David Vetter (Ph.D., Universidad de California) ha trabajado por más de cuatro décadas en temas de financiamiento y economía urbana en América Latina. He ejercido la docencia y dirigido investigaciones urbanas en Brasil durante 17 años en el Instituto Brasileño de Geografía y Estadísticas (IBGE), el Programa de Ingeniería para Graduados (COPPE), el Instituto de Planificación y Estudios Urbanos y Regionales (IPPUR) y la Fundación Getúlio Vargas. En 1990 se incorporó al Banco Mundial, donde desarrolló programas de inversión y reformas subnacionales para Argentina, Brasil, Chile y Ecuador. A fin de fomentar una mayor participación del sector privado en el financiamiento urbano, ingresó en Dexia Credit Local en 1998 en calidad de vicepresidente, y estableció programas de préstamo en Argentina, Brasil y México. Desde su regreso a Brasil en 2004, ha trabajado como consultor e investigador para varios clientes, como el Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo y el Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, donde ha sido visiting fellow desde julio de 2014. Ha escrito recientemente dos artículos para Land Lines: “Residential Wealth Distribution in Rio de Janeiro” (Distribución de la riqueza residencial en Rio de Janeiro, enero de 2014) y “Land-Based Financing for Brazil’s Municipalities” (Financiamiento basado en el suelo para los municipios brasileños, octubre de 2011).
Land Lines: ¿Cómo se involucró en el Instituto Lincoln?
David Vetter: Por muchos años, ya sea en mis trabajos de investigación y consultoría, o en el Banco Mundial o el sector privado, encontré con frecuencia información sólida del Instituto Lincoln que me ayudó. Más recientemente, el Instituto financió mis investigaciones sobre riqueza residencial y finanzas municipales en Brasil.
Land Lines: ¿Qué investigará como visting fellow y por qué?
David Vetter: Me concentraré en estrategias de financiamiento de infraestructura urbana en Brasil. Como otros países latinoamericanos, Brasil necesita realizar inversiones sustanciales en forma continua para poder mantenerse al día con el rápido crecimiento de nuevos hogares y reducir la cantidad de hogares que no tienen acceso a infraestructura urbana. Entre 2000 y 2010, la cantidad de hogares en Brasil creció en más de 12 millones, o sea, casi 7 veces más que los 1,8 millones de hogares del área metropolitana de Boston-Cambridge en 2010. Dada esta presión demográfica, la cantidad absoluta de hogares de Brasil sin acceso a infraestructura urbana siguió siendo alta en 2010, a pesar de las considerables inversiones efectuadas en la década anterior. Y los déficits de algunos tipos de infraestructura en realidad han aumentado. Entre 2000 y 2010, por ejemplo, la cantidad de hogares urbanos en Brasil sin un sistema adecuado de alcantarillado creció aproximadamente en 2 millones, que es más que la cantidad total de unidades de vivienda en el área metropolitana de Boston en 2010.
El Ministerio de las Ciudades de Brasil estimó que los sistemas de sanidad básicos (agua potable, aguas residuales, residuos sólidos, y alcantarillado) costarían más de US$80.000 millones sólo entre 2014 y 2018. Las carreteras, pavimentación de calles, seguridad pública, salud y educación demandan inversiones de similar magnitud, y estos montos frecuentemente exceden con mucho las fuentes de financiamiento existentes.
Land Lines: ¿Cómo se podría recuperar las plusvalías de estas inversiones en infraestructura para poder financiarlas?
David Vetter: Los beneficios de las inversiones en infraestructura se capitalizan en los precios del suelo y los edificios. Los foros del Instituto Lincoln sobre instrumentos notables de intervención urbana de 2013 demostraron que muchos gobiernos de América Latina están utilizando eficazmente una amplia variedad de herramientas de recuperación de las plusvalías creadas por sus inversiones de infraestructura, como puede comprobarse en el minucioso repaso de la bibliografía realizado por Martim O. Smolka (2013): venta de derechos de desarrollo; contribución por mejoras para pavimentación de calles, alcantarillado y otras mejoras; y alianzas público-privadas (APP) de recuperación de plusvalías, como en el caso de la estructuración financiera de la renovación masiva del puerto de Rio (Porto Maravilha). También sería útil contar con una cobranza más efectiva del impuesto sobre la propiedad y de los impuestos de transmisión de propiedades.
La recuperación de plusvalías puede generar una realimentación positiva, creando un círculo virtuoso que genera recursos adicionales para más inversiones. Por ejemplo, el aumento del valor generado por las inversiones aumentaría la base gravable del impuesto sobre la propiedad, suponiendo que las valuaciones se mantengan actualizadas, y los ingresos resultantes se podrían usar para financiar otras obras.
Land Lines: ¿Hasta qué punto podrían las municipalidades de Brasil aumentar la recuperación de plusvalías?
David Vetter: Según la teoría económica, el valor generado por las inversiones de infraestructura debería ser aproximadamente igual a su costo. Como la oferta de infraestructura parecería ser poco elástica, debido a las restricciones de financiamiento público, el valor de mercado generado podría exceder en realidad el costo de las inversiones.
Por ejemplo, las municipalidades de Brasil invirtieron más de US$82.000 millones en infraestructura y equipos entre 2006 y 2010 (alrededor de US$16.000 millones por año). Pero solamente en 2010, el gobierno nacional y los gobiernos estatales invirtieron también más de US$50.000 millones. La recuperación de aunque sea un pequeño porcentaje de las plusvalías creadas podría proporcionar recursos de inversión significativos. Por ejemplo, la Región Metropolitana de Rio de Janeiro está recibiendo inversiones de infraestructura masivas del gobierno nacional, estatal y municipal, y también de socios privados, para varios proyectos como el cinturón vial Arco Metropolitano y una nueva línea de metro. Algunas son concesiones o APP que reciben un financiamiento significativo a tasas de interés inferiores a las del mercado por parte de los bancos de desarrollo públicos (BNDES y CAIXA).
Land Lines: ¿Qué papel debería cumplir la recuperación de plusvalías en la política de viviendas?
David Vetter: La inversión en infraestructura crea riqueza residencial, ya que su valor se capitaliza en la venta de viviendas. Las estructuras residenciales representan alrededor de un tercio del capital fijo neto de Brasil en las cuentas de riqueza nacional, como es habitual en otros países del mundo. Dada su importancia, nos preguntamos en nuestro trabajo sobre la Región Metropolitana de Rio de Janeiro: ¿Qué genera la riqueza residencial? ¿Cuánta riqueza residencial existe? ¿Quién la tiene? Descubrimos que hay ganadores y perdedores. Por ejemplo, el aumento en el valor generado por la inversión en infraestructura incrementa la riqueza residencial de los propietarios de vivienda, pero también aumenta los precios para los inquilinos en el área beneficiada y los costos de vivienda para personas que se quieren reubicar en esa zona.
Land Lines: ¿Una política de vivienda enfocada a la generación de riqueza residencial y la equidad de su distribución sería muy distinta de la mayoría de los programas de viviendas de bajos ingresos?
David Vetter: Sería bastante distinta. La mayoría de los programas de viviendas de bajos ingresos reduce sus costos construyendo en suelo de bajo valor. El precio del suelo es bajo cuando no tiene acceso a empleo y servicios urbanos básicos, así que las unidades de vivienda social frecuentemente están en estas áreas carentes de servicios. Una política de vivienda enfocada en la riqueza residencial enfatizaría el acceso a empleo y servicios básicos, que son los determinantes clave del valor de una vivienda.
Land Lines: ¿Pero no es esto una utopía? ¿Cómo podríamos recuperar las plusvalías para ayudar a aumentar la riqueza residencial de familias de bajos ingresos?
David Vetter: Sin duda el desafío es grande. Pero la recuperación de plusvalías de familias de mayores ingresos podría subsidiar a las de ingresos menores, sobre todo a los inquilinos que se quieran reubicar en zonas que se benefician de inversiones en infraestructura.
Le voy a dar un ejemplo. La cantidad de hogares en la Región Metropolitana de Rio de Janeiro aumentó en más de 600.000 entre 2000 y 2010 (esto es el doble de la cantidad de hogares en Washington, DC en 2010). Como consecuencia, los déficits de infraestructura urbana de la región siguen siendo altos a pesar de la gran cantidad de inversiones realizadas. Un reciente estudio de impacto del nuevo cinturón vial de Rio de Janeiro (Pontual et al., 2011) exploró la posibilidad de desarrollar nuevos vecindarios completos, socialmente integrados y con todos los servicios de infraestructura, para albergar a la enorme cantidad de hogares que se esperan a lo largo del cinturón. Este desarrollo podría financiarse en parte con la recuperación de las plusvalías generadas por las inversiones masivas en infraestructura planificadas y en proceso de implementación. Parte de las plusvalías recuperadas de familias de mayores ingresos se podría usar para financiar a las familias de menores ingresos.
El estudio de impacto analizó cuál sería la mejor ubicación para estos vecindarios. ¿Qué instrumentos de recuperación de plusvalías funcionarían mejor en este caso? Es interesante señalar que el sector privado ya está desarrollando lo que se describen como “barrios verdes” en las regiones aledañas al Río metropolitano. ¿Tiene sentido planificar proyectos de vivienda individuales cuando se va a producir un aumento tan grande en la cantidad de hogares?
Land Lines: ¿Las familias de bajos ingresos estarían en condiciones de pagar por la infraestructura?
David Vetter: En América Latina, los criterios de elegibilidad de programas de recuperación de plusvalías casi siempre incluyen una prueba de capacidad de pago. Por supuesto, la recuperación de plusvalías sólo se debería aplicar a familias que estén en condiciones de pagarla.
Land Lines: ¿Cómo respondería a los profesionales de Brasil dedicados a temas urbanos que argumentan que es imposible recuperar las plusvalías por razones legales o culturales?
David Vetter: Si bien la constitución de Brasil concede amplios poderes para recuperar plusvalías, sólo las municipalidades más grandes, como São Paulo y Rio de Janeiro, parecen usarlos. Otros gobiernos subnacionales y nacionales dedican mucho menos esfuerzo para recuperar las plusvalías de sus considerables inversiones públicas.
Ello probablemente se deba, en parte, a resistencia de aquellos que creen que la recuperación de plusvalía es legalmente imposible. Aun cuando la contribución por mejoras encuentra una resistencia similar, Silva y Pereira (2013) estiman que los ingresos totales por dicho concepto superaron los US$300 millones en las municipalidades de São Paulo, Paraná y Santa Catarina entre 2000 y 2010, a pesar de que relativamente pocas municipalidades utilizaron este instrumento. Esta cantidad no es muy significativa para estados de este tamaño, pero demuestra que las contribuciones por mejoras son viables.
Una de las razones por las que las contribuciones por mejoras fueron exitosas en Paraná y Santa Catarina fue que el Banco Mundial y el Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo exigieron medidas de recuperación de costos en sus proyectos de desarrollo municipal desde la década de 1980. Este éxito respalda la idea de que los incentivos de un programa nacional o estatal pueden fomentar el uso de la recuperación de plusvalías a nivel municipal.
Además, hay muchos casos de recuperación de plusvalías que pasan desapercibidos. En la ciudad de Rio de Janeiro, por ejemplo, la venta de suelo excedente del sistema de metro existente se usó parcialmente para financiar una nueva línea completa, y los desarrolladores instalan agua corriente y alcantarillado como condición para la aprobación de un proyecto en un vecindario de mayores ingresos, Barra de Tijuca.
Land Lines: ¿De qué manera podrían fomentar el uso de la recuperación de plusvalías los programas gubernamentales nacionales y estatales?
David Vetter: Una de las maneras sería proporcionar acceso a financiamiento como un incentivo para que las municipalidades hagan uso de la recuperación de plusvalías. El banco de desarrollo de Ecuador (Banco del Estado) utiliza este tipo de acceso para alentar a las municipalidades a usar las contribuciones por mejoras. El acceso a financiamiento se podría usar para implementar una gama más amplia de instrumentos de recuperación de plusvalías, como la venta de derechos de desarrollo y aranceles de impacto, además de las contribuciones por mejoras.
Land Lines: ¿Cómo puede estimular el Instituto Lincoln el financiamiento de infraestructura por medio de la recuperación de plusvalías?
David Vetter: Lincoln ha hecho un trabajo excelente para generar el conocimiento de la recuperación de plusvalías, por medio de investigaciones, foros, programas de capacitación y publicaciones. El Instituto podría ampliar su trabajo sobresaliente en recuperación de plusvalías en la región por medio de más foros y publicaciones, y asesorando en forma directa a los dirigentes políticos en lo que al diseño y ejecución de programas se refiere.
Compulsory purchase, expropriation, eminent domain, or simply “taking” are different names for the legal institution that allows governments to acquire property against the will of its owner in order to fulfill some public purpose. This tool has been used for a long time as a major instrument of land policy, but now it is subject to a number of criticisms and mounting social resistance in many parts of the world. Campaigns for housing rights, movements for the defense of property rights, and legislative and judiciary activism are among the factors changing the conditions under which governments exercise their power of eminent domain.
The current state of global urban development is unsettling and plagued with man-made and natural disasters. In many developing countries, the government does not have the fiscal and institutional capacity to build affordable housing and basic infrastructure for the growing urban population, resulting in a proliferation of informal settlements and slums. At the same time, natural disasters in some of these distressed regions have destroyed homes, roads, water and sewage systems, and other public facilities, exacerbating the already limited basic services available to the urban poor.
In response to these problems, many international aid agencies such as UN-HABITAT and the World Bank, as well as governments, scholars, and practitioners, are looking for new ideas or repackaging existing ways to rebuild cities. This article discusses a long-established land management tool that has attracted recent attention—land readjustment (LR)—and describes how selected elements of this tool are being adopted to assist post-earthquake reconstruction efforts in Chile.
The LR approach emphasizes the integration of the urban economy, city planning, law, and governance with land management to form a comprehensive urban development or upgrading strategy. It requires an interdisciplinary team of experts with different perspectives to work on a concrete land development project. Although many scholars such as Doebele (1982) and Hong and Needham (2007) have emphasized the importance of this integrated approach, some practitioners perceive it as merely a tool to facilitate land transactions. This narrow view has limited opportunities in some developing countries to resolve urban upgrading and development problems in a more comprehensive way.
The recent resurgence of interest in LR is due to the recognition of the importance of coordinating economic, legal, political, and social institutions in the design and implementation of urban (re)development plans. Practitioners are also contemplating the possibility of extending LR from management of peri-urbanization and post-disaster reconstruction to slum upgrading, for example in some rapidly urbanizing African cities. The application of this LR approach to countries where the technique has never been used is still at an experimental stage. Potential pilot projects are being designed, but have not been fully implemented, so further research is needed to test the validity of assertions about this approach.
Challenges of Urbanization
In 2010, about 50.7 percent of the world’s population (3.5 billion people) lived in urban areas (World Bank 2011). The percentage is expected to increase to 70 percent by 2050, mostly in the periphery of secondary cities in developing countries. According to UN-HABITAT (2011), one-third of the urban population in developing countries (1.2 billion people) lives in slums and, despite substandard living conditions, these populations are increasing, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Asia-Pacific region. Between 2000 and 2010, the number of slum dwellers increased by six million annually (Cities Alliance 2011).
Unfortunately, infrastructure and basic service development in most African countries have not increased at the same rate. Cities where sanitation, roads, water, and other services were already underdeveloped have limited fiscal resources and struggle with accommodating the unprecedented increase in population. Two major problems that hinder urban upgrading are holdouts in land assembly and lack of public funds to finance infrastructure—issues to which we will return.
Natural disasters also have taken a toll on urban populations. According to a United Nations estimate, earthquakes, tsunamis, landslides, floods, and volcano eruptions caused economic damage totaling $109 billion in 2010, three times more than in 2009 (Reuters 2011). Cities in developing countries with poor infrastructure and fiscal health are particularly vulnerable and are facing increasing price tags for both post-disaster reconstruction and adaptation to future calamities. Again, solving the problems associated with land assembly and infrastructure financing are crucial.
Conventional solutions for dealing with land assembly problems, such as compulsory purchase (eminent domain) and market transactions, are onerous. With increasing global demands for democratic governance and the realization of human rights to adequate housing, secure tenure, and protection from forced eviction, the traditional approach of relying on coercive measures that take land from owners or occupants for urban expansion and redevelopment is encountering strong legal opposition and public protests (table 1).
Using the market to facilitate voluntary land transfers is also problematic. Holdouts by individual landowners could thwart the redevelopment project and increase compensation costs for land acquisition. In some African countries where market mechanisms are not yet fully developed, unequal access to information has led to land grabs and speculation by local elites. As a result, the urban poor were either forced out or bought out from their neighborhoods and were relocated to remote areas where access to employment, public transportation, and basic services are limited.
To make matters worse, the fiscal outlook for cities in developing countries is bleak, and the opportunities to speed up the construction or repair of housing and basic infrastructure are limited. The 2008 subprime mortgage market meltdown in the United States has had adverse repercussions for municipal finances around the world. The decline in demand for imports in industrialized nations and the tightening of liquidity in the financial markets has slowed global economic growth. As exports to developed countries decrease, income-tax and value-added-tax collections in less developed nations also drop. The reduction in tax revenues exacerbates the already tight local budgets and further undermines the ability of municipalities to repair disaster-damaged infrastructure or build new facilities to accommodate rapid population growth.
Land Readjustment as an Alternative
LR has been practiced in many countries to achieve policy goals ranging from farmland consolidation to inner-city revitalization (Doebele 1982; Hong and Needham 2007). Its basic principle is to organize landowners to act collectively—in cooperation with a municipality and/or private developer—to pool their land in order to accomplish a redevelopment project.
LR is often used to re-parcel land when existing parcel boundaries are in conflict with the current land use plan. One important outcome is that a portion of the readjusted land can be retained by the development agency for construction of necessary infrastructure and basic services. If LR is not used, this land would have to be acquired by the local government, which could entail a huge upfront cost.
In return for the owners’ or occupants’ land contribution to the project, each participant receives, upon completion of the program, a new parcel proportionate in size or value to the original one. The size of the parcel may be smaller, but the value is greater due to land improvements and infrastructure created by the project. In this way, LR generates desirable urban development patterns, increases land values, allocates these increments to the involved parties, and limits displacement.
What is important about the recent interest in LR is its renewed emphasis as a mechanism for building legal and social institutions to govern urban development. The major goal is to combine job creation, land use planning, urban densification, public-private partnerships, and value capture for public infrastructure financing in one comprehensive policy package.
Potential Advantages and Disadvantages
Different elements of this unified goal can be emphasized depending on the context. For instance, in the design of a LR project for urban upgrading in an African city where residents do not have legal property rights, policy makers can legitimatize the occupants’ claims to land and allow them to exercise their right to participate in the project. After land is pooled, readjusted, and serviced, the residents will be invited back to the neighborhood to rebuild their homes or receive an apartment unit with legal title. This is a win-win approach because it allows squatters to improve their living conditions and tenure security, and it increases development densities to enable the city to obtain much-needed land for urban expansion.
LR can also help implement citywide land use regulation incrementally. To ensure that individual LR projects add up to a coherent whole, they must be conducted as part of a comprehensive urban planning process. In situations where local governments lack the capacity to execute a large-scale master plan, related LR projects can be implemented in an orderly sequence and at a manageable scale to put into action a coordinated, long-term development strategy.
In addition, LR can engender democratic governance. The core principle of LR is to build consensus and cooperation among the parties involved in land development. These parties include formal landowners, informal landholders, renters, NGOs, national government agencies, city officials, and private developers. The process entails grassroots mobilization by giving the urban poor real bargaining power to approve LR proposals. Agreement from the supermajority of landowners and renters is required before LR can proceed, thus ensuring that the government (or a private organizing agency) will pay special attention to the needs of the underprivileged groups and avoid confrontation caused by the threat of forced eviction at the very beginning of the project.
Finally, LR can facilitate land value capture for financing local infrastructure and social services. In readjusting the land boundaries, land space is created by increasing development densities. This land space can then be sold in the market to raise funds to defray a portion of the infrastructure costs. This technique creates a clear connection between the development benefits received by landholders and the price that they need to pay to make the program financially viable.
Despite these potential advantages of LR over conventional land assembly methods, it is hardly quick or uncomplicated. LR is particularly difficult to implement in developing countries where public participation is not integrated into urban planning or where there is limited capacity to maintain ownership records and resolve competing land claims. When property owners do not recognize their obligation to pay for basic infrastructure and services, requests to give up a portion of their land to cover the project costs will be strongly resisted.
Another concern is that LR reduces plot sizes, causing problems in many informal settlements where people often rely on extra space to earn rental income or conduct agricultural and business activities. In some cases, urban legislation is often too rigid for facilitating LR. Furthermore, different stakeholders may value real assets in diverse ways, making consensus building difficult. Some see possible improvements in living conditions, neighborhood amenities, social networks, and cohesiveness of community as the predominant factors. Others may make their decision based solely on monetary gains.
The integrated LR approach is designed to target all of these issues by focusing on institutional design and development. It emphasizes learning from past LR experiences to illustrate the importance of local context and enhancing this tool to accommodate a wide range of variables and situations. In addition, future adoption of the technique will search for a good fit rather than a single best practice. Most fundamentally, the design of LR projects must be based on multiple perspectives ranging from political economy and anthropological approaches to legal investigation.
Designing Land Readjustment in Chile
On February 27, 2010, a massive earthquake and tsunami destroyed a large part of Central Chile. Three regions—O’Higgins, Maule, and Bio-Bio—comprising 5 major cities and 45 small towns were seriously damaged; more than 80,000 homes were destroyed, and about 108,000 units were severely damaged (figure 1).
In response to this unprecedented disaster, the Chilean government expanded its National Reconstruction Plan to include new mandates and more flexible policies to speed up its post-earthquake reconstruction efforts. This plan offers four types of assistance in the form of vouchers to affected families: (1) US$24,144 for rebuilding a new home on existing land; (2) US$19,083 for buying a new home in another neighborhood; (3) US$3,761 for repairing houses that were partially destroyed; and (4) a special bonus of US$4,200 if the destroyed house is located in a heritage zone (Ministry of Housing and Urban Development 2011).
Despite this financial assistance from the government, affected property owners are facing two major problems. First, because the reconstruction program gives priority to low-income households, the money provided by the state to middle-income families is insufficient for them to rebuild homes of the same size and quality or in the same neighborhood. Property owners without insurance coverage who want to build a similar house must sell their land and move to another neighborhood where the land price is lower. Those who live in tsunami-damaged areas now considered unsafe for redevelopment must resettle further inland, yet that may limit their access to jobs and public services.
Second, selling their land to finance reconstruction may not be a viable option for all affected residents. Some landowners refuse to sell to private developers who offer a low price because the property is so badly damaged. Others who are unable to sell their land may not have sufficient financial resources to rebuild. This persistence of unlivable houses and vacant lots covered with debris further dampens the private incentive to reinvest in the neighborhood.
To assist the post-earthquake reconstruction effort, the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy and the ProUrbana Program in the Public Policy Center at the Catholic University of Chile (the team) put forward a joint proposal to the Chilean government to experiment with LR.
The Pilot Project: Las Heras, Talca
The team decided to conduct its first pilot in the Las Heras neighborhood in Talca for four reasons.
First, Las Heras was ripe for redevelopment even before the earthquake. It is a middle-class neighborhood with large old houses and a beautiful main square. Good social networks exist among its residents, organized by the church and local NGOs, although its development had stagnated for many years due to economic restructuring of the Chilean economy. The central government was offering Las Heras assistance in developing affordable housing through the national voucher program, and these housing subsidies later became an important potential funding source for the proposed LR project.
Second, the Public Policy Center has another program called Puentes (Bridges) that conducts collaborative research projects with local municipalities, including a preexisting work agreement with Talca, which facilitated prompt support and cooperation from city officials.
Third, Talca has a master plan that allowed the team to design a series of related LR projects to be implemented step-by-step, so it could fulfill the city’s long-term development plan. Preliminary land ownership and demographic information, land use data, and property damage assessments in different neighborhoods are also available.
Fourth, the local government and private developers in Talca were interested in increasing urban densities. Densification provided the much-needed profit incentive for the private sector to redevelop damaged sites, and it could help the local government achieve its objective of increasing and upgrading the housing supply.
Buy-In from All Involved Parties
Following the integrated LR approach, the team recognized the importance of gaining support from the central government. It organized a seminar in Santiago in May 2010 to present the concept of LR and exchange views with top officials from the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development (MHUD). After several rounds of follow-up discussions, the director of the National Program of Housing Reconstruction agreed to purchase reserved land generated from the proposed LR project, thus providing a guarantee for one of the funding sources, and agreed to go to Talca with the team to encourage property owners to participate.
To obtain critical local government involvement, the team travelled to Talca in September 2010 to present the LR ideas to city officials. The team also met with selected property landowners to determine if they might be interested in contributing all or part of their land as capital to finance the reconstruction of their homes and neighborhood. In another visit, some team members also met with school and community leaders, emphasizing the need for broad community support for the project’s success.
The team next began to gather detailed data about the area by conducting a survey of residents in eight blocks comprising 217 lots near the main plaza of Las Heras (figure 2). Team members completed 135 questionnaires over the telephone and then interviewed selected residents. The survey results indicated that 77 percent of the respondents trusted their neighbors, and the majority of them (65 percent) wanted to stay in the neighborhood and were willing to work with their neighbors to rebuild the community. Only 12 percent of respondents planned to sell their property and relocate to another area. This information revealed that organizing property owners for LR was feasible.
Project Design
Because the majority of residents in Las Heras are unfamiliar with the concept of LR, the strategy started with a small pilot project to demonstrate the applicability of this method. The team chose a block near the plaza and proposed three scenarios for combining 8 to 12 sites for LR. The number of lots included in the proposed project would depend on the levels of difficulty involved in negotiating with affected property owners. To facilitate the participation process, the team prepared visual images of what the neighborhood environment might look like after the project (figure 3).
The team also conducted detailed financial and legal feasibility studies for the project. A tentative plan for financing the pilot included a careful calculation of the amount of land that each owner would need to contribute based on the availability of government subsidies, estimated building costs, compensation for temporary relocation, and a projected land price at the completion date of the project. The financial study also revealed that constructing housing units at an estimated future price of US$46,000 per unit would allow the project to be self-financing and provide the developer with a 10 percent profit margin—under the assumption that MHUD would purchase the reserved land to build affordable housing for low- and low-to-middle-income households after LR. It was also estimated that 24 percent of the housing units within the block would be affordable for low-income households. This would help the MHUD attain its policy goal of social integration through the provision of subsidized housing.
The Real Estate Co-ownership Law in Chile requires all participating owners of the LR project to sign a legal document specifying their rights and liabilities. For example, any sale of land held by the designated organizing agency would require the consensus of all participating owners. A legal contract signed by the agency and each participating owner would specify explicitly the number of housing units that the owner would receive at the end of the project and the date of the delivery. The contract would also guarantee compliance by requiring the agency to pay compensation to owners in case of failure to transfer properties in a timely manner and of acceptable quality. The agency also needs to submit the proposed plan to the city. The Municipal Works Department would review the project, approve the building plan, and authorize the transfer of land. The approved plan would then be recorded by the registrar.
Although the research conducted by the team shows that LR is feasible in Las Heras, progress in convincing landowners to participate has been slow due to five key challenges.
First, most property owners are unfamiliar with LR, and there is no existing example in Chile to show how the idea could work. The lack of precedents makes community organizing difficult.
Second, city officials have not provided sufficient support in organizing community meetings or interacting with property owners directly about the proposed project.
Third, many affected property owners who received assistance from their extended families or friends have already relocated to other areas. These owners are in no hurry to rebuild their homes and are delaying the transfer of their land until they receive a higher offer from a private developer or the government. In Chile, there is no LR law that can force these owners to transfer their real assets.
Fourth, not all buildings in the neighborhood were destroyed by the earthquake, and the owners of the unaffected homes are not willing to give up their existing plots for a neighborhood-wide redevelopment.
Fifth, although the survey shows that many owners are willing to work on rebuilding with their neighbors, solving local problems through collective action is not a social norm in Chile. Some property owners have a strong sense of entitlement to receive public resettlement assistance, which contradicts the idea of community self-help.
Interim Assessment
Although the LR approach in Las Heras is still a work-in-progress and it is too soon to predict if the team will be able to overcome local challenges, the project has already generated several observable impacts on Chile’s post-earthquake reconstruction policy (Public Policy Center 2011).
First, LR gives property owners in Las Heras an additional option for reconstructing their homes. Before the proposal, they had to either sell their properties to a private developer and move to another area or take the government’s subsidies and rebuild a house of smaller size and lower quality. LR provides residents with the opportunity to remain in the neighborhood and to attain the highest possible living standard by using their land as capital for home reconstruction.
Second, LR opens a new channel for the central government to work with local communities on reconstruction projects. The main reasons that the LR proposal for Las Heras could go forward are MHUD’s willingness to buy land, provide assistance in encouraging landowners to participate in LR, and give participating landowners the first priority to receive government housing vouchers to finance reconstruction.
Third, the introduction of LR has influenced the government’s overall post-earthquake reconstruction strategy. Through this holistic approach, public officials are designing a comprehensive reconstruction plan to rebuild the entire neighborhood coherently, rather than giving subsidies to individual homeowners to rebuild their houses separately. The MHUD has also invited the team to assist its reconstruction effort in the earthquake-damaged city of Constitución, indicating that the government has taken LR seriously as a viable option for other projects.
Fourth, all discussions among the central and local governments, landowners, NGOs, developers, scholars, and urban designers about LR have engendered an environment of mutual learning and understanding, which in turn is reshaping the governance structure for post-earthquake reconstruction. The involved parties have begun to realize that neither a top-down nor a bottom-up approach is sufficient to generate satisfactory solutions. Cooperation among all interested parties is paramount. The LR experiment has fostered a social discourse that helps all segments of society learn how to solve their problems collectively.
Conclusion
Like all policy experiments, the current proposals to test the integrated LR approach for urban upgrading and post-disaster reconstruction in countries where the idea is new will face uncertainties and challenges. Yet, given the mixed outcomes of conventional land assembly methods in many (re)development situations, LR could offer another option for policy makers, practitioners, and other interested parties to consider.
About the Authors
Yu-Hung Hong is a senior fellow of the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy and a visiting assistant professor at Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Isabel Brain, a sociologist, coordinates the ProUrbana Program (Program of Urban and Land Policy) at the Public Policy Center, Catholic University of Chile in Santiago.
References
Cities Alliance. 2011. World statistics day: A look at urbanisation. Washington, DC. http://www.citiesalliance.org/ca/node/2195
Doebele, William A. 1982. Land readjustment: A different approach to financing urbanization. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
Hong, Yu-Hung, and Barrie Needham. 2007. Analyzing land readjustment: Economics, law, and collective action. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, Government of Chile. 2011. Reconstruction Plan (English version). Santiago, Chile: Ministry of Housing and Urban Development.
Public Policy Center. 2011. Land readjustment project, second report. Santiago: Catholic University of Chile. May.
Reuters. 2011. Cost of natural disasters $109 billion in 2010. January 24. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/24/us-disasters-un-idUSTRE70N26K2…
UN-HABITAT. 2011. State of the world’s cities 2010/2011–Cities for all: Bridging the urban divide. Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations Human Settlements Program.
World Bank. 2011. Data: Urban population. Washington, DC. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL
Acknowledgments
The authors thank the other members of the LR project team for their contributions to this article: Armando Carbonell, Department of Planning and Urban Form, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy; Pia Mora, ProUrbana, Public Policy Center, Catholic University of Chile; Julio Poblete, DUPLA/Urban Design and Planning; Alejandra Rasse, Catholic University of Maule; Francisco Sabatini, Institute of Urban and Territorial Studies, Catholic University of Chile; and Martim Smolka, Program on Latin America and the Caribbean, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
David Vetter (Ph.D., University of California) has worked for more than four decades on urban finance and economics issues in Latin America. He taught and conducted urban research in Brazil for 17 years at the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), the Graduate Engineering Program (COPPE), the Institute of Urban and Regional Planning and Studies (IPPUR), and the Fundação Getúlio Vargas. In 1990, he joined the World Bank, where he developed subnational investment and reform programs for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Ecuador. To push for greater private-sector participation in urban financing, he joined Dexia Credit Local in 1998 as vice president and established lending programs in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. Since returning to Brazil in 2004, he has worked as a consultant and researcher for various clients, including the Inter-American Development Bank and the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, where he has been a visiting fellow since July 2014. He recently authored two articles for Land Lines: “Residential Wealth Distribution in Rio de Janeiro” (January 2014) and “Land-Based Financing for Brazil’s Municipalities” (October 2011).
Land Lines: How did you become involved with the Lincoln Institute?
David Vetter: For many years—whether I was doing research, consulting, or working at the World Bank or in the private sector—I quite often found solid information to help me from the Lincoln Institute. More recently, the Institute financed my research on residential wealth and municipal finance in Brazil.
Land Lines: What will you research as a visiting fellow and why?
David Vetter: I will focus on strategies for financing urban infrastructure in Brazil. Like other Latin American countries, Brazil continually needs to make substantial investments to keep pace with the rapidly growing number of new households and to reduce the number of them without access to urban infrastructure. From 2000 to 2010, the number of households grew by more than 12 million—an increase nearly 7 times the 1.8 million households in the Boston-Cambridge Metro Area in 2010. Given this demographic pressure, the absolute number of Brazilian households without access to urban infrastructure remained high in 2010, despite sizeable investments over the previous decade. And the deficits of some types of infrastructure actually increased. From 2000 to 2010, for instance, the number of Brazilian urban households without adequate sewage systems rose by nearly 2 million—more than the total number of housing units in Metropolitan Boston in 2010.
Brazil’s Ministry of Cities estimated that basic sanitation (potable water, waste water, solid waste, and drainage) would cost more than US$80 billion just for 2014 to 2018. Highways, street paving, public security, health, and education demand similarly high investments, and the amounts required often greatly exceed existing sources of financing.
Land Lines: How could value captured by these infrastructure investments help to finance them?
David Vetter: The benefits of infrastructure investments are capitalized into land and building prices. The Lincoln Institute’s 2013 forums on Notable Instruments for Urban Intervention showed that many governments in Latin America are effectively using a wide variety of tools to capture value created by their infrastructure investments, as detailed in Martim O. Smolka’s comprehensive review of the literature (2013): sale of development rights; betterment levies for street paving, drainage, and other improvements; and public-private partnerships (PPPs) involving value capture, as in the financial structure of Rio’s massive port renovation (Porto Maravilha). More efficient collection of the real estate property and transfer taxes help as well.
Value capture can generate positive feedback, creating a virtuous circle that generates additional resources for further investments. For example, the increases in value generated would increase the base for the property tax if real estate assessments were conducted in a timely manner, and the resulting revenue could be used to finance further investment.
Land Lines: To what extent could Brazilian municipalities increase the use of value capture?
David Vetter: According to economic theory, the value generated by infrastructure investments should roughly equal their cost. Because the supply of infrastructure would seem to be inelastic due to public finance constraints, the market value generated can actually exceed the cost of the investments.
For example, Brazilian municipalities invested more than US$82 billion in infrastructure and equipment from 2006 to 2010 (about US$16 billion per year). But in 2010 alone, state and national governments also invested more than US$50 billion. Capture of even a relatively small percentage of the value created could provide significant resources for investment. For example, the Rio de Janeiro Metropolitan Region is receiving massive infrastructure investments from national, state, and municipal governments, as well as from private sector partners, for various projects including the new Arco Metropolitano beltway and a new Metro line. Some are concessions or PPPs with significant financing at below-market interest rates from the public development banks (BNDES and CAIXA).
Land Lines: What role could value capture play in housing policy?
David Vetter: Infrastructure investment creates residential wealth, as its value is capitalized into housing value. Residential structures represent about one third of Brazil’s total net fixed capital in the national wealth accounts, as is typical for other countries around the world. Given this importance, we ask in our own work on the Rio de Janeiro Metropolitan Region: What generates residential wealth? How much residential wealth exists? Who holds it? We found that there are winners and losers. For example, the increase in value generated by infrastructure investment increases the residential wealth of homeowners, but it raises prices for renters in the benefitted area and housing cost for homebuyers wishing to locate there.
Land Lines: Would a housing policy focused on generating residential wealth and the equity of its distribution differ from most low-income housing programs?
David Vetter: It would be quite different. Most low-income housing programs keep unit costs down by building on low-cost land. Land price is low when it lacks access to employment and basic urban services, so affordable units often end up in these poorly serviced areas. A housing policy focused on residential wealth would emphasize access to employment and basic services, as they are among the key determinants of housing value.
Land Lines: But isn’t this utopian? How could value capture help to increase the residential wealth of lower-income families?
David Vetter: The challenge is certainly great. But value capture from higher-income families could allow cross subsidies to lower-income ones, especially renters who wish to locate in the areas benefiting from infrastructure investments.
Let me illustrate. The number of households in the Rio de Janeiro Metropolitan Region increased by more than 600,000 from 2000 to 2010 (that’s twice the number of households in Washington, DC, in 2010). As a result, the region’s urban infrastructure deficits remain high despite high investments. A recent impact study of metropolitan Rio de Janeiro’s new beltway (Pontual et al. 2011) explored the possibility of developing whole new socially integrated and fully serviced neighborhoods to hold the huge expected increase in the number of households along the beltway. This development could be financed in part by capturing value generated by the massive infrastructure investments planned and being implemented. Part of the value captured from higher-income families could be used to finance lower-income ones.
This impact study analyzed where such neighborhoods might best be located. Which value capture instruments might work best in this case? It is interesting that the private sector is already developing what they describe as “green neighborhoods” in the outlying regions of metropolitan Rio. Does it make sense to plan individual housing projects when such large increases in households are involved?
Land Lines: Would lower-income families be able to pay for infrastructure?
David Vetter: In Latin America, the eligibility criteria for value capture programs almost always include a test for capacity to pay. Of course, value capture should only be applied to families who can afford it.
Land Lines: How do you respond to the Brazilian professionals working on urban issues who argue that it is impossible to capture value for legal or cultural reasons?
David Vetter: Although Brazil’s constitution provides broad powers for value capture, only the largest municipalities, such as São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, appear to be using them. Other sub-national and national governments are doing much less to capture the value of considerable public investments.
This failure is probably due in part to resistance by some who think that value capture is legally impossible. Yet while betterment levies meet with similar resistance, Silva and Pereira (2013) estimate that total revenue from them exceeded US$300 million among municipalities in the states of São Paulo, Paraná, and Santa Catarina from 2000 to 2010, even though relatively few municipalities employed them. This amount is not very significant for states of this size, but it does show that betterment levies are feasible.
One reason why betterment levies were successful in Paraná and Santa Catarina was that the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank have required cost recovery in their municipal development projects since the 1980s. This success supports the idea that incentives of a national or state program can encourage use of value capture at the municipal level.
In addition, many cases of value capture seem to go unnoticed. In the City of Rio de Janeiro, for example, the sale of excess land from the existing subway system partly financed the expansion of a whole new line, and developers provide water and sewerage trunk lines as a condition for project approval in a higher-income neighborhood, Barra da Tijuca.
Land Lines: How might national or state government programs encourage greater use of value capture?
David Vetter: One way would be to provide access to financing as an incentive for the municipalities that use value capture. Ecuador’s development bank (Banco del Estado) uses such access to encourage municipalities to employ betterment levies. Access to financing could be used to provide access to a broader range of value capture instruments, such as the sale of development rights and impact fees, as well as betterment levies.
Land Lines: How can the Lincoln Institute encourage infrastructure financing through value capture?
David Vetter: Lincoln has done an excellent job of generating knowledge about value capture through its research, forums, training program, and publications. The Institute could scale up its excellent work on value capture in the region through more forums and publications, and by directly advising policy makers regarding program design and implementation.