Emerging concerns about climate change impacts along with changing preferences for housing options are shaping the debate over growth patterns and sustainability. Climate modeling experts expect Arizona’s Sun Corridor to become hotter, drier, and more prone to extreme weather events. In a region where summer temperatures top 110°, annual precipitation is only 9 to 10 inches, and flood events already can be extreme, adaptation to and mitigation of climate change impacts will be of paramount importance. The response will require significantly changing prevalent land use planning and development patterns in the region.

Ethan Seltzer is a professor in the Nohad A. Toulan School of Urban Studies and Planning at Portland State University. He previously served for six years as the director of the school, and prior to that for eleven years as the founding director of Portland State’s Institute of Portland Metropolitan Studies.

Before joining Portland State in 1992 he served as the land use supervisor for Metro, the regional government in the Portland area; assistant to Portland City Commissioner Mike Lindberg; assistant coordinator for the Southeast Uplift Neighborhood Program in Portland; and coordinator of the Drinking Water Project for the Oregon Environmental Council.

Seltzer received his Ph.D. in City and Regional Planning and Master of Regional Planning from the University of Pennsylvania. His doctoral dissertation examined the role of citizen participation in environmental planning. Current research interests include regional planning, regionalism, regional development, and planning in the Pacific Northwest.

In addition to his current work with the Lincoln Institute, his publications include chapters titled Maintaining the Working Landscape: The Portland Metro Urban Growth Boundary, in Regional Planning for Open Space, edited by Arnold van der Valk and Terry van Dijk (Routledge 2009); and It’s Not an Experiment: Regional Planning at Metro, 1990 to the Present, in The Portland Edge, edited by Connie Ozawa (Island Press 2004).

Land Lines: How did you become associated with the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy?

Ethan Seltzer: Regional planning has been at the center of my career for a long time. I used to be the land use supervisor for Metro, the regional government in the Portland metropolitan region. In the late 1980s we were just starting work on what is now the Region 2040 Growth Concept. Part of that work involved seeking out new ideas about planning, land use, land management, and related topics, and through that search, I started to engage with the Lincoln Institute. A few years later, I was part of a planning project organized through the Regional Plan Association in New York that brought U.S. and Japanese planners together. I met Armando Carbonell (chair of the Institute’s Department of Planning and Urban Form) through that process, and we have remained collaborators on a number of projects since then.

Land Lines: What was the first project you conducted for the Lincoln Institute?

Ethan Seltzer: The first one I recall had to do with re-establishing a dialogue around regional planning and building on the ideas put forth by the old Regional Plan Association of America going back to the 1920s. I was also a part of numerous Lincoln Institute seminars, including one held in Chicago on the relationships and interdependencies between cities and suburbs. The papers were published by the Institute in 2000 in the book Urban-Suburban Interdependencies, edited by Rosalind Greenstein and Wim Wiewel. Since then I have been involved in several Institute-sponsored projects and events, most recently in conjunction with the showing of the film Portland: Quest for the Livable City as part of the Making Sense of Place documentary film series.

Land Lines: How has your association with the Lincoln Institute influenced your research?

Ethan Seltzer: I think the Lincoln Institute is one of the only, maybe the only, institution that has consistently focused on the confluence of issues associated with planning practice, place, regionalism, and land use. There are few other places that address these issues in such a thoughtful, deliberate manner. The support that the Lincoln Institute provides for thinking and writing about these issues is part of what makes it possible for me to find both an audience and like-minded colleagues. There are other networks important to me as well, notably the connections provided by the Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning. Nonetheless, the Lincoln Institute is uniquely a forum for the things that I am most interested in and where I hope to contribute.

Land Lines: What are your current projects for the Lincoln Institute?

Ethan Seltzer: I am working on a book on regional planning in America with an explicit focus on practice. I teach courses in regional planning and, though there is an interesting literature on the reasons why regional planning might make sense and the stark challenges to pulling it off, there is not much information available regarding what regional planners do, and how regional planning is distinguished from other types of planning (i.e., city, urban, transportation).

With support from the Lincoln Institute, and in collaboration with coeditor Armando Carbonell, I was able to recruit a group of talented authors and put together a series of chapters that, we expect, will more completely present what gets done in the name of regional planning in the United States today. We also hope this project will provide a basis for better understanding the unique aspects of regional planning practice.

The working title for the book is American Regional Planning: Practice and Prospect. Coauthors include Tim Beatley, Robert Fishman, Kate Foster, John Fregonese and CJ Gabbe, Frank and Deborah Popper, Manuel Pastor and Chris Benner, Gerrit Knaap and Rebecca Lewis, Fritz Steiner, and Bob Yaro. The manuscript will be completed this fall and the book will be published in the spring of 2011.

Land Lines: Regional planning seems to be a really challenging idea in America. Why are you so interested in it?

Ethan Seltzer: You are absolutely right, but it’s often hard to find a place in the scheme of things for regions and regional planning. The history of America is told with broad, sweeping regions in mind—the South, New England, the West—but the history of planning in America is largely one of local institutions, states, and the federal government.

Regional planning, then, is both present at the outset and a latecomer to the planning game. The institutional turf is quite congested. Although the need for better regional coordination and planning actually predates the “invention” of modern city planning in America (consider that the Burnham Plan for Chicago was a regional plan), regional planning has never been able to mount a convincing challenge to the profoundly local emphasis of planning.

Still, it simply makes too much sense to put aside regional planning for long. One need not be a rocket scientist to recognize that many of the things we care about and depend on are not well managed or defined by local jurisdictions. When I worked as the land use supervisor for Metro in Portland, I was struck by the fact that everyone—rich, poor, and in-between—lived regional lives. That is, households in our region were working, socializing, recreating, worshipping, schooling, and sleeping in territories of their own devising, none of which corresponded to any single local jurisdiction. Consequently, planning by jurisdiction, which is the norm in Oregon and elsewhere, becomes a more complicated proposition. It really makes one wonder for whom the planning is intended. If it is simply about maintaining local property values, then we’ve both made that task overly complicated and are poorly serving a whole host of larger values, goals, and objectives.

However, the other thing that struck me while working for Metro is that if people don’t feel empowered to address the issues right in front of them when they walk out the front of their house or apartment building, then they will never relate to the kinds of things we are talking about at the regional scale. Local empowerment made regional planning and growth management possible. Local and regional, then, go hand in hand, and you cannot have one without the other.

Having worked at the regional level, served as president of my local planning commission, and provided planning assistance to neighborhood associations early in my career, I am familiar with the ongoing tensions between these scales—the scale at which we live in the region, and the scale at which we are empowered at the locality. I think this tension is always going to be present, and I am under no illusions that it will evaporate or that the region will “win” any time in the future.

Still, I, like others, keep coming back to the region because to ignore it is to give up on things that are important to our sense of place and quality of life. The region helps us understand the world and how it works, and makes one look deeply into the causal relationships that link us together and to the natural world. I guess the ecologist in me will never give up on that.

Land Lines: What other kinds of research topics have you been investigating?

Ethan Seltzer: I guess you could summarize my work under several headings. I have written about planning in Portland, particularly regional planning and the way that Metro developed a regional growth management plan. That work has been incorporated in publications and projects in the United States, Japan, and the Netherlands.

More recently, I have been engaged in the work of America 2050 on megaregions. I have provided information about Cascadia, the megaregion of the Pacific Northwest, and participated in several research seminars organized to further our understanding of the nature of megaregions, planning for megaregions, and the utility of that concept for better understanding issues associated with sustainability and competitiveness in the years ahead.

I have also worked with Connie Ozawa, a colleague at Portland State, on the kinds of skills needed by entry-level planners, and therefore the nature of the relationship between graduate planning education and planning practice. I am also working with colleagues at the University of Oregon and Oregon State University to investigate the dynamics underlying and opportunities for bridging the “urban/rural” divide in Oregon. A book on that topic will be published by Oregon State Press in 2011. The fundamental themes that tie all of this together have to do with place and practice—the place being the Portland metropolitan region and the Pacific Northwest, and the practice being what actually gets done by planners.

Land Lines: Any last thoughts?

Ethan Seltzer: In an interesting way, the Lincoln Institute’s association with the ideas of Henry George and their extension into thematic areas of land as property, taxation, and land planning is very contemporary. The challenges we face in the United States and globally due to climate change and instability, the pressure for sustainability, urbanization, and the future of our cities and metropolitan regions all come together around these themes.

Ultimately, the challenges that we talk about in sweeping terms must make sense and be addressed democratically and locally. Pulling that off in a manner that acknowledges the global context for local action is really about infusing what we do as planners and academicians with a new ethical commitment to acknowledging and acting at the true scales at which these issues operate.

Many countries in Latin America have passed legislation that supports value capture policies as a way to recoup some or all the unearned increase in private land values resulting from public regulations or investments. Thus far, however, only a few jurisdictions in certain countries have applied this potentially powerful financing tool systematically and successfully.

In 2011 and 2012 the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy surveyed public officials and academics in the region to discover why value capture has not been used more often. The 2012 questionnaire was designed to elicit respondents’ views about the prospects for designing, institutionalizing, and implementing two emblematic value capture instruments–betterment contributions and the sale of building rights.

Betterment contributions (known as special assessments in the United States) are charges imposed on owners of selected properties to defray the cost of a public improvement or service from which they specifically benefit (Borrero 2011; Borrero et al. 2011). Under the sale of building rights, in contrast, the government charges for special rights that it grants, such as allowing a higher floor-to-area ratio (FAR), a zoning change (e.g., from residential to commercial), or conversion of land from rural to urban use (Sandroni 2011).

The results of both surveys challenge much of the conventional wisdom about the use of value capture policies in Latin America. In particular, respondents with actual experience in using these tools consider legal and technical difficulties less of an obstacle to implementation than the lack of understanding among key government executives about their potential payback. Moreover, value capture is still viewed primarily as a tool to promote equity in cities rather than as a way to improve municipal fiscal autonomy.

Survey Distribution

Launched in the spring of 2011, the first survey was distributed to 436 public officials and academics who had participated in one or more of the Lincoln Institute’s previously offered courses and workshops on value capture issues. A second questionnaire with a different set of questions was sent by email in February 2012 to 14,355 people affiliated with the Institute’s Program on Latin America and the Caribbean. Respondents (134 and 1,066 respectively) included officials at all levels of government, city planners, academics, independent scholars and consultants, and members of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

When classified by country, responses to individual choices for many questions numbered fewer than ten. For this reason and to simplify the presentation, the analysis combines the responses from countries with similar sociopolitical characteristics in terms of value capture into three groups.

1. Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela. All five countries have some national legislation on value capture and are currently run by governments sympathetic to value capture policies. Uruguay in 2008 (Law No. 18.308 of 18.VI.2008) and Ecuador in 2010 (with its new national code, COOTAD ) approved national legislation enhancing the scope of government prerogatives with regard to land value increments.

2. Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Peru. These fast-growing, mature countries are still struggling to introduce more explicit national legislation on value capture, in addition to imposing betterment levies.

3. Central America and the Dominican Republic. Countries in this region comprise a single group because they are relatively small and have liberal urban development regimes.

Brazil and Colombia are presented separately because they make up a significant share of survey respondents, and they have the most experience with value capture tools. The number of respondents generally follows the size of the population of the country group, except for Brazil and Colombia, which account for disproportionately large numbers of respondents (table 1).

The Pragmatic Character of Value Capture

Even though only a few countries explicitly prescribe value capture in their legislation, the smaller 2011 survey revealed detailed information about jurisdictions that had recovered some land value increment resulting from changes in land use. Of 13 countries covered in that survey, respondents cited 22 cases of value capture in 30 jurisdictions in 8 countries. In general, these cases involved some kind of benefit exactions for the community achieved through direct negotiation between developers and public authorities.

On average, though, the value extracted was less than one-third of the estimated land value increment. The likelihood of the contribution exceeding one-third of the total value was higher when the contribution was made in cash rather than in kind. These cases occurred in countries without explicit legislation on the sale of building rights, such as Bolivia, Costa Rica, and Peru, illustrating the pragmatic approach to value capture on the part of officials in charge of urban land management.

Overall, survey respondents consider themselves familiar with the topic, and the findings of the 2012 survey reinforce the point that awareness of value capture instruments is not limited to countries that have institutionalized the practice. Relatively few respondents claimed to be unfamiliar with value capture instruments, although the real number of officials may be larger, given the self-selection bias of the survey respondents (table 2). The share of respondents unfamiliar with value capture instruments in Brazil and Colombia is about half the share of respondents from other countries.

The Implementation Challenge

One of the common arguments raised about the chances of applying value capture policies in Latin America relates to the technical difficulty of implementation–specifically, assessing the land value increment resulting from public interventions. To probe the importance of this issue, the 2012 survey asked whether respondents consider a 30-percent margin of error in valuation acceptable enough to justify application of value capture. The overwhelming majority of respondents (89 percent) stated that, regardless of the margin of error, value capture policies should be applied. Only 11 percent argued to the contrary.

The main reason cited for supporting value capture is again a pragmatic one. Similar margins of error occur in other contexts, such as valuation for property taxation purposes (36.9 percent). A close second is the “need to establish the principle” (31.8 percent). The fact that value capture instruments are contemplated in the legislation places third (21.4 percent). As expected, respondents from Brazil and Colombia rank the legal reason for applying value capture as more important (27 percent and 31.6 percent, respectively) than respondents in other countries (15.2 percent on average).

It is notable that 41.8 percent of respondents in Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Peru—countries still striving to pass national legislation on value capture—ranked “need to establish the principle” higher than other respondents. In contrast, Colombian respondents ranked this reason third. Reasons given by respondents from the other country groups are not significantly different from the sample average (31.8 percent). Among the 11 percent of respondents opposed to value capture policies, legal and legitimacy arguments prevail over pragmatic ones (illegitimacy of policy or administrative and judicial costs).

The Known versus the Unknown

Laws throughout Latin America support betterment contributions, and local governments frequently count on revenues from that source in their budgets. However, these revenues are generally modest and rarely account for more than 1 percent of local own-revenues in most places except in Colombia and to a lesser degree in certain cities with experience using this instrument, such as Cuenca, Ecuador, and San Pedro Sula, Honduras, and in a few Brazilian jurisdictions in the State of Paraná. The sale of building rights, in contrast, is still being established as a value capture tool and is legislated in only a few countries.

Survey respondents were also asked about their preference between betterment contributions (the familiar value capture tool that performs poorly) and the sale of building rights (the newer instrument with stronger revenue-generating potential). Across all countries the results show greater support for betterment contributions: 59 percent versus 41 percent.

Even among respondents from Brazil, the only country where preference for the sale of building rights was significantly above average (48.9 percent), betterment contributions still rank as the preferred value capture instrument (51.1 percent). This is remarkable in light of São Paulo’s success in generating considerable revenue from selling building rights. For example, the April 2012 auction of Certificates of Additional Construction Potential (CEPACs) in São Paulo added US$420 million to public coffers, on top of about US$2.5 billion from previous auctions (São Paulo Stock Exchange 2012).

The survey evidence suggests that most respondents are not fully aware of the difference in the revenue potential of these two value capture tools. In fact, only 10 percent of respondents cite revenue potential as the main reason to prefer one over the other. Proponents of value capture give top priority to promoting equity rather than to generating revenue–another surprising finding given the potential of value capture to strengthen municipal autonomy.

When asked how they would characterize the arguments for value capture, respondents in the 2011 survey could choose from 50 terms related to land policy attributes. The eight terms that received the most responses (49.7 percent of the total) were associated with equity issues such as charges and benefits, redistribution, social function of property, anti-speculation, equity, and social justice. The one exception was a financial term, which ranked fourth.

In contrast, terms such as fiscal autonomy, fiscal harmony, decentralization, tax, self-sufficiency, financing, and additional resources received only 18.7 percent of the votes, while terms related to the functioning of urban markets, such as efficiency and market discipline, received just 11 percent. Arguments against value capture were associated with such terms as tax, fiscal burden, acquired rights, and double taxation, as well as abuse, violation of rights, and illegitimacy.

Respondents to both the 2011 and 2012 surveys cited ethical and sociopolitical legitimacy as the primary reason for preferring one value capture tool over the other. Indeed, the 59 percent of respondents favoring betterment contributions over the sale of building rights mention ethical and sociopolitical legitimacy as the most important reason for their choice. The 41 percent of respondents favoring sales of building rights gave the same reasons for their preference. At the same time, 24.4 percent of respondents favoring the sale of building rights consider the capacity to generate revenues the second most important reason for choosing that instrument, but only 17.6 percent of respondents favoring betterment contributions share the same opinion.

All in all, this suggests that officials in Latin America often tolerate a wide gap between the equity-legitimacy principle and revenue generation, based on a perception of greater technical ease in charging betterment contributions. From another perspective, it appears that they favor the quicker path to the moral high ground rather than one leading to higher local revenues.

Experience Matters

After ethical and sociopolitical legitimacy, the next most important reason for preferring a particular value capture instrument varies according to the respondent’s level of experience. Strong confirmation of the importance of implementation experience comes from the two countries that have applied the tools: Colombians favor betterment contributions, and Brazilians prefer the sale of building rights.

Colombia has long experience with betterment contributions, which may explain why 16 percent of respondents from that country cite technical ease of implementation as the reason to choose that approach. By comparison, only 7.9 percent of respondents in other countries mention that reason. Meanwhile, 12.6 percent of respondents in Brazil favor the sale of building rights due to ease of implementation, compared with just 5 percent of respondents from other countries. These results underscore how much experience shapes opinions about the technical constraints involved in applying value capture tools.

Obstacles to Implementation

Respondents to the 2012 survey attribute the reluctance of public officials to apply value capture policies primarily to lack of information (23.2 percent) and political risk (22.5 percent). Other explanations include complicity with landowners’ interests (18.4 percent) and technical difficulties in implementation (15.4 percent). Few consider lack of legislation as an important reason for not using value capture instruments (1.5 percent), with ideological motives (3.2 percent) and administrative costs (3.8 percent) ranking somewhat higher.

Pragmatic reasons are important only among respondents from countries lacking significant experience with such tools. While 13 percent of respondents from Brazil and Colombia mention technical implementation difficulties as the primary obstacle, 31 percent of respondents from other countries cite that reason on average. This reinforces the finding that experience with value capture tools counts. Brazilians explain why value capture instruments are not used in terms of land interests and political risk, which together account for 59 percent of responses. Among Colombians, 26 percent see no reason not to use value capture instruments. This is a much higher share than among respondents from other countries (7.2 percent on average), indicating a perception in Colombia that the tools are getting the attention they deserve.

Targeting Key Stakeholders

The 2012 survey asked respondents to select which stakeholders involved in the debate should be the primary targets of capacity building in order to overcome resistance to value capture policy. High on the list are heads of the executive branches of government, such as mayors and directors, followed by members of the legislature, including members of congress and city councilors (table 3). Planners–who are frequently on the front line of policy operations–rank third.

Surprisingly, only 6.2 percent of respondents cite members of the judiciary (judges, lawyers, and public attorneys), even though the courts often block value capture initiatives. Brazilian respondents are the only ones to assign a higher importance to members of the judiciary. Consistent with the institutional advances their countries have made in value capture, respondents from both Brazil and Colombia give lower priority to legislators (20.7 percent) than respondents from other countries (32.3 percent on average).

Respondents from all occupation groups rank academics and journalists last. As a result, the strategy of training the trainers would seem counterproductive as long as academics are not considered critical stakeholders in reducing resistance to value capture policies. This result supports the Lincoln Institute’s program focus on building capacity of public officials directly involved in the policy debate or tool implementation, rather than on building capacity in graduate schools. The low priority given to journalists as a target for capacity building is puzzling, but may reflect the fact that the value capture discussion is still largely confined to public agencies and academia. Nevertheless, greater involvement of the media could have a positive influence in broadening the debate.

One other interesting result of the survey is that responses across various groups are relatively consistent. Occupation, institutional affiliation, place of employment, level of education, and even size of the respondent’s city make little difference. Indeed, only the distinction between respondents from countries with and without significant experience with value capture seems to stand out as important.

Conclusions

The survey results point to a relatively consistent understanding about the state of the debate and implementation of value capture across Latin America. The prospects for successfully implementing value capture policies in the region, however, are less clear. The social justice rhetoric still seems to prevail even among “informed” supporters. In addition, decision makers in critical executive positions are seen as ill-informed or lacking in political will. Moreover, as the experiences of Brazil and Colombia attest, institutionalizing value capture policies is a process of painstaking trial and error that takes time to succeed.

Three lessons follow from the work done by the Lincoln Institute on value capture in Latin America. First, land value increments are captured more successfully from specific actors who receive greater benefits from a public sector intervention than from the general community (the win-win condition). Second, value capture tools are more likely to succeed when conceived to address a locally recognized problem than to emulate alleged best practices.

Third, strengthening the legitimacy of value capture policies is essential. This can be achieved by publicizing successful projects, especially in countries where value capture initiatives are still isolated and sporadic. It is important to shift the debate on value capture from ideological, wishful-thinking rhetoric to a more technical and practical context grounded in evidence that it can be done and, most importantly, that it has been implemented effectively in many cases.

About the Author

Martim O. Smolka is senior fellow and director of the of the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy’s Program on Latin America and the Caribbean. He has been researching policies and experiences with value capture for many years.

References

Borrero Ochoa, Oscar. 2011. Betterment levy in Colombia: Relevance, procedures, and social acceptability. Land Lines 23(2): 14-19.

Borrero Ochoa, Oscar, Esperanza Durán, Jorge Hernández, and Magda Montaña. 2011. Evaluating the practice of betterment levies in Colombia: The experience of Bogotá and Manizales. Working Paper. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Sandroni, Paulo Henrique. 2011. Recent experience with land value capture in São Paulo, Brazil. Land Lines 23(3): 14-19.

São Paulo Stock Exchange. 2012. http://www.bmfbovespa.com.br/pt-br/mercados/download/Agua-Suplemento-27012012.pdf

Amedida que las ciudades costeras continúan enfrentando las amenazas de un clima cada vez más volátil, las marejadas y el ascenso del nivel del mar, todas las cuales están relacionadas con el cambio climático y pueden llegar a ser muy costosas, desarrollar un mayor nivel de resiliencia se está convirtiendo en una prioridad principal de planificación. Sin embargo, la resiliencia posee varias dimensiones: no sólo significa construir cosas tales como compuertas contra inundaciones y estructuras más sólidas, sino también conservar libres de desarrollos sistemas naturales como los pantanos, y, en muchos casos, tomar la decisión de no construir nuevamente en los lugares más vulnerables. Y aquí yace un problema complejo y en continua evolución que afecta los derechos de propiedad privada.

Al menos desde los albores del siglo XX, la Corte Suprema ha estado lidiando con una pregunta básica: ¿cuándo la regulación del uso del suelo constituye una expropiación que requiere pagar una compensación a los propietarios, según la 5º enmienda de la Constitución de los EE.UU. (“…la propiedad privada no podrá ser objeto de expropiación para uso público sin la debida compensación”)? Desde los casos Pennsylvania Coal contra Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) y Euclid contra Amber Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926), la esencia de los fallos ha sido que el gobierno posee una libertad de acción considerable a la hora de ejercer su facultad de regular el uso del suelo. En el caso Kelo contra City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), el tribunal supremo afirmó la facultad que posee el estado de utilizar la expropiación a los fines del desarrollo económico en el siglo XXI.

No obstante, en junio de 2013, una decisión en cuanto a un proyecto de desarrollo en Florida pareció indicar un cambio sutil en otro sentido. En el caso Koontz contra St. Johns River Water Management District, los jueces fallaron 5 a 4 que el gobierno presentaba un celo excesivo al imponer requisitos de mitigación a los desarrolladores como condición para obtener permisos de construcción. Coy Koontz, padre, cuya intención había sido construir un pequeño centro comercial en su propiedad, objetó las demandas de un distrito de administración del agua de Florida, según las cuales debía pagar por la restauración de los pantanos que se encontraban fuera del sitio con el fin de compensar por el daño ambiental causado por la construcción. Koontz citó dos casos, Nollan contra California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) y Dolan contra City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), con el fin de sustentar su aseveración de que los requisitos constituían una expropiación por exceder una “proporción aproximada” entre dichos requisitos y los alcances de los daños causados por el desarrollo. En el año 2011, la Corte Suprema de Florida rechazó el argumento de Koontz, pero en junio de este año el tribunal supremo falló que los requisitos de mitigación impuestos al constructor eran excesivos.

Este fallo alarmó a algunos ambientalistas y grupos, como la American Planning Association, quienes temieron que se establecieran nuevos límites a la facultad del gobierno de controlar el desarrollo e imponer requisitos para restaurar y conservar áreas naturales. Este motivo de preocupación se extendió hacia las regiones metropolitanas costeras que se estaban preparando para los impactos del cambio climático; un ejemplo de esto es la Ciudad de Nueva York que, en el mes de mayo, propuso un plan modelo de 20 mil millones de dólares consistente en una combinación de estrategias para vivir con el agua y mantenerla alejada. Los expertos en derechos de propiedad especularon que los desarrolladores podrían citar el caso Koontz como justificación para negarse a pagar un fondo para dichas iniciativas.

A un nivel más amplio, la pregunta permanece en pie: después de una situación como la del huracán Sandy, ¿tiene el gobierno derecho de prohibir la recon-strucción o de modificar las regulaciones con el fin de evitar nuevas construcciones? La respuesta legal es, básicamente, “sí”, según Jerold Kayden, abogado y profesor en la Facultad de Diseño de la Universidad de Harvard, quien participó en el Foro de periodistas sobre el suelo y el entorno construido llevado a cabo por el Instituto Lincoln el pasado abril.

Especialmente a raíz de la mayor disponibilidad de datos sobre el ascenso del nivel del mar y las marejadas que se tiene hoy en día, el gobierno tiene el derecho legal de evitar que los propietarios construyan en lotes vacantes expuestos a las inundaciones y al ascenso del nivel del mar o que reconstruyan una vivienda que fue destruida. Sin embargo, según Kayden, “desde el punto de vista político, esta es otra historia”.

Nueva York y Nueva Jersey representaron dos enfoques muy diferentes en cuanto a la reconstrucción que tuvo lugar con posterioridad al huracán Sandy. El gobernador de Nueva York, Andrew Cuomo, y el alcalde de la Ciudad de Nueva York, Michael Bloomberg, abogaron por una serie de normas destinadas tanto a la reconstrucción como a una “retirada estratégica”, mientras que el gobernador de Nueva Jersey, Chris Christie, se enfocó en la asignación de fondos destinados a los residentes para que éstos pudieran reconstruir en las parcelas afectadas por la tormenta, aun cuando dichas propiedades permanecieran dentro de la zona de riesgo.

Por otro lado, la ciudad de Boston ha comenzado a requerir a los desarrolladores de zonas costeras que se preparen ante la posibilidad de ascensos del nivel del mar y marejadas, mediante la reubicación de las maquinarias que guardan en los sótanos a pisos más elevados, entre otros requisitos. A medida que el caso Koontz despeja el camino hacia un escrutinio más rígido de las medidas impuestas por el gobierno municipal como condición para la construcción, los desarrolladores podrían demandar al gobierno por estos costosos requisitos relacionados con el clima, argumentando que dichos requisitos son demasiado onerosos y podrían constituir una expropiación reguladora.

Aunque las demandas por derechos de propiedad relacionadas con la reconstrucción y las restricciones sobre nuevas construcciones en áreas costeras indudablemente continuarán proliferando, Pratap Talwar, director de Thompson Design Group, presentó una alternativa para la planificación a largo plazo que podría evitar que surgieran dichos conflictos. Talwar detalló ante un grupo de periodistas el caso de estudio de Long Branch, Nueva Jersey, una ciudad que, hace varios años, se replanteó su proceso de planificación con el fin de incluir normas más rígidas y a la vez un proceso más rápido para el desarrollo que estuviera de acuerdo con las pautas. Según Talwar, Long Branch fue la única milla de la costa de Nueva Jersey que soportó las inclemencias del huracán Sandy de forma relativamente intacta.

Foro de periodistas sobre el suelo y el entorno construido: La ciudad resiliente

Treinta y cinco escritores y editores de primera línea que cubren noticias sobre problemas urbanos asistieron al 6º Foro de Periodistas sobre el Suelo y el Entorno Construido, llevado a cabo el 20 de abril de 2013 en el Lincoln House. El tema del foro fue “La ciudad resiliente” y abarcó desde los municipios costeros que se preparan para el ascenso del nivel del mar y las marejadas hasta las ciudades tradicionales que intentan evolucionar a pesar de la reducción de sus poblaciones y de su actividad comercial.

Kai-Uwe Bergmann, director de Bjarke Ingels Group, abrió el foro dando un panorama general sobre las innovaciones en diseño urbano que maximizan la eficiencia en el suelo, la vivienda y los proyectos de infraestructura de gran envergadura. Johanna Greenbaum, de Kushner Companies, quien ayudó a poner en funcionamiento la iniciativa de microviviendas del alcalde de la Ciudad de Nueva York, Michael Bloomberg, dio detalles sobre dicho proyecto y otros de similares características en diferentes lugares del país destinados a personas solteras y parejas que pueden vivir en espacios de 28 metros cuadrados.

Alan Mallach, coautor del informe sobre enfoque en políticas de suelo del Instituto Lincoln titulado Regeneración de las ciudades históricas de los Estados Unidos, observó señales de resurgimiento en lugares tales como el Central West End (St. Louis) o el barrio Over-the-Rhine (Cincinnati), a la vez que reconoció los desafíos que en-frentan Camden, Nueva Jersey, Flint y Detroit, Michigan y Youngstown, Ohio. Antoine Belaieff, director de innovaciones en MetroLinx, dio detalles sobre el uso de las redes sociales para obtener la opinión de los ciudadanos con respecto a una inversión de 16 mil millones de dólares en infraestructura de transporte resiliente dentro del área de Toronto.

John Macomber, de la Facultad de Negocios de la Universidad de Harvard, dirigió una sesión sobre la ciudad global, en la que reconoció que existen cientos de millones de personas que continúan migrando de áreas rurales a urbanas, lo que requiere una planificación a gran escala para la infraestructura. Martim Smolka, director del Programa para América Latina y el Caribe del Instituto Lincoln, lamentó los desplazamientos generalizados que están teniendo lugar a causa de los preparativos para la Copa Mundial de fútbol y los Juegos Olímpicos que se disputarán en Río de Janeiro. Bing Wang, de la Facultad de Diseño de Harvard, observó que 11 ciudades en China tienen una población de más de 10 millones de habitantes y, aún así, esta nación en rápido crecimiento sólo ha logrado la mitad de la urbanización esperada.

John Werner, director de movilización en Citizens Schools, explicó la manera en que los sistemas escolares urbanos pueden encender pasión entre los estudiantes trayendo desde fuera a distintos profesionales para que actúen como maestros y mentores. Gordon Feller, de Cisco Systems, imaginó un mundo completamente conectado y una Internet para todo. Se sumó Dan Keeting, periodista de investigación del Washington Post, quien compartió sus experiencias al extraer datos de diferentes niveles del gobierno.

El foro se vio obligado a abreviarse debido a la búsqueda de las personas que pusieron las bombas en el Maratón de Boston en el área de Cambridge-Watertown; sin embargo este evento dio pie a un diálogo acerca de la solicitud de procedimientos de “refugio en el lugar”, presentada por el gobernador de Massachusetts, Deval Patrick, la seguridad y el espacio público, y otros tipos de resiliencia en el área de Boston. Varios participantes escribieron sobre estos eventos, como Emily Badger (The Atlantic Cities), Donald Luzzatto (Virginian Pilot) e Inga Saffron (The Philadelphia Inquirer).

La reunión de periodistas cada abril es una asociación entre el Instituto Lincoln, la Facultad de Diseño de la Universidad de Harvard y la Fundación Nieman para el Periodismo de la misma universidad. La misión de esta actividad es reunir a periodistas a fin de compartir ideas y aprender acerca de las últimas tendencias relativas a la cobertura de noticias sobre ciudades, arquitectura y planificación urbana. — AF

A New Yorker cartoon by Jack Ziegler captures the essential irony of buying into condominiums, cooperatives, and other homeowner associations. A car is entering a driveway that leads to a group of townhouses in the distance, and a sign by the entrance proclaims, “Welcome to Condoville and the Illusion of Owning Your Own Property” (Ziegler 1984).

Despite this ambiguity, about a quarter of the American population now lives in association housing situations, collectively known as common interest communities (CICs). Figure 1 shows the tremendous increase in CICs over the past several decades. From 1970 to 2013, the number of housing units in such communities spiked from about 700,000 to 26.3 million, while the number of residents multiplied more than 30-fold from 2.1 million to 65.7 million.

With their growing popularity, common interest communities have raised policy challenges and legal issues that require ongoing resolution. These conflicts generally reflect either external concerns that CICs segregate the wealthy from the rest of society or internal disagreements between individual owners and their associations’ governing bodies. This article examines some of the controversies associated with the CIC model and its governance, and suggests approaches for enhancing the benefits of common interest communities for both property owners and society at large.

The Rise of Common Interest Communities

With increasing industrialization during the 19th century, the intrusion of pollution, traffic, noise, and disease led many planners and citizens to favor the separation of residential, commercial, and industrial uses. (Zoning had not yet emerged as a planning tool and would not be validated by the Supreme Court of the United States until 1926.) Some residential developers thus imposed “servitudes”—covenants, restrictions, and easements—on their subdivision projects. Servitudes generally restricted the properties to residential uses and often created shared rights to communal facilities and services in exchange for fees. Lot purchasers agreed to the servitudes, and once the restrictions were recorded, subsequent purchasers were also legally bound. The common law proved to be an effective vehicle for creating high-end residential areas, including New York City’s Gramercy Park (1831) and Boston’s Louisburg Square (1844).

After a slowdown during the Great Depression and World War II, construction of CICs began to boom in the late 1960s, after the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) recognized the condominium as an insurable ownership vehicle, and state statutory authorization followed. FHA mortgage insurance encouraged developers to build middle-class condominiums, which gained market acceptance as a result of the “new town” movement—exemplified by early planned communities such as Reston, Virginia (1964), and Columbia, Maryland (1967). The passage of California’s Proposition 13, the initiative that limited property taxation in 1978, and similar measures in other states also spurred an increase in CICs, as cash-strapped local governments, under increased pressure to provide more services, were unwilling to absorb the infrastructure and service costs from new development. As a result, they tended to approve new developments only in CIC form, where the developer (and ultimately the owners) covered the costs.

Today, CIC owners are generally subject to a variety of constraints related to their private units, from limitations on the layout and design of buildings and the type of construction materials used, to restrictions on visible home decorations, ancillary structures, and landscaping. There are often controls on the owner’s behavior and use of the property, which is typically limited to residential occupancy. Noise, parking, and traffic rules may also be imposed, along with vehicle restrictions. In some cases, political signs, leafleting, and related activities are also prohibited.

In exchange for their association dues, owners have access to common facilities, such as roads and recreational areas, and to private services, such as security, trash collection, street cleaning, and snow plowing. The CIC is usually administered by a private residential government and various committees, elected by the owners and subject to the law of contract rather than public administrative and Constitutional law (see Box 1).

————————

Box 1: Common Interest Community Models

CICs typically create a private government elected by the owners to administer and enforce contracts, and to promulgate rules to advance community interests. While the exact form of the arrangement may vary, the basic concepts are similar.

Homeowner Associations
Unit owners hold fee title to their individual properties, which are usually single-family or townhouse homes. The association holds title to common areas and grants the owners easement rights for their use. These can be created by common law or under statutes in some states. Homeowner associations make up more than half of community associations nationally.

Condominiums
Unit owners receive fee title to their units plus a percentage ownership in the common areas. The association administers the common areas but does not hold title to them. Condominiums may be vertical (high-rise) or horizontal (single-family or townhouse homes), and they are created exclusively pursuant to state statute. Condominiums represent 45 to 48 percent of community associations.

Cooperatives
A cooperative corporation owns the building, and the owners receive shares in the corporation and automatically renewable, long-term leases on their individual units. Unlike condominium and homeowner associations, the corporation can control transfer of leases and shares by cooperative owners. Only 3 to 4 percent of community associations are organized as cooperatives.

————————

Economic Benefits of CICs

CICs bring substantial economic benefits to owners and to society at large. Residents who buy into these communities have determined that shared facilities, such as recreational areas, are a better value than, say, personal swimming pools and other private facilities. Similarly, those joining CICs have determined that certain restrictions—such as a prohibition on parking mobile homes in driveways—increase property values.

These communities help to achieve efficient use of land as well. The costs of organizing and administering a private residential community are lower than in a public system (Nelson 2009). Transaction costs and rent-seeking through the political system are also reduced. Finally, because it is free from statutory and constitutional restraints, a private community has greater flexibility in the substance of its rules and operations, freeing it from adherence to public guidelines when entering into contracts with service providers and suppliers.

American courts have recognized these efficiency benefits when enforcing CIC arrangements and the owners’ reliance on them. As one court noted, “It is a well-known fact that [covenants] enhance the value of the subdivision property and form an inducement for purchasers to buy lots within the subdivision” (Gunnels v. No. Woodland Community Ass’n, Tex. Ct. App, 17013 [1978]).

External Concerns: Secession from the General Community

Despite these benefits, various commentators have argued that the services and private facilities of CICs are available only to those who can afford them and facilitate the separation of the wealthy from the rest of society. The rest of a CIC’s municipality is forced to do without, creating a permanent, two-tier system of housing. Critics also claim that privatization of infrastructure and services isolates CIC residents and reduces their stake in broad communal issues.

By this logic, CIC dwellers are less willing to engage with public government on civic matters and more likely to resist tax increases, given that the CIC rather than the municipal government provides many services. Where community associations are part of suburban developments, isolation from the urban core may be acute. These concerns often center on a fear of class and economic segregation. As former Secretary of Labor Robert Reich wrote in a New York Times article called “Secession of the Successful”: In many cities and towns, the wealthy have in effect withdrawn their dollars from the support of public spaces and institutions shared by all and dedicated the savings to their own private services. . . . Condominiums and the omnipresent residential communities dun their members to undertake work that financially strapped local governments can no longer afford to do well (Reich 1991).

Freedom of Choice

This characterization of community associations, however, is at odds with the fundamental American values of freedom of contract and freedom of association. It is a shared value that people may spend their money for lawful purposes as they wish and enter into contracts as they please. The law intrudes on freedom of contract only in rare instances when major policy considerations are at stake. Courts have recognized freedom of contract as an important consideration for upholding private servitude arrangements: We start with the proposition that private persons, in the exercise of their constitutional right of freedom of contract, may impose whatever restrictions upon the use of land which they convey to another that they desire to impose (Grubel v. McLaughlin, D. Va. [1968]).

CICs also reflect the American belief in freedom of association, exemplified in a long tradition of utopian communities and other belief-centered networks. Residents in modern CICs might share common interests, such as the homeowners living in golf or equestrian communities. Other residents may simply share a desire for neighborhood tranquility or character. In Behind the Gates, Setha Low suggests that CICs allow “middle-class families [to] imprint their residential landscapes with ‘niceness,’ reflecting their own aesthetic of orderliness, consistency, and control” (Low 2004). Whatever the reason, community associations are consistent with de Tocqueville’s observation about American interactions: Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions, constantly form associations. They have not only commercial and manufacturing companies, in which all take part, but associations of a thousand other kinds—religious, moral, serious, futile, extensive or restricted, enormous or diminutive (de Tocqueville 1835).

Moreover, the available evidence indicates that CIC residents are generally happy with their choice. In a 2014 survey conducted by Public Opinion Strategies for the Community Associations Institute, 64 percent of owners were positive about their overall experience, and 26 percent were neutral. While 86 percent of respondents indicated that they wanted either less or no additional governmental regulation, 70 percent maintained that association rules and restrictions protect and enhance property values.

The Issue of Double Taxation

While the rise of CICs reflects a variety of factors, the constrained finances of municipalities following the property tax revolts in the 1970s were key. In fact, a different take on the “secession” narrative is that some owners in common interest communities believe that municipal government abandoned them.

CIC owners pay property taxes at the same rates as other citizens, even though they privately purchase services such as trash collection, street cleaning, and security with their community association dues. This amounts to double taxation, charging association owners for a service they are not receiving.

If a no-service policy were in effect before an owner purchased a unit in a CIC, theoretically the buyer could lower the offer price to reflect the lack of municipal services and the double-taxation-effect. The unit owner would be protected, and the developer would absorb the loss. But if a municipality reduces services but not taxes after the unit purchase, the owner suffers an uncompensated loss. This outcome would be bad policy in that it permits rent seeking, allowing the majority of citizens in the town to select one group of residents to bear an extra tax burden even though they do not create extra costs. This offends notions of both fairness and efficiency, and it’s antithetical to community building and civic trust.

It is especially important for legislatures to avoid the use of double taxation as a matter of policy, given that judicial challenges are unlikely to succeed. The few courts that have entertained attacks on double taxation have been unsympathetic to claims that it violates due process of law, offends the equal protection clause of the Constitution, or works a taking of property without compensation. While double taxation may be bad policy, it is not unconstitutional. The courts should not overturn such legislative decisions, because these are essentially political outcomes that the public should challenge at the ballot box.

The Question of Inequality

The “secession of the wealthy” argument appears to be based on the notion that only higher-income owners with higher-value homes live in common interest communities. The available data, however, do not clearly support this assumption. As Figure 2 indicates, prices for condominiums and cooperatives—half of the units in CICs nationally—are below those for all existing homes (including condominiums, cooperatives, and single-family homes inside and outside of community associations). While these estimates are not deeply segmented (for example, they do not break out single-family homes inside and outside CICs), they do show that the values of condominiums and cooperatives are consistent with those of homes generally.

Housing affordability and access are significant challenges in the United States, but community associations are not necessarily the cause of these deep-seated, complex problems. Employed before CICs became popular, exclusionary zoning imposed by local governments in the form of large lot requirements has prevented developers from building affordable housing. CICs have in fact been found to lower the costs of home purchases. Multi-unit housing, such as condominiums and townhouses, is more affordable than single-family homes because it cuts the cost of land, infrastructure, and building (Ellickson & Been 2005). Affordable housing cooperatives permit restrictions on resale prices and owner income, thus ensuring that housing opportunities remain available for lower-income families. For these purposes, developers operating under city requirements or incentives often designate condominium units within a project as affordable units.

It is therefore simplistic and counterproductive to see community associations as a battleground between rich and poor. Similarly, pejorative use of the term “gated” communities to describe those CICs with limited public access does not advance understanding. Indeed, a moderate-income cooperative with a front door locked for basic security reasons falls within the definition of a “gated” community.

Guiding Principles

In what ways should the “secession of the successful” critique affect our understanding, acceptance, and authorization of common interest communities? The issue is complex and does not lend itself to binary choices. Instead, it is a matter of accommodating competing interests according to the following principles:

• Acceptance of the CIC model has increased over time. These types of housing arrangements represent the free choice of many people, and the law enforces their contracts in most instances.
• CIC owners should relate to the municipal government and the CIC structure under what might be termed “augmented federalism.” Under this notion, residents have additional contractual duties to the CIC, but these obligations do not excuse them from duties to and participation in federal, state, and local governments. In return, legislators should base policy decisions affecting CIC owners on considerations of fairness, efficiency, and community building.
• Housing access and affordability require comprehensive solutions. These issues should be discussed and debated directly, and the political process should determine the course of action. Viewing these issues only as a CIC problem is unwarranted and will not bring effective results.

Internal Conflicts: Individual Owners vs. the Community

In his groundbreaking book Privatopia: Homeowner Associations and the Rise of Private Residential Governments (1996), Evan McKenzie warned that: CICs feature a form of private government that takes an American preference for private home ownership and, too often, turns it into an ideology of hostile privatism. Preservation of property values is the highest social goal, to which other aspects of community life are subordinated. Rigid, intrusive, and often petty rule enforcement makes a caricature of . . . benign management, and the belief in rational planning is distorted into an emphasis on conformity for its own sake.

Conflicts between residents and CIC associations or boards often revolve around two general issues: the substance of the restrictions and the procedures for enforcement (see Box 2). As Figure 3 shows, disputes may focus on a range of topics, from landscaping restrictions to assessment collection. Indeed, 24 percent of CIC residents responding to the 2014 Public Opinion Strategies survey had experienced a significant personal issue or disagreement with their associations. Of this group, 52 percent were satisfied with the outcome and 36 percent were dissatisfied; in 12 percent of cases, the issue was still unresolved.

There are indeed certain risks that community associations can overstep with respect to the substance and enforcement of restrictions, but legislation and judicial supervision can address these substantive and procedural policy concerns.

————————

Box 2: Conflicts Make Good Copy

While the following headlines fail to represent the myriad positive interactions between individual owners and associations, they do suggest some of the difficult interactions that can occur.

• “Marine’s Parents Sued Over Sign of Support in Their Bossier City [La.] Front Yard.” The 3 ft. x 6 ft. sign displayed a picture of their son in uniform, before deployment to Afghanistan, with text that read, “Our son defends our freedom” (Associated Press, July 25, 2011).
• “Bucks County Woman Fined by Homeowners’ Association For Colored Christmas Lights.” Association members had previously voted in favor of permitting white lights only (CBS Philly, December 2, 2011).
• “Dallas Man Suing Rabbi Neighbor Who Uses House as a Synagogue.” The plaintiff claimed that the use of the home for a 25-person congregation violated the residential restriction (KDFW Fox4 Online, February 4, 2014).
• “A Grandfather Is Doing Time For Ignoring A Judge’s Order in a Dispute Over Resodding His Yard.” The association won a judgment of $795 against the owner who claimed that he could not afford to resod his browning lawn. When the owner failed to pay, the court jailed him for contempt (St. Petersburg Times, October 10, 2008).
• “Hilton Head Plantation Resident Disputes Gate Toll for Unpaid Fees.” An owner brought suit after an association imposed a $10 entrance gate fee on homeowners delinquent on their annual association dues (Island Packet, August 29, 2014).

————————

Freedom of Choice

As discussed earlier, individuals exercise their freedom of choice by purchasing homes in CICs and agreeing to be subject to their rules. Association living may not be for everyone, but the expectation of people who choose the CIC life should generally be respected and not be frustrated by someone who subsequently seeks to violate the compact. The courts generally reflect this view, as suggested by this 1981 ruling: [The original] restrictions are clothed with a very strong presumption of validity which arises from the fact that each individual unit owner purchases his unit knowing and accepting the restrictions to be imposed. . . . [A] use restriction in a declaration of condominium may have a certain degree of unreasonableness to it, and yet withstand attack in the courts. If it were otherwise, a unit owner could not rely on the restrictions found in the declaration . . . since such restrictions would be in a potential condition of continuous flux (Hidden Harbour Estates v. Basso, Fla. Ct. App. [1981]).

There are several scenarios, though, where homeowners may have no freedom of choice. First, it is possible that the only new housing available to buyers would be in CICs—i.e., developers are no longer building new homes outside of associations. Indeed, a recent report found that in 2003, 80 percent of all homes being built at that time were in associations (Foundation for Community Association Research 2014). In addition, municipal government may require developers to create associations as a condition for subdivision approval. (Recent legislation in Arizona prohibiting this practice indicates that it still occurs.) Finally, some courts have suggested that while rules in place at the time of purchase should be enforced, a rule subsequently enacted by the association or board under a reserved power should not be enforced if an owner can show that it is “unreasonable.” Other courts disagree: Homeowner should not be heard to complain when, as anticipated by the recorded declaration of covenants, the homeowners’ association amends the declaration. When a purchaser buys into such a community, the purchaser buys not only subject to the express covenants in the declaration, but also subject to the amendment provisions. . . . And, of course, a potential homeowner concerned about community association governance has the option to purchase a home not subject to association governance. . . . For this reason, we decline to subject the amendments . . . to the “reasonableness” test (Hughes v. New Life Development Corp., Tenn. Sup. Ct. [2012]).

Guidelines for Protecting Personal Autonomy

Association restrictions raise concerns when they threaten the personal autonomy and fundamental individual rights of owners. Constraints of this type might include prohibitions of political signs or messaging, and restriction of occupancy to “traditional” families.

Courts should enforce restrictions if they limit spillovers (also known as fallout or externalities) from one owner to the rest of the community. They should not, however, enforce restrictions that limit the nature or status of the occupants or the behavior within a unit that does not create externalities. This approach is based on the theory that the primary purpose of CIC regimes is to enhance economic value and encourage efficient exchanges. Thus, if the owner creates no externalities, the courts should not enforce bans on the particular behavior. Moreover, some values of personal autonomy are too important and trump the usual rules of contract. We do not, for example, permit contracts of indentured servitude or the sale of human organs.

By this standard, limiting noise and banning smoking (because of seepage of odors) in multi-family units would be legitimate, but restrictions based on the marital status of residents would not. Some situations are trickier—for example, restrictions on pets. Under the suggested guidelines, it would usually be legitimate to bar pets because of the potential noise and the reluctance of some residents to share common areas with them. In the case of service animals, however, the unit owner’s health needs may trump community concerns.

First Amendment–type issues present special challenges. Free expression—such as political or issue-related signage, leafleting, demonstrations, or other manifestations—can cause spillovers that may include noise, aesthetic interference, and disruption of the community’s general ambience. At the same time, however, free speech is fundamental to our republican form of government, arguably whether it is addressed to the larger public government or the private government. In expression cases, courts might apply the longstanding doctrine that prohibits covenants that violate public policy, rejecting total bans on speech in favor of reasonable restrictions on time, place, and manner. This would allow expression but limit, if not eliminate, spillover on the community.

Religious freedom is another fundamental American value. Restrictions on the placement of a mezuzah on doorposts and the display of crèches, statues of saints, and Christmas lights limit free exercise of religion. While it would open a Pandora’s box to engage in balancing the religious importance of colored versus white Christmas lights against CIC standards, it would nevertheless be appropriate for the courts to impose a general standard of reasonable accommodation on CIC regulations that affect religious practices.

Finally, in the development and enforcement of association rules, CIC property owners have a right to expect certain behavior from associations and boards. This expectation traces from the obligation of good faith and fair dealing that is incumbent on all parties to a contract. Thus, an owner should have a right to fair procedures, including notice and an opportunity to be heard; to be treated equally to other similarly situated owners; and to be free from bias, personal animus, and bad-faith decision making by the board and its members.

Conclusion

Common interest communities are a large part of the American residential landscape, currently providing homes for a quarter of the U.S. population. While CICs bring great economic advantages to residents and society in general, these types of housing arrangements do require nuanced interactions between the community association and the municipal government, and association rules can impinge on the personal autonomy of members. However, strategies are available to mitigate if not overcome these problems. Indeed, these approaches can make ownership of a home in a CIC less of an illusion and more of a reality.

About the Author

Gerald Korngold is Professor of Law at New York Law School and a visiting fellow at the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. He teaches and writes in the fields of property and real estate law.

References

De Tocqueville, Alexis. 1835. Democracy in America. London: Saunders and Otley.

Ellickson, Robert C. & Vicki L. Been. 2005. Land Use Controls. New York, NY: Aspen Publishers, 3rd edition.

Foundation for Community Association Research. 2014. “Best Practices. Report #7: Transition.” www.cairf.org/research/bptransition.pdf.

Foundation for Community Association Research. 2013. “National and State Statistical Review for 2013.” www.cairf.org/research/factbook/2013_statistical_review.pdf.

Grubel v. McLaughlin Gunnels v. No. Woodland Community Ass’n, 17013, Texas Court of Appeals (1978).

Hidden Harbour Estates v. Basso, Florida Court of Appeals (1981).

Hughes v. New Life Development Corp., Tennessee Superior Court (2012).

Low, Setha. 2004. Behind the Gates: Life, Security, and the Pursuit of Happiness in Fortress America. London: Routledge.

McKenzie, E. 1996. Privatopia: Homeowner Associations and the Rise of Private Residential Governments. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.

Nelson, R. H. 2009. “The Puzzle of Local Double Taxation: Why Do Private Communities Exist?” The Independent Review. 13 (3) (Winter) 345–365.

Public Opinion Strategies. 2014. “Verdict: Americans Grade Their Associations, Board Members and Community Managers.” Falls Church, Virginia: Community Associations Institute.

Reich, Robert. 1991. “Secession of the Successful.” The New York Times Magazine. January 20.

Treese, C. J. 2013. Association Information Services, Inc., compiled from National Association of Realtors data. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1I_2LgTIYSqR4nLPRxN-HtCV-oOFK_QqN1AcO5JJTw-g/edit.

Ziegler, J. 1984. The New Yorker. September 3.

Editor’s note: This article summarizes a recent Lincoln lecture by Dean Gerald Korngold of the Case Western Reserve University School of Law. He outlined the current status of the law on nonpossessory rights in property and discussed its future direction.

Everyday life presents many examples of agreements that divide the rights to possession of property. A typical lease allows the tenant a period of possession in exchange for payment of rent, and joint ownership arrangements provide a means of sharing or dividing possession. But, nonpossessory interests are equally important because they provide a mechanism for private land use regulation. Some examples are condominium owners’ rights in their building’s common areas, storekeepers’ agreements with the operator of the shopping center in which they are located, and gated communities’ covenants to restrict access. None of these convey possession, but all affect daily living and business arrangements. The widespread adoption of public zoning restrictions over the past century has by no means diminished the role of private land use agreements, and may even have enhanced it by making limitations on a possessor’s rights of use a familiar and accepted aspect of property ownership.

An agreement concerning the use of property could, of course, take the form of a simple contract, whether between neighbors, store owners and a mall operator, or condominium residents and their homeowners’ association. But such a contract would not necessarily survive a sale, inheritance or other transfer of ownership of the property in question. A generation later, a court might well refuse to enforce an agreement where neither the person violating its provisions nor the person seeking to uphold them were parties to the original contract. For this reason, long-term durability requires that private land use restrictions take the form of a conveyance of a property interest, rather than a contract.

The New Restatement of Property

Part of the complexity of nonpossessory rights stems from the numerous and often ambiguous distinctions among them in the common law. They fall within four traditional categories:

• An easement is a nonpossessory right in the land of another.
• A profit allows the holder to enter on land that he or she does not possess and remove resources from it, as by mining coal or harvesting timber.
• Covenants, including both real covenants and equitable servitudes, are promises between owners of neighboring land, differing only in the remedy available in the event the promise is broken.
• An equitable servitude can be specifically enforced by ordering action to be taken and the promise kept; breach of a real covenant would only result in monetary damages.

It is clear even from this cursory description that a given interest might be assigned to more than one category. For example, an agreement between neighbors not to construct commercial buildings on their properties might be characterized as an easement, an equitable servitude, or a real covenant, and each result would carry different legal consequences.

Traditionally, courts were most favorably disposed toward easements, and were much less likely to enforce real covenants and equitable servitudes. Over time two distinct categories of property law developed to address similar issues in these different contexts. In 2000 the American Law Institute, an organization of practitioners, jurists and scholars concerned with legal reform, took a major step in attempting to simplify and rationalize the law of nonpossessory interests. Its Restatement (Third) of the Law of Property adopted a single unified approach and a new category, termed “servitudes,” encompassing all earlier classifications. Restatements have no binding legal effect, but they often influence both legislatures considering changes to the law and courts charged with its interpretation.

Policy Arguments: Pro and Con

Judicial decisions concerning nonpossessory interests often give weight to larger issues of public policy in determining whether to enforce these agreements. Four major policy considerations often support enforcement: the moral obligation accompanying a promise; interests of economic efficiency; respect for freedom of choice; and a desire to promote certainty in business agreements.

Moral Obligation. This issue reflects a sense of fairness in enforcing a promise and applies both to the original parties to the agreement and to their successors in ownership. When restrictions that are intended to affect future purchasers (i.e., restrictions that “run with the land”) are recorded at public registries and available for inspection, failure to enforce these agreements will produce an unwarranted windfall for the parties who breach them. The original owners who entered the agreement did so voluntarily and in anticipation of some benefit. Later purchasers presumably made their own bargains in light of these agreements. A buyer of restricted property will generally pay less for it than he or she would if a more profitable use were permitted. Thus the new owner would receive an unfair benefit if the lower purchase price were followed by a release from the obligation to adhere to the restrictions.

Efficiency and Freedom of Choice. Nonpossessory agreements promote efficiency by greatly expanding the range of possible property interests that may be transferred. Consider the case of an owner seeking to insure that there is no intrusive construction on a neighboring lot in the future. Absent the availability of a nonpossessory interest, the owner’s only recourse would be to purchase the entire neighboring lot, even if outright ownership was not desired and in fact precluded other nonobjectionable use by a different party. The ability to acquire only part of the bundle of rights constituting the property allows flexibility that can benefit all affected parties. In this way efficiency concerns are closely related to those favoring freedom of choice. The value our society places on individual autonomy leads to a presumption in favor of voluntary private arrangements concerning land ownership. This is especially important when the subject matter concerns one’s home, as do many land use agreements.

Certainty. Enforcement of private agreements also promotes the certainty and stability necessary for long-term planning and investment. By contrast, a zoning ordinance may be varied in individual instances or altered in response to political pressure. This is one important incentive for private agreements to restrict land use, even when such limitations are already part of the local zoning code.

These concerns, however, are balanced by other policy considerations that may argue against enforcement of a servitude. Perhaps the most significant is the centuries-old common-law distrust of restrictions on future land use, development and sale. Recognizing that we have no special power to predict the social and economic concerns of future generations, courts have traditionally limited the extent to which contemporary agreements may bind later owners. In fact, the term “mortmain,” referring to property held without the power of sale, literally refers to the “dead hand” of past restrictions. From this perspective, policy considerations favoring efficiency, flexibility and personal choice can militate against as well as in favor of enforcement of restrictions in specific cases.

In some instances, this concern centers on restraints on alienation, or provisions that make the land more difficult to sell. However, the very flexibility fostered by the introduction of a market for new partial property interests will often obviate this objection. A prospective owner who wishes to buy property free and clear of a longstanding servitude can often accomplish this by a two-part transaction: purchasing the encumbered property at the lower price it currently commands on the market and simultaneously paying the holder of the servitude the amount needed to release it. Thus, a purchaser of property limited by private agreement to residential use could build a retail structure there (assuming it were permitted by local zoning ordinances) if he or she were able to negotiate with the neighbor a termination of the agreement prohibiting such construction. The lifting of a “cloud on title” of this type is extremely common, as in the case of a new owner who negotiates with a current tenant over payment for early termination of a lease.

New Models for Judicial Decisions

Given the effort of the Restatement to release some of the “dead hand” of common law classification, and given the enormous proliferation of commercial, condominium, homeowner and conservation restrictions in recent years, what new criteria should courts apply in determining whether to enforce a specific agreement?

One frequently discussed criterion concerns subject matter: should certain categories of restrictions be suspect because they may infringe on special rights, such as the right to individual expression and free speech? Should a homeowners’ association be able to bar the display of flags and political posters from its members’ premises? One real-life dispute pitted the governing board of a cooperative on the East Side of Manhattan against a unit owner who refused to cease sponsoring baptisms in the apartment’s swimming pool. (The owner argued that often the ceremonies involved college football players, who were too large to fit in a bathtub.) Note that these disputes do not involve the First Amendment, which only prohibits governmental restrictions on speech and religion, not voluntary private agreements. Restrictions also increasingly address architectural and aesthetic issues, which combine concerns for common amenities with problems of limiting personal expression and individual freedom.

Instead of allowing the subject matter to determine the outcome of these cases, an alternate approach would enforce only those covenants that regulate external behavior, not those that seek to limit personal status or activities within a private residence. This would permit restrictions on outside flags and posters, but not prohibitions on unmarried couples living together or the conduct of church services within a home (including baptisms in the bathtub). Of course, it would permit restrictions on the external effects of such arrangements, such as garbage, traffic, parking and noise. Similarly, it would generally support architectural limitations on landscape and external building elements, for these have important “spillover” effects on other residents.

The new Restatement of the Law of Property does not attempt to formulate this approach into a formal rule. However, it does recommend that general considerations of public policy guide courts in determining whether to enforce a specific servitude, and it notes the need for special concern in addressing issues of personal autonomy.

The Special Case of Conservation Easements

Conservation easements are currently one of the most significant and fastest-growing types of servitudes. They convey to a conservation organization or governmental unit the right to enforce a limitation on development of privately owned property, illustrating the great potential of nonpossessory interests. Often families who are the most committed to the preservation of their land and have a strong sense of its value as open space are the least interested in selling the property to a charity or to the government. The conservation easement permits protection against development while the land remains in private ownership. The organization holding the easement does not have the responsibilities of ownership, and some portion of the property value remains on the tax rolls. The net expenditure, even when the easement must be purchased, is less than the cost of the entire parcel. It is easy to see why conservation easements have become tremendously popular land preservation tools.

At the same time, some of the public policy concerns that argue against enforcement of other servitudes can be operative here as well. In particular, unease over long-term restrictions on land use is magnified in this case because federal income tax law allows a deduction for the gift of an easement only if it operates in perpetuity. Perpetuity is a long time, and appropriate land use may change dramatically in the future. Conservation easements are also “in gross,” meaning that they can be held by organizations that are not neighboring property owners. The original limitation of covenants to nearby owners reflected a concern that distant parties might be uninterested in or uninformed about local issues, with no necessary stake in promoting efficient land use and economic development. They could also be difficult to locate if needed to release a covenant or servitude. Finally, there are troubling antidemocratic aspects of a system that permits private parties to impose perpetual land use restrictions without public oversight.

These concerns are not grounds for recommending wholesale changes to the law of conservation easements, such as a restriction to type of ownership or a uniform limitation on duration. These requirements would be too rigid a response, particularly when more time is needed to understand how well-founded such misgivings might be. Individual decisions informed by experience, rather than expansive rulemaking on the basis of abstract reasoning, is the greatest strength of our common-law heritage. This approach permits courts to intervene selectively in the rare cases where the public interest may not support specific enforcement of an easement. This is already a familiar response in, for example, the law of nuisance, where individual awards may be limited to monetary damages alone. State attorneys general may also be able to exercise increased oversight and represent the public interest more actively as conservation easements come into ever-broader use.

Conclusion

Nonpossessory interests in property are as widespread as rights of way and as familiar as the covenants in a homeowners’ association agreement. The enormous usefulness of these servitudes makes efforts to modernize and rationalize their application critically important. At the same time, because their influence is felt in numerous facets of everyday life, judicial analysis of their legal effects provides a context within which to consider bedrock issues of public policy.

Joan Youngman is senior fellow and chairman of the Lincoln Institute’s Department of Valuation and Taxation and an attorney who writes on legal aspects of property taxation policy and practice. She has developed and teaches numerous Institute courses on conservation easements, land valuation techniques and the interaction of property taxation and public finance.

Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 5 del libro Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.

La tierra vacante(1) y su integración al mercado de tierras urbanas son temas raramente investigados en América Latina. Los estudios publicados al respecto tienden a limitarse a los aspectos descriptivos: es decir, principalmente a la cantidad y al tamaño de los vacíos urbanos. El contexto actual de profundas transformaciones económicas y sociales, y de cambios en los patrones de demanda de tierras en las ciudades, está propiciando un giro en la percepción de estos predios en desuso: de ser un problema, se están convirtiendo en una oportunidad.

Como parte de un proyecto de investigación patrocinado por el Instituto Lincoln, en agosto de 1998 se realizó un estudio comparativo de tierra vacante en seis ciudades latinoamericanas: Buenos Aires (Argentina), Lima (Perú), Quito (Ecuador), Rio de Janeiro (Brasil), San Salvador (El Salvador) y Santiago (Chile). Los investigadores participantes examinaron diferentes categorías de tierra vacante, los problemas que ésta genera y sus usos potenciales, así como también los cambiantes papeles de agentes tanto privados como públicos -incluyendo los gobiernos- en el manejo de los mismos. Las conclusiones del estudio destacan que estos espacios libres son elementos integrales de los complejos mercados de tierras de esas ciudades, y que afectan las políticas fiscales en materia de desarrollo urbano; por tal motivo, tienen un gran potencial para el desarrollo a gran escala. El manejo de la tierra vacante podría conducir no sólo a mejorar las condiciones de las áreas urbanas, sino también a reducir la polarización social y fomentar una mayor igualdad para sus habitantes.

Si bien las seis ciudades del estudio varían en tamaño, todas comparten ciertas características comunes, tales como un acelerado crecimiento demográfico y territorial, además de indicadores sociales similares (altas tasas de pobreza, desempleo y subempleo), déficits significativos de vivienda y de servicios públicos, y altos niveles de segregación y estratificación social geográfica. Los mercados de tierras de cada una de las ciudades tienen también características similares, aunque exhiben sus propias dinámicas en cada submercado.

Características de la tierra vacante

Esta investigación estudió cuatro características principales de la tierra vacante: tenencia, cantidad, situación y duración de la condición vacante. Como regla general, la tierra vacante latinoamericana está a cargo de uno o más de los agentes citados a continuación (cada uno con sus políticas respectivas): gestores o subdivisores inmobiliarios -legales o ilegales-; pequeños propietarios que han adquirido las tierras, pero que están incapacitadas para desarrollarlas; especuladores de bienes raíces; agricultores; empresas estatales; y otras instituciones como la Iglesia, el estado militar, el seguro social, etc.

El determinar cuánta tierra vacante hay en cada ciudad es una tarea compleja, debido a las diferentes definiciones que se le da al término en cada país (ver fig. 1), junto con los numerosos obstáculos para obtener informaciones precisas. Todo esto dificulta la comparación de datos y porcentajes en áreas metropolitanas. Aun más, en algunas de estas ciudades (San Salvador, Santiago y Buenos Aires) existe un número significativo de tierra vacante “latente”, consistente en edificaciones total o prácticamente deshabitadas que a menudo estaban ocupadas por ex-empresas estatales, y que actualmente están a la espera de nuevas inversiones que permitan su demolición o desarrollo.

En las seis ciudades estudiadas, el porcentaje de tierra vacante oscila desde un poco menos del 5 por ciento (San Salvador) hasta casi un 44 por ciento (Rio de Janeiro). Si en San Salvador se incluyera toda la tierra vacante “latente”, la suma ascendería a un 40 por ciento de toda el área metropolitana. Como un todo, la tierra vacante de las ciudades representa un porcentaje significativo de las áreas edificables -es decir, con acceso a servicios públicos- que podría albergar a una cantidad considerable de población que actualmente no dispone de acceso a la tierras urbana.

La situación de la tierra vacante es relativamente uniforme dentro de una región. Así, mientras que en los Estados Unidos tienden a estar localizados en el centro de las ciudades (principalmente espacios y sitios industriales abandonados), en América Latina la mayoría se encuentra en la periferia, donde frecuentemente son objeto de una fiera especulación y de estrategias de retención dependiendo de su accesibilidad a las redes de servicios públicos. En cambio, hay diferencias considerables en la duración del desuso de los terrenos: en Lima y en Quito, los vacíos urbanos son relativamente “nuevos”, mientras que en Buenos Aires hay algunos que han estado desocupados durante varias décadas.

Políticas y potencial de desarrollo

Un examen de las condiciones ambientales urbanas de la tierra vacante demuestra que muchos de estos sitios podrían soportar actividades residenciales o productivas, por lo que constituyen un recurso desaprovechado en el que debería construirse una infraestructura urbana a fin de mejorar la eficiencia del uso de las tierras. No obstante, otra cantidad considerable de lotes presenta una serie de importantes factores de riesgo, por ejemplo: inadecuada infraestructura básica; agua contaminada por desechos industriales; riesgo sísmico, de inundaciones o erosión; y vías de acceso deficientes. Tales terrenos no son aptos para ser urbanizados a menos que se realicen inversiones considerables que los resguarden contra tales problemas. Algunos podrían tener un gran potencial para la protección ambiental, aunque la conservación de la tierra sigue siendo un asunto de baja prioridad en América Latina.

En el estudio se afirma que, como norma general, los sectores urbanos de bajos recursos tienen poco acceso a la tierra, debido a los altos precios de la misma (a pesar de que sus valores varían según el submercado). Las áreas de expansión urbana dinámica, que ofrecen mejores vías de acceso y redes de servicios, son sumamente costosas. En varias de las ciudades estudiadas hay una gran cantidad de tierra vacante que no está a la venta y que posiblemente permanecerá desocupada por un tiempo indefinido. Los investigadores del proyecto proponen someter dichas tierras a políticas de abaratamiento de los precios, de manera de aumentar su accesibilidad a la población de bajos recursos.

En la mayoría de las ciudades latinoamericanas no existen políticas explícitas ni marcos jurídicos referentes a la tierra vacante. Donde sí existen leyes (como es el caso de Rio de Janeiro), éstas se limitan a ser meramente declaraciones de principio, y resultan ineficaces. La reciente promulgación de nueva legislación en la ciudad de Santiago ha promovido el aumento de densidad en áreas urbanas, pero todavía es muy temprano para conocer las implicancias de tales medidas(2) . De igual manera, comúnmente las legislaciones urbanas contemplan escasas referencias al medio ambiente. La tierra vacante podría desempeñar un papel importante en la sustentabilidad urbana, pero ello requiere desarrollar una mejor articulación entre las acciones ambientales y las de planificación, especialmente al nivel local.

Otra característica común de las áreas estudiadas (a excepción de Santiago), es la falta de articulación entre las política de desarrollo urbano y, más específicamente, de mercados de tierras con la política tributaria. Incluso en aquellas ciudades en las que teóricamente se ha hecho una distinción impositiva entre la tierra vacante y la ocupada -tales como Buenos Aires y Quito-, no se han producido resultados verdaderos, y los agentes encargados de tales terrenos han podido librarse de sanciones o alzas de impuestos a través de una serie de “excepciones” y exenciones fiscales.

Propuestas y criterios de planificación

Al mismo tiempo que aboga por una mayor influencia gubernamental en los mercados de tierras, en combinación con el establecimiento de programas de creación de instituciones y de capacidad entre otros mecanismos, el estudio presenta varias propuestas para el uso y la reutilización de tierra vacante en América Latina. Una de las propuestas fundamentales es la de incorporar la tierra vacante en el marco de las políticas generales de cada ciudad, desde un enfoque que considere su diversidad de condiciones. Como parte de un programa de objetivos de planificación urbana, se recomienda implementar políticas de expansión de espacios verdes, de construcción de conjuntos de vivienda para población de bajos ingresos, y de construcción de la infraestructura necesaria. Aún más, la tierra vacante debería utilizarse para promover una “racionalidad urbana” de manera de estimular la ocupación de lotes disponibles en las regiones donde ya exista una infraestructura apropiada, y de suprimir el crecimiento urbano en aquellas carentes de dicha infraestructura.

El estudio también recomienda establecer políticas urbanas en tierra vacante mediante políticas fiscales. A este respecto, algunas de las ideas discutidas sugieren ampliar la base y los instrumentos impositivos; incorporar mecanismos de aumento de la recuperación de las inversiones públicas urbanas (“captura de plusvalías”); aplicar una política progresiva de impuestos sobre bienes raíces a fin de desalentar la retención de tierras por parte de propietarios pudientes; y fomentar una mayor flexibilidad en el sistema impositivo municipal.

Estas políticas deben vincularse a otros mecanismos diseñados para frenar la expansión de la tierra vacante y la dinámica de segregación y estratificación social geográfica. Tales mecanismos podrían incluir la concesión de subsidios o créditos a bajo interés para la adquisición de materiales de construcción; la asistencia técnica para la construcción de viviendas; el establecimiento de redes de infraestructura para reducir los costos; y los créditos o períodos de para el pago de impuestos, y tarifas de servicio a la propiedad.

Otras propuestas sugieren desarrollar programas piloto de transferencia de tierras mediante sociedades público-privadas para construir en terrenos que sean propiedad del gobierno, a fin de estimular la creación de viviendas a precios accesibles. También recomiendan reutilizar algunas tierras para producción agrícola y prestar mayor atención a los factores ambientales, con la meta de asegurar la futura sustentabilidad urbana.

Nora Clichevsky, investigadora del CONICET (Buenos Aires, Argentina), es la coordinadora del proyecto de estudio de tierra vacante en seis ciudades latinoamericanas, cuyos integrantes se reunieron en agosto de 1998 para discutir sus hallazgos. Contribuyó a este artículo Laura Mullahy, asistente de investigación del Programa Latinoamericano del Instituto Lincoln.

Otros miembros del grupo de investigación fueron Julio Calderón (Lima, Perú); Diego Carrión y Andrea Carrión, miembros de CIUDAD (Quito, Ecuador); Fernanda Furtado y Fabrizio Leal de Oliveira, de la Universidad de Rio de Janeiro (Brasil); Mario Lungo y Francisco Oporto, de la Universidad Centroamericana (El Salvador); y Patricio Larraín del Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo de Chile.

Notas

1. La traducción para el término vacant land varía según país. Otras traducciones posibles incluyen: terrenos baldíos, predios baldíos, tierras desocupadas, tierras disponibles, terrenos libres, terrenos vacíos, terrenos desocupados, sitios eriazos. En este artículo se usa tierra vacante, la traducción más frecuentemente ocupada en los programas del Instituto Lincoln.

2. El Plan de Regulación para el área metropolitana de Santiago tiene la meta de aumentar la densidad promedio de la ciudad en un 50 por ciento, mientras que ciertas reformas a la Ley de Rentas hechas en 1995 imponen un impuesto predial a las tierras no edificadas con objeto de desalentar la especulación de la tierra.

Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 6 del libro Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.

La descentralización del estado, el crecimiento de las empresas y la participación comunitaria en los asuntos públicos, están presentando nuevos retos para el desarrollo de las instituciones enfocadas en las políticas de tierras y su implementación en a través de América Latina. Los alcaldes y consejos locales están asumiendo nuevas responsabilidades en las áreas de protección ambiental, transporte urbano, infraestructura básica, financiamiento local, servicios sociales y desarrollo económico. Al mismo tiempo, las empresas y organizaciones civiles encuentran nuevas vías para asegurar la atención pública de sus exigencias mediante el urbanismo participativo, la administración de presupuestos, la cofinanciación y el control a nivel local.

De este modo, la descentralización y participación democrática están construyendo un medio en el cual las alianzas publico-privadas pueden desarrollar proyectos conjuntos de interés común tanto para individuos como para el gobierno. Sin embargo, a muchas instituciones les falta mucho para adaptarse totalmente a sus nuevos papeles de planificación, regulación y evaluación.

Las culturas de apatía y desconfianza hacia el gobierno arraigadas desde hace mucho tiempo, deben transformarse en una confianza común capaz de movilizar las mejores tradiciones comunitarias de los latinoamericanos. El patronazgo político y económico y la corrupción del estado, deben reemplazarse por responsabilidad política y administrativa. Leyes municipales, de contratación y de administración obsoletas aún restringen la capacidad tanto de los gobiernos locales como de la sociedad civil de interactuar creativamente por medio de arreglos contractuales y de cofinanciación.

Los retos institucionales y los dilemas de políticas que actualmente enfrenta el Área Metropolitana de San Salvador (AMSS) ilustran las transformaciones que ocurren a lo largo de la región. Después de años de guerra civil, los salvadoreños firmaron un acuerdo de paz en 1992 que proporcionó un marco de competencia real entre los partidos políticos y estimuló una participación más activa por parte de las empresas, las organizaciones no gubernamentales (ONGs) y las organizaciones comunitarias. La AMSS comprende varias municipalidades, algunas de ellas dirigidas por alcaldes de partidos de oposición al gobierno central. El cuerpo coordinador del AMSS es el Consejo de Alcaldes, que a su vez es dirigido por la Oficina Metropolitana de Planificación.

Con asistencia técnica de ONGs internacionales, la AMSS ha preparado un plan integral de desarrollo. Instrumentos contemporáneos de planificación urbana tales como la macrozonificación, los impuestos a la propiedad de tasa variable, la recuperación de plusvalías para la protección del medio ambiente, los consorcios público-privados y los coeficientes de uso de suelo están siendo considerados en la implementación de políticas de tierra, de desarrollo y de protección del medio ambiente. De hecho, los salvadoreños tienen el apoyo de varios centros de investigación que están familiarizados con el uso e impacto de estos y otros instrumentos en otras partes del mundo. Actualmente, su necesidad fundamental es movilizar a los protagonistas metropolitanos, tanto públicos como privados, en dirección a políticas comunes y desarrollar instrumentos compartidos para su aplicación.

Cerca del final, PRISMA, una prominente ONG salvadoreña y centro urbano de investigación, invitó al Instituto Lincoln a desarrollar un taller conjunto sobre herramientas de administración urbana, mecanismos de coordinación intergubernamental para áreas metropolitanas e iniciativas público-privadas para ciudades sustentables. El taller, llevado a cabo en El Salvador en octubre, contó con la participación de representantes de alta jerarquía en el gobierno central, así como alcaldes, funcionarios de planificación y otras autoridades del AMSS; así como representantes de asociaciones de construcción y desarrollo y algunas instituciones y organizaciones comunitarias.

Los oradores del Instituto Lincoln presentaron experiencias de Taiwan, Filipinas, México y otros países de América Latina que destacaron las políticas e instrumentos capaces de armonizar los intereses de diversos inversionistas urbanos y coordinar varios niveles de gobierno para el uso de la tierra y objetivos de desarrollo urbano. Los salvadoreños explicaron sus preocupaciones inmediatas, como la falta de coordinación intergubernamental para proteger el ambiente urbano, las discontinuidades en las medidas políticas, arbitrariedades a todos los niveles del gobierno e incertidumbres legales y administrativas.

Los participantes del taller concluyeron que para fomentar el nuevo marco legal e institucional que busca el AMSS, los salvadoreños necesitan ampliar las discusiones a otros protagonistas urbanos. También necesitan continuar trabajando con instituciones como el Instituto Lincoln, que tienen la confianza y credibilidad para presentar políticas de administración de tierra reconocidas internacionalmente y pueden ayudar a construir consenso entre intereses públicos y privados.

Mario Lungo es investigador en PRISMA, el Programa Salvadoreño de Investigación y Medio Ambiente; Alejandra Mortarini es la directora de los programas para Latinoamérica y el Caribe del Instituto Lincoln; y el abogado colombiano Fernando Rojas, es miembro visitante del instituto este año.