposición datos contables completos, los ingresos derivados del impuesto a las ganancias societario se estiman en 158 millones de dólares, y los impuestos pagados por la empresa pública ascienden a 19,86 millones de dólares. Los nuevos propietarios de los inmuebles pagan aproximadamente 12,4 millones de dólares al año en concepto de impuestos inmobiliarios al gobierno de la ciudad. Una vez que haya finalizado la construcción, se calcula que los ingresos por impuestos inmobiliarios alcanzarán 24,3 millones de dólares al año.

El proyecto también estimuló el crecimiento del mercado laboral. Al día de hoy, las construcciones privadas en Puerto Madero comprendieron cerca de 450 millones de dólares en costos laborales, es decir, el equivalente a 900.000 meses de trabajo o 3.750 empleos por año, distribuidos en 20 años. Las inversiones del proyecto en obras públicas generaron 313 empleos por año durante 20 años, además de 26.777 empleos administrativos para el año 2006 y 45.281 empleos en el área de servicios para el año 2010. Estas cifras demuestran el papel vital que este proyecto ha representado en la estimulación de la economía de la ciudad.

Reducción de la rentabilidad

A pesar del éxito general de Puerto Madero, para muchos observadores, los resultados sociales no fueron satisfactorios. La causa principal fue la rápida venta de grandes parcelas de terreno durante el período de venta más dinámico, es decir, de 1996 a 1999. Algunas de estas parcelas tenían el tamaño de una cuadra completa del centro y, en la actualidad, se encuentran ocupadas por torres que funcionan, de alguna manera, como comunidades verticales cerradas. Además, resultó necesario que las empresas de mayor envergadura y mejor equipadas se encargaran de los enormes volúmenes de construcción, lo que excluyó a las pequeñas y medianas empresas. Así, la morfología de las grandes parcelas de terreno definió esencialmente los tipos de empresa y los tipos de producto que se ofrecerían y el perfil social de los posibles compradores.

Además, la estrategia de comercialización de los desarrolladores privados influenció el discurso general del proyecto, diluyendo así los objetivos de inclusión social de la gestión pública con el fin de favorecer la creación de un barrio de características exclusivas. Los ciudadanos con alto poder adquisitivo y los empresarios de alta gama codician los espacios residenciales y comerciales de Puerto Madero. A la CAPM le resulta difícil proteger el carácter público aun de los nuevos espacios abiertos del distrito, como por ejemplo la reserva ecológica, debido a que los residentes del distrito portuario con alto poder adquisitivo desalientan en gran manera la realización de actividades recreativas y deportivas que pudieran atraer a los porteños provenientes de toda la ciudad. En este sentido, la CAPM se limitó a articular los intereses de los empresarios privados y los residentes existentes, ignorando las políticas diseñadas para el beneficio de muchos habitantes de la ciudad. Las viviendas económicas y otros elementos que hubieran garantizado la diversidad en la demografía residencial de la zona no formaban parte de la tarea encomendada a la CAPM. Se planificaron varios programas sociales con este objetivo como parte de la estrategia más amplia para el centro de la ciudad, pero estos programas nunca se materializaron, lo que generó el aislamiento de Puerto Madero como un área de desarrollo para una elite.

La escala del proyecto de Puerto Madero, que hubiera sido imposible de gestionar y demasiado riesgosa para los inversores privados en ese momento, demuestra que el sector público es capaz de asumir un papel de liderazgo en el desarrollo de la ciudad. Sin embargo, también demuestra que los estándares socialmente progresivos son difíciles de mantener una vez que el proyecto se vuelve prestigioso y los crecientes valores inmobiliarios aumentan la presión impuesta por los desarrolladores privados. La capacidad de Puerto Madero de autofinanciarse representó una espada de doble filo. Por un lado, permitió que se llevara a cabo un proceso de desarrollo dirigido por el estado sin incurrir en costos del gobierno. Debido a que la empresa pública podía diferir el pago de dividendos a sus accionistas, fue capaz de capitalizar las ganancias obtenidas por las ventas de los terrenos y reinvertirlas en obras y servicios públicos destinados a la zona. El barrio abierto y accesible, dotado de obras de infraestructura pública y espacios abiertos, protegía en gran medida el interés público. Asimismo, el proyecto estimuló la actividad económica y contribuyó a un patrón de desarrollo general más eficiente en toda la ciudad, los cuales representan dos objetivos importantes de la gestión pública.

Sin embargo, los resultados habrían sido mejores si hubiera existido un apoyo financiero proveniente de préstamos de agencias multilaterales a fin de coordinar en forma óptima el ritmo de las ventas y tomar mejores decisiones a largo plazo que impulsaran el beneficio público del proyecto. La flexibilización de los requisitos de licitación sobre lotes de grandes dimensiones durante la segunda mitad de la década de 1990 aumentó las ventas, aunque provocó que la mayor parte de la plusvalía de los terrenos derivada del último aumento de precios inmobiliarios se devengara a favor de los grandes inversores que se habían comprometido en primera instancia.

En el año 2011, la CAPM transfirió el mantenimiento de todas las áreas desarrolladas a la ciudad y se comprometió a finalizar las restantes obras públicas para el año 2013. En la actualidad, los ingresos y los gastos de la CAPM están equilibrados. Los ingresos se ven limitados al alquiler de los diques y los lugares de estacionamiento. Los bienes de la CAPM consisten en varias propiedades (oficinas, lotes), cuyo producto constituye las ganancias de la empresa y cuyo valor de mercado se calcula en aproximadamente 50 millones de dólares. Estas ganancias podrían servir para iniciar nuevos emprendimientos de capital, o podrían transferirse a los accionistas cuando decidan disolver la CAPM. La solidez de los estados contables de la CAPM es una realidad, aunque la crítica de las que fue objeto durante el desarrollo de Puerto Madero podría constituir un obstáculo al acceso del gobierno a nuevos emprendimientos.

La inversión pública inicial en Puerto Madero fue de 120 millones de dólares, conformada por el terreno (tasado originalmente en 60 millones de dólares) y un conjunto de servicios intangibles, tales como el diseño del proyecto, la reconocida experiencia y la consultoría. Las ventas totales de terrenos ascendieron a 257,7 millones de dólares, con un costo general (administración, impuestos) de cerca de 92 millones de dólares (sin contar los costos de puesta en marcha, que no implicaron operaciones monetarias), lo que deja una modesta tasa de retorno. Aunque los precios deberían haber sido promocionales durante la etapa inicial del desarrollo, los valores de venta podrían haberse aumentado al transcurrir el tiempo si dichas ventas se hubieran programado con el fin de aprovechar el aumento de los precios de mercado. Para obtener tasas de retorno más altas, hubiera sido necesario un valor de venta promedio más alto, una mejor programación de la venta de los terrenos y un compromiso más modesto en cuanto a las obras públicas, tales como la infraestructura, el espacio público y los parques. La CAPM podría haber ahorrado una cantidad considerable si la construcción de puentes y pasarelas no se hubieran extendido más allá del perímetro del proyecto, bajo la jurisdicción municipal.

Los resultados del proyecto hubieran sido muy diferentes si los terrenos se hubieran vendido sin mejoras o si el proyecto hubiera estado en manos de desarrolladores privados. En este sentido, resulta importante destacar que, al momento de esbozar el proyecto, el riesgo se consideraba, en general, alto, y la escala de inversión superaba la capacidad de los inversores privados locales. De manera similar, los inversores internacionales no hubieran estado dispuestos a asumir este nivel tan alto de riesgo sin mayores concesiones de parte del gobierno. Además, los desarrolladores privados estaban interesados en promover proyectos de gran envergadura con acceso restringido casi exclusivamente a los propietarios. Mediante el control ejercido por el gobierno a través de la empresa pública se garan-tizaron ciertos atributos finales del proyecto, tales como el aporte de espacios públicos y el carácter holístico del desarrollo, con el fin de asegurar los beneficios para la comunidad.

Conclusión

Podría decirse que los objetivos originales del proyecto (estimular la actividad económica, afirmar el rol del centro de la ciudad, contribuir a la reducción de patrones de desarrollo no deseados y mejorar las condiciones de vida) se han cumplido. El proyecto de Puerto Madero generó empleos, estimuló la economía de la ciudad, atrajo grandes niveles de inversiones y sumó complejidad al centro de la ciudad, lo que contribuyó a su preeminencia y dio como resultado mejoras en las áreas circundantes. Creó además espacios abiertos de alta calidad, renovó el sistema metropolitano de parques y mejoró el patrón general de desarrollo en Buenos Aires.

No obstante, la relajación de los controles de calidad, el amplio alcance de los proyectos y la rapidez con que se han vendido los terrenos en ciertos momentos provocaron una reducción de los posibles ingresos que el proyecto hubiera podido devengar en beneficio del sector público y redundaron en una disminución de la capacidad de redistribución de esta iniciativa. El acceso al crédito hubiera fortalecido la posición de la CAPM y permitido una programación cuidadosa de las ventas de los terrenos y de las mejoras en la zona. Resulta alentador que la ocupación residencial haya excedido en gran medida las proyecciones originales, con lo que se consolidó una tendencia de repoblar el centro de la ciudad, aunque el proyecto debería haber incluido un porcentaje de viviendas económicas.

Estos resultados revelan la complejidad de llevar a cabo múltiples iniciativas con el fin de obtener un resultado social equilibrado. Puerto Madero no logró incorporar una mayor combinación social, debido a que no se llevaron a cabo otras estrategias para el centro de la ciudad, como por ejemplo la recuperación de edificios del patrimonio histórico. Las futuras iniciativas de gestión de proyectos urbanos deberían contemplar factores que aseguraran la continuidad de las políticas. Dentro de este marco, resulta importante impulsar la participación entre los beneficiarios de intervenciones específicas, tales como las viviendas económicas, ya que su participación y compromiso representan la garantía más sólida para la continuidad de las políticas.

Finalmente, el proyecto de Puerto Madero señala la capacidad que el estado ha demostrado tener al tomar la iniciativa de dirigir el proceso de desarrollo urbano. En este caso, el estado dejó a un lado su rol normativo y se hizo cargo de una iniciativa de redesarrollo importantísima. La CAPM demostró su capacidad de sustentar un complejo proyecto de regeneración urbana durante un tiempo prolongado y de mantenerse a flote en medio de un clima político turbulento y una grave crisis económica. La constitución de la empresa pública representa una innovación creativa en cuanto a la gestión urbana, ya que ofrece un claro ejemplo de cómo lograr el auto-financiamiento de un proyecto y la cooperación interjurisdiccional respecto del gobierno urbano. En este sentido, la experiencia de Puerto Madero sirve como un modelo convincente para la gestión urbana interjurisdiccional y reafirma el rol positivo que puede representar el estado en las iniciativas de planificación de la ciudad.

Sobre los autores

Alfredo Garay fue secretario de planificación en Buenos Aires cuando comenzó el megaproyecto Puerto Madero, y todavía se desempeña en el directorio de la CAPM. Arquitecto y catedrático en la Universidad de Buenos Aires, Garay ha recibido numerosos premios nacionales e internacionales en los campos de gestión urbana y organización de intervenciones de gran envergadura..

Laura Wainer es arquitecta y planificadora urbana en Buenos Aires. En el año 2012, recibió la beca Fulbright, la beca internacional de investigación Delta Kappa Gamma y la beca del presidente de la New School de Nueva York.

Hayley Henderson se ha desempeñado como planificadora urbana en Buenos Aires y en Brisbane, Australia. En la actualidad, es candidata a un doctorado en planificación urbana en la Universidad de Melbourne, Australia.

Demian Rotbart es arquitecto, planificador urbano y profesor adjunto de planificación urbana en la Universidad de Buenos Aires.

Liz Wood wanted to buy a house. It was 2006, she had been renting for A decade, and her monthly payments were getting high. She was 43 and steadily employed, earning $34,000 annually plus benefits as a family educator. She didn’t want anything fancy, just a place where she could “gather love and bring stability.” She would stay within her means.

Nonetheless, the math was tricky. Wood lives in Duvall, Washington, a town of roughly 7,500 in the foothills of the Cascade Mountains. Steeped in lush forest, Duvall is about 30 miles from Seattle and a mere eight miles from the City of Redmond, the headquarters for Microsoft. The median income in Duvall is nearly twice that of the state of Washington, and homes in this area are expensive. In 2010, the median value of owner-occupied homes in Duvall was $373,500, compared to $262,100 for the state, according to the U.S. Census Bureau.

With few options, Wood eventually decided on a used factory-built home (also known as manufactured housing) for $55,000 in Duvall Riverside Village, a four-acre community of 25 manufactured homes in the middle of downtown Duvall. “It’s amazing here,” she says. “I live on riverfront property, so when I walk out my door I see water, pine trees, and a walking trail that goes from my house to the next town. I wake up in the morning hearing birds. I know all my neighbors; I’m connected to my community. I’m a block from the police station. I feel safe.”

But it was still difficult. Wood owned her house, but not the land on which it sits. Instead, she rented the plot for $450 a month, plus water and utilities, as did the other residents of Duvall Riverside Village. As a result, Wood and her neighbors remained largely at the mercy of the property owner, their landlord, and forfeited much of the autonomy and security associated with more traditional home ownership models.

Their landlord prohibited garages, leaving residents limited storage options. He charged them $25 a month per additional car or adult beyond those registered at the time of move-in. He charged $5 a month for every pet and required dogs to be leashed at all times. There was a $5 monthly fee for every extra half-cord of firewood, which Wood needed to fuel her stove. Though he employed a groundskeeper, he didn’t install outdoor lights, nor did he maintain the community roads, which were pocked and cracked.

In 2012, Wood and her neighbors received a written notice that the owner was selling the land. Unlike many owners, who prefer to sell their properties to a developer, this landlord was open to selling to residents. He had agreed to host a meeting between the tenants, a real estate broker, and the Northwest Cooperative Development Center, a nonprofit that supports cooperatives. The parties discussed the possibility of establishing a nonprofit, resident-owned cooperative to purchase the property. In doing so, they would conserve the land for manufactured housing, continue living there as a community, and collectively manage it to guarantee a safe, affordable, high-quality experience.

The residents voted to go for it. The landlord had two demands. He wanted fair market value, and he wanted to complete the sale by the end of the year. It was already August. They had five months.

In addition to the collaboration with Northwest Cooperative Development Center, the residents also began working with ROC USA, a New Hampshire–based nonprofit organization that offers residents of manufactured housing communities a mix of technical assistance and affordable financing to purchase their rented land when it becomes available for sale. Since its establishment in 2008, ROC USA has successfully facilitated 80 of these transactions nationally and secured more than $175 million in financing for them.

ROC USA works with a network of eight regional affiliates, including the Northwest Cooperative Development Center. In Duvall, the nonprofits worked together with the residents to assess the economics of a possible deal and to confirm that the community was a good fit for resident ownership. Next, the organizations helped the residents to hire a third-party lawyer and establish their cooperative, which would operate as a democracy with residents elected into leadership positions by fellow residents. ROC USA assisted the residents to hire an independent engineer and conduct due diligence of the property; secure financing through ROC USA’s lending subsidiary, ROC USA Capital, to purchase the property and undertake critical repairs; and organize the real estate transfer.

On December 27 of that year, the newly formed cooperative bought the Duvall Riverside Village with $1.3 million in purchase financing from ROC USA Capital, granting Wood and her fellow home owners control over their living arrangements, and permanently preserving 25 affordable homes in a town where such housing stock is scarce.

The residents continue to pay $450 a month to rent the land, but now they vote to determine community rules, and use the rent to make improvements and to pay the community’s mortgage, taxes, and expenses.

“Now, you can have a garage if you want,” explains Wood, who is president of the Duvall residents’ cooperative and a ROC USA board member. “And we spent $35,000 to fix the roads. We don’t have to live in fear anymore, so people are willing to invest in their homes. We have annual meetings to vote in projects. We can lower the monthly rent if we are over-budgeting for things we don’t need. The bottom line is that we are in control of our own destiny.”

Upon completing the sale, ROC USA and the Northwest Cooperative Development Center have continued providing the residents with technical support to ensure smooth operations.

“If they had just lent us the money and said, ‘these are the guidelines, here’s what you need to do, have at it,’ we would have failed,” explains Wood. “But they are an ongoing resource. They help us with tough situations, or when we don’t know how to do something legally. The goal is for us to become independent and to be able to run our community like a business. Pay your bills, and your house can stay where it is. Period. Forever.”

Benefits

Across the United States, more than 18 million Americans live in factory-built homes, which represent 5 percent of the nation’s housing stock in metro areas, and 15 percent in rural communities. They range significantly in quality. Roughly 25 percent of today’s manufactured housing stock is the stereotyped, rickety trailers of the 1960s and early 1970s, produced before the federal government introduced quality controls in 1976. The remaining 75 percent complies with the federal standards, and includes charming, energy-efficient homes, indistinguishable to the untrained eye from their site-built counterparts. Though manufactured homes have long been cast aside as a housing choice of last resort, today’s models are robust, efficient, and inviting, with the potential to help alleviate the nation’s shortage of safe, affordable housing.

Modern manufactured homes cost approximately half as much as their site-built counterparts and can be built five times faster, making them a genuinely viable option for low-income consumers. The production process is less wasteful, and models that comply with the federal government’s Energy Star standards offer home owners meaningful energy savings. And they are durable. Whereas manufactured homes built prior to the 1976 regulations were made to be portable, like recreational vehicles, modern models are built with stronger materials and designed to be permanent. Today’s manufactured homes can sit on any foundation that would otherwise accommodate a site-built structure, creating the flexibility to use the housing in a wide range of geographies and environments.

“The manufactured housing stock is a critical component of the nation’s affordable housing,” says George McCarthy, president and CEO of the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. “It easily outnumbers our subsidized stock two or three times in almost every market.”

Manufactured homes are cheaper to produce than site-built houses because of the manufacturing process. As Andrea Levere, president of the Corporation for Enterprise Development, writes in the Huffington Post, the “term ‘manufactured housing’ itself has less to do with quality and more to do with the production process, which is a derivative of Ford’s assembly lines. This model allows manufactured homes to be built in a more controlled work environment, translating into predictable costs, increased efficiencies, and reduced waste” (Levere 2013).

In 2013, a new, energy-efficient manufactured home cost $64,000, compared to $324,500 for a new, site-built one, according to the U.S. Census, though the price for the latter includes the land. Even after stripping out the land costs, manufactured homes are still significantly less expensive, averaging $44 per square foot, versus $94 per square foot for site-built homes. And they are unsubsidized, which is a boon given the extremely short supply of subsidized housing compared to demand. Currently, only one in four income-qualified families receives a housing subsidy according to the Bipartisan Policy Commission, leaving the remaining 75 percent in need of an affordable, unsubsidized alternative. By helping to fill that gap, manufactured housing can relieve some of the demand for subsidized housing that state and federal governments are struggling to supply in the face of shrinking budgets. “The majority of families who live in manufactured housing would qualify for subsidized housing, but instead they choose this less expensive and unsubsidized option,” says McCarthy.

The stock is also very versatile, argues McCarthy, who cites its role in housing people during the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Sandy. “Recovery workers got 17 manufactured homes on the ground in New Jersey within weeks of the hurricane—permanent homes for displaced renters, not the problematic ‘Katrina trailers.’ And they did it before most organizations even had a housing plan. This speaks to the efficiency and nimbleness of building manufactured housing. The production times are about 80 percent shorter than for site-built homes, making them the best housing option for disaster response.”

Nevertheless, manufactured housing often gets a bad rap, due largely to the widespread misperception that today’s models are the same as the earliest generations of mobile homes built prior to the introduction of quality control standards by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development in 1976. Today, there are roughly 2 million of these pre-1976 homes; many are barely hanging together and house the nation’s most vulnerable populations, including the elderly and disabled. Though the pre-1976 stock is virtually unrelated to its present-day counterpart, these older, dilapidated dwellings dominate the general public perception of manufactured homes in the United States.

The housing stock’s reputation is further diminished by the vulnerabilities facing home owners who do not own the land on which they live. Roughly 3 million people live in one of the nation’s 50,000 manufactured housing communities, while another 3 million rent on private property. There are manufactured housing communities in every state in the country. Like Duvall Riverside Village, many of them are on prime real estate, and the landowners routinely receive purchase offers from developers.

Advocates working to improve the manufactured home ownership experience, and to promote the stock’s viability as affordable housing, are focusing on three critical areas of innovation: conserving mobile-home parks; replacing pre-1976 units with modern, energy-efficient homes; and increasing access to affordable financing for potential buyers, which is virtually unavailable in the current market and is imperative to building equity and preserving a home’s resale value.

Conserving Manufactured Housing Communities

The conversion of Duvall Riverside Village from a privately owned mobile home community to a resident-owned cooperative is not common. For every community available for purchase that is successfully preserved as affordable housing, there are many more that end up sold for redevelopment, displacing residents who may lack good alternatives.

“It’s not as simple as just moving the home,” says Ishbel Dickens, president of the National Manufactured Home Owners Association. “First, there’s the question of whether the home can even be moved. It may be too old or unstable to survive a move. And even if it can be moved, it’s expensive to do so, and very hard to find a space in another community. In most instances, when a park closes, the residents are probably going to lose the home and all their equity in it. In all likelihood, they will never own a home again. They’ll likely end up on a wait list for subsidized housing, or may even end up homeless.”

To some degree, it’s an accident of history that so many of today’s mobile home parks occupy plots of coveted real estate, says Paul Bradley, president of ROC USA. As he explains it, in the late 1950s and 1960s, Americans began to embrace transportable trailers and campers, in part because of a cultural shift toward outdoor recreation, and in part because post–World War II factories began producing them to utilize excess manufacturing capacity, making them widely available and affordable. As the units grew in popularity, they transitioned from temporary structures to permanent ones, and people began adding makeshift carports and sunrooms. At the time, urban planners accepted the evolution toward permanency. As they saw it, most of the trailers were on land that no one else was using in outer-circle developments. Why not let these campers stay for awhile, until the cities expanded to meet them, at which point the land would be redeveloped?

“These original communities were built with a plan to close them,” says Bradley. “Back then, no one contemplated the full implications of creating a housing stock for which home owners lacked control of the underlying land. No one anticipated that these communities would be full of low- and moderate-income home owners who spent their own money to buy these homes and had few alternatives. And that’s what we are still grappling with today. That lack of control of the land means that home owners live with a deep sense of insecurity and the feeling that it’s irrational to make investments in their properties because they won’t get it back. What’s the implication for home owners who cannot rationally argue for investing in their home? What does that mean for the housing stock? For neighborhoods?”

Short-sighted land use policies are not the only challenge to preserving manufactured housing communities. An equally onerous obstacle is the lack of legal protections afforded to residents. In 34 states and the District of Columbia, the landowner can sell the property without giving residents the opportunity to purchase it. In fact, in most states, the landowner doesn’t have to notify residents that the community is for sale; the landowner can wait until the property has been sold to inform residents of the transaction, suddenly leaving them in a tenuous position. Even the 16 states that require the owner of a manufactured housing community to provide residents advance notice of a sale do not necessarily afford tenants the necessary protections. “In most of the states with advance notice, there are so many limitations on the notice requirements that it is rarely of any use to residents,” says Carolyn Carter, director of advocacy at the National Consumer Law Center.

To better protect residents, advocates support legislative reforms to state laws and tax incentives for landowners who sell to residents. The most effective of these strategies are state laws requiring a landowner to give residents both advance notice of the sale—ideally 60 days—and the opportunity to purchase the property, argues Carter. According to her, there are six states with laws that “work on the ground and provide effective opportunities for residents to purchase their communities,” including New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Florida, Vermont, and Delaware. She says Oregon passed promising legislation in January 2015.

“In those states with effective notice and opportunity to purchase laws, resident ownership takes off,” Carter explains. Roughly 46 percent of the 80 communities that ROC USA supports are in either New Hampshire or Massachusetts—two small states with some of the nation’s strongest resident protections. There are an additional 89 resident-owned cooperatives in New Hampshire that predate ROC USA’s launch.

To understand the value of strong consumer laws for residents, consider the story of Ryder Woods, a 174-unit mobile home park in Milford, Connecticut, 11 miles south of New Haven, just off a major thoroughfare. Connecticut is one of 19 states that either offer tax incentives or provide residents “some” protections when a community is sold, but also contain “significant gaps,” according to Carter.

In 1998, Ryder Woods’ landowner sold the property to developers. He informed the residents via eviction notices, in violation of state laws requiring him both to give them advance notice of the pending sale and to provide them the right of first refusal to purchase the land. Ryder Woods had an active home owners association, and very quickly they organized protests and petitions and lobbied the state legislature to reverse the sale. Eventually, the local news picked up their story, at which point a Milford-based attorney volunteered her services to help them. As she dug into the case, she realized that the law was on the side of the residents and that the community needed more legal support than she alone could offer. She enlisted help from a friend and fellow attorney—a partner at a prominent, Hartford-based firm—who agreed to take the case pro bono and assigned it a team of attorneys. The case ended up going to trial, eventually making its way to the state’s highest court. Uninterested in the unfolding legal headache, the original buyer resold the property to a second developer.

Four years after the original sale, the courts ruled in favor of the residents. In an unprecedented deal, and as required as part of the settlement, the second developer purchased a new piece of land a mile from the original parcel and completely rebuilt the community there. The developer purchased 174 new mobile homes and sold them to the residents at significantly reduced prices with more favorable mortgage terms than any available in the conventional financing market. He built a community center and a pond, complete with swans. And, as required by their agreement, he provided the residents the opportunity to form a cooperative and buy the land, which they did in 2009 with $5.4 million in purchase financing from ROC USA Capital. They closed on their purchase in the offices of the Hartford firm, which had continued to volunteer its services to the residents through the sale’s completion. Today, there is a Walmart on the land that housed the original Ryder Woods community.

“Sometimes, when we look back, we think it was crazy. We chartered a bus, went to Hartford, spoke to the legislature, and just fought it. We stuck together and won against two big-time, billion-dollar developers,” explains Lynn Nugent, 68, a part-time merchandise associate at Sears, and one of the residents who helped organize the campaign, along with her husband, a retired locksmith. “Now I always say, ‘Somebody else used to own us, and now we own ourselves.’”

Improving Access to Quality, Affordable Manufactured Homes

Unlike the residents of Ryder Woods, many owners of manufactured homes struggle to secure a quality unit with affordable financing. Here again, legislation is a primary culprit. Under federal law, manufactured homes are considered personal property, like a car or a boat, opposed to the real property designation assigned to traditional homes. Consequently, buyers cannot access mortgage loans. Instead, financing is available in the form of personal “chattel” loans. More expensive than mortgage loans, they average an additional 50 to 500 basis points and provide fewer consumer protections. More than 70 percent of purchase loans for manufactured homes are these higher-cost loans, which are considered a proxy for subprime products.

“This second-tier status is one of the biggest limitations to increasing the stock of permanently affordable manufactured homes,” says McCarthy. “It makes financing the homes more challenging and expensive than it should be, and it diminishes the homes’ wealth-building potential because it reduces effective demand for existing units.”

While the dream fix would be to change federal titling laws, such revisions are not forthcoming. Instead, Next Step, a Kentucky-based nonprofit organization, has established “Manufactured Housing Done Right (MHDR).” This innovative strategy works to make high-quality, affordable manufactured homes—and financing—available to low- and moderate-income consumers through a combination of energy-efficient homes, home buyer education, and affordable financing. Here’s how it works.

First, Next Step gives low-income buyers access to high-quality manufactured homes. The organization created a portfolio of models that are both robust and affordable. Each Next Step home meets or exceeds Energy Star standards, reducing utility costs for the home owner and shrinking the environmental footprint. According to Next Step, testing has shown these homes to be 30 percent more efficient than a baseline code home and 10 to 15 percent more efficient than a baseline Energy Star home. On average, this results in $1,800 in energy savings each year for every pre-1976 mobile home replacement and $360 each year for every new home placement.

Additionally, Next Step homes are “value engineered to ensure affordability while upholding quality standards.” They are installed on permanent foundations, providing for greater structural support against wind and reducing settling issues. The homes contain high-quality flooring and insulation, which helps to increase durability and reduce energy costs. And because water is the number one problem for foundations, Next Step homes contain additional safeguards to protect against moisture.

Improving Access to Sustainable Financing

Next Step also makes sure the home buyers can secure sustainable, affordable financing. “One of the problems facing the industry is that the capital markets don’t participate in a big way,” explains Stacey Epperson, CEO of Next Step. “The secondary market is not there in any meaningful way, so there are very few lenders in this marketplace and very few options for buyers. Our solution is to prepare our borrowers for home ownership, and then bring them good loans.”

Next Step works with a mix of nonprofit and for-profit lenders, vetted by the organization, to provide safe, reasonably priced financing. In return, Next Step reduces the lenders’ risk. The homes are designed to meet the lenders’ requirements, and the home buyers receive comprehensive financial education so that they are equipped to succeed as home buyers. Consequently, Next Step home buyers not only secure a better initial mortgage, but also have the capacity to build equity and obtain a good resale price for the home should they decide to sell it one day.

Importantly, each Next Step home is placed on a permanent foundation in order to qualify the home owner for certain government-backed mortgage programs, which are less expensive than a chattel product. Next Step estimates it has saved its 173 home buyers approximately $16.1 million in interest payments.

“Right now, close to 75 percent of all financing for manufactured housing is going out as chattel. But 70 percent of new manufactured homes are going out on private land where, in many cases, the home could be put on a permanent foundation, and the owner could get a mortgage with a lower interest rate and a longer term,” says Epperson.

The MHDR model is innovative in part because it is scalable. Next Step trains and relies on a membership network of nonprofit organizations to implement the model in their respective communities. Next Step sells the homes to members at competitive prices, and then member organizations oversee the process of identifying and educating buyers, assisting them to secure the loan, and managing the installation.

“The way the industry works, there has never really been a way for a nonprofit to buy a manufactured home at wholesale prices. That’s what we’ve engineered, and that’s what makes these homes a lot more affordable than if the nonprofit or home owner tried to buy them on their own,” explains Kevin Clayton, president and CEO of Clayton Homes, one of the nation’s largest producers of manufactured housing, and one of Next Step’s long-time supporters.

“The Next Step program works because it sets people up for success,” says Clayton. “Next Step takes them through home ownership counseling, and supports home owners if they have a hardship down the road. They get to buy the house for a lot less than they otherwise could have, build equity in the home, and have a low monthly loan payment and energy costs.”

Cyndee Curtis, a Next Step home owner, agrees. Curtis was 27, single, and pregnant when she purchased a used, 1971 Fleetwood mobile home for $5,000 in 2001. She put it on the lot she owned just outside the town of Great Falls, Montana.

“I didn’t have money, I didn’t have a degree, and I didn’t have choices,” says Curtis. “The old steel septic tank was a ticking time bomb, with rust holes. The carpet was worn through, the linoleum underneath had burn spots on it, and the ceiling leaked where an addition had been added. Every year, I would buy construction books, go to Home Depot, and ask how to fix that leak. And every year I ended up there by myself, trying to fix it. There was mold on the doorway from that leak, and I had a newborn in there.”

In 2005, Curtis went back to school for two years, obtained her nursing degree, and began working as a licensed practical nurse, earning $28,500 a year. “I figured now I am earning a livable wage and can explore my options,” says the single mother of two. “I wanted something that my kids could grow up in and be proud of, and to make the most of owning the lot I lived on.”

But her credit was poor, and eventually she ended up at NeighborWorks Montana, a nonprofit Next Step Network member that told her about the Next Step program. Over the next two and a half years, Curtis worked with the staff of NeighborWorks Montana to repair her credit. With their assistance, she secured a mortgage and purchased a Next Step home for $102,000, which included not only the house but also the removal, disposal, and replacement of her old septic system. Because the Next Step home is on a permanent foundation that meets certain qualifications—and because of Curtis’s improved credit history, income, and geography—she qualified for a mortgage from the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Rural Development program, which was significantly less expensive than the more common chattel products. Additionally, whereas Curtis’s previous mobile home was titled like a car, her Next Step home is deeded like a site-built house. Consequently, a future buyer will also be eligible to apply for a traditional mortgage.

Curtis says her Next Step home has provided her significant energy savings. “I have 400 square feet more now than I had previously. I went from having one bathroom to two. And still both my gas and power bills have been cut by about two-thirds.”

She continues. “My house is a thousand percent better than what I lived in before. If a person goes inside my house, they can’t tell it’s a manufactured home. It has nice doorways, nice walls that are textured. It looks like any new home you would want to live in.”

“Sometimes people think they have to suffer with poor housing conditions. I know how it is, and I want them to know that if you put in some hard work, you can make a difference for yourself and your family.”

Loren Berlin is a writer and communications consultant based in Greater Chicago.

References

Levere, Andrea. 2013. “Hurricane Sandy and the Merits of Manufactured Housing.” Huffington Post. January 8. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/andrea-levere/hurricane-sandy-manufactured-housing_b_2426797.html

Boulder, Colorado, has developed a national reputation for having dealt creatively with growth management issues. The city has developed a 27,000-acre greenbelt, a system for controlling the rate of population growth by limiting building permits, and a defined urban growth boundary managed in cooperation with Boulder County. Boulder’s approach to urban growth boundaries, called the service area concept, offers important lessons for controlling sprawl, preserving rural land uses outside the city, and extending urban services in a rational manner.

Located 27 miles northwest of Denver at the base of the Rocky Mountains, Boulder is a home-rule city of approximately 96,000 people. It is the Boulder County seat, the home of the University of Colorado, and a regional employment center with approximately 86,000 jobs. Its strong economy is founded on the university, federal laboratories, regional and local retail, and a dynamic industrial sector concentrated in the high tech industry and business services.

Colorado has no statewide, mandated planning program. Statutory and home-rule cities and counties are granted land use planning and regulatory powers directly by the state. The Denver Regional Council of Governments engages in general planning, clearinghouse, and federal funding allocation activities, but there is no real, effective regional planning effort. As a result, sprawling development, undifferentiated between cities and unincorporated areas of counties, is typical along most of Colorado’s Front Range.

In the decade of the 1950s, Boulder’s population grew from 25,000 to 37,000 and during the 1960s it grew by a whopping 29,000 to reach 66,000. Some initial efforts to manage this growth included the “Blue Line,” a citizen-initiated amendment to Boulder’s charter in 1959 that restricted the extension of city water service above an elevation of 5,750 feet. It was later extended by ordinance to sewer service. While a few exceptions have been granted at the ballot box, the effect of this measure was to limit the city from extending water service to properties along the mountain backdrop. Property owners can still develop in the county, but at much lower densities than is typical in the city and only with individual water and septic systems.

Another important growth management program began in 1967, when Boulder became the first city in the United States to pass a tax specifically dedicated to preserve open space. This open space system forms the outer extent of the Boulder Valley, a joint planning area between the city and county.

Boulder’s Service Area Concept

A concern that unwanted development was continuing to take place outside city limits in the county, sometimes with city water and sewer service, led to the implementation of Boulder’s urban growth boundary. In 1970 the city and county adopted a joint comprehensive plan that defined the intended geographic extent of city expansion into the plains. This plan was further refined in 1978 to limit the city from extending water and sewer services outside city service area boundaries and to limit the county from approving new subdivisions that would need “urban” levels of services and facilities.

What specifically does the service area boundary do? It defines that part of the Boulder Valley planning area where the City of Boulder either already provides a full range of urban services to annexed properties or will provide services upon annexation. Land outside the service area boundary remains in the county at rural densities until the city and county jointly agree to bring the property into the service area. Land can also be “moved” out of the service area.

The 1978 plan, thus, protected the city against development just outside its boundaries that would put demands on city services without the ability to collect taxes to finance those services. It was also aimed at controlling sprawl, protecting sensitive environmental areas and rural land uses, and planning, financing and providing urban services in a more rational way. By adopting the plan through an intergovernmental agreement, both the city and county gained better control over urban development and service provision, while accomplishing many other conservation objectives. This approach owes much to the phased growth control ordinance pioneered in 1969 by the Township of Ramapo, New York.

What Are the Benefits?

• The service area concept creates an identifiable urban/rural edge. Unlike many cities that have either sprawled into the countryside or facilitated leapfrog development, Boulder has created a real edge between urban and rural development.
• It provides for the rational extension of urban services. The definition of areas where services are to be provided (along with initial designations of land use) allows a direct link between land use planning and infrastructure planning. Parks, recreation, police, fire, transportation, water, sewer and flood control service providers can develop their master plans knowing where services are to be extended, over what time frame, and for what types of land uses.
• It helps preserve rural lands outside the city. Boulder’s service area policy has sent a clear signal to the land markets that land outside of Boulder’s service area is not likely to be urbanized in the near future. This has lessened land speculation for urban development purposes and facilitated the acquisition of open space.
• It helps focus development within the city. Through redevelopment of underutilized areas and infill development, the city has been able to capitalize on existing public investments in infrastructure.
• It eliminates competition from the county for retail development and the loss of associated tax revenues.
• It provides both flexibility and certainty to the planning process. As the community experiences change over time, land can be added to or deleted from the service area, and property owners inside and outside the service area can act accordingly.

What Are the Pitfalls?

• Boulder’s region encompasses the whole county. Therefore, the city’s surging job growth and limitations on residential growth have had a significant impact on housing demand in adjoining communities. The most striking example is the nearby town of Superior. In 1990 the population of Superior was 255; in 1996 it was 3,377. It has practically no jobs and no sales tax base. This regional imbalance between jobs and housing has created tremendous problems with traffic congestion, lack of affordable housing and school facility needs.
• Getting a hold on sprawl is only half the equation. What happens within the urban service area is the other. In Boulder’s initial planning efforts, there was a clear expression of a preference for infill and redevelopment over sprawl. Since there is no requirement that a certain amount of land be contained within its service area (such as the 20-year required land supply within Oregon’s urban growth boundaries), Boulder does not have to make a trade-off between expansion versus infill and redevelopment. However, it is increasingly difficult to convince specific neighborhoods and the community as a whole that additional density is in their best interests. The community can choose to not expand the service area, maintain current densities and simply not grow.

Is that good or bad? On the good side, it has allowed Boulder to determine its own ideal city size, with consideration of how much congestion is tolerable, what sized city leads to a high quality of life, and what is sustainable over time. On the bad size, it holds Boulder back from capturing some of the benefits that additional development could bring, such as more affordable housing and less dependence on the automobile by building mixed use, transit-oriented neighborhood centers.

There is no real ending to this story. Land use planning is a major fixation for Boulder, and these issues are continuously analyzed, discussed, and often hotly debated. Nevertheless, Boulder has maintained a central vision of a compact city with a clear identity in the midst of a rural area. The growth management techniques used in Boulder may vary from those used by other cities, and they may be changed from time to time to meet local conditions, but the vision has remained intact.

Peter Pollock, AICP, is the director of the Community Planning Division for the City of Boulder, Colorado. This year he is a Loeb Fellow at the Harvard University Graduate School of Design and a visiting fellow at the Lincoln Institute. This article is based in part on his presentation of the Fourth Annual David R. Fullmer Lecture, “Tools and Techniques for Managing Growth in the Boulder Region,” at the Institute in October 1997.