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Vacant land and its integration into the urban land market are topics rarely investigated in Latin America. The existing literature tends to focus only on descriptive aspects (i.e., number and size of lots). In the current context of profound economic and social transformations and changing supply and demand patterns of land in cities, the perception of vacant land is beginning to change from being a problem to offering an opportunity.
A comparative study of vacant land in six Latin American cities (Buenos Aires, Argentina; Lima, Peru; Quito, Ecuador; Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; San Salvador, El Salvador; and Santiago, Chile) was recently completed as part of an ongoing Lincoln Institute-sponsored research project. The participating researchers examined different categories of vacant land, the problems they generate and their potential uses, as well as the changing roles of both private and public agents, including governments, in the management of vacant land. They concluded that vacant land is an integral element of the complex land markets in these cities, affecting fiscal policies on land and housing. Thus, vacant land has great potential for large-scale developments that could result in improved conditions for urban areas, as well as reduced social polarization and greater equity for their populations.
The six cities in the study vary in size but share the common attributes of rapid population growth and territorial expansion. They also have comparable social indicators (high rates of poverty, unemployment and underemployment), significant deficits in housing and provision of services, and high levels of geographical social stratification and segregation. The land markets in each of the cities also have similar characteristics, although they exhibit their own dynamics in each sub-market.
Characteristics of Vacant Land
The four primary characteristics of vacant land considered in this research project are ownership, quantity, location and length of vacancy. In general, vacant land in Latin America is held by one or more of the following agents, each with their respective policies: real estate developers or sub-dividers (both legal and illegal); low-income people who have acquired land, but cannot afford to develop it; real estate speculators; farmers; state enterprises; and other institutions such as the church, the military, social security, etc.
Determining how much vacant land exists in each city depends on the definition given to the term in the respective country . Quantifying vacant land is further complicated by the numerous obstacles that exist to obtaining accurate information, thus limiting the possibility of comparing data and percentages across metropolitan areas. Finally, in several of these cities (San Salvador, Santiago and Buenos Aires) there are significant “latent” vacant areas. These are unused or marginally used buildings, often previously occupied by former state-owned companies, waiting for new investments in order to be demolished or redeveloped.
In these six cities, the percentage of vacant land ranges from under 5 percent in San Salvador to nearly 44 percent in Rio de Janeiro. If all of San Salvador’s “latent” vacant areas were included, the percentage of vacant land could increase to 40 percent of the total metropolitan area. On the whole, vacant land in the cities accounts for a significant percentage of serviced areas that could potentially house considerable numbers of people who currently have no access to serviced urban land.
The location of vacant land is relatively uniform throughout the region. Whereas in the United States vacant land tends to be centrally located (such as abandoned areas or industrial brownfield sites), in Latin America the majority of vacant sites lie in the outskirts of the cities. These areas are frequently associated with speculation and retention strategies for occupation based on the provision of services. In contrast, the length of time land has been vacant differs considerably: in Lima and Quito, vacant urban lots are relatively “new,” whereas in Buenos Aires some urban lots have remained vacant for several decades.
Policy Issues and Development Potential
An evaluation of the urban-environmental conditions of vacant land concludes that a significant number of sites could tolerate residential or productive activities. These areas currently constitute an underutilized resource and should be considered for investments in urban infrastructure to improve land use efficiency. An equally significant segment, however, has important risk factors: inadequate basic infrastructure; water polluted by industrial waste; risk of flood, erosion or earthquake; and poor accessibility. Such land is inappropriate for occupation unless significant investments are made to safeguard against these environmental problems. Some land in this category could have great potential for environmental protection, although consciousness about land conservation remains a low priority in Latin America.
The study asserts that, in general, the urban poor have little access to vacant land due to high land values, despite the fact that values do vary according to sub-market. Prices are high in areas of dynamic urban expansion that offer better accessibility and services. A large amount of vacant land in several of the cities studied is not on the market and will likely remain vacant for an indefinite period of time. It is in these areas, the researchers contend, that policies should be implemented to reduce the price of serviced vacant land to make it more accessible to the poor.
The majority of Latin American cities have no explicit policies or legal framework regarding vacant land. In those cities where some legislation does exist, such as Rio de Janeiro, it is basically limited to recommendations and lacks real initiatives. In Santiago, recent legislation has promoted increased density in urban areas, yet it is too soon to know the implications of these measures. References to the environment are also generally lacking in “urban” legislation. Vacant land could play an important role in urban sustainability. However, reaching this potential would depend on better articulation between environmental and planning actions, especially at the local level.
Another characteristic common to the areas studied, with the exception of Santiago, is that urban development policy and specific land market policies have been disconnected from tax policy. Even in those cities where there is a distinction in taxation on vacant versus built land-such as Buenos Aires or Quito-it has not translated into any real changes. Sanctions and higher taxes on vacant areas have largely been avoided through a series of loopholes and “exceptions.”
Proposals and Criteria for Implementation
Arguing for an increased government role in land markets in combination with institution-building and capacity-building among other involved actors, the study formulates a number of proposals for the use and reuse of vacant land in Latin America. An overriding proposal is that vacant land should be incorporated into the city’s overall policy framework, taking into account the diversity of vacant land situations. Land use policies to increase the number of green areas, build low-income housing and provide needed infrastructure should be implemented as part of a framework of urban planning objectives. Furthermore, vacant land should be used to promote “urban rationality” by stimulating the occupation of vacant lots in areas with existing infrastructure and repressing urban growth in areas without appropriate infrastructure.
Urban policy objectives on vacant land should also be pursued through tax policy. Some suggestions formulated in this regard are the broadening of the tax base and tax instruments; incorporating mechanisms for value capture in urban public investment; application of a progressive property tax policy (to discourage land retention by high-income owners); and greater flexibility in the municipal tax apparatus.
These policies should be linked to other mechanisms designed to deter the expansion of vacant land and the dynamic of geographical social stratification and segregation. Such related mechanisms might include the granting of low-interest credits or subsidies for the purchase of building materials; technical assistance for construction of housing; provision of infrastructure networks to reduce costs; and credits or grace periods for payment of closing costs, taxes and service fees on property.
Other proposals address the development of pilot programs for land transfers using public-private partnerships to build on government-owned land in order to promote social housing at affordable rates; reuse of some land for agricultural production; and greater attention to environmental issues, with the goal of assuring urban sustainability in the future.
The 1994 Regulatory Plan for the Santiago metropolitan area defined a goal of elevating the city’s average density by 50 percent, while 1995 reforms to the Ley de Rentas introduced a fee on non-edified land and a disincentive to land speculation.
Nora Clichevsky is a researcher with CONICET, the National Council for Scientific and Technical Research in Buenos Aires, Argentina. She is the coordinator of the six-city study of vacant land in Latin America, which met to discuss these findings in August 1998. Laura Mullahy, a research assistant with the Lincoln Institute’s Latin American Program, contributed to this article.
Other members of the research team are Julio Calderón of Lima, Peru; Diego Carrión and Andrea Carrión of CIUDAD in Quito, Ecuador; Fernanda Furtado and Fabrizio Leal de Oliveira of the University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; Mario Lungo and Francisco Oporto of the Central American University in El Salvador; and Patricio Larraín of the Chilean Ministry of Housing and Urbanism.
In the next phase of this project, the Lincoln Institute will sponsor a seminar on vacant land this spring in Río de Janeiro, with the participation of the original researchers as well as other experts from each of the cities involved.
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Decentralization of the state and growing business and community involvement in civic affairs are posing new challenges to the development of institutions focused on land policies and their implementation throughout Latin America. Mayors and local councils are assuming new responsibilities in the areas of environmental protection, urban transportation, basic infrastructure, local financing, social services and economic development. At the same time, business and civic organizations are finding new avenues to ensure public attention to their demands through participatory planning, budgeting, co-financing and control at the local level.
Thus, decentralization and democratic participation are gradually building an environment in which public-private alliances can develop joint projects of common interest to both government and individuals. However, many government institutions have a long way to go before they are fully adjusted to their new roles in planning, regulation and evaluation.
Long-entrenched cultures of apathy and citizen distrust of government have to be transformed into mutual confidence capable of mobilizing the best community traditions of the Latin American people. Political and economic patronage and state corruption need to be superseded by political and administrative accountability. Obsolete budget, contract and municipal laws still restrict the capacity of both local governments and civil society to interact creatively through contractual and co-financing arrangements.
The institutional challenges and policy dilemmas currently confronted by the Metropolitan Area of San Salvador (MASS) illustrate the transformations occurring throughout the region. After years of civil war, the Salvadorans signed a peace agreement in 1992 that provided the framework for real competition among political parties and stimulated more active participation by business, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and community organizations. MASS incorporates several municipalities, some of them led by mayors from opposition parties to the central government. The coordinating body of MASS is the Council of Mayors, which in turn is supported by a Metropolitan Planning Office.
With technical assistance from international NGOs, MASS has prepared a comprehensive development plan. Contemporary urban planning instruments such as macrozoning, multi-rate property tax, value capture for environmental protection, public-private consortiums and land use coefficients are being considered for the implementation of land, development and environmental policies. Indeed, the Salvadorans have the support of several research centers that are familiar with the use and impact of these and other instruments in other parts of the world. Their primary need now is to mobilize public and private metropolitan actors around common policies and to develop shared instruments for their application.
Toward that end, PRISMA, a prominent Salvadoran NGO and urban research center, invited the Lincoln Institute to develop a joint workshop on urban management tools, intergovernmental coordinating mechanisms for metropolitan areas and public-private initiatives for sustainable cities. The workshop, held in San Salvador in October, included high-ranking officers from the central government, mayors, planning officers and other authorities from MASS, and representatives from builders’ and developers’ associations and some cooperative housing institutions and community organizations.
Speakers from the Lincoln Institute presented experiences from Taiwan, The Philippines, Mexico and other Latin American countries that underlined policies and instruments capable of harmonizing the interests of different urban stakeholders and coordinating several layers of government for land use and urban development objectives. The Salvadorans explained their immediate concerns, such as the lack of intergovernmental coordination to protect the urban environment, discontinuities in policy measures, arbitrariness at all levels of government, and legal and administrative uncertainties.
The workshop participants concluded that to foster the new legal and institutional framework sought by MASS the Salvadorans need to expand discussions among other metropolitan actors. They also need to continue to work with institutions such as the Lincoln Institute that have the trust and credibility to present internationally recognized land management policies and can help build consensus among different public and private interests.
Mario Lungo is a researcher at PRISMA, the Salvadoran Program for Development and Environmental Research; Alejandra Mortarini is the Lincoln Institute’s Latin America and Caribbean programs manager; and Fernando Rojas, a lawyer from Colombia, is a visiting fellow of the Institute this year.
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Water companies and the communities they serve have been grappling for years with complex issues of water treatment and provision, watershed management, public finance and control over regional land use decisionmaking. The federal Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974 prompted water providers across America to face a dilemma: “to filter or not to filter.” Some states or regions require filtration to ensure water quality, but elsewhere communities explore alternative strategies to both protect natural filtration processes in their watersheds and avoid the enormous costs of installing water treatment plants.
The hard-fought conversion of the New Haven Water Company from a private, investor-owned company to a public regional water authority provides an informative case study of a partnership strategy. In the process of hammering out agreements on difficult land use and tax issues, the city and surrounding suburbs succeeded in breaking down conventional barriers and recognized that regional solutions can meet shared needs for a safe water supply, open space protection, recreation and fiscal responsibility.
The drama unfolded in 1974, when the Water Company attempted to sell over 60 percent of its 26,000 acres of land in 17 metropolitan area towns to generate capital for filtration plant construction. The announcement of this massive land sale created vehement opposition throughout the state. Residents of the affected towns viewed the largely undeveloped land as an integral part of their community character. They feared losing control of the land as well as environmental damage and increased costs associated with potential new development.
Several New Haven area legislators recognized the critical link between the city and its watershed communities. They introduced legislation imposing a moratorium on the land sale and proposing public ownership of the water works. New Haven Mayor Frank Logue countered with an announcement that the city planned to buy the water company under a purchase option in a 1902 contract. The suburban towns responded by promoting regional ownership as the only viable alternative to city control.
After a lengthy feasibility study, and despite a gubernatorial veto, legislation enabling the creation of the South Central Connecticut Regional Water Authority (RWA) was enacted in 1977. In addition, separate legislation classified all utility-owned watershed land and severely restricted its sale. The sale restrictions combined with standards for source protection, provisions for public recreation and consideration of the financial impact on ratepayers, also diminished the land’s market value, thereby limiting the Water Company’s ability to use the land as a source of capital.
Regionalization of the Water Company also required a regional approach to taxation. This was the most difficult obstacle to overcome in passing the RWA enabling legislation. With New Haven Water Company’s projected capital investments in excess of $100 million, the region’s towns had looked ahead to vastly increased tax revenues from the private utility. However, New Haven, with the majority of consumers, was more concerned with keeping water rates low.
The conflict between city and suburbs was resolved through the principle that the regionalization of the water utility would cause no erosion of the tax base. Under the agreement, each town would receive payments in lieu of taxes (PILOTs) on all property acquired by the RWA, equivalent to the taxes that would be paid by a private owner. However, while these payments would rise and fall with future assessments, the RWA would not be required to make such tax-substitution payments for any new capital improvements.
Lessons of Regional Resource Sharing
In addition to forcing a reconsideration of the balance between suburban tax bases and urban water rates, New Haven’s Regional Water Authority has broadened its own mission. While protecting the water supply is the primary focus of all RWA land use policies, the authority also manages recreational use of the land to meet the needs of both inner city and suburban residents.
The early success of the conservation and recreational use plans depended on public participation in formulating the RWA Land Use Plan. Many types of active recreation would have been unsuitable for water supply land, but it was determined that hiking and fishing, the two most popular activities, could be conducted without threatening water quality.
The RWA’s active program for policing the watersheds was reinforced by establishing a center to educate future consumers on water supply protection. Located at the base of the dam at Lake Whitney, the Whitney Water Center annually teaches thousands of children the basics of drinking water science. It emphasizes the interdependence of source protection and safe drinking water.
Primary among the lessons to be learned from the New Haven Water Company’s ill-advised land sale proposal is that the value of a water supply watershed as a natural and human resource is far greater than its value as a market commodity. Management of the watershed’s natural resource potential must extend beyond the collection and distribution of water to include the needs of the people who live within the watershed. At the same time, limiting watershed land activities to low-risk uses minimizes the water treatment costs that are still necessary for safe drinking water.
Regional cooperation need not begin and end with water. Developing economic and ecological partnerships between cities and their suburbs for tax-sharing, recreation, and education recognizes that the economic and ecological concerns of all residents in a metropolitan region are interdependent. Successfully bucking the trend toward privatization, the RWA demonstrates that regional resource sharing is the most viable way of meeting the needs of New Haven and its suburbs.
Watershed Protection vs. Filtration in Other Regions
The public acquisition of the New Haven Water Company in the 1970s provided a preview of 1990s approaches to managing water resources. Today, water supply management is increasingly becoming watershed management, with plans reflecting the broader ecological functions of watersheds and the importance of partnerships with local residents. Conflict resolution has become an essential skill for today’s watershed managers.
Watershed land acquisition continues to be a key filtration avoidance strategy in many areas. New York City has the nation’s largest unfiltered water supply, and some experts have called on the city to develop programs to filter its drinking water. However, New York Governor George E. Pataki has taken the position he would “do whatever it takes to avoid filtration,” from working with farmers and businesses on mutually beneficial voluntary programs to buying up to 80,000 acres from willing sellers to protect the water supply.
New Jersey Governor Christine Todd Whitman has committed to a “hands across the border” $10 million contribution toward purchasing the New York portion of the two-state metropolitan watershed in Sterling Forest, which is threatened with commercial recreational and housing development. The nonprofit Trust for Public Land and the Open Space Institute are negotiating the purchase on behalf of both states, and recent congressional action has guaranteed funding for the project.
In central Massachusetts, the Metropolitan District Commission’s Quabbin Reservoir has met the Safe Drinking Water Act’s criteria as an unfiltered water supply source for the Boston area, but the MDC’s Wachusett Reservoir has not. A recently approved $399 million state open space bond includes funds for land acquisition in the Wachusett watershed.
Acknowledging the essential function that undeveloped land serves in preventing contaminants from reaching water supplies is long overdue. But is watershed source protection alone a viable alternative to filtration?
In North Carolina, where all surface water supplies are already filtered, state legislation requires local water authorities to develop watershed land use plans that must be approved by the state. Although such legislation can reduce the health risks of watershed development and the cost of water treatment, it cannot prevent future development.
Our conclusion is that the combination of watershed protection and filtration is a proven, cost effective approach to ensure safe drinking water while also building partnerships to implement regional land use policies.
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Dorothy S. McCluskey was a Connecticut State Representative from 1975 to 1982 and chaired the Environment Subcommittee on the Sale of Water Company Land. She subsequently served as director of government relations for The Nature Conservancy Connecticut Chapter. Claire C. Bennitt, secretary-treasurer of the Regional Water Authority since 1977, was a resident of North Branford when the threatened land sale galvanized the New Haven region. She worked with Rep. McCluskey as her administrative assistant in the state legislature. They have written Who Wants to Buy a Water Company: From Private to Public Control in New Haven, to be published in early 1997 by Rutledge Books, Inc., of Bethel, Connecticut.
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As a part of the educational activities of the Lincoln Institute’s Latin America Program, a course on “Large Urban Projects,” held in Cambridge last June, focused on the most important and challenging aspects of this land planning issue. Academics, public officials and representatives from private enterprises in 17 cities participated in the presentations and discussions. This article presents a synthesis of the principal points, questions and challenges raised in carrying out these complex projects.
Large urban redevelopment projects have become an important issue in many Latin American countries recently, due in part to changes motivated by the processes of globalization, deregulation and the introduction of new approaches in urban planning. These projects include varied types of interventions, but they are characterized primarily by their large size and scale, which challenge traditional instruments of urban management and financing.
Urban projects on a grand scale are not considered a novelty in Latin America. The diverse elements of existing developments include the revitalization of historic centers; conversion of abandoned industrial facilities, military areas, airports or train stations; large slum rehabilitation projects; and construction of innovative public transportation models. However, at least four important features characterize this new type of intervention:
The last feature is reinforced by the influence of different planning strategies and the impacts of large urban projects in various cities around the world (Powell 2000). One project that has influenced many city planners and officials in Latin America was the transformation of Barcelona in preparation for the Olympic Games in 1992 (Borja 1995). Several projects in Latin America have been inspired by, if not directly emulated, this approach (Carmona and Burgess 2001), but it also has faced serious criticism (Arantes, Vainer and Maricato 2000). It has been seen as a convenient process through which a group of decision makers or private interest stakeholders manage to bypass official planning and policy channels that are seen to be too dependent on the public (democratic) debate. As a result most such projects tend to be either elitist, because they displace low-income neighborhoods with gentrified and segregated upper-class land uses, or are socially exclusionary, because they develop single-class projects, either low-income settlements or high-income enclaves, in peripheral locations.
Large-scale projects raise new questions, make inherent contradictions more transparent, and challenge those responsible for urban land analysis and policy formulation. Of special importance are the new forms of management, regulation, financing and taxation that are required for or result from the execution of these projects, and in general the consequences for the functioning of land markets.
Size, Scale and Timeframe
The first issue that emerges from a discussion of large-scale projects has to do with the ambiguity of the term and the necessity of defining its validity. Size is a quantitative dimension, but scale suggests complex interrelations involving socioeconomic and political impacts. The wide variety of feelings evoked by large projects shows the limitations in being able to restore a vision of the urban whole and at the same time its global character (Ingallina 2001). This issue has just begun to be discussed in Latin America, and it is framed in the transition to a new approach in urban planning, which is related to the possibility and even the necessity of constructing a typology and indicators for its analysis. Issues such as the emblematic character of these projects, their role in stimulating other urban processes, the involvement of many actors, and the significance of the impacts on the life and development of the city are all part of the discussions. Nevertheless, it is the scale, understood as being more than just simple physical dimensions, that is the central core of this theme.
Since the scale of these projects is associated with complex urban processes that combine continuity and changes over the medium and long terms, the timeframe of their execution must be conceived accordingly. Many of the failures in the implementation of such projects have to do with the lack of a managing authority that would be free or protected from the political volatility of local administrations over time.
The cases of Puerto Madero in Buenos Aires and Fenix in Montevideo, the first completed and the second in process, offer examples of the difficulties in managing the scale and timing of development in the context of economic situations and policies that can change drastically. Twelve years after its construction, Puerto Madero has not yet stimulated other large-scale projects, such as the renovation of nearby Avenida de Mayo, nor appreciable transformations in urban norms.
The scale and timeframe are particularly important for the project in Montevideo, raising doubts about the feasibility of executing a project of this scale in relation to the character of the city, its economy, and other priorities and policies of the country. Its goal was to generate a “work of urban impact,” in this case promotion of public, private and mixed investments in a neighborhood that lost 18.4 percent of its population between 1985 and 1996, and focusing on an emblematic building, the old General Artigas train station. Most of this work has been executed, with a loan of $28 million from the Inter-American Development Bank, however the percentage of public and private investments are minimal and the Fenix project is having to compete with another large-scale corporate-commercial development located east of the city that is already attracting important firms and enterprises.
Land Policy Issues
The issue of scale relates intrinsically to the role of urban land, which makes one ask if land (including its value, uses, ownership and other factors) should be considered a key variable in the design and management of large-scale urban operations, since the feasibility and success of these projects are often associated with the internalization of formidable externalities often reflected in the cost and management of the land.
Projects to restore historic centers offer important lessons to be considered here. We can compare the cases of Old Havana, where land ownership is completely in the hands of the state, which has permitted certain activities to expand, and Lima, where land ownership is divided among many private owners and public sector agencies, adding to the difficulties in completing an ongoing restoration project. Even though Old Havana has received important financial cooperation from Europe and Lima has a $37 million loan from the Inter-American Development Bank, the main challenge is to promote private investment while also maintaining programs of social and economic assistance for the local residents. Both cities have created special units for the management of these projects, which constitutes an interesting commentary on institutional modernization.
The Role of the State
The scale, the time dimension and the role of land in large urban projects lead us to consider the role of the state and public investment. While urban operations on a large scale are not new in Latin American cities, their present conditions have been affected radically by economic changes, political crises and substantial modifications in the role of the state in general. These conditions make the execution of urban projects, as part of the process of long-term urban development, a source of contradictions with the generally short tenure of municipal governments and the limits of their territorial claims. We must also consider the differences in regulatory competencies between central governments and local municipalities, and the differences between public entities and private institutions or local community organizations, which often reflect conflicting interests due the decentralization and privatization processes being promoted simultaneously in many countries.
Two large projects related to transportation infrastructure are examples of local situations that led to very different results. One was the transformation of the old abandoned Cerrillos airport in Santiago, Chile, and the other was a project for a new airport for Mexico City in Texcoco, an area known as ejido land occupied by peasants and their descendants. In the first case, the active participation of interested groups is expanding the recuperation process of a zone of the city that does not have quality urban facilities. A total investment of $36 million from the public sector and $975 million from the private sector is supporting the construction of malls, facilities for education, health and recreation, and housing for the neighborhood. In Mexico serious conflicts between state interests and community rights to the land had caused social unrest and even the kidnapping of public officials. As a result, the federal government has recently withdrawn from the Texcoco project, assuming huge political and economic costs for this decision.
Segregation and Exclusion
Many planners and practitioners have doubts about the feasibility of large projects in poor countries and cities because of the distortions that their execution could cause on future development, in particular the reinforcing tendencies of segregation and social exclusiveness. The diminishing capacity of the state to look for new alternatives for financing socially beneficial projects through private capital, principally from international sources, adds to the doubts about their success. Many large-scale projects are seen as the only alternative or the unavoidable cost that the city or society has to pay to generate an attractive environment in a context of growing competition among cities for a limited number of external investors.
A key matter with respect to the use of public space generated by these projects is to avoid segregation of space and people. Special attention must be given to protect the inhabitants of the zones where the large urban projects are developed from the negative consequences of gentrification. This is without a doubt one of the most difficult aspects of large urban projects. Table 1 shows the most important aspects and the principal challenges that arise from an analysis of the large urban projects. Effectively, the integration of projects of this scope calls for a vision of the city that avoids the creation of islands of modernity isolated in the middle of poor areas, which would contribute to the process called the dualism of the city, or the generation of new exclusive urban centers.
Table 1: Aspects and Challenges of Large Urban Projects
| Aspects | Challenges |
|---|---|
| Urban grid | Integrate the project into the existing city fabric |
| Planning process | Design the project to be compatible with the established approach to city planning strategies |
| Urbanistic norms and regulations | Avoid the creation of norms giving privileges of exclusiveness to the project |
| Stakeholders | Incorporate all participants involved directly, in particular the not so easily identifiable groups indirectly affected by these projects |
| Financing | Establish innovative public and private partnerships |
| Social, economic and urban impacts | Develop effective ways to measure and assess various types of impacts and ways to mitigate the negative effects |
Two cases in different political-economic contexts help us reflect about this matter. One is the El Recreo project, planned by Metrovivienda, in Bogotá. Although presenting innovative proposals about the use and management of the land in a large project for popular housing, the project has not been able to guarantee the integration of social groups with different income levels. In the Corredor Sur area of Panama City large zones are being planned for the construction of residences, but the result again serves primarily medium- and high-income sectors. Thus in both a decentralized and a centralized country the general norms that provoke residential segregation cannot seem to prevent negative consequences for the poorest sectors of society.
In view of all this, large urban projects should not be seen as an alternative approach to obsolete plans or rigid norms like zoning. They could instead be presented as a kind of intermediate-scale planning, as an integrated approach that addresses the needs of the whole city and avoids physical and social separations and the creation of norms that permit exclusive privileges. Only in this way can large-scale projects take their place as new instruments for urban planning. The positive effects of specific elements such as the quality of architecture and urban design are valuable in these projects if they operate as a benchmark and are distributed with equity throughout the city.
Public Benefits
Large-scale projects are public projects by the nature of their importance and impact, but that does not mean they are the total property of the state. Nevertheless, the complexity of the participant networks involved directly or indirectly, the variety of interests and the innumerable contradictions inherent in large projects require a leading management role by the public sector. The territorial scale of these operations especially depends on the support of the municipal governments, which in Latin America often lack the technical resources to manage such projects. Local support can guarantee a reduction of negative externalities and the involvement of weaker participants, generally local actors, through a more just distribution of the benefits, where the regulation of the use and taxation of the land is a key issue. Such is the intention of the Municipality of Santo Andre in Sao Paulo in the design of the extraordinarily complex Tamanduatehy project. It involves the reuse of an enormous tract of land previously occupied by railroad facilities and neighboring industrial plants that fled this once vigorous industrial belt of Sao Paulo to relocate in the hinterland. The project involves establishing a viable locus of new activities, mostly services and high-tech industries, capable of replacing the economic base of that region.
Beyond creating and marketing the image of the project, it is important to achieve social legitimacy through a combination of public and private partners engaged in joint ventures, the sale or renting of urban land, compensation for direct private investment, regulation, or even public recovery (or recapture) of costs and/or of unearned land value increments. Active public management is also necessary, since the development of the city implies common properties and benefits, not only economic interests. Analysis of economic and financial costs, and opportunity costs, are also important to avoid the failure of these projects.
Conclusions
The basic components in the pre-operational stage of executing large urban projects can be summarized as follows:
An adequate analysis of the trade-offs (economic, political, social, environmental, and others) is indispensable, even if it is clear that the complex problems of the contemporary city cannot be solved with large interventions alone. It is important to reiterate that more importance must be given to the institutionalization and legitimacy of the final plans and agreements than simply the application of legal norms.
The presentations and discussions at the course on “Large Urban Projects” show that the matter of urban land strongly underlies all the aspects and challenges described above. Land in this type of project presents a huge complexity and offers a great opportunity; the challenge is how to navigate between the interests and conflicts when there are many owners and stakeholders of the land. It is necessary to combat the temptation to believe that modern urban planning is the sum of large projects. Nevertheless, these projects can contribute to building a shared image of the city between the inhabitants and the users. This topic clearly has facets that have not been completely explored yet and that need continued collaborative analysis and by academics, policy makers and citizens.
Mario Lungo is executive director of the Office of Planning of the Metropolitan Area of San Salvador (OPAMSS) in El Salvador. He is also a professor and researcher at the Central American University José Simeón Cañas.
References
Borja, Jordi. 1995. Un modelo de transformación urbana. Quito, Peru: Programa de Gestion Urbana.
Carmona, Marisa and Rod Burgess. 2001. Strategic Planning and Urban Projects. Delft: Delft University Press.
Ingallina, Patrizia. 2001. Le Projet Urbain. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Powell, Kenneth. 2000. La transformación de la ciudad. Barcelona: Ediciones Blume.
Arantes, Otilia, Carlos Vainer e Erminia Maricato. 2000. A cidade do pensamento unico. Petrópolis: Editora Vozes.
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Over the last 50 years cities have been the scene of major transformations that have allowed them to evolve from being centers primarily for economic activities to a combination of more specialized productive, commercial and service functions. The results are mixed, but in those cities considered most successful, beauty and humanism have managed to coexist with economic efficiency and effectiveness, significantly increasing the creation of wealth and the well-being of the community at large. In this context, developments known as “large urban projects” seek to rescue dilapidated areas such as historic centers, former industrial and military zones, vacant railroads and airports, and decaying housing settlements and transform them into vibrant residential areas able to generate tax revenues, employment, and public and social benefits to enhance quality of life.
The redevelopment of waterfronts creates tremendous opportunities to reintegrate historic city centers with their adjacent waterways and to facilitate growth that would otherwise move to the outskirts of the city. Many concerns have to be addressed, however. What type and scale of development are desirable and possible? How can meaningful relationships be established between the old and the new? What are the impacts on the environment and the existing infrastructure? What public policies and investments are needed? What are the roles of the public and private sectors? How do we organize the planning process, including building political and community support?
Amsterdam and Havana are cases where waterfronts provide challenges and opportunities to address this complex balancing act. Both are UNESCO World Heritage Cities dealing with the pressures of profit-driven real estate development and the desire to protect both their historic centers and the interests of their contemporary populations.
In December 2003 the Lincoln Institute, with Havana’s Group for the Development of the Capital (GDIC), the Office of the Historian and the Port Authority of the Ministry of Transportation, cosponsored a seminar in Havana at which waterfront experts from Amsterdam, Rotterdam, New York and Panama shared their experiences with Cuban planners and public officials. This article elaborates on the Amsterdam presentation, in particular how management, experiments, planning and land policies enabled an impressive transformation of that city’s former industrial waterfronts, and offers lessons that may be applicable for Havana.
Planning and Development Policies in the Netherlands
The Netherlands has a well-known tradition of strong national planning and development, precipitated by the housing shortage since World War II. The notion of limited space drives the country’s development policies and its commitment to preserving green and agricultural areas between cities. Housing, infrastructure, retail and office development, environmental protection, agriculture, water management and open space are major concerns at both the national and local levels. With two-thirds of their country below sea level, the Dutch have always pursued new ways of relating to water. National planning policies thus concentrate on facilitating growth in designated areas, controlling urban sprawl and reorganizing inner cities without neglecting major infrastructure and the management and control of green spaces and water bodies.
The Dutch rediscovered the importance of their cities in the 1980s after the rapid growth of suburbs and new towns caused increasing congestion and a lack of livable spaces. The idea of a “compact city” was adopted in the nation’s Fourth Memorandum of Urban Planning (1988), advocating concentration on the urban nexus in order to “redevelop currently abandoned areas.” Typical sites include Rotterdam’s Kop van Zuid and Amsterdam’s Eastern Docklands. The compact city concept was broadened in the 1990s with the notion of the “complete city,” marrying concepts of multiple and intensive land use with the concentration of functions and activities in a melting pot of lifestyles.
The reorganization of transit areas and transport routes is another planning priority that aims to combine different transport functions and discourage the use of cars. Examples include the Airport City plan for the Amsterdam Schiphol Airport and the area around the future high-speed train station Zuidas-WTC. The Zuidas master plan creates enough space over the railway and highway for the construction of 7 million square feet of offices, 1,500 dwellings, retail space, hotels, museums and a new park.
Despite the national government’s plans and ambitions, financial resources determine its role in development projects. The significant decrease in national housing and development subsidies since 1990 has highlighted the strategic importance of the local government in the (re)development process. However, the Amsterdam case also shows that management capacity, reliable development partners and creative financial and development tools are instrumental for redevelopment.
Amsterdam’s Land and Housing Policies
Amsterdam is the cultural and financial capital of the Netherlands and the largest city in the Randstad-Holland or Deltametropolis region of 6 million people. The city has close to 750,000 inhabitants, 375,000 housing units and 417,000 jobs, and has one of the world’s largest conserved historic city centers.
Amsterdam’s land policies are strategic tools in the city’s redevelopment strategies. In 1896 the city democratically decided on a land-lease system to acquire land and lease it to future users. Important arguments for leasing were that increases in land value should benefit the entire community and the city should determine the use of scarce land to prevent speculation and undesirable development.
The land-lease system works as follows. The city’s land corporation acquires land and leases it to private developers for periods of 49 or 99 years. Leaseholders pay an annually adjusted amount for use of the land, determined by location, square feet of development, type of use (office, retail, affordable or market rate housing, open space, etc.), new or existing buildings, and parking (on the street or inside). The city determines the price of land through a residual land value method that links the market value of the property, the land and the construction costs. The value of land equals the sales value of the property minus the construction costs determined by the location (costs are considerably higher in the historic neighborhoods). In 2002 leases totaled 59 million euros.
Acquisition of privately owned land—as in the Eastern Docklands area—is financed through loans to the city’s land corporation, whose interest payments account for 80 percent of its expenses. Excess revenues are used to support the city’s development and rehabilitation efforts, particularly for commercially unprofitable projects such as parks and open space. This system also serves political objectives such as the provision and geographic distribution of affordable housing. In a high-density city like Amsterdam, land is scarce and its use is subject to much real estate pressure. As the landowner the city maintains a strategic role in determining the use, quality and amount of land available for development.
Amsterdam relies on its relationships with the city’s civic and nonprofit development groups for support and implementation of its plans, and the role of housing associations is critical. These associations were created as a result of the housing law of 1901, which allowed for union-related associations and religious organizations to establish nonprofit housing associations. With national subsidies and strong support from local governments, they have built thousands of units, especially in the neighborhoods damaged during the war. In some of these areas over 75 percent of the units is owned by housing associations.
The deregulation of the Dutch housing market in the early 1990s strongly affected the housing associations’ position as both owners and developers. They lost most of the national housing subsidies, but in exchange the government granted them more financial and institutional freedom to manage their assets. As a result, the nonprofit sector had to become more professionalized, and many of the housing associations merged to create economies of scale. Today, Amsterdam counts 13 housing associations that manage over 200,000 units, ranging from 1,400 to 37,500 units each. Many associations successfully positioned themselves as trustworthy and financially stable developers. Moreover, they became strategic partners for commercial developers looking for experts on affordable housing and partners for creating goodwill for their projects with the city and community groups. More and more, they develop mixed-income projects in collaboration with private developers using creative financial packages. In 2000, for example, half of the units built by housing associations were market rate. The resulting profits financed the other half as affordable and moderate-income units.
In an unexpected side effect of the housing reform, these associations have become leaders in setting high standards for urban design and planning. With their commitment to the city and to community development they have been willing to take risks with low-cost but provocative designs, and many of their projects have become international examples for innovative affordable housing concepts.
Waterfront Redevelopment in Amsterdam
Amsterdam is a city founded on water and around a dam that separated the Amstel River from the IJ River. In the seventeenth century, Amsterdam was the world’s most prominent commercial and maritime center. The canals and waterways built in that era still marvel the millions of tourists who visit the city every year. The relationship between the city and its waterfront has not always been organic; mistakes have been made, such as the 1898 decision to build Amsterdam’s central railway station in the middle of the port area. The station effectively ruined the visual relationship and physical connections between the IJ, the port and the dam, destroying the ancient heart of the capital.
In the past 40 years, most port functions have moved closer to the sea to handle container ships, while the large financial institutions moved to the south axis of the city due to a lack of space and poor accessibility. The inner city of Amsterdam, which is adjacent to the old port areas, remains the region’s largest center for retail, culture and entertainment and is well suited for pedestrians, bicyclists and public transportation. Although the port continues to play an important economic role for Amsterdam, the city essentially turned its back to the harbor for many years.
Major areas of Amsterdam are now being converted and rehabilitated, while entirely new areas are being built on artificial islands. The city’s southern and northern waterfront system of old piers and wet docks is becoming an attractive residential and mixed-use district with retail and cultural centers, new transit, parks and waterfront promenades, most of which mix contemporary design with the historic maritime character. The construction of IJburg, an overspill area in the IJsselmeer Lake, is designed to accommodate 45,000 new inhabitants.
Discussion about the redevelopment of the Eastern Docklands and the rest of the southern IJ waterfront began in the early 1980s. Following years of negotiations between the municipality, developers and well-organized community groups, the plan, currently in the final phases of construction, proposed a series of high-density, moderate-rise communities on the water, thus remaking a historic and cultural bond with the water. Housing is the major component of all development on the IJ bank, and 40 percent of it is affordable. In many cases the city’s professional nonprofit housing associations have led the development and encouraged private investment.
The formal planning process for the IJ-waterfront started with a design competition in 1984. Initially the city government endorsed the IJ Boulevard master plan by Rem Koolhaas for the entire 10 km southern waterfront. The redevelopment program incorporated a range of uses, but focused on office development and supporting amenities to stop the exodus of corporations and to finance the proposed infrastructure program. The plan was to be implemented by the Amsterdam Waterfront Finance Company (AWF), a public-private partnership of the city and one master developer/investor with unprecedented authority. Subsequent controversy over the size and cost of the plan, the collapse of the office market in the late 1980s, and growing discontent with the plan among the city’s prominent civic and community groups led to the dismantling of the partnership in 1994.
The city then changed its approach and passed a strategic memorandum titled “Anchors of the IJ” in 1995. This plan proposed to build on the existing island structure with a phased development starting at the outer edges and working toward the Central Station area. This pragmatic and organic approach concentrated the city’s efforts and resources on master plans for smaller and more manageable areas. The development program shifted toward housing with public buildings and squares (the anchors) at strategic locations within a framework of larger infrastructure investments. The national government committed to building a new tunnel in the early phases of the planning process and a light-rail system at a later phase. Urban design and development programs were determined by site potential and strong community input and were modified over time based on experience, new ideas and changing market conditions. Since the city owns the land and thus controls how much land is available for development, it encouraged private developers to team up with nonprofit housing groups to bid for portions of the waterfront. The Amsterdam case underscores the fact that strategy, planning tools, leadership and partners are interdependent and instrumental for redevelopment that benefits the community at large.
Implications for Havana
The uniqueness of Havana’s waterfront makes it a formidable site for innovative and comprehensive redevelopment and for avoiding the mistakes that have spoiled the charm of many other cities around the world. Havana is Cuba’s capital city, home to more than 2 million of the country’s 11 million citizens. Prior to the 1959 revolution Cuba was the leading business and tourist destination in the Caribbean, but its subsequent political isolation and lack of economic development have resulted in a mostly unspoiled historic city now in desperate need of repair. Since the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the subsequent loss of a market for 65 percent of Cuban exports, Havana has focused on attracting investment through real estate ventures. Most joint ventures (350 were active in 2001, worth $2.6 billion) are with Canadian and European companies in the booming hospitality industry. Tourism and related activities again generate much-needed foreign currency, especially in Havana where historic downtown hotels have been upgraded and new office buildings are being built in nearby elegant neighborhoods to the west.
The government recognizes the historic and economic value of Old Havana’s architectural heritage and strongly supports renovation and rehabilitation of its historic buildings and squares. The progress and benefits are impressive, considering the limited public resources and the state of the city’s infrastructure and buildings. The Office of the Historian, the development authority for Old Havana, has stimulated revenues that generated $50 million for social and historic preservation programs in 1999 alone (Nunez, Brown and Smolka 2000).
Havana’s waterfront is considered a key asset for future growth and therefore a key area of concern. The waterfront includes the famous Malecon Boulevard as well as the lesser-known inner-harbor districts on the east side of Old Havana. Along the shores of this bay, historic warehouses and small communities are mixed with decaying infrastructure, port facilities, heavy industry and shipyards. Many different city and state agencies are involved in planning for this vast area, yet no clear development directive has been defined and most players lack the authority to take that role. In response, some agencies have developed plans for individual properties, but implementation is unlikely because there is no funding in place and the oil refineries across the bay produce heavy fumes, which discourage some tourist-oriented activities.
Since land in Havana is publicly owned, capturing the increase of land values could create a strategic and sustainable source for financing much-needed public investments in affordable housing, public space and infrastructure. The local government can lead the redevelopment process; however, support and collaboration with regional and national public partners will be important for larger investments. Flexibility in program and a focus on process instead of blueprint planning is essential to accommodate changing market conditions and emerging opportunities. The latter is especially evident as development depends significantly on private investments.
With its historic beauty, proximity to the United States and lack of development for more than 40 years, Havana draws the attention of developers from throughout the world. It has the potential to become a model livable city that has preserved most of its heritage and is not spoiled by the automobile. It is in the interest of all of us, but especially the Cuban people, to ensure that attention to both high-quality redevelopment and the public interest determines the transformation of Havana’s waterfront.
Frank Uffen is managing director of New Amsterdam Development Consultants in New York. Other Dutch participants in the seminar who contributed to this article are Riek Bakker (partner, BVR Consultancy for Urban Development, Landscape and Infrastructure, Rotterdam), Ad Hereijgers (partner, DE LIJN Office for Urban Development, Amsterdam), Willem van Leuven (project manager, Amsterdam Project Management Bureau) and Rutger Sypkens (project developer, Ballast Nedam Construction, Amsterdam).
Reference
Nunez, Ricardo, H. James Brown, and Martim Smolka. 2000. Using land value to promote development in Cuba. Land Lines 12(2):1–4.
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In the nearly 35 years since Bosselman and Callies (1972) published The Quiet Revolution in Land Use Control, land use policies in states across the nation have continued to change and evolve. The state of Maryland offers a good example. The history of land use policy in Maryland records a variety of conservation, development, and growth management acts, but in 1997 the state burst into the national spotlight with its innovative Smart Growth and Neighborhood Conservation package of land use reforms.
Today, some 10 years later, a new initiative is aiming to take the reform process in Maryland even further. Named Reality Check Plus: Imagine Maryland, this effort is supported in part by the Lincoln Institute, along with other nonprofit organizations, foundations, corporations, and individuals. It remains to be seen how far this effort will go and in what ways it may produce significant policy change, but regardless of the outcome it represents an interesting test of whether a privately led reform initiative can foster land use change at state and local levels.
A Rich Planning History
Maryland has a longstanding reputation as a national leader in land use policy and planning. The historical roots of Maryland’s smart growth program date to 1933, when Maryland established the nation’s first state planning commission. Recent planning history begins with the formation of the Chesapeake Bay Commission in 1980. Although the commission has no explicit land use authority in the signatory states (Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia), its recommendations have been instrumental in shaping land use policy in Maryland. The state’s Critical Area Act of 1984, for example, required local governments to adopt special development regulations within a 1,000-foot buffer of the Bay shoreline, and the Economic Growth, Resource Protection, and Planning Act of 1992 required local governments to address six visions originally outlined in a report prepared for the Chesapeake Executive Council (DeGrove 2005, 254–256).
Although the 1992 Planning Act provided a framework for local comprehensive plans, it failed to stem the tide of urban sprawl, according to the Growth Commission, established by the act as a new state advisory body. Following an extensive listening campaign, many meetings, and frequent forums, Governor Parris Glendening (1995–2003) proposed and the 1997 legislature passed the initiatives that have led to Maryland’s recognition as a leader in the promotion of smart growth. The original 1997 package of smart growth legislation included five separate measures; the first two captured the primary focus of the program (see Figure 1), and three others supported the overall concept.
Incentive-based Programs
Maryland’s smart growth programs are interesting in a number of ways, but the most distinctive feature is their reliance on spatially specific incentives instead of land use regulations (Cohen 2002). For example:
This reliance on incentives is what enabled these programs to pass the Maryland legislature, and what makes them so attractive to other states. After nearly 10 years, Maryland remains a national model for state efforts to promote smart growth, although many within the state believe the program has not gone far enough. According to John W. Frece, a former aide to Glendening, the smart growth program was “unquestionably a move in the right direction,” but it also represented only as much change as was politically possible at the time (Frece 2005). He concludes that the Maryland program might have been more effective if it had set specific goals and benchmarks when it was created, and that it failed to conduct any statewide visioning or other exercises to determine what the public thought their region or state should look like in the future. He also notes that the basic planning blocks of smart growth, the priority funding areas, proved to be too weak and porous to slow sprawl, much less stop it.
Because Maryland’s smart growth policies relied extensively on state incentives, their efficacy waned when those incentives were not maintained after Glendening left office. In some cases the policies were simply insufficient to counteract the economic factors that drive sprawl development. Moreover, if a development project was approved by the local government but did not need or rely on financial incentives from the state, the smart growth initiative had no effect on it. Finally, the smart growth program skirted the politically sensitive issue of whether the state should have more authority over local land use decisions. If local decisions were contrary to the state’s smart growth policies, the state had little recourse (Frece 2005).
Several recent studies support these assertions.
These reports suggest that although Maryland has adopted some of the most innovative land use policies in the country, there is limited evidence that these policies have significantly altered urban development trends. The reasons are complex, but the available research suggests that state incentives are either too small or are poorly suited to the situation to have major impacts on land development trends, especially without supportive regulatory policies at the local level.
Reality Check Plus: Imagine Maryland
To rekindle interest in urban development trends and land use policy in Maryland, and to advance progress in land use reform, a new initiative was launched in 2005. Reality Check Plus: Imagine Maryland is a broad-based, long-term effort led by the Baltimore District Council of the Urban Land Institute (ULI), the National Center for Smart Growth Research and Education at the University of Maryland, and 1000 Friends of Maryland. It is also supported by more than 130 organizations throughout the state.
The first component of the effort involved four public participatory visioning exercises based on similar exercises in Washington, DC, and Fredericksburg, Virginia, led by ULI and the National Center for Smart Growth. In these exercises citizens representing civic, government, and business interests, including elected officials, were literally brought to the table to confront the issues of urban growth and express a desired vision for their region’s future. The Maryland exercises were held in May and June in four regions: the Eastern Shore, Southern Maryland, Western Maryland, and the Baltimore-Washington Corridor. Participants expressed their vision for where future growth should go by placing plastic Lego® blocks representing projected job and housing growth through 2030 on large, table-top regional maps.
The final results of the four Maryland exercises will not be fully integrated and analyzed until September, but preliminary results presented at each event reveal similar but distinct results (see Figure 2). The consensus visioning principles expressed public desires to (1) protect open spaces and natural resources; (2) utilize existing infrastructure; (3) concentrate growth near transit stations in existing urban areas; and (4) balance the location of jobs and households. And at all four events, the placement of Legos was consistent with these principles. Specifically, when compared with current development patterns, participants placed larger proportions of growth inside PFAs and near transit stations and highway corridors, and placed more jobs in job-poor areas.
Notable support was given in all regions for new and expanded transit service and for more regional cooperation or even regional authorities to plan for future growth. There were also some important regional differences: participants from the Eastern Shore focused on protecting the region’s small town and agrarian way of life; in Western Maryland there was concern about uneven economic growth; the primary concern in Central Maryland was traffic congestion; and in Southern Maryland there was apprehension about the impacts of growth in military jobs.
Although these exercises represent one of the largest forums on growth ever conducted in a single state, it is important not to overstate what these events can produce. A pile of Legos placed on a table for a few hours cannot be confused with a thorough analysis of alternative development patterns, a careful consideration of consequences, and a true statewide consensus about the results. These events, however, do represent an important beginning to what must be a continuing dialogue on growth in the state.
In September, during the state’s quadrennial election cycle, a synthesis of the four regional events will be presented at a statewide forum. Candidates for state and local office, including candidates for governor, will be invited to attend and pledge their support for implementing the results. In the meantime, each of the three lead organizations is developing work plans for the implementation phase. The Baltimore District Council of ULI will offer a series of education and outreach programs designed to disseminate the results of the four events throughout each region, especially to elected officials. 1000 Friends of Maryland will sponsor a series of candidate forums and regional caucuses to encourage the implementation of the results, especially through state and local policy reform. The National Center, with support from the Lincoln Institute, will conduct more extensive analyses of alternative statewide development scenarios and existing land use policies in Maryland and other states.
For Maryland, these four regional exercises, and whatever changes in land use policies may follow, represent just the latest chapter in the state’s closely watched history of land use planning and policy. For other states, these exercises represent a rare natural experiment. Can a privately led visioning exercise precipitate significant change in the substance of state and/or local land use policy, local development decisions, and development trends? Stay tuned.
The Visioning Experience
At each Reality Check Plus event, up to 10 participants at each table were asked to think about how their region should accommodate the growth projected over the next 25 years. A six-foot by eight-foot map of the region was shaded in various colors to represent the existing population and employment density. The maps also depicted major highways; subway and commuter rail lines and stations; parkland or other protected conservation areas; airports, military bases, and other government installations; and rivers, floodplains, and other bodies of water.
To encourage participants to think regionally rather than locally, all jurisdictional boundaries were intentionally omitted, although place names of cities and towns helped with orientation. Each table was staffed by a scribe/computer operator and a trained facilitator to lead the three-hour exercise. Before considering where to accommodate growth, participants were asked to reach consensus on a set of principles to guide their decisions about where to place the new development, such as protecting open space, making use of existing infrastructure, and maintaining jobs-housing balance.
The exercise used Lego® blocks of four different colors: white blocks represented the top 80 percent of new housing units in the region based on price, or essentially market-rate housing; yellow blocks represented the bottom 20 percent of housing based on price, essentially a stand-in for nonsubsidized affordable housing; black blocks represented lower density housing development that could be exchanged for higher density white blocks at a ratio of 4:1; and blue blocks represented jobs.
The maps were overlaid with a checkered grid and scaled so a single block fit on each grid. Participants who wanted to add more than one housing or employment block to a single grid simply stacked the blocks. Those who proposed a mixed-use development pattern could stack various types of blocks together. Once all the Legos were placed on the map, the result yields a three-dimensional representation of where future growth in the region is or is not desired.
After all the Legos were placed, the participants were asked to assess their work. Have they allocated jobs and households across the region in a manner consistent with their vision for what the future should hold? Does the quantity of growth seem appropriate for a 25–30 year timeframe, or would they prefer more or less growth? Finally, if they are comfortable with the consensus vision, what policies or land development tools do they favor for assuring that the preferred vision is the one that is actually realized? What new infrastructure will be necessary to accommodate the projected level of growth? What might be the environmental impacts and tax implications? The participants’ considered responses to these questions are perhaps the most important products of the exercise.
During the lunch break a team of students from the University of Maryland counted the numbers of Legos at each table, entered the information into a computer, and then converted the results into two– and three-dimensional maps for each table. The data were also analyzed and inserted into a formatted PowerPoint presentation. The slides identified results for each table in a quantitative analysis of urban development indicators, such as percentages of jobs and households within one-quarter mile of a transit station; inside metropolitan beltways; inside existing urban areas; and in existing greenfields and farmland. Other indicators measured location of affordable housing and the degree to which it is integrated with market-rate housing; and the extent of jobs-housing balance.
After lunch the participants gathered in a large auditorium to hear a presentation of the results, which included a summary of the consensus principles, selected results from various tables, and a synthesis of the results from all the tables. Subsequent events included a town hall-type panel discussion focused on how to implement the pattern of development envisioned by the participants at each regional event.
Gerrit-Jan Knaap, an economist and professor of urban studies and planning, is executive director of the National Center for Smart Growth Research and Education at the University of Maryland. He is one of three co-chairs of the Reality Check Plus visioning exercise.
Dru Schmidt-Perkins is executive director of 1000 Friends of Maryland, a statewide citizens’ coalition that supports protection of natural resources, revitalization of existing communities, preservation of historic resources, efficient and effective transportation choices, and development that takes into account the public’s interest. She is also one of three co-chairs of the Reality Check Plus project.
References
Bosselman, Fred, and David Callies. 1972. The quiet revolution in land use control. Washington, DC: Council on Environmental Quality.
Cohen, J. R. 2002. Maryland’s “smart growth”: Using incentives to combat sprawl. In Urban sprawl: Causes, consequences and policy response, G. Squires, ed. Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press.
DeGrove, John M. 2005. Planning policy and politics: Smart growth and the states. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
Frece, John W. 2005. Twenty lessons from Maryland’s smart growth initiative. Vermont Journal of Environmental Law 6: 106–132.
Howland, Marie. 2000. The impact of contamination on the Canton/Southeast Baltimore land market. Journal of the American Planning Association 66 (4): 411–420.
———. 2003. Private initiatives and public responsibility for the redevelopment of industrial brownfields: Three Baltimore case studies. Economic Development Quarterly 17 (4): 367–381.
Howland, Marie, and Jungyul Sohn. Forthcoming. Has Maryland’s priority funding areas initiative constrained the expansion of water and sewer investments? Land Use Policy.
National Center for Smart Growth. 2003. Smart growth, housing markets, and development trends in the Baltimore-Washington Corridor. http://www.smartgrowth.umd.edu/research/pdf/KnaapSohnFreceEtAl_SGHousingMarketsBalWash_DateNA.pdf.
———. 2006. Adequate public facilities ordinances in Maryland: Inappropriate use, inconsistent standards, unintended consequences. http://www.smartgrowth.umd.edu/research/pdf/NCSG_APFOMaryland_041906.pdf.
1000 Friends of Maryland. 1999. Smart growth: How is your county doing—Baltimore Region. http://www.friendsofmd.org.
———. 2001. Smart growth: How is your county doing—Eastern Shore. http://www.friendsofmd.org.
Shen, Qing and Feng Zhang. Forthcoming, Land-use changes in a pro–smart growth state: Maryland, USA. Environment and Planning A.
Sohn, Jungyul, and Gerrit-Jan Knaap. 2005. Does the job creation tax credit program in Maryland help concentrate employment growth? Economic Development Quarterly 19: 313–326.
Tassone, Joseph, Erik Balsley, Lynda Eisenberg, Stephanie Martins, and Rich Hall. 2004. Maximizing return on public investment in Maryland’s rural land preservation programs. Annapolis, MD: Maryland Department of Planning.
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Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 7 del CD-ROM Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.
Paulo Sandroni se graduó de economista en la Universidad de São Paulo en 1964 y fue profesor adjunto de economía en la Universidad Católica de São Paulo (PUC) hasta 1969, cuando dejó Brasil durante la dictadura militar. Enseñó en la Universidad de Chile en Santiago hasta 1973 y después en la Universidad de los Andes en Bogotá, Colombia, hasta 1979. Después de retornar a São Paulo, volvió a enseñar en la PUC hasta 2006 y también se incorporó a la Escuela de Administración de la Fundación Getulio Vargas (FGV).
En 1988, después de la victoria del Partido de los Trabajadores (PT) en Brasil, se incorporó al gobierno municipal de la alcaldesa Luiza Erundina en São Paulo, donde dirigió agencias dedicadas al desarrollo urbano y el transporte público. Durante un breve período, también fue viceministro de administración en el gobierno federal.
En 1994 dejó el área de gobierno municipal para continuar enseñando y realizando investigaciones sobre desarrollo urbano en ciudades de Brasil y otros países de América Latina, y publicando artículos y libros sobre economía, incluyendo un diccionario de economía que se considera como referencia primaria en Brasil. Inició su afiliación con el Instituto Lincoln en 1997. En la actualidad es consultor privado sobre temas de desarrollo urbano y transporte, y sigue enseñando en la Escuela de Administración de FGV y en programas patrocinados por el Instituto Lincoln.
Land Lines: ¿Cómo se interesó en temas de política urbana, vistos sus antecedentes en macroeconomía?
Paulo Sandroni: En 1988 −cuando era asistente de Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, ahora Presidente de Brasil y en ese entonces un candidato en las elecciones de 1989− ayudé a desarrollar programas para resolver los problemas macroeconómicos de Brasil. Después de la victoria de Luiza Erundina a la alcaldía de São Paulo en 1988, fui invitado a dirigir el programa de Operaciones Interligadas. Este programa consistía en negociar y formar sociedades entre los sectores público y privado para otorgar derechos adicionales de edificación, y usar la recaudación proveniente de la parte recuperada del incremento del valor del suelo (o plusvalía) para construir viviendas sociales para familias pobres.
También participé en el desarrollo de Operaciones Urbanas (OU), una forma de intervención para revitalizar grandes áreas de la ciudad, que también involucró la recuperación de plusvalías. Estaba fascinado por el desafío de formar parte de un grupo cuya misión era gobernar la ciudad más grande de Brasil con un proyecto de gran connotación social, y además continué asistiendo al Presidente Lula da Silva en temas macroeconómicos hasta 1998.
Land Lines: A su juicio, ¿por qué los proyectos de desarrollo urbano son un desafío tan grande?
Paulo Sandroni: La primera razón es que en los grandes proyectos que afectan los aspectos históricos, culturales, sociales y ambientales de la ciudad, la resolución de los problemas económicos y de financiamiento se debe considerar como parte del desafío, pero no son el objetivo principal. Por ejemplo, las OU que tratan de evitar el aburguesamiento y producir un entorno social más equilibrado pueden tener que usar tierras más valiosas para construir viviendas sociales. Estos proyectos requieren atención especial, porque la tierra no se puede vender usando el criterio típico de mayor y mejor uso. En Brasil hay una distinción importante entre los grandes proyectos urbanos (GPU) que pueden o no usar las herramientas de recuperación de plusvalías proporcionadas por las OU. Los GPU que están en condiciones de usar estas herramientas pueden redituar beneficios financieros y sociales, tanto para el sector público como el privado, con mayor facilidad.
Land Lines: ¿Puede describir el instrumento financiero detrás de esta política?
Paulo Sandroni: Desde 2004, los fondos para financiar las viviendas sociales y otras inversiones de infraestructura en las OU se han recaudado por medio de un nuevo instrumento ingenioso de recuperación de plusvalías llamado CEPAC (Certificado de Potencial Adicional de Construcción). Un CEPAC puede representar una cantidad determinada de metros cuadrados de derechos de construcción adicionales, dependiendo de dónde se formó la OU. Por ejemplo, en la OU de Faria Lima los CEPAC oscilaban de un mínimo de 0,8 a un máximo de 2,8 m2 y en la OU de Agua Espraiada, de 1,0 a 3,0 m2, porque los precios del suelo varían entre distintos lotes, incluso dentro de la misma OU.
La administración pública que crea y posee los derechos de desarrollo puede vendérselos a los emprendedores que quieran edificar con una densidad mayor que lo que estaba permitido previamente en esos lotes. Los CEPAC se venden en subasta a través de la bolsa, y si el interés de los emprendedores es alto, los precios pueden llegar a aumentar. No hace falta que el sector público valore la propiedad, porque el mercado se encarga de hacerlo. Los ingresos por la venta de CEPAC se depositan bajo una ley muy estricta en una cuenta separada utilizada para financiar proyectos de infraestructura y de viviendas sociales dentro de la OU, de manera que no aumenta la presión sobre el presupuesto de la ciudad.
Muchos observadores ven con recelo este instrumento porque temen que sea una forma de especulación del suelo en los mercados financieros. Creo que esto es un error, por dos razones. Primero, los especuladores agresivos en general invierten en bonos de alta liquidez que pueden aumentar de valor rápidamente en el corto plazo; los CEPAC no tienen ninguna de estas características. Segundo y más importante, el gobierno controla el mercado a esta altura del proceso. Si los precios aumentan debido a especulación, el sector público puede vender estos derechos a un precio más alto, incrementando sus ingresos proporcionalmente, o puede vender una cantidad más grande de acciones, causando un descenso del precio y neutralizando a los especuladores.
Land Lines: ¿Cómo han funcionado los CEPAC en la práctica?
Paulo Sandroni: Ambas OU que mencioné anteriormente han usado este instrumento para recaudar fondos de los emprendedores. A la fecha se ha vendido el 31 por ciento del inventario de metros cuadrados, o CEPAC, en el caso de Agua Espraiada y el 32 por ciento de Faria Lima. El caso de Agua Espraiada ilustra el proceso de licitación y la influencia de los especuladores. El gobierno de la ciudad realizó una subasta de 186.740 CEPAC en febrero de 2008, a un precio inicial de R$460 (equivalente a US$200). Un oferente trató de comprarlos todos, así que el precio subió a R$1,110 (US$480), un aumento increíble del 141 por ciento.
Meses más tarde, en octubre, otra subasta ofreció 650,000 CEPAC a un precio inicial de R$535 (US$230), pero se vendieron solamente 379.650, sin ningún aumento del precio. Entre diciembre de 2004 y febrero de 2009, la recaudación por venta de CEPAC en la OU de Faria Lima fue de R$567 millones (US$244 millones) y en la OU de Agua Espraiada fue de R$642 millones (US$276 millones). Si comparamos estos ingresos combinados de $520 millones de dólares en el curso de cuatro años con la recaudación total de impuestos sobre la propiedad en 2008, que fue de $1,25 mil millones de dólares, vemos que representa más del 40 por ciento, o alrededor del 10 por ciento anual.
Land Lines: ¿Cómo se pueden usar estos ejemplos para obtener respaldo a los medios alternativos de financiamiento del desarrollo urbano?
Paulo Sandroni: La forma clásica de financiar inversiones de capital en infraestructura es por medio de préstamos de largo plazo y transferencias de fondos federales; en general, el impuesto sobre la propiedad se usa para mantener la infraestructura y los servicios públicos. Pero en Brasil, los préstamos que pueden tomar las municipalidades y los estados están sujetos a límites estrictos. El hecho de que los ingresos por CEPAC no tengan este tipo de restricción presupuestaria agrega un valor financiero significativo a este instrumento.
Además, al igual que en los Estados Unidos y otros lados, aumentar impuestos es muy impopular. En las últimas cinco elecciones en São Paulo, por lo menos tres candidatos perdieron porque los votantes interpretaron que respaldaban un aumento de impuestos. Por lo tanto, para financiar grandes proyectos urbanos tenemos que evaluar cuánta plusvalía se va a crear, determinar cómo capturarlo y crear una situación que beneficie a todos. Los CEPAC ofrecen una alternativa viable.
Land Lines: ¿La mayoría de los proyectos de América Latina tienen tendencia al aburguesamiento? ¿Cómo se pueden hacer más socialmente aceptables?
Paulo Sandroni: En la medida que los GPU se concentren en las inversiones urbanas en infraestructura (construcción de caminos, puentes, centros comerciales, centros de negocios, etc.), el precio de la tierra probablemente aumentará en ciertas áreas afectadas, y ello contribuirá a la expulsión de familias pobres y hasta algunas de la clase media. De todas maneras, estos GPU son iniciativas del sector público, así que se pueden diseñar mecanismos para mitigar estas fuerzas de exclusión.
La legislación brasileña permite el establecimiento de ZEIS (Zonas Especiales de Interés Social) en áreas ocupadas por barrios marginales dentro del perímetro de los GPU. En estas áreas designadas, el emprendedor sólo puede construir nuevas viviendas para los pobres, aun cuando el precio de la tierra sea muy alto. Por supuesto, la oposición económica y social creada por este mecanismo es considerable entre los terratenientes y los emprendedores inmobiliarios, pero es defendida vigorosamente por las organizaciones y los residentes locales. São Paulo cuenta en la actualidad con ZEIS en cuatro GPU: Agua Branca, Faria Lima, Agua Espraiada y Rio Verde-Jacu. El ZEIS del barrio marginal Coliseu en Faria Lima, y el barrio marginal Jardim Edith en Agua Espraiada, son casos interesantes, porque están ubicados en las tierras más caras dentro de estos proyectos (ver Biderman, Sandroni y Smolka 2006).
Land Lines: ¿Cuáles son las desventajas de estas herramientas regulatorias (CEPAC, ZEIS, OU, etc.) que puedan haber dejado vacíos para el oportunismo de partes interesadas bien posicionadas?
Paulo Sandroni: Bueno, se puede encontrar corrupción y conductas antisociales en todos lados, y algunas condiciones pueden favorecerlas. Pero si uno sobrecarga el sistema con reglamentaciones y normas, se puede terminar bloqueando las iniciativas para superar estos problemas y se paraliza un proceso que puede beneficiar el interés público. Es más riesgoso, por supuesto, reducir las reglamentaciones y brindar más oportunidad para negociar, pero este riesgo se puede mitigar si se crean normas de negociación, con castigos muy severos por violarlas. Al mismo tiempo, hay ciertos asuntos que demandan una reglamentación muy precisa, como es el caso de los ZEIS, porque los grupos más pobres de la ciudad necesitan de la intervención del sector público.
Land Lines: ¿Se pueden replicar estos tipos de proyectos de São Paulo en otras ciudades de América Latina?
Paulo Sandroni: Tenemos que tener cuidado a la hora de transplantar o repetir experiencias que fueron exitosas en un país a otro. Antes de hacerlo, es importante conocer dos cosas: las condiciones imperantes en la ciudad cuando se crearon estas OU; y los tipos de problemas que los planificadores querían resolver con estos proyectos.
Por ejemplo, una condición importante en São Paulo es la separación de los derechos de edificación de los derechos de propiedad, lo cual abre un camino para cobrar por un cambio en la relación de superficie de edificación a superficie del lote. En grandes partes de la ciudad, la relación de superficie de edificación a superficie del lote, que está relacionada con las normas de zonificación, es muy baja en la actualidad, oscilando entre una y dos veces el área del lote. Cuando sea posible aumentar esta relación tres o cuatro veces sin ejercer una gran presión sobre la infraestructura, se impone un cargo sobre los dueños o emprendedores por los derechos adicionales a construir con mayor densidad.
En otras ciudades, donde la relación de superficie de edificación a superficie del lote ya sea alta, hay menos flexibilidad para cobrar por derechos de desarrollo adicionales, de manera que quizás haga falta crear otras políticas o herramientas. La lección principal es que las OU de São Paulo han demostrado que cobrarles a los propietarios o emprendedores por los derechos adicionales a edificar ha sido tanto razonable como equitativo. Ya no es social, política o aun económicamente admisible conceder estos derechos de desarrollo sin cargo.
Referencia
Biderman, Ciro, Paulo Sandroni, y Martim O. Smolka. 2006. Large-scale urban interventions: The case of Faria Lima in São Paulo (Intervenciones urbanas a gran escala: el caso de Faria Lima en São Paulo). Land Lines 18(2): 8–13.
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A medida que una ciudad crece, tanto en tamaño como en su densidad de edificación, una parte de este proceso de crecimiento consiste, por lo general, en las mejoras que se realizan en el suelo a raíz de los nuevos desarrollos. No obstante, la combinación de la demanda de sitios de construcción adicionales y de la cantidad limitada de espacio físico disponible para el desarrollo generalmente da como resultado un aumento en los precios de los terrenos.
Esta escasez de suelo se debe a tres factores principales: la capacidad de los propietarios de no poner a disposición del mercado sus terrenos con servicios (una causa que se atribuye a la concentración de la propiedad de terrenos y a otras limitaciones legales e institucionales); las dificultades para tener acceso a ciertas áreas que aún no están listas para ser ocupadas debido a la falta de infraestructura; y las restricciones impuestas por las normas de zonificación. Cada uno de estos factores presenta su propia dinámica, aunque no necesariamente aparecen al mismo tiempo. Este es el caso de las ciudades brasileñas, particularmente São Paulo, donde estos factores restrictivos no siempre se presentan de la misma manera en relación con el precio de los terrenos.
Por ejemplo, las normas de edificación pueden reducir el precio de los lotes individuales, pero pueden aumentar el precio general cuando dichas normas afectan a todos los lotes y, como consecuencia, restringen la oferta de viviendas. Una gran oferta de terrenos vacantes controlados por unos pocos propietarios puede ocasionar el aumento de los precios, mientras que la falta de accesibilidad puede dar como resultado la reducción de los precios.
El precio de los terrenos también depende de las características de las normas sobre el suelo. A medida que la ciudad crece, la mayor demanda de terrenos urbanos edificables por lo general genera valores más altos si la infraestructura existente tiene la capacidad de contener una ocupación de terrenos más intensa y si las normas sobre zonificación (o las modificaciones a dichas normas) permiten además una mayor densidad de edificación.
Con el fin de examinar estas cuestiones, debemos, en primer lugar, considerar de qué forma se financia la inversión en infraestructura que brinda o intensifica los medios para acceder a los terrenos y utilizarlos y, en segundo lugar, analizar cómo se distribuyen los beneficios y costos derivados de las mejoras al suelo. Por lo general, el costo de los servicios públicos (tales como calles, puentes, alcantarillado, alumbrado público, agua potable, etc.) se financia mediante los fondos públicos, mientras que las mejoras o el valor agregado a los terrenos como resultado de la inversión pública en infraestructura son aprovechados, salvo pocas excepciones, por los propietarios de los terrenos mejorados sin ningún tipo de costo.
El aumento en los valores de las propiedades también puede provenir de simples cambios en la utilización del suelo que ya se encuentra accesible, como por ejemplo cuando un terreno que anteriormente se consideraba rural ahora se redefine como urbano. Los cambios en las posibles densidades como consecuencia de nuevas normas de zonificación pueden generar grandes beneficios para las propiedades afectadas, aunque en este caso, como en el caso anterior, la presión futura en cuanto a la infraestructura requerirá una importante inversión pública.
Marco legal
Los propietarios de inmuebles mejorados en Brasil tradicionalmente se apropiaban, tal como ocurre en la mayoría de los países, del valor agregado que se derivaba de la inversión del sector público y de los cambios en la zonificación. El concepto de que los propietarios no deberían ser los únicos beneficiarios de dichas mejoras se introdujo en forma gradual en Brasil durante la década de 1970, y este principio se incorporó en los artículos 182 y 183 de la Constitución Federal de 1988. Con posterioridad, dichos artículos se regularon mediante la Ley Federal Nº 10.257 del año 2001, conocida también como la Ley de Desarrollo Urbano o Estatuto de la Ciudad (Estatuto da Cidade).
Desde 1988, el desarrollo urbano se ha convertido en una cuestión del derecho federal. En la práctica, la legislación federal ratificó el principio de la función social de la propiedad de terrenos urbanos y la separación del derecho a la propiedad del derecho de edificar. Sobre la base de la ley de 2001, la ciudad de São Paulo aprobó su Plan Estratégico de Ordenamiento Territorial en el año 2002, así como también la Ley sobre la Utilización del Suelo Nº 13.885 en 2004. Las mencionadas leyes introdujeron el mecanismo de Compensación Monetaria por el Derecho de Edificación (Outorga Onerosa do Direito de Construir u OODC), establecieron coeficientes de utilización del suelo (o coeficientes de edificabilidad) mínimos, básicos y máximos, y limitaron la oferta de superficies edificables. La utilización de estas herramientas en conjunto permitió al municipio mejorar la eficiencia en la gestión del suelo, promover los resultados sociales deseados y aumentar los ingresos.
El coeficiente de edificabilidad (CE) mínimo se refiere a la utilización mínima que se espera de un lote para que cumpla con su función social; el CE básico se relaciona con la superficie edificable que todo propietario tiene el derecho de desarrollar en virtud de su propiedad; y el CE máximo es la cantidad de desarrollo permitida por la infraestructura existente y las normas de zonificación. Los cargos asociados con la OODC se aplican sobre la diferencia existente entre el CE máximo y el CE básico de un lote.
Administración de los derechos de edificación
La OODC es la compensación monetaria que pagan aquellos a quienes el gobierno les otorga nuevos derechos de edificación (superficie edificable). Esta concesión de desarrollo (establecida en los artículos 28, 29, 30 y 31 de la Ley Federal Nº 10.257 de 2001 y definida en los artículos 209 a 216 del Plan Estratégico de Ordenamiento Territorial de 2002) es una de las herramientas normativas que se utilizan a los fines de administrar los derechos de edificación en la ciudad, con excepción de aquellas áreas destinadas a proyectos urbanos a gran escala en los que se utiliza una herramienta legal especial cuyo fin es fomentar las intervenciones públicas y privadas (Biderman, Sandroni y Smolka 2006).
El CE básico de utilización del suelo establecido en el año 2004 varía entre 1 y 2, dependiendo del área de la ciudad a considerar. El CE máximo puede ser 1, 2, 2,5 ó 4, dependiendo asimismo del área. En algunas áreas urbanas, estas nuevas normas redujeron los derechos de edificación, estableciendo un CE básico de 1 para aquellos terrenos que se habían clasificado como 2 o más según la legislación anterior. En forma paralela, el municipio de São Paulo utilizó la OODC para extender el potencial de edificación o el CE máximo hasta 4 en aquellos terrenos que, según la legislación anterior, solo podían desarrollarse hasta 1 ó 2.
Como resultado, en algunas áreas en las que se redujo el CE de 2 a 1, los emprendedores pudieron presentar proyectos utilizando el CE 2 anterior, o hasta el CE máximo de 3 ó 4, siempre y cuando pagaran al gobierno el monto relativo a la superficie edificable adicional correspondiente a la diferencia entre el CE básico y el CE utilizado en el proyecto. Suponiendo que los cargos sean efectivos en cuanto al costo para los emprendedores, este instrumento los beneficia, ya que les permite edificar hasta un CE 4 en áreas en donde previamente el máximo era de CE 2. No obstante, el propietario promedio no siempre considera que esta herramienta sea una ventaja, debido a que el potencial de edificación de su terreno podría verse reducido y se le podría aplicar un cargo sobre lo que anteriormente percibía como un derecho de edificación libre de todo cargo.
Los propietarios de pequeños lotes y viviendas de baja densidad tal vez no se den cuenta de lo que podrían estar perdiendo cuando se modifica el CE, debido a que, por lo general, consideran su propiedad como una combinación del terreno, la edificación y otras mejoras. Resulta difícil separar el valor del terreno del valor de las mejoras, por lo que una futura reducción en el valor del terreno no se percibe en forma inmediata. Asimismo, la expansion del mercado inmobiliario en São Paulo coincidió con la aprobación de la nueva legislación en el año 2004, por lo que el aumento general en los precios de los terrenos puede haber compensado la futura reducción de los precios de los terrenos asociada con las modificaciones del CE. Debe destacarse además que la expansión del crédito gubernamental destinado a la financiación de la vivienda desde el año 2006 contribuyó a un aumento en la demanda de terrenos y, en consecuencia, a un aumento en los precios de los mismos.
Para los emprendedores, el aumento del CE a 4 en aquellas áreas en las que el máximo había sido 1 ó 2 constituyó una situación favorable, ya que pudieron invertir más capital en los terrenos y llevar a cabo proyectos más lucrativos que compensaron los pagos adicionales realizados en concepto de la diferencia entre el CE básico y el CE máximo. En forma gradual, los emprendedores se convencieron de que era mejor pagar este aumento en el valor del terreno al gobierno que a los propietarios privados, ya que el gobierno convertía dichos pagos en mejoras que, por lo general, generaban un beneficio para los proyectos de los emprendedores.
El Plan Estratégico de Ordenamiento Territorial de 2002 y la Ley 13.885 de 2004 también limitaron la oferta de potencial edificable, tanto residencial como no residencial, en todos los distritos municipales, estableciendo una superficie edificable adicional total de 9.769 millones m2: 6.919 millones m2 para uso residencial y 2.850 millones m2 para uso no residencial (ver tabla 1). Dicho potencial no incluyó las superficies edificables que se encontraban dentro del perímetro de los 13 proyectos urbanos de São Paulo. Las superficies adicionales se distribuyeron entre 91 de los 96 distritos municipales, exceptuando cinco áreas destinadas a la protección ambiental. Esta definición y delimitación de la oferta de edificación potencial introdujo un nuevo elemento en el mercado inmobiliario.
Una vez que los emprendedores supieron cuál era la superficie edificable máxima, previeron la escasez de terrenos en aquellos distritos en los que la oferta era baja y la dinámica inmobiliaria era alt y, así, desataron una tendencia hacia un aumento de los precios de terrenos. A su vez, la falta de superficie edificable originó presiones por parte de los emprendedores inmobiliarios para que el gobierno aumentara la oferta, es decir, modificara los límites de la superficie edificable en algunos distritos durante la revisión del Plan Estratégico que se llevó a cabo en el año 2007, aunque no tuvieron éxito. Hacia octubre de 2010, la oferta de terrenos se había agotado totalmente (o casi por completo) para la utilización residencial en 17 distritos, y para la utilización no residencial en 5 distritos (ver figura 1).
Factores de planificación e interés social
La fórmula para calcular la OODC, adoptada en el Plan Estratégico de Ordenamiento Territorial de 2002 de São Paulo, tiene en cuenta factores de planificación e interés social, además de las características de la parcela en cuestión y del beneficio económico real que se le asigna a la propiedad como resultado de la OODC. El factor de la planificación es un instrumento cuyo fin es el de fomentar o desalentar densidades altas en ciertas áreas dependiendo de la infraestructura existente, en particular del transporte público y el tránsito masivo. El factor de la planificación también se utiliza con el fin de obtener una mayor compensación económica derivada de la venta de derechos de edificación para empresas ubicadas en áreas de la ciudad que han experimentado mejoras, ya que el coeficiente varía según los terrenos se utilicen con fines residenciales o no residenciales.
El factor del interés social establece exenciones o reducciones en los cargos financieros, dependiendo del tipo de actividad que se desarrollará en la parcela en cuestión. El coeficiente varía de 0 a 1 y se aplica sobre una variedad de actividades. A modo de ejemplo, el coeficiente correspondiente a viviendas económicas o de interés social es 0, lo que significa que los emprendedores de este tipo de viviendas nopagan compensación alguna por los derechos de edificación adicionales. De manera similar, las instituciones sin fines de lucro, tales como hospitales, escuelas, clínicas de salud y maternoinfantiles, centros culturales, instituciones deportivas y recreativas y centros religiosos, poseen un coeficiente 0.
Los mencionados factores actúan a modo de incentivos para lograr los resultados sociales deseados, ya que cuanto menor sea el coeficiente correspondiente al factor de planificación e interés social aplicable a un área determinada, menor será el cargo que se abonará, y mayor será el incentivo para llevar a cabo proyectos de desarrollo en dicha área.
Los efectos en los ingresos y la asignación de fondos
Los ingresos totales provenientes de los pagos de la OODC alcanzaron los R$650 millones (US$325 millones) en aproximadamente cinco años, a pesar de la crisis económica mundial que restringió el crédito hacia finales del período (ver tabla 2). Dichos fondos se depositan en el Fondo de Desarrollo Urbano (FUNDURB), creado con el fin de llevar a cabo planes y proyectos en áreas urbanas y de protección ambiental, u otros tipos de intervenciones contempladas en el Plan Estratégico de 2002.
Para septiembre de 2008, los proyectos aprobados para ser financiados por el FUNDURB fueron 15 parques lineales (R$42,5 millones), mejoras en las aceras y calles (R$21,2 millones), drenajes y obras sanitarias (R$108 millones), instalaciones comunitarias (R$21,1 millones), regularización de asentamientos informales (R$50 millones) y restauración de edificios del patrimonio cultural (R$37 millones).
Comentarios finales
Después de que la ciudad de São Paulo aprobó el Plan Estratégico de Ordenamiento Territorial de 2002, el principio de concesiones de desarrollo y terrenos edificables se aplicó en todo el territorio de la ciudad. Cuando un proyecto inmobiliario excede el CE básico y el emprendedor desea edificar hasta un máximo de 4, deberá abonar al gobierno ciertas compensaciones económicas. Desde que se introdujo la OODC, los ingresos han aumentado todos los años. Debe tenerse en cuenta que dichos ingresos son netos de los más de mil millones de dólares generados por 2 de los 13 proyectos urbanos de la ciudad (Faria Lima y Agua Espraiada) donde están ocurriendo los mayores cambios en cuanto a zonificación y densidad (Biderman, Sandroni y Smolka 2006). En dichas áreas, los nuevos derechos de edificación obtienen su precio a través de la subasta de Certificados de Potencial Adicional de Construcción (CEPAC), y los ingresos deben invertirse en el área correspondiente al proyecto urbano, en lugar de colocarse en el FUNDURB para el beneficio de toda la ciudad (Sandroni 2010).
El cargo correspondiente a derechos de edificación en São Paulo parece no haber afectado el rendimiento económico de los emprendedores. Por el contrario, el aumento del CE máximo hasta 4 en algunas áreas de la ciudad contribuyó a mejorar las tasas de rendimiento de los emprendedores. Sin embargo, el establecimiento de una reserva máxima para derechos de edificación parece haber generado una tendencia de aumentos en los precios de los terrenos, en particular en aquellos distritos en los que la oferta de superficies edificables es baja. En algunos distritos, los emprendedores agotaron rápidamente la oferta de derechos de edificación residencial. Este tipo de respuesta tal vez se intensifique en el futuro, lo que dará como resultado que el gobierno municipal se vea presionado para aumentar la oferta máxima de superficies edificables y/o el CE máximo. De ser así, existe el riesgo de que la motivación para aumentar los ingresos municipales tal vez llegue a tener más peso que los criterios de planificación urbana y las limitaciones de la infraestructura, en particular el transporte público y el tránsito masivo.
Por otro lado, el flujo de compensación económica no será continuo. A diferencia de los ingresos derivados de impuestos inmobiliarios, que se repiten en forma anual, los ingresos generados por la venta de derechos de edificación irán desapareciendo con el tiempo a medida que se agote el potencial de edificación adicional. En algunos sectores de la ciudad, la oferta de superficies edificables ya se encuentra agotada y la ciudad ya ha llegado al límite de densidad de edificación definido en la normativa. No obstante, las modificaciones que se realicen en un futuro al Plan Estratégico tal vez establezcan un mayor potencial de edificación para dichas áreas, dependiendo de las recomendaciones técnicas y las condiciones políticas para que ocurran dichos cambios.
En resumen, la aplicación del principio de la función social de la propiedad, incluido en el Plan Estratégico de Ordenamiento Territorial de 2002 de la ciudad de São Paulo, permitió la promulgación de una legislación municipal que separa claramente el derecho a la propiedad del derecho a edificar.
Como resultado, ya no se sostiene la noción tradicional de los derechos de propiedad globales, por lo que el hecho de poseer la propiedad de un terreno no puede invalidar el interés público ni estar por encima de la función social de la propiedad. En consecuencia, los derechos de edificación existents pueden reducirse sin que los propietarios tengan el derecho a recibir una compensación económica por el simple hecho de que se han frustrado sus sueños.
Sobre el Autor
Paulo Henrique Sandroni es economista y fue director de planificación urbana y transporte público de la ciudad de São Paulo desde 1988 hasta 1993 y, por un breve período, fue viceministro de administración del gobierno federal. Ha publicado artículos y libros sobre economía, entre los que se cuenta un diccionario considerado como referencia principal en temas de economía en Brasil. Sandroni es, además, profesor de la Facultad de Economía y Negocios en la Fundación Getulio Vargas de São Paulo, consultor independiente en temas de desarrollo urbano y transporte y conferencista en programas patrocinados por el Instituto Lincoln.
Referencias
Biderman, Ciro, Paulo Sandroni y Martim O. Smolka. 2006. “Large-scale urban interventions: The case of Faria Lima in São Paulo”. En
Ayuntamiento Municipal de São Paulo, Secretaría de Finanzas. www.prefeitura.sp.gov.br/cidade/secretarias/financas.
Sandroni, Paulo. 2010. “A new financial instrument of value capture in São Paulo: Certificates of additional construction potential”. En Municipal revenues and land policies, Gregory K. Ingram y Yu-Hung Hong, editores, 218–236. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
SECOVI. 2010. Estoque de Outorga Onerosa Residencial. Septiembre. www.geosecovi.com.br.
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La conversión del suelo de producción agrícola a desarrollo urbano e industrial es uno de los procesos de cambio críticos en las economías en vías de desarrollo que experimentan la industrialización, urbanización y globalización. Los cambios en el uso del suelo urbano que están ocurriendo en China han atraído la atención de muchos académicos, especialmente en vista de las grandes reformas económicas, el significativo crecimiento económico y los profundos cambios estructurales que han tenido lugar en las últimas tres décadas. La transición de una economía planificada a una economía de mercado, y de un gobierno provincial y municipal autoritario a un tipo de gobierno más descentralizado ha generado un nuevo marco institucional para los cambios del uso del suelo (Lin y Ho 2005).
La opinión general es la de calificar el cambio del uso del suelo como resultado del crecimiento económico y de los cambios estructurales. Este punto de vista está alineado con el modelo de crecimiento neoclásico en el que el suelo cumple un papel cada vez menor en el crecimiento económico. No obstante, estos cambios en el uso del suelo pueden ser tanto la consecuencia del crecimiento económico como los factores impulsores de dicho crecimiento (Bai, Chen y Shi 2011; Ding y Lichtenberg 2011).
Pero la realidad resulta mucho más compleja. En lugar de estar impulsada por una población en crecimiento, la expansión del suelo urbano en China está motivada por el financiamiento de suelo, en virtud del cual los gobiernos municipales recaudan ingresos y atraen inversiones mediante el arrendamiento y desarrollo de terrenos. Como resultado, la política urbana centrada en el suelo se ha identificado con una de las fuerzas impulsoras más importantes de la espectacular expansión de las ciudades desde mediados de la década de 1990 (Lin 2007). La oferta de suelos agrícolas para fines no relacionados con la agricultura permite de hecho al gobierno municipal “matar varios pájaros de un tiro” (Ping 2011). En consecuencia, el desarrollo del suelo fomenta el crecimiento económico, especialmente en áreas urbanizadas.
Los cambios en el uso del suelo en China también se ven afectados en gran manera por las políticas de oferta de terrenos, que se han visto ajustadas en forma regular a fin de suplir la demanda del desarrollo económico. La oferta ilegal de terrenos es una de las causas principales de una inversión excesiva y descontrolada, que se produce cuando el gobierno municipal no ofrece terrenos a las personas que utilizan el suelo de acuerdo con los planes de uso del suelo en curso o después del permiso definitivo del gobierno central. Como resultado, el gobierno central comenzó a utilizar las políticas de suelo como herramienta fundamental del control macroeconómico nacional a fines del año 2003.
Entre otras medidas, la transferencia de terrenos se ha llevado a cabo mediante subastas o licitaciones desde 2004, y la política sobre oferta de terrenos dio un giro desde el control de la cantidad al control estructural desde 2006. Los índices sobre el uso del suelo distribuidos por el gobierno central a los gobiernos municipales sólo hacían hincapié en la cantidad de terrenos antes de 2006; sin embargo, en la actualidad, la distribución de los usos del suelo en categorías la realiza el gobierno central, que define, incluso, hasta la intensidad del uso del suelo.
Este legado puede observarse en la decisión del Consejo de Estado de establecer el sistema altamente centralizado de Supervisión Estatal del Suelo (SES) en 2006. Se crearon nueve oficinas regionales nuevas, encargadas de investigar la oferta ilegal de terrenos en todo el país (Tao y otros 2010). La nueva política de suelo ha representado un papel activo en la mejora del uso del suelo, mediante la prohibición de arrendamiento de suelo para proyectos que no se encuentren en línea con la política industrial nacional, los planes de desarrollo y las normas de ingreso. Con posterioridad a la introducción de estas reformas y gracias a un estricto control, se ha reducido significativamente la cantidad de suelo ofrecido de manera ilegal, mientras que el PIB generado por unidad de suelo desarrollable ha aumentado sustancialmente (Centro de Derecho sobre Recursos de Suelo y Mineros de China 2007). Se espera que esta estricta política de suelo tenga un impacto significativo en el patrón espacial del uso del suelo y tenga efectos sobre la relación existente entre los cambios en el uso del suelo y el crecimiento económico en China.
Cambios en los patrones de uso del suelo en China
La política de suelo en China ha sufrido cambios drásticos desde 2004, por lo que podría también esperarse un patrón diferente del uso del suelo desde entonces. En base a los datos oficiales a nivel de condado de 2004 a 2008, examinamos los cambios en el uso del suelo de las ciudades a nivel de prefectura y analizamos la relación espacial entre los cambios en el uso del suelo y el crecimiento económico. Los datos oficiales sobre cambios en el uso del suelo se dividen en varias categorías de uso del suelo dentro de tres niveles todos los años. El primer nivel incluye el suelo agrícola, el suelo para construcción y el suelo sin utilizar. El segundo nivel incluye diez categorías de utilización del suelo. El tercer nivel incluye 52 subcategorías.
La tabla 1 muestra los cambios en el uso del suelo a nivel nacional de 2004 a 2008, período durante el cual se reconvirtió una mayor cantidad de suelo para usos de construcción, mientras que la cantidad de suelo agrícola y suelo sin utilizar disminuyó. Entre las categorías de suelo agrícola, el suelo para pastoreo y el suelo cultivado se redujeron en 12,69 millones de mu (0,85 millones de hectáreas) y 11,27 millones de mu (0,75 millones de hectáreas), respectivamente. El suelo sin utilizar se redujo en 17,91 millones de mu (1,19 millones de hectáreas).
Debido a las recientes y rápidas industrialización y urbanización, no es de sorprender que las reconversiones de suelo que se llevaron a cabo a mayor velocidad en China hayan sido las destinadas para uso de construcción, que sumaron 18,83 millones de mu (1,26 millones de hectáreas). En la categoría de asentamientos y emplazamientos industriales y mineros, las ciudades, las ciudades designadas y los emplazamientos industriales y mineros fueron los que experimentaron una expansión del suelo más rápida, llegando a tasas de crecimiento del 19,61 por ciento, 13,33 por ciento y 12,42 por ciento, respectivamente, mientras que la superficie de suelo destinada a asentamientos rurales disminuyó. Asimismo, grandes cantidades de suelo se reconvirtieron para su utilización en el transporte, particularmente para la construcción de autopistas.
El presente análisis a nivel nacional oculta diferentes variaciones espaciales en los cambios en el uso del suelo en provincias y regiones concretas (figura 1). Así, analizamos los cambios en el uso del suelo a nivel provincial, centrándonos en los cambios acaecidos en el suelo cultivado, el suelo urbano (que incluye ciudades y pueblos designados), los emplazamientos industriales y mineros autónomos, los asentamientos rurales y el suelo para transporte destinado a autopistas.
La figura 2 muestra que la pérdida de suelo cultivado se dio principalmente en la región este y central de China. El crecimiento económico, la urbanización y la industrialización se han acelerado en las provincias de Hebei, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Guangdong y Guangxi, donde la mayor parte del suelo cultivado se reconvirtió con fines urbanos, industriales y de transporte. Las provincias de Shanxi, Shaanxi, Chongqing y Sichuan también experimentaron una rápida reconversión de su suelo cultivado para fines de actividades no relacionadas con la agricultura. Dichas provincias se encuentran en el cinturón geográfico de transición en China, donde el suelo cultivado es la mejor opción a la hora de realizar proyectos de construcción y desarrollo. Por el contrario, las provincias del interior, tales como Tíbet, Qinghai, Xinjiang, Mongolia interior y Heilongjiang, experimentaron ciertos incrementos en el suelo cultivado.
El suelo destinado a asentamientos rurales se ve influenciado tanto por las nuevas políticas sobre el campo y el crecimiento de los ingresos rurales. El aumento en los ingresos ha tenido un impacto sobre la reconversión del suelo para asentamientos rurales en las provincias del este, como Guangdong, Fujian, Zhejiang, Guangxi, Hebei y Tianjin, y en ciertas provincias del interior, como Heilongjiang, Mongolia interior, Xinjiang, Qinghai, Tíbet, Yunnan, Guizhou, Hubei y Shanxi. Sin embargo, algunas provincias experimentaron descensos significativos en la cantidad de terrenos utilizados para asentamientos rurales, particularmente en Jiangsu, Jiangxi y Anhui. Este descenso puede tener relación con las nuevas políticas sobre el campo, que literalmente han obligado a los campesinos a mudarse a las ciudades.
La urbanización y la industrialización son los principales motores de la expansión del suelo no destinado a usos agrícolas en China. La tasa de urbanización creció del 40,50 por ciento al 45,68 por ciento entre 2004 y 2008, período en el que todas las provincias experimentaron una expansión del suelo urbano e industrial (figura 3). No obstante, la mayor parte de la expansión del suelo urbano se dio al sur del río Yangtze. En el norte, sólo Shandong, Anhui y Jiangsu experimentaron cambios importantes en el suelo urbano e industrial.
El rápido crecimiento de la cantidad de suelo utilizado para emplazamientos industriales y mineros se observa principalmente en las provincias del este, tanto en términos de cambios absolutos como relativos, en concreto en Fujian, Jiangsu, Zhejiang y Hebei (figura 4). Con tasas de crecimiento relativamente menores, Guangdong, Shandong y Liaoning experimentaron también la reconversión de una gran cantidad de suelo para emplazamientos industriales y mineros. Las provincias de Mongolia interior, Qinghai y Tíbet en el oeste del país experimentaron un rápido crecimiento de terrenos para emplazamientos industriales y mineros, aunque se observó un bajo crecimiento absoluto.
De 2004 a 2008, China dio un gran impulso al desarrollo de redes de transporte mediante la construcción de nuevos ferrocarriles y autopistas para sostener el crecimiento económico. A nivel nacional, el suelo destinado al transporte creció cerca de 10 por ciento durante dicho período. En muchas provincias se observó un crecimiento más rápido en la cantidad de suelo utilizado para el transporte que en el país en su conjunto, incluyendo Mongolia interior, Hebei, Qinghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Chongqing, Hubei, Anhui, Jiangxi y Guangxi. La confiscación de terrenos para construir autopistas se concentró principalmente en las provincias del este, y los mayores aumentos absolutos se dieron en las provincias de Zhejiang, Jiangsu y Hebei.
En general, China ha experimentado cambios muy importantes en el uso del suelo, en concreto en las provincias del este y en algunas de la región central. El patrón espacial de cambios en el uso del suelo es coherente con el cambio espacial del crecimiento económico, ya que las provincias del este gozan de ventajas institucionales y de ubicación y economías de aglomeración. Estas provincias han atraído la mayor parte de las inversiones extranjeras, particularmente aquellas relacionadas con las industrias que utilizan el capital y la tecnología de forma intensiva, y son las exportadoras líderes de los productos chinos.
La aceptación dentro de la Organización Mundial de Comercio ha redundado en aún mayores beneficios para las industrias ubicadas en la región este de China, ya que tienen mayor acceso a los mercados internacionales. Por otro lado, a medida que las industrias continúan aglomerándose, la región este ha experimentado un aumento en los costos del suelo, de la mano de obra y del medio ambiente, obligando a algunas industrias tradicionales a mudarse a las provincias centrales. Algunas de estas áreas recientemente han atraído inversiones y han experimentado un crecimiento económico más rápido, lo que elevó su nivel de importancia entre las economías regionales de China.
Correlaciones entre los cambios en el uso del suelo y el crecimiento económico
A fin de investigar la relación existente entre los cambios en el uso del suelo y el crecimiento económico de forma sistemática en todas las ciudades y provincias, calculamos los coeficientes de correlación entre la tasa de crecimiento del PIB de 2005 a 2009 y la tasa de cambios en diferentes categorías de suelo. La extensión de dicha correlación puede depender de diferentes factores económicos, de ubicación e institucionales. Analizamos el impacto que tiene el tamaño de la ciudad, la ubicación, la estructura industrial, la cantidad de inversiones extranjeras directas (IED) y las limitaciones en la oferta de terrenos sobre la relación existente entre los cambios en el uso del suelo y el crecimiento económico. Los coeficientes de correlación se calculan además utilizando submuestras de las ciudades clasificadas según dichos factores.
Los resultados inesperados muestran que sólo existen unos pocos, y pequeños, coeficientes de correlación significativos entre la tasa de cambios en el uso del suelo y la tasa de crecimiento económico (He, Huang y Wang 2012). Los cambios en el suelo destinado a otros tipos de transporte (tales como aeropuertos, puertos y ductos) poseen un coeficiente significativamente positivo. Los coeficientes de correlación para suelo urbano, emplazamientos industriales y mineros, ferrocarriles y autopistas resultaron apenas significativos.
Algunas evidencias muestran que el tamaño de la ciudad, la ubicación geográfica, la situación fiscal, la oferta de terrenos y las IED realizadas pueden moderar la correlación existente entre los cambios en el uso del suelo y el crecimiento económico. Por ejemplo, la expansión del suelo urbano se relaciona con el crecimiento económico de manera positiva en la región central de China, pero de manera negativa en las regiones del este y el oeste. Los emplazamientos industriales y mineros autónomos aumentan significativamente junto con el crecimiento económico en el oeste de la China. Sin embargo, en general, la correlación entre la tasa de cambios en el uso del suelo y el crecimiento económico es algo débil.
Dado que el suelo puede tomarse como un factor en la función productora, la cantidad de suelo puede contribuir en forma directa al crecimiento del PIB. Calculamos los coeficientes de correlación entre el crecimiento absoluto del PIB de 2005 a 2009 y los cambios absolutos en el uso del suelo de 2004 a 2008 a fin de analizar esta relación y descubrir si presentan una estrecha correlación. A nivel nacional, la reconversión de una mayor cantidad de suelo cultivado para fines no relacionados con la agricultura contribuye significativamente al crecimiento absoluto del PIB, con un coeficiente de correlación de -0,26. Una mayor cantidad de suelo para uso urbano y para fines industriales y mineros se relaciona en forma significativa y positiva con los aumentos en el PIB.
La existencia de coeficientes de correlación significativos entre los cambios en el uso del suelo y el crecimiento económico sugiere que el suelo ha sido un importante factor impulsor del crecimiento económico, aunque dicho aporte positivo se ve moderado por diferentes factores, tales como el tamaño de la ciudad, la ubicación, la estructura industrial, la situación fiscal y la utilización de IED. Se observa que la reconversión de suelo cultivado para fines no relacionados con la agricultura contribuye al crecimiento económico, especialmente en ciudades de más de 5 millones de habitantes, que realizaron IED por más de US$200 millones, y que poseen mayores limitaciones en el suelo para fines agrícolas, un dominio de la industria secundaria y una ubicación en la región central de China.
Claramente, el suelo no agrícola es más productivo que el suelo cultivado en las ciudades grandes e industriales. En los últimos años, a medida que la implementación de políticas del gobierno central se centró en el desarrollo de la región central de China, las provincias del interior han atraído mayores inversiones, tanto nacionales como extranjeras, y han experimentado un rápido crecimiento económico a medida que el suelo cultivado se ha ido reconvirtiendo para usos urbano e industrial.
En términos comparativos, la expansión del suelo urbano posee una mayor correlación con el crecimiento del PIB en las ciudades más pequeñas y en aquellas ubicadas en el interior. Estos tipos de ciudades tienen más probabilidades de depender del arrendamiento de suelos a fin de generar ingresos municipales, ya que enfrentan mayores limitaciones fiscales. En dichas áreas, la acumulación de capital derivada del arrendamiento de suelos es una típica estrategia de desarrollo municipal. Además, la expansión del suelo urbano cumple una importante función para estimular el crecimiento económico cuando las limitaciones fiscales son mayores, la oferta de terrenos se encuentra estrictamente controlada, dominan las industrias terciarias y se utilizan más inversiones extranjeras. La expansión del suelo industrial también contribuye de manera significativa al crecimiento económico, especialmente en las ciudades que tienen más limitaciones fiscales y más actividades industriales.
La reciente explosión experimentada en el desarrollo de infraestructura del transporte también ha contribuido al crecimiento económico. El aumento del suelo para construir autopistas ha estimulado el crecimiento económico sin ningún tipo de límites. Las ciudades ubicadas en las regiones del oeste y aquellas que presenten un bajo nivel de recaudación fiscal son las que más se benefician de las nuevas autopistas, mientras que la expansión del ferrocarril se relaciona en menor medida con el crecimiento económico. La construcción de otros tipos de infraestructura de transporte (aeropuertos, puertos, ductos) ha representado un papel fundamental para facilitar el crecimiento económico en ciudades más pequeñas y ubicadas hacia el este, así como también en aquellas ciudades cuyas economías se encuentran dominadas por las industrias de servicios.
El análisis de correlación ofrece pruebas claras que demuestran que el aumento de suelo urbano, industrial y para fines de transporte se relaciona de forma significativa y positiva con el crecimiento económico. La reconversión de suelo cultivado ha contribuido a la expansión económica en varias regiones de China; no obstante, la importancia de la ampliación del suelo no destinado a actividades agrícolas en función del crecimiento económico se encuentra moderada por condiciones sociales, económicas y geográficas.
Conclusión y debate
Desde la implementación de su reforma económica, China ha perseguido un modelo de crecimiento basado en el uso intensivo de recursos que ha obligado al suelo a cumplir un papel fundamental en el sostenimiento de su rápido crecimiento económico. Esto ha dado como resultado una gran oferta de suelo desarrollable y una rápida reconversión de suelos agrícolas en suelos no relacionados con la agricultura. En China, el suelo no es sólo el resultado del crecimiento económico sino también su motor.
La conversión del suelo cultivado para fines no agrícolas se ha concentrado en las regiones del este y del centro del país. Con la implementación de nuevas estrategias de desarrollo del campo y la imposición de limitaciones más estrictas en cuanto a la oferta de terrenos, China ha experimentado una reducción de los asentamientos rurales en la mayor parte de la región central y noreste. La expansión del suelo urbano e industrial ha dominado los cambios del uso del suelo en todo el país. El desarrollo del transporte, incluyendo nuevas autopistas, ferrocarriles, aeropuertos, puertos y ductos, también ha sido una de las principales causas de consumo de terrenos en los últimos años, particularmente en las regiones este y central.
El análisis de componentes principales en base a los datos sobre cambios en el uso del suelo de las ciudades a nivel de prefectura indicó una significativa variación espacial en los cambios en el uso del suelo entre las ciudades chinas y demuestra que tienen una autocorrelación espacial. El análisis de correlación también demostró una débil relación entre la tasa de crecimiento del PIB y la tasa de cambios en el uso del suelo. Sin embargo, en términos absolutos los cambios en el uso del suelo y el crecimiento del PIB presentan una fuerte correlación, lo que indica que la cantidad de terrenos constituye un factor fundamental en el crecimiento económico.
Por lo general, las teorías occidentales sobre crecimiento económico consideran que el suelo cumple una función marginal en el crecimiento económico. Nuestro análisis exploratorio sugiere que, en China, se da la situación contraria. A medida que China se urbaniza, se industrializa y se globaliza, va experimentando cambios significativos en el uso del suelo que presentan una correlación con el crecimiento económico. Esta relación significativa se asocia a los particulares sistemas de propiedad estatal del suelo y de derechos de uso del suelo en China. Como tal, el suelo puede utilizarse como una poderosa herramienta de intervención macroeconómica. El arrendamiento a largo plazo de derechos de utilización del suelo incentiva a los gobiernos locales a vender terrenos para generar ingresos totales que posteriormente se utilizan para financiar el desarrollo urbano e industrial y la provisión de infraestructura.
En consecuencia, el suelo ha cumplido una función fundamental en el rápido crecimiento económico de China. Sin embargo, este tipo de urbanización e industrialización basada en el suelo ya ha causado graves tensiones sociales, una degradación del medioambiente y fluctuaciones económicas. Los ingresos totales generados por el arrendamiento de suelo no son sustentables, si se tiene en cuenta que, aún siendo tan extensa, China posee una limitada oferta de suelo. Puede esperarse que el papel del suelo como factor impulsor del crecimiento económico se reduzca a medida que China experimente gradualmente un avance industrial.
Sobre los autores
Canfei He es profesor asociado en la Facultad de Ciencias Urbanas y Ambientales de la Universidad de Pekín, además de director asociado del Centro de Desarrollo Urbano y Políticas de Suelo de la Universidad de Pekín y el Instituto Lincoln en Beijing.
Zhiji Huang es estudiante de doctorado en la Facultad de Ciencias Urbanas y Ambientales de la Universidad de Pekín y del Centro de Desarrollo Urbano y Políticas de Suelo de la Universidad de Pekín y el Instituto Lincoln en Beijing.
Weikai Wang es estudiante de posgrado en la Facultad de Ciencias Urbanas y Ambientales de la Universidad de Pekín y del Centro de Desarrollo Urbano y Políticas de Suelo de la Universidad de Pekín y el Instituto Lincoln en Beijing.
Referencias
Bai, X., J. Chen y P. Shi. 2011. Landscape urbanization and economic growth in China: Positive feedbacks and sustainability dilemmas. Environmental Science and Technology 46: 132–139.
Centro de Derecho sobre Recursos de Suelo y Mineros de China. 2007. The evolution of land policy’s involvement in macro-control policies of China. China Land 6, 53–56 (en chino).
Ding, C. y E. Lichtenberg. 2011. Land and urban economic growth in China. Journal of Regional Science 51(2): 299–317.
He, Canfei, Zhiji Huang y Weikai Wang. 2012. Land use changes and urban economic growth in China: An exploratory analysis. Documento de trabajo. Beijing: Centro de Desarrollo Urbano y Políticas de Suelo de la Universidad de Pekín y el Instituto Lincoln.
Lin, G. C. S. 2007. Reproducing spaces of Chinese urbanization: New city-based and land-centered urban transformation. Urban Studies 44 (9): 1827–1855.
Lin, G. C. S. y S. P. S. Ho. 2005. The state, land system, and land development processes in contemporary China. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 95(2): 411–436.
Ministerio de Suelo y Recursos. 2008. Land use change survey data. República Popular China.
Ping, Y. C. 2011. Explaining land use change in a Guangdong county: the supply side of the story. The China Quarterly 2107: 626–648.
Tao, R., F. Su, M. Liu y G. Cao. 2010. Land leasing and local public finance in China’s regional development: Evidence from prefecture level cities. Urban Studies 47(10): 2217–2236.
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With more than 25,000 local governments in the United States involved in the review and approval of proposed changes in zoning, planning, and property development, the number of local land use decisions made annually likely runs into the millions. While the vast majority of such determinations proceed in a routine fashion, more complex and contentious changes in land use and zoning frequently involve lengthy and acrimonious conflicts. Excess development entitlements in the Intermountain West (p. 4) exemplify such a challenging land use issue.
Land use and real estate development disputes are ranked among the most common types of civil disagreements in the United States, and they generally include multiple parties, properties, and interests. These contests produce costs for all parties directly involved as well as for the public more generally. Yet long experience with the resolution of land use disputes indicates that changes in the land use decision-making process can produce better outcomes at lower cost.
Local governments normally have a board charged with making decisions about changes in land use, and such boards employ a four-step process. First, the party seeking a change or permission to develop a property files an application with the board. Second, the board reviews the submission and may seek responses or modifications from the applicant. Third, there is an opportunity for public comment, which may lead to an additional dialog between the board and the applicant and further modifications in the application. Finally, the board renders a decision. This process works well for the majority of applications that are processed reasonably quickly. However, most of the board’s time is spent on the minority of cases that involve many interests and numerous rights that can be overlapping, contradictory, or imprecise.
The typical four-step process focuses on adjudicating rights; when the issues are few and simple, and the rights are well defined for the properties in question, this method works well. For more complex cases, however, an expanded approach that focuses on mutual gains for all concerned parties is more promising. The mutual gains approach is most productive when: there are many interested stakeholders; the deciding board has some discretion in the particular decision; the impacts of the decision are long-term and far-reaching; and a non-collaborative outcome is likely to be challenged by one or more of the involved stakeholders. The mutual gains approach should not be viewed as an alternative to the usual four-step process but as an expansion of it—essentially through the addition of extra steps or the expansion of existing steps in the standard procedure.
The key to successful use of the mutual gains approach is to discover stakeholders’ underlying interests—behind their publicly announced positions—and then to develop new options or solutions that are responsive to those interests. It is ideal if this step occurs early in the process when positions are still flexible.
This process of investigation and discovery is an element of the first stage of the mutual gains approach, which involves identifying the stakeholders, listening carefully to their concerns, and building on their interests. In the usual four-step process, this would likely occur in a pre-application phase addressing development and design concepts before final proposals are formulated. The second stage of the mutual gains approach is to design a process for collaboration that involves all stakeholders and offers opportunities for them to share information and learn from each other. The third stage is to promote successful deliberation among the stakeholders—typically by using a good facilitator who can build relationships and trust among those involved. The final stage is to implement the agreements that have been forged, ensuring that the proposed solutions incorporate the accords reached by the participants while also meeting the requirements of the decision-making board.
A much more detailed description of the mutual gains approach, along with informative case studies, is available in the recent Lincoln Institute book, Land in Conflict, authored by Sean Nolon, Ona Ferguson, and Pat Field. This title is available in both print and ebook formats.
