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Because many brownfield sites are located in areas with depressed property values, the cost of remediation and redevelopment can be greater than the expected resale value. These sites, referred to here as low-to-no market value brownfields, are rarely addressed under current policies and programs. Rather, the current practice of many brownfield redevelopment projects is to select only the most marketable sites for remediation and redevelopment, essentially perpetuating the age-old “creaming” process. Private and public developers’ avoidance of the lowest market value parcels typically excludes disadvantaged neighborhoods from programs aimed at redeveloping brownfields and creates the potential for widening existing inequalities between better-off and worse-off neighborhoods.
The Role of Land Banks
In a recently completed project supported by the Lincoln Institute, I examined the barriers to brownfield redevelopment and focused on promising approaches for improving the prospects of the least marketable sites. The specific research goal was to identify land transfer procedures and processes through which land bank authorities and other community land development entities would be willing to receive vacant brownfield property that is tax-delinquent and environmentally contaminated, and then arrange for its remediation and sale.
A local land bank authority is typically a nonprofit entity established by either a city or county to address the problems of urban blight and to promote redevelopment. The original motivation for this project was to seek a solution to the problem of land banks being unwilling to accept some tax-delinquent brownfield properties due to fears of becoming liable for the contamination on these properties. Removing that barrier improves the prospects for promoting productive land redevelopment and reducing property vacancies to enhance a community’s economic development.
Over the course of this project, the nature of the original problem shifted in a positive way when recent federal guidelines clarified that land bank authorities that are part of a local government and acquire brownfield properties involuntarily (e.g., because they are tax-delinquent) are not liable for any contamination. With removal of this legal liability, it became clear that the real problem land banks face in taking on tax-delinquent, low-to-no market value properties is a lack of financial resources to arrange for their subsequent remediation, sale or redevelopment.
For example, the Atlanta/Fulton Country Landbank operates on a model of clearing title on properties to allow for private redevelopment, since it does not have the financial resources to act as the redeveloper itself. The Landbank, like most of the public or quasi-public entities we have identified as engaging in brownfield redevelopment, is promoting a market-based, creaming process of redevelopment. While there is validity in employing such processes, to do so exclusively poses a serious public policy issue. It serves to widen the inequality between the most depressed neighborhoods, where the low-to-no market value properties are most likely to be found, and the neighborhoods experiencing revitalization and brownfield cleanup.
Barriers to Brownfield Redevelopment
Our review of current land bank activity in other cities has revealed that, overall, land bank authorities do not take a pro-active stance on brownfield redevelopment for several reasons: operational limitations, fear of legal liability, and/or lack of funds to cover remediation costs. Our national search yielded only two exceptions: the Cleveland Land Bank and the Louisville/Jefferson County Land Bank Authority. But of these two, only the Louisville/Jefferson County Land Bank has pursued brownfield properties actively and has made the required changes in its by-laws to effectively acquire, remediate and redevelop contaminated properties. The Cleveland Land Bank experience in brownfield redevelopment was with a donated parcel that was suspected of being contaminated.
Operational Limitations
The two major operational requirements that currently deter land banks from entering into brownfield redevelopment are the need to identify an end user for a property before the property can be acquired by the land bank and the limited scope of activity for which the land banks were established originally. For example, the Nantucket and Martha’s Vineyard land banks in Massachusetts were established for conservation purposes; they rarely deal with properties that would be considered brownfields, although their organizational structure makes them ideal candidates to do so.
Fear of Legal Liability
As with any owner of contaminated property, land banks are concerned about the legal liability associated with brownfields. Although most state volunteer cleanup programs offer liability exemptions for municipalities, the issue of federal liability still has to be addressed when land banks choose to acquire contaminated properties.
Federal legal liability arises from the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), also known as Superfund, but both federal and state governments have developed programs and guidelines aimed at eliminating that barrier. As a point of clarification, it is not the intent of federal or state programs to release responsible parties from their legal obligation to clean up property that they have contaminated, but, rather, to facilitate brownfield remediation and redevelopment by reducing the fear of unwarranted legal liability.
Landowners who are not responsible for contaminating the property, who did not know, and had no reason to suspect contaminants were present on the property are not liable under CERCLA sections 107(b) and 101(35). This is often referred to as the “innocent landowner defense.” Sections 101(20)(D) and 101(35)(A) protect federal, state and local governments from owner/operator liability if they acquire contaminated property involuntarily as a function of performing their governmental duties, including acquisition due to abandonment, tax delinquency, foreclosure, or through seizure or forfeiture authority. This process was further clarified by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in June 1997 to facilitate the work of state and local brownfield redevelopment programs.
For land bank authorities that are a part of local government, the above-mentioned program should protect the acquisition of contaminated properties through the land bank’s normal operational functions. However, any land bank seeking to acquire contaminated properties should contact its regional EPA office for further legal clarification and assistance with the redevelopment process.
Lack of Funds for Remediation Costs
The often costly remediation process is another significant problem for land banks seeking to redevelop brownfields. Even when the mission of the land bank is to eliminate blight and spur revitalization, both of which are directly related to brownfield reuse, limited budgets prevent interested and willing land banks from acquiring brownfields for remediation and redevelopment. Therefore, while the land bank authority could be helpful in forgiving the property taxes owed on the parcel as an incentive for reuse, the property’s redevelopment potential is still thwarted by its having little-to-no market desirability.
Promising Alternatives for Low-value Sites
When the focus of this research project became the identification of promising approaches for improving the redevelopment prospects of low-to-no market value brownfield sites, we began to examine different kinds of roles for land banks. These included identifying possible ways of raising revenues for land banks and other community development agencies to use in financing the remediation and redevelopment of low-to-no market value sites, and considering potential reuses of such sites, including open space, residential or commercial/industrial uses.
One alternative is found in community land trusts, which generally are private non-profit corporations in both urban and rural areas engaged in social and economic activities, such as to acquire and hold land for affordable housing development. While traditionally they have not focused on conservation issues, their model could be adapted for brownfield redevelopment efforts. One approach for solving the problem of low-to-no market value brownfields is a community land trust modeled after Boston’s Dudley Neighbors, Inc., which received from the city the power of eminent domain to acquire vacant land and buildings in its neighborhood. This strategy provides an alternative mechanism to a citywide land bank for acquiring brownfield properties, and it can be used to target geographic areas in greatest economic decline.
Another promising alternative to the traditional land bank is modeled after Scenic Hudson, an environmental advocacy organization and land trust located in Poughkeepsie, New York. It has an urban initiative to acquire, remediate and develop environmentally friendly reuses for derelict riverfront sites. Among its projects has been the redevelopment of a twelve-acre abandoned industrial waterfront for a public park, the Irvington Waterfront Park. Scenic Hudson has proven that, with cooperation from public and private organizations, land trusts can be effective vehicles for brownfield redevelopment.
The most popular form of land trust is one founded to protect natural areas and farmlands. Such land trusts most often operate at the local or regional level to conserve tracts of land that have ecological, open space, recreational or historic value. If land trusts choose to expand their conservation goals to include urban open space, they could become very helpful partners in public/private projects to create green space and parks from remediated brownfields. The Scenic Hudson land trust model specifically addresses brownfield redevelopment for the stated purpose of stemming greenfield development.
To address the needs for financing the redevelopment of low-to-no market value brownfields, the Louisville Land Bank Authority’s approach is promising. It established a fund that uses the profits from the sale of remediated brownfields to fund future remediation projects. Another possibility for raising funds for land banks is suggested by the two-percent transfer fee the state of Massachusetts authorized for its Nantucket and Martha’s Vineyard land banks to purchase open space. The transfer fee idea could be adapted by land banks to create a fund for brownfield remediation.
The research project also sought to identify municipalities that did not have a specific land bank authority, but did have a municipal office or program that dealt with tax-delinquent properties and their redevelopment. Two municipalities found to be engaging in noteworthy and innovative brownfield redevelopment are Kalamazoo, Michigan, and, Emeryville, California. Kalamazoo’s brownfield pilot approach of creating brownfield redevelopment districts emphasizes community development over traditional, market-based economic development goals. The city uses stakeholder groups to design brownfield projects and to plan for redevelopment.
Emeryville has determined, through surveying its property owners and developers, that offering financial assistance for site assessment alone is not effective; it must be backed up by financial assistance for remediation. The city’s brownfield program is based on the principle that “sharing of risks should lead to sharing of rewards.” That is, if a community bears the residual risk for permitting the private sector to conduct risk-based cleanup, a portion of the private sector’s savings on remediation expenses should be shared with the community. The Emeryville approach to brownfield redevelopment also recognizes that smaller sites and projects require proportionately more loans, grants and technical assistance than do larger sites and projects.
Conclusion
At the present time, there is a paucity of programs and strategies to address tax-delinquent, low-to-no market value brownfield properties in marginal urban neighborhoods. If this deficiency persists, the current brownfield redevelopment movement will likely lead to a widening of intraurban inequalities. If municipalities, land bank authorities, and community development organizations will recognize the need for, and move towards, promoting more equitable brownfield redevelopment, the approaches presented in this article hold promise for correcting this deficiency and preventing wider inequalities. Further, such actions could remove potential polution sources and health hazards from the neighborhood, provide much-needed open space, and hold the remediated property until the surrounding area increases in value and the site can be redeveloped through traditional market processes.
References
City of Emeryville, Project Status Report, Emeryville Brownfields Pilot Project. Emeryville, California. November 1998. See also
Rosenberg, Steve. “Working Where the Grass Isn’t Greener: Land Trusts in Urban Areas.” Land Trust Alliance Exchange. Winter: 5-9, 1998.
U.S. EPA. Handbook of Tools for Managing Federal Superfund Liability Risks at Brownfields and Other Sites. Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance. November 1998.
Nancey Green Leigh, AICP, is associate professor of city planning in the Graduate City and Regional Planning Program at the Georgia Institute of Technology. She teaches and conducts research on urban and regional development, industrial restructuring, local economic development planning, and brownfield redevelopment.
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Community land trusts provide affordable housing by separating the value of land from the value of buildings. Households pay for only the building or dwelling unit, and the CLT retains ownership of the land in this form of shared equity housing.
When the household sells, the CLT typically has the right to repurchase the unit at a price determined by a formula based on the value of improvements made by the household, the change in local housing prices, and the duration of tenancy. The CLT then resells the building or unit to another low-income household, and continues to own the land. This chain of sales ensures that the unit provides affordable housing services on a sustainable basis.
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Los fideicomisos de suelo en los Estados Unidos difieren entre sí en gran manera, ya sea en términos de antigüedad, tamaño de la superficie protegida, misión, estrategia, presupuesto y contexto. Audrey Rust, una reconocida líder conservacionista y beneficiaria de la beca Kingsbury Browne 2012 del Instituto Lincoln, es la indicada a la hora de analizar las diferencias entre dos medidas de conservación totalmente diferentes pero igualmente exitosas que se dieron en la región oeste de los Estados Unidos. Rust se desempeñó como presidente y gerente general del Fideicomiso del Espacio Abierto de la Península (Peninsula Open Space Trust o POST) en Palo Alto, California, durante 24 años hasta julio de 2011. En la actualidad es miembro del directorio de la Reserva American Prairie (American Prairie Reserve o APR) en Bozeman, Montana.
La APR es uno de los nuevos proyectos de conservación más ambiciosos del país, cuyo objetivo es lograr reunir 1,42 millones de hectáreas y crear el complejo más grande de vida silvestre de los 48 estados continentales del país en Montana, el cuarto estado más grande de los Estados Unidos, cuya población es la séptima de menores dimensiones (solamente un millón de habitantes en 2012). Por otro lado, el POST comprende sólo el 2 por ciento de la superficie proyectada de la APR, aunque se considera un proyecto con mucho éxito, ya que reúne unas 28.300 hectáreas de espacios abiertos, granjas y parques de altísimo valor económico en una región que presenta una gran densidad y que va de San Francisco al Valle Silicon, con más de 7 millones de habitantes.
A pesar de sus perfiles tan disímiles, estas organizaciones comparten una sorprendente cantidad de similitudes. En esta entrevista con el Instituto Lincoln, Rust compara las historias y características particulares del POST y de la APR en base a su experiencia de primera mano con cada organización, y ofrece además algunas lecciones universales para todos aquellos involucrados en la difícil y desafiante tarea de preservar los espacios abiertos.
Instituto Lincoln: ¿Cómo se originó el Fideicomiso del Espacio Abierto de la Península y cuál es su misión?
Audrey Rust: El POST es un fideicomiso de suelo tradicional de 35 años de antigüedad, ubicado en una densa región metropolitana y que ha crecido en forma significativa desde su fundación en el año 1977. En sus orígenes, esta organización fue una socia de conservación privada del Distrito Regional del Espacio Abierto del Centro de la Península, una agencia pública de la península de San Francisco financiada mediante impuestos (ver figura 1). El POST, trabajando en la periferia urbana, recaudaba fondos privados en nombre del Distrito y, en ocasiones, llevaba a cabo un proyecto de donación de tierras. En la actualidad, todo el territorio protegido por el POST se encuentra dentro de un área metropolitana importante.
Debido a que el POST se encuentra ubicado en un lugar de gran densidad poblacional, resultó indispensable desde el principio incluir de inmediato oportunidades de recreación pública de baja intensidad, así como también brindar la posibilidad de exposición a la biodiversidad de la península, donde, dentro de un tramo transversal de 20 kilómetros, podemos pasar a través de al menos nueve ecosistemas diferentes. La tarea del POST tiene como objetivo garantizar un sistema de terrenos abiertos interconectados en corredores a lo largo de la bahía de San Francisco, las montañas de Santa Cruz y la costa del Pacífico. No se contempla ninguna cantidad total específica de hectáreas, a menos que se esté llevando a cabo una campaña en particular; sin embargo, el hecho de brindarle a la gente un lugar donde experimentar la naturaleza es sin duda una fuerza impulsora.
Instituto Lincoln: ¿Y cuáles son la génesis y misión de la reserva American Prairie?
Audrey Rust: Desde su fundación en el año 2002, la APR ha logrado reunir 110.883 hectáreas, aunque continuamente intenta proteger otras 1,42 millones de hectáreas contiguas de praderas de hierba corta en calidad de reserva de vida silvestre en la región noreste de Montana, uno de los únicos cuatro lugares en todo el mundo donde tal medida de conservación es posible (ver figura 2). La idea 1se originó en las investigaciones realizadas por un grupo de organizaciones conservacionistas sin fines de lucro que trabajaban en la región norte de las Montañas Rocosas, quienes, en sus comienzos, obtuvieron el asesoramiento científico del Fondo Mundial para la Vida Silvestre.
La APR está introduciendo bisontes de las llanuras sin introgresión genética del ganado, y es su intención desarrollar una manada sustentable de 10.000 cabezas, a la vez que se encuentra restaurando otras especies nativas, tales como perros de la pradera, hurones de pies negros y lechuzas vizcacheras. La APR adquirió rápidamente una gran cantidad de tierras, pero le llevará décadas reintroducir la fauna silvestre e impulsar un crecimiento significativo de poblaciones de estas especies.
Los terrenos federales representan un gran porcentaje del hábitat de vida silvestre que está reuniendo la APR. Los terrenos de la reserva limitan al sur con el Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Charles M. Russell y al oeste con el Monumento Nacional de la Quebrada del Río Missouri Superior, el cual figura destacadamente en nuestra historia nacional como parte de la expedición de Lewis y Clark.
Instituto Lincoln: ¿Cuáles son los desafíos clave que deben enfrentar el POST y la APR?
Audrey Rust: El mayor desafío que enfrenta cualquier proyecto de conservación es siempre el financiamiento. El primer obstáculo es identificar a los posibles donantes y captar su atención. Para ello, se necesita una visión claramente articulada, así como también la habilidad de hacer que el proyecto sea interesante para el posible donante. La validación de la misión por parte de un tercero respetado es clave en esta cuestión. También se necesitan ciertos medios para que el donante experimente el proyecto de interés y se sienta adecuadamente incluido, además de desarrollar una relación sólida que dé como resultado la posibilidad de solicitar su apoyo en forma apropiada y en el momento justo.
Instituto Lincoln: ¿Cuáles son los desafíos de financiamiento del POST en particular?
Audrey Rust: En el área de la bahía de San Francisco, millones de personas ven y aprecian el hecho de que la proximidad con la naturaleza mejora su calidad de vida, pero la mayoría no conoce el papel que desempeña el POST en esta tarea o, si lo saben, no necesariamente se sienten movilizados para apoyar económicamente el trabajo del POST. La competencia por obtener financiamiento filantrópico dentro de la pequeña área geográfica del Valle Silicon es intensa. Todas las principales organizaciones conservacionistas, además de la poderosa maquinaria de recaudación de fondos de la Universidad de Stanford, funcionan dentro de esta área.
En el POST, la recaudación de fondos se realiza de manera tradicional. Existe un programa anual de donación muy bien desarrollado que mueve a muchos donantes en los niveles de donación de capital más altos. Muchos de ellos están dispuestos a prestar sus redes de contactos para la causa y, debido al éxito que siempre tiene la organización y a su listado de donantes actuales, las personas se sienten cómodas y apoyadas por su comunidad cuando realizan una donación. El modelo del POST también ha dependido de conseguir y crear fondos públicos y, posteriormente, vender terrenos o derechos de servidumbre a una entidad pública, ya sea al mismo precio pagado por el POST o a un precio menor, lo que permite que la organización obtenga un rendimiento de los fondos del donante para que estos sean utilizados nuevamente en el futuro.
El POST también enfrenta el desafío del éxito. Con frecuencia, los donantes a nivel de liderazgo sienten que ya están listos para pasar a enfocarse en nuevas ideas y nuevas cuestiones medioambientales, ya que ven que su impacto personal no es tan visible como lo sería si comenzaran su propia organización nueva. Algunos donantes sienten que ya han hecho su parte y que ahora es el turno de que otros ocupen su lugar. Nunca ha sido tan difícil atraer a nuevos donantes de los niveles más altos de liderazgo.
Instituto Lincoln: ¿De qué manera la misión y los objetivos de la APR afectan su estrategia de recaudación de fondos?
Audrey Rust: La APR enfrenta lo que comúnmente se denomina un problema de “pipeline” debido a que la APR es una organización relativamente nueva, y en la que la población de posibles donantes se encuentra muy dispersa y a gran distancia de la reserva, encontrar a las personas correctas ha conllevado varios falsos comienzos y reuniones improductivas. Ha sido difícil exponer el proyecto ante los posibles donantes de manera que se pueda desarrollar una relación filantrópica. Aunque los miembros del directorio están dispuestos, solamente unos pocos poseen redes de contactos que hayan sido productivas para la APR. Resulta difícil y costoso evaluar el interés real de un posible donante, estimar su probable nivel de donación y desarrollar una relación perdurable con una persona que se encuentra lejos geográficamente. Por ahora, el estatus no está asociado con el hecho de apoyar la causa. Además, la enorme meta de la campaña (de 300 millones a 500 millones de dólares) hace que una donación de un millón de dólares parezca insignificante. Toda campaña práctica debería atraer una donación de entre 80 millones y 100 millones de dólares en la cima de la pirámide de la recaudación de fondos.
Desarrollar un listado productivo de posibles donantes a nivel de liderazgo sólo vale la pena si realmente podemos reunirnos y desarrollar relaciones con ellos. La geografía genera dificultades cuando no hay suficientes personas en un área en particular y no se pueden aprovechar los esfuerzos realizados. El tiempo es un elemento clave para desarrollar las relaciones necesarias.
No obstante, debido al tamaño y alcances poco comunes de la APR, esta organización puede tener un atractivo singular para personas con un alto nivel económico que, tal como ocurrió con los Rockefeller hace unas décadas, podrían crear esta Reserva solamente en base a sus obras filantrópicas. Y este es el sueño sin cumplir de todo director ejecutivo. Las probabilidades son pocas, pero la historia nos demuestra que es posible. El modelo de la APR nunca recurrió a los fondos públicos como manera de aprovechar el dinero privado, ya que los terrenos públicos arrendados están, en cierta medida, logrando justamente esto.
Otro desafío muy importante para la APR en cuanto al financiamiento es la escala del proyecto. El impacto se da en aumentos de 20.250 o 40.500 hectáreas en un paisaje en el que los biólogos conservacionistas han determinado que, para que una llanura de hierba mixta sea un ecosistema sano y funcional y pueda sostener el complemento total de la biodiversidad de praderas nativas, el terreno debería ser de aproximadamente 13.000 kilómetros cuadrados (cerca de 1,3 millones de hectáreas).
Instituto Lincoln: ¿Cómo han enfrentado los desafíos de financiamiento los líderes de ambas organizaciones?
Audrey Rust: Tanto en la APR como en el POST, el primer presidente y director ejecutivo, que también cumplía las funciones de miembro del directorio, tenía una sólida formación en negocios pero ninguna experiencia en la recaudación de fondos o en cómo llevar adelante una organización sin fines de lucro. El vicepresidente del directorio de ambas organizaciones era un exitoso inversor de capital de riesgo y se lo consideraba como fundador. Todos estos líderes eran carismáticos y poseían buenos contactos. Por último, pero no por ello menos importante, ambos directores ejecutivos fundadores debieron aportar o prestar grandes cantidades de fondos a la organización para mantenerla a flote.
El presidente fundador de la APR, Sean Gerrity, continúa al timón de la organización después de 10 años, sin que se haya reducido su pasión por el conservacionismo. Sin embargo, el tiempo necesario para realizar tantos viajes y suplir las necesidades económicas de la organización superaba el de un trabajo de tiempo completo y ninguno de los profesionales de desarrollo que contrató logró aliviarle la carga. Bajo la premisa de que los posibles donantes desean encontrarse con alguien que posea un título, hace dos años Gerrity realizó un cambio radical en cuanto al funcionamiento de la organización y contrató dos directores gerentes que son capaces de soportar una significativa carga en cuanto a la recaudación de fondos y los contenidos. Esta estrategia requiere de reuniones o llamadas telefónicas constantes a fin de mantenerse alineados en todos los aspectos de la organización, pero está funcionando. La organización de la APR en base al modelo de directores gerentes ha permitido al personal viajar más y desarrollar mejores relaciones con los donantes. El personal actual ha sido contratado hace menos de dos años, pero está logrando avances.
Instituto Lincoln: ¿Cómo ha superado usted el desafío de recaudar fondos en el POST?
Audrey Rust: Cuando el POST me contrató en 1986 para reemplazar a Robert Augsburger, director ejecutivo fundador, mi primera misión fue recaudar 2 millones de dólares en unos pocos meses para ejercer una opción de compra sobre una finca costera muy importante, que representó el primer proyecto realmente independiente del POST.
Yo entendía a la comunidad local de donantes y tenía bastante experiencia en recaudación de fondos y gestión de organizaciones sin fines de lucro. Estaba completamente abocada al trabajo y a la necesidad de cumplir con nuestras obligaciones financieras. Aunque generalmente no era necesario viajar para recaudar fondos, la proximidad de los posibles donantes convertía cada fin de semana, cada mercado de agricultores y cada evento a nivel local en una oportunidad para entablar contactos. Llevamos a cabo un proyecto importante tras otro, mientras realizábamos un buen trabajo conservacionista e íbamos tomando impulso, pero yo estaba exhausta.
A fin de resolver este problema, conseguí un personal muy bueno. No obstante, mi enfoque fue tradicional: tener la suficiente cantidad de dinero en el banco para contratar al personal adecuado y asegurarme de que uno de los empleados fuera un joven abogado con el potencial necesario para asumir mayores responsabilidades y tareas de liderazgo. Continué encargándome de la recaudación de fondos de grandes donantes, así como también supervisando la estrategia y negociación de adquisición de terrenos clave, mientras que otros empleados se encargaban de realizar las tareas y la administración diarias de la organización. La capacidad de aumentar la cantidad de empleados y delegar algunas tareas significó un gran avance, tanto para mí como para la organización.
Instituto Lincoln: ¿Cuál ha sido el enfoque básico del POST en cuanto a la adquisición de tierras y de qué manera esto ha afectado su estrategia financiera?
Audrey Rust: Tanto el POST como la APR tienen como objetivo conectar terrenos públicos existentes mediante la adquisición de propiedades privadas adyacentes, y ambas organizaciones consideran a los entes conservacionistas locales como sus aliados clave en la tarea de preservar la biodiversidad, brindar acceso público y generar una mayor visión del paisaje protegido. Sin embargo, debido a que tienen diferentes estrategias básicas de conservación del suelo, esto da como resultado patrones de financiamiento e impactos financieros a largo plazo muy diferentes.
La intención del POST es transferir todos los terrenos que protege, y la mayor parte de estas tierras se convertirá en propiedad pública en forma de parques federales, estatales o de condados, o se entregará a los distritos regionales de espacios abiertos para que se encarguen de su administración y protección de forma permanente. Las tierras aptas para la agricultura, que se encuentran protegidas por estrictos derechos de servidumbre con fines conservacionistas, se venden a los agricultores locales. El POST retiene los derechos de servidumbre junto con un fondo dotal que vela por los derechos de servidumbre a fin de garantizar el monitoreo y el cumplimiento de las normas.
El primer proyecto que emprendió el POST a fines de la década de 1970 dio como resultado la donación y posterior venta (a la mitad del valor tasado) de una propiedad altamente visible que era adyacente a la ciudad donde vivía un gran porcentaje de los posibles donantes. Gracias a los fondos que surgieron de esta venta, el POST logró salvar otras tierras. Sin embargo, la organización progresó lentamente durante aproximadamente una década, sin tener una verdadera estrategia de protección de suelos que fuera financieramente sustentable.
En 1986, a raíz de una oportunidad para comprar una finca costera de 485 hectáreas, el POST presentó una oferta de compra de la propiedad, que requería el financiamiento por parte del propietario, una importante recaudación de fondos y la posterior acción política en todo el estado. El éxito en este caso se tradujo en la creación de un fondo de capital de trabajo que le permitió al POST repetir una estrategia similar en varias oportunidades, enfocándose en proyectos de conservación importantes y ambiciosos. Debido a que se ganó la reputación de cumplir con sus promesas, el POST pasó luego a recaudar fondos en una campaña de capitales respecto de un inventario mucho mayor de propiedades. El hecho de poseer un capital de trabajo le permitió al POST estar libre para enfocarse en lo que debía hacerse en lugar de lo que podría hacerse.
Instituto Lincoln: ¿Cuáles han sido los logros y los fracasos más importantes de la estrategia del POST?
Audrey Rust: El POST logró generar un capital de trabajo y así demostrar a los donantes una rentabilidad apalancada. El éxito generó más éxito y, en la actualidad, el POST funciona con una cuenta de capital de trabajo de más de 125 millones de dólares. Las tierras protegidas nunca estuvieron en riesgo de perderse debido a problemas financieros. El tipo de fondos públicos que se utiliza, sumado a las donaciones de origen privado, brindan aún mayores garantías.
Cada uno de estos logros ha generado en el POST la confianza de pasar a otro nivel respecto de las tareas de protección, restauración y colaboración en forma directa. En la actualidad, el arsenal conservacionista de la organización comprende además la ingeniería forestal sustentable, los derechos de servidumbre activa en las tierras de cultivo, el pastoreo de conservación y la remoción de especies exóticas.
Por otro lado, nunca se articuló bien una visión amplia de lo que podría traer aparejado el futuro, ya que el POST siempre trabajó de manera gradual. Despertar la imaginación de los donantes empresariales en niveles del liderazgo (que representan la principal fuente de riqueza en el valle) se volvió cada vez más difícil a medida que transcurrió el tiempo. También resultó difícil para la organización abocarse a la tarea de restaurar y administrar las tierras que poseía para su posterior transferencia.
A medida que los fondos públicos se van agotando, resulta mucho menos probable que las agencias públicas acepten la responsabilidad que conlleva poseer terrenos adicionales. El POST está experimentando en la actualidad tanto los gastos derivados de poseer propiedades en forma indefinida como la incapacidad de vender las tierras para obtener un rendimiento de capital que vaya nuevamente a sus cuentas.
Instituto Lincoln: ¿Cuál ha sido el enfoque básico de la APR?
Audrey Rust: La APR enfrenta una situación diferente en Montana, donde las fincas privadas son mucho más grandes que cualquier parcela de las montañas de Santa Cruz, y sus propietarios controlan otros tramos de grandes dimensiones de terrenos de propiedad federal arrendados. Es intención de la APR mantener a perpetuidad estas tierras y arrendamientos privados. A fin de garantizar la gestión de estas tierras, se necesitará realizar una recaudación de fondos dotales en forma privada.
La APR quiso demostrar desde el principio que podía lograr progresos reales respecto de su gran visión conservacionista, a pesar de la falta de fondos. La APR se movió rápidamente para adquirir tierras y sus arrendamientos correspondientes mediante el financiamiento por parte de los propietarios. El liderazgo de la organización consideró que establecer firmemente nuestra posición en este asunto era la única manera de comenzar a atraer el dinero que necesitábamos para adquirir las propiedades que conformarían la reserva. Sin la suficiente experiencia en recaudación de fondos o sin un listado de posibles donantes, la lucha era enorme. Hasta hace poco, sólo teníamos unos fondos mínimos en nuestras reservas, lo que volvía extremadamente difícil cumplir con nuestras obligaciones financieras, en particular las deudas.
Instituto Lincoln: ¿Cuáles son los logros más importantes y los desafíos actuales de la APR?
Audrey Rust: La persistencia y el buen trabajo están dando sus frutos. Entre los avances más importantes se cuentan la oportunidad de adquirir cuotas y sus arrendamientos respectivos en una finca de 60.700 hectáreas y, en el año 2012, una donación muy importante de parte de uno de los mayores benefactores de la organización. La APR también comenzó a construir un lujoso “campamento safari” que abrirá sus puertas en 2013 y que permitirá atraer a la pradera a donantes del nivel de liderazgo, desarrollar relaciones y profundizar su conexión con la tierra.
La organización posee un buen historial y ha demostrado su capacidad de hacer que las cosas funcionen, por lo que puede comenzar a poner en práctica principios de gestión a fin de pronosticar las futuras actividades. Uno de los ejemplos más carismáticos es la reintroducción de bisontes genéticamente puros. En la actualidad existen extraordinarias oportunidades para adquirir importantes lotes de terrenos. Sin embargo, sin reservas de capital de trabajo significativas, el personal y el liderazgo de la APR enfrentan grandes dificultades a la hora de cumplir con sus obligaciones financieras. Esto genera un clima en el que se busca obtener un rápido rendimiento de las donaciones en lugar de desarrollar el tipo de donaciones provenientes de los niveles de liderazgo que la organización más necesita a largo plazo. Por ahora, los planes se encuentran incompletos para garantizar una protección privada permanente de los terrenos adquiridos. La organización puede comprar los terrenos bajo financiamiento de los propietarios o que estén especialmente a un muy buen precio, aun cuando no exista una gran prioridad para su adquisición. La recaudación de los fondos dotales necesarios para la administración continua de los terrenos ha sido un proceso muy lento.
Instituto Lincoln: En conclusión, ¿cuáles son los principales aspectos que estas dos organizaciones tan diferentes tienen en común?
Audrey Rust: El POST y la APR se encuentran en diferentes etapas de su crecimiento organizacional, y el futuro de cada una depende de sus diferencias más evidentes y sus historiales respectivos. No obstante, es posible identificar ciertos elementos clave que ambas tienen en común y que pueden llevarlas al éxito:
Ambas organizaciones continúan enfrentando importantes desafíos para financiar sus objetivos. El POST ha realizado con éxito la transición hacia un nuevo liderazgo y se encuentra abocado a iniciativas conservacionistas mucho mayores y complejas. El éxito ha dominado a esta organización por tanto tiempo que resulta difícil para los nuevos filántropos encontrar algo que “inventar” o apoyar. El POST es una organización muy bien administrada, que deja pocas oportunidades para que la nueva elite del Valle Silicon participe con su consabida frase “podemos hacerlo mejor”. El POST debe dedicarse más a identificar y atraer a aquellos pocos donantes de la cima de la pirámide. Este desafío resulta especialmente difícil debido a que la participación del gobierno prácticamente se ha detenido y a que los tres mayores donantes del POST ya no están brindando subvenciones para este tipo de tareas conservacionistas dentro del rango de entre los 20 millones y los 50 millones de dólares. Además, es difícil apuntar a una fase final y, sin ello, la organización perderá el sentido de urgencia y el apoyo de las donaciones.
La APR es una organización nueva y fascinante y ha logrado asociarse en forma creativa con National Geographic, que produjo un video de una hora de duración titulado “The American Serengeti”, con el cual se logró realzar la misión de la APR y, como consecuencia, darle a la organización la importancia nacional que necesita a fin de poder recaudar mayores donaciones a nivel nacional. Es justamente en estos tiempos que los donantes clave del nivel de liderazgo deben involucrarse en la causa. En toda organización sin fines de lucro, las pirámides de financiamiento se están volviendo cada vez más verticales. Las campañas de este tipo con frecuencia dependen de que uno o dos donantes provean fondos que igualen la mitad o hasta dos tercios del objetivo total. Sin estos donantes, el personal de la organización se desgasta tratando de recaudar fondos y los costos de estas actividades aumentan rápidamente.
Estoy convencida de que el tamaño, los alcances y la habilidad para medir la visión que tiene una organización son factores determinantes para el éxito. Los donantes y el público en general se sienten impulsados por la idea de que podemos cambiar nuestro mundo. Articular claramente esa visión y promoverla es una tarea esencial. El POST debe trabajar en los mensajes que envía para poder articular mejor su visión actual. La APR debe encontrar otras formas de comunicar su visión de forma más efectiva y desarrollar una importante masa crítica de partidarios.
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June 22, 1998, saw an event that would have been improbable only a short while ago-developers, public officials and environmentalists gathered in Newark’s Ironbound neighborhood to announce the opening of a new $4.5 million state-of-the-art compressed gas packaging facility on an old brownfield site. The facility, owned by Welco Gases Corp., will provide industrial and specialty gases to the welding, medical and research markets in New York and New Jersey. It demonstrates how redevelopment of brownfield sites has been revolutionized, at least in some places.
With legislation passed last January, New Jersey is one of the latest states to enact environmental laws intended to bring companies and investors into the redevelopment arena by offering them new assurances, incentives and assistance. While the site on Newark’s Avenue P may seem an obvious choice for redevelopment-close to rail, air and sea facilities and in the middle of a burgeoning metropolitan region with almost 20 million inhabitants and a half trillion dollar economy-its history of abandonment demonstrates how complicated redevelopment of contaminated sites has become.
The Welco project was one of four sites highlighted during a conference on Land, Capital and Community: Elements of Brownfield and Vacant Land Redevelopment cosponsored by the Lincoln Institute and the Regional Plan Association (RPA) last May. The conference goal, to identify the critical elements to successful brownfield and vacant land redevelopment, was achieved by visiting projects in various stages of redevelopment in Newark and Elizabeth, New Jersey. By examining different strategies for attracting private investment and public involvement, the conference focused attention on the basic components needed for any state or local redevelopment initiative.
In keynote remarks New Jersey Governor Christine Todd Whitman discussed RPA’s Third Regional Plan (1) and how many aspects of its vision are incorporated in the New Jersey State Development and Redevelopment Plan, a central piece of her current legislative agenda. In particular, she mentioned the state’s role in promoting the redevelopment of brownfield and vacant urban sites through planning and expedited permitting.
Governor Whitman cited the City of Long Branch, where a private organization prepared a master plan that was pre-approved by the Department of Environmental Protection (NJ DEP) as meeting the requirements of the Coastal Areas Facility Review Act (CAFRA). This pre-approval (which took three years of negotiation with NJ DEP) ensures that any development project approved by the city automatically receives coastal area regulation approval as well. In an urban community that had seen a decade without a single real estate transaction in its downtown, developer interest in Long Branch has surged due to the promise of streamlined CAFRA applications. While other issues also contributed to the city’s success, such as the active involvement of the private sector and the quality of the master plan devised by Thompson Design Group, this example demonstrates that predictability is a vital component to any urban economic development strategy.
Another perspective was presented by Dr. Tomas Grohé who spoke about the Emscher Park International Building Exhibition, a redevelopment of brownfield and vacant sites in the heavily settled North Rhine/Westfalia region of Germany. The Emscher project is using a regional approach to identify remedies for communities and ecosystems damaged by decades of industrial activity. Through jury selection processes and extensive community involvement, the program is implementing restorative projects including housing, new industrial and commercial business parks, and river and forest restoration. This approach is different in many respects from the United States model of market-driven projects, but it also manages to include public/private partnerships, infrastructure investments, and other familiar components.
Tiers of Redevelopment Potential
For the purposes of the public policy discussions at the conference, brownfield and vacant sites were categorized into three categories:
Many of the tier one sites in the region are being developed and do not require strategic planning. However, an important policy issue regarding these sites is that since their redevelopment does not require public incentives any available subsidies should be focused on other sites. Furthermore, their remediation and redevelopment should be consistent with the surrounding community’s zoning and planning.
The tier two sites hold the potential to move forward under market conditions, if the right level of incentives-tax abatements, remediation reimbursement, public assistance-can be provided. Making these sites attractive for private investment should be the primary objective of financial incentives, essentially bringing them into the tier one category. Once in that category, remediation and redevelopment plans should again be consistent with the surrounding community’s zoning and planning.
The tier three sites require substantial public investment. To create a regional strategy for brownfield redevelopment, it is not sufficient to focus solely on sites with significant economic return. Tier three sites may, by their location in less-advantaged neighborhoods, their lack of access or other circumstances, justify considerable public or philanthropic involvement. Public policy and the majority of public investment dollars must concentrate on remediation and redevelopment of sites that pose health risks and deter economic development in lower-income communities.
Two panel discussions explored incentives to encourage redevelopment projects. The first focused on incentives that can make tier two sites attractive for private investment, such as tax abatements, infrastructure investments or remediation reimbursement. These techniques are essential to bring private market forces into the brownfield redevelopment arena. Panelists talked about the kinds of regulatory and financial mechanisms required to make marginal sites attractive to private investors who would be willing to remediate and redevelop contaminated or vacant land.
The second panel discussed tier three sites that would require greater public or community involvement. Just because some brownfield or vacant land sites may be risky investments does not mean they should be left out of regional redevelopment strategies. Techniques to focus on these sites include involvement of a community development corporation, a broader regional approach, environmental justice advocacy, and public investment on a federal, state or local level. Panelists shared examples of successful brownfield redevelopment as a community revitalization technique and outlined the actions necessary to spur these transformations.
Incentives and Planning Strategies
Tax Abatements. Tax abatements can be an important technique to help cover the cost of redeveloping a vacant site, but their implementation raises issues of planning and prioritization. New Jersey has a recently amended tax abatement law that creates Environmental Opportunity Zones (EOZs) where developers pay a reduced property tax rate for 10 to 15 years to help them recover the costs of remediation. While no communities are yet implementing the EOZ, participants discussed the particular types of projects that would most benefit from the incentive, and how municipalities should focus the program only to projects that really need such significant advantages.
Tax Increment Financing. Infrastructure may pose significant impediments to redevelopment projects, particularly when an entire neighborhood has been in decline for many years. For example, the Chicago metropolitan area has successfully implemented tax increment financing mechanisms to provide infrastructure for brownfield and vacant land redevelopment sites.
Site Valuation. Many brownfield sites become public property through involuntary tax foreclosure or other processes. To return these sites to productive use, municipalities often try to encourage private investment and economic development. However, real estate appraisers have difficulty quantifying the value of property where the cost of cleanup remains unknown, thus complicating the process of returning land to private hands.
Insurance Policies. Insurance packages can provide broad benefits to encourage the redevelopment of brownfield sites, but they need to become better understood and more widely used. Provided by the private sector, these tools are readily available to sellers, buyers and lenders involved in the redevelopment of brownfields. Participants discussed the new products now available for indemnification and cited examples where these products could reduce the need for public assistance.
Community Participation. In many instances, a community-based organization can play an important role in identifying sites and implementing a community-driven remediation and redevelopment proposal. A case example in Trenton, New Jersey, showed how community advocacy and working with local government helped identify funding and develop innovative techniques to remediate a vacant lot in a residential neighborhood.
Advocacy Planning. Issues of advocacy planning such as environmental justice can change the entire dynamic of a site redevelopment program. In the case of brownfield sites, a community may feel it has been taken advantage of once already, by the polluter, and may approach new proposals with some hesitancy. How can environmental justice advocacy be targeted to promote redevelopment projects that are beneficial to communities? What types of projects can combine the effectiveness of community development corporation models, and yet emulate the scope and ambition of the European example?
Conclusions
Following the panel discussions, participants debated the merits of different approaches to brownfield redevelopment and identified five critical components: sureness of the process; flexibility of public agencies; effective local planning; political leadership and support; and involvement of the entire community.
Some participants felt that many of the case examples did not take advantage of the full range of state or local assistance packages. They suggested that public policy analysis should consider ways to incorporate environmental laws, community development and business interests into an understanding of why brownfield redevelopment leaders do not seem to be more aware of existing programs and incentives.
What is the final or crucial element that pushes a redevelopment project such as the Welco Gases site over apparent obstacles to success? While the participants, representing real estate interests, community organizations and local governments, surely benefited from discussing and learning about the programs and incentives used in various case examples, in the end no one could identify a magic bullet to brownfield redevelopment.
Thomas K. Wright, director of the New Jersey office of the Regional Plan Association, organized the conference described above and heads up RPA’s brownfield redevelopment programs. Ann M. Davlin, RPA program analyst, provided research assistance.
1. In February 1996 Regional Plan Association released A REGION AT RISK, RPA’s Third Regional Plan for the New York-New Jersey-Connecticut Metropolitan Region. The plan, its policy and investment recommendations are based on an in-depth analysis of the rapid changes affecting the region’s economy, environmental systems and social equity: the 3 E’s.
Lincoln Institute Publications on Brownfields and Vacant Land
J. Thomas Black, Model Solutions to Revitalize Urban Industrial Areas, Land Lines, September 1997.
Donald T. Iannone, Redeveloping Urban Brownfields, Land Lines, November 1995.
Barry Wood, Vacant Land in Europe, 1998. Working Paper.
James G. Wright, Risks and Rewards of Brownfield Redevelopment, 1997. Policy Focus Report.
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Faculty profile of John Emmeus Davis.
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Land trusts across the United States differ vastly in terms of age, size of protected acreage, mission, strategy, budget, and context. Audrey Rust, an acknowledged conservation leader and the 2012 Kingsbury Browne Fellow at the Lincoln Institute, is in a unique position to parse the differences between two strikingly distinct yet successful preservation efforts in the American West. She served as president and CEO of the Peninsula Open Space Trust (POST) in Palo Alto, California, for 24 years until July 2011, and she is now a board member of the American Prairie Reserve (APR) in Bozeman, Montana.
APR is one of the nation’s most ambitious new conservation efforts, aiming to assemble 3.5 million acres and create the largest wildlife complex in the lower 48 states—in Montana, the nation’s fourth largest state with the seventh smallest population (just one million as of 2012). By contrast, POST encompasses only 2 percent of APR’s projected acreage, yet is considered remarkably successful for amassing 70,000 acres of very expensive open space, farms, and parkland in a densely settled region, from San Francisco to Silicon Valley, with more than seven million inhabitants.
Despite their dissimilar profiles, these organizations share a surprising number of similarities. In this Q&A with the Lincoln Institute, Rust compares POST’s and APR’s particular histories and characteristics, based on her first-hand experience with each organization, and offers some universal lessons for all involved in the difficult and challenging work of preserving open space.
Lincoln institute: How did the Peninsula Open Space Trust begin and what is its mission?
Audrey Rust: POST is a 35-year-old, traditional land trust in a dense metropolitan region, which has grown significantly since POST was founded in 1977. It began as a private conservation partner for the Midpeninsula Regional Open Space District, a public, tax-supported agency on the San Francisco Peninsula (figure 1). Working on the urban fringe, POST would raise private funds on behalf of the District and take on an occasional land donation project. To this day, all the territory it protects lies within a major metropolitan area.
Given POST’s densely populated location, it was essential from the beginning to immediately include opportunities for low-intensity public recreation and provide exposure to the biodiversity of the peninsula, where within a 12-mile transect one can pass through at least nine distinct ecosystems. POST works to assure a system of interconnected open lands in corridors along the San Francisco Bay, the Santa Cruz Mountains, and the Pacific Coast. No specific number of total acres is contemplated, unless a particular campaign is underway, but giving people a place to experience nature is a driving force.
Lincoln institute: How do the genesis and mission of the American Prairie Reserve compare?
Audrey Rust: Since it was founded in 2002, APR has amassed 274,000 acres but seeks to permanently protect some 3.5 million contiguous acres of short-grass prairie as a wildlife reserve in northeastern Montana—one of only four places on earth where such a conservation effort is possible (figure 2). The idea originated from research done by a group of nonprofit conservation organizations working in the northern Rockies, with science assistance from the World Wildlife Fund at the start.
APR is reintroducing plains bison that are free of cattle gene introgression and intends to develop a sustainable herd of 10,000 animals while restoring other native species including prairie dogs, black-footed ferrets, and burrowing owls. APR acquired a lot of land quickly, but it will take decades to reintroduce wildlife and foster significant growth of species populations.
Federal lands form a large part of the wildlife habitat APR is assembling. The Reserve lands are adjacent on the south to the Charles M. Russell National Wildlife Refuge and on the west to the Upper Missouri River Breaks National Monument, which figures prominently in our nation’s history as part of the Lewis and Clark expedition.
Lincoln institute: What are the key challenges for POST and APR?
Audrey Rust: Funding any conservation work is always the biggest challenge. The first hurdle is identifying potential donors and getting their attention. To do that, you need a clearly articulated vision and the ability to make the project relevant to the potential donor. Validation of the mission from a third respected party is key. You also need some means for the donor to experience the relevant work and feel appropriately included, in addition to a well-developed relationship that results in an appropriate request for support made at the right time.
Lincoln institute: What are the particular funding challenges at POST?
Audrey Rust: In the San Francisco Bay Area, millions of people see and appreciate how proximity to nature enhances their quality of life, but most do not know the role POST plays in assuring this; or, if they do know, they don’t necessarily feel moved to support POST’s work financially. Competition for philanthropic dollars within the small geographic area of Silicon Valley is intense. All the major conservation organizations, plus Stanford University’s powerful fundraising machine, operate in the area.
Fundraising takes a traditional course at POST. There is a well-developed annual giving program that moves many donors to the upper capital gift levels. Many of them are willing to lend their networks to the effort, and because of the successes of the organization and the existing donor list, people feel comfortable and supported by their community when making a gift. POST’s model has also depended on finding and creating public funds and then selling land or easements to a public entity, at or below the price paid by POST, allowing the organization to return donor funds to be used again and again.
POST also faces the challenge of success. Often leadership-level donors are ready to move on to new ideas and new environmental issues, seeing that their personal impact is not as visible as it would be in starting their own new organization. Some donors feel they have done their part, and now it’s someone else’s turn. New top leadership-level donors are as difficult as ever to attract.
Lincoln institute: How do APR’s mission and goals affect its fundraising strategy?
Audrey Rust: APR faces what is often called a “pipeline” problem. As a relatively new organization—and one where the potential donor population is both scattered and at a great distance from the Reserve—finding the right people has required many false starts and unproductive gatherings. It has been difficult to expose potential donors to the project in ways that can build a philanthropic relationship. Although board members are willing, only a few have networks that have proven productive for APR. It’s difficult and expensive to assess the real interest of a potential donor, estimate his or her likely gift level, and develop an ongoing relationship with a person who is geographically removed. As yet, status is not associated with being a supporter, and the enormity of the campaign goal ($300 million to $500 million) dwarfs even million-dollar gifts. Any practical campaign would need to attract a gift of $80 million to $100 million at the top of the fundraising pyramid.
Building a productive leadership-level prospect list is only worthwhile if meetings and relationships can happen. Geography creates difficulties when there are not enough people in one area, and efforts can’t be leveraged. Time is a key element in building the needed relationships.
Because of its rare size and scope, however, APR may have singular appeal to extremely wealthy individuals who, like the Rockefellers decades ago, could create this Reserve with their philanthropy alone. This is the unfulfilled dream of every executive director. Chances are slim, but history shows it is possible. APR’s model has never looked to public funding as a way to leverage private dollars, since the leased public lands are in some measure doing just that.
Another key funding challenge for APR is the scale of the project. Impact comes in increments of 50,000 or 100,000 acres in a landscape where conservation biologists have determined that a mixed-grass prairie would need to be approximately 5,000 square miles (roughly 3.2 million acres) to be a healthy, functioning ecosystem that supports the full complement of native prairie biodiversity.
Lincoln institute: How has the leadership at both organizations handled the funding challenges?
Audrey Rust: At both APR and POST, the first president/executive director, who also served as a board member, had a solid business background but no experience fundraising or running a nonprofit organization. The second board chair of both organizations was a successful venture capitalist and was viewed as a founder. All these leaders were charismatic and well-connected. Last but not least, both founding executive directors had to contribute or lend substantial funds to the organization to keep it afloat.
APR’s founding President Sean Gerrity is still at the helm after ten years, and his passion for conservation is undiminished. The time needed for extensive travel and meeting the financial needs of the organization was more than a full-time job, however, and none of the development professionals he hired could relieve his load. On the premise that potential donors want to meet someone with a title, two years ago Gerrity made a major change in how the organization functions by hiring two managing directors who are able to carry a significant fundraising and content load. The strategy requires regular telephone or in-person meetings to stay aligned on all aspects of the organization, but it’s working. Organizing around the managing director model has allowed APR staff to travel more and develop better donor relationships. Current personnel have been in place for fewer than two years, but they are making progress.
Lincoln institute: How did you weather the fundraising challenge at POST?
Audrey Rust: When POST hired me to replace Founding Executive Director Robert Augsburger in 1986, my first mission was to raise $2 million in a few months in order to exercise an option on a key coastal ranch, POST’s first truly independent project.
I understood the local donor community and had a good deal of experience in fundraising and nonprofit management. I was completely absorbed by the work and the need to meet our financial obligations. Although travel usually wasn’t necessary to raise funds, the proximity of potential donors meant that every weekend, every farmer’s market, every local event was an opportunity to connect. We undertook one major project after another, doing good conservation work and building momentum, but I was exhausted.
To solve this problem, I also found really good staff people. My approach, however, was traditional: Get enough money in the bank to hire adequate staff and ensure one of them was a young lawyer with potential to take on additional responsibilities and leadership. I would continue doing large-gift fundraising as well as oversee key land acquisition strategy and negotiation, and others would take over more of the day-to-day work and administration. The ability to grow the staff and delegate some of the work was a major step forward for me and the organization.
Lincoln institute: What has been POST’s basic approach to land acquisition and how has that affected its financial strategy?
Audrey Rust: Both POST and APR want to connect existing public lands through acquisition of adjacent, privately held property, and both have treated local conservation entities as key allies in the task of preserving biodiversity, providing public access, and creating a larger vision of a protected landscape. Their different basic land conservation strategies, however, lead to very different funding patterns and long-term financial impacts.
POST plans to transfer all the land it protects, and most of it will go into public ownership as federal, state, and county parks or to one of the regional open space districts for its management and permanent protection. Agricultural land, protected by strict conservation easements, is sold to local farmers. POST retains the easements along with an easement endowment fund to assure their monitoring and compliance.
The first project POST undertook in the late 1970s resulted in the gift and subsequent sale (at half the appraised value) of a highly visible property adjacent to the town where a high percentage of potential donors lived. The funds resulting from this sale allowed POST to save some additional lands. However, the organization progressed slowly for nearly a decade, with no real financially sustainable land protection strategy in place.
In 1986, driven by an opportunity to purchase a 1,200-acre coastal ranch, POST optioned the property, which required owner-financing, significant fundraising, and later statewide political action. Success led to the creation of a working capital fund that allowed POST to repeat a similar strategy several times, focusing on prominent and ambitious conservation projects. Gaining a reputation for delivering on its promises, POST transitioned to raising funds in a capital campaign for a much larger inventory of property. Having working capital freed POST to focus on what needed to be done, rather than what could be done.
Lincoln institute: What were the key accomplishments and shortfalls of POST’s strategy?
Audrey Rust: POST was able to build working capital and show donors a leveraged return. Success built on success, and today POST operates with a working capital account of more than $125 million. Protected land was never at any risk of being lost due to financial issues. The type of public funds used, coupled with private gifts, provide further assurances.
Each accomplishment has given POST the confidence to move to another level in direct protection, restoration, and collaboration. Sustainable forestry, affirmative easements on farmland, conservation grazing, and exotic species removal are all now a part of its conservation arsenal.
On the other hand, a broad vision of what the future could hold was never well articulated, as POST essentially worked in an incremental fashion. Stirring the imagination of leadership-level entrepreneurial donors, the primary wealth in the Valley, became more difficult as time went on. It was also difficult for the organization to embrace the restoration and management of land being held for later transfer.
As public funds have begun to dry up, public agencies are less likely to take on the obligation of additional land ownership. POST experiences both the expense of holding the property indefinitely and the inability to sell the land to return capital to its account.
Lincoln institute: What has been APR’s basic approach?
Audrey Rust: APR faces a different situation in Montana, where the privately held ranches are far larger than any parcel in the Santa Cruz Mountains, and their owners control additional vast tracks of federally owned leased land. APR intends to hold these private fee lands and leases in perpetuity. Privately raised endowment funds will be required to ensure the management of these lands.
APR wanted to show from the beginning that it could make real progress on its large conservation vision, despite the lack of funds. APR moved quickly to acquire land and the accompanying leases using owner financing. The leadership of the organization felt putting a stake in the ground was the only way to begin to attract the money it would need to acquire the property that would make up the Reserve. Without sufficient fundraising experience or a developed prospect list, the struggle was enormous. Until recently, only minimal funds were held in reserve, making it extremely stressful to meet financial obligations, especially for debt.
Lincoln institute: What are APR’s key accomplishments and ongoing challenges?
Audrey Rust: Persistence and good work are now paying off. Critical advances include the opportunity to acquire fees and associated leases on a 150,000-acre ranch and in 2012 a very important gift from one of the organization’s largest supporters. APR also began building a high-end “safari camp” to open in 2013 that will allow them to bring leadership-level donors to the prairie, build relationships, and deepen their connection to the land.
The organization has a track record, demonstrating its ability to get things done, and can begin management practices to foreshadow future activity. Reintroducing genetically pure bison is a charismatic example. Extraordinary opportunities for acquiring key pieces of land can now be pursued. Without significant working reserves, however, APR staff and leadership are under great stress to meet their financial obligations. This creates a climate of looking for quick delivery on donations rather than developing the kind of leadership gifts the organization needs most for the long haul. As yet, plans are incomplete for assuring the permanent private protection of the acquired lands. Land that carries owner financing or is especially well priced may be purchased, even though its priority for acquisition may not be high. Raising the necessary endowment funds for the ongoing stewardship of the land has been slow.
Lincoln institute: In conclusion, what are key commonalities between these two very different organizations?
Audrey Rust: POST and APR are at different stages in their organizational growth, and their futures are based on their most obvious differences and track records. However, it is possible to identify similar key elements leading to success:
Both organizations continue to face significant challenges in funding their goals. POST has successfully transitioned to new leadership and is pursuing ever larger and more complex conservation initiatives. Its success has dominated the organization for so long that it is difficult for new philanthropists to find something to “invent” and support. It is a very well-run organization, which leaves little room for the new Silicon Valley elite to provide their trademark “we can do it better” involvement. POST needs to do more to identify and attract those very few top-of-the-pyramid donors. This challenge is especially difficult because government participation has virtually ended, and POST’s three largest donors are no longer making grants, in the $20 million to $50 million range, to this type of conservation. Further, it is difficult to point to an endgame, and, without it, the organization will lose urgency and gift support.
APR is new and exciting. The organization has sought a creative partnership with National Geographic, which produced an hour-long video called The American Serengeti, elevating APR’s mission and bringing with it the national prominence APR needs to raise large gifts in the national arena. It is during this time that key leadership donors must become involved. In all nonprofit organizations, funding pyramids are becoming more and more vertical. Campaigns such as this one often depend upon one or two donors to make gifts equal to half or even two-thirds of the total goal. Without these donors, staff members are worn out by raising money, and the cost of fundraising rises rapidly.
I am convinced that the size, scope, and ability to measure the vision held by an organization are key determinants of success. Donors and the public in general are elevated by the idea that we can change our world. Clearly articulating and promoting that vision is instrumental. POST needs to work on its messaging to better articulate its current vision. APR needs to find more venues to effectively communicate its vision and develop a critical mass of supporters.
Conservation leader Audrey Rust, the 2012 Kingsbury Browne Fellow at the Lincoln Institute, will lecture on “The Peninsula and the Prairie: Regional and Large Landscape Conservation,” at Lincoln House on May 1, 2013, at noon (lunch is free).
