It is difficult to overstate how ongoing population loss has devastated Detroit. Between 1900 and 1950, when the rise of U.S. automobile manufacturing made the city one of America’s premier industrial and cultural centers, the population spiked from 300,000 to 1.85 million. Beginning in 1950, however, it began to fall. And its decline has been continuous to the present day, plummeting to just 700,000 in 2010, at a rate of descent nearly as swift as the rate of ascent in the first half of the 20th century.

Despite Detroit’s decades-long effort to keep pace with population loss by removing dilapidated housing stock, roughly a quarter of its 380,000 parcels are now abandoned, managed by the city or other public entities. As of July 2014, 114,000 properties have been razed, and 80,000 more are considered blighted (Austen 2014).

While the downtown is recovering and the suburbs remain vital, the “unfathomable dissolution of [the] built landscape” in vast areas of the city may shock the unsuspecting visitor (Austen 2014).

The first installment in a two-part series, this article considers the fiscal causes and repercussions of Detroit’s surplus of housing and vacant property: from the extent and location of abandoned homes and lots throughout Detroit to the downward spiral of house price declines leading to overassessment, property tax delinquency, and foreclosures; the public acquisition of that property; the pattern of land values across the city; and, finally, some potential ways to reconcile the remaining number of people with the amount of vacant and publicly held property. These measures range from targeting densely populated neighborhoods for redevelopment to establishing a greenbelt and reclaiming vacant parcels for public use as parks, forests, industrial buffers, retention ponds, and other open space (Austen 2014).

Factors Behind the Fall

The reasons for Detroit’s demise are numerous and perhaps too familiar. Federally subsidized transportation infrastructure, such as the Interstate highway system, facilitated rapid suburbanization, which was further enabled by permissive development codes. Racial tension, global economic forces, and corruption corroded what remained of the city proper. In the early stages of the malaise, higher-income residents, most of them Caucasian, left for the suburbs in search of a better quality of life, as shown in table1. By 1990, the African-American population had peaked as well and began to drop in the first decade of the 21st century. Beginning in the 1960s, Michigan auto manufacturing began its long, precipitous decline, disproportionately impacting Detroit and Flint. The loss of well-paying middle-class jobs further harmed the urban demographic and economic base, as households sought new employment opportunities elsewhere. Rising crime rates and continued erosion of public services induced another wave of exits.

Table 1 illustrates this downturn in the city’s demographic and economic conditions from 1950 through 2010. By 2012, according to government sources, median household income was just $25,000, less than half of the national median income. Poverty and unemployment rates were 38 and 27.5 percent, respectively. The labor force participation rate was 54 percent (compared to 63 percent nationwide), and for every 6.35 employed workers, there was one person receiving Social Security Disability benefits (compared to 1 of 12 nationwide). More than 34 percent of the city’s population received food stamps, and 81 percent of children in the Detroit Public Schools qualified for the Free and Reduced Lunch Program. Revenue streams became increasingly dependent on external sources, including nonresidents, as discussed in box 1. In 2013, when the city finally succumbed to the weight of accumulating fiscal challenges and declared bankruptcy, its debt and unfunded liabilities amounted to $18 billion—or $68,000 per household, which is about 2.7 times the median household income (Turbeville 2013).

The Failed Housing Market

The enormous excess supply of housing that accumulated over decades as a result of winnowing demand in Detroit corroded the value of that property. The real estate crisis of 2007–2008 dealt the final blow, resulting in the near-complete breakdown of Detroit’s housing market. By 2010, the average price of a residential property had plummeted to about $7,000 from $57,000 in 2006 (Hodge et al. 2014a). Detroit’s current excess of land and housing would likely suppress real estate price recovery in the coming years even if the population were to stabilize.

Property Tax Delinquency, Abandonment, and Public Acquisition of Property

Tax officials have not recalibrated assessment values to reflect house price declines. The resulting overassessment is as high as 80 percent (Hodge et al. 2014a), contributing to a general unwillingness to pay taxes, according to Alm et al. (2014). Their research also shows that additional factors such as high statutory tax rates and limited services such as public safety worsen this delinquency as well.

In the midst of the real estate crisis, property tax delinquency reached an alarming 50 percent (Alm et al. 2014). Figure 2 (p. 13) shows delinquency rates by neighborhood across the city in 2010. Property tax collection depends on a jurisdiction’s ability to impose sanctions for nonpayment of taxes, as noted by Langsdorf (1973). When real estate values collapse, taxing authorities have no workable enforcement mechanism; homeowners’ savings from nonpayment of property tax are greater than the value of the house they own and would lose in the instance of foreclosure. Further, proceeds from the sale of low-valued tax-foreclosed property are insufficient to cover back taxes owed and the government costs of initiating foreclosure proceedings.

Widespread failure to pay property taxes and the subsequent abandonment of homes has resulted in the public acquisition of thousands of properties throughout Detroit. Fifteen percent of the parcels within the 139-square-mile city are now empty, and nearly 25 percent of Detroit’s land area is now nontaxable, owned and managed by the city or some other public entity (Sands and Skidmore 2014), as illustrated in figure 3.

The Downward Spiral of Foreclosures

Currently, the number of properties flowing into public hands via tax foreclosure far outpaces the number of publicly held properties being purchased back by private taxpaying owners.

In Michigan, delinquent property taxes are subject to a 4 percent administration fee and 1 percent monthly interest on the delinquent amount computed at a non-compounded rate, beginning in the first month of nonpayment. After one year of delinquency, the city forfeits the property to county government, and the owner becomes subject to an additional 0.5 percent monthly interest charge. During this two-year period, owners may redeem their properties by paying all outstanding taxes and fees.

If property taxes go unpaid for more than two years, the Wayne County Treasurer initiates foreclosure proceedings. After a show cause hearing in the Circuit Court, the County Treasurer publicly auctions the foreclosed parcels. The starting bid equals the unpaid property taxes plus interest and penalties, and the proceeds are distributed proportionately to the taxing jurisdictions. If the property doesn’t sell at the first auction, the county lowers the minimum bid to $500 and holds a second auction. This procedure has led to further tax evasion, as some homeowners elect to ignore their tax bills with the expectation that they will be able to repurchase the parcel for $500 at the second auction.

Property that doesn’t sell at either auction may be transferred to a public body (city or state) or to a state or local land bank, or it may be held for a subsequent auction. County records indicate that 80 percent of the parcels sold to private buyers at auction over the past two years are once again delinquent on taxes (MacDonald 2013). Given that the tax delinquency rate is 67 percent for non-homestead property owners (Alm et al. 2014), it seems likely that a significant proportion of buyers at auction are absentee landlords who intend to reduce their operating expenses and increase their net rental income by never paying property taxes.

Property taxes are effectively optional on low-valued parcels as well. To minimize the backlog of tax-delinquent lots (MacDonald 2013), the county does not foreclose on homeowners who owe less than $1,600 in taxes and penalties in aggregate, effectively rendering these debts optional.

Expected revenue from the sale of low-valued parcels is insufficient to cover legal expenses associated with tax foreclosure and unpaid property tax balances. The end result is an increasing rate of delinquency and a growing inventory of unwanted property that ends up in the public sector, where it generates no revenue for the city.

Where to Go from Here?

Another wave of property tax-related foreclosures is expected in late 2014 and early 2015. What can be done to stabilize the situation?

Curbing Property Tax Delinquency

As mentioned, delinquency will abate when tax payers perceive that they receive commensurate returns for their money. Thus, improving the tax-service package by upgrading core services such as public safety will reduce evasion and lateness (Alm et al. 2014). Under the leadership of recently elected Mayor Mike Duggan, city government is taking steps to improve basic public service provision and put its fiscal house in order. For example, just 35,000 of 88,000 streetlights currently work, so Duggan plans to install 2,400 functioning streetlights per month (Austen 2014). He also increased the number of operating buses from 143 to 190, and improved snow plowing during the particularly harsh winter.

Lowering tax rates would modestly reduce delinquency as well (Alm et al. 2014). Roughly double the regional average, Detroit tax rates are at the state’s maximum of 67 mills and 85 mills per assessed value for homestead and non-homestead properties, respectively. While a reduction would improve the competitive position of the city relative to other communities in the region, currently there is no discussion of reducing property tax rates.

Aligning assessed values more closely with actual market conditions will also reduce delinquency. Mayor Duggan recently promised to lower assessments by 5 to 20 percent across the city to reconcile them with state guidelines. However, Duggan’s promised reductions are just a small fraction of the 80 percent cut needed to bring assesment to market levels, according to Hodge et al. (2014a).

Removing Land from the Market

In the absence of robust demand for land, which seems unlikely in the near future, the excess must be removed from the market for a period of time in order for real estate value to improve broadly across the city. Given that public entities now hold so much property, it is within the power of government authorities to credibly remove it from the market. Without this type of policy action, the possibility that these parcels could be quickly transferred to the private sector serves to hamper price recovery.

Currently, public lands are held by many public entities. Authorities from the City of Detroit, Wayne County, and state government are working to consolidate these parcels under a single entity that can manage them more effectively. Detroit Future City (2010) details the extent of the fragmented ownership of public lands:

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Public land in Detroit is held by many separate agencies, including city, county, and state agencies, as well as autonomous or quasi-governmental entities such as the Detroit Public Schools, the Detroit Housing Commission, and the Detroit Economic Growth Corporation. Few other cities have such fragmented holding of their public land inventory. There is no consistency of policy, procedure, or mission among these agencies, while many are hamstrung by burdensome legal requirements and complex procedures. The Department of Planning and Development controls the largest number of properties, yet its ability to do strategic disposition is constrained by procedural obstacles, including the need to obtain City Council approval for all transactions, however small and insignificant from a citywide perspective.

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While this consolidation process is necessary, it is not sufficient. Financial resources are required to remove blight and implement land use plans. City leaders are focused mainly on strategies to return these parcels to private ownership. If they can stimulate greater interest in Detroit property, this approach might be viable.

Indeed, opportunities for private ownership are emerging in the central business district (CBD). Daniel Gilbert, founder of Quicken Loans, has moved his headquarters to downtown Detroit and invested $1.3 billion in city real estate (Forbes 2014). And downtown renewal has led to substantial rental price increases (Christie 2014).

Land values are very high in the CBD, as depicted in figure 4 (p. 16) by the black parcels, which represent the very highest land values on the map. Detroit’s land value gradient is very steep, however. While several areas within the donut around the CBD have retained some worth, land values plunge rapidly as distance from the CBD increases, though they rise again near the city’s border, probably because amenities such as shopping are available in the nearby suburbs.

Given the weak demand outside the CBD, it may be more effective to determine which publicly held properties should return to private taxpaying parties, which properties should be taken off the market for a decade or two, with the option of returning land to the market should conditions change, and which should be permanently removed from the market.

The 2012 master plan, as outlined by Detroit Future City, calls for the reclamation of land for parks, forests, industrial buffers, greenways, retention ponds, community gardens, and even campgrounds (Austen 2014). Full implementation of this ambitious proposal requires significant financial resources. But consider how state and federal authorities intervened in the last major episode of mass tax foreclosure. During the Great Depression, many homesteaders on marginal agricultural lands in Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin were unable to pay their property taxes, and this default resulted in a mass wave of tax delinquency, foreclosure, abandonment, and eventual forfeiture. In these states, county governments frequently became the owners of thousands of acres, much of which was eventually sold to the state and federal governments. The six national forests in Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Michigan, as well as the region’s numerous state forests, all have origins in this mass land abandonment of the Depression Era, as state and federal authorities pieced together a patchwork of adjacent lands purchased from counties eager to sell off their tax-forfeited property.

Today, state and federal authorities have no taste for a Detroit “bailout.” But history suggests that state and federal governments could help Detroit regain fiscal viability by purchasing patchworks of unwanted parcels, making payments in lieu of taxes, as is typical for other publicly owned lands, and then using the land for the benefit of the general public. Potential uses are mapped out in the aforementioned city master plan which the second installment of this series will explore. A federal, state, and local government partnership to reclaim these properties could help stabilize the land market and generate a revenue stream for the city and the other overlying taxing jurisdictions (including the state government via the state education tax). Property value recovery in combination with downtown reinvestment, continued efforts to improve Detroit’s tax-service package and remove blight, and long-run investment in Detroit’s human and social capital are essential elements of a sustainable Detroit recovery.

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Box 1: Targeting Nonresidents for Revenue

Detroit’s revenue streams have become increasingly dependent on external sources, including nonresidents, as its population and economic base have declined. This shift occurred in part because over time Michigan state legislatures empowered the City of Detroit to use tax-exporting strategies to help shore up weakening fiscal conditions and deal with massive structural changes to the regional economy. While there were periods during which it appeared that Detroit was on the cusp of recovery, various forces prevented “escape velocity.”

Today, the City of Detroit relies on the income tax, property tax, casino wagering tax, state revenue sharing, a utility user’s tax, federal grants, and various fees and licenses to fund public services. Of these, the casino wagering tax and the city income tax were adopted to bolster fading revenues from more traditional sources.

The casino wagering tax, based on gamers’ winning receipts, has become particularly important to the City of Detroit over the last decade, as shown in figure 2, which summarizes trends in the city’s major revenue sources from 1960 through 2012. The state legislature authorized casino gaming activity and the wagering tax in Detroit in 1996, to help the city address its fiscal challenges. By 2001, casino construction had been completed. The $180 million in additional annual revenues helped to stave off financial pressures even as other sources, such as income taxes and state shared revenues, were in decline. Up to 85 percent of gamers at the three major Detroit casinos are nonresidents, according to recent reports and interviews with gaming experts (Miklojcik 2014).

Since 1963, the city income tax has represented Detroit’s largest and, for a number of years, fastest-growing revenue source. At the time of adoption, the majority of the income tax was paid by city residents. As Detroit’s population has declined, however, the income tax on nonresidents who work in the city has become an increasing share of the city income tax base, composed of wages and salaries earned at a city-based job. The tax rate is 2.4 percent for city residents, whereas nonresidents pay 1.2 percent. While corporations and partnerships also pay an income tax, it is a very small portion of total revenues collected. According to Scorsone and Skidmore (2014), about half of the city income tax revenue in Detroit is paid by nonresidents.

State revenue sharing continues to play a critical role in Detroit’s finances, though population loss has diminished even this income source. In Michigan, state government collects a statewide sales tax and then shares a portion of the proceeds with municipal governments. Sales tax revenues are allocated to local governments based on constitutional provisions as well as state statute. The constitutional portion of revenue sharing is based on each jurisdiction’s share of the total state population. Given the dwindling number of Detroit residents, this portion of state revenue sharing has been falling for decades. The city experienced significant growth in total revenue sharing funds through the 1970s and 1980s, due to increases in statutory revenue sharing, which is distributed by formulae that have been changed by legislators many times in recent decades. But new changes to the statute combined with stagnation in the sales tax led to declining growth and eventual decline in revenue sharing for cities across the entire state in the 1990s. As Michigan entered a decade-long recession, this decline continued for most local jurisdictions, including Detroit, through the 2000s.

Some have pointed to revenue sharing reductions as a major source of stress for the City of Detroit, and a major catalyst for the bankruptcy. However, these declines affected all cities that received revenue sharing in Michigan; while cuts to revenue sharing likely influenced the timing of Detroit’s bankruptcy, they were not the ultimate cause. Further, it is important to note that revenue sharing for Detroit represents a net positive transfer of funds from the rest of the state to the city. According to the 2007 economic census, retail sales in the City of Detroit were $3.2 billion, or about 2.9 percent of the $109 billion in the State of Michigan.

In 2012, total state revenue sharing to all municipalities in Michigan was about $1 billion, and Detroit’s share of the total was $172 million, or 17.2 percent. Given that Detroit represents just 3 percent of total state retail sales in Michigan, one can conclude that the majority of state revenue sharing that flowed to Detroit originated from retail transactions that occurred outside the city.

As of 2014, the City of Detroit had approximately a $1 billion General Fund, considerably lower than in 2002 when revenue peaked at $1.4 billion. A 30 percent drop in revenues over time without a commensurate cut in expenditures led to the Detroit fiscal crisis and the eventual declaration of bankruptcy in 2013. By 2012, Detroit had borrowed more than $1 billion in an attempt to stave off default and a liquidity crisis (Michigan Department of Treasury 2013).

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About the Author

Mark Skidmore is professor of economics at Michigan State University, where he holds the Morris Chair in State and Local Government Finance and Policy, with joint appointments in the Department of Agricultural, Food and Resource Economics and the Department of Economics.

References

Alm, J., T. Hodge, G. Sands, and M. Skidmore. 2014. “Detroit Property Tax Delinquency—Social Contract in Crisis.” Lincoln Institute of Land Policy Working Paper.

Austen, B. 2014. “The Post-Apocalyptic Detroit.” New York Times, July 13. http://nyti.ms/1mFu3Jn

Center for Educational Performance and Information. Accessed in July 2014 from www.michigan.gov/cepi/0,4546,7-113-21423_30451—,00.html

City of Detroit. 2013. Comprehensive Annual Financial Report. www.detroitmi.gov/Portals/0/docs/finance/CAFR/Final%202012%20Detroit%20Financial%20Statements.pdf

Christie, Les. 2014. “I’ve Been Priced Out of Downtown Detroit.” CNN Money, May 27. http://money.cnn.com/2014/05/27/real_estate/downtown-detroit/index.html

Detroit Future City. 2010. Detroit Future City Strategic Framework Book. http://detroitfuturecity.com/framework

Forbes. 2014. “World’s Billionaires.” www.forbes.com/profile/daniel-gilbert

Hodge, T., D. McMillen, G. Sands, and M. Skidmore. 2014a. “Tax Base Erosion and Inequity from Michigan’s Assessment Growth Limit: The Case of Detroit.” Lincoln Institute of Land Policy Working Paper.

Hodge, T., G. Sands, and M. Skidmore. 2014b. “The Land Value Gradient in a (Nearly) Collapsed Urban Real Estate Market.” Lincoln Institute of Land Policy Working Paper.

Landsdorf, K. 1973. “Urban Decay, Property Tax Delinquency: A Solution in St. Louis.” The Urban Lawyer 5: 729–748.

MacDonald, C. 2013. “Half of Detroit Property Owners Don’t Pay Taxes.” The Detroit News, February 12.

Michigan Department of Treasury. 2013. Supplemental Documentation of the Detroit Financial Review Team. www.michigan.gov/documents/treasury/Review_Team_Report_Supplemental_2–19-13_411866_7.pdf

Michigan Department of Treasury. 2010. Real Property Tax Forfeiture and Foreclosure. www.michigan.gov/taxes/0,4676,7-238-43535_55601—,00.html

Miklojcik, J. 2014. President of Michigan Consultants. Information shared in personal interview with Eric Scorsone.

National Public Radio. 2014. “Chinese Investors Aren’t Snatching up Detroit Property Yet.” www.npr.org/2014/03/04/285711091/chinese-investors-arent-snatching-up-detroit-property-yet

Sands, G. and M. Skidmore. 2014. “Making Ends Meet: Options for Property Tax Reform in Detroit.” Forthcoming in Journal of Urban Affairs.

Scorsone, E. and M. Skidmore. 2014. “Blamed for Incompetence and Lack of Foresight and Left to Die.” Response to William Tabb’s “If Detroit Is Dead Some Things Need to Be Said at the Funeral.” Forthcoming in Journal of Urban Affairs.

Turbeville, W. 2013. “The Detroit Bankruptcy.” Demos, November 20. www.demos.org/publication/detroit-bankruptcy

Edesio Fernandes is a Brazilian lawyer and city planner based in London, where he is a part-time lecturer at the Development Planning Unit of University College London. He is also coordinator of IRGLUS (International Research Group on Law and Urban Space), a partner of United Nations/HABITAT. His research and teaching interests include urban and environmental law, planning and policy; local government and city management; and constitutional law and human rights in developing countries. For the last two decades, he has focused on the field of urban land regularization in Latin America and other regions.

Fernandes has lectured and taught in courses at the Lincoln Institute for several years and he coordinates the Institute’s Latin American Network on Urban Land Regularization. He helped organize and teach a course on informal land markets and regularization held at Lincoln House in October 2001, and is teaching the course again in November 2002 (see page 19). This conversation with Martim Smolka, senior fellow and director of the Lincoln Institute’s Program on Latin America and the Caribbean, explores some of these issues.

Martim Smolka: How did you become interested in informal land markets and regularization policies?

Edesio Fernandes: My interest in the problems of informal land markets goes back to the early 1980s, shortly after I graduated from Minas Gerais Federal University Law School in Belo Horizonte, Brazil. I began working at PLAMBEL, the state agency in charge of the metropolitan planning of Belo Horizonte, one of Brazil’s few historic planned cities. However, its detailed plans and maps did not reserve areas for the lower-income people who built the city, and as early as 1895, two years before its inauguration, 3,000 people were already living in favelas.

This number grew considerably over decades of intensive urbanization. In 1976, a pioneering zoning scheme was approved, but the favelas were again ignored and treated as unoccupied areas. In 1983, I participated in the interdisciplinary Pro-FAVELA team that drafted a legal formula to incorporate these areas into a revised zoning scheme. It was through this early work as a city planner, and by building academic bridges between legal and urban studies, that I came to explore the nature of the relationship between law, planning and sociospatial exclusion in third world cities.

MS: Has that legislation had any effect on the status of favelas in Belo Horizonte and Brazil in general?

EF: Until the 1970s, the official policy in Brazil towards favelas was eviction or neglect, with the occasional introduction of limited services for political convenience. The Pro-FAVELA program was a groundbreaking experience that sought to materialize the city’s newly recognized democratic commitment to sociopolitical and sociospatial inclusion of the favelas into the urban fabric. The approved formula has become a paradigm for urban land regularization in most Brazilian cities. The notion is that “special zones of social interest” should be created within the city’s zoning scheme, permitting planning and zoning regulations to be adapted to the specific requirements of the favela dwellers. Moreover, the formulation of specific land tenure policies should be combined with both inclusive urban planning mechanisms and participatory institutional processes of city management. This allows for the integration of informal settlements into the formal planning apparatus and for the introduction of services and infrastructure to redress long-standing inequalities.

MS: Are these goals now well integrated into the legal and administrative systems in Brazilian cities?

EF: Urban legislation has evolved in Brazil, but most Brazilian law courses do not offer specialized modules on urban land use and development control. Legal professionals in Brazil, and throughout Latin America, have long been trained to adopt an obsolete and individualistic approach to legal matters, typical of unreformed classical liberal legalism, and particularly the notion of absolute property rights. As a result, they are still largely unacquainted with recent legal developments, uninformed about the legal implications of socioeconomic dynamics and the challenges posed by rapid urbanization, unaware of the potential of different legal principles supporting urban legislation, especially the notion of the social function of property, and thus they are unprepared to deal with inevitable conflicts over the use and development of urban land. A groundbreaking legal development, though, took place in Brazil in 2001, with the enactment of Federal Law No. 10.257, entitled City Statute, which aims to regulate the original chapter on urban policy introduced by the 1988 Constitution. The new law provides consistent legal support to those municipalities committed to confronting the grave urban, social and environmental problems that directly affect the 82 percent of Brazilians who live in cities. In conceptual terms, the City Statute broke with the long-standing tradition of civil law and set the basis for a new legal-political paradigm for urban land use and development control. Municipalities must formulate territorial and land use policies, balancing the individual interests of landowners with the social, cultural and environmental interests of other groups, and the city as a whole. They are also required to integrate urban planning, legislation and management so as to democratize the local decision-making process and legitimize a new, socially oriented urban-legal order. The City Statute also recognized legal instruments to enable municipalities to promote land tenure regularization programs and facilitate access to urban land and housing.

MS: Can you elaborate on the connections between regularization, security of land tenure and broader concerns of poverty and social justice?

EF: On one hand, regularization programs focusing on upgrading projects have tended to neglect underlying land tenure issues, for example in the highly acclaimed Favela-Bairro program in Rio de Janeiro. As a result, these programs have frequently produced unintended perverse effects, such as occupation by drug lords, expropriation by force, and even, given the increasingly complex relationship between formal and informal land markets, what has been called “eviction by the market.” On the other hand, regularization programs focusing exclusively on the formal titling of individual plots, such as the large-scale programs inspired by the ideas of Hernando de Soto, have tended to reinforce unacceptable housing and living conditions in unserviced areas that are frequently remote and environmentally unsuitable.

In my experience, those programs that have tried to combine the two dimensions, upgrading and legalization, tend to be the most sustainable in urban, social and environmental terms. Comprehensive programs also tend to have a more controlled impact on both formal and informal land markets. Thus, they can be more effective in guaranteeing that the ultimate beneficiaries of the public investment will indeed be the residents in informal settlements, not the land developers and promoters who, by failing to offer affordable, sufficient and adequate housing options to the poor, have provoked the process of informal development in the first place.

MS: To what extent have these regularization programs really addressed or helped to resolve the problem of poverty alleviation?

EF: Regularization programs are always curative and need to be integrated with preventive urban planning policies, fiscal and legal measures, and management strategies aimed at promoting overall urban change, thus breaking with the cycle that has long produced urban informality. Moreover, they can only have a more significant impact on urban poverty if they are combined with programs aimed at broadening access to urban services and generating jobs and income to alleviate poverty.

There are many assumptions in this discussion that should not be taken for granted, especially given the findings of recent research. An enormous amount of money has been invested in regularization programs over the years, and it is about time that a comprehensive and critical review was promoted. There are many questions still left unanswered regarding the nature of the processes leading to irregular settlements, the means to address the issue and the method of actually implementing policies: How are informal settlements produced? Why is it important to regularize them? When and how should regularization programs be formulated? Who should pay for them, and how? What happens after the program is completed?

MS: What have you learned, as a lawyer, about the legalistic approach to titling policies?

EF: In particular, one should question critically the widely accepted argument that titling is the fundamental condition for residents in informal settlements to have access to services and credit, and thus to invest in their houses and businesses. On the whole, in consolidated situations where informal land occupation has been supported by sociopolitical mobilization of the residents, access to services and infrastructure has taken place regardless of their legal status. Research in several countries has already indicated that a set of socioeconomic and political-institutional circumstances may create a perception of security of tenure, thus encouraging people to invest in home improvements, even when the legalization process has not been completed. Research has also shown that jobless poor people have failed to gain access to formal credit even when they have titles, whereas untitled but employed people do get access to formal credit in some cases.

MS: Are you suggesting that the formalization of legal titles is not that important?

EF: No, what I mean is that it may indeed provide individual security of tenure, but it does not necessarily guarantee access to formal credit and does not produce sustainable settlements. Regularization alone usually fails to achieve what I think should be the ultimate objective of regularization programs—the sociospatial integration of the informal areas and communities. That said, titling is indeed important from many perspectives, such as to resolve domestic, family and neighborhood conflicts and to legally recognize sociopolitical rights. The challenge is to promote the recognition of individual security of tenure in a way that is compatible with the provision of social housing, thus reverting, or at least minimizing, the process of sociospatial segregation. The only way to do that is through a combination of urban planning mechanisms and city management strategies with innovative land tenure policies, stressing that there is a wide range of legal options other than individual freehold rights.

The importance of the topic is undeniable as the combined processes of urbanization and poverty are increasing internationally. UN figures suggest there are about 840 million people living in slums today, and reasonable projections suggest there will be 1.5 billion by 2020. This growing urbanization of poverty has already had many negative socioeconomic, political and environmental consequences, which tend to be aggravated by the processes of immigration and widespread organized crime.

MS: The Lincoln Institute has been deeply involved in these issues in Latin America for almost ten years. Do you have any final comments on how we can expand this work?

EF: The centrality of this discussion of intertwined land matters—land structure, access to land and housing, land management, and land use planning and development control—has been increasingly recognized internationally, confirming the relevance of the Lincoln Institute’s original mandate and overall research and teaching agenda. I believe the discussion of informal urban land development is of interest to all concerned about matters of social justice and human rights, as well as the conditions for market expansion in the context of economic globalization.

In closing, I would like to emphasize the importance of legal education. Urban change requires legal reform, which in its turn requires an adequate understanding of the nature, problems and shortcomings of the prevailing legal order, as well as the possibilities for change that it entails. The promotion of comparative research and teaching activities, such as those already supported by the Institute, is crucial, as well as support for academic and policy networks such as IRGLUS and the Latin American Network on Urban Land Regularization. The group of professionals in Latin America who have explored the interfaces between law and planning, and between legality and illegality, from a critical, sociolegal viewpoint is still quite small and needs to be widened. More than ever, it is imperative that we construct a sound legal discourse to provide support for new attempts to promote positive urban change, including by means of regularization programs. This is not an easy task, but we have been making progress.

While it is known as a region of great diversity, Latin America is also characterized by common legacies that directly or indirectly affect land issues. These include a heritage of patrimonialism based on a land ownership structure in which political influences determine the spatial allocation of public investments and services; strong central administrations with weak fiscal accountability at the local level; and a legal tradition with elitist codes and rigid, even anachronistic, land-related legislation. Urban planning, with its physical design bias, has tended to focus on the “legal” city while overlooking the “real” city. At a broader level, investments in the fast-growing built environment (i.e., urbanization) are relatively autonomous from the industrialization process. In a context of weak capital markets and high, often chronic, inflation land frequently takes on the role of a capitalization mechanism or a surrogate for the lack of social security.

Regional Trends

One of the main features of the functioning of urban land markets in Latin America is the magnitude and persistence of illegal, irregular, informal or clandestine activities in accessing and occupying land, largely resulting from the insufficient supply of serviced land at affordable prices. This scarcity of serviced land plays an important role in the region’s social culture, since access to land is often a tacit condition for citizenship and social mobility.

Perhaps most important are the multifaceted trends that are sweeping the continent and are opening new opportunities for urban land policy. First is the widespread re-democratization of many countries after long periods of authoritarian or military regimes, which has had numerous implications on land policy. There is a generalized increase in awareness of public officials’ liability and accountability in urban land management as in other aspects of public administration, as well as the emergence and public recognition of new social agents such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs). New forms of community participation and civil action are the expressions of a heightened consciousness of the need to legitimize alternatives to land access by the urban poor, including innovative modes of collective ownership and attention to gender issues in the regularization of illegally occupied land.

A second and related trend reflects the need for institutional and constitutional reforms accompanied by the redefinition of state roles. This process has had a number of manifestations, including:

• fiscal decentralization, resulting in pressure for new revenue sources at the local level and opportunities to improve on property tax collection;
• political and administrative decentralization, which has increased the power and autonomy of local and intermediate level authorities. This process has created many new responsibilities associated with land market regulation for the provision of services and social housing;
• new instruments for regulatory and fiscal intervention, including the implementation of tools associated with the mobilization of land value increments for the community’s benefit;
• privatization or removal of statutory restrictions on the availability and release to the market of previously state-owned land, thus increasing opportunities to use or reuse existing vacant land;
• new modes of service provision caused in part by the widespread privatization of utilities, with direct implications on the process of land use and redefinition of patterns of spatial segregation;
• the emergence of public/private partnerships in urban development and redevelopment, resulting in a variety of new kinds of urban sub-centers.

A third major development of recent decades has been macro-economic restructuring, which has resulted in the stabilization of the region’s historic and often chronic problems with inflation and has influenced the evolution of land prices. Latin America also has experienced broader trends toward globalization, the opening of national economies, and technological changes. Among other consequences, these trends have led to greater competition among cities for private investments, ranging from the use of strategic planning as a city marketing device to giving up local incentives through fiscal wars. This has greatly affected the economic base of the cities and the nature and scale of urban poverty. Also affected are the types of urban interventions (ranging from large-scale rehabilitation projects of abandoned or depressed areas, to new mixed-use developments in urban fringe areas) that are redefining urban form, city dynamics, and patterns of spatial and social segregation.

Building a Presence

Since 1993, the Lincoln Institute has made a concerted effort to participate in the lively debate over land and taxation policy in Latin America. We adopted a multi-country approach to work wherever we can find issues closely related to our own agenda, pursue opportunities to make a difference for local capacity building, or develop initiatives that could be disseminated and potentially replicated in other countries. This strategy allows us to be present in places where significant policy changes are imminent or where important land-related issues are under discussion.

Experience has shown that the Institute is well positioned to play three important roles that serve our educational mandate: to promote cross-fertilization of ideas, to act as a convenor and facilitator of debates among different stakeholders, and to offer intellectual leadership. As in all Lincoln programs, we place great value on the dissemination of valuable information based largely on case studies that can be used to foster intraregional sharing of knowledge and problem solving. This role of encouraging the cross-fertilization of ideas through horizontal dialogue is particularly important given the centralist nature of public administration in Latin America and the predominance of vertical channels of communication.

The Lincoln Institute’s international credibility and recognition as a respected non-partisan institution concerned with land policy and property taxation issues places us in a unique position to facilitate complex, politically sensitive discussions among different stakeholder groups, particularly public officials at different administrative levels and representatives of the business sector, NGOs, and the political community.

Equally important is the Institute’s role in offering intellectual leadership by helping to bridge the gap between state-of-the-art knowledge and the more practical, immediate needs of public officials dealing directly with the implementation and administration of land use and taxation policies. This role often involves “translating” academic ideas and arguments into the language of practitioners through both printed materials and face-to-face courses and seminars. By supporting research and curriculum development projects, we also draw attention to critical and sometimes unperceived dimensions of complex topics, such as the economic consequences of informality in the access to land. As a resource provider to our international partners, we help identify experts and provide useful case studies and other materials from different countries and contexts.

Networks and Program Focus Areas

Beginning in 1995, the Institute’s Latin American Program developed a core network of representatives from twelve countries with whom we worked closely on both curriculum development and educational programs. Our strategy has evolved as we have gained a more profound understanding of the issues that are pertinent to the Institute’s international agenda. Today we work with several networks of public officials, practitioners and scholars that are organized thematically rather than geographically. These five transnational networks, whose topics are often overlapping and thus mutually reinforcing, are linked to the Institute’s three main program areas.

In the Program on Taxation of Land and Buildings, value capture is the primary topic for which the Institute has definite comparative advantages in the region. We focus on technical and management conditions for the implementation of instruments through which land value increments have been or may be mobilized directly or indirectly (through taxes, fees, exactions and other regulatory means) to promote urban development and to benefit the community at large.

In addition to the use of value capture mechanisms to control urban growth and territorial expansion and to reduce the perverse effects of land speculation, we are interested in their applicability to circumstances characterized by the large-scale and persistent informality in land markets so typical in Latin America. These include situations where land tenure relationships are poorly defined, where land occupations are mostly irregular or illegal, and where significant land value increments are self-generated by the community, rather than by state action. This network explores whether land value increments (resulting directly or indirectly from public interventions) can be mobilized to mitigate urban poverty in general and improve the access to serviced land by low-income families in particular.

Our second network looks at property taxation, assessment and collection. International comparisons have shown that the collection of property taxes in Latin America is generally considered inadequate to meet the needs of rapid urbanization. Strong vertical and horizontal inequities, inefficient collection systems, poor assessment practices, strong influence of historical values, and fragile legal frameworks are among the drawbacks to property tax systems in many areas. Nevertheless, many national efforts, sometimes supported by multilateral agencies, are promoting reforms and improvements in property tax systems. These improvements include the innovative use of self-declaratory systems and sophisticated information systems, creative shifts to land value taxes, and opportunities to reinstate the property tax in countries where it does not currently operate. This network contemplates more interconnected research and educational initiatives, ranging from studies of the pros and cons of shifting to land value taxes, to the role of the property tax in facilitating access to land by the urban poor, and to the use of new operational tools to improve local property taxation goals in general.

Spatial and social segregation are concerns we share with the Institute’s Land Markets Program. The landscape of Latin American cities is often stigmatized by the social distance between neighborhoods that emulate the most elegant sectors of cities in any developed country and those settlements with precarious physical conditions to which the majority of the poor urban population is confined. The formation of this divisive social pattern of land use may be attributed to a number of factors: “white expulsions” through market mechanisms; more subtle exclusionary policies embedded in legal and administrative standards (i.e., urbanistic norms, regulations and credit requirements); or the direct land evictions and removals by force that have occurred in almost all Latin American cities. Much has been written about these processes, yet little has been documented about the policies to prevent them or reverse their outcomes. This network addresses questions such as: What are the policies that have been or could be used, and how effective have they been? What should urban planners know about spatial segregation, and why?

The fourth network, also in the Land Markets area, recognizes the need to review existing regulatory environments in the Latin American land policy agenda and to design new urbanistic norms and regulations that can be complied with more realistically by low-income sectors. This means adequately assessing the effects of alternative regulations on the pattern of land uses, specifically on the access to land and urban services by the urban poor. In most large cities in the region, new high-income developments are increasingly out-competing the less attractive and accessible land traditionally affordable to the urban poor. City managers struggle with the promotion of sustainable inner-city densification and the reutilization of abandoned industrial areas, while also trying to control sprawling land use in urban peripheries.

As part of the Institute’s Land as Common Property Program, security of tenure, regularization and urban upgrading programs are important themes. Many countries throughout the region are making major efforts to set legal and urban regularization programs. However, the implementation of these initiatives is often met by political and practical obstacles. The signals being given by these essentially “curative” programs have significant impacts on the illegal, irregular, informal or clandestine activities of groups seeking to access and occupy urban land. The resolution of disputes around regularization programs and arbitration of adequately assessed values for public acquisitions of land for social interest projects often runs into legal and institutional bottlenecks at the national and local levels. This network seeks to better understand the economic impacts of these programs on the functioning of land markets in general and on the benefited settlements in particular.

Dissemination of Information

While continuing to sponsor research and educational programs in Latin American countries, the Institute is also developing parallel efforts to disseminate information to broader audiences. We have created a Latin American section within the Lincoln Institute website, where we present the full text of many research projects and papers presented in our seminars and conferences, in their original language. Also available on the site are a number of Land Lines articles translated into Spanish.

The Institute is making a concerted effort to systematize all curriculum materials (research papers, seminar presentations, outlines, supporting audiovisual materials and other teaching aids) and products (books, articles, videos) to facilitate the organization and integration of our present and future academic activities. A number of Latin America-related publications are now available or are in the planning stages. For example, an annotated bibliography of materials related to urban land markets in Mexico was recently published and will soon be available on our website. This bibliography should serve as a model for other members of our Latin American networks to publish materials on their countries. In addition, several collections of papers presented as part of on-site education programs are being edited for publication.

This issue of Land Lines lists funded curriculum development and research projects and dissertation fellowships for the current academic year, highlighting those affiliated with the Latin American Program.

Martim Smolka is senior fellow and director of the Institute’s Program in Latin America and the Caribbean, and Laura Mullahy is a research and program assistant.

Latin America: A Region of Great Diversity

A brief look at the region reveals a wide variety of situations regarding the status of land and land markets, as indicated below. The Lincoln Institute has worked with scholars and public officials in each of these countries to understand and address their land policy concerns.

Chile’s liberalization of land markets and virtual elimination of urban land boundaries in 1979 (only partially reinstated in 1985) stands in contrast with Colombia’s current efforts to implement a strong value capture planning tool, “Participación en Plusvalias.” This legislation requires local governments to designate 30 to 50 percent of the land value increment resulting from changes in land designation from rural to urban use for social housing and infrastructure provision in underserved neighborhoods.

Informal settlements and land occupations are dealt with quite differently among Latin American countries. In Argentina there have been virtually no restrictions on land use, and consequently there are no officially recognized illegal settlements. Peru’s governments have recognized freely accessed unserviced land on the urban fringe (arenales) since 1961, while in Ecuador there is a complete absence of norms and regulations to deal with informal occupations.

Significant variations in national land policies are also important. For example, Cuba is unlikely to give up state ownership of the approximately 70 percent of land under its control, whereas Mexico passed national legislation in 1992 that allowed for the privatization of the land held under its ejido system.

Brasilia, the capital of Brazil, was inaugurated in the early 1960s as a “new city” that was to usher in a new era for Latin American metropolises, demonstrating how the government’s efficient use of land would allow for orderly urban growth. Two basic instruments were provided for this purpose: normative control of the use of land based on a master plan devised by Lucio Costa; and government ownership of land in the federal capital, which would permit the capital to be planned without the kinds of restrictions and conflicts that normally result from private land ownership. However, three and a half decades later, the problems associated with urban development in Brasilia do not differ substantially from those experienced by other large cities in Latin America.

Land Tenure Shortsightedness and Administrative Patronage

Brasilia presents a unique example of urban land management in Latin America because the administration of public land has always been the responsibility of the local government. Nevertheless, the city’s periphery has experienced an explosive rate of growth with its concomitant pattern of irregular land occupation, illegal subdivisions and lack of infrastructure. In Brasilia the possibility of steering the process of urban growth by means of an explicit policy of access to public land has been slowly and irreparably jeopardized by spontaneous (and illegal) land occupation. This shortsighted use of public land is generally dysfunctional for both urban density and public finance, thus hindering the local administration’s efforts to provide infrastructure to these irregular sites.

Furthermore, political influences on the development process have significantly compromised the chances of efficiently managing the supply of public land in Brasilia. In the early 1990s the government distributed about 65,000 lots in areas without any basic infrastructure. Besides reducing the stock of public land, this “land tenure patronage” created the need for new funding sources to finance new infrastructure. Since the main resource available to the Federal District’s Development Agency (Terracap) is the land itself, this patronage policy resulted in the sale of additional public lands to finance infrastructure in irregular settlements. This vicious cycle has caused serious distortions that the present local administration aims to solve by using public land as “capital” to create an effective policy to manage land tenure revenues and urban costs.

The Brasilia experience seems to confirm the arguments of Henry George and others that public land ownership does not per se lead to more balanced and socially egalitarian urban growth. The current local government strategy to define ways to manage revenue from public lands in order to manage the use of urban land indicates a new form of government interaction with the land market. In this sense, the government changes its role from being the principal landowner to becoming the administrator of land benefits.

Public Land as Land Tenure Capital

The core principle of Brasilia’s new strategy of administering land equity is the definition of public land as “land tenure capital.” The use of this land is submitted to a set of strategic actions that transform public land capital into a factor that induces the consolidation of the Federal District’s technological complex. This is the public counterpart in the process of reconverting land use in the city center into an instrument of social promotion in the land tenure regulation program: public lands are used as land assets through sales, leases and partnerships in urban projects.

The use of differentiated land tenure strategies lends more flexibility to the government in coordinating its actions. The search for a balance between initiatives of a social nature and others where the government seeks to maximize its income is now taking on the appearance of an actual policy of public land administration that breaks with former patronage practices.

In this context of exploring new approaches to the use of public land to control urban development in Brasilia, the Lincoln Institute, the Planning Institute of the Federal District and Terracap organized an International Seminar on Management of Land Tenure Revenue and Urban Costs in June 1998.

The program brought together international experts, government secretaries and local administrators with a view to evaluating international experiences in using public lands to finance urban growth in Europe, the United States and Latin America. Martim Smolka of the Lincoln Institute described the relationships between land market operations, land use regulations and the public capture of land value increments. Alfredo Garay, an architect and former planning director for the city of Buenos Aires, reported on experiences in the development of public land around the city’s harbor.

Bernard Frieden of Massachusetts Institute of Technology described how commercial activities on public trust lands in the western United States are used to raise funds for education and other local purposes. Henk Verbrugge, director of Rotterdam’s fiscal agency and The Netherlands’ representative to the International Association of Assessing Officers, described the country’s system of hereditary tenure, a legal regulation by which land can be used for full private use and benefit while remaining under municipal control and economic ownership.

The participants discussed how these experiences compared with the situation in Brasilia and concluded that the success of various strategies for the use of public land depends on the suitability of specific projects to the respective country’s business culture and the institutional practices in effect in the local administration.

Pedro Abramo is a professor at the Institute of Urban and Regional Research and Planning at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

A group of Latin American scholars, practitioners and government officials who monitor urban market information systems and publish statistical reports on market behavior met in Chile in April to share their experiences and explore plans for future cooperation. Representatives came from Mexico City; San Salvador, El Salvador; Sao Paulo and Porto Alegre, Brazil; Montevideo, Uruguay; Santiago, Chile; Quito, Ecuador; and Bogota, Colombia. Specialists from the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) also participated.

Most of the cities’ initiatives originated from small ventures to obtain information for project evaluation, research requirements or market analysis, and later expanded into larger-scale systems to monitor different types of markets and broader geographic regions.

Newly constructed housing and office and commercial buildings are the most frequently studied markets; price, location and product type are the basic variables being computed. Other variables are used in specific cases to obtain more precise information about each product being supplied to the market or each transaction. In all cases, statistics are gathered from the formal market, even though an estimate from Bogota indicates that this market represents only about one third of all transactions.

Newspapers, magazines or specialized publications are the major sources of market data, but building permits or visits to construction sites also provide useful information. In San Salvador, the main source is data from the banking system on credit loans for the acquisition of real estate property.

The geographical area and the time period for which statistics are computed vary from case to case. Yet, all systems face the same dilemma of losing statistical validity when reducing the size of the unit of analysis or shortening the time period. On the other hand, broadening the geographic area means a loss of homogeneity of well-defined neighborhoods, and broadening the time frame limits fine tuning of the phenomena.

General statistics and market trends are disseminated through newspapers and specialized publications, while more detailed statistics are sold through periodical bulletins and reports. Published listings of new construction provide an open and useful mechanism for correcting information, because when a case is not listed the supplier is the first one to make it known.

At present, only Brazil and Mexico are operating their information systems on a profit basis. In other countries, income from the sale of market data covers only operating expenses, but dissemination of the data provides opportunities for professional consultants to use it for related profitable activities. Thus, this information aids the private sector by making markets more transparent and helping entrepreneurs evaluate urban projects and define geographic and economic trends. For the public sector, the market data assists in the public valuation of properties and in planning purposes.

Many challenges remain to improve the coverage of urban market transactions, the quality of the information, the analysis of the data, and the debate this information can stimulate regarding urban land policy. From an academic perspective, the challenge is to improve the understanding of the phenomena being observed. From a professional perspective, it is to use the available information for better project analysis and to adjust valuation maps to establish more accurate records for property tax purposes.

Since many Latin American cities lack any type of urban market monitoring systems, the special challenge facing the participants in this ongoing project is to find ways to share their experiences to improve the efficiency of market operations and urban planning throughout the region.

Pablo Trivelli is regional coordinator of the Urban Management Program, United Nations Development Program, Santiago, Chile. The seminar was cosponsored by the Lincoln Institute with the GTZ-MINVU project, the Urban Studies Institute of the Catholic University of Chile, and Chile’s Ministry of Housing and Urban Development.

As delegates to the World Social Forum (WSF) in Porto Alegre, Brazil, in January 2003, the authors examined alternatives to the neoliberal approach to urban development, to escape the negative results that are too often ignored by the media and even academia. Broad-scale, national-level alternatives to neoliberalism have been rare, but alternatives at the municipal level are more common. The authors draw from lessons in Brazil and from their home countries of Mexico, South Africa and the United States. Their lectures and seminars at the World Social Forum, and related programs at the University of São Paulo and the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, have been supported in part by the Lincoln Institute.

Residents of enormous districts in some of the world’s largest cities suffer with miserable housing, difficult access to work, inadequate water supplies and sewerage, poor public services and exposure to violence. In many cases, conditions grew worse during the “lost decades” of the 1980s and 1990s, due to recession and cutbacks in planning and public investment. Those with faith in trickle-down improvements waited in vain for private markets to increase household incomes. Instead, in many countries the poorest three-quarters of the population suffered absolute losses.

Forced to respond to these kinds of problems, city governments contemplate new approaches to such questions as local versus national authority, productive efficiency versus neighborhood-based redistribution of services, and conflicts between plans and markets. At the municipal level the complications become painfully clear. Popular advocates of redistributive reforms struggle to survive in a hostile environment, often against strong private business interests, a privileged middle class, and conservative provincial and central governments. The problems in cities are immediate and concrete, requiring negotiation, concessions, compliance with an often-biased legal framework, and high degree of professional competence and leadership. Municipal planners and activists cannot overturn the whole system, but for success they must look to exploit cracks and find institutional openings. In spite of the manifest failures of the neoliberal regimes, reformers will find no simple return to an earlier age.

This brief discussion highlights complex issues, perhaps raising questions more than answering them. How does one deal with land issues underlying most urban problems: ownership, regulation, taxation and value? How much scope is available to municipal governments to pursue economic development or to redistribute basic needs, including household income and access to land? How much difference does it make at the municipal level whether or not the national regime is moving in progressive, redistributive directions? Complicating these issues, globalization may be intensifying, challenging cities with low-cost competition, increased transnational corporate reach, and ever-broader powers concentrated in multilateral institutions.

Land Values and Markets

The benefits of urbanization require public and private access to land, yet urban land values reflect differing degrees of access to a city’s benefits. Low bidders are excluded from more desirable land in most land markets, whether formal or irregular. The poor are pushed to the city margins or crammed into the deteriorated inner core. Weakly regulated land markets do not even guarantee economically efficient use of urban land, let alone ensure land use patterns vital to environmental survival. Local governments intervene with land use controls and taxation, or facilitate access to cheap urbanized land, in the best of cases pursuing equity, fiscal efficiency and environmental viability. Performance on all these counts is highly variable.

In Mexico, at least 60 percent of the urban population lives in areas developed by the illegal occupation of land that subsequently receives services and supports self-built (or rather, self-financed) housing. Thanks to historically ingrained traditions about the people’s right to land, informal settlements have been supported by infrastructure and service provision, regularization programs, and even credits for home improvements. Otherwise, the urban housing situation in Mexico would be much worse. During the 1980s, public institutions accrued significant land reserves, which were applied successfully in low-cost sites and services, core housing and mutual aid projects as alternatives to irregular development. But Mexico eliminated land banking, under World Bank influence, hampering the scope of planning to ensure equitable and sustainable urban development.

In recent years, mass-produced formal housing in cities has increased. In line with World Bank advice, the subsidized finance system for the salaried working classes and middle-income sectors has been restructured, enabling commercial developers to operate on a very large scale, acquiring vast tracts of cheap greenfield sites (and some inner-city sites), and then designing, constructing and marketing industrialized housing. The initial advantages are the provision of services and the seemingly spacious suburban atmosphere. The disadvantages are inaccessibility, lack of urban amenities, reduced space standards, and lack of space for future growth. The gigantic scale of this type of development may deplete irregular settlements of middle-income residents, thus increasing social segregation.

In Brazil, municipal governments have begun to experiment with ways to regulate land use, such as property tax increases linked with progressive taxation, including broad-scale exemptions for as many as half the property owners, and popular participation in decision making for regulatory changes (planning and zoning) and for investments in urban infrastructure. Many changes were first implemented by Workers Party (PT) mayors, operating in opposition to the federal and state governments, with the aid of fiscal and regulatory changes introduced in the 1988 Constitution. Now, with the PT government holding national power under President Luis Inacio (Lula) da Silva, left or center-left municipal governments may find themselves able to experiment more. Nevertheless, the obstacles are very great. Even in the relatively rich city of Porto Alegre a third of the population lives in irregular settlements.

The South African experience since democracy was won in 1994 shows that tremendous difficulties confront those who would use public agencies to assist the poor to gain access to land. The government did succeed in subsidizing over a million families previously living in shacks and shared rooms, but almost all new houses were located at the extreme peripheries of the cities. A key progressive gain is that many large metropolitan areas are now consolidated in single municipal governments. But economic growth concerns and fiscal crises have limited the ability of the new jurisdictions to redistribute resources in favor of the poor. Planners intended to raise ample funds through taxation of high-value central land, to pay for subsidies for developments in poorer districts, but values did not follow predictions, and receipts were grossly inadequate. Land markets continue, by and large, to exclude the disadvantaged, and they haven’t yielded sufficient tax revenue. A continuing lack of coordination in the formulation of policy has seen programs in land, housing, services, public works and employment working against each other in some cases.

In the United States, nearly all land and housing development is “regular,” market-driven and dominated by private banking, real estate and development firms, and better-off households. The results are starkly unequal, pitting suburbs against much poorer central cities. Efforts to right the imbalance have generally been frustrated, because land markets do not deliver great efficiencies or fairness. The process is highly regulated, so that inequalities are generated not only by (land) markets themselves, but also by political groups such as “growth coalitions” and by fierce regulatory manipulation on behalf of privileged middle-class and wealthy districts.

The regulation of land markets through planning, land banking and taxation constitutes a broad arena for municipal intervention in land policy. Local governments have extensive potential authority, and they typically have constitutional prerogatives for planning and taxation (although in practice they are still constrained by powerful national forces). They may act to support economic growth or to redistribute it, even in a conservative provincial or national climate. Local planning does constrain land markets, but often without redistributive effects, since city governments must contend with strong financial interests, patterns of privilege, and entrenched power. Professional competency and consistency are required to exploit the full potential of property registration and taxation systems, and financial decentralization limits the possibility of cross subsidies and redistributive measures.

Progressive Local Government

In spite of claims about the conservative nature of powerful constraints on the redistributive capacity of local governments, evidence from the four countries cited here suggests that municipalities may indeed find ways to redistribute public goods and services on behalf of their less well-off residents. Municipalities also may serve as laboratories for social experimentation and as sources of progressive ideological change.

In Mexico, the role of municipal and state governments in achieving more equitable cities is undisputed and constitutionally sanctioned, yet fraught with obstacles. In the 1990s, the first electoral defeats of the Revolutionary Institutional Party (the PRI, which dominated the political arena from the 1920s) were at municipal and then state levels. Throughout the country there are genuine examples of successful innovative and socially redistributive programs run by municipal governments, such as participatory budgeting and planning, and community recycling. Mexico City’s Federal District is now governed by the left-of-center Democratic Revolution Party, which also controls most of the poorer and more populous jurisdictions of the metropolitan area. In 2001, this government introduced a social investment program targeting the poorer districts, providing monthly cash payments of US $70 in 2002 to people over seventy years, interest-free loans for home improvements in irregular settlements, and traditional public services and social assistance. Criticized from the left and right as populist and electioneering, this program is now emulated on a smaller scale by the center-right federal government and in local electoral platforms by the PRI. Despite initial positive evaluations, however, questions remain about costs for universal coverage and viability in poorer municipalities, and about reinforcing clientilism.

Brazilian experience with redistribution by municipal government has been documented in many notable cases, from giant cities such as São Paulo, to large cities such as Porto Alegre, Santo Andre and Belem, to the hundreds of smaller municipalities that have elected left-of-center administrations over the past 15 years. The case most often discussed is participatory budgeting, the innovation that has involved more than 10 percent of Porto Alegre’s residents in decisions to allocate more than one billion dollars of public expenditures on infrastructure and services. Other innovations include improvements in transit services and expansion of bus lanes to challenge the hegemony of the automobile, which serves a privileged minority. Some progress has been made in housing, but local government capacity is limited.

South African municipal government has emerged only in the last two years from its long history of apartheid division and the turmoil of reform since 1994. But, new trends demonstrate innovation at the municipal scale. Although many aspects of municipal government have been “corporatized” in Johannesburg, the city is beginning to make substantial progress on the regeneration of decayed inner city areas, using a wholly owned company (the Johannesburg Development Agency) as the instrument of change. Agencies of this kind seem to be able to solve some of the problems of intricate relationships between different spheres of government—local, provincial (or state) and national—and to attract greater private interest in supporting municipal initiative.

New approaches to planning in South Africa are also starting to show signs of success. These participatory approaches bring public utility agencies and big-budget government departments, as well as citizens, into framing municipal action over the short- to medium-term. Such developments indicate that working on the linkages between different agencies is crucial for increasing effectiveness and reducing frustration during the early democratic period. Some municipalities are beginning to find ways of sharing experiences and shaping new forms of cooperation. An example is the new national Cities Network, which brings together nine of the largest municipalities in the country as a means of stimulating innovation and expanding impact.

Social and political innovation has also been documented at the municipal level in cities of various sizes throughout the U.S., often in situations that require resisting politically conservative national trends. Very large cities such as Cleveland and Chicago developed city plans aimed explicitly at redistribution to provide assistance to needy households and deprived neighborhoods. Chicago also developed solid programs to support smaller and more local business enterprises, versus the usual beneficiaries among large firms and downtown interests. Smaller cities such as Burlington, Vermont, and Santa Monica, California, developed aggressive programs in housing and rent control aimed at helping needy constituents. As in the heralded examples of participatory budgeting in Brazil, these progressive municipal programs typically have strict limitations, because they can do little to improve the labor market and thus can offer only small improvements to household cash incomes.

Municipal efforts on land use and housing in the U.S. are often constrained by local control or “home rule,” which isolates the more numerous, wealthier suburbs that literally surround poorer central cities. The wealth and significant taxing power of these separate jurisdictions combines with a U.S. peculiarity—local financing of public schools—to burden city residents with powerful disadvantages. Since about 90 percent of U.S. children attend public schools, local control of schools is a hot-button issue in U.S. politics. Scholars construe de jure public suburban control as de facto privatization: by purchasing homes in suburbs, households are purchasing control of local schools, thereby excluding others, such as new immigrants and ethnic groups, especially African Americans.

One hears echoes of such U.S. suburban privatization and division in the rigidly separated districts and gated communities of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and other Brazilian cities; in the huge separations of privileged central districts and the unserviced periphery in Mexico City; and in the surviving apartheid spatial structure of Johannesburg. We find that municipal governments do act against these inequities, at least in part because of an ideological commitment and because the resulting problems threaten their capacity to govern. Some localities may turn their limited victories into building blocks for larger progressive structures at the national scale, as evidenced in Brazil.

National-level Urban Reform

Urban affairs is a hot issue in Brazil, and various laws, administrative practices, budgets and regulations have been brewing since the new Constitution of 1988 promised an improved status for cities. After more than a decade of extensive public debate, new legislation was enacted in the 2001 City Statute, a federal law on urban policy. The new left-of-center government led by President da Silva is betting on a new national ministry to integrate different activities and to find more effective approaches to persistent urban problems. This Ministry of Cities (Ministerio das Cidades) was established in early 2003 to improve housing, transit and neighborhood services for poor majorities, preserve and renovate historic centers, promote economic development, and drastically increase participation. National leaders aim to emphasize the concerns of mayors, city councils and the neediest citizens in the federal agenda. Other countries are generally a long way from such an urban policy, and the Brazilian experiment will be closely watched.

Mexico is a clear example of how constitutional rights to such things as decent housing, health and education may be considered important, but are not valued enough to guarantee their fulfillment; nor are all those good intentions laid out in the highly complex planning legislation. Even municipal-friendly constitutional amendments of the 1980s have not fully undermined the high degree of centralization of all public policy, including social spending and virtually all environmental regulation. As a result, the urban and social agendas of different levels of government are often competing rather than complementary, and are always insufficient to meet demand.

South Africa has tried to develop a new national policy in the urban field, starting with a national Urban Development Strategy after the 1994 democratic elections. But relatively little has been accomplished since the strategy has tended to remain a paper commitment to good outcomes rather than a concrete program or a real obligation on different departments and levels of government to work together toward common goals. Part of the problem has been competition between different agencies over who should set the agenda. Diverse centers of power, from the president’s office to the finance ministry, the local government department of the national government, some of the provincial governments, and the national municipal association, are vying for position in shaping urban policy.

The lack of coherent urban policy in South Africa also must be placed in the context of the central agenda of government, which stresses not only economic growth but also the continuing empowerment of the previously disadvantaged black majority. There is by no means consensus over the roles of the cities in accomplishing either of these objectives. A single ministry addressing urban issues would seem like a dream to many observers, but other ways of achieving similar objectives by reorganizing relationships between parts of government suggest that progress can be made.

In the United States, the federal agenda for urban policy has been weak since the late 1970s, and general fiscal constraints have combined with suburban voters’ indifference to cities. These problems have been greatly exacerbated by the consequences of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, by demands of the U.S. war economy, and by the conservative nature of redistribution pursued by the Bush Administration.

This range of international experience suggests that profound national changes and legislation can have immense local effects. A national government can provide fiscal, regulatory and administrative support for a whole series of municipal improvements, many of which would be eagerly implemented by local governments. National governments (and even international agreements, as in the earlier European common market) can inhibit or even prohibit such things as municipal tax-cutting competition in pursuit of relocated private investment, thus eliminating a lose-lose situation for public budgets. But, even in the best of cases, such opportunities are limited, politically difficult and technically complicated.

Conclusions

In the context of the globalizing economy, city politicians and officials face remarkably similar uncertainties in Brazil, South Africa, Mexico and the United States. As economies have become more open, some industrial sectors have been hammered, while others have been able to take up new opportunities (such as motor vehicle exporting in South Africa) and new niches have emerged. The current geopolitical context poses challenges for city administrations; how they think about their role in this period of imported instability is significant. There is a tension between those who think that the role of city government is to frame competition with other cities, and those who see more cooperative roles.

Cities themselves need to develop capacity to formulate and implement plans. They cannot simply rely on the panoply of outside professionals and agencies that have increasingly defined urban agendas. Some of the needed sharing can fruitfully take place in an academic environment, especially where long-term research helps to inform choices. It is particularly important to widen opportunities for sharing between the city officials and scholars of the global South and the North, to the mutual benefit of both.

Priscilla Connolly teaches urban sociology and planning at the Autonomous Metropolitan University in Azcapotzalco, Mexico. William W. Goldsmith directs the Program on Urban and Regional Studies at Cornell University. Alan Mabin is associate professor in the Graduate School of Development Management at Witwatersrand University in Johannesburg, South Africa.

Hoy en día, cerca de un millón de personas vive en apartamentos subterráneos en Beijing, donde, para los 23 millones de habitantes de la gran ciudad, las viviendas sociales cercanas a los lugares de trabajo son muy escasas (Xing 2011). Estas unidades habitacionales por lo general son subdivisiones sin ventanas en sótanos y en refugios antiaéreos, cuyo tamaño promedio es de 9,75 metros cuadrados.

En agosto de 2010, Beijing estableció un plan de tres años para evacuar a los inquilinos de estas viviendas subterráneas. Los desalojos comenzaron en 2011, especialmente en los distritos urbanos más céntricos con valores de suelo caros, pero la demanda continúa siendo alta. En algunas áreas de la ciudad, particularmente en los distritos periféricos, pueden verse en la calle anuncios de alquileres subterráneos y, en Internet, también existen miles de avisos de alquiler de unidades subterráneas.

El presente artículo está basado en el análisis de este fenómeno llevado a cabo por la autora en los años 2012 y 2013, cuando los avisos en Internet de apartamentos subterráneos eran una actividad dinámica y creciente. Los listados de alquiler analizados contienen suficiente información sobre las unidades en particular, tales como ubicación, precio, tamaño, comodidades y nivel de subsuelo, para evaluar la dinámica de este submercado de alquiler de viviendas para personas de bajos recursos.

Escasez de viviendas de alquiler accesible

Tal como ocurre en la mayoría de las ciudades chinas, Beijing sufre una grave escasez de viviendas de alquiler accesible, a consecuencia de la migración masiva hacia los centros urbanos (Liu y otros 2013; Xie y Zhou 2012). La ciudad también tiene una gran cantidad de espacio subterráneo, derivada de una política del año 1950 que establece que todos los edificios nuevos deben tener un subsuelo común y refugios antiaéreos. Los códigos de edificación especifican las pautas de construcción, inclusive la provisión de infraestructura, como electricidad, agua y alcantarillado. Esta disponibilidad de espacio subterráneo ha crecido de forma exponencial en medio del extraordinario boom de la construcción que se ha producido en China en las últimas décadas. Algunos complejos constan de hasta 600 unidades por debajo del nivel del suelo.

Como forma de abordar el déficit de vivienda, las políticas oficiales promovieron, durante 24 años en época de paz, la utilización “económica” de este espacio subterráneo, y uno de los usos establecidos por dicha política fue el residencial (BMBCAD 1986). Sin embargo, en 2010 Beijing cesó de otorgar nuevos permisos de uso de apartamentos subterráneos e instituyó el plan de tres años mencionado anteriormente con el fin de evacuar a los residentes. En vista de la cantidad de personas involucradas y la falta de alternativas de vivienda social, este proceso ha presentado diferentes desafíos, como el hecho de que los propietarios de estas unidades están demandando una compensación por derechos de ocupación que habían adquirido cuando las unidades eran legales.

Viviendas financiadas por el Estado

Desde que China hizo la transición a un mercado privado desde una economía de planificación centralizada, en la que el estado proporcionaba todas las viviendas, el sector inmobiliario ha crecido de forma explosiva. Consideradas principalmente como un vehículo de inversión, las nuevas unidades privadas son accesibles únicamente a aquellos que poseen suficientes ahorros para comprar una vivienda con poco financiamiento.

Las restricciones en la oferta de terrenos constituyen otro obstáculo para la provisión privada de vivienda. Debido a que la intención del Estado, propietario de todos los terrenos del país, es proteger el suelo agrícola fértil, ha prohibido el desarrollo en las áreas rurales de la periferia urbana. Aun así, dichas zonas han experimentado una rápida construcción de proyectos de vivienda por parte de personas que se asientan informalmente. Estos “pueblos urbanos” proporcionan viviendas privadas a una cantidad de entre 5 y 6 millones de personas de bajos ingresos que no pueden acceder a viviendas cercanas al centro de la ciudad, pero el gobierno ha estado intentando demoler estas viviendas.

El Estado chino ofrece cuatro tipos de proyectos de vivienda social, especialmente para empleados públicos con bajos ingresos (ver tabla 1). Los primeros tipos de asistencia fueron el programa lian zu fang, que ofrecía viviendas de alquiler a las familias más pobres, y el programa jing ji shi yong fang, que proporcionaba oportunidades de acceder a la propiedad de una vivienda con subsidio.

En 2011, el gobierno lanzó un programa para construir más viviendas de alquiler (gong zu fang) para personas recientemente graduadas de la universidad y trabajadores cualificados en sectores clave, como la industria de alta tecnología. No obstante, debido a que este programa es algo reciente, la cantidad de unidades de alquiler accesible todavía es relativamente baja. Por otro lado, los proyectos de vivienda xian jia fang están dirigidos a la población desplazada. A pesar de la gran cantidad de unidades que se han construido para residentes de bajos ingresos a lo largo de los años, la demanda supera con creces la oferta, produciéndose una larga lista de espera.

La barrera del hukou

En Beijing, el hukou o permiso de registro de familias, es un requisito previo para acceder a cualquiera de los cuatro tipos de viviendas sociales mencionados. A modo de una retención de la planificación central, el hukou otorga a las familias el derecho a los servicios públicos en el lugar de residencia que el gobierno les ha asignado, pero les restringe recibir dichos servicios en otros lugares. Las personas que nacieron dentro de un hukou en grandes ciudades son elegibles para recibir mejores servicios educativos, de salud y de infraestructura. A no ser que un empleador patrocinado por el Estado solicite un cambio en el hukou de un trabajador, las personas que no poseen un hukou en las principales ciudades siguen enfrentándose a una barrera importante para acceder a las oportunidades económicas.

La figura 1 muestra la ubicación actual de los programas públicos de vivienda para las personas que poseen un hukou en Beijing. Al igual que ocurre en otros lugares del mundo, los proyectos de vivienda social se encuentran, como ya se ha mencionado, en las áreas más apartadas de la ciudad, donde los terrenos son menos caros pero, también, menos demandados. El subalquiler, otra de las características típicas de los proyectos de vivienda social, se encuentra muy difundido, pues los beneficiarios del programa cobran un alquiler a sus inquilinos por los apartamentos que les proporcionó el Estado.

Análisis del mercado subterráneo

En nuestro estudio hicimos uso de los listados detallados de viviendas subterráneas en alquiler que se encuentran disponibles en Ganji.com. Estos listados resultaron muy útiles para llevar a cabo el análisis, ya que el sitio estaba bien organizado y tenía la mayor cantidad de avisos. Utilizamos el término de búsqueda “地下室” o “unidad subterránea”, con lo que obtuvimos el alquiler mensual, la superficie en metros cuadrados, la ubicación específica, las comodidades y otras características de los apartamentos subterráneos, tales como el nivel de subsuelo. De los 7.312 anuncios que recabamos desde octubre de 2012 hasta septiembre de 2013, seleccionamos 3.677 entradas singulares con información completa. Tal como muestra la figura 1, estas unidades se encuentran bien distribuidas por toda la ciudad, lo que refleja el requisito de que todos los edificios de nueva construcción en Beijing posean un espacio subterráneo.

Resulta importante destacar que estos anuncios representan lo que probablemente es el sector de mayor poder adquisitivo del mercado inmobiliario subterráneo. Los propietarios que publican sus anuncios en Internet suelen tener un mayor nivel de educación y más recursos. Los anuncios normalmente vienen acompañados de fotografías, para demostrar la calidad relativamente alta de la vivienda. Además, la intención de los propietarios de publicar los anuncios sugiere que se sienten relativamente seguros en cuanto a la tenencia de las unidades.

La tabla 2 contiene estadísticas descriptivas de las 3.677 unidades habitacionales subterráneas estudiadas. La mediana de tamaño de las unidades es de 9,75 metros cuadrados, levemente menor que el mínimo de 10 metros cuadrados de Beijing y que la superficie habitacional general promedio per cápita (28,8 metros cuadrados por persona). Aun así, los apartamentos son por lo general más grandes que un dormitorio promedio para trabajadores, que sólo llega a 6,2 metros cuadrados (Xie y Zhou 2012).

El alquiler promedio mensual de 436 RMB (US$70) confirma que los apartamentos se encuentran en el sector de mayor poder adquisitivo de las viviendas para trabajadores migrantes. Según un estudio llevado a cabo por el gobierno en 2012, cerca del 48 por ciento de los trabajadores migrantes en Beijing paga menos de 300 RMB (US$48) por mes, un 27 por ciento paga entre 301 RMB y 500 RMB (US$48–US$80) y un 17 por ciento paga más de 1.000 RMB (US$160) (Xie y Zhou 2012). Es decir que estas unidades subterráneas en alquiler representan, por lo general, un tipo de vivienda con más valor para los trabajadores migrantes que los dormitorios comunes para trabajadores o las viviendas en pueblos urbanos.

En promedio, las unidades subterráneas se encuentran a menos de 11 kilómetros del centro de la ciudad, con una desviación estándar de 6,2 kilómetros, lo que las ubica definitivamente dentro de la Quinta Autopista de Circunvalación. Con estas ventajas de ubicación, los apartamentos ofrecen potencialmente costos más bajos de traslado ida y vuelta al trabajo, así como mejores oportunidades económicas. De manera similar, la distancia promedio a la estación de metro más cercana es de poco más de 1 kilómetro, lo que se considera una distancia caminable.

Cerca de un 50 por ciento de las unidades anunciadas se encuentran a uno o dos pisos por debajo del nivel del suelo. El 50 por ciento restante son semisubterráneas, como los denominados “apartamentos jardín” de los Estados Unidos, que tienen una pequeña ventana cerca del cielorraso de la habitación. Según nuestro análisis preliminar, el hecho de que la unidad estuviera a uno o dos niveles por debajo del suelo no presentaba ninguna diferencia estadística en cuanto al precio, habiendo considerado otras variables. Con respecto a las comodidades, cerca del 25 por ciento de los anuncios de las unidades indicaba que tenían calefacción, más de la mitad mencionaba la conectividad a Internet, aproximadamente el 25 por ciento señalaba la presencia de cámaras de vigilancia y menos de un 12,5 por ciento indicaba la existencia de guardias de seguridad.

Análisis de la dinámica de mercado

En nuestro estudio analizamos si la demanda en este submercado inusual de viviendas subterráneas es similar al mercado convencional sobre el suelo. En particular, la desventaja de vivir por debajo del nivel del suelo puede ser muy grande; además, este tipo de viviendas es, por lo general, tan pequeña que las demás variables estándar en los modelos de precios hedónicos pueden llegar a ser más pronunciadas o diferenciarse de alguna otra manera.

Nuestro análisis estadístico consistió en una progresión escalonada en la que se intentó ajustar las variables de la prueba a un modelo base que incluye las variables que la bibliografía ya considera significativas. Los resultados del análisis resultaron ser los previstos, ya que todas las variables fueron significativas y apuntaban en la misma dirección. Por ejemplo, el alquiler aumenta cerca del 3,3 por ciento por cada metro cuadrado en que se incrementa el tamaño de la unidad, y un 3,6 por ciento por cada kilómetro en que se reduce la distancia hasta el centro de la ciudad. El acceso al transporte también es significativo. La cercanía a una estación de metro aumenta el alquiler en 1,8 por ciento por kilómetro; y para cada estación de línea de metro en un radio de 800 metros, el alquiler aumenta un 2,8 por ciento.

Debido a que el desempeño de nuestro modelo de precios hedónicos fue el mismo que el de otros modelos, con las mismas variables principales significativas y en la misma dirección, el fenómeno de la vivienda subterránea es, evidentemente, un mercado. El surgimiento de este mercado sugiere que existe una fuerte demanda de viviendas en alquiler –especialmente entre las familias de bajos ingresos– que ni el mercado formal ni los programas públicos de vivienda pueden satisfacer. Este es un hecho evidente, en vista de que las normas sobre hukou no permiten a los trabajadores migrantes presentar solicitudes a los programas públicos de vivienda, y que se sabe que incluso los residentes de bajos ingresos de Beijing que poseen un hukou ocupan viviendas subterráneas.

Los resultados de nuestro análisis sugieren que la máxima prioridad de la población de bajos ingresos y a menudo migrante de Beijing es la proximidad al lugar de trabajo y al transporte. Vivir en habitaciones subterráneas merece la pena cuando la contrapartida es su ubicación céntrica. Además, al comparar los alquileres de estas unidades con los de las viviendas públicas, tal como muestra la tabla 1, observamos que, aunque los costos por metro cuadrado sean mayores, el alquiler total de la unidad subterránea es mucho menor (Hu y Hu 2012). Así, el mercado subterráneo satisface la demanda de aquellas personas con ingresos por debajo de los niveles a los que apuntan los programas de vivienda social.

Conclusiones

Las viviendas subterráneas representan un fenómeno de grandes proporciones en Beijing. En Internet encontramos miles de avisos de alquiler de apartamentos subterráneos, y esa cantidad seguía creciendo en el año 2013, a pesar de los desalojos. No obstante, el tamaño de este submercado no significa que deba ser incorporado a las políticas públicas.

Existen historias extraordinarias de personas que habitaban en tejados y en pozos de alcantarillado para poder vivir en el área central de Beijing. Las viviendas subterráneas son, con frecuencia, sólo otra alternativa desesperada a la que recurren los pobres en los centros urbanos para poder vivir y trabajar en las áreas urbanas donde no poseen hukou y, por ende, no tienen acceso a los servicios.

¿Cuánto puede una sociedad reducir el espacio habitable para que las ubicaciones urbanas sean accesibles? Esta pregunta ejercerá una presión cada vez mayor a medida que las densidades de las megaciudades asiáticas excedan los niveles aceptables de dignidad humana, lo que obligará a los responsables de elaborar políticas y a los diseñadores a pensar de manera más creativa sobre las reformas urbanas. Aunque las unidades subterráneas son, de hecho, más espaciosas que los dormitorios para trabajadores o estudiantes, el extraordinario desarrollo económico de China ha elevado las aspiraciones y expectativas de sus ciudadanos para obtener mejores condiciones de habitabilidad.

Debido a que la mayoría de los inquilinos son solteros o parejas sin hijos, y a que la tenencia es temporal (ya que no se prolonga por muchos años), en las políticas de vivienda debería tenerse en cuenta la necesidad de tener una vivienda para toda la vida, tanto para las personas que recién comienzan a desarrollarse en esta ciudad tan cara como para aquellas que sólo requieren una estancia temporal por motivos de salud, educación y otros.

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Únase a la conversación. Deje sus comentarios en www.lincolninst.edu/news-events/at-lincoln-house-blog.

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Sobre el autor

Annette M. Kim, Ph.D., es profesora asociada en la Escuela de Políticas Públicas Sol Price de la Universidad del Sur de California. Además, es directora de SLAB, el laboratorio de análisis espacial de la Escuela Price recientemente creado, dedicado a promover la visualización de las ciencias sociales para el servicio público por medio de la enseñanza, la investigación y la participación pública.

Referencias

BMBCAD (Oficina Municipal de Defensa Civil Aérea de Beijing). 15 de mayo de 1986. “关于改变结合民用建筑修建防空地下室规定的通知》的实施细则” (Cambios en las normas de implementación para construir refugios antiaéreos mediante su combinación con edificios civiles).

Hu, Hai-feng y Ji-ya Hu. 2012. “Overall Evaluation and Future Development Planning of Beijing Affordable Housing System During the Eleventh Five-Year Plan”. Beijing Social Science 1: 7–14.

Liu, Xiang, Maojun Wang, Jiabin Cai y Mengchen He. 2013. “An Analysis on the Spatial Structure of Non-Native Permanent Population of Beijing Metropolitan Area in 2000–2010”. Urban Development Studies 20(10): 86–93.

Xie, Xinmei y Le Zhou. 2012. “Study on Housing Demands of Migrant Workers in Key Industries in Beijing”. Documento presentado en las ponencias de la Conferencia Anual de Planificación Urbana de China, Beijing.

Xing, Fan. 2011. “北京清理地下空间提速 百万北漂可能无处寄居” (Beijing limpiará el espacio subterráneo. Un millón de personas tal vez no tengan adónde ir). Beijing Times, 14 de enero. http://news.qq.com/a/20110114/000529.htm

St. Petersburg was the host city for an international conference on “Land Reform and the Emerging Property Market in Russia,” organized by the Leontief Centre for Social and Economic Research and the Lincoln Institute in May 2001. Experts from government agencies, commercial entities and academic institutions in Russia, the U.S. and Europe convened to assess the progress of Russian land reforms and discuss future implementation. The conference focused on two key points: the principal obstacles to be targeted by various land reform actions and the triggers that are needed to set a series of decisive steps in motion.

From an academic and historical perspective, the unfolding story of Russian land privatization is intellectually engaging and, from a practical point of view, the process and its implications have far-reaching implications for the Russian people. The Lincoln Institute’s interest in convening the conference and its continuing involvement in Russia allow us to learn from local experts, to share Institute experience and perspectives from other countries, and to provide support for ongoing land reform efforts. The conference revealed the need for professional training for Russians working in the emerging land market, and the Lincoln Institute and the Leontief Centre are developing curriculum and training courses to be offered in St. Petersburg later this year. For example, many private business owners now find themselves in the new role of property manager, and sometimes their land and buildings are a more valuable asset to the enterprise than the business itself. However, they lack knowledge and experience regarding property rights, leases, appraisal, zoning, regulation, planning and a range of other topics.

In the post-Soviet period, privatization of the real estate sector in Russia has been most advanced in its urban centers, and St. Petersburg was one of the first cities to start selling land plots occupied by either privatized (i.e., former state) or new businesses. Yet even there, by 2000 only about 5 percent of urban land had been privatized. The main problems with regard to the land market in Russia arise from the lack of clear definitions provided by Russian law; the failure of the law to develop fundamental provisions contained in the Russian Constitution regarding private ownership of land; and the consequent lack of firm guarantees for private property and inadequate protections through the courts. A brief history of land policies in Russia will help to provide a context for the current situation.

Land in Russian History

Land has been a central social and economic force throughout Russian history, although Russia has never had private ownership of land for any length of time or in any full sense of the term. Until the beginning of the twentieth century, state property was the predominant form of property ownership. Moreover, a considerable part of that property, including land, was unregistered and unconnected to the broader economy. It was only in 1906 that the Stolypin reforms began destroying the obshchina (the existing feudal-like peasant communities) as the main structure upon which allotment-based land use depended, while extending private land ownership through land tenure regulations, a peasants’ land bank and a resettlement policy. In this pre-Soviet period, Russia’s towns and cities experienced a growing market in urban land plots that were already built upon or earmarked for further development.

Following the revolutions of 1917, private ownership of land was abolished, civil transactions involving land were forbidden, and land was transferred to the use of all who worked on it. A 1918 decree abolished private ownership of real estate in cities and towns, and the process of nationalizing land was completed with the adoption of the Land Code of the Russian Socialist Federation of Soviet Republics in 1922. During the New Economic Policy (NEP) of the 1920s, land could be leased for periods of not more than six years (although subletting was not allowed) and tenants involved in working the land could use additional hired labor. However, by 1929 large-scale collectivization was under way, resulting in the creation of so-called cooperative-collective property. Leasing of land was abolished, and hiring labor on small peasant holdings was forbidden. Under socialism land was neither sold nor bought, and all land transactions were prosecutable under the law.

The situation today is reminiscent of that at the end of the nineteenth century, prior to the Stolypin reforms, when land law consisted of piecemeal legislation applying to ownership of different types of land. Private ownership of land was introduced in 1990 by the Constitution of the Russian Socialist Federation of Soviet Republics, beginning a gradual liquidation of the state monopoly on land ownership. The 1990 laws “Regarding Peasant Smallholdings” and “Regarding Land Reform” permitted citizens to hold in private ownership plots of land for use as smallholdings for horticultural purposes, the construction of houses and other personal uses. The terminology of these laws included “the right of use of land,” “life-long possession with the right to pass on as an inheritance,” “rent” and “property.” This wide variety of bases for property rights necessitated subsequent amendments of existing legislation, a development that was also stimulated by the collapse of the USSR.

Over the past decade, land relations continued to evolve. In December 1991 the president of the Russian Federation issued a decree and the Duma passed a resolution that allowed for the privatization of land in a two-step process. First the decree granted collective ownership of land and other assets to collective and soviet farms. Subsequently, shares of farms could be owned by the individuals who worked on them. Only at the end of 2001 was the right to own land, which is inseparable from the right to buy and sell land, ratified in Russia, and this right applied only to urban lands. However, the prohibition on the sale of agricultural land has no absolute force; laws introduced since 1991 permit the sale of land that is to be used as a private subsidiary smallholding for construction of a one-family residential building, or by members of stock-rearing and garage cooperatives.

According to a former minister for agriculture, there is a flourishing black market in land, which denies the general public access to information on the market values of land and negatively affects economic development. The absence of shared information on land market values means the absence of an objective criteria against which to measure land use efficiency. The extensive black market in leasing also deprives governmental budgets of property tax income since real estate cannot be properly taxed without accurate information on levels of ground rent. Under the current Civil Code of the Russian Federation (RF), land plots are considered to be objects of real estate and rights to these plots are categorized as property rights. The land privatization process was initiated in 1997 but then stalled because the RF government overruled buyout prices established by local administrations that were perceived as too low. The RF government indexed prices at a rate higher than locally established lease rates, thus undermining the transition to a private market in real estate. At the same time, under certain conditions (such as stable lease rates or minimal investment conditions), long-term leasing may turn out to be an acceptable substitute for title ownership. On the issue of real estate registration, the existing Russian system does not protect bona fide purchasers, nor does it provide adequate reimbursement when a purchaser’s title is contested. Furthermore, purchasers are normally unable to get a comprehensive review to determine whether their title is clear in the first place.

Obstacles to Land Reform

While the evolution of a private market in land is encumbered by history and politics, the participants at the St. Petersburg conference were interested in changes and adjustments in practice that land professionals might make to facilitate the transition. Zoning and surveying, as well as investment decisions, are among the areas where changes in practice might be made at the level of local government to address some of the following obstacles to land reform.

Slow implementation of legal zoning

Legal zoning, though mandatory according to the RF Urban Planning Code, is being introduced slowly in Russian cities. Some speakers attributed this situation to reluctant municipalities that cling to the “operative space” currently under their direct control, for fear of losing that land. Others maintained that key municipal officials have a number of more specific concerns: (1) their professional image and the stability of their administration depend on the actions they take to attract investment; (2) the arrival of new investors automatically expands the amount of “operative space;” and (3) the realization that even a perfect system of urban planning regulations will leave out a sufficient number of special cases that will have to be considered separately. Further, municipal officers are citizens, too, and they sincerely wish to raise more funds for their cities’ renovations. The problem is that their attention is too often distracted by more immediate economic and political challenges. Nevertheless, an increasing number of Russian cities are introducing legal zoning regulation systems, including Novgorod Veliky, Ufa, Kazan, Irkutsk, Khabarovsk, Tver, Chelyabinsk and Nizhni Novgorod. St. Petersburg’s recent practice of issuing “by-plot urban planning regulations” raised questions about whether or not they conform to the RF Urban Planning Code, which defines urban planning regulations as a set of requirements and restrictions applicable to zones, not to individual units or parcels. The practice of issuing plot-specific regulations was found dramatically inefficient for a number of reasons. First, it precludes making investment decisions from a representative sample of properties, since each property in the city is subject to different regulations. Second, it is more labor intensive than applying regulations to an entire zone. Finally, it is laden with higher developer risks, thus impairing the city’s overall investment profile. Participants from other cities noted that these delays in introducing zonal urban planning regulations evidently clashes with St. Petersburg’s image as the frontrunner of Russia’s reforms in legal and institutional real estate market development.

Inferior surveying

Many land-related problems in Russian cities stem from inferior surveying. Some plots are limited by the uncertainty of the parcel and/or building boundaries, and others suffer from poor siting. That is, many properties that are new to the market have no direct access to transport, communications, storm water collection systems, or other infrastructure networks. The result is a host of deficient properties that in turn inhibit the development of adjacent properties, and can bring down the value of an entire urban area. The conference discussions emphasized the importance (or even inevitability) of conducting an extensive urban land survey, which could provide more certainty to both investors and developers, reduce the time needed to prepare investment proposals, and help to expand property ownership.

Confusion over privatization of apartments

Most urban residents have not taken advantage of the recent privatization of apartments. Not only did this initiative fail to produce a new class of motivated and effective property owners capable of acting as responsible customers for housing maintenance agencies, but it created baffling new legal challenges as well. No one in St. Petersburg, where the privatization of apartments is most advanced, understands who (and on what legal basis) should be in charge of issuing permits to reconstruct general-purpose premises or reassign residential apartments for nonresidential use. As a result, apartment owners can exercise only a limited set of property rights, which in turn hampers the extension of the private real estate market. The conference participants discussed to what extent a law requiring apartment owners to purchase condominiums could help address the situation. Moreover, given an environment where apartment owners have limited experience with such ownership arrangements, discussion centered around whether economic stimulation or economic sanctions would be most successful in dealing with those who fail to meet their ownership obligations.

Investment in infrastructure

The complicated issues of engineering and infrastructure support for construction and renovation projects are evident in St. Petersburg. When determining title payments, the city takes into account the developer’s contributions to urban infrastructure development and actively mediates between the developer and the resource supplier. Provision of full, authentic and timely information is the principal factor behind the attractiveness of real estate investments, since this information allows for the quick and safe selection of investment opportunities. St. Petersburg has made progress in this direction, but its database will remain inadequate until the city fully adopts urban planning regulations (i.e., legal zoning), formulates clear heritage protection standards for its many historic properties, undertakes an overall land survey, allocates areas for municipal developments, and maps at least the contours of infrastructure networks.

Intergovernmental taxation systems

A reform of intergovernmental budget relations is necessary to improve the current taxation system. Most cities receive budget support from their oblasts (similar to U.S. states). Thus, they are not interested in reporting increased property tax revenues, because those revenues would then be subject to redistribution to the oblast. For example, to simplify its taxation system and stimulate investment in real estate, the city of Novgorod Veliky replaced its two-part land and property tax with a single real estate tax. For legal persons, as opposed to business establishments, the tax is charged on full title owners only. Despite a certain dip in the tax proceeds from the unified tax (compared to revenues from the former two taxes), the city’s overall tax revenues increased because of a higher profit-tax yield due to enhanced business activities.

Lessons from Russia and around the World

The RF government’s meetings and decisions on the notorious electric supply failures in the Far East and floods in Yakutia during the late spring of 2001 show that, unfortunately, only large-scale catastrophic events seem to be able to galvanize public administrators to change their old ways. One would like to believe that less destructive developments could stimulate action as well. For example, it would be worthwhile comparing investment activities in different Russian cities to see if such activity varies with the development levels of their local regulatory bases, the amount and types of information provided to developers, and the time required to develop project applications and the time it takes for local government bureaucrats to make project decisions. The case of recent German urban planning history is instructive to the situation in Russia. Beginning in 1990, the German system lost some of its characteristically strict reliance on municipal plans and initiatives for development and moved toward more reliance on private-sector initiatives. Now it is more common for private developers, rather than municipalities, to prepare detailed zoning plans, and then to purchase and develop the site. However, a direct borrowing of this German method is not recommended for Russian cities, since any system must take into account specific local challenges and cultural traditions. American participants had a similar view on the risks of borrowing planning methods from other countries. Although the general guidelines and principles may seem to be similar across countries or jurisdictions, local regulations, procedures and techniques can vary significantly due to different historical precedents and the specificity of current challenges. Some principles to consider include the following:

• balancing of municipal and private interests;
• minimization of risks by preliminary establishment of all major planning and regulatory requirements;
• transparency and public discussion of planning and development decisions by the municipality;
• accessibility and reliability of information;
• minimization of costs involved with engineering services due to the monopoly that municipalities often hold on the provision of these services; and
• creation of a mechanism for appealing administrative decisions.

This opinion was supported by Russian speakers who referred to urban planning regulations in Russia before 1917 or to the current situation that compels cities to illegally hide their revenue growth and thus evidently hamper economic development. In closing, H. James Brown, president of the Lincoln Institute, reminded the participants that it is important to build mutually acceptable decisions rather than to continue disputes and quests for the ultimate (and not always absolute) truth. He called on those present to listen to their opponents’ arguments in order to arrive at fruitful agreements, not to waste time and effort on trying to prove one’s own case.

Leonid Limonov is the research director of the Leontief Centre for Social and Economic Research in St. Petersburg.

References

Limonov, Leonid E., Nina Y. Oding and Tatyana V. Vlasova. 2000. Land Market Development in St. Petersburg: Conditions and Peculiarities. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy Working Paper. Malme, Jane H., and Joan M. Youngman. 2001. The Development of Property Taxation in Economies in Transition: Case Studies from Central and Eastern Europe. Washington, DC: World Bank Institute.

Smart growth has moved from the domain of policy analysts into more general acceptance. It is championed by national leaders such as Vice President Al Gore, governors (Parris Glendening of Maryland), urban mayors (William A. Johnson of Rochester, New York), non-governmental organizations (National Trust for Historic Preservation), and the private sector (Urban Land Institute). Voters in many California cities, including Sacramento, Santa Barbara, Irvine and Davis, and in numerous suburbs around San Francisco have approved urban growth boundaries (UGB) as one type of intervention to contain sprawl development.

Urban containment policies are not limited to environmentally active communities in California, Oregon or Colorado, or booming economies in states such as Florida, however. Lexington, Kentucky, observed the 40th anniversary of its urban growth boundary last year, and Sioux Falls, South Dakota, has had a containment boundary for many years. This kind of broad-based popular support for smart growth policies is more than simply a growth management fad and is likely to increase, particularly as long as the national economic expansion continues. Indeed, urban containment appears to be building a kind of momentum as a land use policy that has not been seen since the Supreme Court’s sanctioning of zoning in Ambler Realty Co. vs. Euclid, Ohio.

Urban containment planning has two basic purposes: (1) to promote compact, contiguous, and accessible development provided with efficient public services; and (2) to preserve open space, agricultural land and environmentally sensitive areas that are not currently suitable for development. Urban containment consists of drawing a line around an urban area within which development is encouraged, often with density bonuses or minimum density requirements, to accommodate projected growth over a specified future time period, typically ten to twenty years. Land outside the boundary is generally restricted to resource uses and to very low-density residential development by limiting the extension of utilities, wastewater services and other infrastructure.

Intuitively, however, this sort of land regulation appears to be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, measures aimed at reducing traffic congestion or infrastructure costs, or improving the aesthetic quality of urban areas, are appealing. On the other hand, measures that are seen to limit land supply and potentially cause housing prices to increase are unappealing, particularly to those seeking to expand the stock of affordable housing.

To explore the implications of these two faces of urban containment as smart growth policy, the Lincoln Institute and the Fannie Mae Foundation convened a group of scholars and practitioners for a symposium in Cambridge last February. The economists, planners and other researchers in attendance discussed the existing literature on urban containment and identified questions for future research that could inform policy making in this dynamic area of land regulation.

Housing Price Effects

Housing costs reflect the price of land, the price of the house and the value of amenities. Urban containment policies change housing costs for two reasons. First, land prices change when land supply is altered. Second, if urban containment increases the value of the amenity package associated with a house, then that, too, will cause a change in house prices. Much of the discussion at the symposium centered around these two theoretically distinct aspects of the housing price problem.

Most economic literature assessing urban containment argues that it raises land and housing prices principally by constraining the supply of land and/or by failing to accommodate new demand for serviced land. But, others argue that urban containment systems, when coupled with increased densities within the growth boundary, should not adversely affect supply and, indeed, should generate benefits to residents. This latter view shifts the focus away from the microeconomic theory of price determination to housing economics, which introduces the concept that house prices capitalize the value of neighborhood amenities.

For example, the increased densities within an urban growth boundary can make it practical to extend or enhance existing public transit, thus yielding greater accessibility. In addition, increases in densities can result in lower costs to provide urban services by the public sector. Similarly, higher neighborhood densities can lead to more interactions with neighbors and more “eyes on the streets,” which, in turn, can translate into lower crime rates. Finally, if urban containment is successful in preserving open spaces, house values in neighborhoods near the preserved open space should also rise.

All of these benefits can be counted among the amenities that give value to a house and are ultimately capitalized in its value, even while the land supply restriction can also put pressure on house prices. In truth, both factors may be at work, and we still have much to learn about their impacts. Furthermore, some of these internalized benefits may have different values for households at different income levels.

A comparison of Atlanta, Georgia, and Portland, Oregon, both suggests of these sorts of benefits and points to areas for future research to answer these questions more comprehensively (see Table 1). During the first half of the 1990s, Portland experienced a large increase in housing prices (approximately 60 percent compared to almost 20 percent in Atlanta, in nominal terms). Between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s, homeownership rates in Portland increased by nearly 5 percent while Atlanta’s rate remained virtually unchanged. Finally, perceptions of improved house quality were greater among Portland residents than those in Atlanta. In both metropolitan areas and in both time periods, the proportion of household income spent on housing was virtually the same, suggesting that income growth in Portland exceeded that in Atlanta. However, it is difficult to conclude definitively that increases in house quality in Portland were due to enhanced amenities conferred on households by changes in land regulation, rather than to rising incomes.

Although urban containment policies may stabilize the supply of land, they usually increase the supply of development opportunities. Such policies are typically accompanied by “upzoning” whereby land zoned formerly at one level of development intensity is changed to allow for a higher density. One strategy to increase densities is to infill and redevelop (or “refill”) urban areas at higher than extant levels through the adoption of “minimum intensity” zoning. We do not know the subsequent effect of such policies on house prices, and we know even less about their effect on household budgets and disposable income. For example, higher housing prices may simply reflect capitalization of more efficient development patterns that reduce expenditures in other parts of the household budget.

It is possible, however, that current and future homeowners will benefit directly from these sorts of capitalized savings. For example, location-efficient mortgages, a lending instrument being tested in a few markets, allow lenders to extend mortgages to households based on a higher mortgage-to-income ratio. The rationale for altering the income eligibility is that, in comparison to suburban households, urban households can substitute walking and public transit for automobile payments, including both capital costs and operating expenses. Thus, disposable income is effectively increased as non-housing expenditures decline. Current experiments with the location-efficient mortgage are underway in Chicago’s northside neighborhoods and in central Seattle. If default rates for these loans are similar to those for traditional mortgages, we may see greater adoption of this instrument in appropriate submarkets.

Other savings that may accrue to urban homeowners as a result of containment policies are lower taxes due to lower capital costs or increases in supplemental income if higher densities are achieved through the addition of accessory apartments in existing houses.

Landowner Behavior Implications

The imposition of urban containment policies and changes in density are also likely to result in changed expectations of landowners. Therefore, an additional consideration for researchers, which the symposium participants confronted, is the role of containment in affecting the nature of landowner behavior with respect to land acquisition and land development.

In an environment of a relatively inexhaustible supply of land, speculation can be reasonably efficient while the competition to sell land keeps prices low. The end result may be that housing prices will not be affected materially. However, when supply is constrained, even if upzoning increases development capacity, the number of players in the land market can fall and cartels may form. Furthermore, an assumption of urban containment policies is that undeveloped land inside the boundary will come on-line in sufficient amounts and at appropriate times to sustain development. There is no research into this, however. Will owners of land, knowing they hold an oligopolistic position in the land market, delay its sale to get a higher price?

Until now, in our studies of urban land markets, we have lived with the assumption of relatively inexhaustible (i.e., elastic) land supply. Urban containment policies can change that premise by making land an exhaustible commodity, resulting in the problem of dual predictability. On one hand, developers are given more certainty in whether and how they develop land; on the other hand, landowners know that land supply will become exhaustible and therefore they may be enticed to become speculators, in their own right. Will local governments reward those willing to develop vacant or underused parcels with higher densities to offset others who delay sale? Certainly, a land tax is expected to limit this sort of behavior. Can other changes in the tax regime encourage development within the UGB? For all of these reasons, we have much to learn about the effect of urban containment on landowner and speculative behavior.

Summary Observations

The symposium participants spent more time on the economic issues related to urban containment than on environmental concerns. However, some material was presented that suggested significant environmental benefits as a result of urban containment. Table 2 presents additional comparisons of Portland and Atlanta between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s. While vehicle miles traveled increased in both places, Portland experienced little change (2 percent) whereas Atlanta experienced a significant increase (17 percent). At the same time, Portland’s average commute times fell, air quality improved, and per capita energy consumption declined.

All of these indicators suggest that Portland is different from Atlanta in meaningful ways. Furthermore, typical behavior by individuals in each of these metropolitan areas is presumed to be different. We should attempt to find out the degree to which growth containment policies account for these behavioral differences and whether there are other policies that may also play important roles in affecting the economic and environmental dynamics of metropolitan regions. For example, the problem of housing affordability remains a serious concern in most cities, whether with or without urban containment boundaries.

Urban containment creates an entirely new regime in urban planning and development decision making, offering research challenges because of the difficulties in developing methodologies that can tease out complex interactions and frame the results in a manner that can advance both public and private interests. The Lincoln Institute, the Fannie Mae Foundation and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development are among a growing number of research entities interested in pursuing these challenges.

Arthur C. Nelson is professor of city planning, urban design and public policy at the Georgia Institute of Technology in Atlanta. He organized the seminar referenced in this article and has researched and written extensively on this topic.